Former concorde captain speaks out on erebus
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Brian Abraham. Greetings. I don't disagree with most of your last post, which is a repeat dose. As Liberace said, too much of a good thing is absolutely wonderful. Perhaps he was being tongue-in-cheek, so to speak. (I am 69 today.)
Scenario: A theatre nurse mistakenly selects the wrong substance; the surgeon injects it. The surgeon and the hospital might be sued because the doctor is accountable for his actions and the hospital is responsible for a safe environment. The nurse must demonstrate the phial and the doctor must read the label, every time.
Scenario: I own an airline. I want to consult you. How do you get from a general discussion of human frailty to organising an operation that is safe? From a passenger point of view that means their aeroplane doesn't crash.
Let us find some common ground. Do we agree a pilot is responsible for the safely of the aircraft and must be accountable for his actions? Yes/No.
Scenario: A theatre nurse mistakenly selects the wrong substance; the surgeon injects it. The surgeon and the hospital might be sued because the doctor is accountable for his actions and the hospital is responsible for a safe environment. The nurse must demonstrate the phial and the doctor must read the label, every time.
Scenario: I own an airline. I want to consult you. How do you get from a general discussion of human frailty to organising an operation that is safe? From a passenger point of view that means their aeroplane doesn't crash.
Let us find some common ground. Do we agree a pilot is responsible for the safely of the aircraft and must be accountable for his actions? Yes/No.
Last edited by Ornis; 18th Apr 2012 at 22:31. Reason: clarity
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Aviation Week & Space Technology, Monday, March 19, 2007
Making "Safe" Safer
The NTSB Relishes The Recent Air Record
The unfortunate fact of our existence upon this good earth is that there will always be accidents -- otherwise, they could stop building trauma centers in hospitals. Some years ago, an ICAO official was asked by a reporter (when a zero rate in some aviation accident statistic had been reached): "I guess you'll be breaking out the champagne then?"
The ICAO official's cynical (albeit ungrammatical) retort: "No. We consider it to be a statistical aberration that we don't ever expect to see repeated again." Perhaps he was just trying to emphasize the fickle nature of statistical conclusions.
From the Report Card submitted by the National Transportation Safety Board last week, the industry as a whole has an outstanding record of which we can all be proud, but that doesn't mean we can rest on our laurels and not strive for that elusive zero rate in spite of the ICAO assessment.
After all, the oft-repeated "that could've easily been me" runs through our minds each and every time we turn on the television and see the ruinous aftermath of yet another seemingly inexplicable accident. The other sobering aspect of any such record is that it's necessarily historical and that the only thing that counts for you, and those you hold dear, is what's coming down the pike to change it all -- "for better or for worse" as they say in that other commonplace disaster. More on that gloomy perspective later.
So what was good in that NTSB summary? First, the overall accident rate dropped again in 2006, although marginally. Passenger and cargo carriers operating larger aircraft under 14 CFR Part 121 continued, as expected, to have the lowest accident rates in civil aviation. In 2006, they carried 750 million passengers more than 8 billion miles while logging more than 19 million flight hours.
The cost was 31 accidents, a more than 20 percent drop from 2005. Only 2 of those 31 accidents were fatal, resulting in 50 fatalities. It equals .01 accidents per 100,000 flight hours or .018 accidents per 100,000 departures. For those who like their statistics mirror imaged, this translates to, on average, only 1 accident every 266 million miles, 630,000 hours flown, or 368,000 departures. The odds are that everybody has a much better than even chance of not making one of those unfortunate TV appearances.
On-demand part 135 operators had 54 accidents, down almost 20 percent from 2005, with 10 of those accidents resulting in 16 fatalities (or 1.5 accidents and .28 fatal accidents for every 100,000 hours flown). Part 135 covers air taxi, air tour and air medical operations. Scheduled Part 135 (commuter) operators experienced only 3 accidents, one of them fatal, resulting in two fatalities.
In General Aviation there was a total of 1,515 accidents, 303 of them fatal, resulting in 698 fatalities. Even though GA accounts for half of all civil aviation flight hour activity, it should be noted that the claimed drop-off in accidents is partly related to a decline in GA activity. Since 1990, according to NTSB, GA activity has declined by 20 percent and the rate has thus remained stable at 7.5 accidents per 100,000 flight hours.
What are the factors in the looking glass that could reflect or inflict future changes in our presently stable stats? Disregarding security concerns, there are a dismal myriad of these:
a. Looming pilot shortages and some of the measures being taken to address the situation (ICAO's MPL or Multi-crew Pilot's License).
b. Outsourcing of maintenance as driven by the need to pare costs and boost profit margins.
c. New technologies (including the next generation air traffic control system).
d. The rise in low-cost minimalist operations under deregulation worldwide.
e. Directly related to d., a marked trend toward tasking pilots up to the legal limits.
f. The Very Light Jet swarm (and the manning of those fleets).
g. The increasing popularity of sports aviation.
h. A denser air traffic environment.
i. Diminishing experience levels among air traffic controllers, some of which will be related to their perceptions of their longer term prospects in a different ATC environment (NextGEN).
We've not mentioned the new age limit of age 65 retirement, because that is extremely unlikely to blip any statistic anywhere. And we'll not even stand by to eat our words on that claim. To borrow a phrase from that well-known non-aviator Forrest Gump: "Safety is as Safety Does". Only the really dumb take chances.
Making "Safe" Safer
The NTSB Relishes The Recent Air Record
The unfortunate fact of our existence upon this good earth is that there will always be accidents -- otherwise, they could stop building trauma centers in hospitals. Some years ago, an ICAO official was asked by a reporter (when a zero rate in some aviation accident statistic had been reached): "I guess you'll be breaking out the champagne then?"
The ICAO official's cynical (albeit ungrammatical) retort: "No. We consider it to be a statistical aberration that we don't ever expect to see repeated again." Perhaps he was just trying to emphasize the fickle nature of statistical conclusions.
From the Report Card submitted by the National Transportation Safety Board last week, the industry as a whole has an outstanding record of which we can all be proud, but that doesn't mean we can rest on our laurels and not strive for that elusive zero rate in spite of the ICAO assessment.
After all, the oft-repeated "that could've easily been me" runs through our minds each and every time we turn on the television and see the ruinous aftermath of yet another seemingly inexplicable accident. The other sobering aspect of any such record is that it's necessarily historical and that the only thing that counts for you, and those you hold dear, is what's coming down the pike to change it all -- "for better or for worse" as they say in that other commonplace disaster. More on that gloomy perspective later.
So what was good in that NTSB summary? First, the overall accident rate dropped again in 2006, although marginally. Passenger and cargo carriers operating larger aircraft under 14 CFR Part 121 continued, as expected, to have the lowest accident rates in civil aviation. In 2006, they carried 750 million passengers more than 8 billion miles while logging more than 19 million flight hours.
The cost was 31 accidents, a more than 20 percent drop from 2005. Only 2 of those 31 accidents were fatal, resulting in 50 fatalities. It equals .01 accidents per 100,000 flight hours or .018 accidents per 100,000 departures. For those who like their statistics mirror imaged, this translates to, on average, only 1 accident every 266 million miles, 630,000 hours flown, or 368,000 departures. The odds are that everybody has a much better than even chance of not making one of those unfortunate TV appearances.
On-demand part 135 operators had 54 accidents, down almost 20 percent from 2005, with 10 of those accidents resulting in 16 fatalities (or 1.5 accidents and .28 fatal accidents for every 100,000 hours flown). Part 135 covers air taxi, air tour and air medical operations. Scheduled Part 135 (commuter) operators experienced only 3 accidents, one of them fatal, resulting in two fatalities.
In General Aviation there was a total of 1,515 accidents, 303 of them fatal, resulting in 698 fatalities. Even though GA accounts for half of all civil aviation flight hour activity, it should be noted that the claimed drop-off in accidents is partly related to a decline in GA activity. Since 1990, according to NTSB, GA activity has declined by 20 percent and the rate has thus remained stable at 7.5 accidents per 100,000 flight hours.
What are the factors in the looking glass that could reflect or inflict future changes in our presently stable stats? Disregarding security concerns, there are a dismal myriad of these:
a. Looming pilot shortages and some of the measures being taken to address the situation (ICAO's MPL or Multi-crew Pilot's License).
b. Outsourcing of maintenance as driven by the need to pare costs and boost profit margins.
c. New technologies (including the next generation air traffic control system).
d. The rise in low-cost minimalist operations under deregulation worldwide.
e. Directly related to d., a marked trend toward tasking pilots up to the legal limits.
f. The Very Light Jet swarm (and the manning of those fleets).
g. The increasing popularity of sports aviation.
h. A denser air traffic environment.
i. Diminishing experience levels among air traffic controllers, some of which will be related to their perceptions of their longer term prospects in a different ATC environment (NextGEN).
We've not mentioned the new age limit of age 65 retirement, because that is extremely unlikely to blip any statistic anywhere. And we'll not even stand by to eat our words on that claim. To borrow a phrase from that well-known non-aviator Forrest Gump: "Safety is as Safety Does". Only the really dumb take chances.
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Ornis,
Yes/No, would appear to be to much to ask.
Yes/No, would appear to be to much to ask.
The answer is YES. It has always been YES. It will always be YES.
I still remember the first airline I flew for. One of the senior (non-flying) managers explained to us that the company viewed all it's captains as senior managers. Why? Because an errant captain could single-handedly shut down the airline by making one serious mistake. There are several examples out there of airlines that didn't survive a serious accident that involved heavy loss of life.
That's the whole point about being a captain. It comes with money, perks and prestige... but it also infers an awesome responsibility. A captain may be called upon, at any moment and probably at very short notice (ask Capt Sullenberger), to make a decision that will have dire consequences if he or she gets it wrong. Quite a few captains have had to make decisions that ended their own (and their crews) lives, in the hope of not causing further casualties on the ground. A captain has to balance safety with service, and know how to resist commercial pressure. He or she has to have the backbone to be accountable for their decisions (quite possibly in a courtroom if things go bad).
Of course, for 99.9% of captains, it'll never happen. But for the few to whom it does happen... well, that's why airlines invest so much money and trust in their captains.
So I would say, and taught during my airline career, that all captains should always be saying to themselves, "what is the safest possible course of action in these circumstances?"
Proceeding visually below MSA when one does not have adequate visual reference would seem, to me, to NOT be the safest possible course of action.
What this thread does demonstrate to me, is that some people will never learn from the mistakes of others. All down to today's "no blame" culture, I suppose...
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Brian Abraham, okay, let's leave Question 1, the responsibility and accountability of pilots.
Question 2. Does your recurrent analysis of the human psyche translate into organising an airline and operating large airliners? Yes/No.
As an aside, and I don't want to distract you from considering the question: almost without exception the pilots whom I have known die in light aircraft have done something remarkably stupid, often despite being warned, sometimes repeatedly. Some of these pilots were wealthy and clever professional men.
Prospector, I too spent time in the military. Typically the response is: "The answer is, NO, now what's the question?"
Remoak, I think your comments paint a very balanced appraisal of the crash and the organisation. Thank you.
Question 2. Does your recurrent analysis of the human psyche translate into organising an airline and operating large airliners? Yes/No.
As an aside, and I don't want to distract you from considering the question: almost without exception the pilots whom I have known die in light aircraft have done something remarkably stupid, often despite being warned, sometimes repeatedly. Some of these pilots were wealthy and clever professional men.
Prospector, I too spent time in the military. Typically the response is: "The answer is, NO, now what's the question?"
Remoak, I think your comments paint a very balanced appraisal of the crash and the organisation. Thank you.
Last edited by Ornis; 19th Apr 2012 at 16:48. Reason: punctuation
almost without exception the pilots whom I have known die in light aircraft have done something remarkably stupid, often despite being warned, sometimes repeatedly. Some of these pilots were wealthy and clever professional men.
What you say about the pilots being wealthy and clever professional men interests me because I've long suspected a link between business success and poor descision making airborne. I haven't looked into it so I may just be imagining it but I suspect that the same ego/confidence that works well for someone in the business world can cause trouble when the cloud base is lowering and the terrain is rising.
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I have not commented on this accident to date. I was actually on the flight deck of the US C141 Starlifter that day as they attempted to call the DC10.
The reason I was on the C141 was to attend a survival course at McMurdo before joining Deep Freeze operations. Certainly white outs where emphasised during the course so to say not much was known of white outs is untrue.
There were a number of systemic contributing factors, but in my opinion the final defence shield was broken by CaptCollins. In all my flying, breaking the lowest safe was a no no unless you had the visual cues.
In discussing the tragic accidents with the base operations people at McMurdo this was an accident waiting to happen with most airlines operating sight seeing flights apparently breaking agreed minimums with fly-bys of the bases. How much awareness training and awareness of sector white out was provided to any of the crews who flew these flights from all the airlines including the Red Rat.
The reason I was on the C141 was to attend a survival course at McMurdo before joining Deep Freeze operations. Certainly white outs where emphasised during the course so to say not much was known of white outs is untrue.
There were a number of systemic contributing factors, but in my opinion the final defence shield was broken by CaptCollins. In all my flying, breaking the lowest safe was a no no unless you had the visual cues.
In discussing the tragic accidents with the base operations people at McMurdo this was an accident waiting to happen with most airlines operating sight seeing flights apparently breaking agreed minimums with fly-bys of the bases. How much awareness training and awareness of sector white out was provided to any of the crews who flew these flights from all the airlines including the Red Rat.
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framer. Light aircraft is my domain; I am not attempting to extrapolate to airliners.
A retired sea captain acquired a kit-built and decided to fly to the RNZAF 75th anniversary show at Ohakea. He was told several times where he could refuel; it seems he didn't. It had a Rotax engine and he didn't want to use avgas. Splat.
A maxillo-facial surgeon bought a twin. Late in the day after a farewell at the hospital he took off with his two young sons from Feilding. One engine stopped - he had turned the fuel off himself - and he returned to FI, despite being told many times in the event of an engine failure to go to Palmerston North. He turned into the dead engine. Splat.
An instructor strapped a very fat man in an aerobatic acft, filled it with fuel, climbed vertically until it went into an (anticipated) inverted spin, ~150kg overweight. Splat.
These are examples that spring to mind. I think you have serendipitously put your finger on the problem: people do stupid things "without thinking" because they don't see the danger, don't assess the risk. Sometimes people just don't think, even clever people. The difference is, once a problem has been identified, clever people do better solving it.
Flying presents a strange dichotomy. Pilots must be very confident yet avoid all unnecessary risk. That is a matter of judgement.
Business people must take risks. If they succeed they think they are clever. It might be just luck. Read: Everything is Obvious - Once You Know the Answer; Duncan J Watts, formerly Australian Navy, now sociologist with a difference - PhD in theoretical mechanics.
A retired sea captain acquired a kit-built and decided to fly to the RNZAF 75th anniversary show at Ohakea. He was told several times where he could refuel; it seems he didn't. It had a Rotax engine and he didn't want to use avgas. Splat.
A maxillo-facial surgeon bought a twin. Late in the day after a farewell at the hospital he took off with his two young sons from Feilding. One engine stopped - he had turned the fuel off himself - and he returned to FI, despite being told many times in the event of an engine failure to go to Palmerston North. He turned into the dead engine. Splat.
An instructor strapped a very fat man in an aerobatic acft, filled it with fuel, climbed vertically until it went into an (anticipated) inverted spin, ~150kg overweight. Splat.
These are examples that spring to mind. I think you have serendipitously put your finger on the problem: people do stupid things "without thinking" because they don't see the danger, don't assess the risk. Sometimes people just don't think, even clever people. The difference is, once a problem has been identified, clever people do better solving it.
Flying presents a strange dichotomy. Pilots must be very confident yet avoid all unnecessary risk. That is a matter of judgement.
Business people must take risks. If they succeed they think they are clever. It might be just luck. Read: Everything is Obvious - Once You Know the Answer; Duncan J Watts, formerly Australian Navy, now sociologist with a difference - PhD in theoretical mechanics.
Last edited by Ornis; 20th Apr 2012 at 20:38. Reason: spelling
Thread Starter
Despite repeated calls here of late to let 'sleeping dogs lie' etc., I again contend that there will be grounds for review for many years to come. Though others will deride, if I have learned anything of life, it is that truth is more often than not an artefact. Truth is constructed. That being so, the line between fact and opinion becomes blurred. We need to remember that much of the time opinions slip and slide around to become stories that people make up, and are seduced into believing.
Bearing this in mind, and hypothesising for a moment, it is as well when a matter as crucial as say an expert revisionist's post mortem on Erebus is concerned, to be judiciously guarded, hesitant even, before advancing opinion or comment on his published work. Sir Richard Williams, the First World War Australian Flying Corp pilot who rose to the rank of Air Marshal, (Chief of Air Staff and later Director-General of Civil Aviation), titled his autobiography 'These are Facts', a bizarre, bumptious, brave banner to run with. How stern. How uncompromising. Not a little startling that a man in his exhaulted position, who'd experienced so much, could admit of no shades between black and white. With Erebus, those who purport to see the broad picture, trot out nevertheless their Readers' Digest condensed version, (at times tainted with temerity, gross presumption even), that 'a' followed by 'b', followed by 'c' is all there is to know and all you need to know. Purblind they are and purblind they will ever be. Moreover, they are woefully unaware that where you find that events have been selected or omitted, that people involved have been given the roles of heroes or villains, interpretation is unavoidable. This is all to the good, so long as the interpretations are credible.
There has probably been no other accident in air transport history that equals this one in terms of protracted, unresolved debate, combined with strident polarised opinion, though the R101 story with all its attendant cover-up and intrigue does invite comparison. That said, when it comes down to it, one of the overlays is a natural, very human fascination with the multifarious strands of the story. So in these cases, when high drama is evoked, as the specifics of terrible misfortune unfold, many are the comparisons that may be drawn, such as the Titanic, the Hindenburg and Space Shuttle Challenger.
What befell TE901 is no less complex, no less intriguing. It will continue to exercise curious minds while life as we know it falters on. He who would set out to comprehensively write the story afresh is of course obliged to be as accurate, as scrupulous, as he possibly can. He will have borrowed large parts of his account from actual people who actually lived. He owes them his best shot at the truth. He is a kind of crook if he doesn't pay up.
Bearing this in mind, and hypothesising for a moment, it is as well when a matter as crucial as say an expert revisionist's post mortem on Erebus is concerned, to be judiciously guarded, hesitant even, before advancing opinion or comment on his published work. Sir Richard Williams, the First World War Australian Flying Corp pilot who rose to the rank of Air Marshal, (Chief of Air Staff and later Director-General of Civil Aviation), titled his autobiography 'These are Facts', a bizarre, bumptious, brave banner to run with. How stern. How uncompromising. Not a little startling that a man in his exhaulted position, who'd experienced so much, could admit of no shades between black and white. With Erebus, those who purport to see the broad picture, trot out nevertheless their Readers' Digest condensed version, (at times tainted with temerity, gross presumption even), that 'a' followed by 'b', followed by 'c' is all there is to know and all you need to know. Purblind they are and purblind they will ever be. Moreover, they are woefully unaware that where you find that events have been selected or omitted, that people involved have been given the roles of heroes or villains, interpretation is unavoidable. This is all to the good, so long as the interpretations are credible.
There has probably been no other accident in air transport history that equals this one in terms of protracted, unresolved debate, combined with strident polarised opinion, though the R101 story with all its attendant cover-up and intrigue does invite comparison. That said, when it comes down to it, one of the overlays is a natural, very human fascination with the multifarious strands of the story. So in these cases, when high drama is evoked, as the specifics of terrible misfortune unfold, many are the comparisons that may be drawn, such as the Titanic, the Hindenburg and Space Shuttle Challenger.
What befell TE901 is no less complex, no less intriguing. It will continue to exercise curious minds while life as we know it falters on. He who would set out to comprehensively write the story afresh is of course obliged to be as accurate, as scrupulous, as he possibly can. He will have borrowed large parts of his account from actual people who actually lived. He owes them his best shot at the truth. He is a kind of crook if he doesn't pay up.
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A very dim source of light provides photons one at a time that pass through two close narrow slits to hit a screen behind. Each particle passes through both slits, interferes with itself and changes direction to form an interference pattern: a pattern of illuminated lines with dark lines between. How come? How can one particle pass through two slits? It is a mystery.
A DC10 hitting Erebus is no mystery. There are no contradictions. The pathway was poorly formed and the pilot stumbled.
The road to reality is different. Few of us will follow it to the present end. Fewer will build it. Some will never see it; they will die believing there is no pathway forward. They would doom us all to beat around the bush, wringing our hands, declaring it is the human condition: we are all lost.
A DC10 hitting Erebus is no mystery. There are no contradictions. The pathway was poorly formed and the pilot stumbled.
The road to reality is different. Few of us will follow it to the present end. Fewer will build it. Some will never see it; they will die believing there is no pathway forward. They would doom us all to beat around the bush, wringing our hands, declaring it is the human condition: we are all lost.
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Quote Ornis....
Let us find some common ground. Do we agree a pilot is responsible for the safely of the aircraft and must be accountable for his actions? Yes/No
Well Brian.....As a current Captain on an A/C that does carry more than a "few"......if you walked onto my A/C and informed me that the above quoted statement does not apply to me (As the "Designated" Captain of that flight)........I would have you escorted off the flight,..there has to be checks and balances and someone(the Captain) must enforce them
Spent qiute a few years flying in Alaska....several years contracted to the local NTSB office in Anchorage.......our job was to fly them to the scene of A/C accidents ....and during that time I talked with a lot of them,actively trying to learn as I much as I could about what caused the accident,how it could have been avoided,what led up to it,the medical state of the pilot...etc etc...you get my drift....................the one thing they always said and agreed upon was .....the PIC was/is always responsible for the safety and operation of his/her A/C........PERIOD!!
Let us find some common ground. Do we agree a pilot is responsible for the safely of the aircraft and must be accountable for his actions? Yes/No
Well Brian.....As a current Captain on an A/C that does carry more than a "few"......if you walked onto my A/C and informed me that the above quoted statement does not apply to me (As the "Designated" Captain of that flight)........I would have you escorted off the flight,..there has to be checks and balances and someone(the Captain) must enforce them
Spent qiute a few years flying in Alaska....several years contracted to the local NTSB office in Anchorage.......our job was to fly them to the scene of A/C accidents ....and during that time I talked with a lot of them,actively trying to learn as I much as I could about what caused the accident,how it could have been avoided,what led up to it,the medical state of the pilot...etc etc...you get my drift....................the one thing they always said and agreed upon was .....the PIC was/is always responsible for the safety and operation of his/her A/C........PERIOD!!
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PB, certainly the captain is responsible. But so are the airline management, maintenance, nav department. A whole range of people have responsibility, not just the two people occupying the font seats. A work mate died in the DC-10 at O'Hare which had an engine fall off. The crew crashed a perfectly flyable aircraft, they could have flown a circuit and safely landed. Everyone perished. Was it the crews fault? Do they carry the entire responsibility? Interested to hear your view.
Moderator
A whole range of people have responsibility, not just the two people occupying the font seats
.. which is why, in the often inevitable court case after the mishap, judgement often apportions various percentages of damages according to the court's assessment of the relative culpability of various of the players.
.. which is why, in the often inevitable court case after the mishap, judgement often apportions various percentages of damages according to the court's assessment of the relative culpability of various of the players.
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Gidday Brian..........mate I have read all your posts on this subject,I agree with a lot of the opinion and fact you have brought to the table.......sorry to hear about your mate in ORD...I have read the NTSB report..........Regarding the Moderators post,I can only agree 100% with it......all you have to do follow the Concorde crash,and see where the blame is being "apportioned"
But ,,..the premis that the Captain is not solely responsible for the saftey of his/her flight seems to allude you........I see it no other way.....regardless of who may have contributed to that flights demise........As the Captain,no matter what happens on that flight whether it be at my hands or others,.....I am still responsible to deal with the "situation" at hand ......and are responsible no matter what the outcome.............
I am lucky that Ive been in the left-seat for many years.....maybe its my training,maybe experience....maybe a lot of things...I am never to old to learn.......but the one thing that has never changed is my"ultimate" Responsibilty...How that Responsibilty is "gauged"....not sure their is one...other than what the controlling agencies and Airlines, say what it is....I consider it, from way before the flight takes place until I walk out of the cockpit and "Release" the A/C back to the company..... I hope you can see that.......
But ,,..the premis that the Captain is not solely responsible for the saftey of his/her flight seems to allude you........I see it no other way.....regardless of who may have contributed to that flights demise........As the Captain,no matter what happens on that flight whether it be at my hands or others,.....I am still responsible to deal with the "situation" at hand ......and are responsible no matter what the outcome.............
I am lucky that Ive been in the left-seat for many years.....maybe its my training,maybe experience....maybe a lot of things...I am never to old to learn.......but the one thing that has never changed is my"ultimate" Responsibilty...How that Responsibilty is "gauged"....not sure their is one...other than what the controlling agencies and Airlines, say what it is....I consider it, from way before the flight takes place until I walk out of the cockpit and "Release" the A/C back to the company..... I hope you can see that.......
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Tricky business, apportioning blame.
Many aircraft have been doomed from the moment they took off, and nothing the crew could or did do would have saved them (the Alaska Airlines 261 crash for example, where a control failure led to loss of control). In that case, it's hard to see how any blame could be paid at the Captain's door. Others, like Erebus, are a combination of factors. My view is that Erebus would never had happened had the Captain not ignored the basic tenets of visual flight.
Having said that, he probably took what he assessed as a reasonable risk in the circumstances... and if the other factors had not come into play (inaccurate position due changes made without his knowledge), he almost certainly would have got away with it.
So maybe the argument should really be, "what is a reasonable risk when commanding an aircraft"?
Some would say no risk is reasonable, others would say every part of flying is a risk and just needs to be managed properly. I tend to the latter view.
I think most of us know instinctively when we are straying from the path, it's what we do next that matters.
Many aircraft have been doomed from the moment they took off, and nothing the crew could or did do would have saved them (the Alaska Airlines 261 crash for example, where a control failure led to loss of control). In that case, it's hard to see how any blame could be paid at the Captain's door. Others, like Erebus, are a combination of factors. My view is that Erebus would never had happened had the Captain not ignored the basic tenets of visual flight.
Having said that, he probably took what he assessed as a reasonable risk in the circumstances... and if the other factors had not come into play (inaccurate position due changes made without his knowledge), he almost certainly would have got away with it.
So maybe the argument should really be, "what is a reasonable risk when commanding an aircraft"?
Some would say no risk is reasonable, others would say every part of flying is a risk and just needs to be managed properly. I tend to the latter view.
I think most of us know instinctively when we are straying from the path, it's what we do next that matters.
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To me it all boils down to discipline. Discipline from the LAME that signed my aircraft out, discipline from the avionic LAME that signed my aircraft out, discipline from what we called loadmasters, to get the weight right, discipline from the CC who know their job backward and can perform it well and I am not talking about serving tea, a competent and disciplined flight crew, and last of all a dedicated and disciplined Captain. That is what the public pay for and that is what they should get. However like the Captain of the Titanic, we are all human, we make mistakes, we forget the best advise we ever had from our first flying Instructor," if in doubt, don't." And my old flying instructor gave me the best advice ever. "Don't ever trust the bastards" because the day you do, it could be over for you and your pax. And work with what you have, not what you have lost. That advice was given 53 years ago, it still stands, regardless of all the bells and whistles that pilots have today, the A380 showed that. This is not to say that the TE crew were not disciplined, I have no doubt that all were excellent Airmen, but placed in a incredibly difficult position that was totally unfamiliar to them, and then it comes back to "if in doubt, don't." Stuff the company, stuff the PAX, you are the boss if your experience, your airmanship (that old word) tells you its wrong, get the hell out of there. Everytime.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: New Zealand
Age: 64
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The reason for all of this continued nonsense is that Mahon was completely wrong.
Brian A: Yes, they could, in a perfect world, have recovered the DC-10 at O'Hare. Do the crew have any of the blame? Definitely not.
TE901 was nothing like that. It was a standard CFIT accident, caused by a captain attempting to fly VMC, when he wasn't, and when he knew he wasn't.
Brian A: Yes, they could, in a perfect world, have recovered the DC-10 at O'Hare. Do the crew have any of the blame? Definitely not.
TE901 was nothing like that. It was a standard CFIT accident, caused by a captain attempting to fly VMC, when he wasn't, and when he knew he wasn't.