Nil by mouth
22nd Jan 2022, 16:32
From my local Rag:-
https://www.euroweeklynews.com/2022/01/22/revealed-two-near-miss-ryanair-flights-at-malaga-airport-classed-as-serious-incident/
A bit more detail here:-
The CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:
The investigation has determined that the incident occurred because an aircraft was given clearance to land on a runway that was occupied by another aircraft in the process of taking off, without respecting the regulatory distances.
Deficient planning by the air traffic controller, who took advantage of a gap between two landings to authorise a take-off, is considered to have been a contributing factor in the incident.
Furthermore, given the immediate danger posed by the loss of regulatory separation, the absence of decision-making (to cancel the take-off, for example) by the air traffic controller is also deemed to have been a factor.
The CIAIAC analysed:
The EI-DYR aircraft on approach with callsign RYR9UD notified the air traffic controller that they were proceeding to 500 ft at 19:53:21. The air traffic controller responded to aircraft RYR9UD, instructing it to continue and await late landing clearance.
At that moment, aircraft RYR9UD was established on final at 1.7 NM from the threshold of RWY 13 and aircraft RYR75JV was taxiing towards RWY 13. The air traffic controller did not recognise the imminent danger resulting from the loss of regulatory separation and continued with the initial plan, instructing the aircraft to continue on approach without informing the aircraft that was about to take off.
Given that the inbound traffic was 1.7NM from the runway threshold and the outbound aircraft was midway between the holding point and the runway threshold, the air traffic controller could have prevented a loss of separation and, therefore, a potentially hazardous situation between the inbound and outbound traffic in a single runway configuration by instructing the arriving traffic to abort its approach and cancelling the take-off of the taxiing aircraft.
However, at 19:53:59 UTC, the LCL TWR LEMG controller cleared the RYR9UD aircraft to land with the preceding traffic in view on runway 13 when it was established at 200 ft of altitude AMSL, and aircraft RYR75JV was on its take-off run on RWY 13 at a speed of 90 kt (GS). The distance between the two aircraft was 0.4 NM.
The landing was authorised when the aircraft was practically above the runway threshold, allowing it to cross said threshold while the outbound aircraft was still on the runway. Moreover, there was no degree of assurance that the regulatory separation could be maintained, as the aircraft on approach was travelling faster than the aircraft on take-off, increasingly reducing the separation between the aircraft. The air traffic controller failed to anticipate the required separation between the aircraft.
...
The landing EI-DYR aircraft touched down on the runway with a ground speed of 141 kt. For its part, the EI-ENH aircraft was on its take-off run executing the rotation manoeuvre, with a ground speed of 157 kt. The distance between the two aircraft was 520 m (0.28 NM). This was the point of minimum separation between the two aircraft.
https://www.euroweeklynews.com/2022/01/22/revealed-two-near-miss-ryanair-flights-at-malaga-airport-classed-as-serious-incident/
A bit more detail here:-
The CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:
The investigation has determined that the incident occurred because an aircraft was given clearance to land on a runway that was occupied by another aircraft in the process of taking off, without respecting the regulatory distances.
Deficient planning by the air traffic controller, who took advantage of a gap between two landings to authorise a take-off, is considered to have been a contributing factor in the incident.
Furthermore, given the immediate danger posed by the loss of regulatory separation, the absence of decision-making (to cancel the take-off, for example) by the air traffic controller is also deemed to have been a factor.
The CIAIAC analysed:
The EI-DYR aircraft on approach with callsign RYR9UD notified the air traffic controller that they were proceeding to 500 ft at 19:53:21. The air traffic controller responded to aircraft RYR9UD, instructing it to continue and await late landing clearance.
At that moment, aircraft RYR9UD was established on final at 1.7 NM from the threshold of RWY 13 and aircraft RYR75JV was taxiing towards RWY 13. The air traffic controller did not recognise the imminent danger resulting from the loss of regulatory separation and continued with the initial plan, instructing the aircraft to continue on approach without informing the aircraft that was about to take off.
Given that the inbound traffic was 1.7NM from the runway threshold and the outbound aircraft was midway between the holding point and the runway threshold, the air traffic controller could have prevented a loss of separation and, therefore, a potentially hazardous situation between the inbound and outbound traffic in a single runway configuration by instructing the arriving traffic to abort its approach and cancelling the take-off of the taxiing aircraft.
However, at 19:53:59 UTC, the LCL TWR LEMG controller cleared the RYR9UD aircraft to land with the preceding traffic in view on runway 13 when it was established at 200 ft of altitude AMSL, and aircraft RYR75JV was on its take-off run on RWY 13 at a speed of 90 kt (GS). The distance between the two aircraft was 0.4 NM.
The landing was authorised when the aircraft was practically above the runway threshold, allowing it to cross said threshold while the outbound aircraft was still on the runway. Moreover, there was no degree of assurance that the regulatory separation could be maintained, as the aircraft on approach was travelling faster than the aircraft on take-off, increasingly reducing the separation between the aircraft. The air traffic controller failed to anticipate the required separation between the aircraft.
...
The landing EI-DYR aircraft touched down on the runway with a ground speed of 141 kt. For its part, the EI-ENH aircraft was on its take-off run executing the rotation manoeuvre, with a ground speed of 157 kt. The distance between the two aircraft was 520 m (0.28 NM). This was the point of minimum separation between the two aircraft.