Yet Another DJ Near Miss
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visually being calm about did not have an operating transponder
uninformed people at Eurocontrol
When it says "Traffic",
And so should you all!
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Great, Just FCUK*%! Wonderful,
So now we have to worry about VB aircraft as well.
What is the harm in just following the RA, so what if you can see an aircraft which may be the offending party, just follow the RA. It's not that hard is it!
A short time later the crew of the 737 received a resolution advisory from their traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) about the C421. Because the crew of the 737 had the C421 in sight, they chose to maintain visual separation rather than follow the TCAS RA. That action was in accordance with company policy.
So now we have to worry about VB aircraft as well.
What is the harm in just following the RA, so what if you can see an aircraft which may be the offending party, just follow the RA. It's not that hard is it!
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A short time later the crew of the 737 received a resolution advisory from their traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) about the C421. Because the crew of the 737 had the C421 in sight, they chose to maintain visual separation rather than follow the TCAS RA. That action was in accordance with company policy.
Perhaps we should be more concerned about the threat from transponders that are incorrectly calibrated. The other day while on descent into Canberra I overheard a VFR aircraft requesting a radar check of his transponder altitude (well done to the pilot, a smart thing to do) - it was out by 500 feet!
500 feet in the wong direction is going to make any TCAS RA useless!
Airspeed Ambassador,
Yep, out flying the eastern seaboard yesterday, and heard an aircraft in lengthy discussions with ATC about its Mode C. ATC were advising that it was 400' in error. And it was inconsistent - had been overeading during climb, underreading in level flight. They instructed him to squawk Mode A only......
AA, you are a DJ pilot, yes? Are you saying the DJ policy is quite clearly follow the RA in all cases, no discretion allowed? (as an aside, I emphasis QF policy is to do so unless it's clearly unsafe to do so). If that is DJ policy, then the ATSB report is, shall we say, extremely suspect. I'm sorry, either they are covering up for the boys not doing the right thing or they have had the wool pulled over their eyes. I'm not wanting to have a go at DJ blokes, just discuss an extremely important aspect of operating in this Class E nonsense.
Awaiting with baited breath the ATSB report on the Tassie one.....
Yep, out flying the eastern seaboard yesterday, and heard an aircraft in lengthy discussions with ATC about its Mode C. ATC were advising that it was 400' in error. And it was inconsistent - had been overeading during climb, underreading in level flight. They instructed him to squawk Mode A only......
AA, you are a DJ pilot, yes? Are you saying the DJ policy is quite clearly follow the RA in all cases, no discretion allowed? (as an aside, I emphasis QF policy is to do so unless it's clearly unsafe to do so). If that is DJ policy, then the ATSB report is, shall we say, extremely suspect. I'm sorry, either they are covering up for the boys not doing the right thing or they have had the wool pulled over their eyes. I'm not wanting to have a go at DJ blokes, just discuss an extremely important aspect of operating in this Class E nonsense.
Awaiting with baited breath the ATSB report on the Tassie one.....
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Airspeed Ambassador
The QRH for an RA states "Follow the planned lateral flight path unless visual contact with the conflicting traffic requires other action"
I would therefore draw the conclusion that an RA does not over-ride the Captains right to make a command decision based on all sources of information, which includes visual acquisition of the threat aircraft.
The company policy is to "treat all TCAS warnings as genuine and action taken as specified in the B737 QRH - Non-normal manoeuvres". End of story!
I would therefore draw the conclusion that an RA does not over-ride the Captains right to make a command decision based on all sources of information, which includes visual acquisition of the threat aircraft.
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Next Generation and Ushuaia,
The point of my original post was not to have a go at the DJ crew concerned. I was not there and I did not see and hear what they did. I simply wanted to point out that the ATSB report statement that their actions were according to company policy, is not true.
Of course the Captain always has the discretion to take alternative action to the norm when in his opinion it would produce a safer outcome.
With respect to TCAS, I would be interested to hear from you the scenarios that would warrant a disregard of the RA commands.
My QRH has the following warning regarding TCAS in the NNM section;
TCAS is a good system. Things would have to look mighty bad before I would disregard what it is telling me.
The point of my original post was not to have a go at the DJ crew concerned. I was not there and I did not see and hear what they did. I simply wanted to point out that the ATSB report statement that their actions were according to company policy, is not true.
Of course the Captain always has the discretion to take alternative action to the norm when in his opinion it would produce a safer outcome.
With respect to TCAS, I would be interested to hear from you the scenarios that would warrant a disregard of the RA commands.
My QRH has the following warning regarding TCAS in the NNM section;
WARNING: Once an RA has been issued, safe separation could be compromised if current vertical speed is changed, except as necessary to comply with the RA. This is because TCAS II-to-TCAS II coordination may be in progress with the intruder aircraft, and any change in vertical speed that does not comply with the RA may negate the effectiveness of the other aircraft's compliance with the RA.
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Next Generataion
Not sure how you draw your conclusion. Given that all TCAS commands are vertical, how does a QRH instruction to follow the planned lateral flight path imply discretion to disregard an RA?
Both my company procedures and AIP GEN 1.5 7.1 are quite unambiguous about this. Discretion doesn't come into it.
The QRH for an RA states "Follow the planned lateral flight path unless visual contact with the conflicting traffic requires other action"
I would therefore draw the conclusion that an RA does not over-ride the Captains right to make a command decision based on all sources of information, which includes visual acquisition of the threat aircraft.
I would therefore draw the conclusion that an RA does not over-ride the Captains right to make a command decision based on all sources of information, which includes visual acquisition of the threat aircraft.
Both my company procedures and AIP GEN 1.5 7.1 are quite unambiguous about this. Discretion doesn't come into it.
Fortunately most operating States (countries) are signatories to ICAO which includes agreed Rules of the Air. As such each state will promulgate local rules/laws/guidance that accord with ICAO. And hopefully not too much is lost in the translation.
Basically the Rules say that a pilot shall follow an RA unless doing so would jeopardize the safety of the aeroplane.
A review of the ICAO Rules of the Air covering TCAS (ACAS) from http://www.eurocontrol.int/acas/Oper...rocedures.html are as follows:
Basically the Rules say that a pilot shall follow an RA unless doing so would jeopardize the safety of the aeroplane.
A review of the ICAO Rules of the Air covering TCAS (ACAS) from http://www.eurocontrol.int/acas/Oper...rocedures.html are as follows:
3.2 Use of ACAS indications
The indications generated by ACAS shall be used by pilots in conformity with the following safety considerations:
a) pilots shall not manoeuvre their aircraft in response to traffic advisories (TAs) only;
Note 1.— TAs are intended to alert the pilot to the possibility of a resolution advisory (RA), to enhance situational awareness, and to assist in visual acquisition of conflicting traffic. However, visually acquired traffic may not be the same traffic causing a TA. Visual perception of an encounter may be misleading, particularly at night.
Note 2.— The above restrictions in the use of TAs is due to the limited bearing accuracy and to the difficulty in interpreting altitude rate from displayed traffic information.
b) on receipt of a TA, pilots shall use all available information to prepare for appropriate action if an RA occurs;
c) in the event of an RA, pilots shall:
1) respond immediately by following the RA as indicated, unless doing so would jeopardize the safety of the aeroplane;
Note 1. — Stall warning, windshear, and Ground Proximity Warning Systems alerts have precedence over ACAS.
Note 2. — Visually acquired traffic may not be the same traffic causing an RA. Visual perception of an encounter may be misleading, particularly at night.
2) follow the RA even if there is a conflict between the RA and an air traffic control (ATC) instruction to manoeuvre;
3) not manoeuvre in the opposite sense to an RA.
Note. – In the case of an ACAS-ACAS coordinated encounter, the RAs complement each other in order to reduce the potential for collision. Manoeuvres, or lack of manoeuvres, that result in vertical rates opposite to the sense of an RA could result in a collision with the threat aircraft.
4) as soon as possible, as permitted by flight crew workload, notify the appropriate ATC unit of the RA including the direction of any deviation from the current air traffic instruction or clearance;
Note. — Unless informed by the pilot, ATC does not know when ACAS issues RAs. It is possible for ATC to issue instructions that are unknowingly contrary to ACAS RA indications. Therefore, it is essential that ATC be notified when an ATC instruction is not being followed because it conflicts with an RA.
5) promptly comply with any modified RAs;
6) limit the alterations of the flight path to the minimum extent necessary to comply with the resolution advisories;
7) promptly return to the terms of the ATC instruction or clearance when the conflict is resolved; and
8) notify ATC when returning to the current clearance.
Note.— Procedures in regard to ACAS-equipped aircraft and the phraseology to be used for the notification of manoeuvres in response to a resolution advisory are contained in the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Chapters 15 and 12 respectively.
The indications generated by ACAS shall be used by pilots in conformity with the following safety considerations:
a) pilots shall not manoeuvre their aircraft in response to traffic advisories (TAs) only;
Note 1.— TAs are intended to alert the pilot to the possibility of a resolution advisory (RA), to enhance situational awareness, and to assist in visual acquisition of conflicting traffic. However, visually acquired traffic may not be the same traffic causing a TA. Visual perception of an encounter may be misleading, particularly at night.
Note 2.— The above restrictions in the use of TAs is due to the limited bearing accuracy and to the difficulty in interpreting altitude rate from displayed traffic information.
b) on receipt of a TA, pilots shall use all available information to prepare for appropriate action if an RA occurs;
c) in the event of an RA, pilots shall:
1) respond immediately by following the RA as indicated, unless doing so would jeopardize the safety of the aeroplane;
Note 1. — Stall warning, windshear, and Ground Proximity Warning Systems alerts have precedence over ACAS.
Note 2. — Visually acquired traffic may not be the same traffic causing an RA. Visual perception of an encounter may be misleading, particularly at night.
2) follow the RA even if there is a conflict between the RA and an air traffic control (ATC) instruction to manoeuvre;
3) not manoeuvre in the opposite sense to an RA.
Note. – In the case of an ACAS-ACAS coordinated encounter, the RAs complement each other in order to reduce the potential for collision. Manoeuvres, or lack of manoeuvres, that result in vertical rates opposite to the sense of an RA could result in a collision with the threat aircraft.
4) as soon as possible, as permitted by flight crew workload, notify the appropriate ATC unit of the RA including the direction of any deviation from the current air traffic instruction or clearance;
Note. — Unless informed by the pilot, ATC does not know when ACAS issues RAs. It is possible for ATC to issue instructions that are unknowingly contrary to ACAS RA indications. Therefore, it is essential that ATC be notified when an ATC instruction is not being followed because it conflicts with an RA.
5) promptly comply with any modified RAs;
6) limit the alterations of the flight path to the minimum extent necessary to comply with the resolution advisories;
7) promptly return to the terms of the ATC instruction or clearance when the conflict is resolved; and
8) notify ATC when returning to the current clearance.
Note.— Procedures in regard to ACAS-equipped aircraft and the phraseology to be used for the notification of manoeuvres in response to a resolution advisory are contained in the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Chapters 15 and 12 respectively.
Last edited by FlexibleResponse; 9th Jan 2004 at 23:21.
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My first post. The TCAS aircraft I have flown displayed aircraft within 2700' of my altitutude (assuming all transponders are accurate), within an option to increase this to 10000'. Are most other, particularly RPTs, similiar? If this is the case wouldn't the DJ crew have seen the aircraft on their display some time earlier than the TA aural warning? If it was displayed 3000' earlier this would have been around a minute prior to receiving a TA (assuming about 2000 fpm RoD).
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AAP
Airspace review after near miss
January 19, 2004
THE Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has recommended a review of parts of the National Airspace System (NAS) after finding a reported near miss over Launceston last month was "a serious incident".
The crew of a Virgin Blue passenger plane was forced to take emergency action to avoid a mid-air collision as the flight approached Launceston on December 24.
The Virgin Boeing 737 flight, en route from Sydney, detected a light aircraft nearby and managed to activate the plane's collision avoidance system.
The ATSB today said an investigation had classified the near-miss a "serious incident" and recommended a review of certain aspects of NAS airspace implementation in Class E airspace, including education, training and chart frequency material.
It said the incident was far more serious than two other reported near-misses investigated since the new NAS was introduced.
"The ATSB investigation found that a 737 passenger jet on instrument flight rules descent into Launceston had to initiate an immediate climb to avoid a potential collision with a Tobago general aviation aircraft travelling under visual flight rules at an altitude of about 7500 feet (2286m) in the opposite direction," the ATSB said.
"Based on the circumstances of this serious incident, the ATSB has recommended that CASA and Airservices Australia, in consultation with the NAS Implementation Group, review NAS procedures and communications requirements for operations in Class E airspace, particularly for Air Transport operations during climb and descent in non-radar airspace, with a view to enhancing pilots situational awareness."
The ATSB said the Virgin crew did not see the Tobago at any time, even after alerts appeared on systems including collision avoidance, traffic advisory and resolution advisory. It said the Tobago pilot saw the 737 but thought his flight path did not present a risk of collision and therefore took no evasive action.
"While the ATSB investigation could not conclusively determine the reason the Tobago passed so close to the left of the 737 when its intended track should have led it to pass to the right, the discrepancy was within the tolerances of the various navigational equipment," it said.
The ATSB said the incident did not provide the basis for a key change to the NAS, but certain aspects should be reviewed.
"While the ATSB does not want to be prescriptive about the review, the bureau believes that it should include examination, and where necessary revision and updating, of education, training and chart frequency material," it said.
"It is also desirable that the responsible authorities seek industry input in their review."
The National Airspace System, which came into effect late last month, allows light planes into areas used by commercial airliners without guidance from air traffic controllers.
AAP
===========================================
Airspace review after near miss
January 19, 2004
THE Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has recommended a review of parts of the National Airspace System (NAS) after finding a reported near miss over Launceston last month was "a serious incident".
The crew of a Virgin Blue passenger plane was forced to take emergency action to avoid a mid-air collision as the flight approached Launceston on December 24.
The Virgin Boeing 737 flight, en route from Sydney, detected a light aircraft nearby and managed to activate the plane's collision avoidance system.
The ATSB today said an investigation had classified the near-miss a "serious incident" and recommended a review of certain aspects of NAS airspace implementation in Class E airspace, including education, training and chart frequency material.
It said the incident was far more serious than two other reported near-misses investigated since the new NAS was introduced.
"The ATSB investigation found that a 737 passenger jet on instrument flight rules descent into Launceston had to initiate an immediate climb to avoid a potential collision with a Tobago general aviation aircraft travelling under visual flight rules at an altitude of about 7500 feet (2286m) in the opposite direction," the ATSB said.
"Based on the circumstances of this serious incident, the ATSB has recommended that CASA and Airservices Australia, in consultation with the NAS Implementation Group, review NAS procedures and communications requirements for operations in Class E airspace, particularly for Air Transport operations during climb and descent in non-radar airspace, with a view to enhancing pilots situational awareness."
The ATSB said the Virgin crew did not see the Tobago at any time, even after alerts appeared on systems including collision avoidance, traffic advisory and resolution advisory. It said the Tobago pilot saw the 737 but thought his flight path did not present a risk of collision and therefore took no evasive action.
"While the ATSB investigation could not conclusively determine the reason the Tobago passed so close to the left of the 737 when its intended track should have led it to pass to the right, the discrepancy was within the tolerances of the various navigational equipment," it said.
The ATSB said the incident did not provide the basis for a key change to the NAS, but certain aspects should be reviewed.
"While the ATSB does not want to be prescriptive about the review, the bureau believes that it should include examination, and where necessary revision and updating, of education, training and chart frequency material," it said.
"It is also desirable that the responsible authorities seek industry input in their review."
The National Airspace System, which came into effect late last month, allows light planes into areas used by commercial airliners without guidance from air traffic controllers.
AAP
===========================================
Bottums Up
WRT the ATSB Report
That old addage, "Rules are for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools" springs to mind.
I find the thought that some one could hear a transmission from an opposite direction aircraft, regardless of type, that is going to have to decend through one's level, and say nothing based on assumptions and the stupid ramblings of the NAS education
material, frightening in the extreme! 
I find the thought that some one could hear a transmission from an opposite direction aircraft, regardless of type, that is going to have to decend through one's level, and say nothing based on assumptions and the stupid ramblings of the NAS education
material, frightening in the extreme!
Last edited by Capt Claret; 20th Jan 2004 at 22:02.
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From what Boyd says, and lets face it he does represent an organistaion called "Air Safety', the Tobago pilot was obviously an extremely responsible pilot (What's wrong with flying a bug smsaher within 1 mile and 200ft of a 737 after all?) and had his state of the art (probably) 20 year old transponder flashing away in mode C. Obviously a full proof system!!!
Now what happens if we have another less responsible or competent pilot flying VFR with no flight plan, in his 25 year old spamcan, complete with very reliable transponder from that era, which he forgot to take out of sby mode anyway?
Well noone will be any the wiser I guess - as long as they continue to miss!!
Are we really entrusting the safety of our airline pax to a group of amateurs (no disrespect intended) and ageing, technolog , which is prone to human error in its operation?
Now what happens if we have another less responsible or competent pilot flying VFR with no flight plan, in his 25 year old spamcan, complete with very reliable transponder from that era, which he forgot to take out of sby mode anyway?
Well noone will be any the wiser I guess - as long as they continue to miss!!
Are we really entrusting the safety of our airline pax to a group of amateurs (no disrespect intended) and ageing, technolog , which is prone to human error in its operation?
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I have a couple of questions.
1. Why is it always DJ. Are they operating differently to QF???? I smell a rat and it isn't a white one.
2. The BASI report quotes the TB10 pilot as having the DJ in sight the whole time, the TB10 had an operating Txp (which pre-NAS it wouldn't have required), and the TB pilot was 'unconcerned'. Separation therefore was not an issue.
3. So why have the ATSB come to the conclusion, or should I say collusion, that this is a serious incident.
As for a review of NAS, well the ATSB ACTUALLY said:
"The ATSB investigation was of a single serious occurrence and does not provide the basis for a major change to the US-based NAS, which is yet to be fully implemented in Australia. However, based on the circumstances of this serious incident, the ATSB has recommended that CASA and Airservices Australia, in consultation with the NAS Implementation Group, review NAS procedures and communications requirements for operations in Class E airspace, particularly for Air Transport operations during climb and descent in non-radar airspace, with a view to enhancing pilots’ situational awareness."
Which is not a review of NAS, I eagerly await the CivilAir beatup of this.
PT
Sya pikir itu bohong besar!!!
1. Why is it always DJ. Are they operating differently to QF???? I smell a rat and it isn't a white one.
2. The BASI report quotes the TB10 pilot as having the DJ in sight the whole time, the TB10 had an operating Txp (which pre-NAS it wouldn't have required), and the TB pilot was 'unconcerned'. Separation therefore was not an issue.
3. So why have the ATSB come to the conclusion, or should I say collusion, that this is a serious incident.
As for a review of NAS, well the ATSB ACTUALLY said:
"The ATSB investigation was of a single serious occurrence and does not provide the basis for a major change to the US-based NAS, which is yet to be fully implemented in Australia. However, based on the circumstances of this serious incident, the ATSB has recommended that CASA and Airservices Australia, in consultation with the NAS Implementation Group, review NAS procedures and communications requirements for operations in Class E airspace, particularly for Air Transport operations during climb and descent in non-radar airspace, with a view to enhancing pilots’ situational awareness."
Which is not a review of NAS, I eagerly await the CivilAir beatup of this.
PT
Sya pikir itu bohong besar!!!
Last edited by pesawat_terbang; 19th Jan 2004 at 10:32.
The atsb have come to the conclusion that this was a seriopus incident because it WAS a serious incident
ie had the crew of the 737 not taken timely action in response to the TCAS RA, or had the TCAS been MEL'd or had in fact the aeroplane not been required to have one, the two aircraft would have in all probability collided.
Not really all that hard to figure out I would have thought!
NAS WILL kill someone at some point, I just hope that when this day does come John Anderson is still an elected official so we can collectively kick his arse!
ie had the crew of the 737 not taken timely action in response to the TCAS RA, or had the TCAS been MEL'd or had in fact the aeroplane not been required to have one, the two aircraft would have in all probability collided.
Not really all that hard to figure out I would have thought!
NAS WILL kill someone at some point, I just hope that when this day does come John Anderson is still an elected official so we can collectively kick his arse!
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OK
Now pre November the whatever, in non-radar Class C, no txp was required.
The tower, it is said, did not have either aircraft in view. The DJ was asked "right or left base" but didn't answer properly (a fact that seems to have disappeared since the draft report).
So, it seems the DJ blundered on figuring out what it was going to do while the TB10 pilot did the right thing and kept it in view.
There was never going to be a collision, BUT, because the TB10 had (as a result of NAS) a working txp the DJ pilots got an RA and decided to look outside.
Oh, and to quote Jeff Griffith, Vice President Air Traffic Management, Washington Consulting Group, previously Deputy Director, Air Traffic Service at the FAA commenting on this incident:
"It should be noted that the U.S. does not have a requirement for transponder in Class E airspace below 10,000 feet and outside 30 miles from a major airport like Atlanta, Chicago, etc. This is unlike Australia, where transponder with altitude reporting is required in Class E airspace. That requirement in Australia provides an additional level of safety."
I suppose NAS was responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs too
PT
Now pre November the whatever, in non-radar Class C, no txp was required.
The tower, it is said, did not have either aircraft in view. The DJ was asked "right or left base" but didn't answer properly (a fact that seems to have disappeared since the draft report).
So, it seems the DJ blundered on figuring out what it was going to do while the TB10 pilot did the right thing and kept it in view.
There was never going to be a collision, BUT, because the TB10 had (as a result of NAS) a working txp the DJ pilots got an RA and decided to look outside.
Oh, and to quote Jeff Griffith, Vice President Air Traffic Management, Washington Consulting Group, previously Deputy Director, Air Traffic Service at the FAA commenting on this incident:
"It should be noted that the U.S. does not have a requirement for transponder in Class E airspace below 10,000 feet and outside 30 miles from a major airport like Atlanta, Chicago, etc. This is unlike Australia, where transponder with altitude reporting is required in Class E airspace. That requirement in Australia provides an additional level of safety."
I suppose NAS was responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs too
PT
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p_t:
I am going to assume for the moment you and Winstun are not the same person, and take you to task a little:
[edited because your comments are just too stupid for me too even bother]
I am going to assume for the moment you and Winstun are not the same person, and take you to task a little:
[edited because your comments are just too stupid for me too even bother]