WW2 Night Bomber Formations

[Jetex Jim]

A "what-if" scenerio is that the Western Allies put 90% available resource into building Lancasters

A more interesting What If might entail different priorities and different tactics, and arguably no greater production efforts.

The free down load available at
http://www.radarworld.org/books.html
The Radar War

Though rather offensively teutonic in places, it gives a fascinating, chronologically ordered, round by round account detailing each radar move and counter move.

Window/chaff was deployed for the first time in the July 1943 raids against Hamburg raid, Because of the use of chaff, our losses were relativly low and there was little effective night fighter activity. .

On this raid bombing accuracy was unprecedentedly high.In about half an hour it is estimated that 550-600 bomb loads fell into an area measuring only 2 miles by 1 mile

But within a few months the Germans had the ability to distinguish between moving aircraft and free falling chaff, and shortly after that the ability to factor in the effect of the wind speed on chaff, this increased again the defence systems ability to discriminate Window from aircraft.

Window, was near enough a one shot and with the exception of the Dresden raid, the bomber force never again hit as hard or with such low losses.

While Germany seems to have countered each British electronic innovation, quickly and effectively, the RAF policy seems to have been to indiscriminately bolt on more kit. Admittedly the Monica system was removed when it was discovered that the Luftwaffe had a receiver capable of receiving its transmissions, but this was not until mid 44. Given how quickly the Germans countered Window, and produced effective jammers for GEE and Oboe -and these effects were clearly seen operationally - it might seem naïve to suppose that they were not, rigorously examining and analysing all kinds of the the RAFs radar kit, after all they were shooting enough of it down.

The ability to add the Me 109 and Fw 190 to the defending forces, which was facilitated by installing relatively simple kit in these single seaters (that were available in great quantity), should not be overlooked.

The RAF flew at night but massively advertised its presence through its mapping radars, warning radars and possibly also IFF.

A strategy where the bomb carriers went in ‘quiet’ and dropped visually against accurately laid down markers couldhave lead to fewer losses. And in faster, lighter aircraft (without those gun turrets) would have been easy to investigate.

In fact towards the end raids were launched with massive airborne infrastructures of jamming, precision-guided dedicated target marker aircraft and airborne bombing leaders. And yet, each bomber carried its own advertising. Having bought the kit, nobody was able to go to war without it.