Gulfstream IV in Bedford MA
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That possibility has crossed my mind. However, during my initial maintenance training on the G-IV many years ago, we were told that the hydraulic actuators are capable of producing more than enough force to shear the lock latches right off of their mounting brackets if the associated flight controls are moved forcefully in the cockpit. One reason why the checklist calls for the control lock lever to be released before engine start.
I don't know about the aileron and elevator locks, but there have apparently been several incidents in the G-IVs history of flight crews breaking the rudder control lock by pressing a rudder pedal after engine start with the lock lever still engaged.
Though, that probably would be easy to do, as the rudder has the largest and most powerful hydraulic actuator in the entire flight control system.
I don't know about the aileron and elevator locks, but there have apparently been several incidents in the G-IVs history of flight crews breaking the rudder control lock by pressing a rudder pedal after engine start with the lock lever still engaged.
Though, that probably would be easy to do, as the rudder has the largest and most powerful hydraulic actuator in the entire flight control system.
Last edited by areobat; 16th Jun 2014 at 16:14. Reason: typo
fleigle- JPJP
Do you think that if the flight crew escaped uninjured after the crash that they would be concerned about flap position for an emergency exit ?????
Do you think that if the flight crew escaped uninjured after the crash that they would be concerned about flap position for an emergency exit ?????
Easy tiger. There's no need to get worked up.
To answer your question - Yes, if the crew had escaped the impact uninjured or injured, they may have performed some of the evacuation checklist. Which, as I'm sure you know, often involves a specific flap setting other than the one used for takeoff.
Given the forces involved I think it's unlikely. However, I was curious about the disagreement between the flap settings. Now that you understand the point, do you have anything to offer ? (Apart from banging your head against a wall).
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NTSB Identification: ERA14MA271
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, May 31, 2014 in Bedford, MA
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE G IV, registration: N121JM
Injuries: 7 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On May 31, 2014, about 2140 eastern daylight time, a Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation G-IV, N121JM, operated by SK Travel LLC., was destroyed after a rejected takeoff and runway excursion at Laurence G. Hanscom Field (BED), Bedford, Massachusetts. The two pilots, a flight attendant, and four passengers were fatally injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight destined for Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey. The business flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
The airplane was based at New Castle Airport (ILG), Wilmington, Delaware, and co-owned by one of the passengers, through a limited liability company. According to preliminary information, the airplane departed ILG earlier in the day, flew to ACY, and then to BED. The airplane landed at BED about 1545 and remained parked on the ramp at one of the fixed base operators. The crew remained with the airplane until the passengers returned. No maintenance or fuel services were requested by the crew.
The airplane was subsequently cleared for takeoff from runway 11, a 7,011-foot-long, 150-foot wide, grooved, asphalt runway. A witness observed the airplane on the takeoff roll at a "high speed" with "little to no altitude gained." The airplane subsequently rolled off the end of the runway, on to a runway safety area, and then on to grass. The airplane continued on the grass, where it struck approach lighting and a localizer antenna assembly, before coming to rest in a gully, on about runway heading, about 1,850 feet from the end of the runway. A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the airplane aft of the cockpit; however; all major portions of the airplane were accounted for at the accident site. The nose gear and left main landing gear separated during the accident sequence and were located on the grass area between the safety area and the gully.
Tire marks consistent with braking were observed to begin about 1,300 feet from the end of runway 11. The tire marks continued for about another 1,000 feet through the paved runway safety area.
The airplane was equipped with an L-3 Communications FA-2100 cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and an L-3 Communications F1000 flight data recorder (FDR), which were recovered and forwarded to the Safety Board's Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC for readout.
Initial review of CVR and FDR data revealed that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 seconds before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 knots, V1, and rotate. After the rotate callout, the CVR captured comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 knots during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 seconds after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 knots. The FDR data did not reveal evidence of any catastrophic engine failures and revealed thrust lever angles consistent with observed engine performance. Review of FDR data parameters associated with the flight control surface positions did not reveal any movement consistent with a flight control check prior to the commencement of the takeoff roll. The flap handle in the cockpit was observed in the 10 degree detent. FDR data indicated a flap setting of 20 degrees during the takeoff attempt.
The airplane was equipped with a mechanical gust lock system, which could be utilized to lock the ailerons and rudder in the neutral position, and the elevator in the down position to protect the control surfaces from wind gusts while parked. A mechanical interlock was incorporated in the gust lock handle mechanism to restrict the movement of the throttle levers to a minimal amount (6-percent) when the gust lock handle was engaged.
The FDR data revealed the elevator control surface position during the taxi and takeoff was consistent with its position if the gust lock was engaged. The gust lock handle, located on the right side of the control pedestal, was found in the forward (OFF) position, and the elevator gust lock latch was found not engaged.
The wreckage was retained for further examination to be performed at a later date. The airplane was also equipped with a quick-access-recorder (QAR), which was retained for download.
The certificated airplane transport pilot, who was seated in the right seat, reported 18,500 hours of total flight experience on his most recent application for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical certificate, which was issued on February 4, 2014.
The certificated airline transport copilot, who was seated in the left seat, reported 11,250 hours of total flight experience on his most recent application for an FAA first-class medical certificate, which was issued on April 15, 2014.
Both pilots completed a Gulfstream IV recurrent pilot-in-command course and proficiency check during September 2013. At that time, the pilot and copilot reported 2,800 and 1,400 hours of total flight experience in G-IV series airplanes; respectively.
Initial review of maintenance records revealed that at the time of the accident, the airplane had been operated for about 4,950 total hours and 2,745 landings.
The reported weather at BED, at 2156, included calm winds, visibility 10 miles; clear skies; temperature 8 degrees Celsius (C); dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 30.28 inches of mercury. Index for May2014 | Index of months
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, May 31, 2014 in Bedford, MA
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE G IV, registration: N121JM
Injuries: 7 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On May 31, 2014, about 2140 eastern daylight time, a Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation G-IV, N121JM, operated by SK Travel LLC., was destroyed after a rejected takeoff and runway excursion at Laurence G. Hanscom Field (BED), Bedford, Massachusetts. The two pilots, a flight attendant, and four passengers were fatally injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight destined for Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey. The business flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
The airplane was based at New Castle Airport (ILG), Wilmington, Delaware, and co-owned by one of the passengers, through a limited liability company. According to preliminary information, the airplane departed ILG earlier in the day, flew to ACY, and then to BED. The airplane landed at BED about 1545 and remained parked on the ramp at one of the fixed base operators. The crew remained with the airplane until the passengers returned. No maintenance or fuel services were requested by the crew.
The airplane was subsequently cleared for takeoff from runway 11, a 7,011-foot-long, 150-foot wide, grooved, asphalt runway. A witness observed the airplane on the takeoff roll at a "high speed" with "little to no altitude gained." The airplane subsequently rolled off the end of the runway, on to a runway safety area, and then on to grass. The airplane continued on the grass, where it struck approach lighting and a localizer antenna assembly, before coming to rest in a gully, on about runway heading, about 1,850 feet from the end of the runway. A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the airplane aft of the cockpit; however; all major portions of the airplane were accounted for at the accident site. The nose gear and left main landing gear separated during the accident sequence and were located on the grass area between the safety area and the gully.
Tire marks consistent with braking were observed to begin about 1,300 feet from the end of runway 11. The tire marks continued for about another 1,000 feet through the paved runway safety area.
The airplane was equipped with an L-3 Communications FA-2100 cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and an L-3 Communications F1000 flight data recorder (FDR), which were recovered and forwarded to the Safety Board's Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC for readout.
Initial review of CVR and FDR data revealed that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 seconds before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 knots, V1, and rotate. After the rotate callout, the CVR captured comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 knots during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 seconds after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 knots. The FDR data did not reveal evidence of any catastrophic engine failures and revealed thrust lever angles consistent with observed engine performance. Review of FDR data parameters associated with the flight control surface positions did not reveal any movement consistent with a flight control check prior to the commencement of the takeoff roll. The flap handle in the cockpit was observed in the 10 degree detent. FDR data indicated a flap setting of 20 degrees during the takeoff attempt.
The airplane was equipped with a mechanical gust lock system, which could be utilized to lock the ailerons and rudder in the neutral position, and the elevator in the down position to protect the control surfaces from wind gusts while parked. A mechanical interlock was incorporated in the gust lock handle mechanism to restrict the movement of the throttle levers to a minimal amount (6-percent) when the gust lock handle was engaged.
The FDR data revealed the elevator control surface position during the taxi and takeoff was consistent with its position if the gust lock was engaged. The gust lock handle, located on the right side of the control pedestal, was found in the forward (OFF) position, and the elevator gust lock latch was found not engaged.
The wreckage was retained for further examination to be performed at a later date. The airplane was also equipped with a quick-access-recorder (QAR), which was retained for download.
The certificated airplane transport pilot, who was seated in the right seat, reported 18,500 hours of total flight experience on his most recent application for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical certificate, which was issued on February 4, 2014.
The certificated airline transport copilot, who was seated in the left seat, reported 11,250 hours of total flight experience on his most recent application for an FAA first-class medical certificate, which was issued on April 15, 2014.
Both pilots completed a Gulfstream IV recurrent pilot-in-command course and proficiency check during September 2013. At that time, the pilot and copilot reported 2,800 and 1,400 hours of total flight experience in G-IV series airplanes; respectively.
Initial review of maintenance records revealed that at the time of the accident, the airplane had been operated for about 4,950 total hours and 2,745 landings.
The reported weather at BED, at 2156, included calm winds, visibility 10 miles; clear skies; temperature 8 degrees Celsius (C); dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 30.28 inches of mercury. Index for May2014 | Index of months
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It seems there is a question remaining on the flight controls Gust Lock.
The Gust Lock Handle was in the OFF position. Normal.
The throttles could be advanced and that indicates the Gust Lock was not engaged. Normal.
I’m uncertain what the FDR is recording; where it was getting its info that the Gust Lock was indicated ON? Abnormal.
Many pilots go forward – aft - left – right on the yoke as a matter of habit somewhere before T/O. This report says the FDR did not record a control check. What was it looking at?
If the controls were locked they would not have felt right on the TO roll, would not have “lightened up” as Vr approached. That would have alerted the pilot flying.
It had been a long day, but my conversations with corporate pilots indicate that was not unusual.
It was a night VFR takeoff on a dry runway.
No reason to expect anything unusual. The airplane worked fine on the inbound legs.
They apparently hit the brakes and reversed at about 165 kts, possibly around the 5500’ point on the 7100’ runway and stopped when they hit the ditch about 1850’ beyond the end of the runway.
Pretty skinny looking tires so braking would not appear to be really significant; but they were hard on the binders because the nose and one landing gear sheared off in the overrun. The wheels were probably not turning much due antiskid.
It takes a couple or three seconds at least for the thrust reversers to work.
They did everything they could but something appears to have been broken between the yoke and elevator.
This was a very expensive, sophisticated airplane, with primary and backup systems that had a lengthy and normal history. What went wrong?
The Gust Lock Handle was in the OFF position. Normal.
The throttles could be advanced and that indicates the Gust Lock was not engaged. Normal.
I’m uncertain what the FDR is recording; where it was getting its info that the Gust Lock was indicated ON? Abnormal.
Many pilots go forward – aft - left – right on the yoke as a matter of habit somewhere before T/O. This report says the FDR did not record a control check. What was it looking at?
If the controls were locked they would not have felt right on the TO roll, would not have “lightened up” as Vr approached. That would have alerted the pilot flying.
It had been a long day, but my conversations with corporate pilots indicate that was not unusual.
It was a night VFR takeoff on a dry runway.
No reason to expect anything unusual. The airplane worked fine on the inbound legs.
They apparently hit the brakes and reversed at about 165 kts, possibly around the 5500’ point on the 7100’ runway and stopped when they hit the ditch about 1850’ beyond the end of the runway.
Pretty skinny looking tires so braking would not appear to be really significant; but they were hard on the binders because the nose and one landing gear sheared off in the overrun. The wheels were probably not turning much due antiskid.
It takes a couple or three seconds at least for the thrust reversers to work.
They did everything they could but something appears to have been broken between the yoke and elevator.
This was a very expensive, sophisticated airplane, with primary and backup systems that had a lengthy and normal history. What went wrong?
JPJP
Sorry, I'd had a bad day and a couple of glasses of wine...
However, given the impact I really doubt that there was any checklist reading going on afterward.
I was involved in a serious car collision at a lot less than 100 knots and I was in no shape to do anything coherent for quite a few minutes afterwards.
Sorry, I'd had a bad day and a couple of glasses of wine...
However, given the impact I really doubt that there was any checklist reading going on afterward.
I was involved in a serious car collision at a lot less than 100 knots and I was in no shape to do anything coherent for quite a few minutes afterwards.
Question
I can't recall this ever happening, but what is the possibility that they pulled the yoke back at Vr and nothing happened. (meaning the yoke actually moved)
What would have to break for that to happen?
What would have to break for that to happen?
Last edited by Old Boeing Driver; 17th Jun 2014 at 00:54. Reason: Spelling
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Comments from an experienced pilot on type
Preliminary GIV Crash Report Focuses on Flaps and Gust Lock | Aviation International News
“The position of the controls recorded by the FDR was pretty consistent with where the flight controls normally rest during taxiing,” he said. On this basis, the gust lock theory would seem less plausible........He explained that part of the Gulfstream takeoff procedure includes feeling the controls lighten as air moves across the tail surfaces early in the takeoff roll. “If we don’t feel that by 60 knots or so, it’s an automatic abort,” he added, while also questioning the takeoff speeds mentioned in the report. “At a light [takeoff] weight, the V1 speed of the GIV should have been about 118 knots,” he said, “with rotation at about 124.” This prompted him to question why the aircraft reached a speed of 165 knots before the crew aborted the takeoff.
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This is very, very speculative at best . . .
Maybe their procedure was to swap legs, and the pilot doing the flying did so in the left seat, but the Captain was still in charge.
In my experience one guy flies, and one guy talks, and it seems to work reasonably well. In the military we sometimes changed seats, but not in the airlines.
I seem to recall that the guy doing the flying could always reject the takeoff, although I’m certain this got exciting at times.
(I flew for PAA for years and the first thing any F/O checked out on a flight was the mood of the Captain.)
If in doubt, reject, and we’ll discuss it later.
Both pilots had plenty of time, type ratings for the airplane, and ATP licenses, so they were working at it.
Also, they had recently passed sim checks, so they were up to speed on the unusual stuff.
The lower time pilot was doing the flying from the left seat – I assume.
At V1 everything is fine, at Vr it doesn’t, and when the nose doesn’t come up, you would say “what the H” because this is not something you have ever experienced, or heard of, before.
You have possibly eaten up 4500’ of runway before the other pilot agrees there is a problem and the reject starts. Now you are at the 6000’ feet of runway and shortly realize you are not going to stop on the runway.
We are so primed for a fire or an engine failure, maybe a runaway stabilizer control problem, but I do not recall a control not working at all.
Ailerons rigged to work backwards maybe, but elevators not working at all, is a new one.
Gulfstream builds a great airplane with quite a reputation so we will soon know what happened.
And I think the new airplanes with the fly by wire stuff might lead to more of this, so know where the breakers are . ..
Maybe their procedure was to swap legs, and the pilot doing the flying did so in the left seat, but the Captain was still in charge.
In my experience one guy flies, and one guy talks, and it seems to work reasonably well. In the military we sometimes changed seats, but not in the airlines.
I seem to recall that the guy doing the flying could always reject the takeoff, although I’m certain this got exciting at times.
(I flew for PAA for years and the first thing any F/O checked out on a flight was the mood of the Captain.)
If in doubt, reject, and we’ll discuss it later.
Both pilots had plenty of time, type ratings for the airplane, and ATP licenses, so they were working at it.
Also, they had recently passed sim checks, so they were up to speed on the unusual stuff.
The lower time pilot was doing the flying from the left seat – I assume.
At V1 everything is fine, at Vr it doesn’t, and when the nose doesn’t come up, you would say “what the H” because this is not something you have ever experienced, or heard of, before.
You have possibly eaten up 4500’ of runway before the other pilot agrees there is a problem and the reject starts. Now you are at the 6000’ feet of runway and shortly realize you are not going to stop on the runway.
We are so primed for a fire or an engine failure, maybe a runaway stabilizer control problem, but I do not recall a control not working at all.
Ailerons rigged to work backwards maybe, but elevators not working at all, is a new one.
Gulfstream builds a great airplane with quite a reputation so we will soon know what happened.
And I think the new airplanes with the fly by wire stuff might lead to more of this, so know where the breakers are . ..
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From #167 above . . .http://www.pprune.org/members/75111-brian-abraham
Comments from an experienced pilot on type
“He explained that part of the Gulfstream takeoff procedure includes feeling the controls lighten as air moves across the tail surfaces early in the takeoff roll. “If we don’t feel that by 60 knots or so, it’s an automatic abort,” he added, while also questioning the takeoff speeds mentioned in the report. “At a light [takeoff] weight, the V1 speed of the GIV should have been about 118 knots,” he said, “with rotation at about 124.” This prompted him to question why the aircraft reached a speed of 165 knots before the crew aborted the takeoff.”
I’m guessing the pilot in charge will buy the accident because he did not start the reject procedure in time to stop the airplane on the available runway.
That whatever the problem with the control(s) might have been there was time for a proper reject of the takeoff.
But it will be most important to discover the reason for the question on the flight controls.
Modern aircraft are so good that you only get to try emergency procedures in the simulator, and when something does go wrong in the real world it tends to be something strange not practiced in those sim rides.
I’ve heard some scary stories about flying the rich folks around and some of the tiny airports they fly into. It has never been a world I wanted any part of, but admittedly the newer airplanes look very nice indeed. But the pilot is always the first to arrive at the scene of the accident, and they seldom get a voice in the investigation.
Given the high quality of the crew and a really first class airplane, I would have been happy to be aboard that flight because Lewis Katz was a class guy who took good care of people. Everyone involved was doing their very best, but sometimes Fate decides that isn’t enough.
But that won’t be mentioned in the final accident investigation report.
Comments from an experienced pilot on type
“He explained that part of the Gulfstream takeoff procedure includes feeling the controls lighten as air moves across the tail surfaces early in the takeoff roll. “If we don’t feel that by 60 knots or so, it’s an automatic abort,” he added, while also questioning the takeoff speeds mentioned in the report. “At a light [takeoff] weight, the V1 speed of the GIV should have been about 118 knots,” he said, “with rotation at about 124.” This prompted him to question why the aircraft reached a speed of 165 knots before the crew aborted the takeoff.”
I’m guessing the pilot in charge will buy the accident because he did not start the reject procedure in time to stop the airplane on the available runway.
That whatever the problem with the control(s) might have been there was time for a proper reject of the takeoff.
But it will be most important to discover the reason for the question on the flight controls.
Modern aircraft are so good that you only get to try emergency procedures in the simulator, and when something does go wrong in the real world it tends to be something strange not practiced in those sim rides.
I’ve heard some scary stories about flying the rich folks around and some of the tiny airports they fly into. It has never been a world I wanted any part of, but admittedly the newer airplanes look very nice indeed. But the pilot is always the first to arrive at the scene of the accident, and they seldom get a voice in the investigation.
Given the high quality of the crew and a really first class airplane, I would have been happy to be aboard that flight because Lewis Katz was a class guy who took good care of people. Everyone involved was doing their very best, but sometimes Fate decides that isn’t enough.
But that won’t be mentioned in the final accident investigation report.
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Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS)
Here is something we can all do, or try to do.
I live in Goleta, CA, and my family uses the Santa Barbara Airport (SBA).
(Actually, I’m an 80 year old fat guy with Parkinson’s and flying on anything is not something I consider pleasant anymore.)
They are going to have a Master Plan Public Meeting at the SBA airport on June 26. This will be at 6:00 – 7:30 PM when I like to be comfortable in front of the TV.
There are several major airlines and many business and private aircraft that use this airport.
It has two runways, only one of which 7/25, is suitable for airline traffic and it has deep ditches at both ends.
The airport was built during WW2 in a swampy area W of the city.
Look up SBA Rwy 7/25 on Google Earth and you will see the situation.
Actually, the short runway also has a ditch at one end . . .
In reading the comments on this accident one person mentioned better, safer, use of the overrun.
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/...m?newsId=13754
The ditch at Hanscom that killed some good people and destroyed a good airplane could have been fixed real easy and this accident would be an incident being discussed over a beer by those involved.
A length of concrete pipe in the ditch to let the water find a way downstream and dirt on top of the pipe planted in greenery would do the job.
It would be much less expensive than flying a load of Marines in a B747 to Iraq, for instance.
Take some of the photos of this accident with you and point out that it could easily happen right here in River City, maybe with them on board.
Talking to a Board of this type is sometimes not particularly pleasant so, if necessary, take someone with you that understands the bureaucratic language. Pay a visit to the local newspaper, brief them on the situation, and they might be interested enough to cover the meeting.
Here is something we can all do, or try to do.
I live in Goleta, CA, and my family uses the Santa Barbara Airport (SBA).
(Actually, I’m an 80 year old fat guy with Parkinson’s and flying on anything is not something I consider pleasant anymore.)
They are going to have a Master Plan Public Meeting at the SBA airport on June 26. This will be at 6:00 – 7:30 PM when I like to be comfortable in front of the TV.
There are several major airlines and many business and private aircraft that use this airport.
It has two runways, only one of which 7/25, is suitable for airline traffic and it has deep ditches at both ends.
The airport was built during WW2 in a swampy area W of the city.
Look up SBA Rwy 7/25 on Google Earth and you will see the situation.
Actually, the short runway also has a ditch at one end . . .
In reading the comments on this accident one person mentioned better, safer, use of the overrun.
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/...m?newsId=13754
The ditch at Hanscom that killed some good people and destroyed a good airplane could have been fixed real easy and this accident would be an incident being discussed over a beer by those involved.
A length of concrete pipe in the ditch to let the water find a way downstream and dirt on top of the pipe planted in greenery would do the job.
It would be much less expensive than flying a load of Marines in a B747 to Iraq, for instance.
Take some of the photos of this accident with you and point out that it could easily happen right here in River City, maybe with them on board.
Talking to a Board of this type is sometimes not particularly pleasant so, if necessary, take someone with you that understands the bureaucratic language. Pay a visit to the local newspaper, brief them on the situation, and they might be interested enough to cover the meeting.
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I knew someone who took off in a DH twin otter with the controls locked.
they got airborne and nearly stalled, the captain reduced power and the nose came down, they got things under control and came back to land.
both got time off from the company and the FAA.
DO YOUR CHECKLISTS!
they got airborne and nearly stalled, the captain reduced power and the nose came down, they got things under control and came back to land.
both got time off from the company and the FAA.
DO YOUR CHECKLISTS!
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Investigators Analyze GIV Controls, Gust Lock In Hanscom Crash
Jun 13, 2014John Croft | AWIN First
Recovered recorders from Bedford, MA, Gulfstream incident May 31
NTSB
NTSB investigators say the pilots of a Gulfstream IV that was destroyed after a rejected takeoff and runway excursion at Hanscom Field on May 31 did not perform a pre-takeoff control surface movement check.
According to a preliminary report released today, the flight data recorder (FDR) parameters associated with flight control surface positions "did not reveal any movement consistent with a flight control check prior to the commencement of the takeoff roll." Control surface movement checks are typically standard checklist items before departure.
At the "rotate" speed where the pilots pull back on the elevator control to lift off, the crew discussed "comments concerning aircraft control," according to the cockpit voice recorder. Though traveling as fast as 165 kt. during the attempted departure, the aircraft did not lift off, and pilots shortly thereafter began applying brakes and reverse thrust in an attempt to stop. The FDR showed the flaps to be set at the typical value of 20 deg., although the lever in the cockpit was set to 10 deg.
Skid marks were found on the final 2,300 ft. of runway and overrun area, with the aircraft traveling another 1,850 ft. through grass, hitting approach lighting and localizer equipment before coming to rest in a gully and burning. All seven on board were killed.
The missing check could be significant, as a primary factor or a distraction, as investigators also found that the elevator surface position during the taxi and takeoff "was consistent with its position if the gust lock was engaged." The aircraft has a mechanical gust lock system, which locks the ailerons and rudders in the neutral position and the elevator in the down position as a method of protecting the surfaces from wind gusts while the aircraft is parked. The system is also supposed to prevent the throttles from being pushed to takeoff power with the lock engaged. Post-crash, investigators found that the gust lock handle, located on the right side of the control pedestal, was in the forward, or "OFF" position, and the elevator gust lock latch not engaged however.
The NTSB says the FDR data also showed that the two Rolls-Royce turbofan engines performed as expected, with no evidence of a catastrophic failure.
http://aviationweek.com/business-avi...-hanscom-crash
Jun 13, 2014John Croft | AWIN First
Recovered recorders from Bedford, MA, Gulfstream incident May 31
NTSB
NTSB investigators say the pilots of a Gulfstream IV that was destroyed after a rejected takeoff and runway excursion at Hanscom Field on May 31 did not perform a pre-takeoff control surface movement check.
According to a preliminary report released today, the flight data recorder (FDR) parameters associated with flight control surface positions "did not reveal any movement consistent with a flight control check prior to the commencement of the takeoff roll." Control surface movement checks are typically standard checklist items before departure.
At the "rotate" speed where the pilots pull back on the elevator control to lift off, the crew discussed "comments concerning aircraft control," according to the cockpit voice recorder. Though traveling as fast as 165 kt. during the attempted departure, the aircraft did not lift off, and pilots shortly thereafter began applying brakes and reverse thrust in an attempt to stop. The FDR showed the flaps to be set at the typical value of 20 deg., although the lever in the cockpit was set to 10 deg.
Skid marks were found on the final 2,300 ft. of runway and overrun area, with the aircraft traveling another 1,850 ft. through grass, hitting approach lighting and localizer equipment before coming to rest in a gully and burning. All seven on board were killed.
The missing check could be significant, as a primary factor or a distraction, as investigators also found that the elevator surface position during the taxi and takeoff "was consistent with its position if the gust lock was engaged." The aircraft has a mechanical gust lock system, which locks the ailerons and rudders in the neutral position and the elevator in the down position as a method of protecting the surfaces from wind gusts while the aircraft is parked. The system is also supposed to prevent the throttles from being pushed to takeoff power with the lock engaged. Post-crash, investigators found that the gust lock handle, located on the right side of the control pedestal, was in the forward, or "OFF" position, and the elevator gust lock latch not engaged however.
The NTSB says the FDR data also showed that the two Rolls-Royce turbofan engines performed as expected, with no evidence of a catastrophic failure.
http://aviationweek.com/business-avi...-hanscom-crash
Its been some time since the GIV, but the other possibilities here:
1. Pitch Trim incorrectly set.
The GIV has the trim setting marked on the trim wheels next to the seats.
A gotcha early on was that the original GIV trim wheel had no "green band" marked on it and it ran from -8 through 0 to +18 (or so from memory). If you werent careful (tired and on a dark night) it was possible at light weights (which equalled low pitch trim settings) to set a negative trim value of -8 instead of +8. Most experienced operators always set at least +10 to avoid this trap - thus ensuring that they have at least +ve pitch trim set.
It seems unlikey that experienced operators would fall for this trap, but me, I can still fall for any trap when its dark and its been a long day.
Later GIVs now have a "green band" marked on the trim wheel that starts at +8.
I have heard stories about this gotcha in other aircraft types causing aborted takeoffs when the aircraft didnt pitch as expected when the yoke was pulled back..
As previously said - the GIV yoke floats back from the forward stops to just short of mid point position from brake release with the combined forces of accelaration and increasing airspeed. That was always the final check of free movement for me.
2. Flight Control Disconnect
Had this happen once on a JAA registered GIV - pilot induced. The JAA GIVs were modified with a mandatory PCU disconnect feature. It was a JAA specific mod and not required or used in an FAA GIV, but something to ask is - was this previously a JAA aircraft with the mod not removed?
A CAS message would have appeared had this occurred.
1. Pitch Trim incorrectly set.
The GIV has the trim setting marked on the trim wheels next to the seats.
A gotcha early on was that the original GIV trim wheel had no "green band" marked on it and it ran from -8 through 0 to +18 (or so from memory). If you werent careful (tired and on a dark night) it was possible at light weights (which equalled low pitch trim settings) to set a negative trim value of -8 instead of +8. Most experienced operators always set at least +10 to avoid this trap - thus ensuring that they have at least +ve pitch trim set.
It seems unlikey that experienced operators would fall for this trap, but me, I can still fall for any trap when its dark and its been a long day.
Later GIVs now have a "green band" marked on the trim wheel that starts at +8.
I have heard stories about this gotcha in other aircraft types causing aborted takeoffs when the aircraft didnt pitch as expected when the yoke was pulled back..
As previously said - the GIV yoke floats back from the forward stops to just short of mid point position from brake release with the combined forces of accelaration and increasing airspeed. That was always the final check of free movement for me.
2. Flight Control Disconnect
Had this happen once on a JAA registered GIV - pilot induced. The JAA GIVs were modified with a mandatory PCU disconnect feature. It was a JAA specific mod and not required or used in an FAA GIV, but something to ask is - was this previously a JAA aircraft with the mod not removed?
A CAS message would have appeared had this occurred.
Last edited by ramble on; 24th Jun 2014 at 22:39.
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GIV Pilot Offers Control Lock Operating Suggestions
With NTSB officials acknowledging that control locks are one area of focus in their investigation of the May 31 crash of a Gulfstream IV at Bedford-Hanscom Field Airport near Boston, several active GIV pilots have shared their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the equipment with AIN. On June 13, Gulfstream issued a maintenance and operations letter to GIV operators reminding pilots of the importance of following airplane flight manual (AFM) procedures. “Flight crews are reminded to perform the following as set forth in the applicable AFM procedures for each model aircraft: ensure the gust lock is OFF prior to starting engines (not applicable for G650); check flight controls for freedom and correct movement prior to taxi/takeoff; [and] confirm the elevators are free during the takeoff roll,” said the letter from the manufacturer, which is not responding to media questions about the accident pending the NTSB investigation. One GIV pilot based in Asia told AIN, “Our SOPs [also] say do not start engines with the control lock on.” While the engines can be cranked with the locks in place, this same pilot warned that if the engines were started that way, the safest next step would be to shut both engines down and begin again. He did not recommend attempting to disconnect the control lock once the engines are turning.
Why shut down engines when GL engaged?
With NTSB officials acknowledging that control locks are one area of focus in their investigation of the May 31 crash of a Gulfstream IV at Bedford-Hanscom Field Airport near Boston, several active GIV pilots have shared their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the equipment with AIN. On June 13, Gulfstream issued a maintenance and operations letter to GIV operators reminding pilots of the importance of following airplane flight manual (AFM) procedures. “Flight crews are reminded to perform the following as set forth in the applicable AFM procedures for each model aircraft: ensure the gust lock is OFF prior to starting engines (not applicable for G650); check flight controls for freedom and correct movement prior to taxi/takeoff; [and] confirm the elevators are free during the takeoff roll,” said the letter from the manufacturer, which is not responding to media questions about the accident pending the NTSB investigation. One GIV pilot based in Asia told AIN, “Our SOPs [also] say do not start engines with the control lock on.” While the engines can be cranked with the locks in place, this same pilot warned that if the engines were started that way, the safest next step would be to shut both engines down and begin again. He did not recommend attempting to disconnect the control lock once the engines are turning.
Why shut down engines when GL engaged?
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Why shut down engines when GL engaged?
Last edited by mutt; 24th Jun 2014 at 17:45.
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I believe the FCOM says that if the gust lock is not disengaged before engine start, the flight power shut off valve should be operated to remove hydraulic power from the control surfaces. The gust lock can then be disengaged without fear of damaging the locking mechanisms.
See post #121 for the system diagram.
See post #121 for the system diagram.
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So it sounds like the Engine Shut-Down Checklist – whatever it’s called – mentions the Gust Lock Lever, but whether it is set or not is apparently optional.
But the Pre Start Checklist specifically calls for the Gust Lock Lever to be in the OFF position before starting engines, and the Gust Lock Lever was found to be in the OFF position.
. . . and somewhere along the line, after engine start, a Flight Control Check is called for.
It wasn’t mentioned on the FR, which is not the same as not being done.
And an operator recently commented here that the elevator forces are very obvious as speed increases on TO roll.
Maybe the absence of those normal elevator forces started the cockpit conversation noted on the Flight Recorder about “control forces.”
The Captain was also a licensed mechanic and could be expected to know the systems better than an average pilot. He would know of this hydraulic situation vs the control lock vs engine start deal.
And maybe they did the control check and didn’t say it out loud, so the FR didn’t pick it up?
Both pilots had plenty of total flight time, and time in type, so they were in a familiar situation, in a geographic area they were familiar with, the WX is fine, wind calm, runway dry.
Lewis Katz, the owner, was known to be a man of good humor, and not the type to start yelling at his employees.
I don’t know the airplane; but with the engine’s running, all systems go, including specifically hydraulics, what would keep the nose from rising? What was going on with the elevators?
I would guess the control cables withstood the fire and should help the investigators.
The position of the stabilizer trim has not been mentioned in the official releases from the NTSB.
Were there any delays before departure for any reason? Any deferred maintenance until they got home?
But the Pre Start Checklist specifically calls for the Gust Lock Lever to be in the OFF position before starting engines, and the Gust Lock Lever was found to be in the OFF position.
. . . and somewhere along the line, after engine start, a Flight Control Check is called for.
It wasn’t mentioned on the FR, which is not the same as not being done.
And an operator recently commented here that the elevator forces are very obvious as speed increases on TO roll.
Maybe the absence of those normal elevator forces started the cockpit conversation noted on the Flight Recorder about “control forces.”
The Captain was also a licensed mechanic and could be expected to know the systems better than an average pilot. He would know of this hydraulic situation vs the control lock vs engine start deal.
And maybe they did the control check and didn’t say it out loud, so the FR didn’t pick it up?
Both pilots had plenty of total flight time, and time in type, so they were in a familiar situation, in a geographic area they were familiar with, the WX is fine, wind calm, runway dry.
Lewis Katz, the owner, was known to be a man of good humor, and not the type to start yelling at his employees.
I don’t know the airplane; but with the engine’s running, all systems go, including specifically hydraulics, what would keep the nose from rising? What was going on with the elevators?
I would guess the control cables withstood the fire and should help the investigators.
The position of the stabilizer trim has not been mentioned in the official releases from the NTSB.
Were there any delays before departure for any reason? Any deferred maintenance until they got home?
jdkirk,
The problem is the FDR didn't record any movement consistent with a flight control check from the LDVTs, I guess. See the preliminary report. The FDR is separate from the CVR and position of each control should have shown the check.
Since having the hydraulic pressures off the control paths, is it possible at some time those paths were damaged by an engine start with the lock engaged?
The problem is the FDR didn't record any movement consistent with a flight control check from the LDVTs, I guess. See the preliminary report. The FDR is separate from the CVR and position of each control should have shown the check.
Since having the hydraulic pressures off the control paths, is it possible at some time those paths were damaged by an engine start with the lock engaged?
The main function of the aux pump on the ground is to supply hydraulic pressure to raise the main entrance door, and to fully charge the brake accumulator prior to setting the parking brake. It can also be used to open or close the nose and main gear doors on the ground.