Australia, New Zealand & the Pacific Airline and RPT Rumours & News in Australia, enZed and the Pacific

Merged: Senate Inquiry

Old 12th May 2014, 23:40
  #1861 (permalink)  
 
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yr right ...

You're right!

I initially didn't 'join the dots' from your post, but it's all coming back to me now.

From what I can recall, there was nearly a 50% increase in MTOM under the STC for the modification to that aircraft.

The NZ CAA addressed increases to MTOM with modifications in Civil Aeronautics Manual (CAM 8), as follows:

7 – Weight and Balance

7.0 General This section stressed the importance of weight to the structure, of weight control and balance, and that if approved limits are exceeded then flight tests should be made.

7.1 General Effects of Gross Weight Changes This section begins a discussion on the relationship between the design load factor and gross weight. It made the point that gross weights chosen should permit safe operation under all normal and emergency conditions. The chart that is currently reproduced in CAR Part 137 Appendix B is mentioned as a guide to determining gross weight provided the aircraft is flown in a restricted manner.

7.10 Effects of Gross Weight Changes on Aircraft Structure This section noted that the aircraft landing gear and supporting structure are particularly critical if the aircraft is landed overweight; and taxiing is very likely to be unfavourably affected by increased gross weights.

With the increase in gross weight there must be a proportionate decrease in the load factor that can be reached in flight. It again notes that caution should be exercised in all flights at overload weights whether or not they are below the possible maximum. There was some discussion on the distribution of load with respect to the structural strain on the fuselage

7.11 Effects of Gross Weight Changes on Maneuvers This section notes that to prevent excessive loading the aircraft must be maneuvered cautiously, and that the stalling speeds are increased and stalls in turns are more easily encountered. A lower allowable load factor means restricting bank angle. Another factor is gust loads; the level flight and never exceed speeds should be reduced by the ratio of specification weight to overload weight but not below maneuvering speed. Again it advised caution in all flight conditions. There was discussion about pull-up speeds and the use of full deflection of control surfaces.
Source: Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review - Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Seems to me that under the circumstances, the factors considered by the NZ CAA may have been applicable?
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Old 13th May 2014, 00:46
  #1862 (permalink)  
 
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Good pick up SIUYA... Once again a disturbing tale of CYA (cover your ass) at all costs, seems to be filtering out in the aftermath of the RFS fire bombing tragedy. Going by yr right's last post, it would seem the standard BTP i.e. blame the pilot modus operandi (bit hard in this case) of FF has shifted to BTE (blame the engineer)...

As YR mentions this matter has been queried in the Senate by none other than the Heff himself, who will all know by now is a Terrier and will not let the matter slide

[YOUTUBE]

Which illicited this 'weasel worded'....response from (& referred to by YR) FF to the Heff QON:
Rural & Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE Supplementary Budget Estimates November 2013 Infrastructure and Regional Development
Question no.: 131
Program: n/a
Division/Agency: (CASA) Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Topic: Relationship between CASA and the Rural Fire Service
Proof Hansard Page/s: 52 (18/11/2013)

Senator Heffernan asked:

Mr McCormick: I can give you a notice, if you like, about the relationship between us and the Rural Fire Service.

CHAIR: I think it is not between the pilot and the Rural Fire Service; it has to be between you and the Rural Fire Service. There needs to be some steadying influence in the cowboy attitude at times. I am not alleging anything, broadly, but it is an uncomfortable feeling that a lot of very learned, experienced pilots have. This guy was disgusted that a remark would be made: 'Are you a man or aren't you? Get up there!' I can give you the details.

Mr McCormick: We will look into that.

Answer: CASA provides oversight of Air Operator Certificate holders, including those who conduct aerial firefighting operations under a commercial relationship with the Rural Fire Service. CASA does not oversight Rural Fire Service organisations directly.

CASA has been advised by the NSW Rural Fire Service that it is undertaking an investigation into the matter raised by Senator Heffernan. CASA has requested a copy of that report when completed, and will consider its content in respect of any aviation safety concerns.
From that it would appear it is all in the lap of the gods but the signs are ominous that another CYA SOP action is being crafted behind closed doors...
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Old 13th May 2014, 21:50
  #1863 (permalink)  
 
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Man up – expletive deleted.

Seems like Heff is onto this fire bomber farce (good on 'im); it's yet another page in his ever expanding notebook of aviation atrocities. Said it before; this Senate committee is bloody furious and the arrogant handlers of the likes of McComic have over estimated the strength of the cards they hold; at the end of the day a Senate royal flush will trump a public servant bluff. Just watch NSW ICAC, one squeals, down they all go.

The 'official' attitude is summed up in the "real pilots are flying" speech. Think on that for a moment,- some ground dwelling office wallah wants to tell an Ag pilot who is fire fighting to "Man up"; Un-Furkin-Believable. The only reason that fool still has teeth in his head is that he didn't say it to me. Seriously; there are limits to contractual politeness. I can only hope Heff tracks this idiot down and sends him my way: for quiet 'chat' over tea and biccy's....behind the shed.

In the video McComic tried to huff, puff and bluff his way out, once again CASA fail the industry it is paid to serve. The Ag boys will go flying, too much money to ignore; they will carry as much as (legally approved) possible; that's the nature of the beast. The RFS want them out there carrying whatever. So somewhere there must be a balance – to even dare to challenge a pilot in that fashion should have brought McComic screaming out of his kennel. But no; (anti-climax) McComic is quite happy to apply the law, just as long as he can rely on the 'expertise' of the operators (to act as CASA approved); nice little get out of jail card that one. Then there's always the trusty pilot, engineer or operator 'error' blame card to robustly apply at a later date, with 20/20 hindsight. Now – Oh, they are 'grounded'. – Excellent choice, stellar management. Crazy stuff.

Last edited by Kharon; 13th May 2014 at 22:07. Reason: But, is Tmesis an art form???
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Old 13th May 2014, 22:38
  #1864 (permalink)  
 
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always the trusty pilot, engineer or operator 'error' blame card to robustly apply at a later date, with 20/20 hindsight


That's if its given after the fact. They where and still being told for the last 10 years that's not 20/20 hindsight sorry. I cant say loudly enough how long ago they where told of this problem. The sad thing is they turned there heads away and closed there ears.


Now don't forget the AAAA are in this as well and they wont to self regulate how the hell can any possibly think that a great idea only one person who wants to make a name for him self and as he told me he has NO aviation knowledge.


Its such a mess where been all put into. Now somehow we got to get out of it. I don't believe aviation has been in a more dangerous place than what we find ourselves into now.

Cheers
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Old 14th May 2014, 09:21
  #1865 (permalink)  
 
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Yr deserves a choccy frog

I enjoy Yr's posts - Somewhat elusive, often cryptic, occasionally bizzare often downright odd, but yet in his own way very informative! Reminds me of the night that myself, Herr Kharon and Gobbledock played Word Yahtzee after two bottles of Jack Daniels while sitting beneath a crimson sunset on the deck of the Styx River boat as we sailed up to a government department to pick up a large contingent of passengers.


But Yr makes a valid point. The regulators 'feelings' towards 'Dave' are despicable. Blame the pilot, blame the engineer, blame the one armed man with one testicle and gingivitis, blame everyone for having a hand in any accident except of course the two-bit hack outfit Regulator.
Go for it Heff, take it to these morons.


TICK TOCK
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Old 14th May 2014, 18:02
  #1866 (permalink)  
 
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I enjoy Yr's posts - Somewhat elusive, often cryptic, occasionally bizzare
I must say I have revised my opinion of yr considerably. he's a good cookie.

what you are haphazardly documenting here is what I see as the core enduring incompetence that is CAsA.
they have little or no serious aeronautical engineering competence and yet as the countries' NAA (national airworthiness authority) they are making variations to aircraft permissions that have no basis in competent engineering.

They have systematically worked to kill off manufacturing in this country to avoid having to be competent.

CAsA are a disaster. They should not be allowed to change the aviation environment to make their inadequacies in this regard in any way acceptable.

Lawyers simply cannot do what aeronautical engineers should be doing.
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Old 14th May 2014, 21:17
  #1867 (permalink)  
 
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W8 Lawyers simply cannot do what aeronautical engineers should be doing.
The technical people LAMEs, pilots, engineers etc seem marginalized by lawyers, HR, IR and a general public sector way.

CASA never have understood certification, engineering and manufacturing adequately for an NAA. Some treat the same as maintenance. Where is the approved data ? Err, that is what certification program will achieve.

There is manufacturing in Australia. But as tier 1 suppliers working under supplier approval to OEM's without any casa involvement.

Last edited by halfmanhalfbiscuit; 14th May 2014 at 21:19. Reason: Grammar.
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Old 14th May 2014, 22:35
  #1868 (permalink)  
 
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2008 M18 – ATSB report.

It's not often, these days anyway, to do anything else when CASA of ATSB are mentioned other than doubt the probity or value of anything said or written; but back in 2008, when an M18 had a wing failure, both agencies did a first rate job. It's very satisfying to be able to say that. The curiosity bump was driving me spare, so a drop or two of midnight oil was burned in an attempt to assuage the itch. Started – HERE – (of course) and found this:-

DFE flieger # 35 – "I think this is probably the link you are after wheatbix:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532975/ao2008084.pdf

It makes reference (Pages 43 to 46 or thereabouts) to the original MTOW of the M18 being 4200kg, and by supplemental amendments and exemptions, increases in MTOW to 4700, then 5300kg, then finally to 6600kg for fire-fighting work. These changes involved reductions in allowable load factors, Vne, Vno and factoring of hours of service, such that 1 hour of flight time would count for more than 1 hour of service life, depending on actual takeoff weights. The report also discusses problems with recordkeeping and tracking of actual takeoff weights, among other issues that could potentially lead to structural problems, and how CASA would act to prevent the problem that occurred in the linked report from recurring."
There are almost 100 pages comprising the excellent, most refreshing ATSB report. Lately I seem to end up 'hunting' for facts and pertinent information; but not this time. The report is well worth reading; of particular interest are the following pages:-

Aircraft modifications - ATSB page 8 (p 18 pdf).
Tests and research – ATSB page 37 (p 47 pdf).
Overweight operations – ATSB page 40 (p 50 pdf).
Aircraft manufacturer-approved overweight operation. ATSB page 41 (p 51 pdf).
CASA general weight exemptions - ATSB page 44 (p 55 pdf).

The following are cherry picked paragraphs from the report:-

During the course of the investigation, it was determined that a number of operators of the aircraft type were not applying the appropriate service life factors to determine the effective hours flown when their aircraft were operated at take-off weights above 4,700 kg. The effect was to overestimate the remaining service life of those aircraft.
It was also found that operators had an interpretation of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) exemptions that, by their understanding, permitted operation at weights in excess of the maximum take-off weight and allowed them to operate at higher take-off weights without the need to account for the additional limitation imposed by the manufacturer for operation at those weights.
As a result of the accident, the following safety action has been taken or proposed:
• The operator undertook a retrospective process of applying the service life factors to its aircraft fleet during operations that had involved take-off weights above 4,700 kg and will apply them to all relevant future flights.
• CASA advised that they had contacted Certificate of Registration holders of M18 Dromader aircraft to verify that they had a procedure for recording and factoring aircraft hours that included overweight operations. Further verification would also occur as part of CASA’s routine surveillance program. CASA also advised that they will provide education to operators on the intention of the exemptions and will be revising the exemptions to ensure that the intended interpretation is clear.
The original type-certified aircraft had a 9-cylinder, supercharged, radial engine, developing 967 shaft horsepower. In more recent years, modifications have incorporated more powerful turboprop engines. One such modification, which was approved under United States (US) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) number SA09039SC, used a Garrett model TPE331 turboprop engine. As a result of the engine change, the modification increased the length of the aircraft’s forward fuselage. After the incorporation of that modification, the aircraft was designated an M18A Dromader (TPE331).
Other modifications to the aircraft included increasing the capacity of the hopper from 2,650 L to 3,028 L, the installation of servo tabs14 to the flight controls, and installation of vortex generators on the wings. The vortex generator manufacturer claimed that the installation resulted in a 7% reduction in the aircraft’s aerodynamic stall speed.
All of the modifications were carried out in accordance with FAA STCs and/or Australian Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 35-approved engineering orders.
The upshot seems to be that the modifications made were not some 'back yard bodge up'; not by a long shot. The CASA approach appears to be 'sound' and if it is in error, then it has been on the side of 'reasoned' caution; the CASA operational approval is well supported and (IMO) justified. There was little else, of a practical nature that they could have realistically done. Good job by someone. Once again, most refreshing.

Which only leaves a couple of loose ends, questions if you like. Why is there no engineering data available to support claim of a 'highly dangerous' modification?; the ATSB went to some pains to troll the world looking for similar and came up dry. The AAAA and type operators seem to be a level headed bunch, safety conscious and have a vested interest in preserving life and promoting their services; so I wonder why there are no howls of protest or internal limitations imposed?; if anyone knows and can sensibly evaluate the risks, they can. No; IMO we must look elsewhere for answers this time. Old Akro # 40 makes some sense of the problem.

I just hope the 2014 ATSB report is as good. I think we may have to cut the ATSB and CASA some slack (benefit of doubt) this time, if the 2008 effort is anything to judge by. We'll just have to wait and see; but one would hope the RFS get a sternly worded letter spelling out the authority of the PIC - if the case is proved.

Itch scratched – Endit.

Last edited by Kharon; 14th May 2014 at 23:27. Reason: Beens and peas are good for your heart - the more you eat.
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Old 15th May 2014, 00:35
  #1869 (permalink)  
 
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Ventus,it cracked from the edge of the hole, probably started at a tiny nick in the edge or a tiny manufacturing defect.

The problem with all this life factoring is that the fatigue life is determined not just by the load the joint has carried, but by the duration of the load - in effect the "stress strain history" of the joint for its entire life. Today digital recorders give us the possibility of actually recording something like that history but mostly we have to make approximations of what the loading history would look like and then test to destruction.
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Old 15th May 2014, 10:36
  #1870 (permalink)  
 
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Hey Sunfish...I am unfamiliar with the digital recorders you are talking about that will record the "stress strain history" of a joint such as a wing attach point. Can you shed more light?....Cheers
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Old 15th May 2014, 11:56
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Gas bag

Most common is a strain gauge. If you can imagine a little stamp self adhesive that has like a "S" in the centre of it with wires to each end. As the material stretches under load the "S" also stretches and they can measure the resistance across the "S" this is recorded and then they can work out the load on the part. They put 100s on when testing.
With computers they can also do modelling with program's. But still sometimes you only have to use your own eyes to know what's going to work and what's not.
White man magic

Cheers
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Old 15th May 2014, 12:12
  #1872 (permalink)  
 
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Dichotomy: Bureau’s air safety investigations & lessons (not) learnt??

Dromader drift but there is a point…

Perhaps one of the most insightful statements ever made on the ANZ & P thread boards…

framer –"That's life, now we need to look at why we haven't learnt from it."

…was eerily echoed in the title and content of a blog from the Malaysian PM: This time, we have to act on lessons learned from an air tragedy

“…The global aviation industry must not only learn the lessons of MH370 but implement them. The world learned from Air France but didn’t act. The same mistake must not be made again…”

Some of the key Safety Recommendations from AF 447 relevant to MH370 and what PM Najib is referring to:
On the basis of this work, the BEA recommends that EASA and ICAO:
· extend as rapidly as possible to 90 days the regulatory transmission time for ULB’s installed on flight recorders on aeroplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas;
· make it mandatory, as rapidly as possible, for aeroplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with an additional ULB capable of transmitting on a frequency (for example between 8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) and for a duration adapted to the prelocalisation of wreckage;
· study the possibility of making it mandatory for aeroplanes performing public transport flights to regularly transmit basic flight parameters (for example position, altitude, speed, heading).

In addition, the BEA recommends that ICAO:
· ask the FLIRECP group to establish proposals on the conditions for implementing deployable recorders of the Eurocae ED-112 type for aeroplanes performing public transport flights.
On the basis of this work, the BEA recommends:
· that EASA and ICAO make mandatory as quickly as possible, for aeroplanes making public transport flights with passengers over maritime or remote areas, triggering of data transmission to facilitate localisation as soon as an emergency situation is detected on board;
and
· that EASA and ICAO study the possibility of making mandatory, for aeroplanes making public transport flights with passengers over maritime or remote areas, the activation of the emergency locator transmitter (ELT), as soon as an emergency situation is detected on board.
4.3 New Recommendations
4.3.1 SAR coordination plans over maritime and remote areas
Those responsible for Brazilian SAR stated that they did not know what means were available in the neighbouring SAR areas and had not tried to obtain information on the subject. Contrary to ICAO standards and recommended practices, there is no SAR coordination plan between Brazil and Senegal. This lack of a plan caused a considerable delay in the start of SAR operations.
Consequently, the BEA recommends that:
· ICAO ensure the implementation of SAR coordination plans or regional protocols covering all of the maritime or remote areas for which international coordination would be required in the application of SAR procedures, including in the South Atlantic area. [Recommendation FRAN-2012-032]
Drifting back to Dromaders and ‘other safety related (ATsBeaker) matters’…

yr right: “ I cant say loudly enough how long ago they where told of this problem. The sad thing is they turned there heads away and closed there ears

And from Kharon’s post titled…2008 M18 – ATSB report…that when it came to the Dromader mod there were indeed lessons learnt and safety issues diligently recorded, yet fast forward to 2013 and these lessons/warnings appear to have been unheeded.

More disturbing is that the 2008 Dromader fatality is not isolated, for inaction by relevant authorities, and has ultimately led to there being similar causal factors in recent accidents/incidents.

Example: Cape Hillsborough EMS Chopper accident 2003 v ABC Chopper accident Lake Eyre 2011
The Hillsborough accident also highlighted that there were outstanding Safety Recommendations that were (and still are) to be adequately addressed.

This apparent ineffective actioning (obfuscation) of SRs was further highlighted in the PelAir inquiry in a 2000 SR (see here) addressed to the BOM. To be fair this SR was somewhat proactively addressed by the BOM and ultimately led to changes in the regs for provision of alternates for remote islands for RPT/Charter but not airwork.

On the subject of provision of alternates, reliability/dissemination of BOM Wx reports:

If we fast forward to the PelAir inquiry we saw a 50:50 split in the CAsA Flight Ops inspectorate on whether DJ should have diverted due wx forecast below alt minima. We also saw several aberrations in what wx information was/wasn’t transferred to VH-NGA inflight and several interpretations on how DJ (as PIC) could have/should have disseminated this wx information.
{Comment: It is worth pointing out that the ATSB investigators, up till the issuance of the prelim report (Jan 2010), had deduced that there was a safety issue in all this (confused interpretation) and deemed it significant enough to fwd to FF as ‘critical’ i.e. a CSI.}

Now if we fast fwd to the bureau Mildura fog incident investigation here (I know touchy subject for some), & refer to the ‘Safety Action’ section (besides the proposed ‘love in’) we get this on the future scoping of the investigation (my bold)…

“…The investigation is continuing and will:

  • examine the accuracy of aviation meteorological products in Australia
  • examine the procedures used to provide information to flight crews from air traffic services and management of changes to those procedures
  • examine the provision by the operators of information to the respective flight crews
  • examine the relevant recorded data
  • review the distribution, dissemination and sharing of operational information to the aviation industry as stipulated by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, and enacted by Airservices Australia and the Bureau of Meteorology…”
Which is all good stuff in theory (despite the possible thirteen plus year lag in possible lessons learnt), but on recent observations is this just more ‘weasel words’ to appease the IOS masses?

MTF…Sarcs

Addendum

On the subject of ‘weasel words’ and following on from my post #1909 & Kharon’s post #1911 (& the weasel worded notified difference for Annex 13 CH 8 ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEASURES Para 8.2), the bureau recently published a REPCON that is particularly relevant to this post:
Reporter's concern

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the procedure used by Airservices Australia to alert flight crews when a Hazard Alert is issued after the flight has departed.

The crew advised that recently they departed on a Melbourne to Sydney commercial high capacity flight at 0653 UTC (due to land at 0756 UTC). During the cruise, the controller advised that their expected landing time was now 0830 UTC.

As this was well outside the NOTAM, which advised a holding time of up to 15 minutes, the crew questioned if a Hazard Alert had been issued. They were advised that one had been issued at 0655 UTC, but no advice had been passed to the crew.

As this is not the first time this has happened, the reporter advised that there appears to be a systemic failure of the system in the flow of information to flight crew of flights which have departed after the Hazard Alert has been issued.

Operator's response (Operator 1)

Airservices Australia (Airservices) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the reported concern regarding the procedure used to inform flight crews of when Hazard Alerts are issued after the flight has departed.

Due to the de-identified nature of the report, Airservices is unable to comment on the specific circumstances of the reported concern and cannot verify the reporter's statement that similar incidents have previously occurred. However in order to address the reporter's concern Airservices has investigated the matter and can provide the following commentary.

Airservices notes that the provision of Hazard Alerts and flight information service (FIS) dissemination is not based on whether an aircraft has departed, but rather on whether the aircraft is within one hour flight time of the condition (see Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) Australia GEN 3.3 sections 2.1.1 and 2.5.4).

With specific reference to AIP GEN 3.3 section 2.1.1, aircraft within one hour flight time of the condition are required to be notified by air traffic control (ATC) of the existence of new operational information. Based on the information provided in the report, the aircraft should have been provided with the relevant information. If the information was not already described in a current meteorological (MET) product or Notice to Airmen (NOT AM) then ATC is required to communicate the information using the prefixed "HAZARD ALERT".

In response to the reporter's concern Airservices will remind controllers of their obligations regarding the provision of FIS to pilots.

Operator's response (Operator 2)

The reporter’s concern was also sent to the aircraft operator and the following is their response:

Hazard Alerts are usually issued by the Tower and / or the Enroute controller.

These are not generally communicated to Flight Dispatch or other operational entities within the operator.

ATC relays these alerts directly to the aircraft when no formal NOTAM is released.

If a NOTAM reflecting changes is released (pertaining to standard traffic holding or any other operational issues) it appears in our dispatch systems and is appropriately disseminated by our Flight Following unit. With regard to aircraft in flight, this is affected by means of ACARS and / or HF, and for aircraft on the ground by contacting the crew.

This process is incorporated into our Operations Manual and is strictly adhered to.

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

CASA has reviewed the REPCON and notes Airservices response. CASA agrees that there appears to have been a lapse on the part of Air Traffic Control to provide a Hazard Alert. As the operator only has an obligation for flight following for Extended Diversion Time Operations and therefore, in this case were not required to monitor changes after a flight departs.

CASA also notes that the nature of confidential reporting makes it difficult for the air navigation service provider and the regulator to take specific action as there is insufficient detail provided to do so.

CASA will include this information as part of its risk assessment of the certificate holder.

ATSB comment

The following further response was received from Airservices Australia:

Consistent with our response dated 28 March 2014, Airservices has published a National Information Circular (NIC 15/2014) to all controllers reminding them of their obligations regarding the provision of FIS to pilots including the provision of Hazard Alerts.
So 'weasel words' or good proactive response, you be the judge..

MTF on the history of REPCON (WOFTAM) the bureau's obfuscation of ICAO Annex 13 plus the legalities of the bureau/FF 2010 MOU...

Last edited by Sarcs; 15th May 2014 at 12:45.
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Old 15th May 2014, 12:28
  #1873 (permalink)  
 
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We will always have accidents. We need to try and limit that to the lowest point we can.
I won't release an aircraft I won't fly in. It's that simple. But when you get awi that pings you for not having a torque wrench for a tyre valve cap you then relize how f up we are now in. And yes that's happened not to me but a mate.
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Old 15th May 2014, 22:03
  #1874 (permalink)  
 
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Good work Sarcs. Nicely done. The Framer post is solid gold;

With specific reference to AIP GEN 3.3 section 2.1.1, aircraft within one hour flight time of the condition are required to be notified by air traffic control (ATC) of the existence of new operational information. Based on the information provided in the report, the aircraft should have been provided with the relevant information. If the information was not already described in a current meteorological (MET) product or Notice to Airmen (NOT AM) then ATC is required to communicate the information using the prefixed "HAZARD ALERT".
The quote above always concerns me; I wonder, is a one hour prior notification adequate?; three hours into a four hour flight your options may be limited; one hour into a four hour flight and the odds improve. I've often wondered if a HA should be 'officially' issued to all aircraft en-route to the affected aerodrome, the moment it becomes 'live'. Can't see how that would cost a lot to do, perhaps some of the ATC could advise on the nuts and bolts.

Re the Met services wrangle, haven't read it yet, but aren't the NTSB putting their foot down about meteorological services to aviation ?.
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Old 15th May 2014, 23:46
  #1875 (permalink)  
 
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NTSB initiative on pilot SIG WX dissemination.

Kharon:
Re the Met services wrangle, haven't read it yet, but aren't the NTSB putting their foot down about meteorological services to aviation ?.
Yes indeed the NTSB have issued a series of SRs on the same topic (SSI). Why?? Well because wx related incidents/accidents continue to rise and it is their solemn duty, in compliance with Annex 13 Ch 8, to mitigate SSI & ultimately (hopefully) prevent future accidents..:
NTSB Recommends Weather Forecast Improvements AINsafety » May 12, 2014
by Robert P. Mark


May 12, 2014, 11:10 AM

The National Transportation Safety Board last week published nine specific recommendations to the FAA and the National Weather Service (NWS) that are intended to deliver more comprehensive pre-flight weather information to pilots. The recommendations—A-14-13 to -16 and A-14-17 to -21—are based on the findings of NTSB accident investigations involving aircraft encountering adverse surface wind, dense fog, icing, turbulence, and low-level wind shear. While this information currently exists, it is not always provided directly to pilots by NWS preflight weather forecasts.

“What’s difficult to understand is why weather advisories from the National Weather Service to the general public, at times, provide more comprehensive information about weather conditions than the advisories they provide to pilots experiencing the same conditions,” said NTSB member Earl Weener. “Why pilots would receive less information makes no sense, and increases the risk of flying in severe weather conditions.”
While the NWS also routinely advises pilots of turbulence and mountain wave activity, there are also no specific requirements to brief pilots about these items.

Tags: National Weather ServiceWeather forecastingNational Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationWeather warningDisasterWeather


FILED UNDER: Accidents, Safety, Security and Training
Maybe this is contributory to the FAA, a couple of days before the NTSB issued the SRs, putting out this: Got Weather?
Knowledge is power. Before you fly consider your abilities and those of your aircraft. Weather briefings, forecasts, and alert apps can provide insight into how likely you are to encounter turbulence on your next flight.
Pilot weather reports (PIREPs) are an excellent way to report and learn about current conditions on or near your route of flight. It is in your best interest to seek them out before you go, listen for them during flight or ask the controller, and learn how to properly submit one if you don't already know how:
Chapter 7.?Safety of Flight
Gotta love the Yanks...

Last edited by Sarcs; 16th May 2014 at 07:15.
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Old 16th May 2014, 10:12
  #1876 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
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Posts: 559
The reason the NSB and the FAA have pretty much nailed the process for safety oversight and safety investigations is in part due to the fact that most Americans won't bend over and grab their ankles like us Australians do!!! Our bureaucrats speak shit and we accept it, cop it on the chin, take another hit in the ass. We need to stand up en mass and fight back.


Long live the IOS!
004wercras is offline  
Old 16th May 2014, 21:18
  #1877 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
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Marquess of Queensberry – never heard of him.

004 - Don't think there's much doubt on 'fight back'; 260 or is it 270 submissions is an avalanche. Word on the street is that if the WLR gets the same treatment as the Pel Air inquiry there will be three revolutions for the miniscule to deal with; one from industry, the second from within the National party, Barnaby and Co. leading the charge over thin ice; and, probably the Senate committee. (IMO they have too much information to ignore, with any sort of clear conscience, that is).

Sarcs has a clever little aside at the tail end of this – POST 770 – (Truss) relating to the Part 61 fiasco; the answer to the question is disingenuous; if it's anything other than NZ /FAA 61. Clever question, dangerous ground. You'd have to wonder why this bloke hasn't sat down with Fawcett and/or Xenophon to get a true picture instead of meekly accepting flawed advice from the creatures who allowed the mess to continue from his last tenure in 2008. The Rev. Forsyth may deliver the sermon but what will happen once the church doors close and the pub doors open is anyone's guess. We shall see, can't be many more sleeps till the WLR is released.

Toot toot.
Kharon is offline  
Old 17th May 2014, 01:58
  #1878 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
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The real AOPA support for NTSB initiative...

Before moving on from my last I noted the following article from the real AOPA:
NTSB seeks better weather delivery

Urges FAA, National Weather Service to improve communication with pilots

In 2010, a Cessna 182R struck mountains near Corvallis, Ore., with two fatalities. The following year, a Eurocopter with five on board struck mountains on the island of Molokai, Hawaii. Another person was killed in 2012, when a Gulfstream jet impacted terrain in Oregon, and four people died in 2013 when a Mooney M20E hit terrain shortly after departure from Angel Fire, N.M.

In each of these cases, weather forecasts provided to the public noted more severe weather conditions than were detailed in aviation weather provided to the flight crews, and the National Transportation Safety Board issued on May 6 a call for the FAA and National Weather Service to improve weather forecast delivery to general aviation pilots.

“What’s difficult to understand is why weather advisories from the National Weather Service to the general public, at times, provide more comprehensive information about weather conditions than the advisories they provide to pilots experiencing the same conditions,” said NTSB Board Member Earl Weener, in a news release. “Why pilots would receive less information makes no sense, and increases the risk of flying in severe weather conditions. That is why this issue is on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List.”

The accidents were detailed in letters sent May 6 to FAA and NWS leaders, seeking action on recommendations to improve forecast data delivery to pilots. Improved aviation weather information distribution is among the items on the agency’s 2014 Most Wanted list, which is updated annually based on accident trends in all forms of transportation.

The announcement follows the May 1 launch of the “Got Weather?” campaign by the FAA and aviation groups including the AOPA Foundation’s Air Safety Institute. That effort will include a variety of weather education products developed by the Air Safety Institute and other organizations that focus on specific weather conditions that have contributed to accidents, with a goal of making pilots better informed, and more aware of forecast information sources and other available weather products.

The NTSB recommendations issued May 6 focus on improving situational awareness for pilots and controllers, and better disseminating important weather information within the aviation system.

“Safety will be enhanced for airmen and their passengers when pilots are given a complete weather report including all of the most current weather information,” Weener said.
The statement in the NTSB 2014 Most Wanted list says...

".....GENERAL AVIATION: IDENTIFY AND COMMUNICATE HAZARDOUS WEATHER

A frequent cause or contributing factor to general aviation accidents is hazardous weather. While having weather information available to pilots, air traffic controllers, and meteorologists is crucial, proper understanding and use of this information is just as critical...."

And from the NTSB SR letter to the FAA
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:


Ensure that all Federal Aviation Administration (and contracted) preflight weather briefings include any products modified or created by the National Weather Service in response to Safety Recommendation A-14-17. (A-14-13)

Require that the National Weather Service (NWS) provide a primary aviation weather product (as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-14-18 to the NWS) that specifically addresses the potential for and existence of mountain wave activity and its associated aviation weather hazards. (A-14-14)


In cooperation with the National Weather Service (NWS), revise the Interagency Agreement between the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/NWS for the center weather service units (CWSU) and its accompanying statement of work if needed to add the new responsibilities of CWSU personnel in response to Safety Recommendations A-14-17 and/or A-14-18 to the NWS, which are in addition to the other responsibilities currently performed by the NWS under this agreement.(A-14-15)


Include centerweather advisories in the suite of products available to pilots via the flight information services-broadcast data link. (A-14-16)

The NTSB also issued five safety recommendations to the National Weather Service.
Acting Chairman HART and Members SUMWALT,ROSEKIND, and WEENER concurred in these recommendations.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement them. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to [email protected]
IMO this is a perfect example of how a State signatory to ICAO Annex 13 (Chapter 8) is supposed to act. There is no obfuscating of responsibilities to the Annex; there is no resources spared in getting the message across; there is no arguing the toss by the regulator; and ultimately all stakeholders respect the NTSB initiative and get on with appropriately addressing the significant safety issues highlighted.

Wonder if the TSBC will have picked up on this stark difference in methodology, interpretation and compliance by the ATsBeaker to Annex 13??

Oh well moving on...

As "K" points out the WLR report release is imminent, as is the TSBC report... Not to mention Senate Estimates (Monday week) and the continued Senate debate on the Govt response to the AAI report. All in all a busy couple of weeks for the miniscule and his minions..."let the games begin!"
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Old 17th May 2014, 03:52
  #1879 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
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Posts: 559
Upcoming Senate Overestimates

Beaker, aka 'Count de Money' strategizing how to overcome the issue of the IOS revolt;



P.S Whisper on the street is that there will only be a 3.25% rise in pot plant allowances in line with the CPI, rather than the usual endless tin of money.
004wercras is offline  
Old 17th May 2014, 21:15
  #1880 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
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Off to the races.

It's coming from all directions for Truss: had the Senate committee not been gazumped by the WLR, I reckon that by now we'd be a long way down the road where a statement like this would be superfluous.

Sarcs # 1935 "IMO this is a perfect example of how a State signatory to ICAO Annex 13 (Chapter 8) is supposed to act. There is no obfuscating of responsibilities to the Annex; there is no resources spared in getting the message across; there is no arguing the toss by the regulator; and ultimately all stakeholders respect the NTSB initiative and get on with appropriately addressing the significant safety issues highlighted.

Wonder if the TSBC will have picked up on this stark difference in methodology, interpretation and compliance by the ATsBeaker to Annex 13?
The big question (IMO) is what will Truss do? – if anything – track record and form considered. You don't need to pull a horse up to loose a race, just give it an outing doing the minimum legally required (look like you're trying), rather than going all out. Looking at the BRB tote board, there's some small money for a late scratching, some of the pragmatic money is on 'an outing' rather than an all out effort to win; but most of the cynical money is bet on a 'token' effort, made with heavy reliance on 'interference' being called in the final furlongs. Result, our horse finishing fourth (out of the money) with a credible excuse for the mug punters when the stewards rule against the claimed 'interference'.

The smart money is on the Senate entry in the next race – the Conscience cup – a classic race with only the top weight for age performers invited. Save your pennies for this one; but, always said it, punting is a mugs game.

Last edited by Kharon; 17th May 2014 at 21:21. Reason: Don't blame me, I only keep the odds and lay the bets.
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