gaunty:
The OBR's were always meant to expose, post facto, what was actually "said" and what was actually "done" against the perhaps convenient interpretation by the participants of the drama.
That may be so Mr G, however much like this statement in a SMH article on who will take custody (if able to be found and recovered) of the MH370 CVR/FDR…
“….Experts say finding the recording devices will be crucial to unravelling the mystery of what happened aboard the flight that was scheduled to fly from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. But they say the cockpit voice recorder inside them may not be helpful because they store only about two hours of sound and probably have not preserved what was being recorded around the time the plane was diverted thousands of kilometres off course while over the South China Sea….”
SMH article link: Flight MH370: who will get custody of black boxes?
As it has been stated numerous times (and was the basis for Beaker ultimately justifying his decision to not recover the black box) the two hour timeframe wouldn’t cover the 0801 UTC RT from NADI to VH-NGA. However it could have covered the crew byplay as to their understanding of the relayed WX updates from NADI & Auckland. As Bryan Aherne highlighted...
“…The second thing is that there are so many assumptions in the fuel calculations of this particular flight. I have had six air transport pilots of high experience, and all of them came out with slightly different answers. It is not an exact science sometimes, but I think the only way we would really know is from the flight data recorder we could get from the accident…”
...perhaps of more importance is the up to 100 hrs of recorded information off the FDR.
Presumably one of the five parameters that NGA’s FDR recorded was fuel quantity/burn. So given that the ATsB investigators initially notified a CRITICAL safety issue that highlighted deficiencies within the interpretation of the regs and pilot guidance in regards to ALT requirements for remote islands etc, then it would be natural to assume that the FDR recording would have been invaluable to the ATsB reinforcing their originally intended CSI.
As a State sanctioned AAI the old (pre-Beaker) ATsB (and still practiced throughout the rest of the world) on recognising a critical or significant safety issue would then have been obligated to issue a safety recommendation to CAsA, who in turn would have been obligated to address the SR within a set timeframe.
As history will now show, the original intended CSI was downgraded to MINOR and no SR was issued, instead we are left with the following intended actions from CAsA for the MINOR SI (take note of the notified dates for intended proactive actions and the several CAsA caveats):
Fuel planning and en route decision-making - AO-2009-072-SI-01
Safety issue description
The available guidance on fuel planning and on seeking and applying en route weather updates was too general and increased the risk of inconsistent in-flight fuel management and decisions to divert.
Proactive Action
Action organisation: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Action number: AO-2009-072-NSA-094
Date: 30 August 2012
Action status: Closed
During this investigation, the ATSB and Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) have had a number of meetings in respect of the general nature of the available guidance and its possible influence on the development of this accident. In response, in July 2010 CASA issued Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) 1003OS, section 3.3.4 of which stated:
CASA also intends to review Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 relating to fuel requirements. This review is being undertaken in two phases: the first to enhance the guidance for fuel planning and in-flight fuel-related decision making on flights to remote destinations (including remote islands); and secondly a holistic review of guidelines for fuel and alternate planning.
In addition, NPRM 1003OS proposed changes to the requirements for the carriage of fuel on flights to remote islands. The proposed changes affected Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 82.0 and included:
- Designating Cocos (Keeling) Island as a ‘remote island’.
- Removing the provision that allowed an operator not to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome if the operator’s operations manual allowed such a procedure.
- Amending the definition of ‘minimum safe fuel’ to require the calculation of fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome in the event of a loss of pressurisation coupled with the failure of an engine, in addition to either of the individual failures.
- A requirement that a pilot in command who is subject to a condition to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome on a flight to a remote island must nominate an alternate aerodrome
- Extending the condition to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome on a flight to a remote island to passenger-carrying aerial work and regular public transport flights.
- Providing for CASA to be able to approve an operator not to comply with a condition to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome on a flight to a remote island, subject to conditions that would not adversely affect safety.
On 25 June 2012, CASA advised that amendment 36 to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 6, State Letter AN 11/1.32-12/10 detailed a number of new Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) in regard to fuel planning, in-flight fuel management, the selection of alternates and extended diversion time operations (EDTO). In this respect, CASA provided the following update:
- CASA intends to review Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 relating to fuel requirements. The ICAO fuel and alternate Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) are the basis of these changes and will be coordinated by CASA project OS09/13. While this project will focus specifically on passenger-carrying commercial flights the project will also be reviewing fuel requirements generally. The project will now be conducted in four phases. The first three phases will involve amendments to the relevant Civil Aviation Order (CAO) applicable Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 and Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 234. The project objectives are as follows:
- Phase 1 will involve amendments to the relevant CAOs and a review of CAAP 234-1 for flights to isolated aerodromes in light of the ICAO amendments. This phase will encompass fuel and operational requirements for flights to isolated aerodromes and will also consider the provision for flight to an alternate aerodrome from a destination that is a designated isolated aerodrome. The CAAP 234-1 will also be expanded to provide guidance and considerations necessary for flights to any isolated aerodrome, in particular when, and under what circumstances, a pilot should consider a diversion.
- Phase 2 will involve amendments to the relevant CAOs and further review of CAAP 234 in light of the ICAO amendments. This phase will encompass regulatory changes related to the implementation of general fuel planning, in-flight fuel management and the selection of alternate aerodromes. This review will include the methods by which pilots and operators calculate fuel required and fuel on-board.
- Phase 3 will involve amendment to CAR 234 to specify that the pilot in command, or the operator, must take reasonable steps to ensure sufficient fuel and oil shall be carried to undertake and continue the flight in safety. In addition, for flights conducted in accordance with Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO), CAO 82 and CAR 234 shall be amended to require consideration of a "critical fuel scenario" taking into account an aeroplane system failure or malfunction which could adversely affect safety of flight. It is anticipated that the methods chosen by the pilot-in-command and operator will therefore be sufficient to meet the requirements of CAR 234 to enable a flight to be undertaken and continue in safety.
- Phase 4 will involve the publication of internal and external educational material along with conducting briefings where necessary.
and that:
The amendment to the ICAO Annex 6 standards will be considered, and where appropriate, incorporated into the relevant legislation/advisory publication. In addition it is anticipated that there will be guidance material for operators who can demonstrate a particular level of performance-based compliance. The intent is to provide a bridge from the conventional approach to safety to the contemporary approach that uses process- based methods and Safety Risk Management (SRM) principles.
The ICAO Fuel and Flight Planning Manual are reflected in the SARP to Annex 6. Inclusion of the provisions of the Amendment 36 SARPs will be captured throughout this project. The ICAO SARP becomes effective from November 2012.
CASA will endeavour to make the changes as soon as possible - subject to third party arrangements such as drafting and resource availability. However the timing of the CAR changes will be subject to a timetable that is not necessarily able to be controlled by CASA.
Finally, CASA also advised of their intent to regulate Air Ambulance / Patient transfer operators as follows:
- Air Ambulance/Patient transfer operations in the proposed operational Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs) will be regulated to safety standards that are similar to those for passenger operations.
- While CASR Parts 138/136 will be limited to domestic operations and, if CASA decides to retain Air Ambulance/Patient transfer operations in these rule suites, any such operation wishing to operate internationally will also be required to comply with CASR Part 119. If, however, CASA decides to move these operations into CASR Parts 121/135/133 they will already be required to comply with CASR Part 119. Either way, Air Ambulance/Patient transfer operations will be regulated to the same standard as Air Transport Operations (ATO). In relation to Norfolk and Lord Howe Islands, all ATO which include Air Ambulance/Patient transfer, will be required to carry mainland alternate fuel.CASR Parts 119/121/135/133 are expected to be finalised by the end of 2012 and are currently proposed to commence in June 2014. CASR Parts 138/136 are expected to be made by June 2013 and are proposed to commence in June 2014. Given that the drafting of these CASR Parts are subject to third party arrangements (Attorney-General’s Department) and CASA and the industry’s ability to effectively implement the new rule suite, these timelines are subject to change.
So everything is sweet, lessons learnt and future potential accidents averted..
, therefore
MINOR SI
closed and there will be proactive action sometime (hopefully) in the next decade??
TICK TOCK!