Dowding Vs Leigh-Mallory
As I understood it the OP was looking for a modern take on what occurred over 80 years ago?
It seems to me that, at this remove, a certain amount of nuance of the times will necessarily be lost. While there has been plenty written about these people most of what we know today is merely author's interpretation, indignation, or aggrandizement, interspersed with a few hard facts. To even begin to fully understand the undercurrents at work I think one would need to totally immerse oneself in the era for a good length of time, and be armed with a lot of original source data - not just latter day books.
That said, like many here the names of these men were familiar to even me a small child, and I am always keen to learn more from genuinely original views. FlightlessParrot's post is one that I gained something from, and while I may seem a little disparaging about contemporary historical accounts the book references are also useful, thank you.
For me, while I like to contribute where I can, I don't think there's a lot I can say here, except that in re-reading accounts of the four or five main protagonists last night I was taken by the similarity in ages between all but one. Park, Leigh-Mallory and Harris were born in 1892, Portal and [Sholto] Douglas in 1893. Dowding of course was ten years older. In itself this is minutiae, but I wonder if it could have had bearing on interaction between the individuals, and their appreciation by others involved?
Otherwise, and while this is no reliable measure of anything I was also interested to note that of the Wikipedia entries about them all Park's was the most detailed, followed by Harris, Dowding, Portal, Leigh-Mallory, and Douglas. Perhaps the word count says as much about the contributors to Wikipedia as anything else, but I wonder if it could also say just a little about the perception of these people and their input at the time, and all these years hence?
FP.
It seems to me that, at this remove, a certain amount of nuance of the times will necessarily be lost. While there has been plenty written about these people most of what we know today is merely author's interpretation, indignation, or aggrandizement, interspersed with a few hard facts. To even begin to fully understand the undercurrents at work I think one would need to totally immerse oneself in the era for a good length of time, and be armed with a lot of original source data - not just latter day books.
That said, like many here the names of these men were familiar to even me a small child, and I am always keen to learn more from genuinely original views. FlightlessParrot's post is one that I gained something from, and while I may seem a little disparaging about contemporary historical accounts the book references are also useful, thank you.
For me, while I like to contribute where I can, I don't think there's a lot I can say here, except that in re-reading accounts of the four or five main protagonists last night I was taken by the similarity in ages between all but one. Park, Leigh-Mallory and Harris were born in 1892, Portal and [Sholto] Douglas in 1893. Dowding of course was ten years older. In itself this is minutiae, but I wonder if it could have had bearing on interaction between the individuals, and their appreciation by others involved?
Otherwise, and while this is no reliable measure of anything I was also interested to note that of the Wikipedia entries about them all Park's was the most detailed, followed by Harris, Dowding, Portal, Leigh-Mallory, and Douglas. Perhaps the word count says as much about the contributors to Wikipedia as anything else, but I wonder if it could also say just a little about the perception of these people and their input at the time, and all these years hence?
FP.
I've read that, initially, Douglas thought that RAF casualities in "Circus" operations would be too severe for any results achieved which turned out to be correct. Post war analysis estimated that 4 RAF aircraft were lost to 1 German.
But on the other hand could it be acceptable to have a large number of RAF home based day squadrons not engaging with the enemy especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia.
But on the other hand could it be acceptable to have a large number of RAF home based day squadrons not engaging with the enemy especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia.
Regardless of what Douglas thought about casualties, he persisted with the operations, which began in January 1941.
It was assumed that the Wehrmacht would roll up Russia in a few weeks, hence keeping large numbers of squadrons at home, rather than send them to the M/E or SE Asia.
Had the Luftwaffe not been affected by Barbarossa, then the RAF may have come off even worse.
I think it was Johnson who said, he didn't mind being shot down in a dog fight, but didn't want to have his career ended by a chap with a rifle.
and it was a bit of an underperforming dog
I think that was making a virtue out of a necessity TBH - they were originally planned as fighters
"But on the other hand could it be acceptable to have a large number of RAF home based day squadrons not engaging with the enemy especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia"
That was clearly the reason - there was relatively little german activity over the UK and we had built up a large fighter arm - it was taking time to build up a heavy bomber force so it was all we could do really. The Army were being rebuilt (or shipped to N Africa) and the navy was stretched
That was clearly the reason - there was relatively little german activity over the UK and we had built up a large fighter arm - it was taking time to build up a heavy bomber force so it was all we could do really. The Army were being rebuilt (or shipped to N Africa) and the navy was stretched
The Mustang Achilles Heel though of course was the cooling system - one little bullet or shrapnel in the Rad or cooling pipery would eventually ruin your day
For low level work though -the mustang was particularly vulnerable with its cooling system design/layout
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On the P-51 as an escort fighter: the story I know is that the British purchasing people wanted P-40s, because they were in production; it was suggested that North American had the spare manufacturing capacity, but when they were approached said they could do something better than the P-40, and did so. I know it wasn't specified or designed as a long-range escort fighter, and I understand that it took quite a bit of modification, including a somewhat marginal rear fuel tank, to make it one. My point was that rather that, since once critical factor was the Merlin supercharger, an escort fighter might have been designed in the UK, but wasn't because it wasn't in the doctrine; and the P-51 was developed into an escort fighter on an American initiative.
We wouldn't develop an escort fighter as we didn't need one. Well, I suppose we did but Bomber Command switched to night flying instead.
The Americans didn't need one either until they realised that their conviction that B.17s could defend themselves in daylight didn't work.
The Americans didn't need one either until they realised that their conviction that B.17s could defend themselves in daylight didn't work.
Originally the idea was that the bomber would fight its way to the target protected by guns on board (as with the Flying Fortress) - a few very nasty sets of losses showed that was effectively murdering the aircrew
So they HAD to fly by night - (oddly to my mind they kept the gun turrets ) but there was no need or possibility of long range escort at night. By the time the USAAF turned up the Luftwaffe was spread pretty thin and even then day time operations in bombers was very high risk affair over W Europe well into 1944
So they HAD to fly by night - (oddly to my mind they kept the gun turrets ) but there was no need or possibility of long range escort at night. By the time the USAAF turned up the Luftwaffe was spread pretty thin and even then day time operations in bombers was very high risk affair over W Europe well into 1944
By the time Lancasters were in service the RAF had pretty well accepted that daylight bombing Germany with what was available was bringing Kamikaze forward to 1942 . As to the turrets well the tail gunner had a unique view and on clear nights (quite lot in N Euroepan winter at higher levels ) this was very valuable so why not keep the guns as well .
There are plans for wars and there are real wars and they dont work out quite the same . Often concepts and practices work backwards, brish equipment was often not very good standard-better than the Russians but worse than the germsn but if what your are building is going to get shot down after ten trips why over build it . The Manchester Bommber wqas crap but wartime meant it could be converted quickly to 4 engines and suddenly its brillaint. T34 taks left the factoy virtually unfinsihed but there were lots of them and theyalso turned out to be pretty damne dgood and a nightmare for ehte Wehrmachts precison engineered but wont work when its cld panzers.
I think one of the fascinating aspects of WW2 is how complciated things could be made quickly (and often crudelly) or how projects bult with one idea in mind helped a probelm ina different area. Mosquitos were built from wood because we had wood and people who could use it . The fact that it gave them an element of Stealth wasnt even heard of let alone considered., DC3 s builkt as the luxury liners for US domestic airlines became one of the great logistical vehicles of all time.
With all the time and comexity of projects today i ljust think the engineers and designers of WW2 on all sides were amazing people
There are plans for wars and there are real wars and they dont work out quite the same . Often concepts and practices work backwards, brish equipment was often not very good standard-better than the Russians but worse than the germsn but if what your are building is going to get shot down after ten trips why over build it . The Manchester Bommber wqas crap but wartime meant it could be converted quickly to 4 engines and suddenly its brillaint. T34 taks left the factoy virtually unfinsihed but there were lots of them and theyalso turned out to be pretty damne dgood and a nightmare for ehte Wehrmachts precison engineered but wont work when its cld panzers.
I think one of the fascinating aspects of WW2 is how complciated things could be made quickly (and often crudelly) or how projects bult with one idea in mind helped a probelm ina different area. Mosquitos were built from wood because we had wood and people who could use it . The fact that it gave them an element of Stealth wasnt even heard of let alone considered., DC3 s builkt as the luxury liners for US domestic airlines became one of the great logistical vehicles of all time.
With all the time and comexity of projects today i ljust think the engineers and designers of WW2 on all sides were amazing people
How many German fighters were actually shot down by Air gunners? Not the claimed numbers but the actual ones? few is my understanding. And you added several crew and several tones of weight (and cost and complexity) to the aircraft. A Stirling without turrets might have actually been quite a useful aircraft
And of course most British bombers had no turret underneath - which is where most night fighters attacked
The turrets were really to give the crew the idea they could shoot back - but in reality it didn't work out
And of course most British bombers had no turret underneath - which is where most night fighters attacked
The turrets were really to give the crew the idea they could shoot back - but in reality it didn't work out
The 'powers to be' had tried to retire Dowding before the BoB but realised he had devised a system that needed him to 'see it through'.
The whole battle of France scenario was no doubt a shock to those in charge, and indeed even as Dunkirk was happening there was no clear understanding that we would actually fight on. Once Churchill had made his May 28th plea to cabinet (and the Government) then the die was cast and Dowdings 'no more fighters to France' message at least kept us with enough machines to offer a defence. This was the important factor, in that although under strength the output of Hurricanes alone meant we were never short of fighters, but of course 'our system' had yet to be put under test in that it had to operate well above its design factor with the enemy being so close. Dowding never flinched because he knew we had a unique ace up our sleeve in not having to rely on standing patrols to intercept raids, and the effect on the enemy actually getting intercepted must have been a considerable shock after such an easy ride on the continent. Battles are won by making fewer mistakes than your opponent and Dowding with Park made the best of what they had and with Quinton Brand (WWI Zeppelin killer) giving support from 10 group they were a fine team. Dowding stood up to the Ministry and Churchill when required and then 'enabled' what we had to be used to the best effect to preserve our forces, and prevail. They were still prevailing when the enemy made even bigger mistakes and lost its best chance of success. No credit is due to others who sought to replace Dowding and Park at the very time they should have been supporting them to the hilt.
The whole battle of France scenario was no doubt a shock to those in charge, and indeed even as Dunkirk was happening there was no clear understanding that we would actually fight on. Once Churchill had made his May 28th plea to cabinet (and the Government) then the die was cast and Dowdings 'no more fighters to France' message at least kept us with enough machines to offer a defence. This was the important factor, in that although under strength the output of Hurricanes alone meant we were never short of fighters, but of course 'our system' had yet to be put under test in that it had to operate well above its design factor with the enemy being so close. Dowding never flinched because he knew we had a unique ace up our sleeve in not having to rely on standing patrols to intercept raids, and the effect on the enemy actually getting intercepted must have been a considerable shock after such an easy ride on the continent. Battles are won by making fewer mistakes than your opponent and Dowding with Park made the best of what they had and with Quinton Brand (WWI Zeppelin killer) giving support from 10 group they were a fine team. Dowding stood up to the Ministry and Churchill when required and then 'enabled' what we had to be used to the best effect to preserve our forces, and prevail. They were still prevailing when the enemy made even bigger mistakes and lost its best chance of success. No credit is due to others who sought to replace Dowding and Park at the very time they should have been supporting them to the hilt.
Pobjoy and Herod, hear hear!
How many German fighters were actually shot down by Air gunners? Not the claimed numbers but the actual ones? few is my understanding. And you added several crew and several tones of weight (and cost and complexity) to the aircraft. A Stirling without turrets might have actually been quite a useful aircraft
And of course most British bombers had no turret underneath - which is where most night fighters attacked
The turrets were really to give the crew the idea they could shoot back - but in reality it didn't work out
And of course most British bombers had no turret underneath - which is where most night fighters attacked
The turrets were really to give the crew the idea they could shoot back - but in reality it didn't work out
Whitleys, Wellingtons, Manchesters, Halifaxes and Lancs all had at some stage dorsal turrets. It was considered however impractical to use them , due to sighting and performance issues.
Schrage Musik wasn't used operationally until the last 20 or so months of the war, from August 43.
Losses from these attacks were of course severe.
Freeman Dyson who was working with Bomber Command Operational Research, blamed himself for not spotting what was causing these losses sooner.
The RAF did know about these attacks, as some aircraft did return with damage clearly caused by upward firing guns, yet they seem to have chosen to keep the information from squadrons.
Gunnery leaders before the advent of Schrage Musik did advise pilots to dip a wing, so gunners could scan below.
6 Group RCAF did persist with dorsal turrets.
As one gunner said however, the intention was not to 'shoot it out with a nightfighter', but to see them first and evade.
As for claims, during the war many exaggerated claims from both sides were made, just one of those things.