Dowding Vs Leigh-Mallory
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Dowding Vs Leigh-Mallory
Hi, newbie here. Very interested in your opinions on the Dowding Vs Leigh-Mallory (big wing) saga, especially how L-M supported by the arrogant Bader managed to get Dowding and Park effectively fired. The air ministry both in the run up to WW2 and the aftermath (Brabazon debacle etc) seems to have been incredibly badly run. What are your views? Are there any other skeletons in the closet? Has anyone documented this properly? Thank you!
"Has anyone documented this properly?"
No - not a single thing has been published on this in 80 years
Try Google first..........................
No - not a single thing has been published on this in 80 years
Try Google first..........................
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Ok let me clarify. Thanks for the emoji - not. I have read everything on this. What I am after is a revisionist and recent opinion. Not books written in the aftermath. So I thought this would be a good place to source some opinions.
If you have time to spare, try "The Right of the Line" by John Terraine ... good coverage of the politics involved but, like most such, has no explanation as to why Bader had so much influence ... strange ! 
he was older, he'd known all the SO's when they started, he was CERTAIN and he promised large scale destruction of the Luftwaffe
And they knew he would never take NO for an answer
And they knew he would never take NO for an answer
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I am neither an aviator, nor a historian, but this is my take.
The Big Wing strategy fitted into the offensive mindset which pervaded UK forces. Compare the response to submarine warfare in WW1: it took a long time before analysts persuaded the Admiralty that the best strategy was convoys, rather than aggressive attempts to sink German submarines.
In the "Battle of Britain" the disagreement was between those who wanted to destroy the maximum number of German aircraft, and those, mostly Dowding and Park, who thought that the objectives were to disrupt German bombing, and above all to keep an RAF force in being. From a very distanced point of view, it was all irrelevant, since even if the GAF had established air supremacy, an invasion could not have been successful.
One of the aspects of WW2 from the British side that is inadequately dealt with in the books I have read is the importance of personality. Dowding was obviously not one of the chaps, and despite having been remarkably clear sighted about the issues involved in the air defence of GB, the establishment was happy to get rid of him. OTOH, Harris was obviously insubordinate, but for some reason seems to have been untouchable.
I do not know, and I have had a bit of a look, how far this outcome was the result of policy. It is clear that Air Force thinking had been captured by the advocates of strategic bombing; that Dowding had to fight very hard to get any kind of interceptor fighter force; and that that force was limited by policy to short range interception, which is why the definitive escort fighter was produced in the USA. But I think the basic conflict was between the offensive mindset of the British military establishment, and the shrewd calculation of Dowding. Plus, Bader was a hero (truly), and heroes are given credibility in areas that are completely out of their competence; but I doubt if Bader's personal advocacy had much influence at the highest level.
The Big Wing strategy fitted into the offensive mindset which pervaded UK forces. Compare the response to submarine warfare in WW1: it took a long time before analysts persuaded the Admiralty that the best strategy was convoys, rather than aggressive attempts to sink German submarines.
In the "Battle of Britain" the disagreement was between those who wanted to destroy the maximum number of German aircraft, and those, mostly Dowding and Park, who thought that the objectives were to disrupt German bombing, and above all to keep an RAF force in being. From a very distanced point of view, it was all irrelevant, since even if the GAF had established air supremacy, an invasion could not have been successful.
One of the aspects of WW2 from the British side that is inadequately dealt with in the books I have read is the importance of personality. Dowding was obviously not one of the chaps, and despite having been remarkably clear sighted about the issues involved in the air defence of GB, the establishment was happy to get rid of him. OTOH, Harris was obviously insubordinate, but for some reason seems to have been untouchable.
I do not know, and I have had a bit of a look, how far this outcome was the result of policy. It is clear that Air Force thinking had been captured by the advocates of strategic bombing; that Dowding had to fight very hard to get any kind of interceptor fighter force; and that that force was limited by policy to short range interception, which is why the definitive escort fighter was produced in the USA. But I think the basic conflict was between the offensive mindset of the British military establishment, and the shrewd calculation of Dowding. Plus, Bader was a hero (truly), and heroes are given credibility in areas that are completely out of their competence; but I doubt if Bader's personal advocacy had much influence at the highest level.
Bader had Leigh-Mallory's ear so there was only Dowding and Portal(?) any higher.
Park's main concern appears to have been that no matter however many aircraft the Big Wing shot down, if they'd already destroyed his airfields or a swathe of London it wasn't a good result.
Park's main concern appears to have been that no matter however many aircraft the Big Wing shot down, if they'd already destroyed his airfields or a swathe of London it wasn't a good result.
"OTOH, Harris was obviously insubordinate, but for some reason seems to have been untouchable."
oddly enough in yesterdays Times Max Hastings was writing about Churchill and the memoirs of Anthony Montague Browne , the great man's last private secretary.
" On the wartime bombing offensive, which in the 1950s was becoming a focus of controversy, Churchill said of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, C-in-C of RAF Bomber Command: “I admired his determination and his technical ability . . . And the Prof [Lord Cherwell] backed him up. You must remember that for a long time we had no other means of hitting back. The public demanded action and rejoiced at our counter-blows at German cities. But it did go on too long, and I pointed it out to the chiefs of staff. Such destruction tends to acquire its own momentum . . . That worried me about nuclear. Of course Harris was under-recognised at the end and so were his gallant men.”
As for the airman’s personality: “A very considerable commander. I said so many times. But there was a certain coarseness about him.”
I suspect that the British built up Harris, like Montgomery , as a war winner in 1942/43 but by late '44 it was clear they should be replaced but the public would have gone ape.
oddly enough in yesterdays Times Max Hastings was writing about Churchill and the memoirs of Anthony Montague Browne , the great man's last private secretary.
" On the wartime bombing offensive, which in the 1950s was becoming a focus of controversy, Churchill said of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, C-in-C of RAF Bomber Command: “I admired his determination and his technical ability . . . And the Prof [Lord Cherwell] backed him up. You must remember that for a long time we had no other means of hitting back. The public demanded action and rejoiced at our counter-blows at German cities. But it did go on too long, and I pointed it out to the chiefs of staff. Such destruction tends to acquire its own momentum . . . That worried me about nuclear. Of course Harris was under-recognised at the end and so were his gallant men.”
As for the airman’s personality: “A very considerable commander. I said so many times. But there was a certain coarseness about him.”
I suspect that the British built up Harris, like Montgomery , as a war winner in 1942/43 but by late '44 it was clear they should be replaced but the public would have gone ape.
Bader apologized to Dowding after the war.
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
Thanks to Dowding's foresight and planning, and Park's inspirational leadership of 11 Group, the RAF didn't lose the Battle of Britain. Not belittling the other participants, but they were relative sideshows.
Arrogant Bader? Bader was Bader and that was that.
If the Air Ministry was so badly run, how did they manage to orchestrate the defeat of the most power air arm that the world had ever known?
As an aside, I've never understood why Sholto Douglas ( another Big Wing advocate ) got off so lightly with his disastrous 'Circus' operations.
During which the attrition of RAF pilots and aircraft, achieved absolutely nothing.
If the Air Ministry was so badly run, how did they manage to orchestrate the defeat of the most power air arm that the world had ever known?
As an aside, I've never understood why Sholto Douglas ( another Big Wing advocate ) got off so lightly with his disastrous 'Circus' operations.
During which the attrition of RAF pilots and aircraft, achieved absolutely nothing.
which is why the definitive escort fighter was produced in the USA
Granted the RAF fighter command didn't have escort fighter as a concept, an argument between USAAC and RAF over the latters participation in Operation Pointblank being emblematic.
Last edited by megan; 24th Jul 2023 at 05:47.
Lets not start another discussion of Bader - there have been at least two previous discussions on here in the last 18 months.
It was designed as more modern alternative to the P.40 the British had asked North American to build.
and it was a bit of an underperforming dog - then they put a Merlin into it in the UK and it was transformed - the British then ordered the "new" model and the US followed
Arrogant Bader? Bader was Bader and that was that.
......As an aside, I've never understood why Sholto Douglas ( another Big Wing advocate ) got off so lightly with his disastrous 'Circus' operations.
During which the attrition of RAF pilots and aircraft, achieved absolutely nothing.
......As an aside, I've never understood why Sholto Douglas ( another Big Wing advocate ) got off so lightly with his disastrous 'Circus' operations.
During which the attrition of RAF pilots and aircraft, achieved absolutely nothing.
But on the other hand could it be acceptable to have a large number of RAF home based day squadrons not engaging with the enemy especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia.