Malaga near miss report
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From my local Rag:-
https://www.euroweeklynews.com/2022/...ious-incident/
A bit more detail here:-
The CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:
The investigation has determined that the incident occurred because an aircraft was given clearance to land on a runway that was occupied by another aircraft in the process of taking off, without respecting the regulatory distances.
Deficient planning by the air traffic controller, who took advantage of a gap between two landings to authorise a take-off, is considered to have been a contributing factor in the incident.
Furthermore, given the immediate danger posed by the loss of regulatory separation, the absence of decision-making (to cancel the take-off, for example) by the air traffic controller is also deemed to have been a factor.
The CIAIAC analysed:
The EI-DYR aircraft on approach with callsign RYR9UD notified the air traffic controller that they were proceeding to 500 ft at 19:53:21. The air traffic controller responded to aircraft RYR9UD, instructing it to continue and await late landing clearance.
At that moment, aircraft RYR9UD was established on final at 1.7 NM from the threshold of RWY 13 and aircraft RYR75JV was taxiing towards RWY 13. The air traffic controller did not recognise the imminent danger resulting from the loss of regulatory separation and continued with the initial plan, instructing the aircraft to continue on approach without informing the aircraft that was about to take off.
Given that the inbound traffic was 1.7NM from the runway threshold and the outbound aircraft was midway between the holding point and the runway threshold, the air traffic controller could have prevented a loss of separation and, therefore, a potentially hazardous situation between the inbound and outbound traffic in a single runway configuration by instructing the arriving traffic to abort its approach and cancelling the take-off of the taxiing aircraft.
However, at 19:53:59 UTC, the LCL TWR LEMG controller cleared the RYR9UD aircraft to land with the preceding traffic in view on runway 13 when it was established at 200 ft of altitude AMSL, and aircraft RYR75JV was on its take-off run on RWY 13 at a speed of 90 kt (GS). The distance between the two aircraft was 0.4 NM.
The landing was authorised when the aircraft was practically above the runway threshold, allowing it to cross said threshold while the outbound aircraft was still on the runway. Moreover, there was no degree of assurance that the regulatory separation could be maintained, as the aircraft on approach was travelling faster than the aircraft on take-off, increasingly reducing the separation between the aircraft. The air traffic controller failed to anticipate the required separation between the aircraft.
...
The landing EI-DYR aircraft touched down on the runway with a ground speed of 141 kt. For its part, the EI-ENH aircraft was on its take-off run executing the rotation manoeuvre, with a ground speed of 157 kt. The distance between the two aircraft was 520 m (0.28 NM). This was the point of minimum separation between the two aircraft.
https://www.euroweeklynews.com/2022/...ious-incident/
A bit more detail here:-
The CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:
The investigation has determined that the incident occurred because an aircraft was given clearance to land on a runway that was occupied by another aircraft in the process of taking off, without respecting the regulatory distances.
Deficient planning by the air traffic controller, who took advantage of a gap between two landings to authorise a take-off, is considered to have been a contributing factor in the incident.
Furthermore, given the immediate danger posed by the loss of regulatory separation, the absence of decision-making (to cancel the take-off, for example) by the air traffic controller is also deemed to have been a factor.
The CIAIAC analysed:
The EI-DYR aircraft on approach with callsign RYR9UD notified the air traffic controller that they were proceeding to 500 ft at 19:53:21. The air traffic controller responded to aircraft RYR9UD, instructing it to continue and await late landing clearance.
At that moment, aircraft RYR9UD was established on final at 1.7 NM from the threshold of RWY 13 and aircraft RYR75JV was taxiing towards RWY 13. The air traffic controller did not recognise the imminent danger resulting from the loss of regulatory separation and continued with the initial plan, instructing the aircraft to continue on approach without informing the aircraft that was about to take off.
Given that the inbound traffic was 1.7NM from the runway threshold and the outbound aircraft was midway between the holding point and the runway threshold, the air traffic controller could have prevented a loss of separation and, therefore, a potentially hazardous situation between the inbound and outbound traffic in a single runway configuration by instructing the arriving traffic to abort its approach and cancelling the take-off of the taxiing aircraft.
However, at 19:53:59 UTC, the LCL TWR LEMG controller cleared the RYR9UD aircraft to land with the preceding traffic in view on runway 13 when it was established at 200 ft of altitude AMSL, and aircraft RYR75JV was on its take-off run on RWY 13 at a speed of 90 kt (GS). The distance between the two aircraft was 0.4 NM.
The landing was authorised when the aircraft was practically above the runway threshold, allowing it to cross said threshold while the outbound aircraft was still on the runway. Moreover, there was no degree of assurance that the regulatory separation could be maintained, as the aircraft on approach was travelling faster than the aircraft on take-off, increasingly reducing the separation between the aircraft. The air traffic controller failed to anticipate the required separation between the aircraft.
...
The landing EI-DYR aircraft touched down on the runway with a ground speed of 141 kt. For its part, the EI-ENH aircraft was on its take-off run executing the rotation manoeuvre, with a ground speed of 157 kt. The distance between the two aircraft was 520 m (0.28 NM). This was the point of minimum separation between the two aircraft.
From the report:
Since 2019, a total of 34 events involving a loss of separation between aircraft at Málaga Costa del Sol airport have been reported to the National Occurrence System.
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Need to see the full report , for instance if if the landing a/c was on a visual app, the story could be different. Could be a real incident, could also been something blown off to make a headline. Mentioning that this was 2 RYR on the title is what seems to count here.
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I have seen this in the US many times, MIA comes to mind , but 500m between 2 B737s is indeed stretching the limits too far, , I am surprised to see the landing one did not go around, but it is clearly a gamble that went wrong from the controller. If he had advised the 2 a/c of what he was trying to do the outcome would have probably been different .
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Always thought landing traffic has priority...
Irrespective of that,RYR75JV SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE OTHER A/C <2miles and STOPPED...even past the `stop bar```. It wasn`t all down to the controller...just impatience....
Irrespective of that,RYR75JV SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE OTHER A/C <2miles and STOPPED...even past the `stop bar```. It wasn`t all down to the controller...just impatience....
Was the distance given to RYR75JV.. or was it a quick casually look out the window and guess with the eyeball.
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As for intervisibility, you might want to look at the taxiway geometry before hanging the departing pilot out to dry.
From my local Rag:-
The landing EI-DYR aircraft touched down on the runway with a ground speed of 141 kt. For its part, the EI-ENH aircraft was on its take-off run executing the rotation manoeuvre, with a ground speed of 157 kt. The distance between the two aircraft was 520 m (0.28 NM). This was the point of minimum separation between the two aircraft.
The landing EI-DYR aircraft touched down on the runway with a ground speed of 141 kt. For its part, the EI-ENH aircraft was on its take-off run executing the rotation manoeuvre, with a ground speed of 157 kt. The distance between the two aircraft was 520 m (0.28 NM). This was the point of minimum separation between the two aircraft.
At the different speeds quoted, the landing aircraft was doing 141 kt and the departing aircraft ahead was doing 157 kt - quite some difference of 16 kt of increasing separation. Therefore the moment of minimum separation must have occurred before this. With the departing aircraft accelerating away, probably their speeds were equal some 4 or 5 seconds earlier, at which moment their separation would have been significantly smaller.
With such a glaring error, it is difficult to believe any other of the 'facts' and figures given.
For reasons best known to the CIAIC, the plots (and therefore very likely the speeds) appear to be based mostly on primary radar rather than FDR or ADS-B data, so a little wiggle room isn't altogether surprising.
Based on the timelines elsewhere in the report, both aircraft appear to have been travelling at around 142-143 kt at the point of minimum separation, which could indeed have been a bit (but probably not a lot) less than the quoted 520 m.
Based on the timelines elsewhere in the report, both aircraft appear to have been travelling at around 142-143 kt at the point of minimum separation, which could indeed have been a bit (but probably not a lot) less than the quoted 520 m.
According to #7 ,RYR9UD had not touched down,but was approx.2500 ft down the runway,when-75JV was 4000ft on rotation at that time.
Distances from `stop bars vary from 100-200yds,depending on which you use.
Distances from `stop bars vary from 100-200yds,depending on which you use.
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They really ought to be labelled "Not to Scale".
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A go-around would have presented three bad choices; turn right towards traffic coming from the North on the STAR for 01R, albeit probably not lower than 4000ft; keep straight and get too close to the 773; turn left into the path of traffic on the visual or ILS approach to 01C. All bad choices, although in hindsight I would have turned right and maintained 2-3000´. As it turned out, we were probably at 50ft over the threshold when the 773 was around 50ft over the departing end of the runway. I think the controller realized it was a f***up as he thanked us profusely as he sent us over to Ground Control.
Last edited by oceancrosser; 26th Jan 2022 at 14:35.
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Thanks for this , I asked because of similar experiences ( although not involving parallels runways and in airports far smaller than KIAD ) . I was clear to take off on a small GA aircraft from a large airfield and once airborne was following ( overflying in fact) the runway center line as per the SID. when the following aircraft (an A320 ) was ordered to go around and the discussion started on the frequency as to what we should do, as obviously a straight ahead go around as the chart says would make things worse, and we both had no visuals on each other.
Another time I was watching from the ground an ATC TWR radio failure situation , where the aircraft already lined up for a while waiting for the preceding landing to vacate, announced he was taking off ,The one on finals had changed frequency trying to reach the TWR and decided to go around ,seeing the aircraft lined up but unaware it was taking off. Both flew straight ahead, ended up exactly one of top of each other at the end the runway fortunately with a few hundred feet separation. There is a clear loophole in those go around situations, but as I was told at the time , you cannot regulate everything,
Another time I was watching from the ground an ATC TWR radio failure situation , where the aircraft already lined up for a while waiting for the preceding landing to vacate, announced he was taking off ,The one on finals had changed frequency trying to reach the TWR and decided to go around ,seeing the aircraft lined up but unaware it was taking off. Both flew straight ahead, ended up exactly one of top of each other at the end the runway fortunately with a few hundred feet separation. There is a clear loophole in those go around situations, but as I was told at the time , you cannot regulate everything,
