CASA response to the ATSB report on Lockhart River
Cap'n
I just cannot agree with you on this. OK, so I only peddle a Bonanza around the place these days, but it has similar approach performance to a bunch of other stuff.
I do GPSRNAV Apprs all the time, and have flown the same LHR appr in sh*t weather (admittedly with my heart in my mouth since the prang) several times.
Is there an equipment issue here?
I did my initial GPS NPA endorsement with a King GPS that I found to be less than friendly, but I love the Garmin 430 in my Bo.
I usually let George (Century III) fly the approach, and I have the pictorial display of the appr on the 430. I set the aircraft up as I would for an ILS with 10 flap and 120 kts, then drop the gear at the point indicated on the chart for the start of the 3 degree descent to ""Mike".
In my Bonanza, 10 flap, gear down, 23/23 gives me a 3 degree descent path - 120 kts, 600ft/min.
(I flew a new C172 to other day that had a King autopilot that would hold a preset ROC or ROD - would love to have me one of them! Flew a fully coupled ILS appr in 22 kt Xwind - it had the needles nailed in the centre all the way to the runway!)
It wouldn't matter a damn to me if Foxtrot was there or not, because I can see on the pictorial display where I am on the appr. I suppose it does give you a check altitude, but the terrain alert in the 430 keeps an eye on that for me.
I would not want to see Oz go to a non-ICAO std GPS NPA Appr. If there genuinely is a problem - change the ICAO standard.
Dr
I just cannot agree with you on this. OK, so I only peddle a Bonanza around the place these days, but it has similar approach performance to a bunch of other stuff.
I do GPSRNAV Apprs all the time, and have flown the same LHR appr in sh*t weather (admittedly with my heart in my mouth since the prang) several times.
Is there an equipment issue here?
I did my initial GPS NPA endorsement with a King GPS that I found to be less than friendly, but I love the Garmin 430 in my Bo.
I usually let George (Century III) fly the approach, and I have the pictorial display of the appr on the 430. I set the aircraft up as I would for an ILS with 10 flap and 120 kts, then drop the gear at the point indicated on the chart for the start of the 3 degree descent to ""Mike".
In my Bonanza, 10 flap, gear down, 23/23 gives me a 3 degree descent path - 120 kts, 600ft/min.
(I flew a new C172 to other day that had a King autopilot that would hold a preset ROC or ROD - would love to have me one of them! Flew a fully coupled ILS appr in 22 kt Xwind - it had the needles nailed in the centre all the way to the runway!)
It wouldn't matter a damn to me if Foxtrot was there or not, because I can see on the pictorial display where I am on the appr. I suppose it does give you a check altitude, but the terrain alert in the 430 keeps an eye on that for me.
I would not want to see Oz go to a non-ICAO std GPS NPA Appr. If there genuinely is a problem - change the ICAO standard.
Dr
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Bloggs,
It is now obvious that you should surrender your Instrument Rating....if indeed you have a real one, because it is quite obvious that you do not self brief before carrying out an RNAV approach and most likely every other type of approach.
If you did then you would not get confused about the waypoints during the approach.
The problem with the RNAV approaches is not the chart or the waypoints or the distance to run to the next waypoint, its with the foolhardy pilots who have failed to understand how they work and expect something different to what is actually presented.
Your points about the presentation of information on the older 'strip' type GPS boxes is valid and CASA should have given more consideration to allowing that type of equipment to be used in the first place. But imagine the stink that decision would have caused. CASA would have been accused of imposing unnecessary cost on the industy by the likes of blokes like you.
The latest boxes are sensational and the map almost eliminates getting lost in the procedure.
Keep your cool though Bloggs, I'd hate to think that you lose it so easily on the internet, but somehow keep cool in the cockpit.
It is now obvious that you should surrender your Instrument Rating....if indeed you have a real one, because it is quite obvious that you do not self brief before carrying out an RNAV approach and most likely every other type of approach.
If you did then you would not get confused about the waypoints during the approach.
The problem with the RNAV approaches is not the chart or the waypoints or the distance to run to the next waypoint, its with the foolhardy pilots who have failed to understand how they work and expect something different to what is actually presented.
Your points about the presentation of information on the older 'strip' type GPS boxes is valid and CASA should have given more consideration to allowing that type of equipment to be used in the first place. But imagine the stink that decision would have caused. CASA would have been accused of imposing unnecessary cost on the industy by the likes of blokes like you.
The latest boxes are sensational and the map almost eliminates getting lost in the procedure.
Keep your cool though Bloggs, I'd hate to think that you lose it so easily on the internet, but somehow keep cool in the cockpit.
In my experience, the biggest danger in flying a GPS NPA is the feckwhit radioless toy-aeroplane pilot who climbs out tracking on the extended runway centreline to fill the windscreen of my Bonanza when I pop out of the cloud doing 120 kts in the opposite direction.
Dr
Dr
the biggest danger in flying a GPS NPA is the feckwhit radioless toy-aeroplane pilot who climbs out tracking on the extended runway centreline to fill the windscreen of my Bonanza when I pop out of the cloud doing 120 kts in the opposite direction.
If there genuinely is a problem - change the ICAO standard.
Moving maps/graphical displays? They only had one of these:
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There's obviously disagreement on this thread as to whether the design and representation of the RNAV (GNSS) NPA's are a problem. Whether or not the design and representation is an issue, Blogg's post above has illustrated one thing that reduces one's situational awareness immeasurably in a RNAV (GNSS) NPA - lack of a moving map. Take that little airplane symbol tracking along the red lines away and you are denied another tool that can help avoid disaster - not only can you see the abbreviation for the next waypoint, but you can see where on which segment of the approach you are flying and match that to the approach chart. A separate CDI can represent x-track accuracy in a format we're all used to - but you do need to know the scale used for the segment.
I fly SPIFR RNAV (GNSS) NPA's a LOT, hand fly a lot of 'em for practice and would not like to tackle any of them with a serious workload without a moving map. Surely it's also the least that the travelling public deserve. I also prefer the ASA DAPs to Jepps for RNAV approaches.
One thing that has always bugged me about the LHR accident is how a decision could be made to go below the minimum altitude that must be maintained from LHRWI until LHRWF (2200') without noticing that the GPS and the annunciator hadn't kicked into APP mode (usu happens within 0.5 NM of FAF). This is a vital final check as to whether to continue the approach, if no APP mode indicated, can't descend further (then try same or other RNAV (GNSS) NPA again or in the LHR case, go on over the top to to the RWY 30 NDB). The LHR accident happened about LHRWI (IIRC) and I have never seen APP mode kick in so far away from the FAF.
Edited
6/4/07: I have since viewed the animation from the ATSB site - the Metro was at ~2200' crossing FAF, so my "IIRC" was incorrect - the ACFT did not go below 2200' until after the FAF, so the "APP mode" observation I made above is irrelevant to the case. Oops.
I fly SPIFR RNAV (GNSS) NPA's a LOT, hand fly a lot of 'em for practice and would not like to tackle any of them with a serious workload without a moving map. Surely it's also the least that the travelling public deserve. I also prefer the ASA DAPs to Jepps for RNAV approaches.
One thing that has always bugged me about the LHR accident is how a decision could be made to go below the minimum altitude that must be maintained from LHRWI until LHRWF (2200') without noticing that the GPS and the annunciator hadn't kicked into APP mode (usu happens within 0.5 NM of FAF). This is a vital final check as to whether to continue the approach, if no APP mode indicated, can't descend further (then try same or other RNAV (GNSS) NPA again or in the LHR case, go on over the top to to the RWY 30 NDB). The LHR accident happened about LHRWI (IIRC) and I have never seen APP mode kick in so far away from the FAF.
Edited
6/4/07: I have since viewed the animation from the ATSB site - the Metro was at ~2200' crossing FAF, so my "IIRC" was incorrect - the ACFT did not go below 2200' until after the FAF, so the "APP mode" observation I made above is irrelevant to the case. Oops.
Last edited by NOtimTAMs; 6th Apr 2007 at 10:06.
Folks,
There might be disagreement on this thread about GPS/NPA, but there wasn't too much disagreement in the recent survey.
Lack of an easily identifiable distance to run to MAP or RW was a/the major issue.
Another issue was the lack of uniformity in operation of GA type equipment, with each manufacturer having different operating logic.
There is absolutely no doubt that a moving maps beats no moving map hands down --- have a look at the CFIT (or lack thereof) accidents with glass cockpits, the message has been clear for years.
If you haven't already, have a look at the flight profile/speeds at Lockhart River, quite apart from what "legal" max. speeds might have been, I would have had great difficulty flying an NPA approach at those speeds, even with a "perfect" chart.
I know more than one of my mates, flying Metro's and old Kingair, with "similar to the above" "official" GPS, and rightly or wrongly, carry a handheld with a moving map, just to have a "better picture" of what is going on.
Tootle pip!!
There might be disagreement on this thread about GPS/NPA, but there wasn't too much disagreement in the recent survey.
Lack of an easily identifiable distance to run to MAP or RW was a/the major issue.
Another issue was the lack of uniformity in operation of GA type equipment, with each manufacturer having different operating logic.
There is absolutely no doubt that a moving maps beats no moving map hands down --- have a look at the CFIT (or lack thereof) accidents with glass cockpits, the message has been clear for years.
If you haven't already, have a look at the flight profile/speeds at Lockhart River, quite apart from what "legal" max. speeds might have been, I would have had great difficulty flying an NPA approach at those speeds, even with a "perfect" chart.
I know more than one of my mates, flying Metro's and old Kingair, with "similar to the above" "official" GPS, and rightly or wrongly, carry a handheld with a moving map, just to have a "better picture" of what is going on.
Tootle pip!!
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A pilot I used to fly with got a job as an FOI about a decade ago. I saw him about a year later and he said if he had his way he would go to work with a pair of bolt cutters and cut the wires to everyones PC and make them get out of the office and do what they are paid to do.
I saw him again recently and he says it has not got any better and the amount of time 'out of the office' is not enough to do the job, but the amount of admin and other BS keeps them inside without any admin help.
There are good people in CASA but the culture and their system is just not delivering the goods. Until that is addressed, I don't see change any time soon. (until the next inquiry, that is !)
I saw him again recently and he says it has not got any better and the amount of time 'out of the office' is not enough to do the job, but the amount of admin and other BS keeps them inside without any admin help.
There are good people in CASA but the culture and their system is just not delivering the goods. Until that is addressed, I don't see change any time soon. (until the next inquiry, that is !)
Well, I hope ASA is taking notice of CASA's predicament ... because they are quickly heading down the same road. Controllers on gazillions of dollars are doing financial budgets, managing projects, and administrative duties.
This ATC administrative workload will be compunded by the removal of all Brisbane Centre HR Staff by the end of next week.
The consequence? ... more ATC will have to be recruited to cover the administartive workload ... as they aren't allowed to employ admin staff.
I don't see the economical or operational logic ...
This ATC administrative workload will be compunded by the removal of all Brisbane Centre HR Staff by the end of next week.
The consequence? ... more ATC will have to be recruited to cover the administartive workload ... as they aren't allowed to employ admin staff.
I don't see the economical or operational logic ...
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Capn Bloggs & FTDK
I think you may be both waltzing around the same point but missing a couple of other things in the ATSB report.
Yes, the aircraft was fitted with a GPS receiver that is hard to read where something like a Garmin 430 with a larger display and graphical presentation would be a lot easier.
Yes, it would have been easier for the pilot if the aircraft had been fitted with an autopilot and that had flown the approach with the pilot having more time to monitor the approach.
However, it cannot be overlooked that this was a multi-crew operation with only one pilot rated for a GPS approach. Nor can it be overlooked that this pilot had, apparently, a history of non-stabilised approaches. Nor can it be overlooked that the operating company had a less than ideal check system in place with an overworked CP.
No wonder the holes lined up eventually.
I think you may be both waltzing around the same point but missing a couple of other things in the ATSB report.
Yes, the aircraft was fitted with a GPS receiver that is hard to read where something like a Garmin 430 with a larger display and graphical presentation would be a lot easier.
Yes, it would have been easier for the pilot if the aircraft had been fitted with an autopilot and that had flown the approach with the pilot having more time to monitor the approach.
However, it cannot be overlooked that this was a multi-crew operation with only one pilot rated for a GPS approach. Nor can it be overlooked that this pilot had, apparently, a history of non-stabilised approaches. Nor can it be overlooked that the operating company had a less than ideal check system in place with an overworked CP.
No wonder the holes lined up eventually.
PLovett
Didn't miss anything! Just chose to focus on the suggestion that the approach itself was the problem, rather than "put the boot in", on any of the numerous other issues.
I have no experience with RPT but it seems to defeat the purpose of a two pilot crew when one of them is not qualified on all aspects of the operation.
I also found it interesting that, according to a prior co-pilot, the PIC of the accident flight was surprised by the proximity of the trees on that appr into LHR. Even when "on profile" on that appr, the trees do appear to be very close as you cross the ridge. Seeing that in VMC does tend to make sure you fly the appr carefully in IMC.
Dr
Didn't miss anything! Just chose to focus on the suggestion that the approach itself was the problem, rather than "put the boot in", on any of the numerous other issues.
I have no experience with RPT but it seems to defeat the purpose of a two pilot crew when one of them is not qualified on all aspects of the operation.
I also found it interesting that, according to a prior co-pilot, the PIC of the accident flight was surprised by the proximity of the trees on that appr into LHR. Even when "on profile" on that appr, the trees do appear to be very close as you cross the ridge. Seeing that in VMC does tend to make sure you fly the appr carefully in IMC.
Dr
PLovett,
Agreed that this was a multi-issue prang. The (lack of) CASA oversight of the Ops Manual, for example, makes me sick. No Stabilised Approach criteria? WTF?
Foxtrot is just another hole that could have been closed up, giving the poor (unrated) FO more of a chance of knowing what was going on. Foxtrot is not necessary, not having it would improve the safety of these approaches, and that would put an extra slice of cheese in the block, making it harder to line up the holes.
Agreed that this was a multi-issue prang. The (lack of) CASA oversight of the Ops Manual, for example, makes me sick. No Stabilised Approach criteria? WTF?
Foxtrot is just another hole that could have been closed up, giving the poor (unrated) FO more of a chance of knowing what was going on. Foxtrot is not necessary, not having it would improve the safety of these approaches, and that would put an extra slice of cheese in the block, making it harder to line up the holes.
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As this is also a multi issue thread and at the risk of being accused of oversimplification may I put forth these facts, (with the benefit of hindsight);
1) CASA has deemed Transair unsafe and withdrawn their AOC.
2) CASA has deemed Aerotropics safe and have not withdrawn their AOC.
Would it not then stand to reason that had the flight been flown by Aerotropics the disaster would not have happened.
I note the Coroners matter has begun in Brisbane and thenceforth to Cairns.
1) CASA has deemed Transair unsafe and withdrawn their AOC.
2) CASA has deemed Aerotropics safe and have not withdrawn their AOC.
Would it not then stand to reason that had the flight been flown by Aerotropics the disaster would not have happened.
I note the Coroners matter has begun in Brisbane and thenceforth to Cairns.
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No TimTams
Mate, you've hit the nail on the head.
Capt Bloggs,
not sure if you're GPS/Rnav approach certified, but the whole point of the Final Approach Fix
is to provide a final check prior to committing to descent below the MSA.
Similar to the outer Marker check on an ILS, it is a requirement to ensure that the "approach" mode
(sometimes indicated by "ACT", Active) annunciator has illuminated.
On a CIR renewal for RNAV approach, failure to call "Approach Mode Active" before descending below MSA will result ina FAIL result.
The report also confirms that CAT B approach speeds for all segments were exceeded, significantly so.
Bob Murphie.
CASA did not find Transair unsafe.
In fact CASA reported to the Senate (Hansard) that just prior to the tragedy that it had conducted
a "Fulsome" (their words) audit and found nothing of concern.
CASA did not cancel Transair's AOC based on any safety concerns,
it cancelled it at the request of Transair.
At some future date, if an application for a new AOC is made, in answer to the question
"Have you had an AOC cancelled by CASA?", the applicant quite correctly can tick the NO box.
The ATSB identifies the relationship between the Carrier (Flight HC675) and the operator, Transair.
The ATSB report shows, on its front page, VH-TFU painted in HC's livery, including HC's name and phone number.
In the ensuing inquiries, much will be revealed, and all is not as it seems.
ATSB's assertion that the regulator's deficiencies in surveillance was a contributory factor will be established.
In fact. it may be established that there may be parallels to Lord Howe.
Based on the available evidence, this was not a stabilised approach, the Category B speeds were significantly exceeded,
and descent was initiated prior to approach mode being active.
What led to a culture that condoned a lack of SOPs is just as significant as any alleged pilot error.
Wait and see what unfolds, it will be interesting to some.
One thing that has always bugged me about the LHR accident is how a decision could be made to go below the minimum altitude that must be maintained from LHRWI until LHRWF (2200') without noticing that the GPS and the annunciator hadn't kicked into APP mode (usu happens within 0.5 NM of FAF). This is a vital final check as to whether to continue the approach, if no APP mode indicated, can't descend further (then try same or other RNAV (GNSS) NPA again or in the LHR case, go on over the top to to the RWY 30 NDB). The LHR accident happened about LHRWI (IIRC) and I have never seen APP mode kick in so far away from the FAF.
Capt Bloggs,
not sure if you're GPS/Rnav approach certified, but the whole point of the Final Approach Fix
is to provide a final check prior to committing to descent below the MSA.
Similar to the outer Marker check on an ILS, it is a requirement to ensure that the "approach" mode
(sometimes indicated by "ACT", Active) annunciator has illuminated.
On a CIR renewal for RNAV approach, failure to call "Approach Mode Active" before descending below MSA will result ina FAIL result.
The report also confirms that CAT B approach speeds for all segments were exceeded, significantly so.
Bob Murphie.
CASA did not find Transair unsafe.
In fact CASA reported to the Senate (Hansard) that just prior to the tragedy that it had conducted
a "Fulsome" (their words) audit and found nothing of concern.
CASA did not cancel Transair's AOC based on any safety concerns,
it cancelled it at the request of Transair.
At some future date, if an application for a new AOC is made, in answer to the question
"Have you had an AOC cancelled by CASA?", the applicant quite correctly can tick the NO box.
The ATSB identifies the relationship between the Carrier (Flight HC675) and the operator, Transair.
The ATSB report shows, on its front page, VH-TFU painted in HC's livery, including HC's name and phone number.
In the ensuing inquiries, much will be revealed, and all is not as it seems.
ATSB's assertion that the regulator's deficiencies in surveillance was a contributory factor will be established.
In fact. it may be established that there may be parallels to Lord Howe.
Based on the available evidence, this was not a stabilised approach, the Category B speeds were significantly exceeded,
and descent was initiated prior to approach mode being active.
What led to a culture that condoned a lack of SOPs is just as significant as any alleged pilot error.
Wait and see what unfolds, it will be interesting to some.
Mainframe
".. the whole point of the Final Approach Fix is to provide a final check prior to committing to descent below the MSA"
OK, but .....
MSA with 10 nm of LHR NDB is 3100'. The point at which you need to commence your descent to get the 3.49 degree descent path is 1.7 nm from LHRWF. If you are on the suggested descent profile at LHRWF, then you will already be at 2860'.
On the LHR Rwy 30 Appr you actually start the descent 4.2 nm from LHREF.
The Garmin 430 changes to Appr mode within 2 nm of the FAF so for the Rwy 12 appr it would probably be in Appr mode at the commencment of descent point, but for the Rwy 30 appr it would still be in Terminal mode when the descent is commenced.
I check that the GPS is in Appr mode at the FAF, but I would have already commenced the descent.
Dr
".. the whole point of the Final Approach Fix is to provide a final check prior to committing to descent below the MSA"
OK, but .....
MSA with 10 nm of LHR NDB is 3100'. The point at which you need to commence your descent to get the 3.49 degree descent path is 1.7 nm from LHRWF. If you are on the suggested descent profile at LHRWF, then you will already be at 2860'.
On the LHR Rwy 30 Appr you actually start the descent 4.2 nm from LHREF.
The Garmin 430 changes to Appr mode within 2 nm of the FAF so for the Rwy 12 appr it would probably be in Appr mode at the commencment of descent point, but for the Rwy 30 appr it would still be in Terminal mode when the descent is commenced.
I check that the GPS is in Appr mode at the FAF, but I would have already commenced the descent.
Dr
Last edited by ForkTailedDrKiller; 6th Apr 2007 at 06:51.
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Mainframe;
I take your point, resigned and so were not sacked.
Still the same, Had Aerotropics flown the flight in question, and being a 'safe' mob, the crash wouldn't have occurred, (question).
I take your point, resigned and so were not sacked.
Still the same, Had Aerotropics flown the flight in question, and being a 'safe' mob, the crash wouldn't have occurred, (question).
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Capn Bloggs does not need me to defend him, he is quite capable of defending self, but I will say he IS extremely qualified when it comes to GPSNPAs.
The crux of what he is saying, and I agree is- you need to have something to increase situational awareness when you dont have a flash ND, and having a fix that references distance to go to the field so that one can easily calculate descent profiling surely is the way to go.
The crux of what he is saying, and I agree is- you need to have something to increase situational awareness when you dont have a flash ND, and having a fix that references distance to go to the field so that one can easily calculate descent profiling surely is the way to go.
Grandpa Aerotart
As alluded to by Capt Bloggs the Foxtrot waypoint is a potentially dangerous waypoint when conducting GPSNPAs.
In my opinion the original design criteria were put down by people with no experience in human factors as they apply to these circumstances...let alone significant experience of flying IAL procedures in general.
The characterisation of the PIC and the manner in which he was flying the approach in question is a disgrace...how can anyone not on board know how he was flying the approach?
It is my opinion that this characterisation is blame shifting on the part of ATSB and CASA because they feel VERY exposed given the less than optimal design of GPS approaches that they have certified as acceptable in Australia.
Given the two alternative ways this accident could have occurred;
1/. The PIC was an unstable personality conducting an approach in an essentially suicidal manner or,
2/. The PIC was confused about where he was on the approach in relation to the terrain and runway, possibly because of input from a non qualified 'co pilot',
I know which I think is the more likely accurate one.
What might have stopped this accident from happening?
1/. A suitably qualified copilot...but that doesn't mittagate for single pilot ops.
2/. A $20000 moving map display. Hardly an acceptable response.
3/. A final approach phase that is referenced to a single point in space as is the case with every other IAL procedure ever published in the history of IAL procedures.
You chose.
In my opinion the original design criteria were put down by people with no experience in human factors as they apply to these circumstances...let alone significant experience of flying IAL procedures in general.
The characterisation of the PIC and the manner in which he was flying the approach in question is a disgrace...how can anyone not on board know how he was flying the approach?
It is my opinion that this characterisation is blame shifting on the part of ATSB and CASA because they feel VERY exposed given the less than optimal design of GPS approaches that they have certified as acceptable in Australia.
Given the two alternative ways this accident could have occurred;
1/. The PIC was an unstable personality conducting an approach in an essentially suicidal manner or,
2/. The PIC was confused about where he was on the approach in relation to the terrain and runway, possibly because of input from a non qualified 'co pilot',
I know which I think is the more likely accurate one.
What might have stopped this accident from happening?
1/. A suitably qualified copilot...but that doesn't mittagate for single pilot ops.
2/. A $20000 moving map display. Hardly an acceptable response.
3/. A final approach phase that is referenced to a single point in space as is the case with every other IAL procedure ever published in the history of IAL procedures.
You chose.
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Why would the ATSB feel exposed? They just call it as they find it. One factor missed by a lot of people is that the Metro would have been required to have had EGPWS fitted a month later. While there are problems with the way GPS approach charts are presented the F/O did not have the experience or qualifications to perform his job properly. This is the type of CFIT accident that has similarities with many other accidents where the cockpit gradient was very steep. The F/O was put in the RHS with little or no training on what his role would be.
CASA cannot duck their responsibilties. They only acted when presented with information that they should have found out years before. Why did the Chief Pilot have approval to be in that position when he had so many other responsibilties? Why were any pilots flying RPT routes when they were not GPS endorsed?
I hope the Coronial picks up where the ATSB report finished.
CASA cannot duck their responsibilties. They only acted when presented with information that they should have found out years before. Why did the Chief Pilot have approval to be in that position when he had so many other responsibilties? Why were any pilots flying RPT routes when they were not GPS endorsed?
I hope the Coronial picks up where the ATSB report finished.