Benalla six dead and $5,000 VOR reward
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Benalla six dead and $5,000 VOR reward
It is now over 2 years and 7 months since the terrible Benalla accident where six people died because the professional pilot was about 11 miles off course. See the ATSB report here.
At the time the Airservices controllers turned off the route monitoring alarm three times rather than inform the pilot.
I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened.
The prime reason for the Government’s decision to go ahead with NAS was so the use of radar could be maximised to save peoples’ lives.
I wonder if there is going to be more needless loss of life – say at places like Proserpine, where there are high mountains nearby but the radar is not used effectively.
It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace.
Everyone at the time raved about how fantastic Voices of Reason (VOR) was, when many postings were being made in relation to airspace. Even Gaunty appeared to think that VOR was fantastic.
VOR placed the following post (see below) on 21 April 2004. This is of course the person we need to get involved in airspace reform. I’m prepared to make a $5,000 donation to the Royal Flying Doctor Service (Broken Hill Branch) if the VOR who wrote the below mentioned piece will identify himself or herself and assist with airspace reform.
I can understand why some people would be loathe to give their real names on PPRuNe, however I cannot understand when professional pilots are dying, along with their passengers, that there wouldn’t be at least one air traffic control expert who would not be prepared to push for the greater use of controlled airspace and radar - under their own name.
So VOR, how about becoming up front and identifying yourself so you can be effective and see if you can get involved in the necessary reform.
I point out that at one stage I thought I knew who VOR was – I believe it was a previous head of air traffic control in Australia. No, not the one who recently passed away. This person has denied being VOR, so VOR must still be out there.
Read the following post and realise just how valuable a person with this experience and knowledge would be. For surely no one wants to die after making a simple human error and not maximising the use of our $350 million radar system.
At the time the Airservices controllers turned off the route monitoring alarm three times rather than inform the pilot.
I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened.
The prime reason for the Government’s decision to go ahead with NAS was so the use of radar could be maximised to save peoples’ lives.
I wonder if there is going to be more needless loss of life – say at places like Proserpine, where there are high mountains nearby but the radar is not used effectively.
It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace.
Everyone at the time raved about how fantastic Voices of Reason (VOR) was, when many postings were being made in relation to airspace. Even Gaunty appeared to think that VOR was fantastic.
VOR placed the following post (see below) on 21 April 2004. This is of course the person we need to get involved in airspace reform. I’m prepared to make a $5,000 donation to the Royal Flying Doctor Service (Broken Hill Branch) if the VOR who wrote the below mentioned piece will identify himself or herself and assist with airspace reform.
I can understand why some people would be loathe to give their real names on PPRuNe, however I cannot understand when professional pilots are dying, along with their passengers, that there wouldn’t be at least one air traffic control expert who would not be prepared to push for the greater use of controlled airspace and radar - under their own name.
So VOR, how about becoming up front and identifying yourself so you can be effective and see if you can get involved in the necessary reform.
I point out that at one stage I thought I knew who VOR was – I believe it was a previous head of air traffic control in Australia. No, not the one who recently passed away. This person has denied being VOR, so VOR must still be out there.
Read the following post and realise just how valuable a person with this experience and knowledge would be. For surely no one wants to die after making a simple human error and not maximising the use of our $350 million radar system.
Class E Airspace and United States Practice
We have watched with incredulity at the dangerously naive statements being made on threads in the Australian PPRuNe sites, concerning the operation of Class E airspace. Class E airspace is NOT an unsafe categorization of airspace, and is in fact used safely and effectively in substantial portions of the globe.
EACH AND EVERY transport and passenger carrying aircraft operating in the United States is required to operate for some portion of their flight in designated Class E airspace – effectively between 18,000 feet and the upper limit of Class B, C or D airspace – or the surface for non controlled aerodromes. This equates to over 10,000 passenger-carrying flights per day, every day of the year. The Class E airspace within which they operate is in the so-called most dangerous phase of flight – climb or descent. Your national carrier is no exception.
There are in excess of 150,000 general aviation aircraft operating in the United States, to either the visual or instrument flight rules – many many thousands per day.
There are CONSTANT interactions between IFR passenger carrying aircraft and VFR aircraft on a daily basis – with no hint that this practice is unsafe.
There are countless examples where aircraft provided with routine terminal area instructions whilst still in Class E airspace are routinely provided sequencing descending turn instructions by controllers in one breath, and VFR traffic information in the other.
We agree that Class E airspace is mostly within radar cover in the United States – probably the greater part of 95%. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and where they can, provide traffic information on VFR flights.
Radar coverage is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace, and in fact in several cases the Class E airspace linking certain aerodromes to upper airspace is not covered by radar. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and as they cannot observe VFR, do not pass traffic unless they know by some other means. That positive IFR-to-IFR separation may, in many cases, be applied on a “one in at a time” basis. The airlines accept that mode of operation.
NOT ONE SINGLE AIRLINE in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
Our observation in relation to the Australian experience has been one of giving proper effect not just to training and education, but also to the cultural change requirements. Pilots need to understand that operating in Class E airspace IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT to the service that they have received in the past – but need to accept that this is a normal way of doing business.
Australian controllers need to STOP being negative, embrace the concept of Class E airspace and to be blunt, get on with it. Controllers in the United States provide services in Class E, without questioning its “safety”, day in and day out, and have done so [either as Class E, or its predecessor], for over 50 years.
NOT ONE SINGLE CONTROLLER in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
We are concerned that this constant questioning and second-guessing by your pilot and controller fraternity will in fact generate a safety deficiency larger that the problem you are trying to solve. By our estimation, there is NO JUSTIFICATION for the large amount of Class C airspace presently designated in Australia, and subject to the appropriate change management processes we have previously described, you should introduce Class E airspace wherever possible.
We have watched with incredulity at the dangerously naive statements being made on threads in the Australian PPRuNe sites, concerning the operation of Class E airspace. Class E airspace is NOT an unsafe categorization of airspace, and is in fact used safely and effectively in substantial portions of the globe.
EACH AND EVERY transport and passenger carrying aircraft operating in the United States is required to operate for some portion of their flight in designated Class E airspace – effectively between 18,000 feet and the upper limit of Class B, C or D airspace – or the surface for non controlled aerodromes. This equates to over 10,000 passenger-carrying flights per day, every day of the year. The Class E airspace within which they operate is in the so-called most dangerous phase of flight – climb or descent. Your national carrier is no exception.
There are in excess of 150,000 general aviation aircraft operating in the United States, to either the visual or instrument flight rules – many many thousands per day.
There are CONSTANT interactions between IFR passenger carrying aircraft and VFR aircraft on a daily basis – with no hint that this practice is unsafe.
There are countless examples where aircraft provided with routine terminal area instructions whilst still in Class E airspace are routinely provided sequencing descending turn instructions by controllers in one breath, and VFR traffic information in the other.
We agree that Class E airspace is mostly within radar cover in the United States – probably the greater part of 95%. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and where they can, provide traffic information on VFR flights.
Radar coverage is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace, and in fact in several cases the Class E airspace linking certain aerodromes to upper airspace is not covered by radar. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and as they cannot observe VFR, do not pass traffic unless they know by some other means. That positive IFR-to-IFR separation may, in many cases, be applied on a “one in at a time” basis. The airlines accept that mode of operation.
NOT ONE SINGLE AIRLINE in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
Our observation in relation to the Australian experience has been one of giving proper effect not just to training and education, but also to the cultural change requirements. Pilots need to understand that operating in Class E airspace IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT to the service that they have received in the past – but need to accept that this is a normal way of doing business.
Australian controllers need to STOP being negative, embrace the concept of Class E airspace and to be blunt, get on with it. Controllers in the United States provide services in Class E, without questioning its “safety”, day in and day out, and have done so [either as Class E, or its predecessor], for over 50 years.
NOT ONE SINGLE CONTROLLER in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
We are concerned that this constant questioning and second-guessing by your pilot and controller fraternity will in fact generate a safety deficiency larger that the problem you are trying to solve. By our estimation, there is NO JUSTIFICATION for the large amount of Class C airspace presently designated in Australia, and subject to the appropriate change management processes we have previously described, you should introduce Class E airspace wherever possible.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 15th Mar 2007 at 00:29.
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It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace
Let me highlight the bit where YOU yourself admit that you are NOT the man for the job...
It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace
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Hi Dick,
This really isn't meant to be a silly response but surely with the new OAM being a part of CASA from 01JUL07, and not AA, the representation and future SHOULD provide somewhat greater balance to the airspace debate with the new GM of OAM (whoever that is) driving/guiding new Australian airspace managment strategies.
Am I being naive (again)?
FTDK
This really isn't meant to be a silly response but surely with the new OAM being a part of CASA from 01JUL07, and not AA, the representation and future SHOULD provide somewhat greater balance to the airspace debate with the new GM of OAM (whoever that is) driving/guiding new Australian airspace managment strategies.
Am I being naive (again)?
FTDK
Dick
I have no disagreement with the thrust of this post, but you would have to agree that it only addresses a breakdown in the "safety net".
As someone who oftens flies GPS/RNAV approaches (including Lockhart River and Proserpine), I find this accident deeply disturbing as the primary cause remains unexplained. How can someone proporting to fly a GPS/RNAV Appr be so far off track and apparently not know it?
For these reasons I always fly with at least 2 GPS's operating (even though one is a top of the range VFR only) and a moving map display. In addition I now have terrain avoidance on my GNS430. I figure the GPS satellite system would have to have a major malfunction for me to come unstuck in this way. It would seem to me that the only alternative to check one's position would be to fly over the NDB or VOR prior to commencing the GPS/RNAV Appr - which really goes against the ease and convenience of the GPS Appr in the first place.
At the time I was surprised by the failure of ATC to advise the pilot that he was diverging from the expected track. I have been queried on a number of occassions by ATC in similar circumstances. The last time it happened took me a bit to figure out what they were on about cause everything in the aeroplane said I was on track. It eventually dawned on me that my departure clearance was ammended to put me via a waypoint that was not on my plan, and that detail had not been passed down the line. I was where I was supposed to be and headed to the right place - just not where that controller thought I should have been headed.
I don't think the airspace issue can be blamed for Benalla, but agree that a change in procedures (among a number of things) may have averted a disaster.
Dr
I have no disagreement with the thrust of this post, but you would have to agree that it only addresses a breakdown in the "safety net".
As someone who oftens flies GPS/RNAV approaches (including Lockhart River and Proserpine), I find this accident deeply disturbing as the primary cause remains unexplained. How can someone proporting to fly a GPS/RNAV Appr be so far off track and apparently not know it?
For these reasons I always fly with at least 2 GPS's operating (even though one is a top of the range VFR only) and a moving map display. In addition I now have terrain avoidance on my GNS430. I figure the GPS satellite system would have to have a major malfunction for me to come unstuck in this way. It would seem to me that the only alternative to check one's position would be to fly over the NDB or VOR prior to commencing the GPS/RNAV Appr - which really goes against the ease and convenience of the GPS Appr in the first place.
At the time I was surprised by the failure of ATC to advise the pilot that he was diverging from the expected track. I have been queried on a number of occassions by ATC in similar circumstances. The last time it happened took me a bit to figure out what they were on about cause everything in the aeroplane said I was on track. It eventually dawned on me that my departure clearance was ammended to put me via a waypoint that was not on my plan, and that detail had not been passed down the line. I was where I was supposed to be and headed to the right place - just not where that controller thought I should have been headed.
I don't think the airspace issue can be blamed for Benalla, but agree that a change in procedures (among a number of things) may have averted a disaster.
Dr
It occurrs to me that we need a Driving Expert to push for the introduction of a special driving lane for me to use on the way to work...
Smart arse? Well, yes, I'm guilty.
However, if I don't agree with the laws, it's up to me to push to have them changed. I can't expect some expert to jump to, for my cause ... unless, of course, I have first convinced him that I'm right and that it's in his best interests too.
Smart arse? Well, yes, I'm guilty.
However, if I don't agree with the laws, it's up to me to push to have them changed. I can't expect some expert to jump to, for my cause ... unless, of course, I have first convinced him that I'm right and that it's in his best interests too.
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Alright then, I admit, I am VOR. Now give the five gorillas to Uncle Bob at BH and lets be done with it.
Dick, I don't know how many times you have to be told.
The radar coverage at Benalla is CRAP.
I....WORK....THAT....SECTOR....AND....THE....RADAR....COVERA GE....IS....CRAP.
Give me a procedural approach rating and I will monitor and separate every aircraft into Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector. Better still put an ADS-B transmitter or radar head at Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector and I will talk you all the way down.
You will need to double or triple the ATC staff to do it though.
Step 1: Upgrade the facilities if you want the service.
Step 2: Staff the sectors correctly.
Step 3: Train the staff appropriately.
Step 4: There's about 20 more steps
Dick, I don't know how many times you have to be told.
The radar coverage at Benalla is CRAP.
I....WORK....THAT....SECTOR....AND....THE....RADAR....COVERA GE....IS....CRAP.
Give me a procedural approach rating and I will monitor and separate every aircraft into Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector. Better still put an ADS-B transmitter or radar head at Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector and I will talk you all the way down.
You will need to double or triple the ATC staff to do it though.
Step 1: Upgrade the facilities if you want the service.
Step 2: Staff the sectors correctly.
Step 3: Train the staff appropriately.
Step 4: There's about 20 more steps
Last edited by En-Rooter; 15th Mar 2007 at 11:29.
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.........I dearly wish that the real reason behind the BLA accident could be indentified once & for all as I knew the PIC of the PA42 for many years, to me it seems almost impossible ( I said almost, we are afterall only human) to think that the (PIC I won't mention his name out of respect)) did anything wittingly wrong but as always with these 'event's it's a chain of events, sadly the chain wasn't broken in time to save 6 lives. Radar coverage will always be a bone of contention through out Aus whether it kept that 'chain' linked or not simply for what I believe to be two reasons.
One being we don't have the traffic (compared to OS) for our geographic size hence a somewhat 'limited' service & secondly we simply can't afford it under the "user pays" system...sad I know but that's the bare facts & there's little we can do about it in the short term.
Aviation will always be a risk, calculated mostly but never the less risky.
Next time vote wisely although there ain't enough pilots of all denominations to have any real long term effect at voting time unfortunetly.
RIP K...., ( & the 5 others) I still think of our quite times at BLA
Capt Wally
One being we don't have the traffic (compared to OS) for our geographic size hence a somewhat 'limited' service & secondly we simply can't afford it under the "user pays" system...sad I know but that's the bare facts & there's little we can do about it in the short term.
Aviation will always be a risk, calculated mostly but never the less risky.
Next time vote wisely although there ain't enough pilots of all denominations to have any real long term effect at voting time unfortunetly.
RIP K...., ( & the 5 others) I still think of our quite times at BLA
Capt Wally
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......apologies yes it was a PA 31T, I used to fly the PA 42 so that's where the mix up was from, old age gets ya aventually !!......obviously people read with a very alert mind.
Capt Wally
Capt Wally
Dick,
I sincerely hope you are NOT using the deaths of these people to further peddle your E airspace agenda. You know very well that TAAATS could be used to provide all the safety functions now: it couldn't give a rats about what airspace the aircraft was in.
By all means push to get ATC to use the TAAATS alarms. Just don't bother pushing that 1950's rubbish of E.
Tarts cost $600m BTW.
I sincerely hope you are NOT using the deaths of these people to further peddle your E airspace agenda. You know very well that TAAATS could be used to provide all the safety functions now: it couldn't give a rats about what airspace the aircraft was in.
By all means push to get ATC to use the TAAATS alarms. Just don't bother pushing that 1950's rubbish of E.
Tarts cost $600m BTW.
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Dick, Cancelling a RAM without telling a pilot is not negligence. I do it most days somewhere between 20-80 times.
Cancelling a RAM "Route Adherance Monitor" Alert is not the same thing as 'the aircraft was off track' (even if it was 3 times). The flight plan that the system had, didn't match the the cleared route (=RAM). Tracking DCT to GPS RNAV waypoints can cause this for almost all GPS RNAV tracking points that are "not defined" within the TAAATS data set. Was this the case?
Everytime we vector or have WX diversions, guess what the System route doesn't match the clearance = RAM alert; do I tell the pilot, no way, it's not unexpected, I know why I'm getting the ALERT.
If an aircraft is tracking to a point not defined in TAAATS the obvious happens the RAM goes off. We put the point the aircraft is tracking to in the LABEL so there is no need to inform the pilot they are off track the RAM is not, repeat, not unexpected thus it's cancelled.
What are we supposed to do:
RAM ALERT
Controller: "You're indicating off track for direct BLA"
Pilot: "We're not tracking DCT BLA we are tracking for BLAED as cleared"
Controller "Oh yes that's right, sorry about that"
Obviously ATC are not in the habit of telling pilots they are complying with their clearance in CTA, that's the point. In class G we have no ability to dictate a particular path to fly; if we get a RAM that is unexpected then we would tell the pilot.
The problem for the ATCs in this case is the 'black and white' docs that 'require' this and that action; but the reality is most ATCs would have done the exact same thing; and would still do so today. Reasonable actions of a reasonable man; there but for the grace of god go I.
The biggest issue here is ATCs are not required to monitor appraoches in Class G and in this circumstance the radar coverage is not sufficient to enable anything near effective monitoring anyway. If we were the sectorisation would change massively and you'd need to more than double the low level sectors and controller numbers. RISK vs COST, CBA. Dick is always on about costs; six lives this time, nothing to be laughed at, but what safety benefit would all that cost actually provide. Would have Class E to 1200 AGL saved this flight?
Would enabled MSAW data helped? Probably not as this was removed due to inaccuracy and relevance in Class G; ie MSAW ALERT on a landing aircraft = Issue alert to pilot; terrain alert, oh yes it's the 2 miles of black tar called a RWY.
If this accident happened at YSDU or YBHI or YMIA would it be the 'fault' of the airspace and/or controllers? Even if they cancelled the RAM 80NM before the aerodrome, there would be no subsequent RAMs due to lack of RADAR (just like in this accident).
While I'm here, rumours I've heard is an American (ex ATC) is being hunted to head the new AIRSPACE OFFICE within DOTARS. Here we go again.
NAS is firmly back on the agenda people.
By all means push to get ATC to use the TAAATS alarms.
Everytime we vector or have WX diversions, guess what the System route doesn't match the clearance = RAM alert; do I tell the pilot, no way, it's not unexpected, I know why I'm getting the ALERT.
If an aircraft is tracking to a point not defined in TAAATS the obvious happens the RAM goes off. We put the point the aircraft is tracking to in the LABEL so there is no need to inform the pilot they are off track the RAM is not, repeat, not unexpected thus it's cancelled.
What are we supposed to do:
RAM ALERT
Controller: "You're indicating off track for direct BLA"
Pilot: "We're not tracking DCT BLA we are tracking for BLAED as cleared"
Controller "Oh yes that's right, sorry about that"
Obviously ATC are not in the habit of telling pilots they are complying with their clearance in CTA, that's the point. In class G we have no ability to dictate a particular path to fly; if we get a RAM that is unexpected then we would tell the pilot.
The problem for the ATCs in this case is the 'black and white' docs that 'require' this and that action; but the reality is most ATCs would have done the exact same thing; and would still do so today. Reasonable actions of a reasonable man; there but for the grace of god go I.
The biggest issue here is ATCs are not required to monitor appraoches in Class G and in this circumstance the radar coverage is not sufficient to enable anything near effective monitoring anyway. If we were the sectorisation would change massively and you'd need to more than double the low level sectors and controller numbers. RISK vs COST, CBA. Dick is always on about costs; six lives this time, nothing to be laughed at, but what safety benefit would all that cost actually provide. Would have Class E to 1200 AGL saved this flight?
Would enabled MSAW data helped? Probably not as this was removed due to inaccuracy and relevance in Class G; ie MSAW ALERT on a landing aircraft = Issue alert to pilot; terrain alert, oh yes it's the 2 miles of black tar called a RWY.
If this accident happened at YSDU or YBHI or YMIA would it be the 'fault' of the airspace and/or controllers? Even if they cancelled the RAM 80NM before the aerodrome, there would be no subsequent RAMs due to lack of RADAR (just like in this accident).
While I'm here, rumours I've heard is an American (ex ATC) is being hunted to head the new AIRSPACE OFFICE within DOTARS. Here we go again.
NAS is firmly back on the agenda people.
Thread Starter
Apache, any success I have ever gained has been by surrounding myself with competent people. I do not see myself as an air traffic control expert. I have, however, spent a lot of time studying airspace systems around the world and asking advice from those who have expertise in airspace.
For example, I can see the advantages of upgrading Class G airspace to Class E – especially where we have radar. This will undoubtedly improve safety.
Tobzalp, no I am not trying to forcibly unmask a person’s identity, but why is it that no ATC expert working for Airservices will post under their own name on this website or even make a public statement to the aviation industry about Class E airspace? It makes you wonder doesn’t it?
ForkTailedDrKiller, the accident could have been caused by either an equipment failure or human error. I’m sure you will agree that as humans we can make just about any mistake that is possible – look at the Tenerife accident where the Dutch 747 Captain took off without a clearance.
You are surprised by the ATC failure to advise the pilot of the track divergence. You obviously know that in Class G airspace (where the aircraft was heading) there is not even a requirement to report when visual – i.e. the air traffic controller has no idea whether you are still in cloud or visual.
In Class E airspace it is totally different. There is quite a different responsibility for the air traffic controller. That is why Class E airspace in this location – which has quite good radar coverage to the initial approach fix – would have very likely prevented the accident from happening.
En-Rooter, you say that the radar coverage is no good at Benalla, however look at the ATSB report. You will find that there was adequate radar coverage to allow a properly trained controller, using properly introduced procedures, to advise the pilot that he was many miles off track.
I agree that proper training is required. My suggestion is that you look at the Cabinet approved NAS document here, especially Note 12 which states:
Canary51, I had no idea until you made your posting that the Coroner had decided to hold an inquest. However what has that got to do with anything? Are you suggesting that because the Coroner believes it is serious enough to conduct an inquest, that I should not continue to push for the proper use of radar in the area?
Do you accept that there could be another accident before the Coroner makes his finding? I would imagine his finding will most likely support proper procedures being introduced, and the use of radar to minimise the chance of similar accidents happening in the future.
Capn Bloggs, you have obviously made up your mind that Class E airspace is “1950’s rubbish”. However it is obvious from the posting of VOR above, that he or she does not agree with you. There must be many pilots and controllers who accept that in radar covered airspace, Class E is better than Class G.
If TAAATS cost $600 million, it is all the more reason to use it properly.
SM4 Pirate, you make the very point of why Class E airspace is safer. You state:
Of course, in Class E – until the pilot cancels IFR – you do have that ability, and that is what makes it safer.
By the way, I don’t believe that NAS was ever off the agenda. I think that you will find it has always been Government policy (see here), and now that people are looking at these six deaths, they are more focused on why we are not using the radar correctly.
These threads are really healthy because they show how some people have made up their mind that the present system is adequate and that accidents like the one at Benalla cannot be prevented by proper procedures and a better use of the radar.
Lastly SM4 Pirate, you say:
I have never stated or implied such a thing. I have made it very clear in everything I have written that as far as I know, the controller was complying with the rules and training material that existed at the time - but six people did die.
For example, I can see the advantages of upgrading Class G airspace to Class E – especially where we have radar. This will undoubtedly improve safety.
Tobzalp, no I am not trying to forcibly unmask a person’s identity, but why is it that no ATC expert working for Airservices will post under their own name on this website or even make a public statement to the aviation industry about Class E airspace? It makes you wonder doesn’t it?
ForkTailedDrKiller, the accident could have been caused by either an equipment failure or human error. I’m sure you will agree that as humans we can make just about any mistake that is possible – look at the Tenerife accident where the Dutch 747 Captain took off without a clearance.
You are surprised by the ATC failure to advise the pilot of the track divergence. You obviously know that in Class G airspace (where the aircraft was heading) there is not even a requirement to report when visual – i.e. the air traffic controller has no idea whether you are still in cloud or visual.
In Class E airspace it is totally different. There is quite a different responsibility for the air traffic controller. That is why Class E airspace in this location – which has quite good radar coverage to the initial approach fix – would have very likely prevented the accident from happening.
En-Rooter, you say that the radar coverage is no good at Benalla, however look at the ATSB report. You will find that there was adequate radar coverage to allow a properly trained controller, using properly introduced procedures, to advise the pilot that he was many miles off track.
I agree that proper training is required. My suggestion is that you look at the Cabinet approved NAS document here, especially Note 12 which states:
It is noted that this will require extensive training for air traffic controllers.
Do you accept that there could be another accident before the Coroner makes his finding? I would imagine his finding will most likely support proper procedures being introduced, and the use of radar to minimise the chance of similar accidents happening in the future.
Capn Bloggs, you have obviously made up your mind that Class E airspace is “1950’s rubbish”. However it is obvious from the posting of VOR above, that he or she does not agree with you. There must be many pilots and controllers who accept that in radar covered airspace, Class E is better than Class G.
If TAAATS cost $600 million, it is all the more reason to use it properly.
SM4 Pirate, you make the very point of why Class E airspace is safer. You state:
In class G we have no ability to dictate a particular path to fly
By the way, I don’t believe that NAS was ever off the agenda. I think that you will find it has always been Government policy (see here), and now that people are looking at these six deaths, they are more focused on why we are not using the radar correctly.
These threads are really healthy because they show how some people have made up their mind that the present system is adequate and that accidents like the one at Benalla cannot be prevented by proper procedures and a better use of the radar.
Lastly SM4 Pirate, you say:
Dick, Cancelling a RAM without telling a pilot is not negligence.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 18th Mar 2007 at 21:46.
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Ahhh I really would have liked the RFDS to recieve the $5,000 BUT cherry picking doesn't cut it around here
Below is the last post from the real VORs from that particular thread.
Some of you may recall it.
27th April 2004, 07:37 #61
Voices of Reason
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: New York
Posts: 132
Clarifications
First, we wish to apologize for some of the recent content (quoted above )under our nom-de-plume – the offending party has been removed from the roster of participants.
Second, as to credentials, suffice it to say our resumes would stand more than favorably against any offered by participants to this forum.
Now, in relation to this thread, perhaps we could go to first principles and try to clarify our original post.
As we have stated before, the entire basis for airspace service levels should be set around equitable risk management – that is, no single party should be exposed to a higher level of risk than another, unless that risk is accepted voluntarily.
By that, we mean that those that have sole responsibility for the risk to which they expose themselves – VFR pilots, glider pilots, military fighter pilots etc – may choose to operate to higher risk levels than those who have little or no control over risk – i.e., the fare paying passenger.
Good and effective airspace management is about ensuring that the fare paying passenger is not exposed to inappropriate risk levels – and just as important – inequitable risk levels.
So, the risk to a passenger flying to Sydney should be no higher than that for a passenger flying to Broome, Alice Springs, Launceston or Mildura, and vice versa.
Prior to the ICAO alphabet airspace classification system, there were as few as two classifications available in most parts of the world – controlled and uncontrolled airspace – with some States offering mid-range services such as Visual Exempt, or Instrument Visual airspace. The ICAO alphabet airspace system when finally codified offers seven layers of airspace service, and seven layers of risk management.
As we have previously stated, the system was developed by a panel whose primary responsibility was the accommodation of VFR flights in an increasingly complex environment of IFR flights – and an increasingly complex set of IFR flight parameters.
Now, for an airspace designer starting with a clean sheet of paper, it would be relatively simple to codify Australian airspace, so that the levels of risk are set to appropriate levels, and no single section of the community is subject to abnormally high levels of risk – except, as we stated before, where they choose to accept that risk. Some service leveling would be required to ensure that the model was not overly complex – so naturally there would be apparent over-servicing in certain areas. This occurs in all States.
We said “appropriate levels of risk”. Here is where it can get exceptionally difficult, even for a clean sheet approach. What one section of the aviation community will accept as appropriate may differ by one or two orders of magnitude to another section of the community. So a glider pilot might well be prepared to accept risk levels one hundred times higher than an airline pilot, or ten times higher than a VFR general aviation pilot. A VFR general aviation pilot might accept risk at a level ten times higher than an airline pilot. Is this wrong – basically no. The point of most contention comes where the high risk acceptor and the low risk acceptor come together. Here the airspace designer may need to impose an airspace classification that accommodates the lower risk threshold, or establish mitigating procedures.
So far, this is a lesson in theory.
The practicality of your debate in Australia is the superimposition of a model which may, or may not, set appropriate risk levels, over a system that has been in place for quite some time, and has therefore established a defacto risk standard.
Yes, it is absolutely true to say that for a given volume of airspace, with a set volume of traffic, the risk associated with Class G is higher than Class F, which is higher than Class E, which is higher than Class C etc. It is also true to say that if you have been providing a higher level of service for some time, the reduction from, say, Class C to Class E may appear either cost neutral or cost negative – i.e., a reduction for no cost benefit.
In fact, by our research into the airspace reforms conducted over the last 15 years in Australia, we have seen enormous overall cost benefit associated with the change in service levels – without any provable or demonstrable change in risk.
We understand that you have transitioned from over 2500 air traffic and flight information staff to around 1100. We accept that a large part of that was due to a technology change – nevertheless, traffic levels have increased, so the cost effectiveness has increased.
We expect that your responses will be along the lines of “we can provide the service, so why don’t we?”. This goes to one respondent’s quotation from Justice Gibbs. We have seen this, and other similar statements – particularly those associated with the United Kingdom and European Occupational Health and Safety directorates. The statements, on there own, are misleading, and need to be linked to the benefit side of the equation. Effectively, it is the passengers who will determine risk tolerability versus cost, a fact that Broome has tested. So, if a passenger can fly from Broome to Perth for $100.00, they may tolerate a “safety tax” of $5.00, but would baulk at $50.00. So the fact that a service can be provided is not necessarily an indicator that it should be provided, particularly when it can be demonstrated that risk is within an acceptable bound.
We suspect that some years ago, talk of controllers simultaneously providing traffic information in Class G airspace and separation services in Class C airspace would have been anathema. We understand it is done routinely now.
Yes, the change from Class C to Class E does increase risk – but is it an unacceptable level of risk – probably not. Are the incidents in Class E airspace indicative of a safety deficiency – yes. Is it a deficiency in airspace design – probably not. It is more likely to be a misapplication of the procedures associated with Class E airspace. Despite the protestations from some that Australia is somehow “different” to the rest of the world, evidence in other States with Class E airspace would seem to indicate that the design of Class E itself is not deficient.
Now to the question of transponders in Class E airspace.
Our research – and we would challenge any participants in this thread to look back through airspace change documentation to validate this information – indicates that the transponder carriage and activation proposal was mooted as part of a reform initiative called Airspace 2000, and was offered as a trade-off by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association as a safety enhancement mitigators, in return for reduction or elimination of airspace charges.
The regulations giving effect to the transponder carriage and activation in Class E airspace were put in place immediately before Class E airspace was implemented on your east coast, several years ago. We understand that it had originally been planned to implement Class E airspace along your entire east coast, from the north of Queensland to South Australia, at 8500 feet and above, and that charts had been printed and distributed. We understand that a Richard Harold Smith ordered the charts withdrawn and the implementation stopped, in favor of a much smaller implementation in New South Wales, two months later. We understand that charts were re-printed and issued – but on instruction from the director of your regulator, apparently at the specific behest of the same Richard Harold Smith, the effective date was deferred for two weeks whilst a debate raged around the need for mandatory transponders. We understand the carriage and activation of transponders was opposed by the same Richard Harold Smith.
As we have stated previously, the carriage and activation of transponders is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace. Yes, it does enhance its application – but it is not a requirement. As we have also stated, the carriage and operation of transponders should only be seen as a means by which the traffic alerting characteristic of Class E airspace is better enabled – and NOT as a way to alert TCAS carrying aircraft to the presence of VFR flights.
We trust this provides clarification.
Below is the last post from the real VORs from that particular thread.
Some of you may recall it.
27th April 2004, 07:37 #61
Voices of Reason
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: New York
Posts: 132
Clarifications
First, we wish to apologize for some of the recent content (quoted above )under our nom-de-plume – the offending party has been removed from the roster of participants.
Second, as to credentials, suffice it to say our resumes would stand more than favorably against any offered by participants to this forum.
Now, in relation to this thread, perhaps we could go to first principles and try to clarify our original post.
As we have stated before, the entire basis for airspace service levels should be set around equitable risk management – that is, no single party should be exposed to a higher level of risk than another, unless that risk is accepted voluntarily.
By that, we mean that those that have sole responsibility for the risk to which they expose themselves – VFR pilots, glider pilots, military fighter pilots etc – may choose to operate to higher risk levels than those who have little or no control over risk – i.e., the fare paying passenger.
Good and effective airspace management is about ensuring that the fare paying passenger is not exposed to inappropriate risk levels – and just as important – inequitable risk levels.
So, the risk to a passenger flying to Sydney should be no higher than that for a passenger flying to Broome, Alice Springs, Launceston or Mildura, and vice versa.
Prior to the ICAO alphabet airspace classification system, there were as few as two classifications available in most parts of the world – controlled and uncontrolled airspace – with some States offering mid-range services such as Visual Exempt, or Instrument Visual airspace. The ICAO alphabet airspace system when finally codified offers seven layers of airspace service, and seven layers of risk management.
As we have previously stated, the system was developed by a panel whose primary responsibility was the accommodation of VFR flights in an increasingly complex environment of IFR flights – and an increasingly complex set of IFR flight parameters.
Now, for an airspace designer starting with a clean sheet of paper, it would be relatively simple to codify Australian airspace, so that the levels of risk are set to appropriate levels, and no single section of the community is subject to abnormally high levels of risk – except, as we stated before, where they choose to accept that risk. Some service leveling would be required to ensure that the model was not overly complex – so naturally there would be apparent over-servicing in certain areas. This occurs in all States.
We said “appropriate levels of risk”. Here is where it can get exceptionally difficult, even for a clean sheet approach. What one section of the aviation community will accept as appropriate may differ by one or two orders of magnitude to another section of the community. So a glider pilot might well be prepared to accept risk levels one hundred times higher than an airline pilot, or ten times higher than a VFR general aviation pilot. A VFR general aviation pilot might accept risk at a level ten times higher than an airline pilot. Is this wrong – basically no. The point of most contention comes where the high risk acceptor and the low risk acceptor come together. Here the airspace designer may need to impose an airspace classification that accommodates the lower risk threshold, or establish mitigating procedures.
So far, this is a lesson in theory.
The practicality of your debate in Australia is the superimposition of a model which may, or may not, set appropriate risk levels, over a system that has been in place for quite some time, and has therefore established a defacto risk standard.
Yes, it is absolutely true to say that for a given volume of airspace, with a set volume of traffic, the risk associated with Class G is higher than Class F, which is higher than Class E, which is higher than Class C etc. It is also true to say that if you have been providing a higher level of service for some time, the reduction from, say, Class C to Class E may appear either cost neutral or cost negative – i.e., a reduction for no cost benefit.
In fact, by our research into the airspace reforms conducted over the last 15 years in Australia, we have seen enormous overall cost benefit associated with the change in service levels – without any provable or demonstrable change in risk.
We understand that you have transitioned from over 2500 air traffic and flight information staff to around 1100. We accept that a large part of that was due to a technology change – nevertheless, traffic levels have increased, so the cost effectiveness has increased.
We expect that your responses will be along the lines of “we can provide the service, so why don’t we?”. This goes to one respondent’s quotation from Justice Gibbs. We have seen this, and other similar statements – particularly those associated with the United Kingdom and European Occupational Health and Safety directorates. The statements, on there own, are misleading, and need to be linked to the benefit side of the equation. Effectively, it is the passengers who will determine risk tolerability versus cost, a fact that Broome has tested. So, if a passenger can fly from Broome to Perth for $100.00, they may tolerate a “safety tax” of $5.00, but would baulk at $50.00. So the fact that a service can be provided is not necessarily an indicator that it should be provided, particularly when it can be demonstrated that risk is within an acceptable bound.
We suspect that some years ago, talk of controllers simultaneously providing traffic information in Class G airspace and separation services in Class C airspace would have been anathema. We understand it is done routinely now.
Yes, the change from Class C to Class E does increase risk – but is it an unacceptable level of risk – probably not. Are the incidents in Class E airspace indicative of a safety deficiency – yes. Is it a deficiency in airspace design – probably not. It is more likely to be a misapplication of the procedures associated with Class E airspace. Despite the protestations from some that Australia is somehow “different” to the rest of the world, evidence in other States with Class E airspace would seem to indicate that the design of Class E itself is not deficient.
Now to the question of transponders in Class E airspace.
Our research – and we would challenge any participants in this thread to look back through airspace change documentation to validate this information – indicates that the transponder carriage and activation proposal was mooted as part of a reform initiative called Airspace 2000, and was offered as a trade-off by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association as a safety enhancement mitigators, in return for reduction or elimination of airspace charges.
The regulations giving effect to the transponder carriage and activation in Class E airspace were put in place immediately before Class E airspace was implemented on your east coast, several years ago. We understand that it had originally been planned to implement Class E airspace along your entire east coast, from the north of Queensland to South Australia, at 8500 feet and above, and that charts had been printed and distributed. We understand that a Richard Harold Smith ordered the charts withdrawn and the implementation stopped, in favor of a much smaller implementation in New South Wales, two months later. We understand that charts were re-printed and issued – but on instruction from the director of your regulator, apparently at the specific behest of the same Richard Harold Smith, the effective date was deferred for two weeks whilst a debate raged around the need for mandatory transponders. We understand the carriage and activation of transponders was opposed by the same Richard Harold Smith.
As we have stated previously, the carriage and activation of transponders is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace. Yes, it does enhance its application – but it is not a requirement. As we have also stated, the carriage and operation of transponders should only be seen as a means by which the traffic alerting characteristic of Class E airspace is better enabled – and NOT as a way to alert TCAS carrying aircraft to the presence of VFR flights.
We trust this provides clarification.
Dick,
Name "some people" please. Prune names will be fine.
These threads are really healthy because they show how some people have made up their mind that the present system is adequate and that accidents like the one at Benalla cannot be prevented by proper procedures and a better use of the radar.
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For example, I can see the advantages of upgrading Class G airspace to Class E – especially where we have radar. This will undoubtedly improve safety.
...they are more focused on why we are not using the radar correctly.
I have never stated or implied such a thing.
At the time the Airservices controllers turned off the route monitoring alarm three times rather than inform the pilot.
... in this location – which has quite good radar coverage to the initial approach fix – would have very likely prevented the accident from happening.
Thread Starter
This is getting better! Now we are to believe that there are different VORs – the “real” ones and the (no doubt) “fake” ones. How are we to know the difference? Well it appears that any VORs that are against NAS are “real” and any VORs which explain how NAS works so well in the United States and could work well here, are “fake.”
Now of course it isn’t quite explained how the “fake” VORs (i.e. the ones that support NAS) have somehow got hold of the password to post, and how we are to know the difference.
By the way, any claims about me preventing Class E airspace implementation are rubbish – I have been a consistent supporter for more Class E.
If the people who make these claims don’t have the self-confidence to phone me and ask the facts, what can we do?
I say again, to answer this nightmare and for the reasonable people who are reading, why is it that Airservices has so frightened its staff and its knowledgeable people that they cannot say anything publicly about airspace?
I too have heard that staff have been threatened if they put anything on PPRuNe or say anything publicly about their professional opinions in relation to airspace. Can you imagine working for such an organisation?
This is not an issue of national security, it is an issue of aviation safety – where there should be no secrets. To intimidate your staff and management so they are not game to say their true beliefs in relation to safety is a damning reflection on this organisation.
Just as with the Wheat Board, it will all come out one day and be exposed - you wait and see.
Now of course it isn’t quite explained how the “fake” VORs (i.e. the ones that support NAS) have somehow got hold of the password to post, and how we are to know the difference.
By the way, any claims about me preventing Class E airspace implementation are rubbish – I have been a consistent supporter for more Class E.
If the people who make these claims don’t have the self-confidence to phone me and ask the facts, what can we do?
I say again, to answer this nightmare and for the reasonable people who are reading, why is it that Airservices has so frightened its staff and its knowledgeable people that they cannot say anything publicly about airspace?
I too have heard that staff have been threatened if they put anything on PPRuNe or say anything publicly about their professional opinions in relation to airspace. Can you imagine working for such an organisation?
This is not an issue of national security, it is an issue of aviation safety – where there should be no secrets. To intimidate your staff and management so they are not game to say their true beliefs in relation to safety is a damning reflection on this organisation.
Just as with the Wheat Board, it will all come out one day and be exposed - you wait and see.