Yet Another DJ Near Miss

[Winstun]

my point was that at 110 km/hr I usually know the other car's there, have time to see it coming and time to do something about avoiding hitting it

.....Yeah right!!! Maybe you bunnies can work out a reaction time to a 110 kmh x2 closing speed on 2 feet..

the road is a far safer place to be in

...hmmm, over 1700 of your citizens dead this year and many several thousand more maimed..tell you anything?

And without casting aspersions on our Recreational Pilots.....may fall into any of your first three categories

Actually I think you will find it most likely that your airline pilots may fall into those first three, categories.
Well, lets see:
unskilled : many an airline pilot in Oz is a cadet type with only a few hundred hours, many more have less PIC time than your average GA or private pilot. And they spend nearly all their time on autopilot...
distracted: well, you only need to listen to the airliner disaster transcripts...a very common missing sterile cockpit, not to mention F/Es, flight attendants, jumpseat riders, and others chiping in...
fatigued: 12, 15, 20 hour tours of duty..speaks for itself...
tipsy n' high? we could go on: seen many of the headlines lately?
neurotic: a now evident trait on this forum amoungst many of the more highly strung airline pilots in Australia that have had no experience in domestic US airspace operations.

[Kaptin M]

Sorry to temporarily hijack this thread, however I have just read The Village Idiot's (aka Winstun) comments on the topic titled Help UAL Captain AL Haynes Save his Daughter on the Rumours & News forum. Following is a link
http://pprune.org/forums/showthread....5&pagenumber=2

But for those who don't wish to follow it, here is TVI's contribution:

"If I were a heavy UAL captain, I would be a little embarassed seeking donations. 200K is less than 1 year's salary, and I am quite sure he could manage this himself. Or with the help of a few of his UAL captain collegues or UA232 survivors. Over Christmas, spare a thought and some coin for the over thirty thousand children than die every day from greed

You are one very, very sick puppy, with a deep envy of professional pilots (something you realise you'll never be ) that is obviously gnawing away deep inside you, Winstun!

[Suffering Sucataash]

Rejoining the rhumb line for a moment,

What is the training or culture with VB crew regards TCAS.
How many TCAS training sim sessions a year do you do with VB?
Do you react in anyway to a TA before the RA pops up?

[DirectAnywhere]

Ok, Winstun, I'm going to have one last try. I thought that like NAS, I'd give you a try before I relied on everyone else's opinion of you - but you've so far lived up to expectations.

Yeah right!!! Maybe you bunnies can work out a reaction time to a 110 kmh x2 closing speed on 2 feet..

Based on this statement maybe you can explain to me why, in your opinion, it is safe to have aircraft, one of which may be no bigger than the average family car, to have closing speeds of somewhere up around 1000km/hr and rely on "see-and-avoid"? If it's dangerous at 220 km/hr, what is it at 5 times that?

the road is a far safer place to be in

You took this quote out of context. On a per departure basis, ie. per trip, the road is a lot safer. Check the NTSB website if you don't believe me. There are far more threats in your average aircraft flight than there are on the road.

In response to your other points.

Unskilled, in the organisation in which I work if the PF is a S/O, the Captain or F/O MUST take over and respond to any RA. If the Capt or F/O happens to be a Cadet they have already demonstrated proficiency to the standard required so what does that matter? And no, I'm not a Cadet. Also, neither of the DJ crews involved in the two recent incidents would have come from a Cadet background. Again, what does it matter anyway?

Distracted, agreed. That's why my company has put in additional requirements to ensure that all possible flight deck duties are completed prior to entry into Class E airspace. If they're forcing us to change the way we do our job, they're obviously taking the issue fairly seriously.

Fatigued, sure. It's for this reason we don't need additional threats to monitor.

Tipsy/Neurotic. Unless you're casting aspersions on every airline pilot in Australia...and if you are, where's the proof, not hearsay but proof.

Winstun, in conclusion a simple challenge. Show me that the NAS is safer than the system it has replaced and I will change my opinion, accept your point of view and remove any post I have made in relation to it. Until then, the system is fundamentally and dangerously flawed in my opinion.

[DirectAnywhere]

Winstun (or anyone else), still waiting...

[RTB RFN]

TCAS RA response should not be used as a primary separation tool in controlled airspace because it introduces another hazard for all other airspace users. Upon complying with RA commands that aircraft then becomes an unknown factor to air traffic control and is, therefore, uncontrolled. All other (controlled!) aircraft must be protected from an aircraft carrying out manoeuvres that are unknown to ATC. This is a little like placing an aircraft in a situation where a go-round is possible however ATC are aware of this potential and can provide a contingency plan. With TCAS RA there is no prior awareness that the manoeuvre may take place - strategic ATC moves to tactical ATC with lots of unknowns - not good. I support aircrew following RA commands except under exceptional circumstances - captain must always have veto.

.

[Venture_Executive]

What's the problem?

A reduction in safety margin isn't necessarily unsafe. It just makes you statistically more vulnerable.

What level of statistcal vulnerability is acceptable? When and on what basis do we decide whether the current arrangment is acceptable or not?

Progress comes at a cost and the cost of maintaining a margin of safety is just another overhead.

At $39 a seat, who can complain? You get what you pay for.

[Air Ace]

Ah, the Million Dollar man again........ Are you suggesting the "reduction in safety margin" resulted in a cost benefit to Government?

I don't think even the Government believes that!

"....the cost of maintaining a margin of safety is just another overhead". A margin or any margin? You jest of course?????

[Kaptin M]

RTB RFN, from your post it appears that you have only a scant knowledge of TCAS.
TCAS will provide an RA with consideration of the nearest 4 aircraft likely to be a factor in any RA - RA`s may be issued to more than 1 (or all) aircraft if necessary.

I support aircrew following RA commands except under exceptional circumstances - captain must always have veto.

Sorry NOT an option - TCAS RA`s MUST be complied with, within 4-5 seconds.

Making manouvres contrary to the RA may well be the CAUSE of a midair.

[DirectAnywhere]

Here we are again, back with "affordable safety". Venture_Executive, how much of a cost is it if two aircraft collide? Does that constitute an overhead or not? As an engineer you of all people should realise that safety is not a cost but an investment.

RTB RFN I disagree. There should be NO discretion when following an RA. TCAS updates at a rate four times faster and with five times more accuracy than radar. I am amazed that any airline still allows discretion upon encontering an RA. The one I work for doesn't. You follow the RA - don't ask questions, don't try and determine visually whether you'll miss - just do what it tells you to do.

Again, I issue the simple challenge, can anyone show me that this system is safer?

[RTB RFN]

KAPTAIN M thank you for your assumption regarding my knowledge of TCAS however my research regarding a particular airspace solution revealed that discretion with RA is not rare and is applied with various situations and with consideration of other knowns, appreciating the fact that there may be unknowns. Your opinion regarding uncompromising obediance to the instructions from the equipment is your right and often legislated for commercial operators (now work out who's left!).

This reminds me of an analogy with selection questioning for FLTENG in the 70's whereby only blind obediance to the captains intent permitted selection and any level of counter meant non acceptance. This has since been reversed during the eighties/nineties (CRM reared its ugly head). The human intelligence quotient was appreciated. What of Minimum Safe Altitude Warning and similar systems.

There have been many posts on PPRUNE that counter your opinion of absolutes with RA and they surely draw some merit, despite my own dubious knowledge. The principle of following SOP's is easily upheld by statistics however there will always be the case for intelligent human discretion. As the late Doctor Ratner said to me "its always smart to follow SOP's except when it is dumb to". Often this is only determined after the fact, after the smoking hole.

My primary point is that an RA disturbs the ATC equilibrium and may cause compounding hazards as a result of ATC action or inaction, adding additional complexities, requiring resequencing of any number of aircraft. In a normal system this is acceptable. However where the TCAS RA is depended upon as part of the normal system of separation the additional hazards may prove to be unacceptable. Consider a busy scenario with perhaps 30 aircraft within 30 nm's (work out where that happens in AUS) and tell me that any RA system can cope with such a dynamic environment with so many aircraft trying to electronically resolve compounding solutions. Has RA been tested in such an environment with such complexities. What of weather and restricted airspace (firing) etc - sure these are of secondary importance to avoidance of a collision but does the RA consider these? No - it considers only limited and immediate consequence; it does not look far ahead to ensure you are not placed into a dead end situation. Enter the human.

TCAS - it's not perfect however from my "scant" knowledge of TCAS I believe the captain must hold veto for an exceptional circumstance. BTW I personally watched the B737 try to dive in front of the E120 and I wondered if traffic had been provided and the aircraft were on the same freq. would the outcome have been any different (this was pre-2B so the prob. of other traffic is v. low).

This happened - Chopper departs on Christmas day no mode C. Switches it on and whadayerknow - 3,400 feet out.

So its a clear blue sky and your equipment says RA and you respond when you happen to notice the blooming of an aircraft in your RA directed position. Options - quickly review your Turning Rejoin - bug out procedures and slide smoothly beneath or blindly follow the RA just in case that's not the one!

[pesawat_terbang]

Affordable safety is a political ideology.

With this government you get user pays (unless you are a Packer and thus exempt from tax).

With the opposition you get "we said what they said" and thus no viable opposition at all.

Rather than petitioning Anderson (who is too dumb and under too much pressure to listen) you need to be fairly up the rear of the ALP convincing them that safety is a community issue and thus a community expence.

Then you ask the community what risk they are prepared to accept and tell them what cost.

PT

[Kaptin M]

Date: 07/01/2002
Location: Uberlingen, Germany
Airline: Bashkirian Airlines / DHL Worldwide Express
Aircraft: Tupolev TU-154M / Boeing 757-200APF
Registration: RA85816 / A9C-DHL
Fatalities/No. Aboard: 71:71
Details: The airliner and cargo plane collided over southern Germany at 35,400 ft. Debris was spread across a 20 mile radius. Fifty-two children on a beach holiday were among the 69 aboard the Tupolev. The Tupolev pilot received contradictory instructions. The collision avoidance warning system (TCAS) told the pilot to ascend followed by an order from the Swiss air traffic controller to descend one second later. The Russian plane did not immediately respond to the tower's order to descend, so it repeated the command 14 seconds later. Thirty seconds later the two planes collided. The Swiss air traffic controller that guided the planes had no way of knowing the Russian pilot was receiving contradictory instruction from his cockpit TCAS unless told so by the pilot. Russian aviation officials said the pilot correctly gave precedence to the control tower, but Western aviation experts said pilots are trained to give precedence to the cockpit warning.

"Western aviation experts said pilots are trained to give precedence to the cockpit warning."
This has been the training I have received from ALL 4 airlines for whom I've worked - Ansett, Singapore, Malaysian, and Japan Air Lines.
TCAS RA's and complying with avoidance procedures are included as a standard simulator exercise, usually practised annually by pilots.
The Captain using his "power of veto", and not acting in accordance with a TCAS RA immediately negates any RA's that may have been issued to (the) other aircraft, further making a mid-air collision MORE likely.
It is not MY opinion that I am expressing, RTB RFN, it is standard operating procedures practised by all major (and not so major) airlines, to the best of my knowledge.

[ferris]

KAPTIN.
All that your post achieves is to underscore that you cannot blindly follow RAs. Follow the RA, sure, but if you have let your SA slip to the point that you don't know who the intruder is, you are behind the eight-ball. Uberlingen showed that you must aquire the intruder visually, because you don't know what he is doing. And in ausNAS, you don't know whether the RA you are receiving is going to cause a collision with an aircraft with a false modeC indication (or even a VFR tobago pilot who thinks "there is no danger of collision"- until you start the radical RA manouvre).
Those words- "a pilot manouvering in response to an RA assumes responsibility for seperation"- are there for a reason. You can't say that your role is to follow the RA, and that's it.
TCAS was not meant to be used like this. NAS allows, nay promotes, unknown intruders.
NAS is an accident waiting to happen.

[HotDog]

NAS is an accident waiting to happen

. Quite right ferris and until they scrub the system, following TCAS RAs is the only option to avoid that accident.

[Kaptin M]

From previous posts, I believe that you are an ATC'er, ferris, is that correct? Because it would appear from your post, and those of RTB RFN's that ATC are not aware of the training that we pilots receive wrt TCAS.
And that is something that needs to be addressed by both your side, and ours.

From the pilots' perspective, a TCAS RA should ALWAYS receive priority over an ATC directive, (accompanied by a transmission at the time of "TCAS climb/descent.") - although they may be totally conflicting, as was the case with the Uberlingen mid air.
It isn't always possible to obtain a visual on other traffic, and especially in low vis conditions, or at night, next to impossible to determine whether an aircraft is at the same level, or even 1-2,000' higher or lower.

TCAS RA's are a "last resort" manouvre, where there has been a breakdown in separation - whether under radar coverage or outside.
"TCAS was not meant to be used like this" - this is PRECISELY what TCAS was designed for, however TCAS was NOT meant to be used INSTEAD of ATC radar coverage, it is meant to be an EXTRA Safety buffer. I believe all ATC'ers and pilots would unanimously agree on that - except perhaps for our adventurer, Mr Dick Smith!
Class E airspace is DANGEROUS!

[ferris]

Correct, Kaptin. ATC. Doesn't mean I'm not aware of your training, or that my training is different. What it means is that in my part of the world, at least 20% of the pilots are from countries where "follow the RA" is not the rule. Years after Uberlingen, and nothing has changed. You can even get speedbird pilots argue either way on prune. I digress......
Any criticism I have of TCAS (and it's a great piece of kit which should be followed in ALMOST all circumstance) is that it is an arse-saver, not a day to day SA awareness tool. The architects of NAS don't see it that way. ADSB may provide what they are looking for, but until that is in every flying contraption SCRAP AUSNAS.

[Four Seven Eleven]

Kaptin M and Ferris
One does not have to look outside Australia to find companies which do not follow RAs every time. In fact, in the ATSB report into the Melbourne Virgin "non-incident", it was noted that:

A short time later the crew of the 737 received a resolution advisory from their traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) about the C421. Because the crew of the 737 had the C421 in sight, they chose to maintain visual separation rather than follow the TCAS RA. That action was in accordance with company policy.

It is incumbent on all of us to be aware of all of the possibilties. Never assume that the other aircraft will follow an RA, as it is evident that this is not a universal policy.

[Clothears]

ADS-B ain't no NAS arse-saver either:

1. It gets its altitude reporting from the same barometric source as current transponders, and is therefore subject to the same or similar technical faults;

2. RFPs currently out there in OZ for GA applications are looking for modified mode AC SSR units sending ADS-B data via an additional 1090MHz modified squitter. It will still require pilot activation to do such things as squawk altitude or even send any bloody data at all. Like we see every day with current Mode AC SSR transponders - they're in stealth mode if they forget/decline to turn it on. For ADS-B to work the transponder also has to be connected to or include a GPS navigator - whether this will have to be separately activated or not God (no, not you, Dick) only knows;

3. The ADS-B data transmitted by the unit should send aircraft identification (ie registration or "tail number"), but you can imagine how much support that will get from some of our less civic minded GA friends when they work out that the local council can buy a cheap receiver to find out which aircraft are really using their aerodrome. If it's mandated that the avionics sends aircraft identification you can bet that the shonkies out there that don't want to pay landing fees won't turn it on;

4. IF ADS-B units send aircraft identification it's of limited use if you can't bloody well talk to him if he's on a different "appropriate frequency" than you are;

5. It still puts the separation responsibility for flight through class E airspace firmly in the cockpit. Does the crew have the resources during an increasing workload phase of flight to both monitor the Cockpit Traffic Display (or whatever it's called when it finally appears), and keep some eyes out the window for non-SSR/non-ADS-B aircraft, and still conduct their normal flight/system management functions, comply with ATC sequencing/separation requirements, etc, etc?

6. While it may provide a means of bringing current non-radar class E up to radar class E standards, it won't make any class E any better than the current crap standard of radar class E;

7. It will only be of any use in low level airspace if every aircraft capable of powering a transponder is required by legislation to have the kit. That's a fargin big job, even in our little corner of the world. Some GA types are already creating a stink because they not only want heavily subsidised or free ADS-B units (which necessarily require an attached GPS Navigator) but they want all the whistles and bells (moving map displays, etc) payed for by the nice people who already pay for everything - the fare paying pax;

8. Aside from all that, in class G airspace and in what is now non-radar class A airspace it offers significant benefits.

There's more, but after a bottle and a half of dubious red I couldn't be bothered.

cheers,

Clothears

PS. Too right, 4711. I did draft a rather large diatribe about all this, but you've put it more succinctly without boring everyone's tits off.

Edited to fix dodgy spelling. The grammar a toss about I could not give.

[4dogs]

ATCers,

TCAS is designed to handle 40 "attackers" at closing speeds of 10,000 fpm and 1200 kts. I suspect that it is better at handling that problem than we humans, TAATS aided or not.

This isn't about cool words like "strategic" and "tactical" - this is about hand-to-hand fighting!!

The average RA, whether it be corrective or preventative, does not require wing-bending manoeuvres or great chunks of altitude. It was designed to allow the arse-saving change of flight path to be completed smoothly and relatively slowly so that our grandmothers lined up waiting for the rear dunny do not get crushed by the double bar cart being pushed down the aisle. In most cases, a couple of hundred feet is all that is required. In most cases, I doubt that you would even know that it had happened before the crew reports the event - notwithstanding the MEL incident which was the focus of alerted ATC activity.

I am surprised (and very disappointed) at VB giving crews the option - it would really make your day if the aircraft you were visually being calm about did not have an operating transponder and nobody had acquired the real enemy! Those fairly uninformed people at Eurocontrol put out some very strong messages about slavishly following RAs, not trying to visually second guess the TCAS and not worrying about the tactical recovery plan. Worth reading.

When it says "Traffic", I look harder - when it says "Climb" or "Descend", I very smoothly and calmly but very slavishly follow the instructions.

And so should you all!