Qantas pilots making errors after long periods without flying
Who teaches to set the park brake on when on the runway during a normal take-off? I learnt a big lesson once watching an aircraft cause several go-rounds because they set the park brake and then the bugger got stuck on, tower loves that call when an aircraft is now lodged on the threshold of the main runway because x-factor pilot is stuck with the park brake jammed. And if this is in the sim, most likely after an unrealistic reset/reposition where a pilot may make this mistake which has no bearing on real operations. The other thing is what modern airplane will not scream at you if you even tried to attempt to apply moderate thrust with the park brake on, unless QF has un-bunged some DC-8s from the bone yard for use.
I always set the park brake when stopped for anything more than a few seconds. I would rather embarrass myself for forgetting it is on than rolling into another aircraft, rolling into an active runway, rolling off a runway or taxiway whilst distracted. It is better to be distracted with the park brake on than off!
Seems to reiterate my point.
[QUOTE=43Inches; The other thing is what modern airplane will not scream at you if you even tried to attempt to apply moderate thrust with the park brake on, unless QF has un-bunged some DC-8s from the bone yard for use.[/QUOTE]
Is that activated by a thrust lever angle switch?
Is that activated by a thrust lever angle switch?
The reason I mentioned the DC-8 was because as I remember they have no park brake warning system and one crash on take-off in the 70s was a suspected park brake locked on.
I assume all modern airliners have brake system cautions that display and become louder if you try to take off with them lit. Similarly the before take-off checklist would require a check of warnings prior to departure, airmanship would dictate you would have to re run from that item if the park brake was set until the caution removed, same as you wouldn't be silly enough to re-engage control locks after doing a control check.
I assume all modern airliners have brake system cautions that display and become louder if you try to take off with them lit. Similarly the before take-off checklist would require a check of warnings prior to departure, airmanship would dictate you would have to re run from that item if the park brake was set until the caution removed, same as you wouldn't be silly enough to re-engage control locks after doing a control check.
It may be a separate case but the real story is way funnier than the parkbrake…….
Physically if not Psychologically at the very least.
Lining up on a 3000m runway when an imminent take off clearance could be issued and you are worried about rolling?? Every time time I have lined up, tower expects me to be rolling within a few seconds…but I digress, why is this a reportable event? I suspect ASA issued a report due to an aircraft forced to GA.
Seems to reiterate my point.
Seems to reiterate my point.
Internal Qantas Memo Flags Errors By Out-Of-Practice Pilots
I love this bit from the Strategic Aviation Solutions Chairman:
Please excuse my ignorance, but who is this clown and what would he know about pilots? I'm not at QF so I wouldn't really know about any so called "cultural issues," but its a bit rich asking for more loyalty from pilots considering the distain and absolute disloyalty all QF group pilots have been shown from management in the last few years.
I love this bit from the Strategic Aviation Solutions Chairman:
The Strategic Aviation Solutions Chairman says the errors are being picked up in training rather than on actual passenger flights. But Mr Hansford points to some ingrained cultural issues at Qantasthat drive troublemaking behaviour, such as, say, leaking memo's “One of the problems at Qantas is you’ve got a group of people who believe they’re elite. They still don’t understand Qantas isn’t owned by the government (anymore), and there’s not just a bottomless pit to throw money at their avarice.“A bit more loyalty from the Qantas pilots, a bit more commitment to doing their job properly, and this story wouldn’t exist.”
Can’t get into too much trouble with the park brake on
Cessna Excel Down in Farmington CT
The Cessna 550 Citation Bravo corporate jet taxied at Lismore Airport for a flight to Baryulgil, New South Wales. The flight crew consisted of a captain and copilot, who were the only occupants of the aircraft.
The flight crew did not detect anything abnormal during the taxi and take-off roll, until the captain attempted to rotate the aircraft to the take-off pitch attitude. When the aircraft had achieved the required rotate speed, the captain applied the normal backpressure on the control column to achieve a standard rate of rotation, and the aircraft did not rotate. The captain then applied full backpressure and reported that the controls felt very heavy. Neither the captain nor the copilot detected any change in the aircraft's pitch attitude or any indication of pitch-up on the attitude direction indicator.
The captain rejected the take-off, applied full braking and reverse thrust, but the aircraft overran the runway. The nose landing gear detached from the aircraft about 50 m beyond the end of the sealed runway, and the aircraft came to rest in long grass and mud. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, and the captain and copilot were uninjured.
The aircraft did not accelerate normally as the acceleration was retarded by drag associated with rolling friction. This was indicative of partial brake pressure remaining during the take-off run. The partial brake pressure was possibly due to the parking brake being selected on at the holding point with enough pressure to retard aircraft acceleration during the take-off, but not sufficient to prevent the aircraft reaching rotate speed.
Furthermore, the nose-down moment generated by the partial brake pressure probably prevented the aircraft rotating sufficiently to become airborne, despite normal nose-up elevator deflection.
Heat in the brakes due to partial pressure during the take-off run may have reduced their effectiveness when the captain rejected the take-off, contributing to the runway overrun.
The flight crew did not detect anything abnormal during the taxi and take-off roll, until the captain attempted to rotate the aircraft to the take-off pitch attitude. When the aircraft had achieved the required rotate speed, the captain applied the normal backpressure on the control column to achieve a standard rate of rotation, and the aircraft did not rotate. The captain then applied full backpressure and reported that the controls felt very heavy. Neither the captain nor the copilot detected any change in the aircraft's pitch attitude or any indication of pitch-up on the attitude direction indicator.
The captain rejected the take-off, applied full braking and reverse thrust, but the aircraft overran the runway. The nose landing gear detached from the aircraft about 50 m beyond the end of the sealed runway, and the aircraft came to rest in long grass and mud. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, and the captain and copilot were uninjured.
The aircraft did not accelerate normally as the acceleration was retarded by drag associated with rolling friction. This was indicative of partial brake pressure remaining during the take-off run. The partial brake pressure was possibly due to the parking brake being selected on at the holding point with enough pressure to retard aircraft acceleration during the take-off, but not sufficient to prevent the aircraft reaching rotate speed.
Furthermore, the nose-down moment generated by the partial brake pressure probably prevented the aircraft rotating sufficiently to become airborne, despite normal nose-up elevator deflection.
Heat in the brakes due to partial pressure during the take-off run may have reduced their effectiveness when the captain rejected the take-off, contributing to the runway overrun.
The original article was just people who couldn't make it into an airline as a pilot telling the people who could make it how to do their job. Interestingly all the "issues" that were raised were still happening prior to covid so I don't quite understand what covid had to do with it. Maybe a bit of IR maneuvering? Leaking a few embarrassing emails to the press to show how bad QF pilots are and how some cheap contracting company could be just as good??
Last edited by neville_nobody; 6th Jan 2022 at 03:25.
I recall a Falcon 10 going for a swim off Chicago Meigs years ago. That’s why there is a take-off configuration warning horn.
(on my plane that calls for O2 masks on and confirm configuration. Or something)
(on my plane that calls for O2 masks on and confirm configuration. Or something)
short flights long nights
Internal Qantas Memo Flags Errors By Out-Of-Practice Pilots
I love this bit from the Strategic Aviation Solutions Chairman:
Please excuse my ignorance, but who is this clown and what would he know about pilots? I'm not at QF so I wouldn't really know about any so called "cultural issues," but its a bit rich asking for more loyalty from pilots considering the distain and absolute disloyalty all QF group pilots have been shown from management in the last few years.
I love this bit from the Strategic Aviation Solutions Chairman:
Please excuse my ignorance, but who is this clown and what would he know about pilots? I'm not at QF so I wouldn't really know about any so called "cultural issues," but its a bit rich asking for more loyalty from pilots considering the distain and absolute disloyalty all QF group pilots have been shown from management in the last few years.
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“A bit more loyalty from the Qantas pilots, a bit more commitment to doing their job properly, and this story wouldn’t exist.”
What a load. There isn’t a pilot body anywhere more committed to “ doing their job properly”
Cheap sensational click bait at its worst.
What a clown.
What a load. There isn’t a pilot body anywhere more committed to “ doing their job properly”
Cheap sensational click bait at its worst.
What a clown.
Internal Qantas Memo Flags Errors By Out-Of-Practice Pilots
I love this bit from the Strategic Aviation Solutions Chairman:
Please excuse my ignorance, but who is this clown and what would he know about pilots? I'm not at QF so I wouldn't really know about any so called "cultural issues," but its a bit rich asking for more loyalty from pilots considering the distain and absolute disloyalty all QF group pilots have been shown from management in the last few years.
I love this bit from the Strategic Aviation Solutions Chairman:
Please excuse my ignorance, but who is this clown and what would he know about pilots? I'm not at QF so I wouldn't really know about any so called "cultural issues," but its a bit rich asking for more loyalty from pilots considering the distain and absolute disloyalty all QF group pilots have been shown from management in the last few years.
When the aircraft had achieved the required rotate speed, the captain applied the normal backpressure on the control column to achieve a standard rate of rotation, and the aircraft did not rotate. The captain then applied full backpressure and reported that the controls felt very heavy
This was indicative of partial brake pressure remaining during the take-off run. The partial brake pressure was possibly due to the parking brake being selected on at the holding point with enough pressure to retard aircraft acceleration during the take-off, but not sufficient to prevent the aircraft reaching rotate speed.
I'm also sceptical that a dragging brake (and alleged nose down moment as a result) couldn't be overcome with "full back pressure" if the a/c had reached Vr (and beyond by the time full back pressure was applied).
“A bit more loyalty from the Qantas pilots, a bit more commitment to doing their job properly, and this story wouldn’t exist.”
What a load. There isn’t a pilot body anywhere more committed to “ doing their job properly”
Cheap sensational click bait at its worst.
What a clown.
What a load. There isn’t a pilot body anywhere more committed to “ doing their job properly”
Cheap sensational click bait at its worst.
What a clown.
That said the original statement is far worse, saying that somehow loyalty equals better performance in the workplace. In fact could be the exact opposite if no one questions the bad parts of the system, due to 'loyalty'. Something that leadership that likes to dictate to its workforce and customers would say and do.
Nothing to see here.
Told to wait on the runway. Tedious holding the brakes on with feet for more than 20 secs or so, so park brake goes on, nothing wrong with that.
Take-off clearance given; 99.9% of the time, we release the park brake and apply thrust etc.
Once in a blue moon, we do it in the wrong order and forget the park brake....oh bugger !; park brake off, "that's better" and away we go.
A bit like in the SIM when you are setting off for the umpteenth take-off but have forgotten to input a flex value on this occasion. Engines spool up but no flex available.....huh?, oh yes, bugger! select TOGA and away we go.
Told to wait on the runway. Tedious holding the brakes on with feet for more than 20 secs or so, so park brake goes on, nothing wrong with that.
Take-off clearance given; 99.9% of the time, we release the park brake and apply thrust etc.
Once in a blue moon, we do it in the wrong order and forget the park brake....oh bugger !; park brake off, "that's better" and away we go.
A bit like in the SIM when you are setting off for the umpteenth take-off but have forgotten to input a flex value on this occasion. Engines spool up but no flex available.....huh?, oh yes, bugger! select TOGA and away we go.