Serious Gulfstream incident in Kerry Ireland.
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I can speak for the G4. You can conduct flight operations without putting fixes or approaches in the FMS. But it s pain in the tail to do so and you lose much of the automation. It doesn't take too long to put the required information in the system to make it work. Not having it increases the workload exponentially.
The Honeywell FMS system in the G4 can be mislead by false glideslope readings. Also it is possible they didn't switch over to green needles. Which also could have given them false readings. When things go wrong it, the more important is it to slow down and take your time.
I would in no way consider India an aviation flag of convenience. I have dealt with them, They could give Britain lessons on bureaucracy. Bureaucracy in and of itself does not make anyone safer. In fact it can and does make it less safe as the bureaucracy tends to keep operators busy jumping through make believe hoops to take care of the real safety issues.
The Honeywell FMS system in the G4 can be mislead by false glideslope readings. Also it is possible they didn't switch over to green needles. Which also could have given them false readings. When things go wrong it, the more important is it to slow down and take your time.
I would in no way consider India an aviation flag of convenience. I have dealt with them, They could give Britain lessons on bureaucracy. Bureaucracy in and of itself does not make anyone safer. In fact it can and does make it less safe as the bureaucracy tends to keep operators busy jumping through make believe hoops to take care of the real safety issues.
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In answer to an earlier question it was VT-MST, operated by Asia Aviation Ltd of New Delhi.
It is a charter aircraft, on their Indian AOC certificate, so presumably should be operating in compliance with Commercial Air Transport regulations and adherance of all cabotage regulations as would be required to operate a commercial flight from Kerry to Luton. Like every other foreign operator operating in Europe doesn't, sorry, does.
Regardless of the safety case, it's about time that the Departments for Transport started protecting their own industries by enforcing the Freedoms of the Air - as everywhere else does to UK operators. This is starting to kill European jobs and operators yet there is legislation in place to stop it.
OK, sorry for the rant and high horse dismounted....
It is a charter aircraft, on their Indian AOC certificate, so presumably should be operating in compliance with Commercial Air Transport regulations and adherance of all cabotage regulations as would be required to operate a commercial flight from Kerry to Luton. Like every other foreign operator operating in Europe doesn't, sorry, does.
Regardless of the safety case, it's about time that the Departments for Transport started protecting their own industries by enforcing the Freedoms of the Air - as everywhere else does to UK operators. This is starting to kill European jobs and operators yet there is legislation in place to stop it.
OK, sorry for the rant and high horse dismounted....
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by enforcing the Freedoms of the Air - as everywhere else does to UK operators.
To all the jealous gentlemen here that think they can destroy us (coorperate flight departments) and thus get the business: no. Won´t happen. Even if the EASA runs as mad at us as JAA did 10+ years ago at you.
Our standards are high, most of the time they surpass the regulated operators by miles. (there are the odd ones too, I admit that, but the AOC holders are worse by percentage)
I have been in AOC ops for 17 years, part thereof as DO, MM, GOM and TM, worked for on contract for 3 companies and did freelance for another 4.
I do fly coorperate since 2007. I guess I know what I talk about.
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Its always easy to look back at events and say point fingers but one thing that I think is worth mentioning is the CPTs statement in the letter months after the incident:
This is not only a load of BS, it is also something that we can all learn from and hopefully remember if we ever end up in a similar situation.
As a Captain it is your JOB to do the "commanding, navigating and correcting what was erroneously compromising the safety of the flight". If you don't not like a job involving these responsibilities then being a pilot sure as h@ll is the wrong job. If the first officer is "falling behind" on what is going on and where you are then its your job to make sure you he gets back "on board" and back in the loop. Get the aircraft to a safe altitude, enter a hold at present position and let ATC know what you are up to. Then SIT BACK for a minute or two before you start rushing in to something that you will regret later. Being within 35 nm from an airport there are VERY few, if any, situations where you need to rush things.
Sounds like common sense and nothing that needs to be "lectured" to professional pilots? I'm sure these guys would have said the same if told in the morning of this flight.....
Good luck!
CP
“Three things that triggered the distraction that derive from this incident are: the windshield screen rupture, the engine vib. and the lack of support from my Copilot, as his situational awareness was diminished and confused by the sequence of events at the time” “In summary I was the only one there flying commanding, navigating and correcting what was erroneously compromising the safety of the flight. Making all the decisions and preventing the aircraft from a worst situation. As I managed to landed safely”
As a Captain it is your JOB to do the "commanding, navigating and correcting what was erroneously compromising the safety of the flight". If you don't not like a job involving these responsibilities then being a pilot sure as h@ll is the wrong job. If the first officer is "falling behind" on what is going on and where you are then its your job to make sure you he gets back "on board" and back in the loop. Get the aircraft to a safe altitude, enter a hold at present position and let ATC know what you are up to. Then SIT BACK for a minute or two before you start rushing in to something that you will regret later. Being within 35 nm from an airport there are VERY few, if any, situations where you need to rush things.
Sounds like common sense and nothing that needs to be "lectured" to professional pilots? I'm sure these guys would have said the same if told in the morning of this flight.....
Good luck!
CP
Last edited by CaptainProp; 1st Sep 2010 at 12:43. Reason: Spelling....
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Yes isn't progress great!
I was always tought to have the return ILS "under the bar" ie 1 flip of your finger and you are in business together with the return NDB tuned up. Please could some one tell me how this G4 thought it was doing an ILS into Luton. Is it that the cockpit is not user friendly or did the crew not know how to use it?
Think I will stick to my Hawkers and get every one to their destinations safely. (Yes that is tongue in cheek)
I was always tought to have the return ILS "under the bar" ie 1 flip of your finger and you are in business together with the return NDB tuned up. Please could some one tell me how this G4 thought it was doing an ILS into Luton. Is it that the cockpit is not user friendly or did the crew not know how to use it?
Think I will stick to my Hawkers and get every one to their destinations safely. (Yes that is tongue in cheek)
PPRuNe Handmaiden
Not being familiar with the FMS on the GIV it is possible the FO "in the heat of the moment" did his familiar routine and selected the destination instead of the departure.
If this is what he would normally do when programming an arrival, I guess (and it's only my opinion) that he did what he would "normally" do.
If this is what he would normally do when programming an arrival, I guess (and it's only my opinion) that he did what he would "normally" do.
The problem here is not the state of registry, or whether or not the operator had an AOC, and nor is it any confusion with the automated features of the Gulfstream.
The problem here is that throwing 2 pilots into an aircraft does not create a crew. Unless the efforts of individual members are co-ordinated and each understands their role, there is no team.
When an F/O believes that 2 minutes after liftoff they are 35 miles from their departure point (a required ground speed of 1050 knots), it shows a lack of SA. When a Captain fails to pick up on this, it shows a disaster in the making.
When a crew member selects an approach for the wrong airport, it shows that he/she is struggling under pressure. When the FMS entry was either not checked by the other crew member, or verified as correct by the other crew member, it demonstrates that this is not a "team" but 2 pilots who might as well each be on different planets.
When a mode selection does not achieve the required outcome (as occurred with the false LLZ capture), it shows a lack of cockpit discipline.
When an abnormal situation occurs, there is usually a task division between crew members, with one pilot flying and communicating, whilst the other addresses the problem. None of that here.
In any non-normal situation, terrain awareness and tracking must be addressed as a priority. No hint of that here.
The fact that an alert controller in an adjacent sector noticed this aircraft in an unsafe environment speaks volumes. Had he perhaps configured his display differently, or "assumed" that the aircraft was in VMC, the outcome would have been dramatically different.
The hinted (by AAIB) post-flight actions of a crew member (implied sabotage of an engine) suggest that something very sinister was going on here, and it had absolutely nothing to do with the comparatively minor inconvenience of a damaged windscreen.
The problem here is that throwing 2 pilots into an aircraft does not create a crew. Unless the efforts of individual members are co-ordinated and each understands their role, there is no team.
When an F/O believes that 2 minutes after liftoff they are 35 miles from their departure point (a required ground speed of 1050 knots), it shows a lack of SA. When a Captain fails to pick up on this, it shows a disaster in the making.
When a crew member selects an approach for the wrong airport, it shows that he/she is struggling under pressure. When the FMS entry was either not checked by the other crew member, or verified as correct by the other crew member, it demonstrates that this is not a "team" but 2 pilots who might as well each be on different planets.
When a mode selection does not achieve the required outcome (as occurred with the false LLZ capture), it shows a lack of cockpit discipline.
When an abnormal situation occurs, there is usually a task division between crew members, with one pilot flying and communicating, whilst the other addresses the problem. None of that here.
In any non-normal situation, terrain awareness and tracking must be addressed as a priority. No hint of that here.
The fact that an alert controller in an adjacent sector noticed this aircraft in an unsafe environment speaks volumes. Had he perhaps configured his display differently, or "assumed" that the aircraft was in VMC, the outcome would have been dramatically different.
The hinted (by AAIB) post-flight actions of a crew member (implied sabotage of an engine) suggest that something very sinister was going on here, and it had absolutely nothing to do with the comparatively minor inconvenience of a damaged windscreen.
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Captain overreacted to a cracked outer pane, panicked, stopped flying the jet, rushed things thereby insuring the copilot had no opportunity to be any assistance, lied to investigators and perhaps intentionally damaged the engine. Winner 
All comm/nav data can be set directly or through the FMS in the G-4. It is quite easy to perform an immediate return for landing without ever touching the FMS. But this was not a situation that required an immediate return.
Outer panes can go quietly or with quite a loud bang. I bet this one let go with some noise and scared the captain out of the sky.
Best,
GC
All comm/nav data can be set directly or through the FMS in the G-4. It is quite easy to perform an immediate return for landing without ever touching the FMS. But this was not a situation that required an immediate return.
Outer panes can go quietly or with quite a loud bang. I bet this one let go with some noise and scared the captain out of the sky.
Best,
GC
Do you have to program everything via the FMS? Can't one simply tune up an NDB and an ILS frequency on an old fashioned control head?
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No, me too.
I was thinking the same thing - maybe its connected to why the Captain had not returned to India? I bet him and the FO had a very interesting chat before and after landing. Superlatives and euphemisms seem equally inadequate ...
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Frankly I am lost for words and I pity these creatures whose crutch is the FMC and whose foreheads are beaded with sweat if they are asked to fly raw data and no automatics in the circuit
Best,
GC
[QUOTE]Considering the damage which was found on the No. 1 engine fan blades, the LP compressor and the HP compressor, there can be no doubt that the engine ingested a hard-bodied object. Laboratory analysis of the impact sites revealed consistent traces of debris similar to low carbon steel (typical of mild steel). Impact marks suggest that the object may have been of round shape with a diameter of 25 mm.[/QUOTE]
Reminds me of the story some years ago of a Citation which lunched the left engine on rotation when the door key passed through the intake. The newbie F/O had unlocked the door for his Captain and closed the door after the pax boarded.
The typical round-headed aircraft door key is made of mild steel and measures about 25mm across!
Circumstances not quite the same, but, Hmmm....
Reminds me of the story some years ago of a Citation which lunched the left engine on rotation when the door key passed through the intake. The newbie F/O had unlocked the door for his Captain and closed the door after the pax boarded.
The typical round-headed aircraft door key is made of mild steel and measures about 25mm across!
Circumstances not quite the same, but, Hmmm....
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Frankly I am lost for words and I pity these creatures whose crutch is the FMC and whose foreheads are beaded with sweat if they are asked to fly raw data and no automatics in the circuit
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Hi guys I think the basic problem is people have lost basic airmanship before the days of the pink line pilots could determine at glance were they were in relation to sector safe altitude .I think pilots are too complacent now and will follow the pink line too much.Always have a plan B raw data maybe I'm showing my age rant over good night.
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How many professionals here really believe that the scenario in Kerry would have happened to a UK AOC company?
More interesting is the reasons why? and part comes down to pilot makeup and overload.
An interesting study compared the human mind to a computer with main memory banks and graphic card memory.
Some of us are lucky enough to have large graphic card memory others are not. The ones with the large graphic card memory can deal with a lot of information on the hoof, can up their game while not having to rely on the main memory banks and have excellent situational awareness while others who have small graphic card memory have to rely on the main computer banks. Feed the computer too much graphics and the thing stutters and freezes.
The one speed pilot is fine in normal situations when he relies on his knowledge and experience but freezes up and doesnt up his game when overloaded with new unfamiliar info coming in and there lies the confusion and bad decision making not AOC v Private.
Yes the AOC guy maybe more controlled and regulated which may go part way to protecting him from getting into demanding situations but that doesnt make him more immune to overload in itself should he ever do so!
We are all susceptable to overload some more than others.
What type was this Captain????
Pace
Last edited by Pace; 2nd Sep 2010 at 13:23.