No TimTams
One thing that has always bugged me about the LHR accident is how a decision could be made to go below the minimum altitude that must be maintained from LHRWI until LHRWF (2200') without noticing that the GPS and the annunciator hadn't kicked into APP mode (usu happens within 0.5 NM of FAF). This is a vital final check as to whether to continue the approach, if no APP mode indicated, can't descend further (then try same or other RNAV (GNSS) NPA again or in the LHR case, go on over the top to to the RWY 30 NDB). The LHR accident happened about LHRWI (IIRC) and I have never seen APP mode kick in so far away from the FAF.
Mate, you've hit the nail on the head.
Capt Bloggs,
not sure if you're GPS/Rnav approach certified, but the whole point of the Final Approach Fix
is to provide a final check prior to committing to descent below the MSA.
Similar to the outer Marker check on an ILS, it is a requirement to ensure that the "approach" mode
(sometimes indicated by "ACT", Active) annunciator has illuminated.
On a CIR renewal for RNAV approach, failure to call "Approach Mode Active" before descending below MSA will result ina FAIL result.
The report also confirms that CAT B approach speeds for all segments were exceeded, significantly so.
Bob Murphie.
CASA did not find Transair unsafe.
In fact CASA reported to the Senate (Hansard) that just prior to the tragedy that it had conducted
a "Fulsome" (their words) audit and found nothing of concern.
CASA did not cancel Transair's AOC based on any safety concerns,
it cancelled it at the request of Transair.
At some future date, if an application for a new AOC is made, in answer to the question
"Have you had an AOC cancelled by CASA?", the applicant quite correctly can tick the NO box.
The ATSB identifies the relationship between the Carrier (Flight HC675) and the operator, Transair.
The ATSB report shows, on its front page, VH-TFU painted in HC's livery, including HC's name and phone number.
In the ensuing inquiries, much will be revealed, and all is not as it seems.
ATSB's assertion that the regulator's deficiencies in surveillance was a contributory factor will be established.
In fact. it may be established that there may be parallels to Lord Howe.
Based on the available evidence, this was not a stabilised approach, the Category B speeds were significantly exceeded,
and descent was initiated prior to approach mode being active.
What led to a culture that condoned a lack of SOPs is just as significant as any alleged pilot error.
Wait and see what unfolds, it will be interesting to some.