Former concorde captain speaks out on erebus
I see it no other way.....regardless of who may have contributed to that flights demise........As the Captain,no matter what happens on that flight whether it be at my hands or others,.....I am still responsible to deal with the "situation" at hand ......and are responsible no matter what the outcome.............
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"Don't ever trust the bastards" because the day you do, it could be over for you and your pax.
Modern aviation is built on a system of trust, and can't possibly function any other way. You have no choice but to trust your engineers (unless you propose disassembling and rebuilding your aircraft before you fly it), your loadmaster/dispatcher/baggage loaders (unless you propose loading your own aircraft and calculating your own mass and balance), your fueller (when was the last time you fuelled your own jet transport), your crew, and so on.
The unfortunate thing is that if any of the people mentioned above screw up, you get to wear the consequences. A bit like Jim Collins ended up wearing the consequences of his Flight Ops department stuffing up. Well, partly.
It's fine to be wary, but at the end of the day you have to trust your team. Otherwise, the operation just falls apart.
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As an ex airline Captain I'm often asked how I coped with the responsibility for 300 plus people.
No problem I reply.' At the front you generally hit first, if I get there the pax will get there'
No problem I reply.' At the front you generally hit first, if I get there the pax will get there'
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Remoak, I was referring to the aircraft. Not the engineers or anybody else involved in its flight. Read my post again. Aircraft are built to fly, always have been, but sometimes they don't, for what ever reason. Sometimes that reason sneaks up on you, sometimes its right in your face (like birdstrike) what the old flying instructor was saying, don't expect it to always do what is expected, to do so is folly, always expect the unexpected, I don't care if it is a Tiger Moth or a A380, or as he also used to say, if it has wings or t$ts, its going to give you trouble somewhere down the track. He was not wrong.
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Nothing can be gained by allotting blame now. The operation was out of the ordinary and Air NZ was out of its depth.
Under air law Captain Collins gets all the blame and it's unlikely Chippindale's finding can be challenged, but the outcome of any court case depends on how smart your lawyers are, what expert witnesses they can net in and the whim of jury members. We have seen already how Mahon painted, with colour and style, Collins as the victim.
In a statistical sense how much blame you get depends on how well you performed compared with your peers; that can only be conjecture since we cannot repeat the flight. How many pilots would have conducted it the way Collins did given the same circumstances? How many would have been saved by intelligence and airmanship?
From the airmanship perspective, the sympathy for Collins is worrying. NZALPA opines Captain Collins left NZ with the "wrong" situational awareness due to the unannounced change in coordinates for "McMurdo". I call that a mindset. For a humble VFR pilot, situational awareness is seeing where I am and where I am going, and if uncertain then flying the aircraft in a safe manner until that's resolved.
Below cloud and at 1500ft, nobody on the flight deck was certain of the aircraft's position - everybody was guessing - and the decision by the PIC to continue south smacks of get-home-itis.
Most likely had the "McMurdo" coordinates Collins entered into the AINS been the same as he plotted the night before, the crash would not have happened. That does not make his choices wise or his actions right. It would have meant he was lucky, this time.
We hear a lot about the safety culture; the attitude to safety in an organisation. Certainly an airline pilot is dependent on others knowing what they are doing and doing it. An organisation is only the people who make it; sometimes unfortunately the total is less than the sum. There need to be systems in place so there is no single point of failure.
We seem to hear less about safety as a personal philosophy or creed, perhaps it is taken for granted. At risk of incurring the wrath of the self-appointed gods of accidents, I speak again as an informed passenger on airliners. What I want up front is a pilot, not a philosopher, psychologist, political analyst or poet. A pilot who knows how to fly the aircraft and is careful.
Whether Collins was careful or not is a question of judgement. That is the crux of the matter, and one on which there seems no agreement.
Under air law Captain Collins gets all the blame and it's unlikely Chippindale's finding can be challenged, but the outcome of any court case depends on how smart your lawyers are, what expert witnesses they can net in and the whim of jury members. We have seen already how Mahon painted, with colour and style, Collins as the victim.
In a statistical sense how much blame you get depends on how well you performed compared with your peers; that can only be conjecture since we cannot repeat the flight. How many pilots would have conducted it the way Collins did given the same circumstances? How many would have been saved by intelligence and airmanship?
From the airmanship perspective, the sympathy for Collins is worrying. NZALPA opines Captain Collins left NZ with the "wrong" situational awareness due to the unannounced change in coordinates for "McMurdo". I call that a mindset. For a humble VFR pilot, situational awareness is seeing where I am and where I am going, and if uncertain then flying the aircraft in a safe manner until that's resolved.
Below cloud and at 1500ft, nobody on the flight deck was certain of the aircraft's position - everybody was guessing - and the decision by the PIC to continue south smacks of get-home-itis.
Most likely had the "McMurdo" coordinates Collins entered into the AINS been the same as he plotted the night before, the crash would not have happened. That does not make his choices wise or his actions right. It would have meant he was lucky, this time.
We hear a lot about the safety culture; the attitude to safety in an organisation. Certainly an airline pilot is dependent on others knowing what they are doing and doing it. An organisation is only the people who make it; sometimes unfortunately the total is less than the sum. There need to be systems in place so there is no single point of failure.
We seem to hear less about safety as a personal philosophy or creed, perhaps it is taken for granted. At risk of incurring the wrath of the self-appointed gods of accidents, I speak again as an informed passenger on airliners. What I want up front is a pilot, not a philosopher, psychologist, political analyst or poet. A pilot who knows how to fly the aircraft and is careful.
Whether Collins was careful or not is a question of judgement. That is the crux of the matter, and one on which there seems no agreement.
Last edited by Ornis; 24th Apr 2012 at 03:58. Reason: grammar
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Then let's get back to the facts:
Only two previous flights had similar conditions. Captain Dalziel took the alternative route. Captain Ruffell did not, but he baled out once he got the weather report, and toured the Dry Valleys - with good success.
Captain Collins had blue skies in the Dry Valleys, but he "preferred [McMurdo] first". Why? So he himself could see the various shacks, which he had not seen before. So this gentleman went and did something that could only be justified in a single-seater, and pretended to be visual, when he knew he was not.
This whole argument is insane, and the root cause of it is a judge with a brain tumour and a couple of dodgy lawyers.
Only two previous flights had similar conditions. Captain Dalziel took the alternative route. Captain Ruffell did not, but he baled out once he got the weather report, and toured the Dry Valleys - with good success.
Captain Collins had blue skies in the Dry Valleys, but he "preferred [McMurdo] first". Why? So he himself could see the various shacks, which he had not seen before. So this gentleman went and did something that could only be justified in a single-seater, and pretended to be visual, when he knew he was not.
This whole argument is insane, and the root cause of it is a judge with a brain tumour and a couple of dodgy lawyers.
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Ampan, you need to have your medication reviewed.
No they didn't. Dalziell had planned to take the alternative route well in advance of the descent because McMurdo was closed, and Ruffell essentially diverted after getting the latest weather report which also indicated McMurdo below all ops. Nothing like the Collins flight.
It has since been shown that the words "No I prefer here first" were never spoken on the CVR. You are forgiven this belief.
Really? And what tantalising piece of knowledge do you have that no-one else has, that you can see into his long-dead mind? Also, didn't realise Collins was acting alone on the flight deck. What was in the minds of the others? Do tell.
Ditto.
The first 5 words I entirely agree with, the rest you can figure it out for youself.
Only two previous flights had similar conditions.
Captain Collins had blue skies in the Dry Valleys, but he "preferred [McMurdo] first".
Why? So he himself could see the various shacks, which he had not seen before.
So this gentleman went and did something that could only be justified in a single-seater, and pretended to be visual, when he knew he was not.
This whole argument is insane, and the root cause of it is a judge with a brain tumour and a couple of dodgy lawyers.
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is not solely responsible for the saftey of his/her flight seems to allude you
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Deadhead,
In what way weather wise do you say the Collins flight was different??
The reported weather at McMurdo was well below minimums for the approved VMC descent procedure, why else would he resort to a hole in the clouds VMC descent??.
Nothing on Ross Island, including Mt Erebus was ever positively identified at any time. What does that say about the weather conditions at the time of descent??.
Nothing like the Collins flight.
The reported weather at McMurdo was well below minimums for the approved VMC descent procedure, why else would he resort to a hole in the clouds VMC descent??.
Nothing on Ross Island, including Mt Erebus was ever positively identified at any time. What does that say about the weather conditions at the time of descent??.
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I'm referring to the reported weather conditions, which were below all ops for the two flights which diverted, and 40 miles visibility for the Colllins flight.
When you say "approved" can I just get you (for my edification) to tell me what you understand by that, and who exactly was authorised to do this "approving,"
When you say "approved" can I just get you (for my edification) to tell me what you understand by that, and who exactly was authorised to do this "approving,"
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deadhead,
From John King's "New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation".
From John King's "New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation".
This was referred to in a company memorandum to Antarctic crews, OAA 14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed McMurdo NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous.
Delete all references in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have
other traffic in area.
A copy of this memorandum was recovered from cockpit wreckage.
Meanwhile the crew of Flight TE901 approaching Antarctica had discussed the weather with the McMurdo meteorological office which advised that Ross Island was under a low overcast base of 2,000ft with light snow and a visibility of 40 nautical miles.
Delete all references in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have
other traffic in area.
A copy of this memorandum was recovered from cockpit wreckage.
Meanwhile the crew of Flight TE901 approaching Antarctica had discussed the weather with the McMurdo meteorological office which advised that Ross Island was under a low overcast base of 2,000ft with light snow and a visibility of 40 nautical miles.
Last edited by prospector; 24th Apr 2012 at 22:41.
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The biggest turds.....
The wheel is just going to keep on turning in relation to 'who thinks who' is to blame for the accident, to that end I will add no more.
What astounds me however is how little attention is paid to the post accident actions of ANZ and the Government.
Read 'Darker Shades Of Blue', it can be applied perfectly to ANZ and the NZ Government of that day. We bang on predominately in life about 'accidents and rogue pilots', but to me more frightening or more worrying are the holistically rogue airlines and rogue governments.
Is it any different today? Rogue regulators, rogue governments and Ministers offices and rogue senior airline executive managers. These elements all exist today, with evidence 'popping up on the radar' on an almost weekly basis. This industry is a block of Swiss cheese and the holes just keep on aligning themselves. The 'fish rots at the head', the head of powers in fact, and there has been a stinking carcas laying around for ages. Erebus was Erebus, we can't turn back the clock. The sad thing is I don't see any improvement or lessons learned within in the rogue executive airline management, government or regulatory bodies in AUS/NZ. Nothing to date, in the past 30 years changes my opinion that the next disaster has been and is lining itself up.
Tick tock
What astounds me however is how little attention is paid to the post accident actions of ANZ and the Government.
Read 'Darker Shades Of Blue', it can be applied perfectly to ANZ and the NZ Government of that day. We bang on predominately in life about 'accidents and rogue pilots', but to me more frightening or more worrying are the holistically rogue airlines and rogue governments.
Is it any different today? Rogue regulators, rogue governments and Ministers offices and rogue senior airline executive managers. These elements all exist today, with evidence 'popping up on the radar' on an almost weekly basis. This industry is a block of Swiss cheese and the holes just keep on aligning themselves. The 'fish rots at the head', the head of powers in fact, and there has been a stinking carcas laying around for ages. Erebus was Erebus, we can't turn back the clock. The sad thing is I don't see any improvement or lessons learned within in the rogue executive airline management, government or regulatory bodies in AUS/NZ. Nothing to date, in the past 30 years changes my opinion that the next disaster has been and is lining itself up.
Tick tock
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Prospector, I'm not denying the briefing material nor am I sticking up for Collins on that score - I am replying to ampan's claim that the Collins flight had similar weather to the 2 diverted flights when it did not - it was patently better. But since you bring it up - did the briefing instruct the pilots on how they were to determine their azimuth from the TACAN? And, what process was undertaken to create this let-down area? Was it approved by the CAD? How? It seems to me that once the NDB was withdrawn flights to the ice should have been stopped by CAD, but that's just me, and the flights kept operating, so irrelevant I guess ..
Last edited by deadhead; 25th Apr 2012 at 02:46.
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deadhead:
I concede that “I prefer here first” is not in the Washington transcript. All the other significant comments made the captain, however, are – and they demonstrate what an awful piece of flying it was:
Cloud come down a bit. Very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice, so can’t be VMC. No NDB, and no directional info from the TACAN. Can’t use the AINS, so we’ll have to go somewhere else. Bit of a shame, because I was looking forward to seeing McMurdo.
Radar assist! That’s great. We’ll get to see McMurdo after all. I’ll tell the passengers.
Can’t get the Tower on VHF. Must be playing up today. Will have to go to the Dry Valleys … Hang on: I can see the sea ice down there. If I duck down through this hole I can fly under the cloud to McMurdo. I know I won’t be VMC but I should be OK if I stick to my nav track. I know I’m not supposed to use the AINS for that, but I also have my eyes, even though I know they won’t work properly. Won’t be getting another break in the cloud, so its now or never. Won’t bother telling the chaps. Tally ho.
Thought I’d be getting a better view than this at 2000 feet. Can’t see horizon. Better arm the nav and drop down another 500 feet.
Still no horizon. This is a bit strange. Should be able to see McMurdo by now, but there’s nothing there. I wonder if the waypoint is where I plotted it last night. ****! I should have checked it. Maybe it’s at McMurdo, like they said at the briefing. That would mean that Erebus is dead ahead, but I can’t see it … cloud! / ice!/ no horizon! / no VHF!: I’ve got to get out of here! F/O says its clear to the right, but if Erebus is dead ahead, Mount Bird would be to the right. I’ll have to go left.
I concede that “I prefer here first” is not in the Washington transcript. All the other significant comments made the captain, however, are – and they demonstrate what an awful piece of flying it was:
Cloud come down a bit. Very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice, so can’t be VMC. No NDB, and no directional info from the TACAN. Can’t use the AINS, so we’ll have to go somewhere else. Bit of a shame, because I was looking forward to seeing McMurdo.
Radar assist! That’s great. We’ll get to see McMurdo after all. I’ll tell the passengers.
Can’t get the Tower on VHF. Must be playing up today. Will have to go to the Dry Valleys … Hang on: I can see the sea ice down there. If I duck down through this hole I can fly under the cloud to McMurdo. I know I won’t be VMC but I should be OK if I stick to my nav track. I know I’m not supposed to use the AINS for that, but I also have my eyes, even though I know they won’t work properly. Won’t be getting another break in the cloud, so its now or never. Won’t bother telling the chaps. Tally ho.
Thought I’d be getting a better view than this at 2000 feet. Can’t see horizon. Better arm the nav and drop down another 500 feet.
Still no horizon. This is a bit strange. Should be able to see McMurdo by now, but there’s nothing there. I wonder if the waypoint is where I plotted it last night. ****! I should have checked it. Maybe it’s at McMurdo, like they said at the briefing. That would mean that Erebus is dead ahead, but I can’t see it … cloud! / ice!/ no horizon! / no VHF!: I’ve got to get out of here! F/O says its clear to the right, but if Erebus is dead ahead, Mount Bird would be to the right. I’ll have to go left.
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deadhead,
As they should have still been above MSA, 16,000ft, until they were in the designated let down area, then the AINS would have been quite sufficient to determine azimuth from the TACAN CH 29. As it was a mandatory VMC descent then if they were not positively VMC, ie positive fix from known ground features, then the descent should not have continued below MSA.
I cannot find the reference right now, but it is my belief that this descent procedure was arrived at after consultation with Deep Freeze ops and NZCAA.
did the briefing instruct the pilots on how they were to determine their azimuth from the TACAN?
I cannot find the reference right now, but it is my belief that this descent procedure was arrived at after consultation with Deep Freeze ops and NZCAA.
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Ampan, if this aircraft was not in VMC the other flight crew would have taken over and ensured Collins would not be in charge of anything other than the interview chair in Gemmels office.
The rest of your post referencing what was going on in Collins' mind you have invented. A complete fabrication.
The rest of your post referencing what was going on in Collins' mind you have invented. A complete fabrication.
Last edited by deadhead; 25th Apr 2012 at 03:18.
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Yes prospector, I get that, but did the briefing specifically instruct them to use the AINS to determine azimuth? Thank you in advance if you can find the reference in regard to the procedure.