Virgin Aircraft 'Emergency' Landing
"Affordable safety" might not have changed the CAR, but the support mechanisms in the context of what ATC provides now compared to past times certainly have.
Removal of "government-provided" Operational Control was not replaced with mandatory company operational control. In addition, AsA do not fulfill their ICAO obligations when it only provides hazard info within 1 hour of arrival.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 28th Jul 2013 at 03:43. Reason: "unsure" to "ensure"
Operator’s Flight Dispatch
1. Flight Dispatch did not proactively provide timely and
comprehensive weather information to the crew about the deteriorating weather conditions at Brisbane.
Substitute the destination as Mildura and its easy to see that nothing has changed in the last 12 years.
5. The operator advised that its flight dispatch department was in the process of updating the operator’s Flight Administration Manual (FAM) to reflect the flight dispatch active operational control support role to flight crews.
Originally Posted by Lookleft
Flight Dispatch did not proactively provide timely and
comprehensive weather information to the crew about the deteriorating weather conditions at Brisbane.
Substitute the destination as Mildura and its easy to see that nothing has changed in the last 12 years.
comprehensive weather information to the crew about the deteriorating weather conditions at Brisbane.
Substitute the destination as Mildura and its easy to see that nothing has changed in the last 12 years.
Looks to me like QF Ops did the right thing.
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.....AsA do not fulfill their ICAO obligations when it only provides hazard info within 1 hour of arrival.
The specified time for most non-routine Met products and Hazard alerting is delegated to regional air navigation agreements.
ACARSd the new ADL TAF to the crew around TOC out of Sydney
Bloggs, in what way do you consider Airservices non-compliant?
The specified time for most non-routine Met products and Hazard alerting is delegated to regional air navigation agreements.
The specified time for most non-routine Met products and Hazard alerting is delegated to regional air navigation agreements.
Somebody (AsA or CASA) has created the "within one hour" requirement. If a regional air nav agreement has that in it, so be it. AsA is still non-compliant with the basic ICAO reg.
Originally Posted by Lookleft
But what happened after that? What happened to the active operational control?
Does it really matter though? Would QF FD have made the aircraft go somewhere else based on the available info and the current rules (and previous weather incidents?)? I doubt it. But at least the crew had the latest weather for ADL at their fingertips pretty quickly and certainly well before any PNR.
I don't think that its as straightforward as simply acarsing ( a new verb!) an updated TAF.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 28th Jul 2013 at 05:09.
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Hey Bloggs.
The ammended TAF was issued at 2100Z. QF pushed back at 2109Z.
Why wasnt that information passed on at that stage from dispatch or indeed from ATC?
Bearing in mind that the Flight Tracker info may not be accurate.
In any event I agree that the outcome in all probability would not have been any different given the TTF's that did not change until both aircraft were essentially on descent into ADL.
The ammended TAF was issued at 2100Z. QF pushed back at 2109Z.
Why wasnt that information passed on at that stage from dispatch or indeed from ATC?
Bearing in mind that the Flight Tracker info may not be accurate.
In any event I agree that the outcome in all probability would not have been any different given the TTF's that did not change until both aircraft were essentially on descent into ADL.
Last edited by tenretni; 28th Jul 2013 at 07:17.
Originally Posted by Tenretni
Hey Bloggs.
The ammended TAF was issued at 2100Z. QF didnt pushback till 2109Z.
Why wasnt that information passed on at that stage from dispatch or indeed from ATC?
The ammended TAF was issued at 2100Z. QF didnt pushback till 2109Z.
Why wasnt that information passed on at that stage from dispatch or indeed from ATC?
Things happen. I can understand a TAF not making it to the cockpit within 9 minutes of issue.
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AsA doesn't comply with ICAO Annex 11 Chapter 4 (my old version, at least). There is no "one hour" criteria in there.
Doc 4444 Ch.9 specifies 1 hour for SIGMETs, yet Airservices stipulates 2 hours for these. Beyond the minimum requirements.
Originally Posted by 5miles
What then does Annex 11 Ch. 4 specify?
ICAO Doc 4444 Chapter 9 Flight Informtation and Alerting Service
Para 9.1.3.5.2 The passing of amended aerodrome forecasts to aircraft on the initiative of the appropriate air traffic services unit should be limited to that portion of the flight where the aircraft is within a specified time from the aerodrome of destination, such time being established on the basis of regional air navigation agreements.
Para 9.1.3.5.2 The passing of amended aerodrome forecasts to aircraft on the initiative of the appropriate air traffic services unit should be limited to that portion of the flight where the aircraft is within a specified time from the aerodrome of destination, such time being established on the basis of regional air navigation agreements.
Thanks Top Drop. I can't get access to the curent regs. Can't find them. I think we would all be in agreement that, unless CASA mandates company operational control/flight following, 1 hour prior to ETA that your destination has an amended TAF for fog is not enough?
I remember when ATC ops control was disbanded, we were told that operational control would be the responsibility of operating companies, who in many cases would delegate it to the pilot. I don't know where that responsibility is written in the regs.
I found this from 1988 Regs.
(2) (a) is very similar to the wording for ops control when it was done by ATC.
CAR 224 Pilot in command
(1)For each flight the operator shall designate one pilot to act as pilot in command.
Penalty: 5 penalty units.
(1A) An offence against subregulation (1) is an offence of strict liability.
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
(2)A pilot in command of an aircraft is responsible for:
(a) the start, continuation, diversion and end of a flight by the aircraft; and
(b) the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time; and
(c) the safety of persons and cargo carried on the aircraft; and
(d) the conduct and safety of members of the crew on the aircraft.
(2) (a) is very similar to the wording for ops control when it was done by ATC.
CAR 224 Pilot in command
(1)For each flight the operator shall designate one pilot to act as pilot in command.
Penalty: 5 penalty units.
(1A) An offence against subregulation (1) is an offence of strict liability.
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
(2)A pilot in command of an aircraft is responsible for:
(a) the start, continuation, diversion and end of a flight by the aircraft; and
(b) the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time; and
(c) the safety of persons and cargo carried on the aircraft; and
(d) the conduct and safety of members of the crew on the aircraft.
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the penny drops...the PIC is LEGALLY responsible for the safety of the people onboard the aircraft. End of legal story. Want to test it in a Courtroom? So you have three choices, keep tossing the dice (and hope that in the meantime enough buck passing might start to carry enough weight to change the Law), put on enough fuel to carry a 'suitable' alt in anything under 8/8ths of blue, or drive a bus.
But the PIC is not the only person legally responsible for the safety of POB. Get ATC to give instructions that cause a mid-air, and test that in Courtroom …
If BOM is ‘all care but no responsibility’, might as well shut it down.
If BOM is ‘all care but no responsibility’, might as well shut it down.
the PIC is LEGALLY responsible for the safety of the people onboard the aircraft.
That was moi. If I arrived safely in one piece with the aircraft in one piece then everyone else on board would arrive safely.
I worked on the principal that there was only one person on board that I was responsible for.
That was moi. If I arrived safely in one piece with the aircraft in one piece then everyone else on board would arrive safely.
That was moi. If I arrived safely in one piece with the aircraft in one piece then everyone else on board would arrive safely.
Of course the PIC is legally responsible for the safe conduct of the flight but in order for him/her to conduct that flight safely he/she needs to be provided with all the information relevant to the flight by those who actually have the information! It also needs to be provided as soon as it becomes available either from ATC or the airlines Ops Centre or whatever it is called. That doesn't remove the responsibility from the PIC for the ultimate outcome of the flight but it makes the decision making process a whole lot easier when the G part of GRADE is a complete picture in real time of what is happening with the weather. If the weather that has been provided states that there are no requirements particularly for the alternate then its not too much to ask for the crew to be updated when that is no longer the case, or are the crew expected to ask every five minutes for the latest update?