BBC1: "Breaking News - computer failure grounds UK flights"(Merged)
Join Date: Jun 2003
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Just a quick “well done” to ALL ATC STAFF - at all grades/roles, who worked their collective nuts off this morning to resolve the HCS outage and minimise its effects at various airfields/centres across the UK. A difficult morning, and one where I am sure we went home thinking we had ALL really earnt our money today - and NOT just the ATCOs.
Join Date: Nov 2003
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LMAO!
That link is very funny. I'm (professionally) dissapointed that I now have to re-educate my friends and family on complexities of ATC and the procedures involved.
Thanks BBC. Your handy guide really did help... no, really, it did. I used it to line the cat's litter tray, the cat even finds it funny.
Ho ho ho BBC.
That link is very funny. I'm (professionally) dissapointed that I now have to re-educate my friends and family on complexities of ATC and the procedures involved.
Thanks BBC. Your handy guide really did help... no, really, it did. I used it to line the cat's litter tray, the cat even finds it funny.
Ho ho ho BBC.
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Norway
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Computers are sometimes fun
We had this situation here in Norway too some years ago, at OSLO ATCC
Like it says in the article on BBC..."The system should be failsafe"
Same they been telling us...But we lost it all, radar and radio!!!
luckely it was in a low traffic period, so all ended well.
What happened was that the norwegian telephone company, TELENOR, had been rerouting their phonecentrals, so even if we have multiple lines out from our nice little mountain...all radardata/coms ended in one plug in one central in the end.
So when someone stepped on that plug...it got very black
So even if the system is failsafe.....there will allways be suprises
We had this situation here in Norway too some years ago, at OSLO ATCC
Like it says in the article on BBC..."The system should be failsafe"
Same they been telling us...But we lost it all, radar and radio!!!
luckely it was in a low traffic period, so all ended well.
What happened was that the norwegian telephone company, TELENOR, had been rerouting their phonecentrals, so even if we have multiple lines out from our nice little mountain...all radardata/coms ended in one plug in one central in the end.
So when someone stepped on that plug...it got very black
So even if the system is failsafe.....there will allways be suprises
Join Date: Aug 2002
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The problems we have with shutdowns stem from 2 main reasons;
1) The sectors you mention are probably the busiest 2 in the room at that time of night, with wave after wave of the low cost carriers and charters heading for the Cherbourg peninsular to try and get home before too much of tomorrow has passed! add to that the last mad dash to depart from LL and KK to meet the sunrise early!
What this gives are 2 very busy links with our neighbours (namely Brest & Maastricht) which works fine when the computers working but creates merry hell when it goes off (well done this morning guys!)
A previous planned shutdown had to be delayed because of this which created terrible problems, I think in FPRS, later in the night, So the subsequent shutdown was brought forward to try to get into a "steady state" manual operation prior to the switch off. Sounds crazy I know, but it actually worked ok! As far as I know the same was planned this time.
and, 2) The added complication is that our new Working Practices agreement came into force on the 1st June, where instead of having 4 controllers covering these sectors, from 2200 local, there are now only 3 on the night shift and 1 late cover from the afternoon shift (who remains til 2300). In practical terms this means that the 4 sectors must now be combined by 2300 (previously we could delay that if needed with the help of 1 other suitably qualified member of staff from a different sector - finding 2 is a bit more difficult!)
This means there will probably be a lot more of these wierd and wonderful re-routes for the rest of the season (LEMG to EGKK via BHD & BCN superb
) because my beloved Westend sectors have managed to keep the same night manning as before.
Hope that's as clear as a muddy pool to all
1) The sectors you mention are probably the busiest 2 in the room at that time of night, with wave after wave of the low cost carriers and charters heading for the Cherbourg peninsular to try and get home before too much of tomorrow has passed! add to that the last mad dash to depart from LL and KK to meet the sunrise early!
What this gives are 2 very busy links with our neighbours (namely Brest & Maastricht) which works fine when the computers working but creates merry hell when it goes off (well done this morning guys!)
A previous planned shutdown had to be delayed because of this which created terrible problems, I think in FPRS, later in the night, So the subsequent shutdown was brought forward to try to get into a "steady state" manual operation prior to the switch off. Sounds crazy I know, but it actually worked ok! As far as I know the same was planned this time.
and, 2) The added complication is that our new Working Practices agreement came into force on the 1st June, where instead of having 4 controllers covering these sectors, from 2200 local, there are now only 3 on the night shift and 1 late cover from the afternoon shift (who remains til 2300). In practical terms this means that the 4 sectors must now be combined by 2300 (previously we could delay that if needed with the help of 1 other suitably qualified member of staff from a different sector - finding 2 is a bit more difficult!)
This means there will probably be a lot more of these wierd and wonderful re-routes for the rest of the season (LEMG to EGKK via BHD & BCN superb
) because my beloved Westend sectors have managed to keep the same night manning as before.Hope that's as clear as a muddy pool to all
I particularly like:
These computers tend to carry much more information than a normal computer system.
Now, let's see. All the flight plan data for all the aircraft in controlled airspace in the UK. Shall we say 1K per aircraft? No, tell you what, let's assume that all the CFMU flight route timing estimates get included: that must take it up to, ooh, about 10K. How many aircraft? Well we run out of Mode A codes at less that a thousand, don't we. So we're talking about a 10 MB sized problem.
How big's the PPrune database, Danny?
These computers tend to carry much more information than a normal computer system.
Now, let's see. All the flight plan data for all the aircraft in controlled airspace in the UK. Shall we say 1K per aircraft? No, tell you what, let's assume that all the CFMU flight route timing estimates get included: that must take it up to, ooh, about 10K. How many aircraft? Well we run out of Mode A codes at less that a thousand, don't we. So we're talking about a 10 MB sized problem.
How big's the PPrune database, Danny?
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Scotland
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My favourite bit was:
"What happens in a situation like this?
Air traffic control basically stops planes from taking off and landing ....."
Reminds me of the BBC report a few years back of a C172 "jet" being blown upside-down on the ramp at EGPH during high winds.
"What happens in a situation like this?
Air traffic control basically stops planes from taking off and landing ....."
Reminds me of the BBC report a few years back of a C172 "jet" being blown upside-down on the ramp at EGPH during high winds.
More than just an ATCO
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Final Vectors Similar incident at Maastricht UAC many years ago. All tellephone lines, also carrying radar data and R/T, were duplicated but came together to enter the building. Unfortunately there was too much cable and it was easier to bury alarge loop rather than to shorten it.Of course the plans were not altered to show this, so when they started to excavate for a building extension it went very still
Join Date: Apr 2002
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People will never tire of sensationalism, irresponsible journalism and programs such as that docu-drama thingy on BBC a few months ago have seen to that. People want to be scared about everything. To just feel safe in the knowledge that come what may your life is safe in the hands of hard working professionals just doesn't satisfy the publics lust for complaining, finger pointing and over-reaction.
I was working the nightshift in Maastricht (delta sector) when the problems started, and the guys in LTCC worked their socks off to accomodate the traffic already airborne, hats off to you guys and gals
Of course no amount of explanation will make it ok for people to lose a few hours of their holidays. Delays are a pain in the arse if youre caught up in them, but thes things do happen unfortunately, and credit should be given publicly to those who work to alleviate the problem.
I was working the nightshift in Maastricht (delta sector) when the problems started, and the guys in LTCC worked their socks off to accomodate the traffic already airborne, hats off to you guys and gals
Of course no amount of explanation will make it ok for people to lose a few hours of their holidays. Delays are a pain in the arse if youre caught up in them, but thes things do happen unfortunately, and credit should be given publicly to those who work to alleviate the problem.
Manchesters Most Wanted PPRuNer
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Dezi
Have a look at my post on this thread : http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...5&pagenumber=3
That should explain why this time was different
That should explain why this time was different
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They managed to do this at Oslo ATCC som years back, there phone/RT/ and radar signals where routed trough 2 separate main lines to 2 centrals. Redundancy you see......
Then the now privatized state phone company shut down one central (to save money offcourse, did not tell anyone) the one that one of the lines went to........and you guessed it:
Sent it to the central where the other line terminated!
Now: Make sure not to dig over all the lines outside this central with a JCB!!!!
But offcourse they did........ *silent*
Then the now privatized state phone company shut down one central (to save money offcourse, did not tell anyone) the one that one of the lines went to........and you guessed it:
Sent it to the central where the other line terminated!
Now: Make sure not to dig over all the lines outside this central with a JCB!!!!
But offcourse they did........ *silent*
Join Date: Nov 2002
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Quote from niteflite01
This time these changes accompanied some new software implementations and changes that reacted rather badly when the system was brought back online, leading to a rather unstable HCS - never a good thing.
Unquote
I understand that any software updates can be quickly removed from the system. In the worst case scenario NAS would be stopped and restarted without the updates. This would take 30 minutes maximum. 30 minutes might annoy ATC but it wouldn't cause chaos.
It's too easy to blame new software. It doesn't explain Thursday morning's failure.
Does any one here know what went wrong?
This time these changes accompanied some new software implementations and changes that reacted rather badly when the system was brought back online, leading to a rather unstable HCS - never a good thing.
Unquote
I understand that any software updates can be quickly removed from the system. In the worst case scenario NAS would be stopped and restarted without the updates. This would take 30 minutes maximum. 30 minutes might annoy ATC but it wouldn't cause chaos.
It's too easy to blame new software. It doesn't explain Thursday morning's failure.
Does any one here know what went wrong?
Join Date: Nov 2002
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Presumably the note on the NATS website is from the PR department.
It says there that problems were noticed at 6.03 (I'm going to assume that's BST as this note is for the general public)
What were these problems?
5.03 GMT is a little late to notice problems. When was NAS first brought back online?
It says there that problems were noticed at 6.03 (I'm going to assume that's BST as this note is for the general public)
What were these problems?
5.03 GMT is a little late to notice problems. When was NAS first brought back online?
Join Date: Sep 2003
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"Air traffic control basically stops planes from taking off and landing."
Wait for it...
"It also clears the air space to get every plane down as quickly as possible."
But not by landing them?
Where oh where is the "Hurin" Sector?
Wait for it...
"It also clears the air space to get every plane down as quickly as possible."
But not by landing them?
Where oh where is the "Hurin" Sector?