NAS Reform? What planet are these fools on?!
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KARRANK
I am sorry that my message was misunderstood by you (and possibly others).
The point I am making is that NAS masks the problem of violations of airspace. The reason for this is that NAS provides for more e airspace and less c airspace and in the future will see reductions in R and D areas.
NAS authorises flight in E and R areas that will be warning areas in the future, by VFR (by intent or otherwise) without airways clearance and therefore the statistics of VCA's will decrease. This will be used by the supporters of NAS to indicate a safer system by default.
Smoke and mirrors mate!
I am sorry that my message was misunderstood by you (and possibly others).
The point I am making is that NAS masks the problem of violations of airspace. The reason for this is that NAS provides for more e airspace and less c airspace and in the future will see reductions in R and D areas.
NAS authorises flight in E and R areas that will be warning areas in the future, by VFR (by intent or otherwise) without airways clearance and therefore the statistics of VCA's will decrease. This will be used by the supporters of NAS to indicate a safer system by default.
Smoke and mirrors mate!
I think RTB RFN has made a very interesting point. Nothing better than decreased VCA statistics to prove their point!
Blair
You have got to be kidding! Think carefully about the nonsense statement you have been fed here. The aerodromes with a tower still have a tower, nothing has changed. How will the controllers monitor busy aerodromes more closely? It is nonsense. The sort of hyperbole dished out in press releases to an apathetic (understandably) public who have no idea of the issues involved. For goodness sake most of the posters on here do not seem to understand the issues that well.
It all sounds great to focus on the circuit area coms and the idea that more people will be on right frequency but the climb and descent is where the problem lies for the higher performance aircraft. Think about it, long and hard.
Blair
taking the focus away from airspace not within the immediate vicinity of major aerodromes - so that controllers may monitor busy aerodromes more closely (in theory anyway).
It all sounds great to focus on the circuit area coms and the idea that more people will be on right frequency but the climb and descent is where the problem lies for the higher performance aircraft. Think about it, long and hard.
PPruNaholic!
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How will the controllers monitor busy aerodromes more closely?
but the climb and descent is where the problem lies for the higher performance aircraft
Andy
I don't want to be the best pilot in the world - Just the oldest
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Is it just me or is Winstun p1ssiing everyone else off with his inane windup posts. 
This is a serious debate which is affecting different types of ops in different ways. The last thing we need is this frigging fool piping up to do nothing else but drop the occasional inflamatory, uninformed and unnecessary comment.
Woomera, please consider red carding this pr1ck.
This is a serious debate which is affecting different types of ops in different ways. The last thing we need is this frigging fool piping up to do nothing else but drop the occasional inflamatory, uninformed and unnecessary comment.
Woomera, please consider red carding this pr1ck.
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Just Facts.....
Trawling the NTSB database..........
The following intends to highlight the lack of efficacy in the “See and Avoid” principal.
If you are interested in a look, click on this link:-
NTSB Database search
- Click on "database query"
- Scroll down and where it says (Enter your word string below: (This option will slow the query performance)) type in
midair collision and then submit!
Reading some of them made my blood run cold (58 records for 98-2003)
Apparently the FAA has a much bigger data base of the same as the NTSB does not investigate all incidents.
These 3 are bad enough!!!
NTSB Identification: ANC00IA088. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier (D.B.A. ALASKA AIRLINES)
Incident occurred Tuesday, July 11, 2000 in ANCHORAGE, AK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/20/02
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registration: N935AS
Injuries: 107 Uninjured.
ANC00IA088
On July 11, 2000, about 1138 Alaska daylight time, the crew of N935AS, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 airplane, reported a near midair collision, about 15 miles north of the Ted Stevens International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The flight was being conducted under Title 14, CFR Part 121, as a scheduled domestic passenger flight, operated by Alaska Airlines as Flight 131. There were no injuries to the two pilots, three flight attendants, or the 102 passengers aboard. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the Ted Stevens International Airport, and an instrument flight plan had been filed. The flight originated about 0900 Pacific daylight time from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington.
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge on July 17, the captain of the MD-82 stated that during approach to the Ted Stevens International Airport, approach control was providing radar vectors in order to intercept the localizer for runway 14. He said that during the initial part of the approach, while descending through 4,000 feet msl, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed. The captain stated that approach control cleared him to descend to 3,000 feet msl, on a heading of 160 degrees, and reported that there was traffic about 1 mile to the southwest, with an indicated altitude of 2,500 feet msl. The captain said that as he started to level the airplane at 3,000 feet msl, and as the airplane descended below the clouds, he immediately saw a twin-engine airplane climbing from 2,500 feet toward his airplane. He said that he had very little time to react before the twin-engine airplane passed to the left and below of his airplane, about 500 feet horizontally, and 200 feet vertically. At the time of the incident both airplanes were operating in Class E airspace.
The captain added that his airplane's traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) was inoperative at the time of the incident. Subsequently, no collision avoidance alert was provided to the crew of the MD-82.
A review of approach control records revealed that the twin engine Piper Seneca, N39522, was not in contact with approach control, nor was it required to be.
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge on July 14, the designated FAA pilot examiner aboard the second airplane involved in the near midair collision incident, reported that he was conducting a multi-engine check ride at the time of the incident. He said that cloud conditions in the area were scattered, with higher clouds to the north of his location. He added that he was able to use a large open area that was clear of clouds. He said that just after completing one of the required maneuvers, about 3,000 msl, and about one-half mile away from the cloud bank, an Alaska Airline MD-82 suddenly appeared from out of the clouds on the right side of his airplane. He added that the MD-82 was about 800 feet above his airplane as it passed from the right to the left.
A review of air-ground radio communications tapes maintained by the FAA at the Anchorage TRACON revealed that the controller advised the MD-82 pilot that there was conflicting traffic, about one mile southwest of his location, headed in a northwesterly direction, and that the altitude was indicating 2,500 feet. About 20 seconds later the pilot of the MD-82 reported to the controller, in part: "...ha, that was pretty close on that traffic."
NTSB Identification: NYC99IA036 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 129: Foreign CANADIAN AIRLINES
Incident occurred Tuesday, December 08, 1998 in NEW YORK, NY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/20/00
Aircraft: Boeing 737, registration: GCPX
Injuries: 52 Uninjured.
On December 8, 1998, about 1725 eastern standard time, a Boeing 737, C-GCPX, operated by Canadian Airlines International Ltd. as Flight 528, experienced a near midair collision while maneuvering to land at La Guardia Airport, New York, New York. The airplane was not damaged, and the 2 flight crewmembers, 4 flight attendants, and 46 passengers were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the scheduled passenger flight that was conducted under 14 CFR Part 129.
According to the duty chief dispatcher for Canadian Airlines, the Boeing 737 was on downwind for La Guardia's runway 4, at 4,000 feet msl, when the crew caught a glimpse of three lights. The lights were red, white, green, and aligned vertically with the red light on the bottom.
The duty chief dispatcher added that the first officer saw the other airplane and had enough time to realize they were not going to collide, but not enough time to execute an evasive maneuver. In addition, the airplane's traffic alert collision avoidance system went from "TRAFFIC" to "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED" to "CLEAR OF CONFLICT" in approximately 2 seconds.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration's Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report, the other airplane was a Cessna 172, IFR, at 5,000 feet msl. The pilot of that airplane apparently saw the Boeing 737 at his 12 O'clock position and perceived it to be at the same altitude. To avoid a perceived collision, the Cessna pilot executed a descent, and at 4,000 feet MSL, the two airplanes passed 0 feet vertically and 500 feet horizontally from one another.
NTSB Identification: LAX98FA086A. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 11, 1998 in MORGAN HILL, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/20/00
Aircraft: Beech J35, registration: N8343D
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 4 Uninjured.
A flight of two military helicopters was on a northerly heading while N8343D was on a converging northwesterly heading at the same altitude. There were no indications that the occupants of either aircraft saw each other prior to colliding in midair. The crew of the second helicopter saw the airplane approaching, but did not have time to radio a warning. After the collision, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent. The helicopter pilot made a precautionary, run-on landing, and made an emergency shutdown. The 5 feet 2 inch airplane pilot used a pillow, placed on the seat bottom to increase his seated height. The seat did not have a vertical adjustment. The sun was in the southwest quadrant, with scattered clouds and 20 miles visibility. The top and bottom rotating beacons, as well as landing lights of both helicopters were illuminated. The helicopter pilot was flight following, but had not received any conflicting traffic advisories. The airplane pilot was not communicating with ATC. The transponder in the airplane was squawking 1200 but the altitude was reported as erratic and unreliable. The unreliable altitude returns from the airplane disabled the automatic intruder program. The controller did not see the airplane as a primary target because he was busy handling other traffic.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to maintain visual separation from the flight of military helicopters approaching from his left. The pilot's failure to request VFR traffic advisories, to maintain an adequate visual lookout, an erratic transponder, and glare from the sun were factors.
Yup, Safety will be improved
The following intends to highlight the lack of efficacy in the “See and Avoid” principal.
If you are interested in a look, click on this link:-
NTSB Database search
- Click on "database query"
- Scroll down and where it says (Enter your word string below: (This option will slow the query performance)) type in
midair collision and then submit!
Reading some of them made my blood run cold (58 records for 98-2003)
Apparently the FAA has a much bigger data base of the same as the NTSB does not investigate all incidents.
These 3 are bad enough!!!
NTSB Identification: ANC00IA088. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier (D.B.A. ALASKA AIRLINES)
Incident occurred Tuesday, July 11, 2000 in ANCHORAGE, AK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/20/02
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registration: N935AS
Injuries: 107 Uninjured.
ANC00IA088
On July 11, 2000, about 1138 Alaska daylight time, the crew of N935AS, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 airplane, reported a near midair collision, about 15 miles north of the Ted Stevens International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The flight was being conducted under Title 14, CFR Part 121, as a scheduled domestic passenger flight, operated by Alaska Airlines as Flight 131. There were no injuries to the two pilots, three flight attendants, or the 102 passengers aboard. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the Ted Stevens International Airport, and an instrument flight plan had been filed. The flight originated about 0900 Pacific daylight time from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington.
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge on July 17, the captain of the MD-82 stated that during approach to the Ted Stevens International Airport, approach control was providing radar vectors in order to intercept the localizer for runway 14. He said that during the initial part of the approach, while descending through 4,000 feet msl, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed. The captain stated that approach control cleared him to descend to 3,000 feet msl, on a heading of 160 degrees, and reported that there was traffic about 1 mile to the southwest, with an indicated altitude of 2,500 feet msl. The captain said that as he started to level the airplane at 3,000 feet msl, and as the airplane descended below the clouds, he immediately saw a twin-engine airplane climbing from 2,500 feet toward his airplane. He said that he had very little time to react before the twin-engine airplane passed to the left and below of his airplane, about 500 feet horizontally, and 200 feet vertically. At the time of the incident both airplanes were operating in Class E airspace.
The captain added that his airplane's traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) was inoperative at the time of the incident. Subsequently, no collision avoidance alert was provided to the crew of the MD-82.
A review of approach control records revealed that the twin engine Piper Seneca, N39522, was not in contact with approach control, nor was it required to be.
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge on July 14, the designated FAA pilot examiner aboard the second airplane involved in the near midair collision incident, reported that he was conducting a multi-engine check ride at the time of the incident. He said that cloud conditions in the area were scattered, with higher clouds to the north of his location. He added that he was able to use a large open area that was clear of clouds. He said that just after completing one of the required maneuvers, about 3,000 msl, and about one-half mile away from the cloud bank, an Alaska Airline MD-82 suddenly appeared from out of the clouds on the right side of his airplane. He added that the MD-82 was about 800 feet above his airplane as it passed from the right to the left.
A review of air-ground radio communications tapes maintained by the FAA at the Anchorage TRACON revealed that the controller advised the MD-82 pilot that there was conflicting traffic, about one mile southwest of his location, headed in a northwesterly direction, and that the altitude was indicating 2,500 feet. About 20 seconds later the pilot of the MD-82 reported to the controller, in part: "...ha, that was pretty close on that traffic."
NTSB Identification: NYC99IA036 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 129: Foreign CANADIAN AIRLINES
Incident occurred Tuesday, December 08, 1998 in NEW YORK, NY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/20/00
Aircraft: Boeing 737, registration: GCPX
Injuries: 52 Uninjured.
On December 8, 1998, about 1725 eastern standard time, a Boeing 737, C-GCPX, operated by Canadian Airlines International Ltd. as Flight 528, experienced a near midair collision while maneuvering to land at La Guardia Airport, New York, New York. The airplane was not damaged, and the 2 flight crewmembers, 4 flight attendants, and 46 passengers were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the scheduled passenger flight that was conducted under 14 CFR Part 129.
According to the duty chief dispatcher for Canadian Airlines, the Boeing 737 was on downwind for La Guardia's runway 4, at 4,000 feet msl, when the crew caught a glimpse of three lights. The lights were red, white, green, and aligned vertically with the red light on the bottom.
The duty chief dispatcher added that the first officer saw the other airplane and had enough time to realize they were not going to collide, but not enough time to execute an evasive maneuver. In addition, the airplane's traffic alert collision avoidance system went from "TRAFFIC" to "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED" to "CLEAR OF CONFLICT" in approximately 2 seconds.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration's Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report, the other airplane was a Cessna 172, IFR, at 5,000 feet msl. The pilot of that airplane apparently saw the Boeing 737 at his 12 O'clock position and perceived it to be at the same altitude. To avoid a perceived collision, the Cessna pilot executed a descent, and at 4,000 feet MSL, the two airplanes passed 0 feet vertically and 500 feet horizontally from one another.
NTSB Identification: LAX98FA086A. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 11, 1998 in MORGAN HILL, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/20/00
Aircraft: Beech J35, registration: N8343D
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 4 Uninjured.
A flight of two military helicopters was on a northerly heading while N8343D was on a converging northwesterly heading at the same altitude. There were no indications that the occupants of either aircraft saw each other prior to colliding in midair. The crew of the second helicopter saw the airplane approaching, but did not have time to radio a warning. After the collision, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent. The helicopter pilot made a precautionary, run-on landing, and made an emergency shutdown. The 5 feet 2 inch airplane pilot used a pillow, placed on the seat bottom to increase his seated height. The seat did not have a vertical adjustment. The sun was in the southwest quadrant, with scattered clouds and 20 miles visibility. The top and bottom rotating beacons, as well as landing lights of both helicopters were illuminated. The helicopter pilot was flight following, but had not received any conflicting traffic advisories. The airplane pilot was not communicating with ATC. The transponder in the airplane was squawking 1200 but the altitude was reported as erratic and unreliable. The unreliable altitude returns from the airplane disabled the automatic intruder program. The controller did not see the airplane as a primary target because he was busy handling other traffic.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to maintain visual separation from the flight of military helicopters approaching from his left. The pilot's failure to request VFR traffic advisories, to maintain an adequate visual lookout, an erratic transponder, and glare from the sun were factors.
Yup, Safety will be improved
Last edited by Capcom; 3rd Dec 2003 at 17:25.
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I'm going to do what I said I would never again do, and that is respond to Winstun the Pooh. He is wrong, wrong, wrong when he says that the controller shouldn't have done what he did, and that he should have been more proactive in separating the aircraft. If you read the full transcript, the controller went to great lengths to explain where the relevant traffic was and only once PSA advised that they had the traffic visual did he, advise the PSA to maintain visual separation from the traffic. You hear from the cockpit voice recorder that subsequent to this, PSA in fact wasn't in visual contact with the traffic and should have advised ATC straight away of this fact. Instead they continued to descend while looking for the traffic. It was the unfortunate pilots who should have been proactive and told ATC of their difficulties and the ATC could have gone to plan B and level off the PSA.
Winstun has always slagged out controllers but from his post he obviously doesn't understand the job and certainly could not do the job. I have in the past suggested he sit with a controller during a morning burst in one of the ATC centres and see whether he still feels the same way about the ATC workload and pressures. Not surprisingly he would prefer to wallow in his ignorance. It should be the other pilots who respect and appreciate what ATC does that set him straight, before he causes a rift between two very proffesional and mutually respecting proffessions.
By the way from working overseas, I can say that yes while Australia is not the busiest place in the world to work as an ATC, the standards of controlling are some of the best in the world, and is only undone at times by unsafe changes to their working conditions, and the resulting constant state of apprehension they find themselves in while trying to keep the skys safe.
Winstun has always slagged out controllers but from his post he obviously doesn't understand the job and certainly could not do the job. I have in the past suggested he sit with a controller during a morning burst in one of the ATC centres and see whether he still feels the same way about the ATC workload and pressures. Not surprisingly he would prefer to wallow in his ignorance. It should be the other pilots who respect and appreciate what ATC does that set him straight, before he causes a rift between two very proffesional and mutually respecting proffessions.
By the way from working overseas, I can say that yes while Australia is not the busiest place in the world to work as an ATC, the standards of controlling are some of the best in the world, and is only undone at times by unsafe changes to their working conditions, and the resulting constant state of apprehension they find themselves in while trying to keep the skys safe.
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CAR 175A
Originally posted in D & G General Aviation
I have a CPL, SE\CIR, and around 3000TT. I have a S\E Aircraft fitted with 2 x VHF, 2 x NAV (1 ILS), 1 x ADF, 1 x TXPR, 1 x HF and a Garmin 295. I also have all the other stuff, jackets, ELT x 2, rations, MED kit etc... and I try to be as professional as possible.
I flew VFR into Horn Island from Cairns several times this year. My customer liked me to arrive at 0000z, the same time as the Dash 8, ex Cairns is scheduled to arrive. I used the same tracking points as the IFR guys, and I used the same frequencies as they did. I self separated with the Dash 8 / Metro RPT services on many occasions, both on arrival and departure. A couple of times I even called them first, or included their callsign in my BROADCAST, because I knew they were in the area. On more than a few occasions there may have been separation conflicts had we not been aware of each other. Usually separation was enabled using GPS distances.
This all seemed to work quite nicely!
I like to fly IFR when I can for several reasons, recency, more service, not being treated like a hick etc. I had planned on flying IFR as often as possible after 27/11, if only so everyone else knows I'm there. But what can I do when conducting passenger charters in my single engine aeroplane?
Should I tell my pax that our Government doesn't consider them IMPORTANT enough to be included in the system, or me COMPETENT enough?
Two Dogs
I have a CPL, SE\CIR, and around 3000TT. I have a S\E Aircraft fitted with 2 x VHF, 2 x NAV (1 ILS), 1 x ADF, 1 x TXPR, 1 x HF and a Garmin 295. I also have all the other stuff, jackets, ELT x 2, rations, MED kit etc... and I try to be as professional as possible.
I flew VFR into Horn Island from Cairns several times this year. My customer liked me to arrive at 0000z, the same time as the Dash 8, ex Cairns is scheduled to arrive. I used the same tracking points as the IFR guys, and I used the same frequencies as they did. I self separated with the Dash 8 / Metro RPT services on many occasions, both on arrival and departure. A couple of times I even called them first, or included their callsign in my BROADCAST, because I knew they were in the area. On more than a few occasions there may have been separation conflicts had we not been aware of each other. Usually separation was enabled using GPS distances.
This all seemed to work quite nicely!
I like to fly IFR when I can for several reasons, recency, more service, not being treated like a hick etc. I had planned on flying IFR as often as possible after 27/11, if only so everyone else knows I'm there. But what can I do when conducting passenger charters in my single engine aeroplane?
Should I tell my pax that our Government doesn't consider them IMPORTANT enough to be included in the system, or me COMPETENT enough?
Two Dogs
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Good God, Two Dogs! Haven't you got it yet?
You have committed the cardinal sin - that of trying or expecting to operate in our airspace as part of an inclusive system.
Remember the sixties - Tune in, turn on and drop out? Well this is the oughties - Tune out, turn off and dumb down. With potentially spectacular results, of course.
But why do you ask....?
(I covet your handle - how much booze would it cost to buy it?)
Edited for clothhanded typing skills )twice
)
You have committed the cardinal sin - that of trying or expecting to operate in our airspace as part of an inclusive system.
Remember the sixties - Tune in, turn on and drop out? Well this is the oughties - Tune out, turn off and dumb down. With potentially spectacular results, of course.
But why do you ask....?
(I covet your handle - how much booze would it cost to buy it?)
Edited for clothhanded typing skills )twice
)
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Thanks again for the insightful replies from the controllers. How about flight following? Any of you familiar with the american flight following system? I think it's superb for VFR pilots and it gives them someone to talk to in emergencies and traffic that they wouldn't get otherwise, or is this what RAS currently does?
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ANS, ATC did not level off PSA 182 at 4000 ft over Montgomery, it was the correct procedure, should be plan A.
CVR transcript after PSA 182 had reported traffic in sight to approach and switched over:
Captain (radio): Lindbergh, PSA182 downwind.
Tower: PSA182, Lindbergh tower, ah, traffic twelve o'clock one mile a Cessna.
Captain (radio): Okay, we had it there a minute ago.
Tower: One eighty two, roger.
I have nothing against controllers at all, and have visited ATC centers and towers on 6 continents.
..
In the wise words of a now famous retiring United captain...try:second best in the world..the best?....the rest of the world..
CVR transcript after PSA 182 had reported traffic in sight to approach and switched over:
Captain (radio): Lindbergh, PSA182 downwind.
Tower: PSA182, Lindbergh tower, ah, traffic twelve o'clock one mile a Cessna.
Captain (radio): Okay, we had it there a minute ago.
Tower: One eighty two, roger.
I have nothing against controllers at all, and have visited ATC centers and towers on 6 continents.
the standards of controlling are some of the best in the world
In the wise words of a now famous retiring United captain...try:second best in the world..the best?....the rest of the world..
Mostly Harmless
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Druglord: Flight following is in stage 3 mate. Personally I don't understand it, we have a form on the console we have to fill out if a VFR talks on "our" frequencies (and, OZBUSDRIVER, I have no intention of putting anything on ours, but somebody has already indicated an aircraft called MGC has been politically whinging & whining, but this may be apocryphal.) Yet at some time in the future when the VFR have been weaned off talking on the radio they will be cordially invited to come back and get the sort of service they lost in 1991 (in radar coverage anyhow) 
27. An on-request radar flight following service for VFR aircraft will be available on a sector specific and workload-permitting basis.
34. An on-request radar flight following service for VFR aircraft will be available on a sector specific and workload permitting basis.
What seems even stranger is that at the same time we are supposed to start offering the services we have denied VFR for over a decade we will WITHDRAW the same service to IFR
30. Directed traffic information services for en-route IFR aircraft will be withdrawn.
The history of NAS so far is that anything that is deemed unworkable or unimplementable even by the NASIG is deferred to a later NAS stage or reinterpreted repeatedly untill "somebody" is happy. Sooner or later they'll run out of stages....
27. An on-request radar flight following service for VFR aircraft will be available on a sector specific and workload-permitting basis.
34. An on-request radar flight following service for VFR aircraft will be available on a sector specific and workload permitting basis.
What seems even stranger is that at the same time we are supposed to start offering the services we have denied VFR for over a decade we will WITHDRAW the same service to IFR
30. Directed traffic information services for en-route IFR aircraft will be withdrawn.
The history of NAS so far is that anything that is deemed unworkable or unimplementable even by the NASIG is deferred to a later NAS stage or reinterpreted repeatedly untill "somebody" is happy. Sooner or later they'll run out of stages....
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http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/...351697164.html
Union scaremongering with near miss reports: Anderson December 4, 2003 - 11:36AM
A union was today accused of scaremongering over claims a plane was within 20 seconds of a mid-air disaster near Melbourne.
Transport Minister John Anderson said the claim was horrendous.
He said it was simply one of more than 60 incidents from the past week since new airspace rules took effect that would be reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).
Ted Lang, president of the air traffic controllers union Civil Air, claimed Virgin flight DJ980 from the Gold Coast to Melbourne was believed to be 20 seconds from colliding with a twin-engine Cessna yesterday when an alarm was triggered yesterday as it was descending north-west of Melbourne.
Mr Anderson said he could not guarantee there would never be a mid-air crash but said the government would not have implemented the new system if it did not believe it was safe.
"Can I guarantee there will never be an incident? No I can't, of course I can't," he said.
"You can't guarantee wherever human beings are involved, wherever mechanical contrivances are involved, total and absolute safety, you can't."
He described claims of a near miss by the union representing air traffic controllers and Mr Lang, as outrageous.
"I hear all of this irresponsible talk about close collisions and 20 seconds and so forth," Mr Anderson said.
"The ATSB has a responsibility now to investigate it.
"This happened in controlled airspace , all the scaremongering that Ted Lang's been engaging in has been about uncontrolled airspace.
"The aircraft, both of them were in contact with the tower."
Mr Anderson said he believed the new airspace system would enhance safety.
"A lot of this centres on so called incidents and it is horrendous to describe something as a near miss when a responsible person knows full well that an incident does not constitute a near miss."
Mr Anderson said there were around 50 incidents reported each week and this had risen to more than 60 in the week since the new rules were introduced.
Earlier, Virgin Blue spokesman David Huttner said the airline would consider in its investigation whether the new National Airspace System was to blame. But he said anyone speculating on the possible cause of the incident "would be doing so without all the facts".
Mr Huttner cast doubt the claim that the aircraft were only 20 seconds from crashing. "Certainly at this point in time nobody has all the facts to make such a statement. It's speculative at best."
AAP
Union scaremongering with near miss reports: Anderson December 4, 2003 - 11:36AM
A union was today accused of scaremongering over claims a plane was within 20 seconds of a mid-air disaster near Melbourne.
Transport Minister John Anderson said the claim was horrendous.
He said it was simply one of more than 60 incidents from the past week since new airspace rules took effect that would be reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).
Ted Lang, president of the air traffic controllers union Civil Air, claimed Virgin flight DJ980 from the Gold Coast to Melbourne was believed to be 20 seconds from colliding with a twin-engine Cessna yesterday when an alarm was triggered yesterday as it was descending north-west of Melbourne.
Mr Anderson said he could not guarantee there would never be a mid-air crash but said the government would not have implemented the new system if it did not believe it was safe.
"Can I guarantee there will never be an incident? No I can't, of course I can't," he said.
"You can't guarantee wherever human beings are involved, wherever mechanical contrivances are involved, total and absolute safety, you can't."
He described claims of a near miss by the union representing air traffic controllers and Mr Lang, as outrageous.
"I hear all of this irresponsible talk about close collisions and 20 seconds and so forth," Mr Anderson said.
"The ATSB has a responsibility now to investigate it.
"This happened in controlled airspace ,
all the scaremongering that Ted Lang's been engaging in has been about uncontrolled airspace. "The aircraft, both of them were in contact with the tower."
Mr Anderson said he believed the new airspace system would enhance safety.
"A lot of this centres on so called incidents and it is horrendous to describe something as a near miss when a responsible person knows full well that an incident does not constitute a near miss."
Mr Anderson said there were around 50 incidents reported each week and this had risen to more than 60 in the week since the new rules were introduced.
Earlier, Virgin Blue spokesman David Huttner said the airline would consider in its investigation whether the new National Airspace System was to blame. But he said anyone speculating on the possible cause of the incident "would be doing so without all the facts".
Mr Huttner cast doubt the claim that the aircraft were only 20 seconds from crashing. "Certainly at this point in time nobody has all the facts to make such a statement. It's speculative at best."
AAP
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US National Airspace Redesign
I have a colour brochure from the FAA re their program to redesign their NAS. The brochure says (capitals are my emphasis):
and
But wait, there's more from http://www1.faa.gov/ats/ata/index.html:
and
These quote raise 2 questions in my mind:
1. Uncle Dick told us that the US of A had the world's BEST and most MODERN airspace system. Clearly, that's not the case as many of the FAA's proposed airspace restructuring initiatives have been a feature of Australian airspace design for over 10 years; and
2. If the FAA considers it necessary to consult with agencies and users, why hasn't the Australian ARG/NASIG done the same (Don't bother replying, as I already know the answer)? If we are to have a complete replica of the US airspace model, then that also entails the establishment of the appropriate procedural and consultation framework, the provision of enhanced radar and communications coverage and THE RETURN OF Flight Service!
What have you got to say Minister Anderson and Dick?
The basic structure of the airspace has not changed appreciably for many years. During the time that airspace has remained essentially static, aircraft and technology have advanced several generations. These advances create the need and the opportunity to RESTRUCTURE the airspace to meet the EVOLVING NEEDS OF A DIVERSE POPULATION OF CUSTOMERS
We are focused and committed to MODERNIZING the nation's airspace. The FAA now has, within a single organisation, all the elements necessary to manage the national airspace effectively and efficiently. Through a major modernisation and beyond, we are COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF OUR DIVERSE CUSTOMER COMMUNITY to create the airspace of our future.
The FAA’s Office of Air Traffic Airspace Management (ATA) IS WORKING WITH NAS users and service providers, using available airspace, facilities and equipment, and calculating future use of these resources to improve efficiency and reduce delays.
Each of the ATA divisional functions, working together as an integrated team, ALONG WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, AGENCIES AND USERS, will ensure the logical and efficient use of the national airspace.
1. Uncle Dick told us that the US of A had the world's BEST and most MODERN airspace system. Clearly, that's not the case as many of the FAA's proposed airspace restructuring initiatives have been a feature of Australian airspace design for over 10 years; and
2. If the FAA considers it necessary to consult with agencies and users, why hasn't the Australian ARG/NASIG done the same (Don't bother replying, as I already know the answer)? If we are to have a complete replica of the US airspace model, then that also entails the establishment of the appropriate procedural and consultation framework, the provision of enhanced radar and communications coverage and THE RETURN OF Flight Service!
What have you got to say Minister Anderson and Dick?
