Virgin ATR grounded in Albury
Let's face it, if casa had an aoc they couldn't keep it. They are a do as I say not as I do organisation and unfortunately do not have a huge amount of respect within the industry.
I was kind of hopeful the new boss would see through a few people but that doesn't appear to have happened.
I was kind of hopeful the new boss would see through a few people but that doesn't appear to have happened.
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The interim report has been released today. Interesting reading.
For those that haven't seen it. Here is a link:
Investigation: AO-2014-032 - In-flight pitch disconnect involving ATR 72 aircraft, VH FVR 47 km WSW of Sydney Airport, NSW on 20 February 2014
For those that haven't seen it. Here is a link:
Investigation: AO-2014-032 - In-flight pitch disconnect involving ATR 72 aircraft, VH FVR 47 km WSW of Sydney Airport, NSW on 20 February 2014
A non level elevator cleared to fly again?
What the hell is wrong with people??? I hope everyone involved in signing it off is out of the industry....
I'd like to know what else these people cleared to fly.
What the hell is wrong with people??? I hope everyone involved in signing it off is out of the industry....
I'd like to know what else these people cleared to fly.
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Good summary here:-
ATR 72 In-Flight Pitch Disconnect and Structural Failure
Was there not a suggestion of maintenance personnel fatigue?
ATR 72 In-Flight Pitch Disconnect and Structural Failure
Was there not a suggestion of maintenance personnel fatigue?
The ATSB report isn’t getting the attention it deserves. Can I please draw invidious comparisons with attitudes to the loss of AirAsia QZ 8501 later in 2014. In both cases the crew mismanaged an upset with opposite control inputs.
The AirAsia A320 broke up in flight for many reasons, not least the language confusion and Captain telling FO to “Pull Down, Pull Down”. The airline was vilified and Indonesian aviation denigrated. However Indonesia’s report is timely and thorough.
For the ATR all we have is an interim report with many unanswered questions.
Opposite control inputs from ATR’s Captain and FO caused the left and right elevator control systems to uncouple from each other. It may not be common knowledge that many aircraft have separate control runs to each side of the elevator. The sides are connected by a clutch which in event of a jam disconnects and allows safe flight. In this incident independent and opposite movement of the left and right elevators via the captain’s and FO’s control columns respectively subjected the tail to asymmetric loads well beyond design requirements.
Subsequent ATR analysis found that the maximum load on the horizontal stabiliser exceeded design ultimate load by about 47 per cent, and the exceedance lasted about 0.125 second.
Somehow the ATR’s tailplane held together. Damage was so severe that the tail was visually twisted, yet nobody noticed. The plane continued in service and extent of damage was discovered almost by chance after a suspected bird strike. The aircraft was so severely damaged that ATR required complete replacement of both the vertical and horizontal tails.
Once again Australia kept its aviation reputation intact more by luck than competency. If you think that’s a harsh judgement read another recent ATSB report, into how two Boeing 737s nearly ran out of fuel and had no option but to land in fog with fuel and visibility below legal minima. Final report is at https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/577054...-100-final.pdf
The AirAsia A320 broke up in flight for many reasons, not least the language confusion and Captain telling FO to “Pull Down, Pull Down”. The airline was vilified and Indonesian aviation denigrated. However Indonesia’s report is timely and thorough.
For the ATR all we have is an interim report with many unanswered questions.
Opposite control inputs from ATR’s Captain and FO caused the left and right elevator control systems to uncouple from each other. It may not be common knowledge that many aircraft have separate control runs to each side of the elevator. The sides are connected by a clutch which in event of a jam disconnects and allows safe flight. In this incident independent and opposite movement of the left and right elevators via the captain’s and FO’s control columns respectively subjected the tail to asymmetric loads well beyond design requirements.
Subsequent ATR analysis found that the maximum load on the horizontal stabiliser exceeded design ultimate load by about 47 per cent, and the exceedance lasted about 0.125 second.
Somehow the ATR’s tailplane held together. Damage was so severe that the tail was visually twisted, yet nobody noticed. The plane continued in service and extent of damage was discovered almost by chance after a suspected bird strike. The aircraft was so severely damaged that ATR required complete replacement of both the vertical and horizontal tails.
Once again Australia kept its aviation reputation intact more by luck than competency. If you think that’s a harsh judgement read another recent ATSB report, into how two Boeing 737s nearly ran out of fuel and had no option but to land in fog with fuel and visibility below legal minima. Final report is at https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/577054...-100-final.pdf
There's an extended version of post above at Plane lucky: an aviation escape
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The question remains - what are two pilots doing on the controls at the same time? There are very few occasions where this may be appropriate these days & I don't believe that this is one of them.
The AirAsia A320 accident almost defies belief. The following quote got my attention -
"The captain needed the co-pilot to assist by pushing his control forward to make the aircraft pitch down." Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do not believe that the A320 requires forward sidestick on both sides in order to obtain a maximum nose down command. If the captain had full nose down input on his side, no amount of input on the F/o's side would make any difference. The captain didn't need the F/o to assist as asserted in the article & if he felt he did, it shows an extreme lack of understanding of the aircraft systems & of the principles of multi-crew operations.
I had a senior pilot riding shotgun in a Chieftain one night who thought he had the right to manipulate the controls at any time he saw fit. Not that I had any idea of what he was doing until after. As I was about to commence the flare, just starting to put pressure on the control column, it jerked back & the aircraft leapt upwards. I was wondering if the control column was sticking but, having enough speed & runway eased the aircraft down & commenced the flare again. Same thing. After the aircraft 'arrived' rather firmly the 3rd time, I discussed the possibility of the control column jamming with him later in the roll-out. He then sheepishly admitted that he had thought I was flaring too late & had pulled back on the controls. The combined input from both me & him lead to the control column jerking back & the aircraft pitching up vigorously. He is now a QF captain & I hope he learnt a lesson that night.
If the captain on the ATR thought that the F/o wasn't doing a good enough job, he should have said "I have control" & the F/o hopefully would have let go.
I am really starting to worry about training and basic airmanship these days.
The AirAsia A320 accident almost defies belief. The following quote got my attention -
"The captain needed the co-pilot to assist by pushing his control forward to make the aircraft pitch down." Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do not believe that the A320 requires forward sidestick on both sides in order to obtain a maximum nose down command. If the captain had full nose down input on his side, no amount of input on the F/o's side would make any difference. The captain didn't need the F/o to assist as asserted in the article & if he felt he did, it shows an extreme lack of understanding of the aircraft systems & of the principles of multi-crew operations.
I had a senior pilot riding shotgun in a Chieftain one night who thought he had the right to manipulate the controls at any time he saw fit. Not that I had any idea of what he was doing until after. As I was about to commence the flare, just starting to put pressure on the control column, it jerked back & the aircraft leapt upwards. I was wondering if the control column was sticking but, having enough speed & runway eased the aircraft down & commenced the flare again. Same thing. After the aircraft 'arrived' rather firmly the 3rd time, I discussed the possibility of the control column jamming with him later in the roll-out. He then sheepishly admitted that he had thought I was flaring too late & had pulled back on the controls. The combined input from both me & him lead to the control column jerking back & the aircraft pitching up vigorously. He is now a QF captain & I hope he learnt a lesson that night.
If the captain on the ATR thought that the F/o wasn't doing a good enough job, he should have said "I have control" & the F/o hopefully would have let go.
I am really starting to worry about training and basic airmanship these days.
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"The captain needed the co-pilot to assist by pushing his control forward to make the aircraft pitch down." Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do not believe that the A320 requires forward sidestick on both sides in order to obtain a maximum nose down command. If the captain had full nose down input on his side, no amount of input on the F/o's side would make any difference. The captain didn't need the F/o to assist as asserted in the article & if he felt he did, it shows an extreme lack of understanding of the aircraft systems & of the principles of multi-crew operations.
Certainly it could be argued that he should have taken control by telling the FO to #@z*^\ well let go, but he didn't and the rest is history.
I think what needs to happen with Airbus control law is any movement on the captains stick overrides the FO stick. If the FO needs to take over, or lockout a malfunctioning Cm1 stick , they push the takeover push button.
If this was the case, AF wouldn't have happened. Neither would Air Asia.
You could argue these crew didn't follow the correct procedure and if they had, they wouldn't have found themselves in the situation. True, however from a human factors perspective it's happening quite often. Despite what we are taught in the sim, when the skipper needs to grab the stick quickly, the PB is often overlooked and the stick is manipulated with a dual input alert.
If this was the case, AF wouldn't have happened. Neither would Air Asia.
You could argue these crew didn't follow the correct procedure and if they had, they wouldn't have found themselves in the situation. True, however from a human factors perspective it's happening quite often. Despite what we are taught in the sim, when the skipper needs to grab the stick quickly, the PB is often overlooked and the stick is manipulated with a dual input alert.
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So back to this topic, an ATR that doesn't have any fancy Airbus control stick gizmos - how did it come about that the FO (who was flying at the time) wasn't aware of the CPT's intentions? Did the CPT announce taking over, and if he did, did he communicate it poorly? Why has this possible active failure not been discussed properly in any reports yet?
What was VARA's organisational culture like at the time? A couple of serious incidents had taken place in the previous 12 months. Was there a notion of fear amongst the crew about a possible punitive culture following an error? Was the CPT so scared of being investigated for a possible over speed that he completely over reacted?
Will the ATSB investigate the contributing organisational factors to this incident (like organisational culture)? Doubt it....
What was VARA's organisational culture like at the time? A couple of serious incidents had taken place in the previous 12 months. Was there a notion of fear amongst the crew about a possible punitive culture following an error? Was the CPT so scared of being investigated for a possible over speed that he completely over reacted?
Will the ATSB investigate the contributing organisational factors to this incident (like organisational culture)? Doubt it....
On 11 July Fairfax Media published my account of the Virgin ATR 72 debacle at Plane lucky: an aviation escape. ATSB took umbrage and published a rebuttal on 14 July at https://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/correcting-the-record/. I stand by my article and deny it “contains factual errors and misunderstandings”.
Since ATSB is so defensive of its lengthy investigation let’s spell out the timeline and compare it with Indonesia’s investigation of the AirAsia QZ8501 accident.
On 20 February 2014 the pilots of a Virgin ATR 72 mis-handled control inputs and overloaded the tailplane by 47 percent beyond ultimate design capability. Nowadays we design aircraft precisely, with no extra strength “for Mum and the kids”. So it is pure luck that the structure held together. For the next 5 days nobody noticed serious damage and a visibly twisted tailplane. The critically weakened airliner stayed in service and carried hundreds of passengers until the damage was found largely by luck.
On 10 June 2014 ATSB published an interim report of the accident, which described the damage but not its cause or why the damage went unnoticed.
On 15 June 2016 ATSB published a second interim report which quantified the overload, explained its cause and alerted operators that inadvertent application of opposing pitch control inputs can catastrophically damage ATR 72 and ATR 42 aircraft. ATSB seems not to have warned operators of other aircraft with similar controls. And 28 months after the accident ATSB is still analyzing why post-occurrence inspections failed to detect such gross damage.
Meanwhile on 28 December 2014 an AirAsia Airbus A320 crashed after a series of mistakes culminating in somewhat similar control mis-handling by the pilots. It took Indonesian investigators just 12 months to recover wreckage, extract flight data, analyse a complicated accident scenario and publish a thorough analysis of what went wrong.
ATSB must explain why its investigation is taking so long, and Virgin and CASA must be held to account for why so many passengers were put in jeopardy. Otherwise Australia’s aviation luck may run out.
Since ATSB is so defensive of its lengthy investigation let’s spell out the timeline and compare it with Indonesia’s investigation of the AirAsia QZ8501 accident.
On 20 February 2014 the pilots of a Virgin ATR 72 mis-handled control inputs and overloaded the tailplane by 47 percent beyond ultimate design capability. Nowadays we design aircraft precisely, with no extra strength “for Mum and the kids”. So it is pure luck that the structure held together. For the next 5 days nobody noticed serious damage and a visibly twisted tailplane. The critically weakened airliner stayed in service and carried hundreds of passengers until the damage was found largely by luck.
On 10 June 2014 ATSB published an interim report of the accident, which described the damage but not its cause or why the damage went unnoticed.
On 15 June 2016 ATSB published a second interim report which quantified the overload, explained its cause and alerted operators that inadvertent application of opposing pitch control inputs can catastrophically damage ATR 72 and ATR 42 aircraft. ATSB seems not to have warned operators of other aircraft with similar controls. And 28 months after the accident ATSB is still analyzing why post-occurrence inspections failed to detect such gross damage.
Meanwhile on 28 December 2014 an AirAsia Airbus A320 crashed after a series of mistakes culminating in somewhat similar control mis-handling by the pilots. It took Indonesian investigators just 12 months to recover wreckage, extract flight data, analyse a complicated accident scenario and publish a thorough analysis of what went wrong.
ATSB must explain why its investigation is taking so long, and Virgin and CASA must be held to account for why so many passengers were put in jeopardy. Otherwise Australia’s aviation luck may run out.
"Nowadays we design aircraft precisely, with no extra strength “for Mum and the kids”. "
Aircraft are designed to ultimate loads which are 150% above the design limit load.
Aircraft are designed to ultimate loads which are 150% above the design limit load.
I agree that it's taking an excessive amount of time for the final report to be released. Mind you, I guess it doesn't help when the aircraft manufacturer is tardy in providing data requested by the investigator. The interim report released last month states that it took the manufacturer around 12 months to provide some of that data.
If the report had contained an analysis of why the damage wasn't found for five days, then I guess it wouldn't have been labelled an 'interim' report. As the ATSB said in its 'Correcting the record' dated 14 July, the initial focus was analysing the safety issue that caused the accident in the first place, ie the opposing control inputs by the pilots. The investigation of the subsequent maintenance issues is ongoing and will be included in the final report, supposed to be released in December.
If the report had contained an analysis of why the damage wasn't found for five days, then I guess it wouldn't have been labelled an 'interim' report. As the ATSB said in its 'Correcting the record' dated 14 July, the initial focus was analysing the safety issue that caused the accident in the first place, ie the opposing control inputs by the pilots. The investigation of the subsequent maintenance issues is ongoing and will be included in the final report, supposed to be released in December.
On any aircraft there are literally thousands of different load cases.
An individual ultimate load case maybe exceeded without causing damage due to an additional margin of safety that case has inherited by meeting the requirements for a different limiting load case.
For example a flight control ultimate load case maybe less than the minimum weight gust response ultimate load case. Aircraft are designed so that the limiting case has a 150% safety factor.
If the limiting ultimate load case was exceeded it would result in failure.