The British Aircraft Corporation TSR-2 - Excellent Documentary
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The British Aircraft Corporation TSR-2 - Excellent Documentary
Published on 1 Apr 2013
"All modern aircraft have four dimensions: span, length, height and politics. TSR-2 simply got the first three right."— Sir Sydney Camm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tEtkrZiDDGc
"All modern aircraft have four dimensions: span, length, height and politics. TSR-2 simply got the first three right."— Sir Sydney Camm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tEtkrZiDDGc
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The documentary is okay but it perpetuates most of the nonsense that has surrounded the TSR2 story for half a century. The comments from people there on Youtube illustrate how the story has become a myth.
Yes, TSR2 was an outstanding design for the time but it was far from perfect. From an aerodynamic perspective it showed great promise but there were no guarantees that its systems would have been quite so good. They may well have taken many years to develop. For example, as it was, TSR2 was going to rely on a bizarre wet film radar readout for "pinpoint" navigation, even though the readout would obviously have lagged behind the real-time position of the aircraft. A bonkers idea by any standards. There were other aspects of the design that were just as bizarre.
The big problem with the story is that almost everything written about TSR2 stems from a very early book produced by Stephen Hastings - an author with a very clear political agenda. Everything written subsequently was largely just a regurgitation of the Hastings book.
Truth of the matter is that the Labour Government didn't "kill off" TSR2. It was already effectively dead but the previous government hadn't got the will to end it, even though it was they who had perpetuated the ludicrous committee structure that had largely created the monster. By 1965 TSR2 had become a hopelessly over-priced aircraft designed for a role (East of Suez) that was about to disappear. There was no control on its wild spending and endless delays and even when BAC (created by a grudging merger simply in order to get the TSR2 contract) was pressured into settling on a fixed price for getting the aircraft into the air, they refused.
Healey, far from being the evil axe murderer, was firmly on the RAF's side (as the RAF will testify). He asked what the RAF wanted and asked if there was any cheaper alternative. F-111 came along at just the right time (or so it seemed). The RAF abandoned TSR2 before the Labour Party cancelled it - this is a recorded fact, even though nobody ever cares to mention it, as it spoils the drama of the story.
Even more absurd is the endless repetition of the post-cancellation saga when the government supposedly ordered destruction of all the TSR2 jigs to ensure that the aircraft could never be resurrected. In reality no such order was ever given. BAC simply destroyed them as they would have for any other redundant project. In actual fact, Healey and Jenkins offered the two flyable TSR2 airframes to BAC for use as flying research aircraft, provided that BAC paid for them. BAC politely declined.
But facts are never permitted to get in the way of a good story
It's fair to say that TSR2 (or rather the Vickers-Supermarine Type 571 to be more accurate) showed great promise, but it was an aircraft designed by committee, and one that was hopelessly over-specified just for the sake of it, largely because the RAF was desperate to maintain a clear performance advantage over the Buccaneer that Mountbatten was trying to impose on the RAF so that funds could be saved for his romantic super carrier ambitions. But most importantly, the aircraft was designed for East of Suez and by the end of the 1960s the RAF needed a European theatre strike/attack platform. Thankfully, they finally got it a decade later when Tornado arrived.
F-111 failed to live up to its promise, as did AFVG, but there's no doubt that at least on paper the F-111 was just as suitable for the RAF as TSR2 was. But more importantly it was to have been cheaper, even though cost rises and exchange rates eventually conspired against it. Fundamentally, it was a bargain offer, particularly because the UK was to have bought it on credit... bear in mind the UK was financially crippled at the time.
In fact, Buccaneer would have been the logical choice all along and Healey admits that his only regret is not persuading the RAF to adopt the Buccaneer at the time. It was inter-service rivalry and Mountbatten's stifling ambitions that encouraged the RAF to pursue TSR2 in defiance of Buccaneer, and led to the seemingly endless quests to make TSR2 more and more complex, thereby leading to its eventual demise.
TSR2 was a classic tale of how not to design a warplane even though, rather ironically, the result was an aircraft that might well have eventually become a truly magnificent machine, given enough patience, time and money. But the really sad part of TSR2's story is the endless repetition of the fifty-year old story of how a wicked government wilfully destroyed what was to have been Britain's greatest aeronautical achievement. The saga is utter nonsense and I hope that one day we'll put the silly tale to rest!
Yes, TSR2 was an outstanding design for the time but it was far from perfect. From an aerodynamic perspective it showed great promise but there were no guarantees that its systems would have been quite so good. They may well have taken many years to develop. For example, as it was, TSR2 was going to rely on a bizarre wet film radar readout for "pinpoint" navigation, even though the readout would obviously have lagged behind the real-time position of the aircraft. A bonkers idea by any standards. There were other aspects of the design that were just as bizarre.
The big problem with the story is that almost everything written about TSR2 stems from a very early book produced by Stephen Hastings - an author with a very clear political agenda. Everything written subsequently was largely just a regurgitation of the Hastings book.
Truth of the matter is that the Labour Government didn't "kill off" TSR2. It was already effectively dead but the previous government hadn't got the will to end it, even though it was they who had perpetuated the ludicrous committee structure that had largely created the monster. By 1965 TSR2 had become a hopelessly over-priced aircraft designed for a role (East of Suez) that was about to disappear. There was no control on its wild spending and endless delays and even when BAC (created by a grudging merger simply in order to get the TSR2 contract) was pressured into settling on a fixed price for getting the aircraft into the air, they refused.
Healey, far from being the evil axe murderer, was firmly on the RAF's side (as the RAF will testify). He asked what the RAF wanted and asked if there was any cheaper alternative. F-111 came along at just the right time (or so it seemed). The RAF abandoned TSR2 before the Labour Party cancelled it - this is a recorded fact, even though nobody ever cares to mention it, as it spoils the drama of the story.
Even more absurd is the endless repetition of the post-cancellation saga when the government supposedly ordered destruction of all the TSR2 jigs to ensure that the aircraft could never be resurrected. In reality no such order was ever given. BAC simply destroyed them as they would have for any other redundant project. In actual fact, Healey and Jenkins offered the two flyable TSR2 airframes to BAC for use as flying research aircraft, provided that BAC paid for them. BAC politely declined.
But facts are never permitted to get in the way of a good story
It's fair to say that TSR2 (or rather the Vickers-Supermarine Type 571 to be more accurate) showed great promise, but it was an aircraft designed by committee, and one that was hopelessly over-specified just for the sake of it, largely because the RAF was desperate to maintain a clear performance advantage over the Buccaneer that Mountbatten was trying to impose on the RAF so that funds could be saved for his romantic super carrier ambitions. But most importantly, the aircraft was designed for East of Suez and by the end of the 1960s the RAF needed a European theatre strike/attack platform. Thankfully, they finally got it a decade later when Tornado arrived.
F-111 failed to live up to its promise, as did AFVG, but there's no doubt that at least on paper the F-111 was just as suitable for the RAF as TSR2 was. But more importantly it was to have been cheaper, even though cost rises and exchange rates eventually conspired against it. Fundamentally, it was a bargain offer, particularly because the UK was to have bought it on credit... bear in mind the UK was financially crippled at the time.
In fact, Buccaneer would have been the logical choice all along and Healey admits that his only regret is not persuading the RAF to adopt the Buccaneer at the time. It was inter-service rivalry and Mountbatten's stifling ambitions that encouraged the RAF to pursue TSR2 in defiance of Buccaneer, and led to the seemingly endless quests to make TSR2 more and more complex, thereby leading to its eventual demise.
TSR2 was a classic tale of how not to design a warplane even though, rather ironically, the result was an aircraft that might well have eventually become a truly magnificent machine, given enough patience, time and money. But the really sad part of TSR2's story is the endless repetition of the fifty-year old story of how a wicked government wilfully destroyed what was to have been Britain's greatest aeronautical achievement. The saga is utter nonsense and I hope that one day we'll put the silly tale to rest!
Last edited by WH904; 10th Sep 2013 at 23:34.
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WH904
"In actual fact, Healey and Jenkins offered the two flyable TSR2 airframes to BAC for use as flying research aircraft, provided that BAC paid for them. BAC politely declined.
But facts are never permitted to get in the way of a good story."
I think you have proved that WH
"In actual fact, Healey and Jenkins offered the two flyable TSR2 airframes to BAC for use as flying research aircraft, provided that BAC paid for them. BAC politely declined.
But facts are never permitted to get in the way of a good story."
I think you have proved that WH
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No problem. I'm not peddling my book (I have no commercial interest in selling it) but I think I set-out the story as clearly as I could in there. When I started looking into the subject I was astonished just how much nonsense had been peddled about TSR2 for fifty years. It is an interesting story but the age-old tale about wicked governmental destruction simply isn't true. TSR2 was simply far too expensive, out of control and inappropriate for the RAF's requirements and that's why it was dumped, not because of some dark socialist policy
WH904,
Thank you for putting some balance in to the TSR2 argument,
At Cranwell as even mere cadets in 1968 we had a very good exposition (from Mod PE IIRC) as to why the beast was a nightmare politically .
Losing one would be have been the equivalent of losing an asset the cost of a destroyer.
Haraka snr. was associated in industry with the program in the early 60's on hydraulics design . He admitted to a sigh of relief, echoed around many sectors of the U.K. Aviation industry when it was axed.
Thank you for putting some balance in to the TSR2 argument,
At Cranwell as even mere cadets in 1968 we had a very good exposition (from Mod PE IIRC) as to why the beast was a nightmare politically .
Losing one would be have been the equivalent of losing an asset the cost of a destroyer.
Haraka snr. was associated in industry with the program in the early 60's on hydraulics design . He admitted to a sigh of relief, echoed around many sectors of the U.K. Aviation industry when it was axed.
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I'm not touting for business, but it's out there if you're interested in the subject. I did the book because I wanted to try and put the record straight as best I could, not because I have any political agenda (I've never voted in my entire life!) but I think it's frustrating when a subject becomes an urban myth. It's easy to keep saying Healey destroyed TSR2 and the tales of "men in black" chopping-up jigs make good drama, but it would be pretty sad if such a significant project was mis-represented forever.
As it is, the story is still a hugely significant one, as it illustrates so clearly how ineptly the whole project was handled, and just how difficult Britain's position was in terms of defence posture. TSR2 was a magnificent aeroplane but it was quite literally ahead of its time. Everyone involved with the project seems to have acted with the best of intentions but with so much politics driving it, there was no way that it could have matured into a practical warplane. It's undoubtedly frustrating to speculate what a superb aircraft it might have been but then, it's always easy to bestow credit on what might have been
As it is, the story is still a hugely significant one, as it illustrates so clearly how ineptly the whole project was handled, and just how difficult Britain's position was in terms of defence posture. TSR2 was a magnificent aeroplane but it was quite literally ahead of its time. Everyone involved with the project seems to have acted with the best of intentions but with so much politics driving it, there was no way that it could have matured into a practical warplane. It's undoubtedly frustrating to speculate what a superb aircraft it might have been but then, it's always easy to bestow credit on what might have been
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"Even more absurd is the endless repetition of the post-cancellation saga when the government supposedly ordered destruction of all the TSR2 jigs to ensure that the aircraft could never be resurrected. In reality no such order was ever given. BAC simply destroyed them as they would have for any other redundant project."
Page 160 "Phoenix Into Ashes" by Roland Beamont
" The programme was cancelled on Budget Day, April 7th, more than two months in advance of the promised review date, and all the aircraft built or under construction, the production jigs and all the equipment available or being prepared for the trials aircraft were ordered to be destroyed by the Government."
So the Chief Test Pilot of the TSR-2 doesn't know what he is talking about? Interesting.
Page 160 "Phoenix Into Ashes" by Roland Beamont
" The programme was cancelled on Budget Day, April 7th, more than two months in advance of the promised review date, and all the aircraft built or under construction, the production jigs and all the equipment available or being prepared for the trials aircraft were ordered to be destroyed by the Government."
So the Chief Test Pilot of the TSR-2 doesn't know what he is talking about? Interesting.
Last edited by ian.whalley; 11th Sep 2013 at 22:49.
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I'm afraid his comments simply aren't always accurate. You have to bear in mind that despite his position, he wasn't in the Government nor was he in the Air Ministry (and he was unashamedly pro-TSR2 of course). Like a lot of people, Beamont tended to repeat assertions that suited his view, and ignore others.
The people who did know, included Jenkins and Healey. Jenkins is long deceased of course but his actions and views on the subject are on record if you care to look. Same applies to Healey, and of course one can always question him directly - as I did.
Naturally, I tried to get to the bottom of the story concerning the scrapping of the jigs, aircraft, etc., and I assure you that there is no record of anyone having "ordered" their destruction. Both Jenkins and Healey specifically state that they certainly gave no such orders, therefore it seems pretty clear that the jigs were simply destroyed by BAC - as they would with any cancelled project.
There was most certainly no order to destroy the aircraft, quite the contrary in fact. BAC were given the opportunity to keep both machines and fly them, but quite understandably, this was to have been done at BAC's expense (BAC had already wilfully declined to offer a fixed price for the continuing programme, so the Government was hardly likely to finance an open-ended research programme). BAC declined the offer and so both aircraft were simply disposed-of in the most practical way. XR219 (which was in a non-flying state at the time) was taken to Shoeburyness and XR220 was retained for noise research at Boscombe Down. Neither aircraft was destroyed.
It's remarkable how the tale of "mandatory destruction" persists. I recall a long communication with someone who insisted he had been at Weybridge at the time and how he'd seen "men in black suits" turn-up and demand the destruction of everything. But when I started to ask for some specifics, it transpired that it was his father who had supposedly been there, and that this was just what he'd supposedly seen. It seems quite likely therefore, that all he saw were some BAC officials, discussing arrangements for the disposal of an awful lot of redundant metalwork.
Likewise, Beamont's comments give the impression that the Budget Day announcement was an "out of the blue" blow. It wasn't like that at all. Yes, BAC were informed of the final decision only shortly before the announcement but they already knew that it was coming. More importantly, the RAF had already agreed that TSR2 should be dropped in favour of F-111, long before Budget Day. Maybe Beamont didn't know, but I suspect he had a pretty good idea.
Beamont can't be blamed for his pro-TSR2 comments but you have to bear in mind his loyalty to English Electric and the aircraft that he flew. He rightly praised the aircraft for its excellent handling qualities but he never mentioned any of its flaws, particularly the on-board systems that lagged way behind the actual airframe. He even managed to gloss-over the endless problems with the landing gear system which was, by any standards, complete nonsense from the outset, and contributed to so many delays in the flight test programme.
Ultimately, Beamont believed in TSR2 despite everything, but he was far too eager to blame its demise on the government of the day. It was the previous government that had allowed the project to run unchecked until it was out of control, and it was the same government that had overseen the forced merger of his company with Vickers - one of the ill-conceived acts that started the whole ugly saga!
I note that you're in Australia and of course the Australian aspect of the story is another one that is hopelessly mis-reported. Accepted wisdom is (was) that Australia was either bribed by America to buy F-111, or that they were dissuaded from buying TSR2 by Mountbatten. Both assertions are untrue, as a bit of investigation revealed. The truth of the matter was that the Australian Government wanted to be more closely and permanently tied to American defence and foreign policy, as they had lost confidence in Britain's will to continue supporting them. Australian Government papers include statements that specifically confirm this, and also state that this was why they abandoned interest in TSR2. It had nothing to do with American chicanery (another ridiculous claim made in so many TSR2 stories), nor did it have anything to do with Mountbatten's poison campaign.
As with so many aspects of the story, the truth was out there, but nobody ever bothered to look for it, because it's obviously easier to simply regurgitate material that is already published on the subject, especially when it's the usual salacious stuff that people enjoy. The problem was (and is) that all of this material can ultimately be traced right back to the Hastings book.
It's an uphill struggle trying to convince people that they've been fed a myth for fifty years, as you can see if you read some of the hilarious comments attached to the TSR2 clips on Youtube (which is where we came in!). Foolishly, I even tried to offer some explanations on Youtube but it's a hopeless cause. I was simply accused of being a co-conspiracist!
The people who did know, included Jenkins and Healey. Jenkins is long deceased of course but his actions and views on the subject are on record if you care to look. Same applies to Healey, and of course one can always question him directly - as I did.
Naturally, I tried to get to the bottom of the story concerning the scrapping of the jigs, aircraft, etc., and I assure you that there is no record of anyone having "ordered" their destruction. Both Jenkins and Healey specifically state that they certainly gave no such orders, therefore it seems pretty clear that the jigs were simply destroyed by BAC - as they would with any cancelled project.
There was most certainly no order to destroy the aircraft, quite the contrary in fact. BAC were given the opportunity to keep both machines and fly them, but quite understandably, this was to have been done at BAC's expense (BAC had already wilfully declined to offer a fixed price for the continuing programme, so the Government was hardly likely to finance an open-ended research programme). BAC declined the offer and so both aircraft were simply disposed-of in the most practical way. XR219 (which was in a non-flying state at the time) was taken to Shoeburyness and XR220 was retained for noise research at Boscombe Down. Neither aircraft was destroyed.
It's remarkable how the tale of "mandatory destruction" persists. I recall a long communication with someone who insisted he had been at Weybridge at the time and how he'd seen "men in black suits" turn-up and demand the destruction of everything. But when I started to ask for some specifics, it transpired that it was his father who had supposedly been there, and that this was just what he'd supposedly seen. It seems quite likely therefore, that all he saw were some BAC officials, discussing arrangements for the disposal of an awful lot of redundant metalwork.
Likewise, Beamont's comments give the impression that the Budget Day announcement was an "out of the blue" blow. It wasn't like that at all. Yes, BAC were informed of the final decision only shortly before the announcement but they already knew that it was coming. More importantly, the RAF had already agreed that TSR2 should be dropped in favour of F-111, long before Budget Day. Maybe Beamont didn't know, but I suspect he had a pretty good idea.
Beamont can't be blamed for his pro-TSR2 comments but you have to bear in mind his loyalty to English Electric and the aircraft that he flew. He rightly praised the aircraft for its excellent handling qualities but he never mentioned any of its flaws, particularly the on-board systems that lagged way behind the actual airframe. He even managed to gloss-over the endless problems with the landing gear system which was, by any standards, complete nonsense from the outset, and contributed to so many delays in the flight test programme.
Ultimately, Beamont believed in TSR2 despite everything, but he was far too eager to blame its demise on the government of the day. It was the previous government that had allowed the project to run unchecked until it was out of control, and it was the same government that had overseen the forced merger of his company with Vickers - one of the ill-conceived acts that started the whole ugly saga!
I note that you're in Australia and of course the Australian aspect of the story is another one that is hopelessly mis-reported. Accepted wisdom is (was) that Australia was either bribed by America to buy F-111, or that they were dissuaded from buying TSR2 by Mountbatten. Both assertions are untrue, as a bit of investigation revealed. The truth of the matter was that the Australian Government wanted to be more closely and permanently tied to American defence and foreign policy, as they had lost confidence in Britain's will to continue supporting them. Australian Government papers include statements that specifically confirm this, and also state that this was why they abandoned interest in TSR2. It had nothing to do with American chicanery (another ridiculous claim made in so many TSR2 stories), nor did it have anything to do with Mountbatten's poison campaign.
As with so many aspects of the story, the truth was out there, but nobody ever bothered to look for it, because it's obviously easier to simply regurgitate material that is already published on the subject, especially when it's the usual salacious stuff that people enjoy. The problem was (and is) that all of this material can ultimately be traced right back to the Hastings book.
It's an uphill struggle trying to convince people that they've been fed a myth for fifty years, as you can see if you read some of the hilarious comments attached to the TSR2 clips on Youtube (which is where we came in!). Foolishly, I even tried to offer some explanations on Youtube but it's a hopeless cause. I was simply accused of being a co-conspiracist!
Last edited by WH904; 12th Sep 2013 at 00:07.
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All I will say is that you offer a lot of your opinion. I spent thirty years as a plod and there is a big difference between opinion and fact.
The words "therefore it seems pretty clear that the jigs were simply destroyed by BAC ' don't seem to be evidence based fact.
In reference to Oz, everything I have read in a number of books, says that Mountbatten went out of his way to convince the Australian Government not to buy the TSR-2. No I wasn't there and I don't have any evidence to support what I have read, but that is what I have read. Not simply my opinion.
The words "therefore it seems pretty clear that the jigs were simply destroyed by BAC ' don't seem to be evidence based fact.
In reference to Oz, everything I have read in a number of books, says that Mountbatten went out of his way to convince the Australian Government not to buy the TSR-2. No I wasn't there and I don't have any evidence to support what I have read, but that is what I have read. Not simply my opinion.
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"Truth of the matter is that the Labour Government didn't "kill off" TSR2."
After the 1964 general election Jenkins was appointed Minister of Aviation. While at Aviation he oversaw the high profile cancellations of the BAC TSR-2 and Concorde projects (although the latter was later reversed after strong opposition from the French Government). In January 1965 Patrick Gordon Walker resigned as Foreign Secretary and in the ensuing reshuffle Wilson offered Jenkins the Department for Education and Science; however. he declined it, preferring to stay at Aviation.[2]
Roy Jenkins. A Life at the Centre. Politico's. ISBN 978-1-84275-177-0.
After the 1964 general election Jenkins was appointed Minister of Aviation. While at Aviation he oversaw the high profile cancellations of the BAC TSR-2 and Concorde projects (although the latter was later reversed after strong opposition from the French Government). In January 1965 Patrick Gordon Walker resigned as Foreign Secretary and in the ensuing reshuffle Wilson offered Jenkins the Department for Education and Science; however. he declined it, preferring to stay at Aviation.[2]
Roy Jenkins. A Life at the Centre. Politico's. ISBN 978-1-84275-177-0.
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a number of books, says that Mountbatten went out of his way to convince the Australian Government not to buy the TSR-2
That's true. He did. But his efforts were ignored by Australia and the UK (in fact our Defence Minister eventually asked him to keep his mouth shut). Point is, Mountbatten's poison actually had no influence on Australia, it's just that countless authors have (wrongly) claimed that it did.
You seem to be suggesting that my comments are merely opinion, whilst comments made in other books and magazines are fact. That obviously doesn't make any sense at all. As I've explained, almost everything that has been written about TSR2 for fifty years has simply been handed-down from the Hastings book. You have to bear in mind that authors of aviation books and magazine articles (and particularly web-based media) often rely on material that has been previously published. TSR2 is a worst-case scenario because very little was actually written about the aircraft (mostly in the Hastings book) and the same key points have therefore been re-used endlessly for decades.
It is only when you stop to take a completely fresh look, without assuming that anything that has been said previously is necessarily true, that you find a different story. If you look at the key points and then try to establish some factual basis to support them, you find nothing, and actually find evidence to reveal something very different. Okay, you can accuse me of expressing opinion in the case of BAC breaking-up jigs, but as I've said, Healey and Jenkins specifically state that they gave no such order, so that isn't opinion. Therefore (unless you imagine they are telling lies, and why should they?) the decision to scrap everything must have been taken by BAC and of course it would have been absurd if they hadn't chosen to scrap everything. Surely you don't imagine that the jigs and hardware from every cancelled project is saved, just in case it's needed again? So what I said isn't opinion as such, it's an assumption based on facts, and common sense.
Conversely, the assertion that the Government issued some bizarre order to destroy everything is patently incorrect. As I've said, Healey and Jenkins were the two ministers responsible, and neither of them made any such order. Likewise, they state quite clearly that they did not order the destruction of the aircraft and that they actually offered them to BAC. So that isn't opinion, it's fact.
I think the problem is that you're assuming that everything you've read before is somehow true, just because you've read it time and time again. That's a dangerous assumption no matter what the subject. Just because something is repeated for decades doesn't mean it was ever true. Ultimately, the previously-published material on the subject was very much "opinion" (like you accuse mine of being) but much more so, as there is clear evidence to destroy all of the myths that have been peddled for so long.
I accept that it can be a bit of a culture shock to hear that almost everything you'd read and learned about TSR2 was wrong, but sometimes that's what happens. I was just as surprised as anyone else when I bothered to look into the subject, instead of simply repeating the stuff that has been churned-out many times before.
Basically, the TSR2 story has been flawed for fifty years because of the inability of aviation writers to actually research their subject, and because far too many people have wanted to believe the story because it was vaguely exciting, and conjured-up an interesting tale of political dark deeds and wicked socialist exploits. The truth is that the story was rather more prosaic, but of course that's not quite so much fun to read and re-tell!
That's true. He did. But his efforts were ignored by Australia and the UK (in fact our Defence Minister eventually asked him to keep his mouth shut). Point is, Mountbatten's poison actually had no influence on Australia, it's just that countless authors have (wrongly) claimed that it did.
You seem to be suggesting that my comments are merely opinion, whilst comments made in other books and magazines are fact. That obviously doesn't make any sense at all. As I've explained, almost everything that has been written about TSR2 for fifty years has simply been handed-down from the Hastings book. You have to bear in mind that authors of aviation books and magazine articles (and particularly web-based media) often rely on material that has been previously published. TSR2 is a worst-case scenario because very little was actually written about the aircraft (mostly in the Hastings book) and the same key points have therefore been re-used endlessly for decades.
It is only when you stop to take a completely fresh look, without assuming that anything that has been said previously is necessarily true, that you find a different story. If you look at the key points and then try to establish some factual basis to support them, you find nothing, and actually find evidence to reveal something very different. Okay, you can accuse me of expressing opinion in the case of BAC breaking-up jigs, but as I've said, Healey and Jenkins specifically state that they gave no such order, so that isn't opinion. Therefore (unless you imagine they are telling lies, and why should they?) the decision to scrap everything must have been taken by BAC and of course it would have been absurd if they hadn't chosen to scrap everything. Surely you don't imagine that the jigs and hardware from every cancelled project is saved, just in case it's needed again? So what I said isn't opinion as such, it's an assumption based on facts, and common sense.
Conversely, the assertion that the Government issued some bizarre order to destroy everything is patently incorrect. As I've said, Healey and Jenkins were the two ministers responsible, and neither of them made any such order. Likewise, they state quite clearly that they did not order the destruction of the aircraft and that they actually offered them to BAC. So that isn't opinion, it's fact.
I think the problem is that you're assuming that everything you've read before is somehow true, just because you've read it time and time again. That's a dangerous assumption no matter what the subject. Just because something is repeated for decades doesn't mean it was ever true. Ultimately, the previously-published material on the subject was very much "opinion" (like you accuse mine of being) but much more so, as there is clear evidence to destroy all of the myths that have been peddled for so long.
I accept that it can be a bit of a culture shock to hear that almost everything you'd read and learned about TSR2 was wrong, but sometimes that's what happens. I was just as surprised as anyone else when I bothered to look into the subject, instead of simply repeating the stuff that has been churned-out many times before.
Basically, the TSR2 story has been flawed for fifty years because of the inability of aviation writers to actually research their subject, and because far too many people have wanted to believe the story because it was vaguely exciting, and conjured-up an interesting tale of political dark deeds and wicked socialist exploits. The truth is that the story was rather more prosaic, but of course that's not quite so much fun to read and re-tell!
Last edited by WH904; 12th Sep 2013 at 11:41.
No I wasn't there and I don't have any evidence to support what I have read, but that is what I have read. Not simply my opinion.
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Incidentally Ian I'm not quite sure what your political biography details about Jenkins is meant to suggest? Yes, that's who Jenkins was and we already knew that. He did oversee the cancellation of TSR2 (and was involved in the Concorde saga) and of course Healey was more directly involved from the very beginning of the Labour Government. Both politicians wrestled long and hard over TSR2 for a long time and contrary to the much-published story, Healey was not against TSR2 as such. The RAF considered Healey to be a very able and wise defence minister who supported the RAF at every stage. TSR2 was simply out of control and monstrously expensive by the time that Healey had to deal with it. Callaghan's extremely tight purse strings left Healey with no option other than to look at ways to get out of so many of the expensive programmes that had been dragging-on aimlessly for years, consuming vast amounts of money. TSR2 was only one of them.
At no stage could Healey be accused of having and dark desire to destroy TSR2, and even Jenkins can't be accused of being set against it on principle. There simply wasn't enough money to pursue it any longer. That much is clear. The real issue is how TSR2 got to that stage in the first place. The blame can be laid at the door of the Government for using TSR2 as a means of creating a "shotgun wedding" between Vickers and English Electric, and for insisting that the project should be managed by committee, with nobody capable of taking control and making key decisions.
But blame can also be laid squarely on the doorstep of the Air Staff, who clearly didn't know what they wanted in the first place. Their aspirations shifted regularly and eventually began to become more and more ambitious, for no logical reason. Even Beamont accepts this point. Of course there was a reason, and it was a political one. The Air Staff were under pressure to buy the Buccaneer because Mountbatten was hell-bent on getting the RAF to take the Navy's aircraft, so that the money being poured into TSR2 could be made available to finance his ostentatious super carrier ambitions. Despite Mountbatten's outrageous actions, the basic concept of giving the RAF the Buccaneer did actually make sense, but the Air Staff were entrenched in an anti-Navy attitude and believed in principle that accepting a naval aircraft would be to accept second best. They wanted their own design and so they continually hyped-up the TSR2 specification, so as to ensure that the Buccaneer couldn't match it.
So the Air Staff were just as culpable as the Government, Mountbatten, and Vickers, when it comes to apportioning blame. The irony is that the person who doesn't deserve any blame is Healey - the man who has always been painted as the villain!
At no stage could Healey be accused of having and dark desire to destroy TSR2, and even Jenkins can't be accused of being set against it on principle. There simply wasn't enough money to pursue it any longer. That much is clear. The real issue is how TSR2 got to that stage in the first place. The blame can be laid at the door of the Government for using TSR2 as a means of creating a "shotgun wedding" between Vickers and English Electric, and for insisting that the project should be managed by committee, with nobody capable of taking control and making key decisions.
But blame can also be laid squarely on the doorstep of the Air Staff, who clearly didn't know what they wanted in the first place. Their aspirations shifted regularly and eventually began to become more and more ambitious, for no logical reason. Even Beamont accepts this point. Of course there was a reason, and it was a political one. The Air Staff were under pressure to buy the Buccaneer because Mountbatten was hell-bent on getting the RAF to take the Navy's aircraft, so that the money being poured into TSR2 could be made available to finance his ostentatious super carrier ambitions. Despite Mountbatten's outrageous actions, the basic concept of giving the RAF the Buccaneer did actually make sense, but the Air Staff were entrenched in an anti-Navy attitude and believed in principle that accepting a naval aircraft would be to accept second best. They wanted their own design and so they continually hyped-up the TSR2 specification, so as to ensure that the Buccaneer couldn't match it.
So the Air Staff were just as culpable as the Government, Mountbatten, and Vickers, when it comes to apportioning blame. The irony is that the person who doesn't deserve any blame is Healey - the man who has always been painted as the villain!
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The conspirators (e.g: he was Red Wilson) never had support from credible Tory politicians (only {to be} 1972/4 Trade Minister (Aerospace) Sir C.Onslow, who asserted that Labour's Defence Policy was led by CND unilateralists: you know the Policy: the one about Polaris and WE.177 and Honest John SSM and nuclear artillery and MADMs in BAOR. That one), nor from brass after retirement: the reverse: (1982-85) CDS FM E.Bramall and Gen.W.Jackson,The Chiefs,Brassey’s,1992,P361:TSR.2: “an albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by (SecStateDef. Thorneycroft. MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go) it was just that (Labour) took the opprobrium”. New (1/9/63) CAS C.Elworthy (to be CDS, 4/8/67-8/4/71): impatient of BAC’s disdain of cost, he had urged Thorneycroft to buy fixed-$ TFX (to be F-111A). M.Quinlan,RAF Hist.Soc.Journal 24,2001,P.10.
Did he know thatThorneycroft had advised PM, 24/4/63 of study of a cheaper alternative? G.C.Peden, Arms,Economics & Br. Strategy, CUP, 2007,P.333. T.Buttler, Br. Secret Projects, Jet Bombers Since 1949, MCP,2003, Pp.124-9 lists projects to TSR.2 replacement O.R.355, 10/61, for Service after 1970. One was Vickers Type 589, variable geometry, length 64ft. AUW 49K lb. TSR.2 was 89ft (Vulcan was 100ft) and 96-105K lb. Because...the march of avionics technology.
GOR.339 was issued to tender 9/9/57, based on transistors, and Red Beard tactical Bomb, big and heavy. On 4/8/58 the derided Sandys secured access to US Bomb data which led in 1962 to funding (to be: WE.177A), snug (even Wasp chopper could lift it -just, one crewman, no door). On 12/9/58 Texas Instruments Dallas lab. demonstrated the silicon chip. When, ultimately, the electric flick-knife did the job, it was 55ft long and max.t.o weight 60K lb.
GD F-111A was invented in 1962 around light Bombs and avionics, 73ft (though also 100K lb). SecDef.McNamara announced plans for >3,000, USAF+USN. RAF cost/ease of ownership would have been better on F-111K than TSR.2 once the quantity to be deployed fell below 100, in 1963. And of course Oz would flourish inter-operating with USN and USAF/PACAF: how ludicrous to contemplate a logistics train for their 24 TSR.2s plus maybe some dozens on the other side of the world. They received brochure puff from the Brits solely to chisel down DoD's price.
H.Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces (Official History),HMSO,1994, Ch.28 spells out Ministers' invitation to BAC to make a fixed price Offer for 50. Sir Geo.Edwards “told Vickers’ Board (he) offered to complete (at further) £430Mn. and to sacrifice all profit if (it) exceeded that” H.Evans,Vickers Against the Odds,Hodder, 1978,P121. R.Gardner,From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde,Sutton,2006 has an offer - loss upto £9Mn., plus absent profit, presented as BAC “exposure” to £55Mn: an uncapped pit “not meeting (PM’s) case at all”.
There really was no conspiracy. TSR.2 was no threat to US industry. Really,my dear,they didn't give a d--n
Did he know thatThorneycroft had advised PM, 24/4/63 of study of a cheaper alternative? G.C.Peden, Arms,Economics & Br. Strategy, CUP, 2007,P.333. T.Buttler, Br. Secret Projects, Jet Bombers Since 1949, MCP,2003, Pp.124-9 lists projects to TSR.2 replacement O.R.355, 10/61, for Service after 1970. One was Vickers Type 589, variable geometry, length 64ft. AUW 49K lb. TSR.2 was 89ft (Vulcan was 100ft) and 96-105K lb. Because...the march of avionics technology.
GOR.339 was issued to tender 9/9/57, based on transistors, and Red Beard tactical Bomb, big and heavy. On 4/8/58 the derided Sandys secured access to US Bomb data which led in 1962 to funding (to be: WE.177A), snug (even Wasp chopper could lift it -just, one crewman, no door). On 12/9/58 Texas Instruments Dallas lab. demonstrated the silicon chip. When, ultimately, the electric flick-knife did the job, it was 55ft long and max.t.o weight 60K lb.
GD F-111A was invented in 1962 around light Bombs and avionics, 73ft (though also 100K lb). SecDef.McNamara announced plans for >3,000, USAF+USN. RAF cost/ease of ownership would have been better on F-111K than TSR.2 once the quantity to be deployed fell below 100, in 1963. And of course Oz would flourish inter-operating with USN and USAF/PACAF: how ludicrous to contemplate a logistics train for their 24 TSR.2s plus maybe some dozens on the other side of the world. They received brochure puff from the Brits solely to chisel down DoD's price.
H.Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces (Official History),HMSO,1994, Ch.28 spells out Ministers' invitation to BAC to make a fixed price Offer for 50. Sir Geo.Edwards “told Vickers’ Board (he) offered to complete (at further) £430Mn. and to sacrifice all profit if (it) exceeded that” H.Evans,Vickers Against the Odds,Hodder, 1978,P121. R.Gardner,From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde,Sutton,2006 has an offer - loss upto £9Mn., plus absent profit, presented as BAC “exposure” to £55Mn: an uncapped pit “not meeting (PM’s) case at all”.
There really was no conspiracy. TSR.2 was no threat to US industry. Really,my dear,they didn't give a d--n
Last edited by tornadoken; 12th Sep 2013 at 18:16.
