CRJ crash in Moscow

[FLEXJET]

same for CRJ

Nosewheel Steering
1) 600-2B19 C 1 0 (M)(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Solenoid selector valve is not failed OPEN,
b) Landing gear selector valve is verified
operative,
c) Nosewheel steering system is selected OFF,
d) Take-off or landing is not conducted from a contaminated runway,
e) Flight/Ground Spoiler Systems are operative,
and
f) Operations are conducted in accordance with
AFM Supplement (Operations with Airplane
Systems inoperative).

NOTE: Asymmetric brakes rather than asymmetric
thrust should be used to maintain directional
control as required at low speed end of the roll.

2) 600-2C10, 600-2D15, 600-2D24
C 1 0 (M)(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Solenoid selector valve is not failed OPEN,
b) Landing gear selector valve is verified
operative,
c) Nosewheel steering system is selected OFF,
d) Take-off or landing is not conducted from a contaminated runway,
e) Both pairs of Ground Spoilers are operative, and
f) Operations are conducted in accordance with AFM Supplement (Operations with Airplane Systems inoperative).

NOTE: Asymmetric brakes rather than asymmetric
thrust should be used to maintain directional
control as required at low speed end of the
roll.

Official link :
http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/applica...adair&x_lang=e

[mellowflyer]

Does Anybody Know The Name Of The Crewmembers????

[crjpilot200]

patience

Please take the time and reflect on what happened

and yes Francisco it is our friend and he is in a coma
i lived there ilive there i was there. as he also did folks unless you were there on the runway give it time . some weather some conditions .there is alot to be construed to all who worked there you probably had a frosty with him
time and professionals
a

[cptnrj]

Just to clarify this aircraft was a CL65 'special edition'. New aircraft coming out are called the Challenger 850.
This aircraft was operated by Ford Aero of Moscow.
ACASS did not have any crew onboard the aircraft, and as 'Redmud' says, accidents are not inevitable.
It will be interesting to find out what finally caused this crash but hopefully comments from 'G5 Moscow' will at last have some accuracy to his next posting.

[buger T]

was there an american crew member on board ? if so could you tell me their name ?

[Fossy]

was there an american crew member on board ? if so could you tell me their name ?

Check item 24 & 29. By the way, I don't think this forum is the right place to publish any names

[G5moscow]

whats the matter guys? run out of pants to sniff?

Hey ctpnrj! good to see you guys made an account here on pprune to spread untruths about Acass!!!!

You dont even remember hiring this these pilots? ? Or how about gloating how little you thought you could get away with paying these guys?
Deny all you wish, the truth will come out.
you do it to yourselves,

cheers

[cptnrj]

CRJ Crash

It seems funny that G5 Moscow is more concerned with the presence of a company, rather than the condition of the pilots or the root cause of the accident.

Are you having some personal issues that you would like to talk about Felix, or are you just venting.

[His dudeness]

Was in Vnukowo yesterday, the wreckage still lays beside the runway...Passengers really must "enjoy" the sight ....

Now how are the crew members doing? Sure hope they will recover soon...

Any news?

[PhaFulFal]

Anybody knows where the final report can be found in the Net?
Cheers

[FLEXJET]

http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigat...t_ew-101pj.pdf

Contact them for an english version.

Interstate Aviation Committee
22/2/1 Bolshaya Ordynka Street
Moscow 119017, Russia
Tel: [phone]
Ìåæãîñóäàðñòâåííûé àâèàöèîííûé êîìèòåò / Interstate Aviation Commitee

[Aviaservice]

http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigat...t_ew-101pj.pdf

This report about CRJ100 crashed at Zvartnots airport (Erevan, Armeniya) in 2008

[FLEXJET]

Sorry for the wrong link, here are the 2 official statements regarding this accident.

Translation anyone?

CL-600 N168CK 13.02.2007

13 февраля 2007 г. в 16ч 36мин московского времени при взлете из аэропорта Внуково на Берлин на взлетно-посадочной полосе ВПП06 (курс взлета 600) произошло авиационное происшествие с самолетом CL-600 (производства Канады), регистрационный N168CK (США). Самолет разрушился и сгорел.
Находившиеся на борту 2 члена экипажа и служебный пассажир эвакуированы из самолета и госпитализированы.
На основании Российского воздушного законодательства, в соответствии с "Правилами расследования авиационных происшествий и инцидентов с гражданскими воздушными судами в Российской Федерации", утвержденными Постановлением Правительства РФ от 18 июня 1998 г. N609 и Приложением N13 к Конвенции ИКАО расследование проводит комиссия Межгосударственного авиационного комитета с участием специалистов Федеральной службы по надзору сфере транспорта, предполагается участие уполномоченных государств регистрации (США) и производителя (Канада).
Комиссия приступила к работе на месте катастрофы.


15.07.2009

Техническая комиссия Межгосударственного авиационного комитета, в состав которой входят официальные представители Ространснадзора и инспекции по безопасности полетов аэропорта Внуково, завершила расследование катастрофы самолета Canadair Regional Jet SE CRJ100-SE (CL-600-2B19) N168CK (США), происшедшей 13 февраля 2007 года в аэропорту Внуково (г. Москва).
В работе Комиссии принимали участие официальные представители Канады (государство разработчик и изготовитель самолета), США (государство регистрации, а также государство разработчик и изготовитель двигателей), Швейцарии (государство, предоставлявшее информацию о техническом обслуживании самолета), Франции (государство, оказывавшее помощь в расшифровке бортовых регистраторов).
В процессе расследования проведен полный комплекс работ по оценке летной и технической документации по эксплуатации самолета и подготовке экипажа, расшифровке и анализу данных бортовых и наземных средств объективного контроля. Выполнена оценка фактических метеоусловий в аэропорту Внуково и порядка противообледенительной обработки ВС. Выполнено математическое моделирование взлета самолета и изучены аналогичные авиационные происшествия с самолетами типа CL-600-2B19 и CL-600-2B16 в мире.
В процессе работ по расследованию трех последних происшествий с воздушными судами данного типа, совместно с разработчиком самолета, была выработана точка зрения о необходимости принятия первоочередных мер по повышению уровня безопасности полетов самолетов типа CL-600-2B19 и CL-600-2B16 в условиях возможного обледенения. В результате, 7 марта 2008 года появились две Директивы летной годности № CF-2008-15 и CF-2008-16, выпущенные Transport Canada, которые вводят дополнительные ограничения по действиям экипажа при подготовке к взлету в условиях возможного обледенения.
По результатам всех проведенных работ техническая комиссия пришла к следующему заключению:
Авиационное происшествие с самолетом CRJ100-SE регистрационный номер N168CK произошло в результате потери несущих свойств крыла на этапе взлета, что привело к сваливанию самолета непосредственно после отрыва от ВПП, столкновению правой консолью крыла с поверхностью ИВПП, последующему разрушению и пожару.
Причиной потери несущих свойств крыла при фактических метеорологических условиях (ливневый снег интенсивностью от умеренного до сильного, температура минус 60С, точка росы минус 70С) явилось влияние наземного обледенения, несмотря на проведенную противообледенительную обработку, которое могло быть вызвано сочетанием следующих факторов1:
– недостатки руководящих документов, определяющих порядок противообледенительной обработки воздушных судов при двухэтапной процедуре, что выразилось в возможности разночтения требований по началу отсчета 3-х минутного интервала между первым и вторым этапами обработки;
– неполучение экипажем метеодокументации в полном объеме при подготовке к полету и, как следствие, невозможность правильного определения времени защитного действия ПОЖ и непринятие мер к повторной обработке самолета;
– нарушение маршрута облива воздушного судна, рекомендованного РЛЭ, и невыдерживание рекомендованного 3 х минутного интервала между первым и вторым этапами обработки;
– отсутствие должного контроля со стороны членов экипажа и/или представителей авиакомпании за полнотой и качеством противообледенительной обработки;
– невключение экипажем ПОС крыла перед взлетом, что является обязательным требованием РЛЭ самолета для фактических метеоусловий.
Выступание герметика на верхней и нижней поверхности крыла на величину, существенно превышающую ограничение действующих технических условий, а также начало подъема носового колеса самолета на скорости на 12 узлов менее рекомендованной, снизили запас по углу атаки сваливания.
Существующий процедурный метод контроля состояния аэродинамических поверхностей самолета перед вылетом, наряду с неэффективностью на этапе взлета существующей системы защиты от сваливания, из-за повышенной чувствительности крыла даже к незначительному загрязнению передней кромки, не могут полностью гарантировать предотвращение подобных происшествий в будущем.

Текст окончательного отчета с заключением о причинах авиационного происшествия и рекомендациями по повышению безопасности полетов согласован с официальными представителями всех государств, принимавших участие в расследовании.
Два члена Комиссии, представители Ространснадзора и аэропорта Внуково, подписали Окончательный отчет с особыми мнениями. Суть особых мнений сводится к тому, что авиационное происшествие стало следствием «непрофессиональных, неадекватных действий экипажа при пилотировании воздушного судна на взлете, приведших к … сваливанию самолета через 5 секунд после отрыва от ВПП», при этом влияние наземного обледенения отрицается. Комиссия отмечает, что особые мнения не учитывают всех материалов, собранных Комиссией в ходе расследования, в частности – результатов математического моделирования, которые показывают, что непроизвольное кренение самолета (сваливание) началось сразу же после отрыва самолета от ВПП, на углах атаки, существенно меньших углов атаки сваливания самолета с «чистым крылом», при существенном несимметричном дефиците подъемной силы, который не может быть объяснен ни чем иным, как влиянием наземного обледенения.
Полностью с текстом Окончательного отчета можно ознакомиться здесь.

1Факторы приведены в хронологическом порядке. Определить "количественное" влияние каждого из них не представилось возможным.

[alph2z]

Google translation of Report's chapter 2 onwards till end.

2.
Analiz4
After starting the engine, having received permission to engage in pre-Manager launch, the crew began taxiing (00:09:50 Manager: "Belavia 1834, a preliminary permit, follow the escort vehicle on the main taxiway" D ", a strip 27").
In the process of taxiing on board were transferred to supervisory permission to perform the flight (ATC clearance) (00:10:08 D: "Write down the dispatch permit is allowed to Minsk, on the planned route, after takeoff expect vektorenie originally 6000 feet and 3142 the defendant." 00:10:58 D: 1834, calculated after taking off to go first to the "Sevan", after wiring the line of "Tunisia", asks approach ").
Team Manager to change the route leaves the aircraft CRJ-100 EW-101PJ was due to the presence of two counter-calling to land boards for wiring which has been modified standard scheme out SID (Standard Instrumental Departure).
Rise nose wheel began in 00:17:57 (E: «V1, rotate») at the indicated speed of 139 knots (design speed Vr = 140 knots). Maximum rate of change of pitch angle in the separation was 4.5 deg / sec, which is 1.5 deg / sec exceeds the recommended RLE (3 deg / sec).
Note. According to the operations manual Plane Part 2, Section 7, additional procedures, operation in cold weather, page 07-12-8 have limitations "Do not exceed the rate of separation of the front pillar, 3 deg / sec. Expect and be prepared to be more than the usual initial rate of climb. This increase in speed initial set will not have adverse effects on the profile of climb.
(Flight Crew Operating Manual Volume 2, Supplementary Procedures, Cold Weather Operations Page 07-12-28:
«Don't exceed 3 degrees / second rate of rotation. Anticipate and be prepared to accept a higher than normal initial climb speed. This increased initial climb speed will not adversely affect the climb profile »).
4 Analysis of developments before the implementation of taxi is given in section 1.1.
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 57
Analysis of the previous flight, the aircraft CRJ-100 EW-101PJ showed that the rate of change of pitch angle in the separation was exceeded in almost all flights. Most likely, this is due to the lack of sustainable skills for airline crews, who are just beginning to fly on this type of aircraft, as well as the inability to control this parameter instrumentally.
The gap between the main landing gear occurred after 2.5 seconds at the indicated speed of about 147 knots and the pitch angle of 6 °. The situation at the time of separation aileron was about 4 ° to the left, the position of the rudder was almost neutral.
Moments later, after the separation of the pitch angle increased to 10 °, but the vertical overload despite the increase in the angle of attack up to 8.5 °, a decrease of 0.075g, before it reached the maximum value of 1.2g. Modeling showed that the estimated decrease in lift coefficient was 0.05 units. In the neutral position the ailerons and rudder on the plane began to develop the left bank, to recreate that in modeling need to change the time on the roll -0.03 units.
Despite a further increase in pitch angle to a maximum of 12.3 ° and the angle of attack up to 10.3 ° vertical overload continued to fall. Calculations showed that the fall of the lift coefficient reached a value of about 0.2 units. Initially, this decline was caused by a breakdown of the flow in the ending of the left wing that led to the intensive development of the left heel, despite full right aileron and rudder to the right to 20 °. In the future, the center of pressure separation zone moved up to 60% polurazmaha left wing, which may indicate how the extension of the separation zone on the left wing toward the fuselage, and the formation of the breakdown at the end of the right wing.
At 00:18:04 (within 7 seconds after lifting the nose wheel) left bank has reached values of about 70 ° and there was touching the surface of runway ending of the left wing. At this point, reached the maximum value of the fall of the lift coefficient (about 0.4 units).
After the collision with the wing surface runway left heel began to decrease, and 2 seconds later, he was about 25 ° to the right, with the Sun, first landing occurred on the right main landing gear, and then, with decreasing angles of pitch and roll, as the main left and front undercarriage.
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 58
At the time interval 00:18:08 ÷ 00:18:11 clashed starboard wing to the ground with its subsequent destruction.
In the future, the aircraft rolled through the right wing at 180o. In this position, the plane crossed IVPP and stopped at the removal of ˜ 1050m from the point of first contact. After the destruction of the right plane and the ignition of fuel spilled on the plane was on fire, resulting in aircraft design partially burned.
After stopping the aircraft crew left the cockpit through the break in the fuselage nose and proceeded to evacuate the passengers.
It should be noted that the activation of the stall protection system (SPS, Stall protection system) has occurred already in the process of intensive development of the left heel, that is the main function of the system - warning of the approach to stall - was not implemented. A similar evaluation of such a system was given in the investigation of accidents with aircraft CRJ-100SE registration number N168CK, occurred 13.02.2007 at Vnukovo (see Report of the Commission of Inquiry). Despite the registration of FDR single command actuation pusher wheel, the actual movement of the wheel (and the elevator) at the dive was not that most likely resulted from the fact that the crew applied a considerable effort to the wheel and "overpowered" pusher.
In connection with the described circumstances (significant decrease in wing lift and the spontaneous development of the left heel to 70 ° immediately after the separation of the aircraft from IVPP) The Commission considered the following "technical" version of what happened:
1. Control system failure in the cross channel:
- Spontaneous aileron on the left bank (waiver);
- Spontaneous deviation spoylerona on the left wing;
- Spontaneous rejection of air spoiler on the left wing;
- Spontaneous rejection of ground spoilers (airbrake) on the left wing.
2. Unbalanced release flap, flap separation sections during takeoff.
3. Spontaneous deflection of the rudder to the left, leading to the slip plane on the right wing and, as a consequence, the development of the left heel.
4. Violation configuration airframe and wings (destruction) during takeoff.
5. Nonsymmetrical fueling.
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 59
6. Failure of the left engine which led to the slip plane on the right wing and, as a consequence, the development of the left heel.
Particular attention was paid to study issues in-flight serviceability of the systems failure which could lead to uncontrolled development of the left bank of the aircraft.
Engineering and technical sub-committee in the process of working on the study of the emergency equipment, study the information on-board recorders, croco AP analysis and input from other subcommittees reviewed all versions of the causes of spontaneous development of the left heel, above. As a result of work performed, it was found that contained "technical" version untenable.
At 1-st version - failure management in the transverse channel.
Inspection management system on the plane and the analysis of flight recorder recordings revealed that the control system aircraft to cross the channel was at fault. Ailerons and spoylerony rejected in accordance with a deviation of steering wheel steering wheel. Air spoilers and ground spoilers (brake shields) on both surfaces of the wing in the development of the left heel aircraft were removed. Individual team "Non-consensual position spoilers", "Production of ground spoilers", "control system failure spoilers" on the flight recorder records available. The left heel began to grow vigorously in the neutral position for aileron harvested spoyleronah, air and ground spoilers, and continued to grow at significant aileron deflection (up to 20 º) on the right bank. Thus, the development of the left bank the aircraft is not associated with the work management system in the transverse channel.
In 2-nd version - Issue asymmetrical flap Branch (destruction) of sections of the flaps during takeoff.
Inspection of the exhaust flap was found that the number of turns of the screw propeller-release mechanisms for harvesting the flaps, the mismatch in the installation sections of the flaps at the time of the destruction of the wing was not. Both planes of the wing flaps were set at an angle ~ 8 º. This is confirmed by recording flight recorder and the position of lever flaps (set at 8 °). Individual team "inconsistent position flaps" and "failure of the exhaust-cleaning flaps" on the records available.
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Office of sections flaps on takeoff and was not, as evidenced by their absence on the runway before the plane crashed to the ground. The first fragments of the flaps began to appear only when the plane was moving along the ground on the right landing gear and right wing.
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 60
On the 3rd version - spontaneous deflection of the rudder to the left, leading to the slip plane on the right wing and, as a consequence, the development of the left heel.
Inspection of rudder control system on the plane and the analysis of flight recorder recordings established that the rudder control system was in working order. Rudder deflected in accordance with a deviation pedals. Left krenenie aircraft began to grow vigorously in the neutral position of the rudder and not related to his position.
In version 4 - a violation of configuration airframe and wing (destruction) during takeoff.
Runway inspection found that the first contact to the point of the left wing of the runway is no separated pieces of the fuselage, wing and other elements of its design was not revealed. The first small fragments ending the left wing and traces of kerosene came only after touching the left wing on the runway. The efficiency of all aircraft systems and the lack of ad hoc emergency teams on the flight recorder records up to touch the left wing on the runway shows no violation of the aircraft configuration on the section takeoff and takeoff of aircraft.
In version 5 - asymmetrical fueling.
According to records on-board recorder, the fuel in the tanks before the spontaneous development of heel as follows:
- In the left wing of the plane - 2004 kg;
- The right wing of the plane - 1967 kg;
- In the central tank - 726 kg.
Thus, the difference in the amount of fuel in the right-and left-wing planes was only 37 kg and could cause spontaneous development of the roll of the aircraft.
In version 6 - the refusal of the left engine which led to the slip plane on the right wing and, as a consequence, the development of the left heel.
In the course of the investigation found that in an emergency flight, both engines were undamaged and able to work until the plane crashed to the ground.
As a result of transcripts onboard recorder (FDR) of single commands indicating, for engine failure is not fixed, rotor speed, the temperature of exhaust gases, instantaneous fuel consumption of both engines consistently match the settings take-off thrust to the moment of collision of AC with the land, that is, the development of the left heel associated with the engines. The Interstate Aviation Committee
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 61
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Thus, the results of the analysis, troubleshooting in aircraft and engines, which could lead to intense kreneniyu aircraft have been identified.
As mentioned in section 1.18.1, for the period of operation of aircraft type CL-600-2B19 and CL-600-2B16 with them, there were several air accidents, the circumstances are similar to the facts of this incident. In all these cases it was found that immediately after separation from the runway the plane went on the regime Stalling intensive unmanageable kreneniem and further clashes with the ground. Dumping occurred before activation of the appropriate warning lights, with significant loss of load-bearing properties of the wing and at angles of attack, a much smaller angle of attack stall aircraft type with a "clean" (not contaminated), the wing received in flight testing. Weather conditions in all cases fall within the definition of Cold Weather Operations. All completed investigations it was found that the "pollution" the leading edge of the wings (frost, snow, etc.) is one of the major factors that led to the accident.
Dynamics behavior of aircraft in this case is typical for stalling in carrying out the take-off from the "contaminated" wing.
The possibility of fuel obledeneniya5 on the surfaces of aircraft wing-type CRJ100 during his stay in Zvartnots airport at the actual weather conditions, after his flight corridors in a large negative temperature, essentially confirmed by experiments conducted by the Commission at the field stage.
According to records on-board recorder after landing at the airport Zvartnots in the left half-wing aircraft were 1450kg of fuel, and in the right - 1480kg. In RLE p. 07-12-7 record that if the remaining fuel in the half-wing is more than 1042kg, the fuel when parked on the ground touches the upper shell of the wing (in the wing root).
Note.
According to the operations manual Plane Part 2, Section 7, additional procedures, operation in cold weather, str.07-12-7 has the following information for pilots:
C. Education transparent ice because of the low
5 The fuel icing, in this case refers to protrusion of frost due to the difference in temperature between the cold fuel remaining in the tanks after landing and the outside air temperature at the airport, where she was parking the aircraft (see also section 1.16.3).
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 62
temperature of the fuel.
Pilots should be aware of the effect, which can occur as a result of the low temperature fuel in the tanks on the moisture present in the upper and lower wing surface. At 0 ° C and below the formation of clear ice on the surface of the wing, even at positive temperatures.
If the amount of fuel in the tank on the wing of more than 1042 kg (2,297.2 pounds), fuel comes into contact with the upper surface of the wing. When fuel temperature 0 ° C and below and at high ambient humidity or if there is visible moisture in any form, pilots should ensure that there is ice on the upper wing surface, checking his hand (tactile). If icing is necessary to make the anti-icing treatment.
D. Education frost because of the cooled fuel
Frost the top and bottom surfaces of the wing may be formed as a result of contact with the chilled fuel even at temperatures much above 0 ° C. Rime of the upper wing surface must be removed.
Allowed to take off with the below mentioned number of frost in the bottom of the fuel tank on the wing:
- A maximum of 3mm (1 / 8 inch) thick.
(Flight Crew Operation Manual Volume 2, Supplementary Procedures, Cold Weather Operations, Page 07-12-7:
C. Clear Ice Due to Cold Fuel
Pilots must be aware of the effect that cold fuel in the tanks may have on moisture present on the wing upper and lower surfaces. If fuel temperature is 0 º C or below, it is possible to have clear ice on the wing with the temperature above freezing.
If left or right wing fuel content exceeds 1042,0 kg (2297,2 lb), the fuel will be in contact with the upper wing skin. If the fuel temperature is 0 º C or below and a high humidity condition exists or visible moisture in any form is present, pilots must ensure that the wing upper surface is free of clear ice by means of a tactile
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 63
(touch) check. Clear ice must be removed.
D. Frost Due to Cold Soaked Fuel
Wing frost caused by cold soaked fuel can form on the upper and lower surfaces of the wing even at temperatures significantly above freezing. Frost on the upper surface of the wing must be removed.
Take-off with the following accumulation of frost, due to cold soaked fuel, on the underside of the wing fuel tank area is permissible:
• Maximum 3 mm (1 / 8 inch) layer of frost.
The greater the amount of fuel in the half-wing compared to the declared value (1042kg), the greater the contact zone of fuel from the upper skin of the wing. Thus, after landing chilled fuel contacted with a significant part of the surface of the upper shell of the wing.
After landing, the plane stayed on the ground more than 2 hours. Air temperature in this period was minus 3 °, and the dew point temperature - minus 4 °.
On the surface of any object located in these atmospheric conditions and has a temperature below minus 4 ° (below the dew point), starts to separate condensate. At negative temperatures of the surrounding air condensation on the surface of precipitates in the form of frost.
As shown by the experiment described in section 1.16.3. Fuel temperature after planting was lower than minus 12 ° C. Consequently, immediately after landing, the frost began to precipitate not only on the bottom, but also in the top casing of the wing in the contact zone with the fuel sheathing .
After refueling in the amount of 2,130 kg with ambient temperature (minus 3 °), the fuel temperature after mixing, in the circumstances amounted to an estimated no higher than minus 8 °, which is below the dewpoint of 4 °.
In this case the wing fuel tanks were almost completely filled with fuel, and the contact area between the upper shell of the wing with cold fuel has increased.
Thus, when the aircraft parked at the airport Zvartnots were the conditions for the formation of frost fuel, including on the upper surface of the wing. Thus the root of the upper casing wing frost formed from the moment of landing until its take-off and could reach a significant magnitude.
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 64
The fact that the frost on the wing to take off the plane 14.02.2008g was evidenced by the fact the aircraft stall at angles of attack, much smaller critical angles of attack for an aircraft with a "clean" wing. Other causes of stalling the aircraft is not there.
Note.
As noted above, anti-icing treatment to address the crew was not carried out because his explanation of the need for this was not.
A survey of the cabin crew on-site accident, it was found that the control panel, anti-icing system (Anti-ice panel) switch heating Wing (Wing anti-ice) was in the OFF position (OFF). This is also confirmed by the absence of records FDR single commands include heating the wing (Wing anti-ice - ON) and explanations of the crew.
Manual operation of the aircraft flying in the "Limitations" (Limitations) contains the mandatory inclusion of POS wing before take-off when the ambient air temperature plus 5 ° (41F) or below and in the presence of visible moisture in any form (mist (fog) with a visibility of 1500 meters or less, rain, snow, snow pellets and ice crystals).
Note.
In accordance with the definitions of "Types of current weather (Table 2-5, ICAO Doc 8896" Manual for Aeronautical Meteorology, "Seventh Edition - 2006) distinguish between two types of shading (hydrometeor): mist (fog), is reported when visibility is 1000 meters or less ; mist (mist) - is reported when visibility is at least 1000, but no more than 5000 m. Thus, the use in the operations manual of the term mist (fog) in combination with a scope which does not coincide with the definition of ICAO, may lead to incorrect interpretation of the applicability of the restrictions.
In line with the forecast of the aerodrome Zvartnots from 21:00 to 06:00 forecasted visibility 3500 meters, haze, scattered clouds (3-4 octant) at 600 m, large (5-7 octants) at 3000 m, at times from 21:00 to 06:00 visibility of 200 m, snow, freezing fog, vertical visibility of 30 m.
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 65
The actual weather at the airfield Zvartnots for 00:00 (the same as the weather was contained in the ATIS information received by the crew): 3500 visibility, haze, clouds small (1-2 octant) at 780 m, scattered (3-4 octant) in 3000 m, air temperature - 3 ° C, dew point temperature - 4 ° C.
Thus, the formal grounds (the requirement RLE), the crew did not need to include the PIC wing before takeoff. However, given that the weather forecast contains information about the possibility of freezing fog, and other information which indicate the presence of moisture, the decision of a competent crew would use (inclusion) PIC wing before takeoff. This is confirmed by the fact that after the accident March 7, 2008 by Transport Canada had issued two airworthiness directives ? CF-2008-15 and ? CF-2008-16, which imposed additional restrictions on the actions of the crew in preparation for take-off in conditions of possible icing. These guidelines, including the call for the inclusion of the PIC wing at the final stage of taxiing at an ambient temperature +5 ° C and below in the absence of processing of aircraft deicing fluid.
At the same time at the request of IAC Aviation Register, for aircraft operated by the certificate such as the MAC, given the additional restriction on compulsory treatment of aircraft deicing fluid at a temperature of +5 ° C and below, as well as the mandatory use of the PIC of the wing during take-off in these conditions in accordance with the recommendations of the developer .
Used by the crew (his words) methods of visual and tactile control of the aircraft (the surface of the wing, fuselage, empennage, etc.) were not effective. Applicable procedural methods that require the crew to take into account many different factors in the subjective assessment of the cleanliness of the surface of the wing (as the most critical element) can not guarantee 100% prevention of accidents during takeoff due to icing. Therefore, continued relevance of the recommendations issued by AAIB UK following an investigation into an aircraft accident in Birmingham, where certification bodies were invited to "review the current procedures for monitoring the state of pre-BC in the presence of ice, and to consider a requirement to equip the Sun system of aerodynamic control surfaces on the subject icing and issuing warnings to the crew in the presence of danger. " This recommendation is not implemented.
The Interstate Aviation Committee
Final Report CL-600-2B19 EW-101PJ 66
It is advisable to implement the above recommendation to amend the schedule of the preflight preparation technological plane in order to establish an additional inspection and assessment of the surface of the aircraft for a time to take a final decision on the surfaces are clean and appropriate treatment (or re-icing of aircraft handling).

[alph2z]

3.
Conclusion
Accident to an aircraft CRJ-100LR registration number EW-101PJ was the result of an asymmetric loss of bearing properties of the wing during take-off, which led to the toppling of the aircraft immediately after separation from the runway, touching the left wing panel on the underlying surface, the subsequent destruction and fire.
The reason for the loss of load-bearing properties of the wing at the actual weather conditions, was the formation of frost, which "pollute" the surface of the wing. The cause of formation of frost, most likely, was the fuel obledenenie6, during the aircraft parking at the airport and taxiing to the return flight, resulting in a difference in temperature of the surrounding air and cold fuel in the tanks after the flight corridors.
Exceeding the recommended RLE values of the angular velocity during lifting nose wheel during takeoff from the "contaminated" wing when it is impossible to control this parameter instrumentally could aggravate the situation.
Existing procedural methods of control of the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency, during takeoff, the existing system of protection from stalling due to increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of similar accidents in future.
Airworthiness Directive on the need to include the PIC wing in the final stage taxiing at the actual weather conditions were issued by Transport Canada after the accident. Inclusion crew PIC-wing anti-icing before take-off and processing BC, probably could have prevented the accident.

4.
The deficiencies identified during the investigation
During the investigation it was found that the RUE NAC Belavia is not carried out monitoring of the piloting technique and analysis of the available variance in the performance requirements of RLE planes using the means of collecting flight information as well as basic business has its own technical resources and expertise to perform work on parametric decoding and audio recorders that are equipped aircraft. Accordingly, prevention of errors made by crews in their development of new aircraft with integrated means of objective control difficult. Question must be addressed.
Pilots, engineers and technical staff RUE NAK "Belavia" insufficiently trained on the specifics of anti-icing protection of aircraft of type CRJ-100/200 for operation in ground icing conditions, which does not comply with the recommendations of the ICAO Manual on Anti-icing of aircraft on the ground (Doc 9640 -AN/940, Second Edition-2000).

5.
Recommendations for improving safety
5.1.
From pilots, engineers and technical staff, operating the CRJ100 aircraft of various types of modifications, to undertake special reviews of research on the circumstances and causes of the accident with the aircraft EW-101PJ.
5.2.
With crews to fly on airplanes of this type:
•
hold classes on aerodynamic characteristics of aircraft c emphasis on the possibility of falling into the mode of stalling on takeoff in conditions not fulfill the concept of "clean wing" especially during the cold temperatures. In studies using material of an educational film released by the company-developer of the aircraft. Extend the holding of such a study in preparation for the operation in the autumn-winter period;
•
draw attention to the implementation of the RLE in the plane of the inclusion of the PIC wing before takeoff.
5.3.
Transport Canada, other certifying organizations and developer of aircraft:
•
revise the current procedural approach to the detection of icing and control to eliminate it before it takes off, and consider introducing a requirement to equip the system automatically detect the dangerous level of ground ice and the issuance of the relevant information to the crew of the types of aircraft, aerodynamic characteristics are most negatively impacted by land-ice;
•
consider amending the RLE (AFM / FCOM) of bringing the concept of "fog" in line with those of ICAO;
•
together with the developer to consider the need for aircraft doponitelnyh wind tunnel tests to determine the impact of "fuel icing (when frost or ice formed only in places of contact of fuel with the upper and lower surfaces of the wing) on nesuschnie properties of the wing.
5.4.
Ministry of Transport and Communications of Belarus jointly with the relevant customs authorities:
•
consider the acceleration of customs clearance of import of spare parts for C operations of foreign proceedings that are in the register of civil Sun Republic of Belarus.

5.5.
RUE NAK "Belavia":
•
consider changing the process schedule for the preparation for take-off planes CRJ-100LR to ensure the crews re-monitoring the state of the surface of the aircraft before departure;
•
arrange for a systematic interpretation of flight information, analysis and control of flying technique, especially for the crews of a small raid or who are at the stage of development of this type of technology;
•
conduct additional training for pilots, engineers and technical staff of airline practices and remedies entirely from ground-based icing.

[alph2z]

google translation to english (posted by FLEXJET)



February 13, 2007 at 16h 36min Moscow time during take-off from Vnukovo airport in Berlin on the runway VPP06 (the rate rise of 600) came from the accident airplane CL-600 (manufactured in Canada), registration N168CK (U.S.). The plane disintegrated and burned.
Were on board the 2 crew members and service passengers evacuated from the plane and were hospitalized.
Based Rossiyskogo air legislation, in accordance with the Rules of the investigation of accidents and incidents involving civil aircraft in Russia, "approved by RF Government Decree of 18 June 1998 N609 and N13 Annex to the ICAO Convention, the Investigation Commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee, with the participation Specialists of the Federal Service for Supervision of transport, the participation of commissioners of registration (USA) and producer (Canada).
The Commission began work on the site of the accident.


15/07/2009

The Technical Commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee, comprising officials Rostransnadzor and inspection of safety Vnukovo Airport, completed its investigation of the crash Canadair Regional Jet SE CRJ100-SE (CL-600-2B19) N168CK (USA), which occurred February 13, 2007 in Vnukovo (Moscow).
In the work of the Commission attended the official representatives of Canada (state developer and manufacturer of aircraft), U.S. (State of incorporation, as well as state developer and manufacturer of engines), Switzerland (the state, provides information on aircraft maintenance), France (state rendering aid in decoding board recorders).
In the course of investigation in a full complex of works on assessment of flight and technical documentation for aircraft maintenance and crew training, decoding and analysis of airborne and ground-based objective control. Completed assessment of actual weather conditions at Vnukovo Airport and order processing icing Sun Mathematical modeling of plane takes off and studied similar accidents with aircraft-type CL-600-2B19 and CL-600-2B16 in the world.
During the work to investigate the three recent incidents involving aircraft of this type, together with the developer of the aircraft, was worked out view of the need for urgent measures to improve safety of aircraft type CL-600-2B19 and CL-600-2B16 in terms of possible icing . As a result, 7 March 2008 there were two Airworthiness Directive № CF-2008-15 and CF-2008-16, issued by Transport Canada, which impose additional restrictions on the actions of the crew in preparation for take-off in terms of possible icing.
The results of all the technical work carried out by the committee came to the following conclusion:
Accident with an aircraft CRJ100-SE registration number N168CK occurred as a result of loss bearing properties of the wing during take-off, which led to the toppling of the aircraft immediately after separation from the runway, a clash of right-wing panel with the surface of IVPP, and the subsequent destruction of the fire.
The reason for the loss of load-bearing properties of the wing with the actual weather conditions (torrential snow intensity from mild to severe, the temperature of minus 60C, dew point of minus 70C) was the influence of ground ice, despite the anti-icing process, which could be caused by a combination of the following faktorov1:
- Shortcomings in the guidance documents governing the treatment of de-icing of aircraft during a two-step procedure, resulting in a possible discrepancy requirements for the top frame 3-minute interval between the first and second phases of treatment;
- Failure to obtain a crew meteodokumentatsii in full in preparing for the flight and, consequently, the inability to properly determine the time of protective action of the AMPs and the failure to re-processing of the aircraft;
- Violation of the route spraying aircraft, as recommended RLE, and nevyderzhivanie recommended 3 x minute interval between the first and second phases of processing;
- Lack of proper control by crew members and / or representatives of airlines for completeness and quality of anti-icing treatment;
- Failure to include the crew of the PIC wing before takeoff, which is a mandatory requirement RLE aircraft for actual weather conditions.
Protrusion of sealant on the upper and lower wing surface by an amount substantially exceeding the limitation of the existing technical conditions, as well as the beginning of lifting the aircraft nose wheel at a speed of 12 knots less than the recommended reduced the margin of the angle of attack stall.
Existing procedural methods of control of the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the ineffectiveness during take-off of the existing system of protection from stalling due to increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of similar accidents in future.

The text of the final report with the conclusion about the causes of the accident and recommendations for improving safety agreed with officials of all states participating in the investigation.
Two members of the Commission, representatives Rostransnadzor and Vnukovo, signed a final report with dissenting opinions. The essence of the dissenting opinions is to ensure that the accident was caused by "unprofessional, inappropriate actions of the crew when piloting an aircraft on takeoff, leading to the toppling of the plane ... in 5 seconds after lift-off from the runway, while the influence of ground ice is denied. The Commission notes that the dissenting opinions do not account for all materials collected by the Commission during the investigation, in particular - the results of mathematical modeling, which show that the rolling off of the aircraft (stall) began immediately after the separation of the aircraft from the runway, at angles of attack significantly smaller angles Stalling attack aircraft with "clean wing", with a significant deficit of asymmetric lift force that can not be explained any more than the influence of ground ice.
The full text of the final report can be found here.

1Faktory listed in chronological order. Determine the "quantitative" effect of each of them has not been possible.

[thomi1968]

that speaks for itself......

Original extract from the accident investigation report:


Crew information:
Capt.: (Instructor Pilot.......)

Despite multiple requests by both MAK and NTSB Mr. Goswami refused to provide additional information that would have assisted in the investigation of this accident. ..........
..............Later after the medical treatment, they were checked out to for further rehabilitation at home. Mr. A.V. Goswami and his relatives left Moscow for the USA.


Copilot: (as well CPT on CRJ)

NB: The analysis of the documents confirming K.G.Sannikov’s pilot’s qualification has shown cases of forgery concerning his total flying experience, which led to corrupted data with increased by over 1300 hours flying experience and decreased break in flying after the flight school. Actually K.G.Sannikov had a break in flying of over 5 years. According to Russian Civil Aviation regulations, to resume flying as a co-pilot of An-24 he should have taken complete initial training, which was not done. Accordingly, when K.G.Sannikov was retrained for CRJ100-SE, the information submitted about his previous flying experience was not true.



that speaks for itself........


i have the investigation report in English from the BBD CIC website....

if anybody is interested, please pm me

[bluefishbeagle]

I am interested in the English version. The captain was an F/O when I flew with him in the CRJ at a Regional Airline prior to his job in the accident aircraft. Glad to finally hear they are OK. He was relatively low time in the seat and total time. Moscow winter time is a tough enviornment.

Captain had to have extra sim sessions as a new hire F/O. He later upgraded to Captain and then left to fly Corp CRJ's. He had friends in HR and Corportate. Scheduling gave him extra favors on trips and swaps etc. Nice guy but needed more experience IMO.

[GIIICapt]

CRJ Crash at UUWW

Actually this was a CRJ 200 that had been converted for corporate use. It was formerly owned by Fun Air from Florida. Fun Air is owned by the CEO of Carnival Cruise Lines. It was previously registered as N305CC.

I had just landed in a heavy snow storm in the Falcon 900B that I was flying out of UUWW. My F/O was friends with one of the crew and we spoke a bit before they took off.

They had a nosewheel steering failure and were ferrying the aircraft to Berlin for maintenance.

My F/O told me that he visited his friend in the hospital a few days after the crash. His friend told him that the Captain apparently rotated prior to VR and all upon breaking the ground, all hell broke loose.

They obviously stalled and rolled the aircraft, landing upside down next to the runway.

It's possible that there hold over time had expired too. It was snowing very heavily at the time they taxiied out and in Vnukovo the taxi can be quite long.