WW2 Night Bomber Formations
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JJ, indeed it would have been so as the Mozzie proved.
Similarly Charlwood's book, No Moon Tonight, recounts one intercept where they dropped the 4000lb cookie for increased manoeuvrability and another, may be the same incident, where the gunners did not fire as the tracer would have revealed their position.
This certainly supports the idea that unarmed might have been better although the lookouts may still have been useful.
Remember a pressurised Wellington reach 42000 feet
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_Wellington
and I found this too:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victory_Bomber
Similarly Charlwood's book, No Moon Tonight, recounts one intercept where they dropped the 4000lb cookie for increased manoeuvrability and another, may be the same incident, where the gunners did not fire as the tracer would have revealed their position.
This certainly supports the idea that unarmed might have been better although the lookouts may still have been useful.
Remember a pressurised Wellington reach 42000 feet
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_Wellington
and I found this too:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victory_Bomber
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Yes too bad a few more Mossies were not made instead of Lancs, isn't it true a Mossie could really carry the same bomb load as a B17?
Another interesting aspect of the Mossie seems to have been it diminished (effective) radar cross section. Did DH develop stealth technology back in 1940?
Seriously though I'd be interested to know how detectable it was compared to say a Beufighter.
Another interesting aspect of the Mossie seems to have been it diminished (effective) radar cross section. Did DH develop stealth technology back in 1940?
Seriously though I'd be interested to know how detectable it was compared to say a Beufighter.
There was a thread on here sometime ago regarding the Mosquito bomb lifting capability and the reasons why they didnt build more.
The basic reason is that the Mosquito was mainly made in small workshops dotted about the country and not concentrated in one huge factory. It was a specliaist wood-working job. Also the demands for the aircraft , once its potential had been revealed was such that supply struggled to keep up!
Also British industry was 'geared up' to build heavies. The changing of production was not a simple task in wartime.
50MPH was the estimated increase a heavy could expect in added speed devoid of armament and gunners. However the Germans used JU88's with Nitrious Oxide to catch Mosquito's , so its probable they would have reacted fairly quickly when faced with a fast unarmed 'Heavy'.
The basic reason is that the Mosquito was mainly made in small workshops dotted about the country and not concentrated in one huge factory. It was a specliaist wood-working job. Also the demands for the aircraft , once its potential had been revealed was such that supply struggled to keep up!
Also British industry was 'geared up' to build heavies. The changing of production was not a simple task in wartime.
50MPH was the estimated increase a heavy could expect in added speed devoid of armament and gunners. However the Germans used JU88's with Nitrious Oxide to catch Mosquito's , so its probable they would have reacted fairly quickly when faced with a fast unarmed 'Heavy'.
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Jetex Jim. Also remember that one of the points of the Mossie was to make use of a cabinet making industry that was, otherwise, making little contribution to the war effort. That industry was finite, though, and was probably working close to its capacity. Additionally, all that balsa wood to sandwich with ply had to run the U-Boot gauntlet from South America and was in competition with other essential war material.
Now, a metal Mosquito would have been interesting and would probably have better utilised skilled airframe (metal) fitters and myriad semi-skilled workers than churning out Stirlings and Halifaxes.
Now, a metal Mosquito would have been interesting and would probably have better utilised skilled airframe (metal) fitters and myriad semi-skilled workers than churning out Stirlings and Halifaxes.
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A Metal Mosquito
Interestingly, pictured in ‘From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde’ a biography of Sir George Edwards is something called the Metal Mossie, Vickers Type 432, Barnes Wallis had a hand in the design and a prototype flew in 1942. To what extent this can be considered an equivalent to the wooden wonder is debatable although Edwards stated in retrospect that he expected it to be abandoned in favour of the wooden version.
A wooden aircraft does seem to hold the promise of a stealth capability, especially against the comparatively low frequencies of the 1940’s German radar. There is a certain irony here, given much of Britain’s later efforts, which seem to indicate, if not an ignorance of radar cross section, at least a cheerful disregard for it. - I think mainly of such slab sided marvels as the Lightning, the TSR2 and the Tornado.
The Edwards book also includes an amusingly captioned photograph of Sir George being interviewed in 1959 for BBC TV by Raymond Baxter. Entitled ‘In the Hot Seat, somehow I think not.
Only a 50 MPH speed improvement, for the removal of turrets? That’s not too shabby when your top speed is only 280mph, and there’d be an increase in altitude, it would be another 20 years before the strategic bomber stopped seeking safety by flying as high as possible.
The Luftwaffe had a few NOX equipped night fighters, and had it come to perhaps they’d have come up with a machine with a bit of endurance as well. But as Dyson puts it, without the gunners, even with losses, the total souls per aircraft lost is reduced. But he maintains that the RAF wouldn’t try, even on a few aircraft, the effect of stripping the turrets out and fairing them off.
Instead the defence systems grew heavier, with Monica, the rearward looking radar, ostensibly to warn of night fighters , but it couldn’t distinguish between them and the rest of the bomber stream, moreover some night fighter were equipped to home on its signals.
Interestingly, pictured in ‘From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde’ a biography of Sir George Edwards is something called the Metal Mossie, Vickers Type 432, Barnes Wallis had a hand in the design and a prototype flew in 1942. To what extent this can be considered an equivalent to the wooden wonder is debatable although Edwards stated in retrospect that he expected it to be abandoned in favour of the wooden version.
A wooden aircraft does seem to hold the promise of a stealth capability, especially against the comparatively low frequencies of the 1940’s German radar. There is a certain irony here, given much of Britain’s later efforts, which seem to indicate, if not an ignorance of radar cross section, at least a cheerful disregard for it. - I think mainly of such slab sided marvels as the Lightning, the TSR2 and the Tornado.
The Edwards book also includes an amusingly captioned photograph of Sir George being interviewed in 1959 for BBC TV by Raymond Baxter. Entitled ‘In the Hot Seat, somehow I think not.
Only a 50 MPH speed improvement, for the removal of turrets? That’s not too shabby when your top speed is only 280mph, and there’d be an increase in altitude, it would be another 20 years before the strategic bomber stopped seeking safety by flying as high as possible.
The Luftwaffe had a few NOX equipped night fighters, and had it come to perhaps they’d have come up with a machine with a bit of endurance as well. But as Dyson puts it, without the gunners, even with losses, the total souls per aircraft lost is reduced. But he maintains that the RAF wouldn’t try, even on a few aircraft, the effect of stripping the turrets out and fairing them off.
Instead the defence systems grew heavier, with Monica, the rearward looking radar, ostensibly to warn of night fighters , but it couldn’t distinguish between them and the rest of the bomber stream, moreover some night fighter were equipped to home on its signals.
Last edited by Jetex Jim; 11th Feb 2008 at 20:55. Reason: spelling
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
A wooden aircraft does seem to hold the promise of a stealth capability, especially against the comparatively low frequencies of the 1940’s German radar.
There is a certain irony here, given much of Britain’s later efforts, which seem to indicate, if not an ignorance of radar cross section, at least a cheerful disregard for it. - I think mainly of such slab sided marvels as the Lightning, the TSR2 and the Tornado.
There is a certain irony here, given much of Britain’s later efforts, which seem to indicate, if not an ignorance of radar cross section, at least a cheerful disregard for it. - I think mainly of such slab sided marvels as the Lightning, the TSR2 and the Tornado.
In the 60s RRE was certainly working on RCS reduction. I remembe seeing a Morris Traveller van covered in rubberised horse hair with two arcs in the windscreen for the wipers. This RAM coating was designed to produce an radar invisbile vehicle. It was then covered with small radar reflectors on rods. Presumably to give a moving target without other reflectors.
Only a 50 MPH speed improvement, for the removal of turrets? That’s not too shabby when your top speed is only 280mph, and there’d be an increase in altitude, it would be another 20 years before the strategic bomber stopped seeking safety by flying as high as possible.
Monica, the rearward looking radar, ostensibly to warn of night fighters , but it couldn’t distinguish between them and the rest of the bomber stream
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Night fighters were equipped with the "NaxosZ" unit which could home in on the "H2S Home Sweet Home" radar set used in Allied bombers.
See :
http://www.radarworld.org/germany4.html
and elsewhere...
Last edited by Jetex Jim; 12th Feb 2008 at 06:08. Reason: spelling
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The air war over Germany was tidal, 1939 to Big Week 1944 daytime offensives by the Allies were impossible to maintain, the early Schweinfurt raids being an example. But Feb 1944 onwards the balance shifted, night raid losses increased and P47/P51 superiority reduced daytime losses.
A "what-if" scenerio is that the Western Allies put 90% available resource into building Lancasters from 1943 onwards for area attacks at night. Does this finish the German war machine? Probably. 2 x Hamburg raids every week is an enormous onslaught. But the end result is the same, Red Army tanks roll into Berlin. Is a Lanc-only bomber force a likely scenario? No (IMHO), no British politician would have removed further resource from other areas to support Harris, benefit of hindsight etc.
A Mossie-only bomber force is even more unlikely, the decision making process at the time was that bigger and more heavily armed = better. Odd thing hindsight, the American's problems at Omaha probably disappear with cab-ranked P47s overhead; likewise Arnhem, Panzers in the woods? Send in 5 Group. No more woods, no more Panzers.
A "what-if" scenerio is that the Western Allies put 90% available resource into building Lancasters from 1943 onwards for area attacks at night. Does this finish the German war machine? Probably. 2 x Hamburg raids every week is an enormous onslaught. But the end result is the same, Red Army tanks roll into Berlin. Is a Lanc-only bomber force a likely scenario? No (IMHO), no British politician would have removed further resource from other areas to support Harris, benefit of hindsight etc.
A Mossie-only bomber force is even more unlikely, the decision making process at the time was that bigger and more heavily armed = better. Odd thing hindsight, the American's problems at Omaha probably disappear with cab-ranked P47s overhead; likewise Arnhem, Panzers in the woods? Send in 5 Group. No more woods, no more Panzers.
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A "what-if" scenerio is that the Western Allies put 90% available resource into building Lancasters
The free down load available at
http://www.radarworld.org/books.html
The Radar War
Though rather offensively teutonic in places, it gives a fascinating, chronologically ordered, round by round account detailing each radar move and counter move.
Window/chaff was deployed for the first time in the July 1943 raids against Hamburg raid, Because of the use of chaff, our losses were relativly low and there was little effective night fighter activity. .
On this raid bombing accuracy was unprecedentedly high.In about half an hour it is estimated that 550-600 bomb loads fell into an area measuring only 2 miles by 1 mile
But within a few months the Germans had the ability to distinguish between moving aircraft and free falling chaff, and shortly after that the ability to factor in the effect of the wind speed on chaff, this increased again the defence systems ability to discriminate Window from aircraft.
Window, was near enough a one shot and with the exception of the Dresden raid, the bomber force never again hit as hard or with such low losses.
While Germany seems to have countered each British electronic innovation, quickly and effectively, the RAF policy seems to have been to indiscriminately bolt on more kit. Admittedly the Monica system was removed when it was discovered that the Luftwaffe had a receiver capable of receiving its transmissions, but this was not until mid 44. Given how quickly the Germans countered Window, and produced effective jammers for GEE and Oboe -and these effects were clearly seen operationally - it might seem naïve to suppose that they were not, rigorously examining and analysing all kinds of the the RAFs radar kit, after all they were shooting enough of it down.
The ability to add the Me 109 and Fw 190 to the defending forces, which was facilitated by installing relatively simple kit in these single seaters (that were available in great quantity), should not be overlooked.
The RAF flew at night but massively advertised its presence through its mapping radars, warning radars and possibly also IFF.
A strategy where the bomb carriers went in ‘quiet’ and dropped visually against accurately laid down markers couldhave lead to fewer losses. And in faster, lighter aircraft (without those gun turrets) would have been easy to investigate.
In fact towards the end raids were launched with massive airborne infrastructures of jamming, precision-guided dedicated target marker aircraft and airborne bombing leaders. And yet, each bomber carried its own advertising. Having bought the kit, nobody was able to go to war without it.
Last edited by Jetex Jim; 13th Feb 2008 at 05:04. Reason: spelling
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The Radar War! An interesting read, thanks, although it's almost a script from Monty Python in places, the Bismarck "advancing" towards the Bay of Biscay etc.
I don't think there's any doubt that the Germans fought the latter part of WW2 with under-developed weapons from the 1950s (V2, Type XXI, Me262), the Allies generally fought the European war with well-developed weapons from the 1930s. The Allies won because they had more of everything and they could manufacture more of everything.
So, with hindsight, no Stirlings, no Halifaxes, no B17s, no Liberators, but 2000 Lancasters twice weekly from the middle of 1943 onwards, starting with the Ruhr, not many Luftwaffe nightfighters equipped with Schräge Musik until late 1943. But following the "what-if" scenario through, if Germany capitulates in 1943/early 1944, what is to stop the Red Army reaching Calais?
Harris's biggest mistake was his obsession with Berlin, he never had the resources to win that air battle.
I don't think there's any doubt that the Germans fought the latter part of WW2 with under-developed weapons from the 1950s (V2, Type XXI, Me262), the Allies generally fought the European war with well-developed weapons from the 1930s. The Allies won because they had more of everything and they could manufacture more of everything.
So, with hindsight, no Stirlings, no Halifaxes, no B17s, no Liberators, but 2000 Lancasters twice weekly from the middle of 1943 onwards, starting with the Ruhr, not many Luftwaffe nightfighters equipped with Schräge Musik until late 1943. But following the "what-if" scenario through, if Germany capitulates in 1943/early 1944, what is to stop the Red Army reaching Calais?
Harris's biggest mistake was his obsession with Berlin, he never had the resources to win that air battle.
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It might have been interesting also if greater effort/focus had been placed on Spec 3/42 which resulted in the Vickers Windsor which, even as a prototype had some pretty decent altitude/speed/bomb load characteristics.
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From Mosquito by Bill Sweetman. ISBN 0 7106 0131 X. Worth buying for Rikyu Watanabe’s beautiful drawings alone. 
It has been argued that Bomber Command could have done far more damage to Germany, with far less loss of life among its own crews and far less wastage of wartime production capacity, had it embraced the concept of the fast unarmed bomber earlier. Certainly, the Command’s post-war policy reflected this experience, with its jet bombers being designed around advanced H2S and electronic countermeasures and relying on speed and altitude for defence.
It takes fairly simple arithmetic to calculate that the Mosquito in its ultimate form could deliver more weapons over the same distance than the typical heavy bomber, when the two aircraft were compared on the basis of crew man-hours, total engine hours and fuel consumption; also, that the average Mosquito could be expected to deliver far more bombs during its far longer life expectancy, and its crew could expect to survive a far longer tour of operations. The only serious weakness of this argument is that the relative invulnerability of the Mosquito was itself indirectly brought about by Bomber Command’s own policies. Because the RAF concentrated on producing the four-engined heavy bombers, the Luftwaffe’s main task was to destroy these; Germany’s aircraft-production chief Erhard Much accordingly opposed production of the Heinkel He 219 night-fighter, which was faster than the Mosquito, in favour of the slower Ju 88G, which was adequate to deal with the heavy bombers and could be built more cheaply than the He 219. The practical difficulties of a shift to the unarmed bomber philosophy would have been enormous at any stage (including the need to train crews to the high standards demanded for the Mosquito) and would have given the Luftwaffe time to re-equip with the He 219, undoubtedly increasing Mosquito losses.
It has been argued that Bomber Command could have done far more damage to Germany, with far less loss of life among its own crews and far less wastage of wartime production capacity, had it embraced the concept of the fast unarmed bomber earlier. Certainly, the Command’s post-war policy reflected this experience, with its jet bombers being designed around advanced H2S and electronic countermeasures and relying on speed and altitude for defence.
It takes fairly simple arithmetic to calculate that the Mosquito in its ultimate form could deliver more weapons over the same distance than the typical heavy bomber, when the two aircraft were compared on the basis of crew man-hours, total engine hours and fuel consumption; also, that the average Mosquito could be expected to deliver far more bombs during its far longer life expectancy, and its crew could expect to survive a far longer tour of operations. The only serious weakness of this argument is that the relative invulnerability of the Mosquito was itself indirectly brought about by Bomber Command’s own policies. Because the RAF concentrated on producing the four-engined heavy bombers, the Luftwaffe’s main task was to destroy these; Germany’s aircraft-production chief Erhard Much accordingly opposed production of the Heinkel He 219 night-fighter, which was faster than the Mosquito, in favour of the slower Ju 88G, which was adequate to deal with the heavy bombers and could be built more cheaply than the He 219. The practical difficulties of a shift to the unarmed bomber philosophy would have been enormous at any stage (including the need to train crews to the high standards demanded for the Mosquito) and would have given the Luftwaffe time to re-equip with the He 219, undoubtedly increasing Mosquito losses.
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forget, does make you wonder how things could pan out. The He 219 had an auspicious combat debut. On the night of 11-12 June 1943, Werner Streib flew the V9 and shot down five bombers. In the next ten days the three Heinkels He 219A-0 pre-production aircraft would shoot down a total of 20 RAF aircraft, including six of the previously "untouchable" de Havilland Mosquito.
Edited to add and one 219 shooting down six bombers in the space of twelve minutes.
Edited to add and one 219 shooting down six bombers in the space of twelve minutes.
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Yes it looks as though the Owl might have given the Mossies a few more worries, especially the 219A-6, dedicated Mossie swatter version.
It looks as though about 250 Uhu’s were made, with tricycle gear and ejector seats, they could have been 1950s technology. These were classic AI equipped nightfighters with a relatively short ranged radar, needs must then that they operated in close concert with ground controllers and were part of a system that had, compared to the numbers in the bomber stream, a low saturation level.
Hence the deployment and success Wilde Sau - Wiki has this on the subject.
He 219A-6 was a conversion from the He 219A-2/R1, powered by 2 × Daimler-Benz 603L, rated at 1,750 hp each, and fitted with nitrous-oxide. This version had no Shräge Musik, and no armor, to increase performance. It entered service in August 1944.
It looks as though about 250 Uhu’s were made, with tricycle gear and ejector seats, they could have been 1950s technology. These were classic AI equipped nightfighters with a relatively short ranged radar, needs must then that they operated in close concert with ground controllers and were part of a system that had, compared to the numbers in the bomber stream, a low saturation level.
Hence the deployment and success Wilde Sau - Wiki has this on the subject.
The Wilde Sau force scored their most notable success during the bombing of Peenemunde on August 17, 1943. Mosquito bombers had dropped target marker flares over Berlin and most of the night fighter force was sent there. When it was realized what was really happening, most of these planes were too far away and too slow to intercept the raid. However the much faster Fw 190’s being flown by the Wilde Sau forces were able to easily catch them, and about 30 planes entered the stream and shot down 29 of the 40 bombers lost that raid
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Regarding Uhus; a more valid measurement of the effectiveness of the Uhu vs the Mossie as a bomber destroyer is: if 500 heavily laden Heinkel 111s flew in loose connection from Germany to the UK, how many would be should down by an experienced Mossie nightfighter crew?
But perhaps the real question should be: why didn't the Luftwaffe take the air war to Bomber Command? Infiltrate a few JU88s into the stream back to the UK and lurk over the airfields; tired bomber crews, aircraft low on fuel, airfield landing lights etc.
But perhaps the real question should be: why didn't the Luftwaffe take the air war to Bomber Command? Infiltrate a few JU88s into the stream back to the UK and lurk over the airfields; tired bomber crews, aircraft low on fuel, airfield landing lights etc.
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Mike
Maybe they didn't think it was a good idea.
Why go all the way to England to be shot at by nightfighters when all the targets they could handle came to them, and they got to take a shot before the bombs were dropped.
why didn't the Luftwaffe take the air war to Bomber Command? Infiltrate a few JU88s into the stream back to the UK and lurk over the airfields; tired bomber crews, aircraft low on fuel, airfield landing lights etc.
Why go all the way to England to be shot at by nightfighters when all the targets they could handle came to them, and they got to take a shot before the bombs were dropped.
Last edited by Jetex Jim; 16th Feb 2008 at 06:32. Reason: spelling
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I can find three accounts of Luftwaffe intruder ops against the RAF and the USAAF, two regarded as successful:
http://www.baermann.biz/pauke/index.php?itemid=145
More Operation Gisella: http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/mar45.html 3rd March 1945
Why not do this in 1943? Risk of German technology falling onto Allied hands perhaps?
http://www.baermann.biz/pauke/index.php?itemid=145
More Operation Gisella: http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/mar45.html 3rd March 1945
Why not do this in 1943? Risk of German technology falling onto Allied hands perhaps?
Bomber Streams
My old mans log (2.3 tours) 49 7 90 and 156 squadron showed 2 entries one in 1941 the other May 45 where his Welly bomber and Lanc escaped with the skin of their teeth when bombs dropped on and all around them. The Welly had one 4lb incendiary bounce off and the Lanc dodged a shower of medium bombs that passed by ahead, astern and by both wingtips. He retired after that saying 68 trips was enough. Don Benett agreed!
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Nachtjagd by Theo Boiten has this to say about German intruder ops.
The Germans carried out intruder operations in the second half of 1940. They monitored Bomber Command’s daytime radio testing to get prior warning of a night raid, they then planned to operate in three waves.
First to shoot down aircraft as they took off, second to intercept over the North Sea outbound and inbound, and third over the bases as the bombers returned.
They quickly discoved that that it was more profitable to operate only over Bomber Command’s bases when aircraft returned with nav lights on to a lit airfield.
These early sorties were not very successful, during the last five months of 1940 they only shot down eight aircraft, but lost eleven aircraft on operations and another ten to other causes.
This, and increasing number of radar equipped Beaufighters, forced a change in tactics to patrolling over the North Sea, and this was more successful.
However, intruder ops over UK were resumed in 1941 and they extended their area of operations to central England..
Between January to October they claimed 125 RAF aircraft destroyed for their own loss of 55.
The continuing losses, bombing, and strafing forced the RAF to end night flying training in East Anglia, Yorkshire, and Lincolnshire.
It all came to an end in October 1941 when Hitler ordered General Kammhuber to halt all operations over the UK and North Sea.
He gave his reasons as “One cannot expect any results by the Fernnachrjagd.
If the Fernnachrjagd really would have been successful the British would have copied it a long time ago, as they imitate anything that works well”.
Hitler also stated on this occasion “The German citizen, whose house has been destroyed by a British bomber pilot, would rather see the British flyer shot down by a German night fighter in such a way that he can see this British machine lying next to his burning house”.
Hitler also did not believe in the effectiveness of the intruder ops because there had been no noticeable decline in Bomber Command raids on targets in the Reich.
The Germans carried out intruder operations in the second half of 1940. They monitored Bomber Command’s daytime radio testing to get prior warning of a night raid, they then planned to operate in three waves.
First to shoot down aircraft as they took off, second to intercept over the North Sea outbound and inbound, and third over the bases as the bombers returned.
They quickly discoved that that it was more profitable to operate only over Bomber Command’s bases when aircraft returned with nav lights on to a lit airfield.
These early sorties were not very successful, during the last five months of 1940 they only shot down eight aircraft, but lost eleven aircraft on operations and another ten to other causes.
This, and increasing number of radar equipped Beaufighters, forced a change in tactics to patrolling over the North Sea, and this was more successful.
However, intruder ops over UK were resumed in 1941 and they extended their area of operations to central England..
Between January to October they claimed 125 RAF aircraft destroyed for their own loss of 55.
The continuing losses, bombing, and strafing forced the RAF to end night flying training in East Anglia, Yorkshire, and Lincolnshire.
It all came to an end in October 1941 when Hitler ordered General Kammhuber to halt all operations over the UK and North Sea.
He gave his reasons as “One cannot expect any results by the Fernnachrjagd.
If the Fernnachrjagd really would have been successful the British would have copied it a long time ago, as they imitate anything that works well”.
Hitler also stated on this occasion “The German citizen, whose house has been destroyed by a British bomber pilot, would rather see the British flyer shot down by a German night fighter in such a way that he can see this British machine lying next to his burning house”.
Hitler also did not believe in the effectiveness of the intruder ops because there had been no noticeable decline in Bomber Command raids on targets in the Reich.
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Henry wrote: "They monitored Bomber Command’s daytime radio testing to get prior warning of a night raid"
When I was an apprentice at BAC, one of our drafties, Dave Booth, had been a wireless operator on Pathfinders. He told us that the wierdest piece of kit he tried was a system that puffed out pink smoke in response to a morse key. The idea being it would give a point to form up on without the tell tale radio traffic.
When I was an apprentice at BAC, one of our drafties, Dave Booth, had been a wireless operator on Pathfinders. He told us that the wierdest piece of kit he tried was a system that puffed out pink smoke in response to a morse key. The idea being it would give a point to form up on without the tell tale radio traffic.
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