WIZZ AIR Skiathos vid

[luvly jubbly]

Not sure if posted previously but your thoughts on this insanity?

WIZZ AIR SKIATHOS (https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/plane-makes-lowest-ever-landing-27709903) - Daily Record

My triple would have left its tyres in the sea….
WIZZ AIR SKIATHOS VIDEO

[Jaf4fa]

If that isn’t a good enough reason not to fly Wizz, then nothing will be😳😳😳😳

[Jonty]

Welcome to Skiathos

[tubby linton]

The runway is narrow, 30m, did he think that he was higher than he was?The runway also has a marked upslope again distorting the visual perception

[Dct_Mopas]

The runway is narrow, 30m, did he think that he was higher than he was?The runway also has a marked upslope again distorting the visual perception

In the video it seems they descend below the normal approach path at a specific point. Then they fly a very shallow final approach well below what would be normal.

From the outside it looks like pure showboating. Removing any margin for error, disgraceful.

[tubby linton]

I can think of one operator who will not operate a A321 into there

[FUMR]

First of all it wasn't a tripple 7, so a pointless comment. Secondly nothing particularly out of the ordinary for this airport (check out the hundreds of videos). Thirdly wrong forum for this sensationalist stuff!

[SpamCanDriver]

First of all it wasn't a tripple 7, so a pointless comment. Secondly nothing particularly out of the ordinary for this airport (check out the hundreds of videos). Thirdly wrong forum for this sensationalist stuff!

There is no way he was @ 50ft over the threshold

[Confusious]

There is no way he was @ 50ft over the threshold
Absolutely correct, and in a lot of airlines this would be a 'chat with no tea and biscuits' event. I can't believe how all the spotters stayed put!

[Jonty]

There is no way he was @ 50ft over the threshold

There’s not many who are.

[Dct_Mopas]

There’s not many who are.

Then one day soon we’ll have a horrific accident, the smallest amount of sink on short finals and that’s it.

Lots of people defending a very unnecessary technique of flying significantly below the approach path. It’s not clever nor impressive.

[jethro15]

With all the negativity Wizz are currently attracting, could this have been an attempt to fuel such negativity. Just an unsubstantiated thought.

[Confusious]

There’s not many who are.
Jonty, but they should be. SOPs are there for good reason and performance calculations allow for touching down at the correct place. All well and good until there's an accident then the book would be thrown at the pilots via the FDR.

[Lord Bracken]

Here’s one from the world’s favourite …

https://youtu.be/s0mfi7n76-I

[Confusious]

Here’s one from the world’s favourite …

https://youtu.be/s0mfi7n76-I

I'll 100% guarantee that they got called in for a chat. Why do it?

[DaveReidUK]

In the video it seems they descend below the normal approach path at a specific point. Then they fly a very shallow final approach well below what would be normal.

The FR24 track indicates that, notwithstanding the low height over the fence, the approach from 2000' was flown at 3°.

(informational post only, no judgement implied)

[Boeingdriver999]

I would hazard a guess from the many youtube videos showing shallow approaches/low TCH that the issue isn't showboating (although it may be a factor). The issue is more likely a lack of faith in the performance figures resulting in landing short to get more runway to stop in. A feel good factor rather than wilful disobedience towards SOPs.

Why would pilot's have a lack of faith in the performance figures? Is it because they are so wildly conservative as to be almost meaningless? Or are they of little practical value even if they were more accurate; who comes to a complete stop on a runway ever during normal line operations? No-one unless it's a form of emergency.

[PoppaJo]

Absolutely correct, and in a lot of airlines this would be a 'chat with no tea and biscuits' event. I can't believe how all the spotters stayed put!
Pointless yelling at people if you have a system wide training/culture problem (which from what I am reading about this operator, chances are high). Just fuels the fire really.

I wonder what injuries the locals would have sustained should they have conducted a missed approach over that sand.

[compressor stall]

I make it about 12 foot from the wheels to the ground at 136m from the piano keys / 300m from the TDZ markings - and there's a displaced threshold on 01 for a reason.

Interestingly the runway is pixellated on the last Google Earth images. Older ones still ok.

[dr dre]

First of all it wasn't a tripple 7, so a pointless comment. Secondly nothing particularly out of the ordinary for this airport (check out the hundreds of videos). Thirdly wrong forum for this sensationalist stuff!

I agree. Skiathos 02 LDA is 1570m. That's not much room in an A321 with over 240 people behind you. There's plenty of flight deck videos on YouTube of 737/320's from a variety of different operators approaching onto 02, the common factor is the aiming point and touchdown point seems to be well short of the 500' marks. Sometimes it's between them and the piano keys. Enough so that I'd say it's probably an SOP to have a short aiming point on this runway. In this case the main gear touchdown looks to be right at the start of the piano keys, well short for a normal runway but only marginally short for this one. Don't want to overrun, there's a steep drop off beyond the opposite threshold.

It isn't the fault of pilots that airlines are wanting them to fly bigger and faster aircraft onto runways originally built for much smaller aircraft. If anything the road in front of the threshold should be blocked off and an extension to the bitumen made all the way to the water. Maybe a boom gate system to stop traffic passing, or block off the road entirely? No pedestrians or spotters at all, it only takes a slightly low approach and a bit of thrust out the back for a serious injury.

[EDLB]

I can see only the spectators on the wrong spot in that picture. That is not even allowed on a glider and light aircraft airport here for good reason.

[ehwatezedoing]

Interestingly the runway is pixellated on the last Google Earth images. Older ones still ok.
Greek government’s paranoia (Probably against the Turk) They had every military base or airport that could be used by them blanked out on Google Earth.

But not yet on things like Flightradar24 :p

[Jonty]

Skiathos is not an easy airport. 02 is short, narrow, uphill, with a cliff at the far end down to the beach. Having flown in there myself, and seen many others, the approach and landing in the video is fairly standard.

[Coachcpt]

I wonder how many times the bus called out “RETARD” and from how far out.

Skiathos is well known for landings like this and lots of people travel there to see them. The wiser ones usually standing off to the side. AFAIK it is a “Captains only” landing.

out of interest if the given QNH is out by perhaps one h/pa and a “3 degree” approach is initiated from 2000, how far up or down would that likely deviate you at the TDZ. +/- 10ft?

Matt

[prickly]

The FR24 track indicates that, notwithstanding the low height over the fence, the approach from 2000' was flown at 3°.

(informational post only, no judgement implied)
was that Fahrenheit or Centigrade, certainly was nowhere near a normal approach

[Direct BAMES]

I agree. Skiathos 02 LDA is 1570m. That's not much room in an A321 with over 240 people behind you. There's plenty of flight deck videos on YouTube of 737/320's from a variety of different operators approaching onto 02, the common factor is the aiming point and touchdown point seems to be well short of the 500' marks. Sometimes it's between them and the piano keys. Enough so that I'd say it's probably an SOP to have a short aiming point on this runway. In this case the main gear touchdown looks to be right at the start of the piano keys, well short for a normal runway but only marginally short for this one. Don't want to overrun, there's a steep drop off beyond the opposite threshold.

It isn't the fault of pilots that airlines are wanting them to fly bigger and faster aircraft onto runways originally built for much smaller aircraft. If anything the road in front of the threshold should be blocked off and an extension to the bitumen made all the way to the water. Maybe a boom gate system to stop traffic passing, or block off the road entirely? No pedestrians or spotters at all, it only takes a slightly low approach and a bit of thrust out the back for a serious injury.
If the aircraft’s normally conservative performance computation says it’ll stop in the distance available (using conventional approach techniques), then it’ll stop in the distance available without having to resort to unconventional techniques. If the performance computation says the aircraft won’t stop in the distance available (using conventional approach techniques) then it has no business being there.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

Skiathos is not an easy airport. 02 is short, narrow, uphill, with a cliff at the far end down to the beach. Having flown in there myself, and seen many others, the approach and landing in the video is fairly standard.


Having visited Skiathos many times for a well known (but now defunct) A321 operator I totally disagree. It is easy enough to stop on 02 in the A321 if you cross the threshold at 50' and don't delay touching down. Runway 20 is more challenging as it is downhill.


This approach would have been abandoned at any other destination. WTF was the PM doing? He/she was certainly not monitoring the trajectory. More likely complicit in the whole thing. There has never been a need to operate like this in JSI in an A321. The crew deserve to be shown the door for endangering an aircraft and its occupants. Sooner or later somebody will lose their life as a result of idiots showboating there.


If you want to fly like this, hire something on your days off. The paying punter does not deserve to be put at risk for someone's ego trip.

[Confusious]

Having visited Skiathos many times for a well known (but now defunct) A321 operator I totally disagree. It is easy enough to stop on 02 in the A321 if you cross the threshold at 50' and don't delay touching down. Runway 20 is more challenging as it is downhill.


This approach would have been abandoned at any other destination. WTF was the PM doing? He/she was certainly not monitoring the trajectory. More likely complicit in the whole thing. There has never been a need to operate like this in JSI in an A321. The crew deserve to be shown the door for endangering an aircraft and its occupants. Sooner or later somebody will lose their life as a result of idiots showboating there.


If you want to fly like this, hire something on your days off. The paying punter does not deserve to be put at risk for someone's ego trip.

Totally agree. Not just what was the PF doing, but what about PNF?

Obviously, we'll never know but I don't think that it was showboating as that would have involved both pilots to agree it in advance, hence no go around call from PNF.

To all those who think that this is acceptable, would said crew ever stop after V1 for a fire? And ask yourself would you? The answer is hopefully no because that's how you have been trained.

And any doubters as to whether this was very low, why has it drawn so much media attention?

[FlightDetent]

Hope the scolding is equally aimed at the BA liveried crew from the video posted upthread.

The rest is agreed, apart from the showboating part. My guess is insufficient competence where high competence is required.

A321 standard landing geometry (following a 50' RDH calibrated 3 deg GP) will provide 31' landing gear clearance when crossing the threshold.

Landing distance and braking performance rules only allow dispatching for a runway where 67% margin is available over the numbers for manual maximum braking effort from a standard landing profile.

Safety on limiting runways is achieved by learning the acceptable touchdown spot (which is by far not 1000 m or 1/3 runway) and going around if the landing gets deep.
​​​
Safety levels assured or markedly improved by using any specific short landing technique are wholly unacceptable.

If you wish to land nearer the threshold anyways, pick a closer aiming point and do some magic to shorten the flare phase from a standard approach angle. Going more shallow is geometrical and energetic nonsense even if it makes the pilot feel good.

Those are facts. Human factors go on top and always shift the picture. To avoid straying too far the underlying theoretical knowledge needs to be accurate.


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[Contact Approach]

out of interest if the given QNH is out by perhaps one h/pa and a “3 degree” approach is initiated from 2000, how far up or down would that likely deviate you at the TDZ. +/- 10ft?

Matt

This is irrelevant as you're visual.

[Jonty]

Having visited Skiathos many times for a well known (but now defunct) A321 operator I totally disagree. It is easy enough to stop on 02 in the A321 if you cross the threshold at 50' and don't delay touching down. Runway 20 is more challenging as it is downhill.


This approach would have been abandoned at any other destination. WTF was the PM doing? He/she was certainly not monitoring the trajectory. More likely complicit in the whole thing. There has never been a need to operate like this in JSI in an A321. The crew deserve to be shown the door for endangering an aircraft and its occupants. Sooner or later somebody will lose their life as a result of idiots showboating there.


If you want to fly like this, hire something on your days off. The paying punter does not deserve to be put at risk for someone's ego trip.

if you have flown in here with a now defunct A321 operator (wonder which one!) then you will know full well you’re talking rubbish. And will have done exactly what this crew did yourself. So you either had your eyes shut or enjoy making out you’re something you’re not.

For those saying if it meets the landing distance calculations it’s fine. I’m my experience it does not meet the dispatch criteria, but does meet the in-flight criteria. The “now defunct” operator I used to fly in here with had dispensation to operate in this way.

[dirk85]

The pilots in question have been called for tea and biscuits, and will be subject to investigation

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

if you have flown in here with a now defunct A321 operator (wonder which one!) then you will know full well you’re talking rubbish. And will have done exactly what this crew did yourself. So you either had your eyes shut or enjoy making out you’re something you’re not.

For those saying if it meets the landing distance calculations it’s fine. I’m my experience it does not meet the dispatch criteria, but does meet the in-flight criteria. The “now defunct” operator I used to fly in here with had dispensation to operate in this way.

Then we clearly worked for different operators. The UK CAA would never allow a "dispensation" for an airline to operate an aircraft in this manner. I've never operated an aircraft like this and I've never worked for a company that would expect its pilots to do so. If you think that's rubbish then that's your choice.

[Confusious]

The pilots in question have been called for tea and biscuits, and will be subject to investigation

Sensibly, this should involve a session in the sim and no more.

Hope the scolding is equally aimed at the BA liveried crew from the video posted upthread.
To some extent the BA one is worse because they are all LCY trained where they normally do every other landing, so adherance to profiles/touchdown points should be even more instinctive.

[FlightDetent]

it does not meet the dispatch criteria, but does meet the in-flight criteria. The “now defunct” operator I used to fly in here with had dispensation to operate in this way. My memory only has shadows of the A320 numbers and seeing A321 made me check the books. Full MLW is a no go, don't have the means calculate the limiting weight now.

Obviously a perf. limiting LW to meet the standard criteria is a different animal from having a waiver from them.

Could I keep my self from aiming 2/3 of the distance geometrically correct for 3/50? Thank you for not asking.

(the result would be 220 mtrs past threshold + flare and 22' tail clearance over the threshold line).

[Jonty]

Then we clearly worked for different operators. The UK CAA would never allow a "dispensation" for an airline to operate an aircraft in this manner. I've never operated an aircraft like this and I've never worked for a company that would expect its pilots to do so. If you think that's rubbish then that's your choice.

Don’t kid yourself Mr Hacker, there won’t have been even one occasion where you will have hit 50ft over the numbers. But keep telling yourself otherwise if it makes you feel better.

[FlightDetent]

Don’t kid yourself Mr Hacker, there won’t have been even one occasion where you will have hit 50ft over the numbers. But keep telling yourself otherwise if it makes you feel better.On the type discussed
+ when pilot is over the numbers
+ the gear is crossing the threshold
= the RA which pilots reference is 31. Auto-call is THIRTY.

​​​​​​Flying to PAPI commonly located at 400 or 450 mtrs past threshold will result in a higher profile that gives the pilot the wrongly desired FIFTY​​ auto-call over the numbers.

Assuming at his ILS home base he flies aligned with the instruments down to 100 feet, going for the big-airplane forward PAPIs will result in 2° profile. If that gets ingrained...
... it a sign of a healthy gut that being 20' (+66%) higher than required with a 2 deg profile feels wrong on a runway like the one discussed.

Some people would push halfway down (because there is actual room) and feel they turned the odds. Some people just arrive on the correct profile to begin with and the crossing height is the same.

These guys got it wrong. I suppose because of not having a clear and defined plan, rendering the PM pretty much powerless. Truth be told, there were still margins from something requiring an official investigation.



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[safetypee]

Extract from a discussion in another safety forum:-

-/-

“Sometimes things go wrong; so we will be able to know when they go right.”

But to know requires understanding; learning, recall and application of understanding.

Avoid the self satisfying individual focus - blame, a subconscious ‘I could do better’; we were not there, we do not have the complete picture.
Beware ‘fancy’ videos, they frame situations from a narrow viewpoint, enhancing armchair analysis.
Whereas the view from the flight deck is much more relevant; also the context of the situation. Look at the airport map, facilities, geography, any unique wether effects, sea-land interface, thermals, …

Yes an after landing chat, first with self, then crew; and tea (with rich tea biscuits) enabling the many lessons in this event to be exposed. Then learn, consider how and when this learning might be applied.

Human performance is variable - that’s normal, but what bounds normal. Is this defined by hindsight, or considered by inspired foresight. What’s the frequency, distribution of this variability; again context, circumstance, understanding.

Learn before comparing; move away the narrow, mentally distorting view of a camera.

-/-

The interest from the preceding posts is that with two or more examples then the focus on individual pilots diminishes; suggesting more operator, industry wide influence in these operations.

Get out of the armchair, leave the camera behind, think about the view from the flight deck.

[nimrodjoe]

Was that a good apple 🍎?

[Coachcpt]

This is irrelevant as you're visual.

So does that mean you are reliant on the PAPIS? I think there was a previous thread somewhere about being on the correct G/P but the PAPIS not indicating the expected colours. I think a few contributors explained that even the head height of the PF can distort that.

there’s all sorts of funny things that seem to happen at LGSK - there’s an interesting one of a TUI 757 using reverse thrust to reverse back to the taxiway to turn off the runway. I’m sure it was an accident of course.

WTF!! Boeing 757 using the REVERSE GEAR - Skiathos Airport is the one to search on the tube for that. (I can’t watch the links) - it’s quite the watch lol!

Matt

[Jonty]

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1170x636/b295d599_b0ae_4cbd_9d9b_84210b8c557d_b785b31675d0fa310331c8b f452869d9aa954907.jpeg
For those that haven’t seen it, here it is.

Note the total lack of any approach guidance.

[Jonty]

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1170x649/4f53d757_212b_4d92_b2a6_10715fd458b9_f292bd4e1032110e04c84f3 6d0cb9f688ce8d9de.jpeg
And another one a bit further out.

[172_driver]

What kind of parachute is an A321 equipped with? The 737-800 cannot go in there with a full load of tourists on a hot summer day. I bet their landing performance gave a whopping 3 m margin or something. It may be legal, but if you can gain another 200 m stopping distance in the beginning of the runway that might actually be considered a good thing (not showboating, incompetence).

People shouldn't be where they were! Wasn't their a woman killed in St. Maarten a few years ago because of jet blast!?

[Coachcpt]

As a side note I think it will be biscotti and espresso too as all Wizzair flights to Skiathos appear to originate from the (relatively new) Italian bases.

I think JSI flights commenced in June, Equally
BA City flyer only started these leisure flights at weekends this year?

Not sure what was so reckless about it anyway, they got low - looks like the descent was arrested, didn’t hit anything and touched down safely. If you were to remove the fact that there happens to be a road (and a bar) and a load of folk standing essentially at the end of the tarmac (which could of been a factor when deciding not to go TOGA at the point it was felt low) would this not be a non event at any other runway? I imagine say at Luton this final phase of the approach deviates 10’s of feet up or down when visual at all runways? It’s of course just antenna and lighting and fields in the vicinity……

Could we actually be seeing a bit of decent airmanship perhaps? - you get to decision altitude you’re a little low and there’s loads of people amassed right in front of you, if you gas on and abort they are about to be hit with 50,000lb of hot thrust and blown off over rocks in to the bay and could be killed or seriously injured so you round it out, declare
continue, arrest the descent - stay low and get featured on YouTube and PPRune!

Matt

[aerodestination]

Do we remember this one? The Wizzair is low, but this AirItaly and the previous BA embrear seem to be even lower. Especially the BA seem to have a significant underspeed too. While the Embrear would not have a huge problem with these shorter runways.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWetojC0ul0

It is easy to blame Wizz, but it is a tricky airport especially with larger and heavier aircraft like the A321.

[tubby linton]

A321 neo 78t Flap Full, Med autobrake , sea level and ISA landing distance required is 1390m. Add on another 75m for a typical sunny day (30c).

[DaveReidUK]

People shouldn't be where they were! Wasn't their a woman killed in St. Maarten a few years ago because of jet blast!?

There have indeed been injuries at Skiathos as a result of jet blast from a departing aircraft.

Should there be a fatality or serious injury as a result of someone being struck by a landing aircraft, that would fall within the scope of Annex 13 and thereby necessitate an ICAO-compliant accident investigation. Maybe that's what it needs in order for anything to change.

[Jonty]

A321 neo 78t Flap Full, Med autobrake , sea level and ISA landing distance required is 1390m. Add on another 75m for a typical sunny day (30c).

Useable length from the 02 threshold is 1570m (according to jeps)

Not much room for error. And error is a 200ft cliff.

And for a standard A321 (CEO) it’s 1480m +100m for a standard Greek temperature day.

[Confusious]

OK, let's take off our pilot's hats and put on the legal ones.

Scenario 1
Crew fly deliberately low in an attempt to reduce the landing distance. Unexpected late downdraft and aircraft lands short of runway resulting in an evacuation.

Scenario 2
Crew fly correct flight path and experience an unexpected downdraft over the threshold resulting in a hard landing.

Regardless of airmanship considerations the blame in scenario 1 would probably result in loss of job and possibly legal action against the crew. Scenario 2 would involve some paperwork filing.

Sorry guys but SOPs are there to be adhered to and will save your bacon if you do.

[Coachcpt]

Useable length from the 02 threshold is 1570m (according to jeps)

Not much room for error. And error is a 200ft cliff.

and if you look at say the Runway at Gatwick and compare, you’ve got a road and members of the public
somewhere just before the zebra crossing markings across the tarmac…..at JSI a road and spotters in the runway object free zone, a popular bar & car park in the controlled
activity area and moored boats with masts in the RPZ.

[Jonty]

OK, let's take off our pilot's hats and put on the legal ones.

Scenario 1
Crew fly deliberately low in an attempt to reduce the landing distance. Unexpected late downdraft and aircraft lands short of runway resulting in an evaluation.

Scenario 2
Crew fly correct flight path and experience an unexpected downdraft over the threshold resulting in a hard landing.

Regardless of airmanship considerations the blame in scenario 1 would probably result in loss of job and possibly legal action against the crew. Scenario 2 would involve some paperwork filing.

Sorry guys but SOPs are there to be adhered to and will save your bacon if you do.

And scenario 3 involves an unexpected tail wind on very short final meaning the aircraft now goes off the end with the loss of all onboard. And don’t even get me started on a loss of braking ecam on roll out.

JSI is a very “interesting” airport to land at. It’s stretching the limits of what some aircraft are capable of.

I’m not going to criticise the Wizz crew in this instance, I wasn’t flying it. And I know the majority of Wizz pilots are very capable and well
trained individuals.

What I will criticise are “arm chair pilots” who haven’t flown these aircraft in to this airport and feel it’s right to criticise the crew for what appears to be a low approach.

[pax britanica]

As a plain ordinary passenegr I had a couple of comments
1 On the vdieo is it an illusion or does the aircraft seem to check descent a short distance from the road ?

2 Surely the Greek authorites have some responsibility here. Space is title so they cannot move the threshold or extend the runway but there cannot be that many ops into Skianthos in a day that would make it impossible to either put up traffic signals for the road and have a cop or two to enforce spectator safety limits back behind a safe line.

I have loved watching aircraft all my life but having a massive steel and rubber landing gear a few feet over my head seems just insanely silly when I can geta better view just by standing 30 odd metres back from the centre line.

[tubby linton]

Useable length from the 02 threshold is 1570m (according to jeps)

Not much room for error. And error is a 200ft cliff.

And for a standard A321 (CEO) it’s 1480m +100m for a standard Greek temperature day.
Did you also add a correction for the standard 5kt approach correction over Vls? That adds 100m to my figures listed above to give 1565m

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

And scenario 3 involves an unexpected tail wind on very short final meaning the aircraft now goes off the end with the loss of all onboard. And don’t even get me started on a loss of braking ecam on roll out.

JSI is a very “interesting” airport to land at. It’s stretching the limits of what some aircraft are capable of.

I’m not going to criticise the Wizz crew in this instance, I wasn’t flying it. And I know the majority of Wizz pilots are very capable and well
trained individuals.

What I will criticise are “arm chair pilots” who haven’t flown these aircraft in to this airport and feel it’s right to criticise the crew for what appears to be a low approach.

You forgot Scenario 4. Pilot ignores PAPI's and deliberately descends below profile. Unexpected downdraft on short final results in main gear passing through Armco barrier.

[Confusious]

And scenario 3 involves an unexpected tail wind on very short final meaning the aircraft now goes off the end with the loss of all onboard. And don’t even get me started on a loss of braking ecam on roll out.

JSI is a very “interesting” airport to land at. It’s stretching the limits of what some aircraft are capable of.

I’m not going to criticise the Wizz crew in this instance, I wasn’t flying it. And I know the majority of Wizz pilots are very capable and well
trained individuals.

What I will criticise are “arm chair pilots” who haven’t flown these aircraft in to this airport and feel it’s right to criticise the crew for what appears to be a low approach.

I'm not an armchair pilot, been there and done it.

Scenario 3 would of course be very unfortunate, but again I say if you were at correct speeds and profile then your conscience would be clear. TBF though it would have to be massive swing in wind direction to add 200m+ to the landing distance.

Let's just agree to disagree Jonty as we're all entitled to our opinions. I hope that deliberately flying high/low/fast/slow doesn't one day come back to bite you.

At the end of the day flight safety is the priority to all of us here.

Safe flying!

[Jonty]

You forgot Scenario 4. Pilot ignores PAPI's and deliberately descends below profile. Unexpected downdraft on short final results in main gear passing through Armco barrier.

That was scenario 1. And at least you will be attending the subsequent board of enquiry.

[kriskross]

I must admit, I used to say to the passengers that it may be a bit like a carrier landing. Our -800s could land there legally with 189 pax, it was back in the 90s though has anything changed?

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

Jonty. I'll stick to flying things as I was trained to do so. It's served me well for 35 years and allowed me to train other pilots into challenging airfields, JSI included. If you choose to defend this type of flying then that's up to you. Maybe you would also advocate adopting this technique onto a contaminated runway? It might just save you from going off the end....

[Confusious]

Hands up anyone who would do this in the sim.

[Doors to Automatic]

My view from the armchair is that given the available length, the size of the aircraft and the 200ft cliff at the end, one cannot blame the pilots for wanting to get down early.

The problem is that it creates far more likelihood of approaches like this one versus an airport where a bit of a float is not a problem. It begs the question of whether aircraft of this size should be operating into a place like this, even if the theory says they can.

[DaveReidUK]

My view from the armchair is that given the available length, the size of the aircraft and the 200ft cliff at the end, one cannot blame the pilots for wanting to get down early.

Would that be the 200 ft cliff at the 19 end (threshold elev 54'), or at the 01 end (ditto) ?

Although 50' is still plenty enough to spoil your entire day ...

[FullWings]

Hands up anyone who would do this in the sim.
That is a very good point. I’ve never operated to JSI but I have used airports with similar LDA.

I can understand the reluctance to use a “standard” approach and landing technique but that’s what the figures are based on, and if you get it right you should stop with adequate runway remaining: IFLD uses LDR x 1.15 which is a reasonable margin. Maybe some sessions in the sim to give people confidence that it will do what the book says? My personal experience has been that shallow approaches and/or trying to get it down early often end in a float past the normal touchdown point or a bounce.

If you don’t get it down in the right place at the right speed, then reject the landing. Just out of interest I ran the numbers on the 777 and yes, you could land a -200ER there at MLW but I think it would fail at the planning stage.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

That is a very good point. I’ve never operated to JSI but I have used airports with similar LDA.

I can understand the reluctance to use a “standard” approach and landing technique but that’s what the figures are based on, and if you get it right you should stop with adequate runway remaining: IFLD uses LDR x 1.15 which is a reasonable margin. Maybe some sessions in the sim to give people confidence that it will do what the book says? My personal experience has been that shallow approaches and/or trying to get it down early often end in a float past the normal touchdown point or a bounce.

If you don’t get it down in the right place at the right speed, then reject the landing. Just out of interest I ran the numbers on the 777 and yes, you could land a -200ER there at MLW but I think it would fail at the planning stage.

Before I went there (A321) we had a dedicated sim visit as it was Cat C. The most challenging part was staying on the 30M pavement with a low speed engine failure. This is where I find the whole argument about "ducking under" ridiculous. An hour after landing at JSI, pilots will refuel and calculate performance which will generate a V1 somewhere around the 130 knot mark. They will then happily take off using it. I'm guessing here, but there is probably around 900M in which to stop from V1 in a much heavier aircraft than the one they landed in just an hour before. Is it just me?

[speedrestriction]

It’s either wilful disregard of correct technique or (more likely) getting too low due to the visual illusion caused by the upsloping runway.

In either case it is unsafe in the conventional aircraft operational sense, the approach should have been discontinued before crossing the coast.

As soon as you start departing from a standardised profile you are opening the door to any number of further threats and errors.

I have not flown into Skiathos but I have flown into plenty of Greek islands and other locations with short runways in turboprops and jets including various models of Airbus. FCTM technique every time, if the performance figures don’t work, you don’t fly the approach. What you do not do is start making up flying technique ad hoc - trust the FCTM, trust the performance figures, fly the correct technique every time.

[FlightDetent]

The downdraft scenario is exactly why one should not fly a shallow profile. And do keep aiming for a standard 30' RA at the threshold. Be observant to err on the low side but not deliberately (much).

Tailwind won't send you over the cliff if the landing was reasonable and braking proper. That's what the 67% reserve is for.

A321 IAE with wing fence is illegal at MLW but that is no news. (1210 + 80 A/THR + 100 ISA20) *5/3 = 2316

Assuming 45 DOW + 4t landing fuel + 19 t full house charter load = LW = 68 t and that is also no dispatch. [(1210-100 Weight) + 80 + 100)]*5/3 = 2150.

Funny that, the A320 classic which I saw operate give: 41 + 4 + 11 (130 pax) = LW = 55 t which is still no dispatch with resulting RLD of 1810. (Technically we could drop the +5 for A/THR but that only is 125 m).

Anyone said 'dispensation' ?

[fdr]

That airport like many that airlines elect to fly aircraft into is fundamentally high risk. It is not a reasonable risk to assume on behalf of the travelling public. The probability of a event and the consequence would in any reasonable analysis lead to upgrading of facilities to assure that MEHT and by association the TCH is safe. It is unreasonable to castigate the crew that are being asked to undertake an approach that is knowingly compromised.

My suggestion to the City is to void insurance on any accident involving a jet aircraft into this airport, and into our favorite scenic spot in the french side of the Caribbean. If we are not going to say no, then perhaps the insurers will step in and say what needs to be said. Perhaps then a PAPI or flight path guidance that will provide an accurate flight path for the crew to at least have a fighting chance.

ICAO puts out glossy documents such as ICAO Doc 9859, the one that says categorically what the airline and regulators and airport are supposed to do to not be a recipient of a lawsuit for wilful negligence or being on the reciving end of a wrongful death suit or proceedings.

[Confusious]

That airport like many that airlines elect to fly aircraft into is fundamentally high risk. It is not a reasonable risk to assume on behalf of the travelling public. The probability of a event and the consequence would in any reasonable analysis lead to upgrading of facilities to assure that MEHT and by association the TCH is safe. It is unreasonable to castigate the crew that are being asked to undertake an approach that is knowingly compromised.

My suggestion to the City is to void insurance on any accident involving a jet aircraft into this airport, and into our favorite scenic spot in the french side of the Caribbean. If we are not going to say no, then perhaps the insurers will step in and say what needs to be said. Perhaps then a PAPI or flight path guidance that will provide an accurate flight path for the crew to at least have a fighting chance.

ICAO puts out glossy documents such as ICAO Doc 9859, the one that says categorically what the airline and regulators and airport are supposed to do to not be a recipient of a lawsuit for wilful negligence or being on the reciving end of a wrongful death suit or proceedings.

If insurance companies made such a move then it would no doubt set a precedent for all CATC "high risk" airfields. Net result would be that airlines would not fly to said airfields and industry wide redundancies.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

There is a basic instrument approach and there are PAPI's at JSI. They are clearly visible and were working well last time I flew there. This **** show occurred on a day that was clearly CAVOK in every meaning of the word. This Condor crew seem to know their stuff. No dramatics, just a well executed approach and landing. You don't need to be an astronaut. https://youtu.be/5Jw88SpuajQ

[Jonty]

This is getting quite funny now.

I have been here with some VERY experienced pilots, trainers of all flavours, and even a CAA flight ops inspector on the jump seat. All, to a man, flew an approach fairly close to what you see in that video. And I defy anyone who says they will do something different.

Why? Because you cant. There’s no approach guidance of any use, PAPIS at 3.3, if they are turned on, which they hardly ever are. It’s short, narrow, uphill. It’s also in a valley, with the approach over the sea. Just about every visual illusion you were warned about is ticked by this place. I have yet to see anyone fly a 3.3 degree approach to touch down here.

Kid yourselves if you want to, but you’re not living in reality.

[Confusious]

This is getting quite funny now.

I have been here with some VERY experienced pilots, trainers of all flavours, and even a CAA flight ops inspector on the jump seat. All, to a man, flew an approach fairly close to what you see in that video. And I defy anyone who says they will do something different.

Why? Because you cant. There’s no approach guidance of any use, PAPIS at 3.3, if they are turned on, which they hardly ever are. It’s short, narrow, uphill. It’s also in a valley, with the approach over the sea. Just about every visual illusion you were warned about is ticked by this place. I have yet to see anyone fly a 3.3 degree approach to touch down here.

Kid yourselves if you want to, but you’re not living in reality.

Well, in that case Jonty please answer my previous question; would you do this in the sim on your check?

[FullWings]

Before I went there (A321) we had a dedicated sim visit as it was Cat C. The most challenging part was staying on the 30M pavement with a low speed engine failure. This is where I find the whole argument about "ducking under" ridiculous. An hour after landing at JSI, pilots will refuel and calculate performance which will generate a V1 somewhere around the 130 knot mark. They will then happily take off using it. I'm guessing here, but there is probably around 900M in which to stop from V1 in a much heavier aircraft than the one they landed in just an hour before. Is it just me?
No, it’s not. I doubt if the guys who leave skid marks on the piano keys understand what a balanced field is. Do they roll their own V1?

[tubby linton]

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1073x560/d639f402_8cd5_4d40_afed_4973686adf7c_4958c2bfe45509400034c6b ea68bcbe3d778853f.jpeg
Runway lighting information
The current chart shows papis at 3.0 degrees. Why would they be steeper when there are no obstructions in the approach path?

[FlightDetent]

So does that mean you are reliant on the PAPIS? I think there was a previous thread somewhere about being on the correct G/P but the PAPIS not indicating the expected colours. I think a few contributors explained that even the head height of the PF can distort that. The PAPI here are located around 250 meters mark which is the normal place if a little shorter. Pending AIP reference due Greek AIS registration. But you can see them in Jonty's picture on the left side - 2 white 2 reds.

The confusion is a possibility (type dependent) where they are further down, not the case here.

FYI to my memory they used to be notamed U/S anyway.

[Confusious]

No, it’s not. I doubt if the guys who leave skid marks on the piano keys understand what a balanced field is. Do they roll their own V1?

And skid marks elsewhere. :)

[Fly-by-Wife]

Here's a video with a larger sample of landings with a variety of aircraft that does suggest that a successful landing can be accomplished without being excessively low:

Skiathos landings

[beardy]

There used to be some interesting braked wheel markings that stopped just short of the cliff.

[DaveReidUK]

The PAPI here are located around 250 meters mark which is the normal place if a little shorter. Pending AIP reference due Greek AIS registration. But you can see them in Jonty's picture on the left side - 2 white 2 reds.

Runway vital statistics from a recent-ish AIP:

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/963x1550/lgsk_runway_metrics_1e5a66633d596980220af71ea31449734edb5f62 .jpg

[DaveReidUK]

And a somewhat older Aerodrome Chart, showing the position of the PAPIs (N.B. predates the runway designator change to 01/19):

[tubby linton]

The papi show from the information above a meht of 14.5m/47.6 ft. I have noticed at many Greek airfields the red lenses of the papi are often sunbleached and look a pinky white, Corfu being a classic example.

[Dct_Mopas]

We have A320’s/ 737’s landing multiple times a day at Jersey EGJJ. Runway 26 is shorter than Skiathos by a few metres. With a sheer cliff at the end of the runway. Most of these aircraft are fully loaded with passengers and with round trip fuel for the next sector.

Yet we don’t have a situation like at Skiathos where aircraft descend below the normal approach path. Have people just got used to the idea this is normal at Skiathos?

Aircraft this size operate with slightly tighter performance margins elsewhere and it’s not ever flagged up. So the idea that aircraft shouldn’t be flying in Skiathos or it’s normal to fly a low approach is nonsense. It just needs to be done as per SOP and performance criteria.

[mahogany bob]

LOW APPROACH



In my experience ( 12000 hours on RAF heavies ) - it is all too easy to get too low before touchdown when landing on very short runways .( ie Gibraltar)



Contributing factors could include:



Fear of overrunning - particularly if the overrun terrain is severe ie water or a cliff!

No PAPIs

No approach lighting ( over the sea )

Visual illusions - black hole / slope

Tailwinds

Lack of faith in ODM landing performance figures

No reverse thrust available

ETC ETC



Small fast jets ( with a 2 1/2 deg GP )regularly touch down on or near the piano keys!

Large ac should aim for the 50ft point to allow the main wheels a good safety clearance.



Whilst it is obvious that you should never risk landing short - ie Vulcan crash in Malta - it it is not good to end up high and hot and risk going off the end- ie Prince of Wales landing his BAe 146!



In an ideal world runways should be longer with better visual cues and airlines should encourage pilots to Go Around if in doubt !



With lots of dodgy airfields around the world it is only due to the pilots skills that there are not more incidents/accidents!



To overly criticise the pilots in this case( showboating !! ) is disingenuous !!

[FlightDetent]

14,5 / 0.0531 (@3.04°) = 273 meters past the THR and that is not the case probably due to upslope. Relevant AIP attached.

To my understanding, the close-in obstacles would be the reason for displacing the threshold. Aiming shorter is not the critical problem, I think, coming in shallow would be.

This seems to be what got the pinkies undesired fame for being low, per the YT headline. Does anyone notice there is a marked upward correction about 100 yards over the sea?

The touchdown itself looks past the pianos which is not the case for AirItaly and the BA ship, both hard to unsee. Whizz gents pulled out in time.

[excrab]

At least one company I know of has an approach for both runways at JSI coded into the fmc database. If you reach the 1600 ft DA and have the runway in sight it gives guidance don to the threshold so the approach can be flown all the way down with VNAV guidance. If you’re not visual at 1600 ft you go around, obviously.

If one company can do it, why not others ?

[1201alarm]

There is a basic instrument approach and there are PAPI's at JSI. They are clearly visible and were working well last time I flew there. This **** show occurred on a day that was clearly CAVOK in every meaning of the word. This Condor crew seem to know their stuff. No dramatics, just a well executed approach and landing. You don't need to be an astronaut. https://youtu.be/5Jw88SpuajQ

Not wanting to cruzifie the crew on the day, we don't know what brought them low.

However to the guys stating that it is "normal" to basically scrap the fence in Skiathos: no it is not. If you think it is you should re-examine your attitude to flying.

You have plenty of room in your dispatch calculations on a dry runway, and this calculation does not consider the upslope (which obviously helps).

If you want to land slightly "early", fly slightly steeper - this also gives you a better chance of not floating, which is the most important thing.

Condor above show how it is done, landed early and firm, with margin of error with regards to the fence. Absolutely no need to creep in low.

[1201alarm]

At least one company I know of has an approach for both runways at JSI coded into the fmc database. If you reach the 1600 ft DA and have the runway in sight it gives guidance don to the threshold so the approach can be flown all the way down with VNAV guidance. If you’re not visual at 1600 ft you go around, obviously.

If one company can do it, why not others ?

Flown such approaches myself. They are great to bring you in "slot", meaning properly vertically and laterally aligned with the very short final. It is especially helpful on difficult circlings with prescribed tracks.

But they are not designed to bring you over the threshold and into the touchdown zone. The last 200ft are always basic flying: fly your aim point in a smooth and stable way. We are pilots after all, aren't we?

[Confusious]

Flown such approaches myself. They are great to bring you in "slot", meaning properly vertically and laterally aligned with the very short final. It is especially helpful on difficult circlings with prescribed tracks.

But they are not designed to bring you over the threshold and into the touchdown zone. The last 200ft are always basic flying: fly your aim point in a smooth and stable way. We are pilots after all, aren't we?

100% correct, and the question that still exists in my mind to those that would advocate flying VNAV down to the TDZ, is when would they look out of the window?

[cupplet]

Just a passenger here but can I ask what happens to that sort of approach with late evening flights? I see the last flight into JSI is at 21.45. I assume darkness adds another layer of 'risk'?

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

Great question. Which kind of closes the case. Nobody would ever dare do this at night. Unless they were really fed up with life.

[Journey Man]

Going more shallow is geometrical and energetic nonsense even if it makes the pilot feel good.

I’m surprised this hasn’t got more traction. I’d imagine an FDM analysis of short final approach path angle versus flare length would assist crews in understanding the pitfalls in conducting shallow approaches and the subsequent flare.

At EGJJ, most of the Airbus operators can vacate Ray 08 at D; mind you it’s not as balmy in Jersey (present UK heat wave excepted)

[fdr]

If insurance companies made such a move then it would no doubt set a precedent for all CATC "high risk" airfields. Net result would be that airlines would not fly to said airfields and industry wide redundancies.


For a land short , fatalities are foreseeable unless clean living, tough fuselages and luck comes to play, as in the Fokker 50 at the Mog. US Bangla went off piste in a slightly different fashion, didn't end well but was great for memes. No operator, regulator or airport authority will be able to state that they were unaware of the risk. in calling in the crew for a debrief, if that is punitive in nature, it would add to the culpability in due course. Knowingly placing the crew in harms way along with 160+ pax, starts to add up.

If the crew are evidently having problems that impact the safety of the flights outcome & that outcome has a reasonably foreseeable probability of loss of life bystanders, then the requirements of all operators and airports and regulators is quite clear. Whether they do anything about it is simply a point of evidence in the case when they have a bad day and the vultures start coming out of the woodwork.

The crews inherent desire to achieve the task enables risky practices to continue, we are enablers of moral bankruptcy of the airlines, the regulators and the airport authorities. We make the stupid and risky conditions work and that permits those responsible to get away with their intent, which is to systemically disregard their own SMM's.

An objection on the grounds of employment is a poor choice. Airlines are profit focused, regulators intent used to be clear but is now totally lost in confusion, and the airports want the flights. If your employer is conducting arson for hire, objecting to the arson and what that does to employment is hard to argue. Perhaps the employer gets to focus on fixing things instead.

ICAO pushed the SMM wheelbarrow, knowingly disregarding catastrophic outcomes doesn't seem to make for a safety program, it is more like a night out in Vegas.

This airport is just one of many, but they all suffer from the inertia that the only consequences are the crew being dragged to an office for tea 'n bikkies. The day is yet young and stuff happens when we ignore obvious hints.

P.S. There is no relief under any SMM risk matrix that says, well its just too hard so we keep on doing it. Might work for a firing squad, but the compliant SMM response is to stop the exposure. [END OF STORY]. If there is a high risk of a catastrophic outcome and it cannot be mitigated to a low risk or minor consequence, the mandatory requirement per the ICAO Ch 5 is to cease that activity. See Figures 5-2, 5-3, 5-4 below. Same in flight test... how that plays out downwind of the smoke and body bags is an interesting question. These figures and hazard management exist in every version of the ICAO Doc 9859 AN/474.

5.3.3 Safety risks assessed as initially falling in the intolerable region are unacceptable under any
circumstances. The probability and/or severity of the consequences of the hazards are of such a magnitude, and the
damaging potential of the hazard poses such a threat to the viability of the organization, that immediate mitigation action
is required. Generally speaking, two alternatives are available to the organization to bring the safety risks to the tolerable
or acceptable regions:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to, and/or the magnitude of, the damaging potential of the
consequences of the hazards; or
b) if mitigation is not possible, cancel the operation.

5.6.3 Second, the safety risk index obtained from the safety risk assessment matrix must then be exported to a safety risk tolerability matrix that describes the tolerability criteria. The criterion for a safety risk assessed as 4B is,
according to the tolerability table in Figure 5-5, “unacceptable under the existing circumstances”. In this case, the safety
risk falls in the intolerable region of the inverted triangle. The safety risk of the consequences of the hazard is
unacceptable. The organization must:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to the consequences of the hazards;
b) allocate resources to reduce the magnitude or the damaging potential of the consequences of the
hazards; or
c) cancel the operation if mitigation is not possible.

any bets on the type of organizations we are talking about?

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1424x764/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_8_45_51_am_dc38301efbceb5048f25af7 31a0c0dc3e1283da0.png


https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1464x1060/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_8_48_29_am_c413358c8747cf913fa6073 38f05da0642f09ddd.png


https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1220x632/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_8_48_44_am_9e09671b71b305c184fef30 19687dcc64571c27a.png
https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1218x1112/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_8_48_56_am_0b93ac7045868622ecfe70a 7b6040f6b2f5dcfb2.png



https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1220x856/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_8_53_41_am_84bc03ae9ab38286ab4d561 050f55ec064ffd169.png


These are from 9859 Rev 2, Rev 3 brought in some prettier graphics that continue on Rev 4. Curiously, ICAO considered that the matter should migrate from Chapter 5 to Chapter 2... may be they thought it was kind of important.


https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1092x732/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_3_43_51_pm_67e840aa9c1d8aa3a5d1657 521d67692793ef6d6.png
https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1084x548/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_3_44_02_pm_3e268c5f008ac498ded6279 e55b37fe4b7f110a2.png
https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1216x1112/screen_shot_2022_08_12_at_3_44_20_pm_d36b05463cc393f0af8c092 aa7b4bbe1f6371ddc.png

[excrab]

I’ve landed there six times in the last three months, all night landings. In good visibility, if anything, it’s easier than in daylight, as the PAPIS are clearly visible from further out. You fly a three degree path, on the PAPIS ( I use the FPV as an additional help ). Below 1600 feet it’s a visual approach, so you’re referencing instruments and outside, and I’m sure that if you had VNAV guidance you’d be scanning that too, you wouldn’t be eyes inside only. You stay on the three degree slope all the way down, and you land halfway along the touch down zone.

I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.

[fdr]

I’ve landed there six times in the last three months, all night landings. In good visibility, if anything, it’s easier than in daylight, as the PAPIS are clearly visible from further out. You fly a three degree path, on the PAPIS ( I use the FPV as an additional help ). Below 1600 feet it’s a visual approach, so you’re referencing instruments and outside, and I’m sure that if you had VNAV guidance you’d be scanning that too, you wouldn’t be eyes inside only. You stay on the three degree slope all the way down, and you land halfway along the touch down zone.

I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.

Kudos, excrab, Special authorizations on the basis of competency meets the system safety requirements, if it removes the risk, and there are indeed sufficient crews that can demonstrate competency then that is adequate, but, the scores of happy snaps of aircraft not flying an on-PAPI approach suggests that this is not the current state of play. If the insurers get antsy, then that sort of restriction is appropriate mitigation. What is not acceptable is to keep getting happy snaps of approaches that don't seem to meet the requirements to be described to be safe.

[TBSC]

What's the point of pushing it at all like it was the Maldives or Tahiti? It's just another greek island in the immediate vicinity of the mainland (4 km) served by dozens of ferries each day. Let those do the job instead of packed 321s blowing away the cart of the milkman.

[DaveReidUK]

The FR24 track indicates that, notwithstanding the low height over the fence, the approach from 2000' was flown at 3°.
was that Fahrenheit or Centigrade, certainly was nowhere near a normal approach

Nope, not Kelvin either. :O

Just the FPA achieved for the last 6 nm of the approach, from approx 2000'.

[Smooth Airperator]

Sim training for Skiathos by some airlines (mine included) is stupid. They focus on max cross wind landings rather than line/length. You are more likely to crash because of landing too short than not being able to brake in time at the end.

[Confusious]

Sim training for Skiathos by some airlines (mine included) is stupid. They focus on max cross wind landings rather than line/length. You are more likely to crash because of landing too short than not being able to brake in time at the end.
Do they cover the runway length risks in their briefs?

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

I’ve landed there six times in the last three months, all night landings. In good visibility, if anything, it’s easier than in daylight, as the PAPIS are clearly visible from further out. You fly a three degree path, on the PAPIS ( I use the FPV as an additional help ). Below 1600 feet it’s a visual approach, so you’re referencing instruments and outside, and I’m sure that if you had VNAV guidance you’d be scanning that too, you wouldn’t be eyes inside only. You stay on the three degree slope all the way down, and you land halfway along the touch down zone.

I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.

Sums it up perfectly. There is only one reason these idiots are that low. They are showing off on a public transport undertaking. Not that long ago behaviour like this would have required a visit to HQ with your uniform items, Airside ID and manuals. Rightly so.

[Smooth Airperator]

No. We're expected to read the breif.

[Confusious]

No. We're expected to read the breif.
Reading the brief is mandatory for all CAT C training/sign offs. You obviously showed competency in all areas, but if you feel that you would like more emphasis on short field techniques then tell the instructor next time you're in the sim. Or why not speak to someone from training management? I'm sure that they would appreciate constructive feedback.

[safetypee]

#90 relates to a mechanistic safety management system, fast approaching its limit with improving operational safety and fewer events. The ‘outcome = future’ basis is unsuitable for human related events due to mis-representing human activity as a number, and then placing the variable human in a categorising box.

According to common analysis, these events were safe as judged by outcome; however risk is evident and related to TCH, but a higher 6 deg 50 ft TCH is not without risk - consider the big picture.

An important factor is what the crew knew (# 38, knowledge, understanding, learning).

Was the approach planned (low) - company policy, training, local practice.

Planned (low), but not as expected - normal pilot variability; or planned (3 deg) and not as expected.

Influencing factors - upslope illusion (# 41, 42), understanding (belief, trust) of landing performance, subconscious bias (pax comfort), standard procedures on non standard runway (special conditions required) unfamiliarity with landing-performance limited operations - the ‘actual’ min distance margins vs those normally achieved.

The day / night observation is interesting - follow the PAPI; why not by day?

Discussion on RNAV is disturbing (or are these head down, armchair, computer views).

A lovely clear day, great scenery, enjoy the view, add experience in locating and using PAPI, visually judging approach path - knowledge, understanding, learning; and debrief - the good, not so good, and the interesting - differences, ambiguities, thoughts and judgements - why, and learn.

The balance of the professionally based arguments, indicates that operations at this airport are safe, but the eye catching, perspective biasing videos of normal varibility are turned into news.

Look, think, check for complacency; how many good landings vs a few videos; or is normal variability in landing on this runway not as imagined by the safety experts - those who set the safety limits in the first instance.
If not as imagined, then look at the videos, FDR, adjust WAI to relate to WAD, and revise safety assumptions.

Back to # 38 “ … what bounds normal. Is this defined by hindsight, or considered by inspired foresight.”

[172_driver]

You are more likely to crash because of landing too short than not being able to brake in time at the end.

I keep reading/hearing about overruns all the time, some quite nasty. I know of only the occasional undershoot. I don't know where you get this from??

[FlightDetent]

PAPI don't provide guidance beacuse the midday sun floodlights them or they are notam'd U/S.

The advisory lateral and vertical guidance derived from RWY THR and calculated as a 4.5 mile fix at 1500' on the extended centerline is a valuable tool and very easy to use properly, without upsetting any gods of visual manouvering. Repeated references to RNAV + armchair uncover insufficient understanding of available technology and their use from your side, safetypee.

At JSI, most of the time it is the best tool to guide the plane to a point from which standard training and skill can take over. If you think pilots can eyeball A320 size CAT loosely unhinged in the 4D airspace somewhere between 3-9 NM in a sector 120-30 degrees offset from the final course - that's an invitation to a world of whole SMS review at the operator.

Or perphaps I couldn't decode the your message properly.

[MPN11]

As EGJJ got a mention in the context of runway length, I do recall a nervous moment in 2020 as SLF on a BA A320. We were still airborne as the Fire station came into view!

Unsurprisingly the landing roll went all the way to the end, but stopped before the cliff!

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x897/long_landing_6baaf53a3d1b5a7e60a60cfff5a0d8f5c8b34fbe.jpg

[ZeBedie]

Probably going back 10 years, but my memory of frequent JSI landings is that the PAPI's were hard to see in strong sunlight and often unavailable. They were once NOTAMed u/s for a whole summer. My company thought we'd go in there in the dark with no PAPI's if running late. I wasn't so sure about that idea!

[Confusious]

As EGJJ got a mention in the context of runway length, I do recall a nervous moment in 2020 as SLF on a BA A320. We were still airborne as the Fire station came into view!

Unsurprisingly the landing roll went all the way to the end, but stopped before the cliff!

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x897/long_landing_6baaf53a3d1b5a7e60a60cfff5a0d8f5c8b34fbe.jpg

The white 'must land by' lights inset into the runway at LCY serve to avoid this happening. Perhaps they should be installed at all airfields with short runways?

[Smooth Airperator]

I appreciate it appears to be a silly statement but let's keep this in context. At Skiathos if you did your perf calcs and stopping was assured. And if you crossed the threshold at 50ft, you have nothing to fear. If you don't trust the perf, and you try to do something silly like cross the threshold at 10ft, it will be another story.

[Confusious]

I appreciate it appears to be a silly statement but let's keep this in context. At Skiathos if you did your perf calcs and stopping was assured. And if you crossed the threshold at 50ft, you have nothing to fear. If you don't trust the perf, and you try to do something silly like cross the threshold at 10ft, it will be another story.

That's far from silly, it's spot on. Not just Skiathos, cross the threshold at 50' everywhere. Good habits will last throughout your flying career.

[SpamCanDriver]

That's far from silly, it's spot on. Not just Skiathos, cross the threshold at 50' everywhere. Good habits will last throughout your flying career.

Completely agree with both of you.
If you dont trust your ability to land within the generous allowances of transport category airplane performance calculations. With the option to abort the landing at any time you think you won't stop within the available distance.
Why would you trust your ability to judge your approach within a few feet of the airport perimeter?

Everyone can mess up an approach myself included, but I dont understand why commercial pilots would intentionally undershoot the standard approach path.

[FlightDetent]

Until showed otherwise, the latest information on this thread is that A321 does not meet the standard RLD at JSI.
Does not change the fact that correct landing is to be achieved with 3 deg profile and having RA call 30 over the numbers.

Stll think it was not showboating but a crew who scared themselves out of competence for the moment. And not trained well for a complex scenario such as the one over there, not overly demanding, just complex.

[JanetFlight]

Its curious...when this thread was created i would swear it would be moved to some kind of spotters or spectators balcony pprune division...i was fully wrong...

[DaveReidUK]

Its curious...when this thread was created i would swear it would be moved to some kind of spotters or spectators balcony pprune division...

As a warning to be careful, you mean?

Waste of time. :O

[ItsonlyMeagain]

What has not been discussed here is the normal touchdown markers at 1000ft in are in fact at 500ft. After many landings here, a copilot who had never been before announced “a Playmobil runway” …. ?? What he meant was that coming from MAN with a 45m wide and 10000 ft long runway, JSI with its half sized (ish) proportions including touch down markers and consequently PAPI position, it looks exactly the same from a distance. However, there is a huge ground rush at the end!

So, at JSI, the aircraft should/will be much lower than at a standard location. This one was just on/outside the outer limits of normality. Had it been the equivalent high, if they had not balked, they probably would not have stopped before the very tight turning circle at the end.

Me

[FlightDetent]

Thank you for proving all my salient points.

[1201alarm]

Until showed otherwise, the latest information on this thread is that A321 does not meet the standard RLD at JSI.

Is this confirmed? There are things like revised ground spoiler logic (if I recall correctly) or some other software improvements offered by Airbus as an upgrade which change (=shorten) the landing distance. It is hard to imagine that a company would put an aircraft on a route that does not meet dispatch requirements.

[Confusious]

Until showed otherwise, the latest information on this thread is that A321 does not meet the standard RLD at JSI.
Does not change the fact that correct landing is to be achieved with 3 deg profile and having RA call 30 over the numbers.

Stll think it was not showboating but a crew who scared themselves out of competence for the moment. And not trained well for a complex scenario such as the one over there, not overly demanding, just complex.

IF the A321 does not meet the standard RLD at JSI then any pilot would be within their rights as a professional to refuse to fly into there.

Totally agree that it was unlikely to be showboating, but if they had scared themselves then why did PNF not call Go-Around? I don't have a clue how Wizz train their pilots or the quality of their training, but the both pilots had been signed off to operate into there.

[Down Three Greens]

The RLD for still air for an 72,400kg Landing Mass A321 SL (CEO) is 1570m (The length of RW01) - Still Air/1013/RW01/Dry.
That gives a payload of (72.4 - 3.0 Fuel - 48.3 DOW) of 21.1T. That's quite a substantial load, in excess of 220 pax (e.g. 95M/95F/30C/0I- 3000 bags is 19.1T).
You don't have to take a full A321 in there from a rotation point of view.

Rw19 RLD Max Mass - 76.1T. Cross-over point 2kts TL-Rw19 HD-RW01, at about 73.0 tons

Just a performance remark.

Getting out without restriction is dependent on destination.

Take-off is about 78-78.8T in similar conditions.

[HURZ]

Cowboy CEO
Cowboy Pilots going the extra mile
Cowboy company

[inbalance]

Not sure if posted previously but your thoughts on this insanity?

WIZZ AIR SKIATHOS (https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/plane-makes-lowest-ever-landing-27709903) - Daily Record

My triple would have left its tyres in the sea….
WIZZ AIR SKIATHOS VIDEO (https://youtu.be/pN40Pxs27Sw)
Obviously a more skilled pilot than you.

[Confusious]

Cowboy CEO
Cowboy Pilots going the extra mile
Cowboy company

Obviously a more skilled pilot than you.

And first prize for the most constructive contribution goes to......

[Maoraigh1]

Not a professional. Should that bit of beach be open to the public? If that aircraft had gone-around late, could there be blast injury to the beach people?

[hans brinker]

Definitely had the 50' RA while still over the water. Had to level off, and the AT would (if on) have increased the power substantially. I'm actually amazed they didn't float more. IMNSHO absolutely should have been a GA.

[DaveReidUK]

Not a professional. Should that bit of beach be open to the public? If that aircraft had gone-around late, could there be blast injury to the beach people?

In a lot of countries, a road that close to the threshold would be controlled to keep both vehicles and pedestrians away from the undershoot during landings and probably takeoffs too.

But hey, it's Greece - plus there's a 3-way junction and even a car park in line with the runway.

[Chesty Morgan]

Corfu does exactly that. But hey, it's Greece...oh wait...

[DaveReidUK]

Corfu does exactly that. But hey, it's Greece...oh wait...

So we've established they don't do things consistently.

I rest my case.

[FullWings]

Reading the brief is mandatory for all CAT C training/sign offs. You obviously showed competency in all areas, but if you feel that you would like more emphasis on short field techniques then tell the instructor next time you're in the sim. Or why not speak to someone from training management? I'm sure that they would appreciate constructive feedback.
Not aimed at you at all Confusious, but “short field techniques” are for getting light aircraft in and out of farm strips: pushing the tail into the trees, full power on the brakes, watching the windsock, clipping the hedge on the way in, etc.

There is only one way of landing a jet transport and that’s the one in the FCTM that you use every flight, irrespective of the runway dimensions. Yes, at the briefing stage you discuss the reduced margins and the importance of discontinuing the approach at any point up to reverser deployment, should any parameters be outside the limits you have set. This does not change the technique, just the focus you have in ensuring that you execute it as specified.

[Confusious]

Not aimed at you at all Confusious, but “short field techniques” are for getting light aircraft in and out of farm strips: pushing the tail into the trees, full power on the brakes, watching the windsock, clipping the hedge on the way in, etc.

There is only one way of landing a jet transport and that’s the one in the FCTM that you use every flight, irrespective of the runway dimensions. Yes, at the briefing stage you discuss the reduced margins and the importance of discontinuing the approach at any point up to reverser deployment, should any parameters be outside the limits you have set. This does not change the technique, just the focus you have in ensuring that you execute it as specified.

Agreed, 'techniques' was the wrong word. What I was trying to get over was the importance of correct speed, profile and touching down at the correct point. Yes, it's not exclusive to short runways, but to highlight the importance during CAT C short runway training is essential and sound training practice in my opinion.

[FullWings]

Absolutely. The interesting thing is that overruns don’t just happen on short runways; in fact medium to long ones appear to have a larger showing. Add a 10kt tailwind with medium braking action to a 2,500m runway and if you don’t get it in the TDZ at the right speed it could become the wrong sort of exciting - the effective LDA has been reduced to something like that at JSI by environmental conditions.

[fdr]

What's the point of pushing it at all like it was the Maldives or Tahiti? It's just another greek island in the immediate vicinity of the mainland (4 km) served by dozens of ferries each day. Let those do the job instead of packed 321s blowing away the cart of the milkman.

Maldives have a good airport at GAN/VRMG and Malé/ VRMM, Tahiti, NTAA, also has a pretty good airport with G/S on at least RWY04, the old VOR RWY 22 was uncomfortable for black hole in the midnight arrivals. None of those airports need special, rat cunning, sneak under the radar techniques to assure public safety. Tahiti has good pizza, great fromage and pain, and pretty average vin ordinaire. Malé is tight on ramp space, GAN is better for long stay, Maldives are beautiful.

[Confusious]

Absolutely. The interesting thing is that overruns don’t just happen on short runways; in fact medium to long ones appear to have a larger showing. Add a 10kt tailwind with medium braking action to a 2,500m runway and if you don’t get it in the TDZ at the right speed it could become the wrong sort of exciting - the effective LDA has been reduced to something like that at JSI by environmental conditions.
Yes indeed, and it's interesting how the 2500m runway with adverse environmental factors may focus the mind differently to JSI in ISA conditions and still air. Some may be more focused and some may be less, but in reality both cases require the same flying parameters for a successful minimal stress outcome. But of course we're getting into human factors now which possibly is going off piste for this thread.

[TBSC]

Maldives have a good airport at GAN/VRMG and Malé/ VRMM, Tahiti, NTAA, also has a pretty good airport with G/S on at least RWY04, the old VOR RWY 22 was uncomfortable for black hole in the midnight arrivals. None of those airports need special, rat cunning, sneak under the radar techniques to assure public safety. Tahiti has good pizza, great fromage and pain, and pretty average vin ordinaire. Malé is tight on ramp space, GAN is better for long stay, Maldives are beautiful.
Those places need air transport being out in the ocean whereas Skiathos is not. Life (even mass turism) would go on without a hitch even if they'd close it (or only have the daily Dash-8 it was built for).

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

Those places need air transport being out in the ocean whereas Skiathos is not. Life (even mass turism) would go on without a hitch even if they'd close it (or only have the daily Dash-8 it was built for).

If the crew are properly trained and operate the aircraft IAW with the FCTM techniques then JSI is perfectly acceptable as a destination. The problem you have here are people that have either wilfully stepped outside their SOP's or are completely incapable of flying a straight in visual approach during daylight. You choose.

Sadly, boring Youtube videos of properly executed approaches don't attract clicks. Idiots showboating 6 feet above the Armco do. It amazes me that people here are willing to defend these types of antics. It only happens at JSI and not other short runways. Ask yourself why.

[AirportPlanner1]

Possibly worth saying there’s airlines and crews that have been operating into JSI for years without a hitch. Wizz come along and within a couple of months they’ve managed to get themselves mainstream news coverage, a viral video and long thread on here.

Mass tourism at current levels won’t be sustained if people are flown into Volos with a coach and ferry transfer. More so for those that transfer on to Skopelos. In turn the island’s fragile economy tanks. Politically closing or restricting JSI is a non-starter. Discussing it is a waste of time.

[safetypee]

Flight Detent, #102
decoding message; as most things depends on context.

The ‘RNAV’ point was addressed primarily to those in their armchairs.

RNAV re this approach is a valuable non precison aid, but use it within its capability - no more, i.e. inappropriately following FD to low altitude (below DA) as an ‘aid’, but not appreciating the potential corrupting influence of ‘aids’ in safety; a low integrity systems shows a good picture (like the thread video), but not ‘accurate’ or reliable in the sense being proposed by some views.

RNAV as a safety backup; if pseudo DME to touchdown is available - great; ideal, height (RA over sea) v distance cross checks, whilst looking out, forming and remembering the mental picture.
The video favoured the latter.

PAPI - sunlight surprises me - having been on the ground flood at their conception, test, use.
Perhaps an inferior (cheap?) version; safety report to EASA ha.

Re PAPI u/s; what mitigations, who. e.g. Operator, no night landing, day special cat; airport / regulator - ‘oh the pilot will managed’ (heard that somewhere before, re accidents).
Stop operations; radial, commercially harmful; but an attention getting incentive for the airport to fix the issue - safety is not cheap. A strongly worded ‘threading’ letter from operator to airport might help, even in Greece (pilot safety report to raise awareness of issue - push the responsibility back upwards).
Alternatively, misplaced faith in training, not all of the people, all of the time … HF suggests otherwise; so fix the environment, clarify the situation, change the system - oh but the pilot will manage … not always; need of a Safety-II viewpoint.

Variable performance (TCH) - an indication of normal human performance, or as an indictor of degrading safety margins?
Which, when, and what is the point of demarcation for changeover; who decides, which metrics.

Safety never stops.

[Confusious]

Flight Detent, #102
decoding message; as most things depends on context.

The ‘RNAV’ point was addressed primarily to those in their armchairs.

RNAV re this approach is a valuable non precison aid, but use it within its capability - no more, i.e. inappropriately following FD to low altitude (below DA) as an ‘aid’, but not appreciating the potential corrupting influence of ‘aids’ in safety; a low integrity systems shows a good picture (like the thread video), but not ‘accurate’ or reliable in the sense being proposed by some views.

RNAV as a safety backup; if pseudo DME to touchdown is available - great; ideal, height (RA over sea) v distance cross checks, whilst looking out, forming and remembering the mental picture.
The video favoured the latter.

PAPI - sunlight surprises me - having been on the ground flood at their conception, test, use.
Perhaps an inferior (cheap?) version; safety report to EASA ha.

Re PAPI u/s; what mitigations, who. e.g. Operator, no night landing, day special cat; airport / regulator - ‘oh the pilot will managed’ (heard that somewhere before, re accidents).
Stop operations; radial, commercially harmful; but an attention getting incentive for the airport to fix the issue - safety is not cheap. A strongly worded ‘threading’ letter from operator to airport might help, even in Greece (pilot safety report to raise awareness of issue - push the responsibility back upwards).
Alternatively, misplaced faith in training, not all of the people, all of the time … HF suggests otherwise; so fix the environment, clarify the situation, change the system - oh but the pilot will manage … not always; need of a Safety-II viewpoint.

Variable performance (TCH) - an indication of normal human performance, or as an indictor of degrading safety margins?
Which, when, and what is the point of demarcation for changeover; who decides, which metrics.

Safety never stops.

oh but the pilot will manage … not always
Pilots don't 'manage' in that sense, they do their job professionally in accordance with set procedures. Licencing of Airfields, Airlines and Pilots is not a grey area, it's black or white. All three must operate professionally with no compromise to achieve the desired outcome, flight safety.

In the case of this event, the pilots did not operate without compromise. Departed the correct and hopefully briefed profile, yet failed to execute a Go-Around. It's the latter that's inexcusable. Sorry, but you can't blame the airline or the airport for the pilots not going around.

If you believe that the airline or airport compromised safety then do what you should do as a professional, file a report.

[Capt Fathom]

So some pilots have issues flying a 3deg visual approach to a 2500m runway?

[topgas]

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1920x944/skiathos_rwy_12_44619ea8de54f76001ac368addfae6f7c42a6ab7.jpg
Image from 2013, as the Greek Govt have helpfully pixelated all their airports in current views. Looks like the piano keys have been moved. Yellow line is 300m

[Capt Scribble]

JSI on the new runway 12 should be interesting. Osprey only I would imagine.

[safetypee]

Confusious, perhaps you overlooked my ‘hidden’ :hmm:

Re back and white; the nature of modern ‘rule based’ operations, is that reality requires all shades of grey. If not, then actual operations will continue to be constrained with mind numbing cognitive dissonance.

The alternative is to have open-minded flexible thinking, ability (and authority) to adjust, adapt; which requires the change in management style, regulation, with delegated authority to those who face reality.

People don't fail; an alternative perspective is that they are doing their best in the circumstances as they understood at the time - awareness; perception + influencing factors (rules, regulation).

‘Failure’ is our admission that we don't have the same view which the crew had, and that we do not understand the crews awareness, or why their choice of action was not as required for the situation.
Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.

The above can be labeled ‘as imagined’ or ‘as done’, according to personal bias, but the list should also include awareness and action ‘as required’, for those who were actually there.

“… file a report” :ok: … is there an ’app’ for that, linked directly to Pprune !

[Confusious]

Confusious, perhaps you overlooked my ‘hidden’ :hmm:

Re back and white; the nature of modern ‘rule based’ operations, is that reality requires all shades of grey. If not, then actual operations will continue to be constrained with mind numbing cognitive dissonance.

The alternative is to have open-minded flexible thinking, ability (and authority) to adjust, adapt; which requires the change in management style, regulation, with delegated authority to those who face reality.

People don't fail; an alternative perspective is that they are doing their best in the circumstances as they understood at the time - awareness; perception + influencing factors (rules, regulation).

‘Failure’ is our admission that we don't have the same view which the crew had, and that we do not understand the crews awareness, or why their choice of action was not as required for the situation.
Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.

The above can be labeled ‘as imagined’ or ‘as done’, according to personal bias, but the list should also include awareness and action ‘as required’, for those who were actually there.

“… file a report” :ok: … is there an ’app’ for that, linked directly to Pprune !

1. https://www.fraport-greece.com/eng/our-expertise-and-services/voluntary-safety-report

2. https://www.caa.co.uk/our-work/make-a-report-or-complaint/report-a-safety-concern/

3. https://hcaa.gov.gr/en/faq/pos-na-anaferete-stin-apa

4. https://www.easa.europa.eu/confidential-safety-reporting

[Confusious]

Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.

Of course we're all human and have all made mistakes. It may well have been a mistake to end up low, but it wasn't a mistake not to have executed a Go-Around.

How can the situation be changed?
​​​​​- Extend the runway
- Stop Wizz flying there
Can't think of any other ways.

[DaveReidUK]

Image from 2013, as the Greek Govt have helpfully pixelated all their airports in current views. Looks like the piano keys have been moved. Yellow line is 300m

See earlier posts with AIP runway data: 01 (formerly 02) has a 58 m displaced threshold, which matches those "phantom" piano keys.

So presumably at one point in time it didn't, although historical GE imagery is inconclusive.

Edit: painted-out original piano keys more clearly visible here:

ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXTpQCG5LRs

[Doors to Automatic]

I note from the above picture that the aiming point is the first marker and, I assume, 500ft past the threshold, half the usual length. Does that mean that the correct threshold crossing height would be 25ft instead of 50ft?

[safetypee]

Confusious,
1-4 :ok:
But I doubt that posting a link to Pprune would have the desired (any) effect !
Also, with sceptical demeanour, what hope of action; any past histories of similar issues.

“… but it wasn't a mistake not to have executed a Go-Around”.
but your quote ‘mistake’ is constructed with hindsight; is that a mistake …

The professional core of this thread appears to conclude that the operation is safe without intervention (my conclusion without further justification).

So why are some operations experiencing such variability in TCH at this airport
N.B. previous long video of many approach and landings.
Back to # 102. Upslope, visual approach, oversea, PAPI, and # 142

For info; ‘A Study of Normal Operational Landing Performance on Subsonic, Civil, Narrow-Body Jet Aircraft During Instrument Landing System Approaches’, DOT/FAA/AR-07/7

Chart of ‘estimated’ TCH from precision approach landing measurements.
A sample ≈ 1% of total.

Caution; datum ref not known. wheel ht, ILS deviation at 50ft RA, or cg.
probably ILS - RA thus wheel ht would be less, cf touch down.


https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1231x1521/66bf5c94_9b0f_4fef_aa02_279639c0f18f_0c2990c47aca136321892dd 4edb6450a40a4f048.jpeg

[Confusious]

But I doubt that posting a link to PPRuNe would have the desired (any) effect !
Also, with sceptical demeanour, what hope of action; any past histories of similar issues.

I don't have a desired effect and don't believe that there is a course of action required. As said in a previous post, normal approaches don't attract YouTube videos and media attention. Also posted previously by Down Three Greens was evidence that the performance numbers stack up.

I assumed from your comment about an App for filing reports that you wanted to, hence the links. Perhaps that was another 'mistake'. 🤔

[FlightDetent]

I note from the above picture that the aiming point is the first marker and, I assume, 500ft past the threshold, half the usual length. Does that mean that the correct threshold crossing height would be 25ft instead of 50ft? That means the confusion on how to use the aim point markers is still prevalent.

You don't. They are rarely painted where you need them.

[WB627]

Possibly worth saying there’s airlines and crews that have been operating into JSI for years without a hitch. Wizz come along and within a couple of months they’ve managed to get themselves mainstream news coverage, a viral video and long thread on here.

Mass tourism at current levels won’t be sustained if people are flown into Volos with a coach and ferry transfer. More so for those that transfer on to Skopelos. In turn the island’s fragile economy tanks. Politically closing or restricting JSI is a non-starter. Discussing it is a waste of time.

No publicity is bad publicity :E or so I was told :rolleyes:

[fdr]

Confusious,
1-4 :ok:
But I doubt that posting a link to Pprune would have the desired (any) effect !
Also, with sceptical demeanour, what hope of action; any past histories of similar issues.

“… but it wasn't a mistake not to have executed a Go-Around”.
but your quote ‘mistake’ is constructed with hindsight; is that a mistake …

The professional core of this thread appears to conclude that the operation is safe without intervention (my conclusion without further justification).

So why are some operations experiencing such variability in TCH at this airport
N.B. previous long video of many approach and landings.
Back to # 102. Upslope, visual approach, oversea, PAPI, and # 142

For info; ‘A Study of Normal Operational Landing Performance on Subsonic, Civil, Narrow-Body Jet Aircraft During Instrument Landing System Approaches’, DOT/FAA/AR-07/7

Chart of ‘estimated’ TCH from precision approach landing measurements.
A sample ≈ 1% of total.

Caution; datum ref not known. wheel ht, ILS deviation at 50ft RA, or cg.
probably ILS - RA thus wheel ht would be less, cf touch down.


https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1231x1521/66bf5c94_9b0f_4fef_aa02_279639c0f18f_0c2990c47aca136321892dd 4edb6450a40a4f048.jpeg


Was an interesting study. It used an estimate of the the flight path down low based on the D/S deviation which has some issues, but at least the methodology was retained for all cases. The G/S signal is not a linear transmission in close, it has a scallop from ground plane effects that is factored into the siting and calibration of the aid. works fine out at 200' normally, (except where there is any anomaly that affects the ground plane, thinking flooding of a plain out at midfield, was a habit at U-tapao in the wet. The cues to the bus assist in reducing speed variability, which helps with touchdown dispersion, however the vertical distribution is tighter on the B737 than the bus. The approach attitude and body lengths in the study would give some effects there.

If the CEOs want the guys to operate into these airfield, then give them good HUD's, a dialled in desired FPA and a live FPV gives a much more accurate finals and minimises the spread of the touchdowns. The collimated displays are great, but lightweight and effective HUDs are available if there is a desire to reduce the need for the cone of shame.

https://youtu.be/VWU5M1q0WqU

[safetypee]

Confusious; touché :ok:

fdr
“If the CEOs want the guys to operate into these airfield, then give them good HUD's, …”

HUD has many positive attributes, but why install expensive new systems without first understanding the issue; and - is there a problem requiring that type of solution.
Fix the PAPI; required flt path vs flt path required; ground to air (PAPI) or air to ground (HUD).

[CVividasku]

Absolutely correct, and in a lot of airlines this would be a 'chat with no tea and biscuits' event. I can't believe how all the spotters stayed put!
It seems that, with a 1600m runway, it's tea and biscuits any way you try to land there. If they flew at 50ft over the threshold, they would have made a "high speed at runway end event"..

[Confusious]

It seems that, with a 1600m runway, it's tea and biscuits any way you try to land there. If they flew at 50ft over the threshold, they would have made a "high speed at runway end"..
​​​​​
How could 50' over the threshold lead to a high speed event?

[CVividasku]

It seems that, with a 1600m runway, it's tea and biscuits any way you try to land there. If they flew at 50ft over the threshold, they would have made a "high speed at runway end

How could 50' over the threshold lead to a high speed event?
The margin are very low.
Touch down slighly further than the 300m mark, or fail to fully and immediately apply the max manual braking and full reversers, the opposite end of the runway will come at you very quickly.

[Confusious]

The margin are very low.
Touch down slighly further than the 300m mark, or fail to fully and immediately apply the max manual braking and full reversers, the opposite end of the runway will come at you very quickly.

So, if your flying technique into Skiathos is to cross the threshold lower than 50', then what is your target height at the threshold and what height do you start the flare?

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

The margin are very low.
Touch down slighly further than the 300m mark, or fail to fully and immediately apply the max manual braking and full reversers, the opposite end of the runway will come at you very quickly.

Nope. You will stop comfortably with config full, auto brake medium and normal reverse in the A321. Just don't try to grease it.

Plenty of examples of how it should be done can be found here.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dpz1cBY1wW8

[172_driver]

Plenty of examples of how it should be done can be found here.

And none of them crosses the threshold at 50 ft. There was a beautiful one by Ryanair in pissing rain. Touchdown point similar to the Wizzair but they didn't drag themselves in like Wizz.

Saying that you should land the same way regardless of runway is too easy of an answer. If the runway is short, contaminated and the plane is heavy there is good reason to choose a visual aiming point short of the "normal" touchdown point. Whatever "normal" is, because the PAPI in Munich takes you to a different touchdown point than the PAPI at Skiathos.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

If the runway is short, contaminated and the plane is heavy there is good reason to choose a visual aiming point short of the "normal" touchdown point.

Can this sage advice be found in your OM-A? Does your training department advocate these techniques?

[FlightDetent]

Whatever "normal" is, because the PAPI in Munich takes you to a different touchdown point than the PAPI at Skiathos.There may be other threads on professional pilots forums (somewhere?), trying to explain why the aiming point for an AFM-compliant landing is independent of the PAPIs due to their varying location. Cue in the name: Approach Indicator.

Just saying. If only someone drew a meme for it, easier to remeber.



​​​

[172_driver]

Can this sage advice be found in your OM-A? Does your training department advocate these techniques?

Not found in the OM-A. Not sure landing technique is described at all in the OM-A but in more operational documents, such as FCTM.
The training department condones free thinking and risk mitigation. When then the situation so warrants, you are not confined to a narrow tunnel of operating practices.

There may be other threads on professional pilots forums (somewhere?), trying to explain why the aiming pint for an AFM-compliant landing is independent of the PAPIs due to their varying location. Cue in the name: Approach Indicator.

What I think you're getting at is reachig AFM landing data?
Where my opinion deviates from others' opinion seems to be only one way of landing and always cross the threshold at 50 ft. It may be in part semantics, as the landing maneuver will look similar in profile view regardless where the trajectory will take you (and where the RA starts to shout). The amining point markers at Skiathos is about 150 m from the threshold. Runways with a length above 2400 m (is it?) has the aiming point markers at 450 m past the threshold. The threshold crossing heights can't be the same, if your objective is to land at the aiming point. The performance in-flight calculations for Actual Landing Distance from 50 ft doesn't care about the runway length. By going for the makers at Skiathos, you've earned yourself a couple of hundred meters compared to the performance figures, but you haven't crossed the threshold at 50 ft.

The video above shows many good (and similar looking) landings at Skiathos with touch downs at or near the aiming point markers. What they all have in common is the threshold crossing is a lot lower than landings at longer (and maybe wider) runways.

[FlyingStone]

Saying that you should land the same way regardless of runway is too easy of an answer. If the runway is short, contaminated and the plane is heavy there is good reason to choose a visual aiming point short of the "normal" touchdown point.

I’m pretty sure your landing performance is calculated based on a normal technique, and not aiming for the piano keys. And if the (these days factored) numbers say you can make it, why apply a different technique and expose yourself (and your passengers) to additional risks?

[safetypee]

The discussion on PAPI, #142 onwards is intriguing; as is the continuing views of ‘normal’.

Adding to the PAPI issue, is the setting of the angular change between white and red, which adjusts the sensitivity of the aid; e.g. crossing the road 3R 1W - a ‘minor’ (unseen) transgression is a small height difference on a ‘tight’ setting, but a larger height difference on a ‘wide’ setting. Not forgetting that this relates to the height of the cockpit, and not the wheel height judged by video.



If aiming to land at the normal touchdown point is safe, then why advise to aim short of normal on a ‘wet’ runway, if it is ‘less safe’, (increase undershoot risk vs perceived increased risk in landing distance for a wet runway). ‘Wet’ is one view, ‘contaminated’ another, but not the same.
This is another SOP double bind; the procedure makers move responsibility down to the crew - no right answer, except by judged outcome.

Where does the perception that risk is increased on wet runways come from; the published landing distances show adequate margin.

[One view is that wet runways landing distances do not always have equivalent distance margins as for dry - a view which I subscribe to, debatable elsewhere - , but not requiring a change in aiming point.]

[Jonty]

What I would say is, have a look at where the touchdown aiming point markers are in the runway, then tell me how low you have to be to get those in the right place in the windscreen?

[172_driver]

Where does the perception that risk is increased on wet runways come from; the published landing distances show adequate margin.


A hidden risk of aquaplanning
Slippery when wet due to rubber deposits,
Dust gathered during dry days turn into a slippery cladding when rain comes along

Even disregarding those possibilities, if a runway is of fixed length and dry numbers give you a small margin, the wet numbers will give you even less margin. It's relevant when we speak of Skiathos.
If, say, 50 m margin is adequate is a subjective.

[fdr]

The discussion on PAPI, #142 onwards is intriguing; as is the continuing views of ‘normal’.

Adding to the PAPI issue, is the setting of the angular change between white and red, which adjusts the sensitivity of the aid; e.g. crossing the road 3R 1W - a ‘minor’ (unseen) transgression is a small height difference on a ‘tight’ setting, but a larger height difference on a ‘wide’ setting. Not forgetting that this relates to the height of the cockpit, and not the wheel height judged by video.



If aiming to land at the normal touchdown point is safe, then why advise to aim short of normal on a ‘wet’ runway, if it is ‘less safe’, (increase undershoot risk vs perceived increased risk in landing distance for a wet runway). ‘Wet’ is one view, ‘contaminated’ another, but not the same.
This is another SOP double bind; the procedure makers move responsibility down to the crew - no right answer, except by judged outcome.

Where does the perception that risk is increased on wet runways come from; the published landing distances show adequate margin.

[One view is that wet runways landing distances do not always have equivalent distance margins as for dry - a view which I subscribe to, debatable elsewhere - , but not requiring a change in aiming point.]

If the operation necessitates anything other than normal operations with more restrictive tolerances, then the public safety is being compromised by the workaround. We used to operate a baby B747 into an interesting airport, and there were very specific criteria for completing a touchdown, but the flight path, MEHT/TCH and Vapp were not altered, it was an exactly standard flight profile, but with very specific decision tolerances.

When a decision to alter the procedure due to a perception of a specific threat arises, then the answer is to revisit what it being attempted. It should not be up to the pilot to use an untrained, and unapproved technique in order to satisfy perceptions of risk, there be dragons in that direction, and the liability reverts to the crew, well, they are always the first at the accident site anyway.

[Confusious]

If it's acceptable for pilots to reduce the height over threshold, then would it also be acceptable for them to reduce Vref?

[FlyingStone]

May I suggest lowering minima as well, if the cloud base is too limiting? :}

[B888]

If the operation necessitates anything other than normal operations with more restrictive tolerances, then the public safety is being compromised by the workaround. We used to operate a baby B747 into an interesting airport, and there were very specific criteria for completing a touchdown, but the flight path, MEHT/TCH and Vapp were not altered, it was an exactly standard flight profile, but with very specific decision tolerances.

When a decision to alter the procedure due to a perception of a specific threat arises, then the answer is to revisit what it being attempted. It should not be up to the pilot to use an untrained, and unapproved technique in order to satisfy perceptions of risk, there be dragons in that direction, and the liability reverts to the crew, well, they are always the first at the accident site anyway.

An Excellent post by FDR ( as usual ). If there is a serious incident or accident, one of the first things the regulatory body asks the cockpit crew is “Were you trained for this”.
If not, why did you do it. Most of the times, “Normalization of Deviance “ sets in a particular operation ( if it’s challenging) and most crews do it even though not specifically trained for it.
If there’s FOQA , the crew should be called in and the operation revisited.
For landing on Wet /Contaminated Runways, SAFO 19003 ( FAA ) is important reading.

[Litebulbs]

The RyanAir takeoff with the GND PWR access panel door open at 9min in the video was another issue to....

[Confusious]

The RyanAir takeoff with the GND PWR access panel door open at 9min in the video was another issue to....
Crickey, good spot :ok:
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/926x566/screenshot_20220814_134640_chrome_b23dc7b89737184ec05c06acae ae293678837415.jpg

[safetypee]

Confusious, Vref
Fly the speed which was used to determine performance.
- - -

This is an acceptable airport for normal procedures, don't invent or address problems where there are none.

The point of interest is the relationship between touchdown markings, PAPI glide-slope origin, and the start of the runway hard surface, and an apparent difference in conventional definition - relationship between these and a ‘threshold’.

The safety issue is with the people on the road, and uncontrolled vehicles; … and any risk inappropriately generated by false perceptions based in videos.

Re SAFO 19003,

The FAA appears lag ICAO post TALPA; ‘for equivalent safety in older aircraft or when FOLD is not avaiable, the wet (factored dry 1.67 +15%) is now 2.2.’

ICAO Doc 10064 - Aeroplane Performance Manual Appendix 5
and
Appendix 7 ‘Landing on length limited runways’.
“Fly correct approach speed”
“Use correct aiming point”

[FlightDetent]

The amining point markers at Skiathos is about 150 m from the threshold. Runways with a length above 2400 m (is it?) has the aiming point markers at 450 m past the threshold. The threshold crossing heights can't be the same, if your objective is to land at the aiming point. The performance in-flight calculations for Actual Landing Distance from 50 ft doesn't care about the runway length. I still take it a reasonable debate need to establish the geometry first, and then start factoring the human factors on top of that.

The aiming point markers are the same thing. If the painted in the wrong place, an AFM-like landing cannot be flown towards them. On a 3°/50' standard AFM or ILS profile the RA 'over numbers' height is 30 feet. The LDA and LDR + FLD + OLD + RLD should be satisfied with their inherent margins as applicable using that technique which should be the same no matter the landing distance (fact to me, but respecting the reality that HF will phase shift that in reality).

Should you choose to aim for the 150 marker the resulting gear clearance is 8 16 feet which is not much room for error but as this runway has the threshold displaced by around another 60 mtrs the wheel clearance over the property edge is assured by 25', pretty close to the normal standard. [edit: but not really only 8, the flare will be most likely happening by then]

Other words: A pilot taking his 320 into a runway so short the aiming marker is unusable for his landing geometry should know not to use it. Was that covered in my short runway training - definitely not. If then, upon seeing the underrun and feeling comfortable (that has not bitten anyone ever, right), the instincts take over and he cuts it short into the first marker - then by all means that is how life works.

Similar but opposite direction, keping the ILS centered to about 100 feet RA and then flying the landing towards 400 mtrs aiming markers + PAPI at Palma / Manchester / Fumicino / Dubai is susceptible to building a habit of a 2 degree profile at 66 feet over threshold (RA 50).

Bring that style to JSI and there will be a massive 'does not compute' moment overloading the normal routines. The rest is videotaped above.

Saying short runways need to be landed short or the aim point markers (at varying distances) should be used to schedule the landing trajectory - sorry sir. I don't mind if you do and trust your skill to make it (repeatedly) but the standard of explainign to others or teaching need to be better than that.

Yet so far the key lesson was completely missed, save for one post.

Why the crew did not go around?! Not whether they should but why they did not. I think anyone here can learn a bit if we dissect that.

[Jonty]

I think they didn’t go around because “out of the window” it didn’t look that far out. Maybe they felt it “a little low”, but well with in the realms of there or there abouts. That’s what this airport does, and that’s why the vast majority of pilots cannot fly a 3 degree profile to touchdown. They will always be low.
On just about every approach I have flown, or I have seen flow (by pilots of much greater talent than me) 50ft call occurs over the sea, 30ft over the beach, 20ft over the threshold. I think this Wizz crew were maybe 10-15ft too low.
Also, only one of the pilots would have undergone any training for this place, and only one of the pilots would be authorised to operate in here. That would be the Captain. It may well have been the first time the FO had ever seen the place, or anything like it.

[FlightDetent]

In the first 2 pages or thereabouts, you did an excellent summary of the curved mirrors this approach environment has for the visitor. Not sure if listed already but elevation might be relevant too, it is 39 feet.

My thinking is as you come into the bay the nicely scalloping waterline in the peripheral gives you a reasonable perception of height - over the water. The runway is narrow which would reinforce the illusion of being (still) high, the sense of depth is just not there looking straight forward

And then the runway, hidden in plain sight until late, jumps up towards you. It is even higher than the road level. :\

[FlightDetent]

Re: AFM geometry A321


https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1283x817/21_fcom_321_pro_nor_sop_19a_f4dd024b2878a89944b17b9a667a311e 575fbaab.jpg

[FlightDetent]

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1041x316/jsi_01_57946f4bf6ee501ca68d6c30bc7f84039ac47115.jpg
Another observation:

The 330 mtrs aiming point as marked with the blue line would result in MLG touch at 400-450 m distance as per AFM, leaving 1120 m of braking pavement ahead.


Touchdown geometry (not on the FCOM graphics above - numbers for A320):

No-flare brings the MLG to ground 130 m ("B") short of the aiming point point whereas 'typical' landing touches about 100 m past the aiming point (430m let's say). A cropped half-flare of 130 meters instead of optimal 230 will land the plane exactly at the aiming point.


Going for the MARKERS with such short flare, which seems to be the most frequent result from the good videos, yields an additional 280 m for braking =>> 1400 v.s. 1120. A marked difference, also giving you the chance utilize the uphill slope.

What about the wheel clearance? (significantly corrected from own post above).

Aiming at markers (150 m) gives around 8 feet.
Threshold is displaced by 60 m providing additional 10.
Ground loop for turning has another 50 mtrs for +8 more.
= 27 ft compared to theoretical 31, not bad.

If the pilot eye ignores the painted lines, crossing the pavement edge while aiming at the makrers (+ invisible PAPI) is not critical and will feel somewhat normal. From a 3 deg profile, that is. Of course, the big squares are 260 m from the grass.

[Jonty]

So just to clarify, are you saying if a pilot aims for the touchdown markers (as trained) the aircraft wheels will cross the road at about 27ft?

[FlightDetent]

I was never trained where to aim for, just assumed and went for the big squares and PAPIs (400 mtrs at 98 % of my airports of first 8 years).

Hope nobody teaches using the aiming piont markers located at 150 as that will result in 8 feet wheel clearance. (no-flare geometry)

If you or I end up doing exactly that (at absence of active understandig what the location and meaning of the markers is), here at JSI the wheel pass approx 27 feet over the edge of the paved surface (turning loop). Which actually covers for the compromised aiming point by the virtue of airport design.

The road itself is little further away and has lower elevation, please check.

[Boeingdriver999]

I think the attitude from certain training departments that all landings should be the same and all runways should be treated the same is a) choosing to be naive to the point of negligence and b) completely and utterly ignores the human factor of the pilot looking out the window and actually experiencing these runways on a daily basis. It brings to mind SOPs that are routinely ignored or worked around by crew but yet the management choose to remain blind to the reality of the situation and ignore the clearly poorly designed/implemented SOP.

If you tell me that landing lightweight, with a ten knot headwind, CAVOK, 3,000+ runway, ops normal should be precisely the same as landing up to MLW, contaminated, possibly tailwind, high autobrake required in-flight calculations then you are either telling porky pies or are genuinely that low-skilled as to not be able to discern/operate as required by the situation.

[Capn Bloggs]

I think the attitude from certain training departments that all landings should be the same and all runways should be treated the same is a) choosing to be naive to the point of negligence and b) completely and utterly ignores the human factor of the pilot looking out the window and actually experiencing these runways on a daily basis.
Rubbish. You train the way you fight. If you are bending the norms to achieve a commercial outcome, you (or someone who isn't as clever as you who tries to mimic you) are going come unstuck eventually. Bending the rules, taking shortcuts, pushing the boundaries is why prangs occur. The lowering of basic piloting skills makes an incident even more probable.

[FlightDetent]

Questions, questions...

How much lower than 28 feet (standard) over the red lights do you want to go for a tailwind landing with a 330?

What is the point of deliberately choosing a landing deeper that the normal distance on any day, protecting the tarmac behind you? 3000 meters rwy most likely have a turnoff to take at 1700 meters, don't they.

The training departments by some lucky chance might just know what they are talking about.

And this is why automation will make us all jobless. Because it is configurable and can be improved. Humans as a group cannot. Freshly reliving other people's bad days since 200000 B.c.e.

Imagine, in 2022, professionals screaming out loud they need to fly shorter than expected as a failsafe means of avoiding an undesired state, and how they enjoy flying the plane for extra 15 seconds because this runway is too long anyway.

Here is a thought:

Why did the FAA chose not to follow the ICAO guidance but instead keep aiming markers at 1000' for even the longest runways? (at the same time they do set the PAPIs at 1500' to allow proper visual guidance for the largest incoming craft and protect threshold crossing clearance).

Thought 2:

Because the painting standard for JSI runway length requires the aim point markers at the first position (150 mtrs), to assure CAT near obstacle clearance (8 ft not enough) is actually the reason why the threshold needed to be displaced deeper down the pavement.?

Flare technique differs, no contesting that. The aiming point the pilot choses should not.

Most people probably don't even chose one. Rest assured by the outcome statistics, everyone seems to be doing a good job - again - we may think about it differently but end up doing the same thing.

On the other hand, the language of training needs to be clear and correct. So when we have a bad day the job is still done acceptably.

[G-AZUK]

TUI have had bad days at JSI too though.

3 point turn in a 757

[FullWings]

I think the attitude from certain training departments that all landings should be the same and all runways should be treated the same is a) choosing to be naive to the point of negligence and b) completely and utterly ignores the human factor of the pilot looking out the window and actually experiencing these runways on a daily basis. It brings to mind SOPs that are routinely ignored or worked around by crew but yet the management choose to remain blind to the reality of the situation and ignore the clearly poorly designed/implemented SOP.

If you tell me that landing lightweight, with a ten knot headwind, CAVOK, 3,000+ runway, ops normal should be precisely the same as landing up to MLW, contaminated, possibly tailwind, high autobrake required in-flight calculations then you are either telling porky pies or are genuinely that low-skilled as to not be able to discern/operate as required by the situation.
It may be the training department but it’s also the manufacturer and the regulator. Doing non-standard stuff invalidates performance calculations and sets you up for failure in limiting conditions. There are plenty of examples of aircraft going off the end of 3,000m+ runways through a combination of factors, including a lack of concern because “it's a long runway”.

Using standard technique and being totally open about rejecting the landing should it not work out is the way to proceed. The videos showing the majority of flights into JSI crossing the road at a reasonable height, doing a “standard landing” and rollout with room to spare shows this.

Part of being a professional pilot is to have the ability to get creative when needed but also to follow SOPs when they have been demonstrated to work.

[Confusious]

It may be the training department but it’s also the manufacturer and the regulator. Doing non-standard stuff invalidates performance calculations and sets you up for failure in limiting conditions. There are plenty of examples of aircraft going off the end of 3,000m+ runways through a combination of factors, including a lack of concern because “it's a long runway”.

Using standard technique and being totally open about rejecting the landing should it not work out is the way to proceed. The videos showing the majority of flights into JSI crossing the road at a reasonable height, doing a “standard landing” and rollout with room to spare shows this.

Part of being a professional pilot is to have the ability to get creative when needed but also to follow SOPs when they have been demonstrated to work.

Wise words.

[Nightstop]

Watching videos such as that just makes me feel extremely angry. I’ve spent 45 years flying into challenging destinations and never felt the need to modify the flight profile to mitigate a perceived risk that doesn’t exist. A weak FOQA department and regulator condones behaviour such as this. I deeply regret bringing this airline to the attention of a close relative who recently flew as passenger with them, never again.

[Oilhead]

To me that is arguably reckless endangerment by an unprofessionally minded pair of pilots. The fact that thrill seekers are allowed to stand on the extended centerline is not wise either. Someone will get their head knocked off at some point.

[Capn Bloggs]

TUI have had bad days at JSI too though.
Bad? Stupid more like it. Locking up the wheels just to turn off at the taxiway.

[fdr]

Bad? Stupid more like it. Locking up the wheels just to turn off at the taxiway.
sure looked like that. Not sure manglement would be too pleased about the ad-hoc 3 point turn. Presumably this is a technique that Tooheys practices in the simulator, as of course no driver is just going to have a rush of blood to the head and go and do summit novel.

" ... 'ere, 'old me pint, watch this.... "

[Capn Bloggs]

" ... 'ere, 'old me pint, watch this.... "
That's it. :ok::ok:

[Klimax]

First of all it wasn't a tripple 7, so a pointless comment. Secondly nothing particularly out of the ordinary for this airport (check out the hundreds of videos). Thirdly wrong forum for this sensationalist stuff!

Remind me again how the dispatch and actual landing performance is calculated? Are you a commercial pilot, operating jets, and you´re not aware of this? Thank you.

[Less Hair]

Today any stunts will be filmed, shared and end up in the wrong places coming back to bite. And one day they will go badly wrong. Stick to procedures please.

[Confusious]

Appalling misinformed journalism.

"This means pilots are required to approach the airport at a much lower altitude than normal, in order to maximise the space they have."

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.thenationalnews.com/travel/airlines/2022/08/16/video-captures-dramatic-wizz-air-landing-at-skiathos-airport/%3foutputType=amp

[172_driver]

Appalling misinformed journalism.

"This means pilots are required to approach the airport at a much lower altitude than normal, in order to maximise the space they have."

I don't think I am going to change your mind. Did you watch any part of the Youtube video above showing a series of landings at JSI? Did you see any of them pass the threshold at 50 ft / touch down 300-500 meters down the runway? With the aiming point markers painted 150 m from the threshold where exactly are you aiming if you intend to land it like at Heathrow?

You don't have to be as low as Wizzair, but it's certainly not "appaling misinformation". It's somewhat near the truth.

[Confusious]

No, you won't change my mind and I have watched all the videos including examples of those doing it correctly.

Don't think that I'll change your mind either, so happy and safe flying to you!

[172_driver]

Don't think that I'll change your mind either, so happy and safe flying to you!

Ditto :ok:

[simmple]

Is there anything in the manuals that mandate a visual threshold crossing height?
Genuine question as I don’t remember seeing anything for visual approaches in ours.
It was only mentioned for CAT 2, 3 autolands which were prohibited if TCH was below 35’ if I remember correctly.
Not condoning, excusing or even saying it was smart in this case!

[safetypee]

simmple, a very good question; interesting.

I do not have an answer, but 35 ft was allowed for steep approaches.
In part, this, like conventional approaches with 50 ft TCH, was the reference for landing performance.

I recall that there are airfield constraints such as obstacle clearance surface, 1:40 ? (I cannot recall).
Also that this slope was cut off before the runway, but not sure of the ref point for the slope.

[FlightDetent]

No answer if and where it is written. Probably all agree that 8' is not a good number to aim for - that would be the front edge of the 150 m marker.

But 35 rings a bell, right, screen height is common knowledge. As a careful and safe compromise between economy and exposure to risk, under wet or contaminated conditions, 15 feet is the regulatory minimum.

I like that. One should never aim for closer than what gives 15 feet wheel clearance at threshold. That margin shall be sacred in the aiming phase.

Skilled ones who trust the performance might still aim for 330 mtrs and shorten the flare to land there.
​
Those who touch at 500 mtrs casually better adopt the short aim technique.

95 % of us in reality struggle somewhere in between, despite the different perceptions of own heroism.
​​​​​​

[simmple]

I also think the 35’ was an aircraft limitation.
Seem to recall it was a gotcha in the sim. You would be somewhere to do a cat3 auto land, 3 degree ils all legal on the plate wx wise etc. Land happy ready for medals in the debrief and then shown the TCH and pointed to the limitations in the manual.
If on a normal Ils, manual landing all was fine
But hey that’s from my memory​​​​​​!

[tubby linton]

I also think the 35’ was an aircraft limitation.
Seem to recall it was a gotcha in the sim. You would be somewhere to do a cat3 auto land, 3 degree ils all legal on the plate wx wise etc. Land happy ready for medals in the debrief and then shown the TCH and pointed to the limitations in the manual.
If on a normal Ils, manual landing all was fine
But hey that’s from my memory​​​​​​!
From memory the limit was 2.5-3.15 degrees glideslope angle for an autoland.

[fdr]

I also think the 35’ was an aircraft limitation.
Seem to recall it was a gotcha in the sim. You would be somewhere to do a cat3 auto land, 3 degree ils all legal on the plate wx wise etc. Land happy ready for medals in the debrief and then shown the TCH and pointed to the limitations in the manual.
If on a normal Ils, manual landing all was fine
But hey that’s from my memory​​​​​​!§ 25.125 Landing. (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.125)(a) The horizontal distance necessary to land and to come to a complete stop ... from a point 50 feet above the landing surface must be determined (for standard temperatures, at each weight, altitude, and wind within the operational limits established by the applicant for the airplane):

(1) In non-icing conditions; and

(2) In icing conditions with the most critical of the landing ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of this part, as applicable, in accordance with § 25.21(g) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.21#p-25.21(g)), if VREF for icing conditions exceeds VREF for non-icing conditions by more than 5 knots CAS at the maximum landing weight.

(b) In determining the distance in paragraph (a) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.125#p-25.125(a)) of this section:

(1) The airplane must be in the landing configuration.

(2) A stabilized approach, with a calibrated airspeed of not less than VREF, must be maintained down to the 50-foot height.

(i) In non-icing conditions, VREF may not be less than:

(A) 1.23 VSR0;

(B) VMCL established under § 25.149(f) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.149#p-25.149(f)); and

(C) A speed that provides the maneuvering capability specified in § 25.143(h) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.143#p-25.143(h)).

(ii) In icing conditions, VREF may not be less than:

(A) The speed determined in paragraph (b)(2)(i) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.125#p-25.125(b)(2)(i)) of this section;

(B) 1.23 VSR0 with the most critical of the landing ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of this part, as applicable, in accordance with § 25.21(g) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.21#p-25.21(g)), if that speed exceeds VREF selected for non-icing conditions by more than 5 knots CAS; and

(C) A speed that provides the maneuvering capability specified in § 25.143(h) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.143#p-25.143(h)) with the most critical of the landing ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of this part, as applicable, in accordance with § 25.21(g) (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/section-25.21#p-25.21(g)).

(3) Changes in configuration, power or thrust, and speed, must be made in accordance with the established procedures for service operation.

(4) The landing must be made without excessive vertical acceleration, tendency to bounce, nose over, ground loop, porpoise, or water loop.

(5) The landings may not require exceptional piloting skill or alertness.

(c) For landplanes ... the landing distance on land must be determined on a level, smooth, dry, hard-surfaced runway. In addition -

(1) The pressures on the wheel braking systems may not exceed those specified by the brake manufacturer;

(2) The brakes may not be used so as to cause excessive wear of brakes or tires; and

(3) Means other than wheel brakes may be used if that means -

(i) Is safe and reliable;

(ii) Is used so that consistent results can be expected in service; and

(iii) Is such that exceptional skill is not required to control the airplane.



OIS: From the threshold....

Approach end of runways expected to serve large airplanes (Visual day/night); or instrument minimums 1 statute mile (day only). appr 20:1


MEHT vs TCH vs WCH have lots of room for variation. B747.... 72' MEHT gives 48' TCH and WCH of around 28'. Variation dependent on attitude = Vref additives, configuration etc.

airbus (https://www.airbus.com/sites/g/files/jlcbta136/files/2021-12/Airbus-Aircraft-Data-for-Visual-Aids-Calibration.pdf)

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1106x1416/screen_shot_2022_08_19_at_12_39_24_pm_f77be30b3981b3f0e1691b bbf00b6ae70849e68c.png
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/998x1402/screen_shot_2022_08_19_at_12_39_43_pm_00af053ec31c06276422f3 a0cfb9d128562e4e44.png
https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1038x1208/screen_shot_2022_08_19_at_12_35_31_pm_233bec2681cc89e845a1f7 7c4f01f8c939d2eaaf.png

[172_driver]

Interesting, never thought about it that way. Which part of the aircraft are they refering to when calculating landing distance from 50 ft?

[FlightDetent]

Airbus use the GP antenna, subtly noted with the ILS reference above.

[safetypee]

172, performance relates to distance from the threshold.
The height, normally rad alt - wheels, relates to the flare segment of the published distance; TCH - touchdown.
Although different altitudes could change the actual distance achieved, this will not change the published performance.

Re this thread; arguably a low flat approach could extend the flare distance, but the discussion in this case is the height over the road.
Based on the videos most landings appear to be around the visual aiming point, and relative to that, not that many ‘short’. However, these short landings may be being judged with respect to other runway threshold positions, particularly if the alternative runway markings and PAPI positioning are not considered.

The height over the road relates to safety; thus the aircraft position relative to the PAPI (eyeball, flt-deck height over road) might be the only comparison - which we (don't) have. Thus on this runway the approach might not appear unusual to the crew, even with some variability below the PAPI path.

[paperHanger]

Meh, it was only dickheads and spotters. Had he clipped a few, nothing of value would have been lost.

The issue is not the planes height over the threshold, it is allowing the great unwashed to stand around in the approach area.

[simmple]

fdr

Yes that’s all fine but only relates to expected performance and the legalities of dispatch etc.
Nowhere does it say thou shall not be 8ft over the threshold or 80ft when flying manually and visual, well it didn’t when I were a lad.
New thou shall nots were published regularly so maybe now it is written.
At one point it was in the manuals that we could land deep at xxx airports as long as we were down by x intersection due to length of rwy and taxi distance!
OK not a 747, equally not a small turboprop.
That did change eventually and it was just mandated touchdown zone, nothing really about how you got to it.

[DaveReidUK]

Meh, it was only dickheads and spotters. Had he clipped a few, nothing of value would have been lost.

With extra points for collecting a bit of that armco and the razor wire, presumably ?

[WillowRun 6-3]

Just fascinating how a pairing of some of the most potent symbols of the popularity and/or value of civil aviation - namely, a beach, a tourist destination, and a summertime flight arrival - has provoked such serious and detailed discussion of actual flying stuff by actual pilots, on a forum for ..... well, not for SLF-attorneys in this instance.

[Airbus_a321]

Skiathos is not an easy airport. 02 is short, narrow, uphill, with a cliff at the far end down to the beach. Having flown in there myself, and seen many others, the approach and landing in the video is fairly standard.
can‘t agree more.

[Confusious]

can‘t agree more.
Quick question: If it's normal, then why has the video gone crazy viral around the media?

[fdr]

fdr

Yes that’s all fine but only relates to expected performance and the legalities of dispatch etc.
Nowhere does it say thou shall not be 8ft over the threshold or 80ft when flying manually and visual, well it didn’t when I were a lad.
New thou shall nots were published regularly so maybe now it is written.
At one point it was in the manuals that we could land deep at xxx airports as long as we were down by x intersection due to length of rwy and taxi distance!
OK not a 747, equally not a small turboprop.
That did change eventually and it was just mandated touchdown zone, nothing really about how you got to it.

Which reminds me of one great HOT that asked one young pilot who was talking about his "techniques",

"please enlighten us, young man, what other training and policy do you deliberately disregard?"

The training trains per the FCTM or OM-B etc, anything other than that is a deviation, and may be wonderful or career limiting dependent on the circumstances. As one who used to look at the data and determine if a crew had acted deliberately or not, I would suggest that most operations want you to target what you are trained to, otherwise it makes people doing what I used to do spill our coffee laughing at what the crew considered as being reasonable on the day.

Even in test flying, the intent is to do what you have briefed and trained to do. I guess you can brief the guy beside you that you intend to cross the fence at head height as you think that is the best thing for safety. You would get a couple of points for CRM, the guy beside you may get some for saying no.

The problem with ad-hoc FPA and TCH is that you do one thing always, and then on one flight where it is apparently critical to achieve the performance that you always have, you deliberately alter the aiming point which potentially ends up with a destabilised condition into the flare.

Yes, in the military we were trained to touch down on the numbers, and there was landing gear left behind on occasions. The punters are paying for an unexciting arrival, if they want excitement then they should go to 6-flags, or go fly Spirit... :}

You are a grown up, whatever you consider to be correct and to be justifiable to your management and to the jury should suffice. Deliberately deviating as it was considered to be a great idea that is not as trained would be written up by persons like me as being a deliberate deviation. If you do that, be very good, and don't F*@# it up.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

Meh, it was only dickheads and spotters. Had he clipped a few, nothing of value would have been lost.

The issue is not the planes height over the threshold, it is allowing the great unwashed to stand around in the approach area.

Had somebody lost their life as a result of this stunt, your Wizz heroes would probably be sat in a Greek jail facing charges of one sort or another. I also wouldn't rule out passengers onboard that aircraft seeking compensation for their lives being put in danger. I would be furious if I had been sat in the back of that. Don't trivialise this.

[Airbanda]

Had somebody lost their life as a result of this stunt, your Wizz heroes would probably be sat in a Greek jail facing charges of one sort or another. I also wouldn't rule out passengers onboard that aircraft seeking compensation for their lives being put in danger. I would be furious if I had been sat in the back of that. Don't trivialise this.

There is a clear risk that for whatever reason an aircraft may be low over the fence.

Consequence is obvious. Probability, given there are at least two vids in the public domain of very low approaches (this and CFE) is significant.

Mitigation is diversion of the road and/or level crossing type controls together with restrictions on loitering in the undershoot area.

[Confusious]

There is a clear risk that for whatever reason an aircraft may be low over the fence.

Consequence is obvious. Probability, given there are at least two vids in the public domain of very low approaches (this and CFE) is significant.

Mitigation is diversion of the road and/or level crossing type controls together with restrictions on loitering in the undershoot area.
Yes, mitigate the risk by controlling the area for the spotters and do the same for hundreds of airports.

But should main the focus of this thread be mitigation of the risk to the other members of the public, the passengers?

[FlightDetent]

Main learning point is to understand why they did not go around. And transform that into better self-awareness so when the time arrives and we'd be facing (literally) a confusing picture at the edge of spare mental capacity, that alone would be a pre-trained trigger.

For the moment we have people arguing that aiming at a 150 m marker is a good plan. Well, it's a start.

Despite the threshold being displaced so that the largest going aircraft aiming for the 150 marker would have a reasonable clearance at the pavement edge. That one is just not painted in correct aiming spot for this size of airplane.

Moving forward. Could we have a show of hands who agrees the f/o was pretty much tool-less to call a G/A for margins reduced too thin? Apart for imminent contact, I don't think he did have any. Unless specifically briefed and explained which did not happen judging by the outcome.

The landing's messed but not too badly. It's the low arrival before they salvaged it (around 300 mtrs to shore) which is the bigger debriefing point.

[Confusious]

Sorry, not a yes or no answer.
Should have called Go-Around earlier.

[3db]

I was told by a BA Cpt in the 1970's a low approach was required at Skiathos. A note on the approach plate stated you had to check the harbour had the correct lights showing it was closed before landing. Harbourmaster was also ATC - he could not be in 2 places at the same time.

[safetypee]

FD, Conf, “… why they did not go around” … “earlier”.

IMHO we will never know, nor might the crew, especially if their viewpoint, their mental understanding of the approach appeared ‘good enough’. Also, if this understanding, thoughts and action were based on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to explain, generally acquired through demonstration and practice - experience.

The landing flare; how - when, do we judge and learn from ‘not such a good one’. More often after the event ‘I didn't expect that’; yes opportunity to learn for the individual, less so for others

There are many HF - cognitive theories as to why crews press-on, plan continuation bias, cognitive overload which are difficult to change.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.

What did the crew see, comprehend, decide;- unknown.
However, their view appeared to satisfy their plan. The view was probably looking ahead to the landing aiming point, and assessing the aircraft trajectory with respect to that, not over the road
Is that how we do it, can we describe how we do it, or how we might assess the boundary of acceptable deviation. Experience, not from an external video. Context, our viewpoint sets the scene.

And for clarification, what is the height of the road with respect to the threshold, or with respect to the touchdown markers (up-sloping runway), and how might these affect the visual-mental picture with respect to a ‘normal’ landing, except that nothing is ever normal.

[Confusious]

FD, Conf, “… why they did not go around” … “earlier”.

IMHO we will never know, nor might the crew, especially if their viewpoint, their mental understanding of the approach appeared ‘good enough’. Also, if this understanding, thoughts and action were based on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to explain, generally acquired through demonstration and practice - experience.

The landing flare; how - when, do we judge and learn from ‘not such a good one’. More often after the event ‘I didn't expect that’; yes opportunity to learn for the individual, less so for others

There are many HF - cognitive theories as to why crews press-on, plan continuation bias, cognitive overload which are difficult to change.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.

What did the crew see, comprehend, decide;- unknown.
However, their view appeared to satisfy their plan. The view was probably looking ahead to the landing aiming point, and assessing the aircraft trajectory with respect to that, not over the road
Is that how we do it, can we describe how we do it, or how we might assess the boundary of acceptable deviation. Experience, not from an external video. Context, our viewpoint sets the scene.

And for clarification, what is the height of the road with respect to the threshold, or with respect to the touchdown markers (up-sloping runway), and how might these affect the visual-mental picture with respect to a ‘normal’ landing, except that nothing is ever normal.
Safetypee, a lot of what you say makes sense, but this I vehemently disagree with:
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.

In the main, blame or train left the industry years ago. All pilots are aware (or should be) of the criteria for a stable approach and what actions MUST be carried out if the criteria is not met. So not going around is inexcusable which is wholly different to casting blame. So the HF influence in this event is a direct willingness to press on and land regardless of how they were trained and what is clearly set out in their procedures.

[Jonty]

So the HF influence in this event is a direct willingness to press on and land regardless of how they were trained and what is clearly set out in their procedures.

Sorry, am going to take issue with this one.

You have no idea how they were trained or what’s set out in their procedures.

I will shed a little light on the subject.

They were very probably (although I can’t be 100% sure) sent into the sim to train for a narrow runway.

To start that sim would be an A320, not the A321 they were flying. Then the sim would be VERY unlikely to have dedicated Skiathos visuals. It would have been a generic airport, just with a 30m wide runway. They may not even have trained on one so short.

Then if they were very lucky, the captain may have sat on the jump seat to Skiathos before operating in there. If he/she did jumpseat, they would have seen a training captain do pretty much what they did. Why? Because that’s what happens in Skiathos. Maybe the trainer might have been 15-20 ft higher, but that’s about it.

If we go right back to basics at this place, the touch down markings (the bit you actually aim for) are 150m from the threshold. The PAPIs are at the same position. As FD has already pointed out, if you aim for these points (as you have been trained) your wheels over the threshold are 8ft. Probably about 30 over the road.

So their “willingness to press on” is because that’s how they were trained. It’s how we have ALL been trained. And it’s why EVERY approach into Skiathos looks like a minor variation of this one.

What I will end with (and it’s my last post on the matter, because I’m obviously not some Sky God, just an ordinary line guy) is if you think you could do better fill your boots. I feel for these Wizz guys, everything is stacked against them. And then some Cuck Yeager wanna be’s come on here and tell them how badly they have flown.

[Flying Clog]

Nice try Jonty.

It was showboating. Simples.

And no one is surprised with the operator in question.

[excrab]

Sorry, am going to take issue with this one.

You have no idea how they were trained or what’s set out in their procedures.

I will shed a little light on the subject.

They were very probably (although I can’t be 100% sure) sent into the sim to train for a narrow runway.

To start that sim would be an A320, not the A321 they were flying. Then the sim would be VERY unlikely to have dedicated Skiathos visuals. It would have been a generic airport, just with a 30m wide runway. They may not even have trained on one so short.

Then if they were very lucky, the captain may have sat on the jump seat to Skiathos before operating in there. If he/she did jumpseat, they would have seen a training captain do pretty much what they did. Why? Because that’s what happens in Skiathos. Maybe the trainer might have been 15-20 ft higher, but that’s about it.

If we go right back to basics at this place, the touch down markings (the bit you actually aim for) are 150m from the threshold. The PAPIs are at the same position. As FD has already pointed out, if you aim for these points (as you have been trained) your wheels over the threshold are 8ft. Probably about 30 over the road.

So their “willingness to press on” is because that’s how they were trained. It’s how we have ALL been trained. And it’s why EVERY approach into Skiathos looks like a minor variation of this one.

What I will end with (and it’s my last post on the matter, because I’m obviously not some Sky God, just an ordinary line guy) is if you think you could do better fill your boots. I feel for these Wizz guys, everything is stacked against them. And then some Cuck Yeager wanna be’s come on here and tell them how badly they have flown.

Maybe the “Chuck Yeager wannabes” have been trained properly, by airlines which use fully modelled simulators for JSI and then send Captains there with a training Captain in the right hand seat before the trainees operate there on their own. So if other airlines can do that, why, according to Jonty, is Whizz air’s training so poor ?

[Wickerbill]

I agree with Jonty, JSI is a special place. Short, narrow runway with a hump, sat on made up ground between two islands. It's not the place where you do an hour in a Sim and off you go. All approaches are are low and "exciting".

It would be useful if anyone commenting on this thread started their post by stating if they had trained for or operated an aircraft into JSI. These people I will happily listen to. The rest should stop criticising something they don't fully understand....

'bill

[Confusious]

Sorry, am going to take issue with this one.

You have no idea how they were trained or what’s set out in their procedures.

I will shed a little light on the subject.

They were very probably (although I can’t be 100% sure) sent into the sim to train for a narrow runway.

To start that sim would be an A320, not the A321 they were flying. Then the sim would be VERY unlikely to have dedicated Skiathos visuals. It would have been a generic airport, just with a 30m wide runway. They may not even have trained on one so short.

Then if they were very lucky, the captain may have sat on the jump seat to Skiathos before operating in there. If he/she did jumpseat, they would have seen a training captain do pretty much what they did. Why? Because that’s what happens in Skiathos. Maybe the trainer might have been 15-20 ft higher, but that’s about it.

If we go right back to basics at this place, the touch down markings (the bit you actually aim for) are 150m from the threshold. The PAPIs are at the same position. As FD has already pointed out, if you aim for these points (as you have been trained) your wheels over the threshold are 8ft. Probably about 30 over the road.

So their “willingness to press on” is because that’s how they were trained. It’s how we have ALL been trained. And it’s why EVERY approach into Skiathos looks like a minor variation of this one.

What I will end with (and it’s my last post on the matter, because I’m obviously not some Sky God, just an ordinary line guy) is if you think you could do better fill your boots. I feel for these Wizz guys, everything is stacked against them. And then some Cuck Yeager wanna be’s come on here and tell them how badly they have flown.

This is exceptionally low, and it shouldn't need special training to identify the risk.

Ask yourself; Do all Wizz flights replicate this? As you say, their trainers probably don't and would be 15 to 20 feet higher.
"Maybe the trainer might have been 15-20 ft higher, but that’s about it."

Take issue as you wish, but for whatever reason this flight did not follow the profile and should have been aborted with a go around. Getting it wrong is one thing, not putting it right is far worse.

Your insult in the final sentence I will ignore and not respond to.

[Confusious]

I agree with Jonty, JSI is a special place. Short, narrow runway with a hump, sat on made up ground between two islands. It's not the place where you do an hour in a Sim and off you go. All approaches are are low and "exciting".

It would be useful if anyone commenting on this thread started their post by stating if they had trained for or operated an aircraft into JSI. These people I will happily listen to. The rest should stop criticising something they don't fully understand....

'bill

You deserve an answer Bill as your question is directed at the likes of me, with whom you do not agree.

I have not flown into JSI.

What I have done though is flown into numerous challenging airfields for many years. Narrow, short, steep approach, very mountainous etc.. Hopefully you will consider me worthy of at the very least, an opinion?

[ItsonlyMeagain]

Firstly to be clear. Yes, I have operated into JSI on multiple occasions, on both runways, in the LHS and the RHS as a trainer.

Early on in the thread I tried to stop speculation from those who have never been there or those who have no knowledge of commercial operations, by stating the facts about its dimensions and markers on the airfield. Strangely, it has disappeared…. Probably because it was correct.

I was well trained to operate there and I trained others well. Yes this aircraft was low, but not far from the norm here. For those outraged by the lack of a go around, please suggest how putting operating criteria for airfields such as LHR onto a CatC specialised airfield would allow you to land at all? Aircraft have been going safely there for years, operated and trained well, by pilots known for their ability.

Not been yourself? The answer to one Captain who asked a trainer, known for his direct answers. “Either nobody likes you or you are crap.”

Me

[Confusious]

Firstly to be clear. Yes, I have operated into JSI on multiple occasions, on both runways, in the LHS and the RHS as a trainer.

Early on in the thread I tried to stop speculation from those who have never been there or those who have no knowledge of commercial operations, by stating the facts about its dimensions and markers on the airfield. Strangely, it has disappeared…. Probably because it was correct.

I was well trained to operate there and I trained others well. Yes this aircraft was low, but not far from the norm here. For those outraged by the lack of a go around, please suggest how putting operating criteria for airfields such as LHR onto a CatC specialised airfield would allow you to land at all? Aircraft have been going safely there for years, operated and trained well, by pilots known for their ability.

Not been yourself? The answer to one Captain who asked a trainer, known for his direct answers. “Either nobody likes you or you are crap.”

Me

"Yes this aircraft was low, but not far from the norm here."

By your own admission as an experienced trainer, this is not the norm, albeit as you say it's 'not far from' whatever that means. As a trainer you should advocate the norm.

JSI is not the only airfield in the world with challenges and pilots who have not flown there are entitled to their opinions.

Top class CRM here sir/madam trainer:
Not been yourself? The answer to one Captain who asked a trainer, known for his direct answers. “Either nobody likes you or you are crap.”

[Saab Dastard]

Early on in the thread I tried to stop speculation from those who have never been there or those who have no knowledge of commercial operations, by stating the facts about its dimensions and markers on the airfield. Strangely, it has disappeared…. Probably because it was correct.
You have only made one other post in this thread, post 112, which is still visible. Lack of basic fact-checking before making disparaging comments somewhat detracts from your credibility.

[excrab]

I agree with Jonty, JSI is a special place. Short, narrow runway with a hump, sat on made up ground between two islands. It's not the place where you do an hour in a Sim and off you go. All approaches are are low and "exciting".

It would be useful if anyone commenting on this thread started their post by stating if they had trained for or operated an aircraft into JSI. These people I will happily listen to. The rest should stop criticising something they don't fully understand....

'bill

So, ‘bill, have you been trained for and operated an airliner into JSI? I’m prepared to accept your “challenge”. I was trained to fly into Skiathos in a fully modelled simulator and went there with a training captain before operating there on my own. As I said in a previous post I’ve been going there since 2010, and in the summer season it appears on my roster, on average, twice a month.

None of those approaches are either “low” or “exciting”. Sometimes if the weather is marginal it can be a bit challenging but for a competent pilot the main challenges are performance planning, not being able to fly a tidy three degree approach path to a sloping runway without almost knocking the heads of the spectators.

[safetypee]

Confusious, #216, re differing views I will concede the word blame, too emotional, but not ‘training’ as being a general response to accidents or safety events.

A Safety-I mindset is prevalent in accident / incident investigation and thence regulatory intervention, and as a generalisation, in operators, knowingly or otherwise.

Your comments of ‘direct willingness’ ‘press on regardless’, assumes knowledge of the crew’s understanding at the time. This assumption reflects the human dislike for uncertainty, that we don't like not knowing.

Training ‘Additional training is one (easy) response, providing a false sense of knowing, a false belief of being able to control future activity, held by those who have higher responsibilities, but of little help to crews.

[Confusious]

Safetypee
"Training is one (easy) response, providing a false sense of knowing, a false belief of being able to control future activity, held by those who have higher responsibilities, but of little help to crews."
And viewed by some as an unnecessary evil.

So, do you think that this was a 'safety event'?

[safetypee]

do you think that this was a 'safety event'?

I cannot tell.

Attempting to analyse this landing based on a narrow perspective of one video without supporting information would have little value (excepting Pprune discussion), and at worst with poor assessment result in unnecessary, even detrimental intervention.

Considering the idea of a ‘safety event’ (after the fact) in ‘very-safe’ operations might also create more problems. How is an event defined, bounded, what limits, when, etc, … by who.
With increasing safety - statistically, then the risk in an event might be less than the risk discovered (imagined) by investigation - the ‘investigators’ are the higher risk - cf the discussion in this thread.

Then what is Safety ?
Something which is done, a continuous activity; or something to have, a limiting standard.
My preference is activity, self evaluation; thus all of my flying, approach and landings, were safety events, but with what risk, and who knows.

[Wickerbill]

So, ‘bill, have you been trained for and operated an airliner into JSI? I’m prepared to accept your “challenge”. I was trained to fly into Skiathos in a fully modelled simulator and went there with a training captain before operating there on my own. As I said in a previous post I’ve been going there since 2010, and in the summer season it appears on my roster, on average, twice a month.

None of those approaches are either “low” or “exciting”. Sometimes if the weather is marginal it can be a bit challenging but for a competent pilot the main challenges are performance planning, not being able to fly a tidy three degree approach path to a sloping runway without almost knocking the heads of the spectators.

I actually agree with you completely. Spotters cameras make the approach look "low and exciting" , and flying in there is more of a challenge than most. But would you agree that the Wizz flight is a bit lower than normal but not wildly different to a standard approach, a la Jonty?

'Bill

[FlightDetent]

I actually agree with you completely. Spotters cameras make the approach look "low and exciting" , and flying in there is more of a challenge than most. But would you agree that the Wizz flight is a bit lower than normal but not wildly different to a standard approach, a la Jonty?

'Bill Simple question, how little margin is the least acceptable? Especially if being done for the first(2, 3rd) time.
​
I am not judging the crew here (Jonty's image of training pretty much mirrors in my mind) but the calls here sayin it's only a tad low, a non-event without educational value or debriefing points.
​​​​​

[Wickerbill]

The point is, if you are 15 ft too low over the fence at LHR or LGW nobody knows or even cares. BUT 15 ft too low over the threshold at JSI looks spectacular.

[FlightDetent]

Surely we are not avoding the question?

A standard fence clearing height at base is about a 120 whereas this place starts with 25 if you get it right. Fifteen feet lower, hold my beer. So again, how much margin is not enough?

The point is, the people who fly this exercise have no real ' too low - discontinue' limits available to them that they could bounce off. A.k.a. 'so far it always worked', a time honoured safety concept

[DaveReidUK]

So, do you think that this was a 'safety event'?

Where would we find a definition of "safety event" ?

Is that equivalent to any or all of the generally understood "Incident"/"Serious Incident"/"Accident" definitions per Annex 13 ?

[Confusious]

Where would we find a definition of "safety event" ?

Is that equivalent to any or all of the generally understood "Incident"/"Serious Incident"/"Accident" definitions per Annex 13 ?
Above - safetpee #227

[safetypee]

Above, above ?
Categories: accident / incident; safe / unsafe.
Black and white thinking, this does not represent the real world where uncertainties have to be judged with knowledge.
Why no ‘not an issue’ category - the crew acted as might be expected.

Without clarifying information, this landing could be a non event, normal operational variability.
It might be better judged with situational intent; assuming a lower altitude than that designed by the runway geometry - did the crew understand the position, was it being corrected - good adaptation.
Understanding but no adaptation, misjudged course of action.
Understood the situation, but as required by training - procedures, as planned.
Did not understand the situation, a weakness in situation awareness, … which part, why.

We don't know, and whatever we hypothesise it is unlikely that our understanding will improve, except a hope of the acceptance of uncertainty in operations and the need for a Safety-II mindset.

Flying involves continual judgement in uncertain conditions.

Humans strive to do their best in situations as understood at that time, not as recorded by video or by armchair analysis.

[Confusious]

Safetypee,
"Above ?"
Just so you know, it wasn't me who asked the pedantic question (see the quote), I knew exactly what you meant.
:ok:

[Jwscud]

I am surprised we have got this far without anyone discussing flight data monitoring.

The operator will have event thresholds for things like short landings and a succession of traces from approaches into Skiathos. They will have hard data and the ability to take action warranted by their policies. Wizz being Wizz, one might not have confidence it will be as non-punitive as other EASA operators but they will be able to determine how out of the ordinary if at all this was.

In god we trust, all others bring data!

[alland2012]

To me that is arguably reckless endangerment by an unprofessionally minded pair of pilots. The fact that thrill seekers are allowed to stand on the extended centerline is not wise either. Someone will get their head knocked off at some point.
Only last week have yellow box junction lines been painted on the road stating at each end "Do not stand within these lines" ...but as you can see from the photo they have made little or no difference ! The boneheads are still out in force getting their intake of Jet A fumes.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/960x527/skiathos_landings_87f808cd0d5530b369e94585d768d409a41683e4.j pg

[Confusious]

Only last week have yellow box junction lines been painted on the road stating at each end "Do not stand within these lines" ...but as you can see from the photo they have made little or no difference ! The boneheads are still out in force getting their intake of Jet A fumes.

Not well worded, most of them are not within the lines.

[DaveReidUK]

Above, above ?
Categories: accident / incident; safe / unsafe.

Thank you for clarifying what you meant by a "safety event". So presumably you are excluding "accidents*" (which would instead be referred to as such), but potentially encompassing "incidents*" and "serious incidents*", as the case may be.

* using the Annex 13 definitions in each case

It remains to be seen how this event ends up being categorised.

[FlightDetent]

A non-event, for what it was.

[Confusious]

A non-event, for what it was.
An uncategorised event which should remain within the confines of the company.

[DaveReidUK]

A non-event, for what it was.

You may well be right. I imagine that the AAIASB will agree with you.

[Confusious]

You may well be right. I imagine that the AAIASB will agree with you.
Dave, there's absolutely no reason for them to be involved. It should stay within the company.

[fdr]

The point is, if you are 15 ft too low over the fence at LHR or LGW nobody knows or even cares. BUT 15 ft too low over the threshold at JSI looks spectacular.

Not so, an operator of RPT will always have a FDM system to check flight data. EASA's 035, and 037 rules apply to the safety and QA requirement. The flight data would be showing this as low TCH, and may also see it as a short landing. (Historically, when guys & girls deviate from the standard flight path that they follow there is an associated variation in flare, landing g, and both short and long landings as the crew are out of the usual geometry and timing for the landing).

EASA operations are required to have non-punitive management practices; if the company takes action that may be determined to be contrary to the mandatory safety policy statement components on that would be grounds for.... grounding of the AOC and denial of the AOCH as a FPP for the AOC. Being punitive comes with some serious risks, e.g., suspension or canceling of the AOC. Would EASA do that? They do take certificate action on occasions, I would suggest that reading and complying with the letter and spirit of the safety policy is a reasonable practice for managers, but is often lost in the day-to-day commercial realities. EASA has no restriction to consider mismanagement other than major non-compliance and worthy of certificate action.

[Potatos_69]

On a side note, I saw a spotters photo of its landing. Wheels touched down before even reaching the piano keys… Definitely not in the TDZ…

[Nil by mouth]

^^^^^^^^^^
"On a side note, I saw a spotters photo of its landing. Wheels touched down before even reaching the piano keys… Definitely not in the TDZ…"

In the video doesn't the touchdown smoke from the landing gear appear after the piano keys?
One of the rubberneckers head does obscure the landing to be fair.

[FlightDetent]

Re: non-event (assuming they did not touch short)

It's coming back slowly, fdr is getting a free shirt. Annex 13 may not be relevant (luckily for everyone) but the operator's SMS still is.

The proper wording in my good old company was 'occurrence', recorded, tracked and evaluated with appropriate levels of intensity but systematically in a similar fashion to an incident.

​​​​Everyone understands the iceberg theory, it's occurrences (again, luckily) that are the daily bread of operator's SMS discovery process. Not all occurences are equal as per the rarity/severity matrix. Here's a one with a significant learning potential.

Other words, squeezing this or similar thorughly is the whole reason why we bother with FDM/SMS at all. Nothing significant happened, everybody knows it was not right but we are incapable (limited in competence) to point a finger onto something deterministic, and there are zero identifiable defences in place why it could not happen again anytime later.

Typical findings (no mater which type of authority looks at it)

- training on short runways does not cover the differences explanation for aiming markers with regards to AFM compliant threshold clearance

- line pilot awareness of proper AFM aiming technique is low, with a possibility of forming a customary long habit on 2400+ m ICAO marked runways.

- PAPI relevance for landing is not understood by large proportion of line pilots leading to both over-use and/or ignorance

- NPA runways are unobserved territory for TCH and short touchdown distance given current technological limitations of FDM systems, moreover so on marginally short runways with low flight count rate typical for seasonal airports.

- in case of PAPI unusable there is no easily identifiable limit the line crews could observe and respect with regards to abandoning the approach in case of a profile which is too low

- this particular airport operate a 'contested wheel clearance' environment but at the same time installed PAPI does not provide any guidance for near approach profile due technical reasons and for extended periods of time, suggesting a lack of understanding and coherence from the QA team of airport operator and the NAA oversight.

- one of the benefits of stable approach technique is that below the threshold (1000 or 500) the flight path control requirement is reduced to maintaining a steady direct trajectory towards the landing. This enables crews to mentally unload and re-focus ahead of the aircraft before the landing itself which is a precursor to a desirable go-around mindset.

Given the inherent low experience of crews visitung JSI due lack of exposure, safety margins could be increased by publishing a 3D RNAV / RNP approach for the runway (acceptably in a form of prescribed visual manoeuvring track and profile). This will enable the use of present on-board technology to reduce crew workload by creating a perception scenario that is well rehearsed in daily operstions, laying ground for optimal cognitive performance during very short approach and transition to flare.
​
=========
​​​​​​
The discussion here, not despite but thanks to the widely differing opinions at certain moments, is a wonderful case of true safety work.

The way I see it, at a game of golf one plays the ball against the perils of the course and own performance, counting the strokes and being honest about it. Whereas the Rules of Golf (R&A USGA) are a mere attempt at a technical specification of what 'honest' actually means in the context.

SMS + Flt Ops QA is all the same. Building published standards on how to deal with things, but at the same time actually working safety is not confined to inside SMS/QA (and also not assured by formal following of the audited guidelines).

Prime example here in few simple steps
+ occurrence discovered by coincidence
+ list the available limits and guidance at present
+ shake the tree hard and see what the wider pool thinks of it before telling them what went missing
+ evaluate probability of re-occurence and hazard level facing the defences already in place
+ determine the cheese holes and requirements to close them

Events where the crew gets it (even very) wrong but scratches no paint are the iceberg tips. Making sure the underwater piece is evaluated in full is how a pro-active risk management should run.
​​​​



​​​​​​

[Capn Bloggs]

@FlightDetent, all very good points, however,
Given the inherent low experience of crews visitung JSI due lack of exposure, safety margins could be increased by publishing a 3D RNAV / RNP approach for the runway (acceptably in a form of prescribed visual manoeuvring track and profile). This will enable the use of present on-board technology to reduce crew workload by creating a perception scenario that is well rehearsed in daily operstions, laying ground for optimal cognitive performance during very short approach and transition to flare.
I don't think this would help. In my view, this approach and landing went pear-shaped at 200ft. I see a discernable duck-under about then, and then a pronouced level-off (or at least significant flattening) of the last stages to get to the runway and a smooth, little-flare landing. This was on a gin-clear day with, I assume, a working PAPI. I doubt whether any 3D approach would have made slope control below 200ft any easier than using the PAPI. Before then, it's just an approach like any other.

Touchdown:
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1124/wizz_2500_454f3793ea0f7ac6f3ceabf7a1f01f7d396bee97.jpg