ATIS messages

[two pints]

Pilots - your thoughts please!!!

We have recently added a new message to our ATIS in situations of low pressure - this reminds pilots of the fact it is low pressure and to watch the cleared flight level on departure.

Surely this is insulting to you guys? as soon as you hear the QNH you will be aware of the pressure and react accordingly, does it really need ATC and a 51 second ATIS to tell you your job??

I can see the theory is to reduce the number of level busts but surely this advice is best left to training captains if they perceive a problem with their crews,

What do you think??

[Over+Out]

As a TC Controller who has dealt with numerous level busts in low pressure, I think it is a good idea to leave it in.
It is not normally European pilots who make this mistake, but might remind those from Overseas that have a much higher transition level, to check their altimeters on departure.

[GBALU53]

We have some issues with our ATIS for a number of reasons but do pilots hear all of the transmission??

Some times things are notamed as well as being on the ATIS as a back up, but when pilos ask question, you can tell they have only heard half the ATIS and not even read any notam.

We all try and help but the ATIS came in to cut down extra R.T. time but we seem to be going back if pilots need to be informed of information that is on the ATIS.

[White Hart]

I agree with GBALU - and I hope this procedure is not adopted at Heathrow - we have enough in the way of additional messaging (most of it unneccessary) as it is.

[anotherthing]

As the TC controller who had the incident on their frequency that sparked off the idea of putting this in, I think it should be left in.

Despite pasing traffic info to both A/C which were climbing/descending to within 1000' of each other, and despite acknowledgement from both aircraft, the A/C in the climb bust his level and I had to give two sets of avoiding action - not the best way to start (within 15 minutes of sitting down) a nightshift!!

As far as I know, there has never been confirmation that the pilots in the climbing aircraft had the QNH still set (certainly not by the time the report was published) - but it was pretty damned obvious to all concerned that they did. The idea of expecting training captains to remedy things when the crew does not even acknowledge they made a mistake in the first place is unfortunately unworkable.

I would hazard a guess that in any one day in the London TMA, there are numerous A/C that climb to a 'FL' whilst still on the QNH... normally, you can get away without it causing an effect, but when the pressure is low, I think it is prudent to give a warning on ATIS.

Yes, highly trained pilots (at least 2 in most cockpits) should not make such a fundamental mistake, but it happens - they are only human. Anything that can possibly alleviate this should be welcomed.

It could have had serious repurcusions on manning levels (and all that entails) if it was not worked out fairly swiftly by local management that it was pilot error - losing one ATCO on a nightshift can have far reaching effects.

It also meant that my colleagues had to work that bit longer and harder whilst I was unable to work as it was being investigated.

[mad_jock]

The warning when I think it was down into the 986 region was quite a good Although today when it was 1012 I think was a bit much.

If they only used it below 1004 it might have a more lasting effect and be not common enough to get annoying.

[Hand Solo]

I'm making an assumption that this is the BHX ATIS where the SIDs all stop at FL60 as opposed to a QNH altitude like just about everywhere else in the UK? It's probably a good idea during times of very low QNH. The regular users seemed to be aware of the risks but an infrequent visitor could easy find themselves caught out.

[30W]

I'm BHX based, and am very aware of the BHX issue with this, I along with many colleagues specifically add the issue to our brief on a low pressure day. Additionally as a pre take-off review we empahsise as a reminder that we are climbing to FLIGHT LEVEL 60.

However, I know BHX has suffered from several 'busts' so, if the additional ATIS message helps stop this, then I'm happy for it to be there.

If in the fulness of time it is shown that the message has had no effect on the number of 'busts' then it's appropriateness can be reviewed.

It would be nice if it was always the 'last' message on the ATIS. Inbounds then can at least disregard listening to the last element as a time saving exercise.

30W

[two pints]

yes it is BHX that is trialing this, all comments greatly appreciated so thanks for taking the time to reply.

many pilots on the frequency today (pressure 1012) were asking if we were aware that the low pressure message was still on the atis, at the moment it is put on the atis for any pressure below 1013 which is when we start to lost separation between FL and altitude.

I can see that it will easily become a bit of the atis that is ignored if it is on too regularly, would pressures of less than 1004 be better than anything below 1013?

yes it is the last thing that you will hear, unless another message has to be voice recorded rather than the computer generated messages. I'll certainly pass it on to my ATSA colleagues to try and get them to ensure its at the end of the message.

also would it help if the UK had a standard transition Altitude? i know most of the LTMA ( if not all of it) is the same, is Birmingham alone in using 4000ft?

cheers!!

[niknak]

If you are going to use "low pressure" messages on the ATIS then it should start at 999mb and below, on the basis of the fact that the pressure has to be read back as 999 millibars until it is 1001 or above.

Personally I dont see any advantage to putting a "low pressure" advisory on the ATIS, the QNH has to be read and acknowledged at the point the aircraft is descending to an altitude and further as applicable.
Equally, most of us are operating on SSR equipped radar, and at my unit, and several others I know of, it is written in the MATS 2 that the SSR readout shall be monitered, by verbal or visual confirmation via the radar, on descent and climb out to ensure that the correct pressure setting is applied.

[anotherthing]

nik nak,

Please read my earlier post - I checked the SSR MODE C on climbout, when the A/C is passing an altitude.

This is a check a check to ensure that the airborne equipment is functioning correctly, NOT a check that the correct pressure is set as you have stated (how could we tell a one millibar mistake when our tolereances are +/- 200' (6 and a bit millibars)?

Fair enough, when in level flight, if the SSR indicates a variance of greater than 200' we check the pilot is flying level and if so, that the correct pressure is set, but that is not why we check SSR initially.

These A/C were validated and verified, the pilot error came in when the outbound pilot, when instructed to climb to FL100 (the climb given whilst he was still climbing on the SID), climbe to 10000' because he had the QNH still on the altimeter, instead of the SAS.

You have a valid point in saying that is should only be used on ATIS for lower pressures - one or two millibars will never be noticed by us anyway.

[30W]

two pints,

Thanks for that. No real feeling at what pressure the message should be triggered, but you are right in that if it is on too much it will start to loose it's impact.

I flew last night, and with pressure as you say at 1012 the message, and it's impact, was a waste of time - I.M.A.O

Here's one for you though - BB dep last week in low pressure - just departed on a COWLY, x-ferred to App - have made early change after flap retraction altitude to 1013 due low pressure.....

"App good morning ABC123 passing FL35 climbing FL60, COWLY 1E"

App: "ABC123 thankyou - report your passing altitude"

Thoughts.....??

Rgds
30W

[Gonzo]

I always use 'report your level'

I'd be interested to hear the reasons why 'report your altitude' is used.

[Northerner]

I'd hazard a guess that it's because the radars in TC use the LL QNH to determine when a/c pass 6,000 and therefore go on to FL's. If you are a bit below 6,000 (like at FL35) then the difference might be significant, and as we try to verify the Mode C it wouldn't be within 200ft. I usually use 'report your passing altitude', but then I don't work BB traffic. With the Solent Traffic (which is always climbing to a FL) I try to have an idea of the difference between Alt/FL based on the pressure of the day to know whether the Mode C is close enough or not.

Will see if anyone else corrects me!

Cheers,
N

"Keep smiling, it makes people wonder what you're up to...."

[Chilli Monster]

Originally Posted by 30W

Here's one for you though - BB dep last week in low pressure - just departed on a COWLY, x-ferred to App - have made early change after flap retraction altitude to 1013 due low pressure.....
"App good morning ABC123 passing FL35 climbing FL60, COWLY 1E"
App: "ABC123 thankyou - report your passing altitude"
Thoughts.....??

You're below transition altitude, therefore mode 'C' readout is expressed as an altitude based on QNH, not a FL. With this in mind ATC can't validate your mode 'C' data because you've checked in with a level that bears no relation to what they're seeing on the screen - hence request for your altitude.

With all this talk of busting FL's when the pressure is low it still amazes me that crews don't use the following procedure which is almost foolproof.

On the runway Altimeter 1 (or whichever altimeter / FMS sytem the level hold from the autopilot takes its data from) is set to 1013.2, thereby giving vertical position relative to the SID limit (if it's a FL)

Altimeter 2 is set to aerodrome QNH, enabling an altitude check to be given on departure, and is changed to 1013.2 on passing the transition altitude - the cross check being done after the change.

Gives good situational awareness - plus will almost always prevent a level bust. In a two crew environment (which 99% of these circumstances are) it's an easy procedure to follow.

[30W]

Thanks for your replies:-)

BB is probably unique in the UK with SID's stopping at a FL. On a low pressure day, delaying 1013 creates the huge pssibility of the bust, we all understand that. BB TA is 4000' all SID's climbing to FL60. To wait until passing 4000' before setting 1013, just so that that our report ties in with that transposed to the radar seems an incident waiting to happen. High rate of climb.......

Chilli - I understand the thought behind your suggestion, but quite simply it isn't acceptable I'm afraid. All engine failure cases are based upon a single engine acceleration (flap retraction ALTITUDE - terrain, and or obstacle clearance). To have different altimeter settings and readings in use between the two crew members in this crucial phase of high workload would be unacceptable, to both airlines, and authority. 1013 can't realistically be set until at least above this point (normally 1000' AGL, but can be higher).

Again with the BB case, if one crew member delays to 4000' on a low pressure day - you are VERY quickly upon FL60. The whole concept of Pilot Not Flying (PNF), alert callouts of '1 to go' etc are very quickly compromised or indeed lost under these circumstances. It's essential that both parties are looking at the same information if accurate and useful monitoring are to be achieved.

LTMA ops are very different to BB because they all stop at ALT's, and hence the operational issue, and mental prompt when RT cleared to a FL is very different.

Common TA across the UK would be most helpful, however having campaigned for it for years now, I'm sure most pf us here will have retired before we ever see it :-(

30W

[foghorn]

Originally Posted by 30W

Thanks for your replies:-)
BB is probably unique in the UK with SID's stopping at a FL.

Some LBA SIDS stop at FL60. You did say probably, though .

[Chilli Monster]

........as do the NX SIDs.

To have different altimeter settings and readings in use between the two crew members in this crucial phase of high workload would be unacceptable, to both airlines, and authority.

With a well disciplined, properly briefed crew it does work - having been using this technique for the last 3+ years (Corporate Jet, 3000fpm climb rate). Until the UK gets around to having a sensible, higher transition altitude everywhere maybe the airlines and the authority should look at this option. It's especially more user friendly when you consider PNF, who is making all the calls, will still be making them in the event of any problem - and it is they who will normally have the altimeter on QNH. PF has the datum for the SID limit set his side.

PNF, by the time he gives his "1 to go call", is normally on SID stop datum by this point. If the pressure is so low that Transition altitude and SID stop level are close together, then a glance between both altimeters (which should both be in the PNF's viewline) will give a heads up that there is a level bust possibility and therefore reduce the chances of it happening.

[Northerner]

I say raise the TA to around 20,000 and give LACC most of the level busts associated with altimeter settings!


Would improve the TC figures no end, surely!

Have certainly learnt a thing or two myself from this thread though.

Cheers,
N

"Keep smiling, it makes people wonder what you're up to..."

[30W]

Yeap, others SID's do exist to FL's - accepted I'd even forgotten about NX when it's only next door!!!

Chilli, thanks for the insight of your ops. Whilst accepting it works for you, I think the rest of the industry are a long way, if ever from moving to what you suggest. For good reasons I.M.A.O

PF of a wide-body jet, departing on a dark, windy, raining night - low pressure. 1013 set on runway (as PF, as suggested). Get airbourne and bang - engine failure/fire whatever..... Any emergency turn will be based on ALTITUDE, and actioned by PF (who doesn't know where he is in relation to ALTITUDE as is on 1013). Aircraft acceleration and single engine flap retraction is based on ALTITUDE, again all actions being led by PF. There are huge issues with the change you suggest to having 1013 from the runway for one pilot. In such high workload situations, having an altimeter in front of you which is not giving you the information you critically need (terrain based!) won't be accepted. PNF may well be very busy himself, monitoring being only one of his duties if he's carrying out any applicable 'recall' drills etc.

One could argue that PF could change back to QNH uder such circumstances..... yes he could - but with an awful lot else going on at that point, I would bet a lot wouldn't!!

Being talked through by PNF, because he has the right setting is not an option that would be deemed suitable I suspect by airlines or the authority.
Looking across at your colleagues instruments to make such calls and decisions is equally unacceptable in the bigger world.

Using the standby alt as the ATC RT report datum if 1013 has been set on departure seems to me the far more practical option.

Good discussion area...... more than happy to chat about it with a cuppa next time i visit LACC, if indeed your there not TC.

Regards
30W