An-148 missing after takeoff from Moscow

[rotornut]

https://www.rt.com/news/418466-passenger-jet-missing-russia/

[Cool banana]

An Antonov An-148 operated by Saratov Airlines and carrying 65 passengers and six crew went missing shortly after take-off from Moscow’s Domodedovo airport, an emergency services source told Russian media.
“The airplane reportedly crashed outside Argunovo village [in the Moscow region],” the source told Interfax news agency. “The crew and passengers had no chance.”

The Russian Emergencies Ministry says it is verifying reports that the An-148 has crashed outside Moscow.

The aircraft departed from Moscow’s Domodedovo airport and was heading for Orsk, a city lying close to the Russia-Kazakhstan

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43024235

[BluSdUp]

Does anyone have a link to Metar and Taf at this airport.
From what I can gather with a quick look at YR.NO it is -4 and light snow.

[MarcJF]

Sky news reporting from Flight Radar aircraft was descending 3300 fpm

[PAXfips]

metar: uudd 111230z 13005mps 8000 -shsn few008 bkn026cb m05/m07 q1019 r14r/590293 r14l///99// tempo 1200 shsn

[testpanel]

Sky news reporting from Flight Radar aircraft was descending 3300 fpm

from around 6000ft (according to graphs on fr24..)

[fluglehrer]

for those fluent in russian, might have info
https://www.yaplakal.com/forum1/topic1739253.html

[Up North Like]

Now reporting '71 on board dead as plane breaks apart after takeoff'.

[2dPilot]

And for non-russian speakers: Google Translate (http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=auto&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.yaplakal.com%2Fforum1%2Ftopic1739253.htm l)

[thomasfo]

More video here : russia. liveuamap. com /en/2018/11-february-an148-of-saratov-airlines-crashed-after-takeoff

Remove spaces, not alloved to pust url's...

[damirc]

Incorrect information removed (Russian Post has no helicopters in their fleet).

[BluSdUp]

This is going to be an interresting one!
At 6000 feet most airliners are established with flaps up and climbing away at 250kts or what ever lower intermediate speed until FL100, Hmmm!

A few observations.
A great looking aircraft , for someone from the Dornier 328TP and JET.
The aircraft is over twice as big.
But the similarity is striking.
Added is : Leading edge slats , Engine revers ( I think) . And flight spoilers!
All something the Dornier lacked and needed in winter Ops runways.

The Aircraft has a good record until now , anyone with any experience with this AC?

[andrasz]

Video shows widely separated smaller pieces of wreckage (including the cockpit section, the largest piece) with individual impact marks in the snow, looks like an in-flight breakup. No sign of the main fuselage / wings / engines in the vicinity of the cockpit.

Edit:

Only saw the post re the possible mid-air after posting, it adds up. The cockpit section does look like it was sliced up by the heli rotor blades, hard to imagine other failure modes that neatly shears out a horizontal slice. The source is quoted as Interfax, the official news agency so looks plausible.

[ApusApus]

Looks like this is the first crash of the An-148 as an commercial flight

[DIBO]

Don't know what it is with the An-148 speed graphs in FR24. Not only this flight/this plane, but other An-148's produce similar erractic speed graphs. Other (western) a/c departing DME (having similar FR24 coverage) produce normal speeds graphs in FR24. So the erratic speed graph on this flight's FR24 profile, is not an indication of anything abnormal (related to this accident).

[Loose rivets]

Not much to add to andrasz and damirc,


Telegraph:



Interfax also reported that the crash may have been caused by a collision with a helicopter.

"The plane crashed near the village of Argunovo. Passengers as well as the crew could hardly survive," they said.

Eyewitnesses in Argunovo said they saw a burning plane falling from the sky.

[BluSdUp]

Yes, that will do it!

Anyone: Would a helicopter in Moscow airspace at say 2000 feet or above have to have a Mode C transponder or TCAS.?

[PPRuNe Towers]

Russian PPRuNe equivalent is up to page 9 now and no better news there other than the widely dispersed wreckage plus first troll video from a passenger seat of flames from an engine.

No comments on a collision from the Russian forum

Acceptable efforts from Google Chrome's inbuilt translation function.

Rob

[ORAC]

Looks like this is the first crash of the An-148 as an commercial flight Only 32 ever delivered to date.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-148

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saratov_Airlines

[gearlever]

The remains of a second aircraft, a helicopter, were found near the crash site. Russian Media are reporting the two aircraft collided in midair.

Crash: Saratow A148 at Moscow on Feb 11tn 2018, midair collision (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b4cb236&opt=0)

[Heathrow Harry]

On 5 March 2011, an Antonov An-148 crashed at Garbuzovo, Alexeyevsky Region, Belgorod Oblast, Russia, killing all six crew members. The aircraft was operating a test flight prior to delivery to the Myanmar Air Force. Witnesses reported that a wing had detached from the aircraft while in flight.

[damirc]

Seems, that if it was a helicopter it wasn't one owned by the Russian Post.

www.rbc. ru /rbcfreenews/5a804a6a9a794748ec50a48f?from=newsfeed

(Russian Post stresses they don't have any helicopters in their fleet would be the gist of it).

As usual - too much false information.

[CargoOne]

Russian media refers to mid-air with Russian Post helicopter which sounds nonsence.. they used to have a couple of copters to serve remote places in Far East Russia but not anywhere near Moscow.

Apparently AN148 does not transmit the speed - so the flightradar24 is inserting the speed calculated from time and position reports.

[JCviggen]

Seems, that if it was a helicopter it wasn't one owned by the Russian Post.

Quite a few pictures have turned up of helicopters with Russian Post branding. Though they don't actually belong to the Russian post, it seems more about semantics than what most would consider a "Russian post" helicopter (a heli painted in typical blue with Russian post written on it) not existing.

Obviously too early to say whether it actually happened, but a modern Antonov coming down in bits seems less likely to be a mechanical failure.

[fantom]

Why would a helicopter be at 6,000?

[damirc]

(a heli painted in typical blue with Russian post written on it) not existing.


First thing I checked was whether they actually had any helicopters - all I can find is photos of a Mi2 that is used in the Far East. Looking at it logically it doesn't really make sense to use helicopters for mail around Moscow (if the post is coming from far it would be on a plane, if it were near - Moscow has more than enough roads). So while it may still have been a helicopter I think it's now likely it was not a helicopter from the Russian Post.

[Martin_123]

I think the whole "Russian Post" thing started because there's a video out there showing mail bags at the scene. But to my understanding, those mail bags were on the An148

[BluSdUp]

Avoiding ice, staying VMC!

[b1lanc]

AP reporting "Russia’s state news agency Tass says the passenger plane that crashed had been flying since 2010, with a two-year break because of a shortage of parts."

There was another An-148 crash in March of 2011. Prelim investigation - structural failure after Vne exceeded.

[AreOut]

it's a well populated area, we would probably see helicopter wreckage by now if it was a collision

[andrasz]

We haven't even seen the main wreckage yet...

[guadaMB]

Because apparently "wreckage" is in a circle with a diam of 1000metres.

[birmingham]

RT reporting that pilot had technical problem and was planning to divert to Zhukovsky.

[Airbubba]

FlightRadar24 has posted updated ADS-B data files on the mishap:

https://blog.flightradar24.com/blog/saratov-airlines-flight-703-crashed-outside-of-moscow/

The FlightAware ADS-B data ends at the same time and is generally consistent with the FR24 data.

[Kulverstukas]

i_tg4uIiu6Y

[Moi/]

Its a little worrying in the timescales all the information has been posted.

From hours of having it reported, we had FR24 post aircraft position including the final moments.

I feel that family members will turn to the internet for answers (I.E here), faster than it can be given out officially.

[PastTense]

There are lots of Youtube videos, although I haven't seen any particularly informative:
https://www.youtube.com/results?sp=CAI%253D&search_query=An-148

[brak]

News now reports that "captain refused deicing". (Apply a good dose of skepticism to any current "news" though)

[Evey_Hammond]

Passenger list released (http://www.mchs.gov.ru/operationalpage/Operativnaja_informacija/item/33515861/) :(

[andrasz]

Thanks Kulver!

The piece of wreckage that appears about 15 minutes into the start of the feed looks like a turbine shaft. It had to be something catastrophic to cause such disintegration of an engine (or APU ?) and the bending of the shaft (ground impact alone would not have done that, neither an engine failure). A mid-air still looks plausible.

[clearedtocross]

Even if FR24 data must be interpreted with a grain of salt the ground speed after levelling off at about 6000 feet (or rather 2000m) seems to be high at more than 350 kts for 2 min. So either airspeed was high or tail wind was a gale in which case turbulence/wind shear might be a factor.

[Kulverstukas]

Thanks Kulver!

The piece of wreckage that appears about 15 minutes into the start of the feed looks like a turbine shaft. It had to be something catastrophic to cause such disintegration of an engine (or APU ?) and the bending of the shaft (ground impact alone would not have done that, neither an engine failure). A mid-air still looks plausible.

https://cdn.aviaforum.ru/images/2018/02/911563_25ac32df0a4d3b2a5e5d1536ca55637d.png

[Kulverstukas]

IAC An-148-100B RA-61704 11.02.2018 (http://mak-iac.org/rassledovaniya/an-148-100b-ra-61704-11-02-2018/)

No english version yet

[Mark in CA]

Google Translate:

According to the information received, on 11.02.2018 at 14:28 Moscow time there was a loss of radio communication and a mark on the radar screen of the An-148-100B RA-61074 airliner of the Saratov airlines of Privolzhsky MTU Rosaviatsii. The plane performed a flight on the route Moscow (Domodedovo) - Orsk. Departure from the airport "Domodedovo" at 14:21. On board there were 65 passengers and 6 crew members. The wreckage of the plane was found in the vicinity of the village. Argunovo, Ramensky district, Moscow region. Information about the consequences of the incident is being clarified.
The Interstate Aviation Committee has formed a commission to investigate this catastrophe. The commission went to the disaster site and started work.
The investigation will be conducted in strict compliance with the provisions of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention.
The Interstate Aviation Committee expresses its condolences to the families and friends of the deceased.

[barry lloyd]

From my reading of it, Kulverstukas, I believe it's just a standard statement from MAK saying they are about to start work on the investigation?

[Kulverstukas]

Exactly, barry

[lomapaseo]

Very large (gross) full frontal impact on high speed running engine.

quite rare, I've only seen one other before

https://cdn.aviaforum.ru/images/2018/02/911563_25ac32df0a4d3b2a5e5d1536ca55637d.png

[rotornut]

Pilot reported technical problem, planned emergency landing:
https://www.rt.com/news/418485-russia-plane-crash-malfunction-report/

[Kulverstukas]

It was already disproved, as well as a collision with a helicopter.

[Kulverstukas]

https://s9.postimg.org/tpu49di7z/S703-1.png https://s9.postimg.org/r8id2461b/S703-2.png https://s9.postimg.org/snjxqvp4v/S703-3.pnghttps://s9.postimg.org/p7weuyu3z/S703-4.pnghttps://s9.postimg.org/aanxu0tr3/S703-5.pnghttps://s9.postimg.org/y1nbcc4an/S703-6.png

[Kulverstukas]

fQktxb4eEG8

[paperHanger]

The fuel explosion would suggest that the tanks/wings were (mostly) intact when it hit the dirt ...

[BluSdUp]

I just like to see if I understand the information up to this point:

No deice needed and executed.
No helicopter midair.
No MAYDAY or PAN to ATC.
A standard departure in a very controlled manner to ca 6000feet until data lost.
Normal speed development, even if FR24 records it a bit strange due to the way it is recorded.

I take it the track on FR24 is accurate , and that indicates no handling problems up until they departed level flight.

They were cleared to FL110 just before they lost control ?

How am I doing so fare?

[BluSdUp]

Did it fly earlier today , and if so, how long was the turnaround.?
Was it deiced earlier today?

I am thinking about the remote chance of frozen up controls , pure speculation from my side.

I fly an aircraft that pitches up when power is added(B738).

If the elevators got stuck and there is only a small pitch down movement in this aircraft as power is added to climb, I can see a remote possibility of this being the outcome.

Is the fleet grounded for now?

[andrasz]

This was no loss of control, that leaves a compact smoking hole in the ground. The answer lies in the photo Kulverstukas now posted in high resoluton.

[DingerX]

Well, at that point:

1. Collision: you'd expect by now to know what it hit.
2. Icing: 7 minutes after departure, 6000 ft above -4 C and climbing.
3. Explosives: 6000 feet, a pressure altitude likely well below that, 28 minutes after EOBT = the only way that will work is if you have a poorly educated suicide bomber with a really big bomb, sitting in just the right place.
4. Rapid disassembly: like #3, does this actually happen?

In short: tragic, and don't believe anyone not bringing additional facts to the table.

[Grumpi]

Well, at that point:
4. Rapid disassembly: like #3, does this actually happen?


Probably not, at least not with "only" 6000ft to accelerate.

But now that video has surfaced, it looks like that speculation can also be put to rest.

That one is highly suggestive of the plane being largely in one piece on impact, but impacting with a shallow angle.

So it would seem the most likely theory from current info is some sort of loss of control at 6000ft (Icing, control lock, disorientation, collision - although that one seems ruled out at this point, power mismanagement, inertial reference fail, reverser deployment... you name it), with a subsequent uncontrolled descent that happened to be in a shallow, but very fast dive on impact (possibly almost recovered). Impacting fast, shallow and banked with a cartwheel-type motion could give you the kind of debris field of pieces this size, and explain the running engines.

By definition the long stretch free of big accidents would be ended by something horrible, but that still only makes it worse when it actually occurs... Sad day. :(

[500 above]

Is the fleet grounded for now?

No, it’s not. Same type, same airline landed on RW14R just before I departed DME tonight.

[flash8]

Well the most obvious initial thought is that it was not an accident. However given the now pretty high security at DME would hopefully like to rule that one out. Huge improvements on the old days and now world class, I used to operate out of there and things really have changed.

[b1lanc]

That one is highly suggestive of the plane being largely in one piece on impact, but impacting with a shallow angle.

I looked at the video frame by frame and I cannot see the AC or light streaks anywhere above ground level prior to the explosion which appeared to take place behind a building. But, it almost looked like there might have been two impacts moving from right to left, the first throwing some snow up and the second resulting in the explosion. Could simply have been poor read on my part or just the clarity of the video.

Going back to the 2011 accident, though the AC did exceed airspeed design limits and break up, one prelim report was defective airspeed indicator which caused the crew to increase speed. Don't know if that was ever definitively determined. Wonder what parts kept this AC grounded for two years?

[pattern_is_full]

I see here, in that video of impact, a replay of the final seconds of the Hawker airshow crash on a larger scale. More or less as Grumpi described - an attempted pullout from a high-speed dive for which there was simply not enough altitude for successful recovery.

Resulting in a shallow ground contact at very high airspeed, and ejecta from the aircraft (probably, from the flying fireball, the center wing/fuselage section containing fuel) and other debris forward over a large distance.

That, of course, will not be the critical cause, which is **whatever** occurred at or about 6000 feet and caused the steep dive in the first place. Simply the outcome.

[costalpilot]

i have it that Ivanov Vyacheslav the CFO of Rosatom was onboard.

[SLFplatine]

The Moscow Regional Transportation Authority has opened a criminal case into the violation of safety rules -perhaps routine procedure

[flash8]

i have it that Ivanov Vyacheslav the CFO of Rosatom was onboard.
looked at the released list and different patronymic... so unlikely.

[up_down_n_out]

given the now pretty high security at DME would hopefully like to rule that one out. Huge improvements on the old days and now world class, I used to operate out of there and things really have changed.

I can 100% assure you, you are WRONG.

I flew through DME* in december and was astonished to see I could take items through hand baggage that would never ever have been allowed through a European airport.

Most of all that anti-terror BS in Putin's republic is just that,- to "reassure" the public that they can be seen to be doing something (mostly paranoiac, and time wasting).

Everywhere there are gates with metal detectors, stations, airports,border crossings, even going to visit ice castles in provincial towns!
None of it is any use,- providing employment for zillions of jobsworths.

I also note the world's press (+BBC) appears to believe Orenburg/Orsk is in the Ural "mountains" (sigh). :ugh:

If they can't even learn basic school geography, what hope of reporting the slightest detail correctly? :rolleyes:

*I have to qualify, SVO is no better, and a baggage check in the hall/corridor after aeroexpress causes nothing but massive annoyance, cos the organisation at busy periods is cr..p

[Kulverstukas]

_37dKazdAak

[andrasz]

Kulver's latest video says the same story as the surveillance video camera. The main wreckage hit at a shallow angle with a substantial forward velocity.
The crucial question remains: where is the cockpit section shown on the initial video in relation to the main impact site. I have seen no trace of smoking wreckage on that frst video, so at a considerable distance I would presume - is it before or after... ?
Same applies to the mangled turbine shaft.

[akaSylvia]

A special thank you to Kulverstukas for reposting photographs and videos from the crash site.

It makes a welcome break from the wild speculation all over the internet. I wish people wouldn't just guess in the absence of more details.

[Kulverstukas]

Impact place

https://cdn.aviaforum.ru/images/2018/02/911643_0d60216241dcede1d2d24d280325eeee.jpg

Debris

https://cdn.aviaforum.ru/images/2018/02/911644_244ced926455d9c9e2652801a5c54d84.jpg

[Foxxster]

Unverified so treat with caution.

.Saratov lost their certification not one year ago due to improper flight deck procedures during inspection

the same Antonov An-148 in the crash had been sold to Saratov after GTK Rossiya had complained on numerous occasions to Antonov about reliability issues with it's electrical and engine systems in cold weather

[Jetjock330]

I am thinking blocked pitot, and increase in indicated speed with altitude, thrust perhaps coming to idle (auto throttle if it has) and stall.

[ATC Watcher]

.Saratov lost their certification not one year ago due to improper flight deck procedures during inspection

Mary Schiavo on CNN yesterday said it was due to someone other than the crew being in flight deck during a flight. A minor thing, She also said that lack of spares was an issue on the aircraft type. Do not know where she got this from but she is (was at least ) generally well informed.

[akaSylvia]

The 2015 incident is written about in detail here: https://airlinegeeks.com/2018/02/11/a-history-of-saratov-airlines-following-devastating-accident-near-moscow/

2015 Controversy
Until Sunday’s accident, Saratov Airlines has had a mostly unblemished safety record. One exception is an unusual incident which occurred on Jul. 19 of 2015, where a surprise inspection by the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency found ‘a violation of Russian Federal Aviation Regulations concerning the presence of persons other than flight crew in the cockpit during operations.’

The subsequent investigation found that on a flight from Saratov Tsentralny (RTW) to Antalya, Turkey, a ‘close relative’ of the airline’s general director was found to be present on the flight-deck without official authorization.

As a result of this incursion, the airline was banned from operating international flights. At the time, foreign destinations included Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Montenegro. As mentioned above, only international routes to Armenia and Georgia currently operate. In response, the airline took action against a number of employees, as well as introducing a number of policy changes to ensure no such errors would occur again.


And from the time:
Saratov Airlines loses its international business over security violation - Russian aviation news (http://www.rusaviainsider.com/saratov-airlines-loses-its-international-business-over-security-violation/)

Commenting on the implicit danger of letting an outsider inside the cockpit, Rosaviacia reminded another incident, that resulted in a crash that killed 75 people aboard an Aeroflot Airbus A310 aircraft in March 1994. The cause of the accident was a pilot’s decision to let his children into the cockpit and allow them to take control of the aircraft.

Which... well, it's quite a big jump from 'letting someone unauthorised onto the flight deck' to 'handing over control and walking away', but whatever.

[Kulverstukas]

curUBRtG0tM

[Abbey Road]

Can anyone here (Kulverstukas?) pinpoint the accident site with a latitude/longitude, or a screen shot of Google Maps/Earth?

The initial reports stated it was "in the vicinity of the village. Argunovo, Ramensky district, Moscow region", which is close to where the Flight Radar 24 track ended. There are a couple of candidate villages of that name in the vicinity of the end of the track, located at 55.284126, 38.393218 and 55.348870, 38.486665, though I suspect it is the former, which is much closer to the end of the flight track.

I have done a visual search of the topography of both areas in Google Maps satellite view, comparing them with the UAV video above (thanks to Kulverstukas), but have been unable to match features to locate the accident site. Admittedly, the current heavy snow cover doesn't help with such a visual search

Any ideas for a precise location? Just curious.


LATER EDIT: I think I have now found the precise spot: 55.299086, 38.403529. Curiosity satisfied.

[DingerX]

The FR data is garbage; about all you can make up from it is that they climbed into IMC, turned 090, got the ground speed up to around 300 kts (~560 KPH) and bounced around 6000 feet/2000 meters for a while, then put the nose down. You might see wild accelerations in the (garbage) fine-grained data, but you can't conclude much more than that. Somatogravic illusion?

[Kulverstukas]

Can anyone here (Kulverstukas?) pinpoint the accident site with a latitude/longitude, or a screen shot of Google Maps/Earth?



Camera https://goo.gl/maps/1nspZdbyexH2
Impact https://goo.gl/maps/VN3zEkdoVup

[Kulverstukas]

https://cdn.aviaforum.ru/images/2018/02/911637_968f19ba030e8430b81fc0f512f88074.jpg

Left arrow - impact
Vertical arrow - engine part
Flight path - almost exactly W-E i.e. left to right.

[Anvaldra]

Operation of Saratov's AN-148 is suspended

[Abbey Road]

Kulverstukas, thanks, I think we got there at pretty much the same time. ;)

I believe your second link is the correct spot, on the north-west side of Stepanovskoye.

[thomasfo]

Flightglobal article from 2010:

"Rossiya says incidence of technical failure in its fleet occurred once every 344h in the An-148, every 5,355h in its Airbuses, and 2,824h in its Boeing 737s."

From (remove 2 spaces) www.flightglobal. com/ news/articles/rossiya-slams-an-148-reliability-347983/

Also interesting to see the ~50% difference between Airbus and Boeing, could it be difference in fleet type/age or is this a general picture?

[andrasz]

Left arrow - impact
Vertical arrow - engine part




Many thanks for the usual excellent information, this clears up a lot of initial speculation. That was some ground impact to totally destroy an engine like that and propel the part that far...

It does now appear that there was no in-flight breakup, the plane came down in one piece, in a very high energy state with at least one engine on full power.

[ExSimGuy]

CFIT? It certainly supports suggestions of an eroneous IAS - Pitot?

[Kulverstukas]

https://cdn.aviaforum.ru/images/2018/02/911679_65ab2d5904961d969f24f4d511f97952.jpeg

https://cdn.aviaforum.ru/images/2018/02/911680_d21ce2796d9efdf4568b77cd8c1f852a.jpeg

[Kulverstukas]

AuTwgFXXAW0

[lomapaseo]

AndrasZ
Kulver's latest video says the same story as the surveillance video camera. The main wreckage hit at a shallow angle with a substantial forward velocity.
The crucial question remains: where is the cockpit section shown on the initial video in relation to the main impact site. I have seen no trace of smoking wreckage on that frst video, so at a considerable distance I would presume - is it before or after... ?
Same applies to the mangled turbine shaft.

I don't see how you can exclude the same linear traces of debris across a field with some random wide scattering from a possibility of an inflight breakup.

I have yet to see a mangled turbine shaft

many possibilities are still open

[andrasz]

I have yet to see a mangled turbine shaft


You actually commented on it, saying you only saw such thing once... :)

In an inflight breakup one would typically expect to find pieces well before the main wreckage (hence my questions to locaton). In this case it seems to be confirmed that all the pieces we saw initially are within the debris fan ejected from the main impact point.

[PPRuNe Towers]

I've been following the Russian PPRuNe equivalent site since the first reports,

They reached page 40 while we still hadn't hit page 3 here and they are just about to reach page 100.

A vast amount of dross to filter but some pertinent points to pass on.

The AN 148 aircraft were from the Russian production line rather than the Ukraine.

Rossiya bought them but were unhappy with maintenance and reliability.

They later dry leased 4 airframes to Saratov.

The helicopter mid air claims were generated by a single news source and immediately debunked by the Russian Post Office.

Hours of in flight breakup conjecture for the usual host of potential reasons crushed by the cctv video. The aircraft rode its wings and tanks all the way to the ground and it had a tail to enable impact at such a low angle.

FR24 and other software fans claimed immediately that the entire 148 fleet never produced ADSB speed data and ground interpolation of position and time stamps is the only way speed could be displayed. For various reasons Saratov were restricted to internal flights plus a small handful of former Soviet states. Thus the lack of knowledge outside Russia regarding data integrity and absence of any usable granularity.

That final point above is the most important of all for the FR24 junkies out there already building their maps and theories.

Rob

[gearlever]

On Feb 12th 2018 the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (Sledcom) reported that the aircraft was intact until impact with the ground, an explosion occurred upon impact with the ground (editorial note: compare the video of the moment of impact below which immediately suggested this conclusion). Both black boxes have been found.Crash: Saratov A148 at Moscow on Feb 11th 2018, lost height after departure (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b4cb236&opt=0)

[Triskelle]

Enlarging a frame from the video just after impact, it appears that the burning fuel plume was associated with the engine launched forward from the main impact point.

[donotdespisethesnake]

It might appear like that, but there is a building obscuring part of the view. I don't think you can draw detailed analysis from that video.

[damirc]

If my understanding of the russian PPRuNe equivalent is correct the Voronezh (Russian) built An-148 have issues with the speed data in ADS-B, that's why FR24 interpolates the speed between datapoints - which naturely provides unreliable data (especially in a turn). If I understood correctly the Ukrainian built An-148's don't exhibit this behaviour.

[henra]

I think it is trees that block the view ob the lower part of the fireball. But the general statement is true: one can only see a small (upper) part of the fireball.
What else can be drawn from the way the fireball and the parts spread is that the angle of arrival was rather shallow, maybe somewhere around 30° and the forward velocity was very high.
So no lumbering in a stall and no lost tail feathers either.
Looks generally like a loss of control at altitude for whatever reason followed by an (aerodynamically) controlled (but from a piloting perspective apparently uncontrolled) dive with insufficient altitude to recover.

[underfire]

(e)ADS-B Latency Requirements -

(1) The aircraft must transmit its geometric position no later than 2.0 seconds from the time of measurement of the position to the time of transmission.

(2) Within the 2.0 total latency allocation, a maximum of 0.6 seconds can be uncompensated latency. The aircraft must compensate for any latency above 0.6 seconds up to the maximum 2.0 seconds total by extrapolating the geometric position to the time of message transmission.

(3) The aircraft must transmit its position and velocity at least once per second while airborne or while moving on the airport surface.

(4) The aircraft must transmit its position at least once every 5 seconds while stationary on the airport surface.

[PPRuNe Towers]

I've just deleted a post from a data driven FR24 junkie so lets do this again.

The Antonovs from the Russia production line at Voronezh have never transmitted speed whatever the requirement and specification docs say.

All the Ukrainian produced airframes do work.

The SSJ had the same problems to cause embarrassment on its world tour until it was 'modified.' I can't say for sure but I suspect Western equipment had to be bought and integrated as overseas sales were inherent to the SSJ's reasons to exist.

Further, I have an Excel spreadsheet of the raw ADSB data. Three columns have zero for every sample entry for three fields.

Altitude
Speed
Vertical Speed

So, a big air data black hole.

Irrespective of the flight following software you favour it is making a huge proportion of what you see up. Good luck working out what each version of software used as its algorithms and data crunching to guess the data you are looking at.

Rob

[Feathers McGraw]

What was the source of your spreadsheet data?

Be vague if you wish...

[DingerX]

FR24 published their ADS-B data in csv format.
Airspeed isn't there, but GPS lat/long is, and that's what I used to get a ground speed of 300 kts until nose down. Even that data is weird, though,since not only does the same data repeat, sometimes it throws other numbers in there.
So I found that I could get acceptable data by taking the values that are repeated and using the time stamp of the first time that value was reported. After all, we know where the plane ended, and the points selected draw a line there over the time elapsed.

But if you want to do fine -grained analysis, the data won't work. Something about the laws of physics.

[DaveReidUK]

Flight profile from cleaned-up FR24 data:

http://www.avgen.co.uk/SOV703.jpg

Last 60 seconds of recorded data (ending at 2475' AMSL, give or take a QNH adjustment) suggests a ROD of around 3800 fpm and a GS of about 315 kts.

[RatherBeFlying]

The Haversine formula will give distance between two nearby lat/long points. Dividing by the interval yields groundspeed in level flight and is close enough in normal climbs and descents.

In the case of steep climbs and descents you also need to include altitude change.

GPS accuracy can be affected by extreme attitudes as satellites come into and out of view.

[PPRuNe Towers]

New version of the spread sheet with more data.

No Altitude until the alt kicks in passing 425' on departure at 11:21z and then the data shows a steady climb.

A series of climb data points indicating 1200 - 1500 feet until a maximum of 1900 at 11:22z. The transponder remained squawking 1571 and didn't ever change through the whole flight. There were several data missed captures with no squawk or time code but altitude was read

Climb continued but with great amounts for time hack discards and replaced by SOV073. There are fairly regular misreads from single data points usually indicating spurious altitude in the teens and as erroneous as FL290. These were individual points

By 11:25z it was operating or or near 6000' but climb continued.

11:26z 6700' drifting back down to 6000' but continuing descent.

VSI data show the usual odd, individual rogue numbers slipping in as I'd expect but the climb 6000 to 6700 has rates suggesting it had been cleared higher. However the descent rate becomes pronounced but leaping from sample to sample from positive to negative numbers in the course of a single second of data.

The attempt to level again at 6000 dips below and here the time hacks are more regular suggesting there's a fair bit of heave ho going on to reach 6000 from 5800' and continues up to 6275'.

The aircraft remains around that altitude for about 5 seconds but the pitch to regain 6000' and remain there is very brief and returns to descent and remains that way until the lowest recorded 2475' and beyond. Below 4900 feet there are no time stamps at all but the claimed vsi data is very extreme.

I've taken the time to describe this in words so that pilots can analyse what was happening and run it through the things they've experienced in the sim over the years.

The pretty illustrations while dramatic are compressed and don't show the data we see in the time periods we have to analyse and react.

Rob

[Kulverstukas]

Both recorders are now lifted and seems they are in satisfactory condition. Hope first information from FDR will be available in a week.

[DaveReidUK]

Better angle showing the vertical excursions described by Rob and the impact point identified by Kulverstukas:

http://217.34.152.155/SOV703(2).jpg

[Feathers McGraw]

The initial upset where climbing becomes a descent looks very sudden. There must have been a rapid change of pitch.

[Volume]

More interesting than the vertical excursions is the absolutely straight track the aircraft flew. Does not look like a hand flown plane struggling to maintain control... If there would be an elevator issue, the autopilot would most probably quit, and the track would not be that straight. Either strange data or a strange behaviour...

[clearedtocross]

It would be interesting to know what the departure clearance was in regard to altitude. Afaik altitude in Russia is not in feet but in meters below transition altitude. The first dip on the graphics looks like the pilots following an atc command like "descend to 2000m" or similar (2000m aprox. 6700ft) and then later a clearance for higher. Just a vague possibility. What's strange is that the rapid descent thereafter was absolutely straight which would suggest that the plane was at least partially under AP control.

[lomapaseo]

What's strange is that the rapid descent thereafter was absolutely straight which would suggest that the plane was at least partially under AP control.

What would the ballistic trajectory look like ?

[Kulverstukas]

MAK/IAC proceeded to decrypt the data of the An-148 FDR

"Due to mechanical damages of the protected memory modules, it was necessary to conduct their complete disassembly with the dismantling of solid-state storage media," the report says on the IAC website.
IAC specialists successfully copied all the information of the on-board parametric recorder. Now at the disposal of the IAC there is a record of 16 flights, including the one that ended in a catastrophe. The specialists began to decipher the record.

[singleacting]

I am thinking blocked pitot, and increase in indicated speed with altitude, thrust perhaps coming to idle (auto throttle if it has) and stall.Perhaps you mean all statics?

[Loose rivets]

The sudden decent may be causal rather than the result of a failure.

Not VFR I gather, but some stimulus other than ATC. For example, suddenly/instinctively pushing against the autopilot only to find pitch control was far from normal after that.

[CargoOne]

Don't put much on someone else in the cockpit - they normally carry one or two ground engineers to sign the transit check (wonders of all Antonov planes), it is quit likely that mechanics are jumpseating in cockpit especially with high pax loads.

[Volume]

From the bare metal leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer I would assume, it has a bleed air anti-ice system. Can somebody confirm the ice protection system design? Is the AoA Vane/pitot/static heating monitored/indicated? Is the elevator hydraulically actuated? The pure elevator related flight path fluctuations in combination with a straight track indicates to me that the issue was somehow related to pitch control, either due to the auto pilot, the FWB or mechanical/aerodynamical horizontal stabilizer/elevator issues without proper feedback to the systems/pilots.
I would assume the autopilot would quit if the pilot fights against it or some system malfunctions.

[akaSylvia]

I'm probably being slow here but if the aircraft was intact when it impacted the ground and then broke up into a lot of very wide-spread pieces, why isn't there a big black hole in the snow?

Specifically, I very much thought it looked like an in-flight break up because of how wide-spread the wreckage was and I'm having a hard time getting my head around the type of ground impact that would leave this sort of mess, as opposed to say a shallower version of the crater from the West Air Sweden CRJ crash in 2016?

[hoss183]

In an inflight breakup one would typically expect to find pieces well before the main wreckage (hence my questions to locaton). In this case it seems to be confirmed that all the pieces we saw initially are within the debris fan ejected from the main impact point.

Well exactly, ALL we have seen so far.
There may well be elevators or other control surfaces back along the track. I'm sure its not easy to find parts in the snow.
It was clearly mostly intact at the end, but not necessarily 100%

[CargoOne]

Russian media is quoting MAK (Russian AIB) says heating of pitots and static was off and caused wrong speed indication which lead to crash

Use google translate
https://m.lenta.ru/news/2018/02/13/mak/

[His dudeness]

Thats is a hell of a quick investigation....

[txl]

Here's a RT report in English (https://www.rt.com/news/418664-russia-plane-crash-cause/):


The crash of An-148 passenger plane in the Moscow Region may have been caused by incorrect flight speed data due to icing, the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) said after deciphering the flight data recorder.

On Tuesday, the IAC announced it had completed the deciphering of information contained in the one of the black boxes – the on-board data flight recorder – of the crashed plane. It is still working on the other black box, the voice recorder.

The preliminary analysis suggests that the “incorrect data about flight speed on the pilots' indicators, which in turn was linked to the icing of the pitot-static [sensor] system” led to a “special situation” with the plane, according to the IAC statement.

(continued (https://www.rt.com/news/418664-russia-plane-crash-cause/))

[A0283]

@akaSylvia having a hard time getting my head around the type of ground impact that would leave this sort of mess

You would need more information to get a good answer of course... But one aspect that we could keep in mind is that it is a high wing with underslung engines. So the impact dynamics can be quite different.

One scenario might be that the final segment of the flight path was under a shallow angle and at some speed. Which might explain the impact 'channels' in the snow. The entry being such that the wing-engines combination detaches from the top of the fuselage. Which might explain the very unusual and high 'roll over' trajectory of 'long flames' on one of the videos. This detachment both rupturing the fuel tanks and destroying the structural integrity of the fuselage. Which might help explain a combination of fragmentation and deformation that could follow that ...

Even within such a single scenario there are multiple possible sub-options. Based on for example engine thrust at impact, impact angle, and impact speed.
If you look at the long flames, and assume we see the trajectory from the side, it might suggest that the planes was wings-level on impact.

The snow is at least knee deep and can hide quite a lot of information if you have to go by photos only.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Assuming they knew they had conflicting instrument indications (they might not have had time to deduce it was airspeed indication that was wrong) why wouldn't they fly power / attitude?

Surely they wouldn't just slavishly follow an erroneous ASI readout and ignore excessive pitch attitude indications (presumably on both main AIs and the standby AI)?

[Luc Lion]

why isn't there a big black hole in the snow?It was snowing at the time of the accident.
So, a snow blanket has covered the wreckage.

Specifically, I very much thought it looked like an in-flight break up because of how wide-spread the wreckage was and I'm having a hard time getting my head around the type of ground impact that would leave this sort of mess, as opposed to say a shallower version of the crater from the West Air Sweden CRJ crash in 2016?
Compare with the images of 5A-ONG wreckage in Lybia (although the Lybian plane speed was lower).
It was also a shallow angle impact.
https://cdn.aviation-safety.net/photos/accidents/20100512-0-C-1.jpg
http://www.aviation-accidents.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/afriqiyah-airbus-a330-202-5a-ong-flight-8u881.jpg
https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2010/20100512-0_A332_5A-ONG.pdf

[Volume]

Thats is a hell of a quick investigation....
There is some reputation of the Russian Industry at stake...

[Mr Joshua]

I rarely ever post here as I am a true amateur but I have a question for the pros. Why can't pitot tube heaters be automated so they they automatically turn on at a specific external temperature ?

[Kulverstukas]

AN-148-100B RA-61704 11.02.2018 (http://mak-iac.org/en/rassledovaniya/an-148-100b-ra-61704-11-02-2018/)

http://mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/e03/briefing_mak_2017_02_13.jpg

[hph304]

Mr Joshua on multiple ac types they are automatic. I don't know about the An-148 though

[PPRuNe Towers]

For browsers that don't translate on the fly here's the most substantive section of this preliminary report.

As I was hinting in the early hours of this morning. 15 previous flights pitot and port heating recorded on. No heat for this take off. You'll find the point where they went manual and I described a bit of 'heave ho' going on.

Credit due, as usual, to our Kulverstukas.

Rob

The commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) to investigate the crash of the An-148-100V plane RA-61704 informs that the decoding of the on-board parametric recorder data was completed in the IAC laboratory and preliminary information analysis was carried out.

A preliminary analysis of the registered parametric information showed that during the entire flight, which ended in an accident, the heating of all three full pressure receivers (PAP) was off. In all other flights on the chart recorder (15 more flights), the heating of the overflow was activated before take-off at the executive launch.

The takeoff was started around 11:21 (here and below the UTC time).

After the separation at an altitude of 130-150 m (hereinafter the height from the runway level), the autopilot was switched on. In the longitudinal channel of the autopilot, the mode of reaching the specified altitude was fulfilled, in the lateral channel - the horizontal navigation. At an altitude of 550 m the flaps were cleaned.

A special situation began to develop approximately 2 minutes 30 seconds after the separation at an altitude of about 1300 meters and an instrument speed of 465-470 km / h, when the discrepancies in the speed readings from MVP1 (air parameters module) (LPD1) of the left pilot and MVP3 , standby). The recorder does not register the speed values ​​from the MVP2 (PPD2) of the right pilot. There were no significant differences in the altitude indication (from the same sources: MVP1 and MVP3). After ~ 25 seconds, the discrepancies reached ~ 30 km / h (the speed from MVP1 was greater) and a one-time crew appeared (message to the crew): V instrument - CF. The registration of a single command at this stage lasted about 10 seconds, after which it ceased.

After about 50 seconds, at an altitude of about 2000 meters, this one-time command was registered again, and this time the rate from MVP3 was larger and continued to grow, and the rate from MVP1 continued to fall.

After the second appearance of the said one-time command (message), the crew disconnected the autopilot. All further flight passed in a manual mode.

The speed readings from the MVP1 continued to fall and after 34 seconds the autopilot was turned off. The speed readings from the MVP3 were 540-560 km / h.

For about 50 seconds after autopilot shutdown, the flight passed at an altitude of 1700-1900 m with vertical overload changes ranging from 1.5 to 0.5 g.

After that, while maintaining the speed values ​​from the MVP1 0 km / h, the velocity values ​​from MVP3 (to 200 km / h and below) began to fall rapidly. In the future, the aircraft was transferred to an intensive decline with pitch angles to dive 30-35 degrees and vertical overload to 0 g.

The collision with the earth occurred around 11:27:05. Before the collision with the ground, the speed readings from the MVP3 began to increase intensively and by the time the collision amounted to about 800 km / h. The speed readings from the MVP1 continued to be equal to 0.

At the time of the collision with the ground, the angle of the pitch to the dive was about 30 degrees, 4-5 seconds before the collision, the right bank began to develop at the aircraft, which reached 25 degrees.

The analysis of the received information continues.

A preliminary analysis of the recorded information, as well as an analysis of similar cases that occurred in the past, suggest that the development of a special situation in the flight could be caused by incorrect data on the flight speed on the pilots indicators, which in turn was apparently due to icing of the PAP when the heating systems are off.

In order to determine the reasons for the shutdown of the heating state of the three PDPs by the investigation commission, the following works are planned, including:

· Decoding of the on-board sound recorder to obtain information about the actions of the crew, the performance of the Operation Technology and the response to signaling;

· Study of the Technology of crew work with the system of heating of PPD, including indication;

· Schematic analysis of the heating systems of PPD for possible malfunctions and failures;

· The laying out of the remaining fragments of the heating systems of PPD.

Specialists of the commission of inquiry also continue to work at the scene of the accident, where the description of the scene of the incident is completed and the fragments of the aircraft structure are collected for further research.

In order to prevent accidents and develop operational recommendations, a brief briefing was held today at the Interstate Aviation Committee, attended by representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry for Emergencies, Rosaviatsia, Rostransnadzor, and airlines operating this type of aircraft. At the briefing, IAC specialists presented the participants with preliminary results of the investigation to take operational measures in the field of flight safety.

[Snyggapa]

Assuming they knew they had conflicting instrument indications (they might not have had time to deduce it was airspeed indication that was wrong) why wouldn't they fly power / attitude?

Surely they wouldn't just slavishly follow an erroneous ASI readout and ignore excessive pitch attitude indications (presumably on both main AIs and the standby AI)?

Why not - happened before (AF477?) , will happen again as long as humans are in the chain of command. Humans behave in irrational ways, sometimes.

I'm not saying that machines in the cockpit would be a perfect solution, they might solve this problem but replace it with another.

[Jaair]

Also happened back in Dominican Republic, 1996 - Birgenair Flight 301, Boeing 757. The captain noticed his ASI was erroneous during take-off roll but decided not to abort due to the first officer's ASI "working".

[RatherBeFlying]

There's three other air carrier fatal accidents on the record in the previous millennium where pitot static systems were implicated:

Aero 08 - Erroneous Flight Instrument Information (http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_08/erroneous_story.html)

I once discovered a dead airspeed on takeoff and took it into the air to avoid trundling into the ravine at the end of the runway. I spent half an hour sorting out what to do. Pretty simple in a 172 on a nice day. Much more difficult in a jet.

[gearlever]

The “Zero Flight Time Training” program allows high
quality training of pilots for the entire An-148
/An-158 family without training flights on a real
airplanehttp://www.antonov.com/media/archive/FAMILY%20OVERVIEW.pdf

Hhm....

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Thats is a hell of a quick investigation....

Ah, but it's not an ""investigation" - it's a statement of the facts as derived from the FDR - and I will concur/concede that it does seem speedy.

But an "investigation" would want to know WHY the heaters were off - crew error, system fault, etc? - and also to understand the sequence by which the initial problem led to the crash. There's still plenty for MAK to do in detail, in "slow time".

[akaSylvia]

Thanks for the explanations, especially the snowless photograph!

Bizarrely, just yesterday I spent an hour explaining to someone about the Aeroperú 603 crash and how a partial blockage is harder to spot than a complete one. But I thought that in that case, the readings are too low while climbing and too high while descending which doesn't seem to map with MVP3.

Regarding automated heating: that it isn't at all clear that the pilots didn't turn the heat on (or that it wasn't automated), just that they didn't manage to diagnose the issue in the first minutes of the flight.

[CargoOne]

While not exactly the same but there was Westair CRJ200 crash a few years ago in Sweden - erroneous instrument indications caused by IRS failure which was not recognised properly by a reasonably well experienced crew...

[EDMJ]

metar: uudd 111230z 13005mps 8000 -shsn few008 bkn026cb m05/m07 q1019 r14r/590293 r14l///99// tempo 1200 shsn

.. shortly after 11:20 UTC at approx. 6000 ft - were they then not VMC above clouds in daylight?

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

I once discovered a dead airspeed on takeoff and took it into the air to avoid trundling into the ravine at the end of the runway. I spent half an hour sorting out what to do. Pretty simple in a 172 on a nice day. Much more difficult in a jet.

Indeed but that's easy - you know of the problem while still on the ground. I'm sure we've all flown circuits in light aircraft with the ASI covered over.

This would have been more subtle - airspeed indications would have been OK up until the point where the pitots froze. If the autopilot was engaged when that happened, that may have caused confusion as well (presumably they were in IMC).

[WHBM]

From the BBC
The instruments began displaying different speed readings, probably because of iced speed sensors while their heating systems were shut off, the committee said....



Russian media reports said the plane's captain had rejected a de-icing treatment on the plane before takeoff. The procedure is optional and the crew's decision is based mainly on the weather conditions.

Russia Saratov crash: Ice on sensors 'may be cause' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43048921)

De icing is typically wings and tail, yes ? The pitot ports are electrically heated.

Though as it was snowing at the time on the ground the lack of de-icing is still maybe notable.

[deSitter]

For browsers that don't translate on the fly here's the most substantive section of this preliminary report.

As I was hinting in the early hours of this morning. 15 previous flights pitot and port heating recorded on. No heat for this take off. You'll find the point where they went manual and I described a bit of 'heave ho' going on.

Credit due, as usual, to our Kulverstukas.

Rob

Very interesting. Sounding like another case of being unable to fly an airplane with one's own brain and hands.

[AerocatS2A]

Thanks for the explanations, especially the snowless photograph!

Bizarrely, just yesterday I spent an hour explaining to someone about the Aeroperú 603 crash and how a partial blockage is harder to spot than a complete one. But I thought that in that case, the readings are too low while climbing and too high while descending which doesn't seem to map with MVP3.

Regarding automated heating: that it isn't at all clear that the pilots didn't turn the heat on (or that it wasn't automated), just that they didn't manage to diagnose the issue in the first minutes of the flight.

A blocked pitot will cause the airspeed indicator to work a bit like an altimeter. As you climb the ASI progressively reads higher and as you descend it reads lower.

I once discovered I had an iced pitot on a Pitts Special as I was climbing out (caused by water in the dynamic pressure lines rather than flying through icing conditions). The whistling in the wires was enough speed information to be able to continue the aerobatic sortie and once that was completed the ice had cleared and the ASI was working normally for landing. Being solidly VMC helped of course.

[Sidestick_n_Rudder]

When I flew PA34 for living it was quite common to for the ASI to drop to 0 in icing conditions - even though the pitot heat was on. Once we were shown this it was a non event. We just continued to fly and after a while the indications were coming back.

Having said that, one colleague of mine, when faced with this situation for the first time, reacted on instincts and pushed the yoke full forward, sending the plane into a dive. Luckily they recovered before the ground...

[Loose rivets]

I recall a quick Aldergrove to City, low level at night, rough as old boots. The tooter and stick shake were on nearly the whole flight, and it astonished me just how it affected my complacency about being able to accept the disruption of just one sensory input. Reacting to that warning was embedded deep in my mind, and dismissing it was bewilderingly hard to do.

[gums]

Have to make a comment on this one, and will not continue much as I did on AF447 thread.

Anyone here that has had the aero probes freeze/quit should have observations such as mine. If the AP was trying to obtain a commanded speed or pitch or....., then you can see the beginning of the accident when the air data went tits up.

I had the static ports freeze up one day due to simple electrical failure of the heater. So descending to the approach fix the speed went up but the altimiter remained at whatever altitude the ports froze. AHA! I had not changed the pitch attitude, and furthermore I had an inertial flight path marker that remained where it was when the ports froze. Big deal, right? Continued descent and looked at radar altimiter. Also intercepted the ILS glide path from above once the needle came off the bottom of the indicator. Ports came clear a few thousand feet AGL, altimiter came back and landed.

I have to iterate some lessons rrom AF447 and other cases where the air data or other data goes bonkers. Turn off the AP!. Maintain attitude and power that existed when crazy things happened. Don't do something! Just sit there!

[Miles Magister]

Gosh, Too many children of the magenta in the air these days. In the days when every picture and the instruments were all in black and white we trained for and practiced this. At the risk of being labeled a grumpy old man why do we not train for it any more? What is wrong with power and attitude?

[PJ2]

An old accident, still as relevant as Birgenair, AF447.

The B727 pitot heat was not automatic and had to be turned on during the cockpit check.

http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR75-13.pdf

"About 1926 EST on December 1. 1974, Northwest Airlines Flight 6231, a Boeing 727-251 crashed about 3.2 mi west of Thiells, New York. The accident occurred about 12 minutes after the flight had departed John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, and while on a ferry flight to Buffalo, New York. Three crew-members, the only persons aboard the aircraft, died in the crash. The aircraft was destroyed.

"The aircraft stalled at 24,800 feet MSL., and entered an uncontrolled spiral descent into the ground. Throughout the stall and descent, the flight crew did not recognize the actual condition of the aircraft and did not take the correct measures necessary to return the aircraft to level flight. Near 3,500 feet m.s.l., a large portion of the left horizontal stabilizer separated from the aircraft, which made control of the aircraft impossible.

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the loss of control of the aircraft because the flight crew failed to recognize and correct the aircraft's high-angle-of-attack, low-speed stall and its descending spiral. The stall was precipitated by the flight crew's improper reaction to erroneous airspeed and Mach indications which had resulted from a blockage of the pitot heads by atmospheric icing. Contrary to standard operational procedures the flight crew had not activated the pitot head heaters."

[akaSylvia]

There's more of these in the last millenium than in this one, I daresay.

[gearlever]

Pitot heat on AN 148.

Is it auto switched ON, like on Airbus (at least one eng running), or are there manual switches to turn it on?

[sonicbum]

gearlever

Probably it is all manual on or off according to the latest news we have.

[Chu Chu]

There's more of these in the last millenium than in this one, I daresay.

But the average annual rate is higher in this one. :)

[DType]

Since the original stick shaker/pusher was driven by angle of attack, I do not understand why unusual AoA is not given a more prominent display/siren. Would have helped in AF447. Maybe here too.
But I am an engineer, not a pilot, so my apologies if this is a dumb suggestion.

[Bergerie1]

DType,

No - it is not a dumb suggestion. And after the Air France accident there was much discussion here on Proone about the virtues of having an angle of attack display.

However, in my view, one of the most basic parts of flying is to know the appropriate power and attitudes for each phase of flight. Others have already said it but - Power plus Attitude equalls Performance.

Whether this was something that might have saved this accident we will not know until we have seen the final report.

[gearlever]

@Kulverstukas or AN drivers

Do you know how the pitot heat in AN 148 is activated?

Manual via switches (like 727, older 737)?

OR

AUTO like on Airbus (at least one eng running)

[get_over_it]

DType,
Power plus Attitude equalls Performance.


Unless the wing is stalled. One of the problems the crew of AF447 had.

[aterpster]

An old accident, still as relevant as Birgenair, AF447.

The B727 pitot heat was not automatic and had to be turned on during the cockpit check.

http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR75-13.pdf

Same day as the infamous TWA 514, about 12 hours later.

I was on the 727 at the time. I often wondered why one of three on that NWA crew didn't double-check the pitot heat when things first started going screwy in obviously bad winter weather.

[liider]

@gearlever

Pitot heat in AN 148 is activated manually before takeoff.

[rigpiggy]

Because proper training/experience costs money, either in salaries or airplane/sim time. The penny pinchers rule now, we must deal with it, hopefully without losses

[gums]

PLZ remember that USAF lost a B-2 on takeoff because of moisture/water in the air data sensor lines. Simple procedures were adopted and voila!

You can have the pitot heat on as early as you want but it won't prevent or melt ice further up stream. So it's possible to have moisture that freezes once the bird gets up and with cold air flowing thru the tubes.

I am having a hard time with the gees as well as the power/pitch procedures.

[vovachan]

You are not supposed to run the heat while on the ground for more than 2 minutes which can lead to a fair amount of on/off switching before takeoff.

Easy mistake to make

[aterpster]

Automatic pilot heat deals with that issue.

[gearlever]

Well sometimes it's too hot for the pilot, sometimes too cold...

[henra]

As I was hinting in the early hours of this morning. 15 previous flights pitot and port heating recorded on. No heat for this take off.


Reading the quoted text I understand they didn't even stall it. They just pointed the nose 30° down until impact!? Actively fighting and defeating an aircraft that would have probably happily continued to fly hadn't they subdued it.
So much for Pitch&Power. The AI must have been showing a lot of Brown stuff (Probably 'Brown out'). And still no clue that something is wrong?
Wow!


Will be interesting what CVR will say. Probably total chaos and total panic. Scary.

[KelvinD]

I am sorry if this sounds silly but wouldn't the captain have a clue something was wrong with the pitch when he had to, effectively, walk up a steep hill to get back to the flight deck?

[EDLB]

Has anyone information how much hand fly experience the crew in IMC conditions had? Loss of SA resulting in a CFIT seem to be a universal problem.

[Anvaldra]

Reported that captain has military experience with 5099 h total including 2147 h on AN148 (as captain since 2017) and co-pilot has 812 h total flight time

[PJ2]

sonicbum, agreed.

Unfortunately, the points remain worth making and are possibly relevant to understanding this accident. Back to the thread.

[Kulverstukas]

MAK-IAC confirmed that CVR was fully read and deciphered. Information obtained confirms one from FDR reading. Investigation continued.

[ATC Watcher]

Lots of people here are referring to eventual lack of basic flying skills to explain that one. If we were talking about an operator using MPLs with 150h on the right seat or accepting shady licences , perhaps, that would be relevant, but in Russia ? Flying in Russia was (still) includes some of the most regulated professions there and basic flying training was far above some western standards. I do not think things have changed much since my time there. But wait to be corrected.

I was told once that Antonov Russian build aircraft were fitted with ( old) Russian avionics and automation , unlike the Ukrainians built ones , which are fitted with standard Western avionics. Can someone in the know confirm this ?

[tdracer]

Bring back manual flying first - Automation after. I'd happily pay XXX more per seat I flew on and know I'd have a crew that were on top form and knew how to manually fly an aircraft. Truth be told, I think 90% of people would.

RiSq, while I share your concern over the degradation of manual flying skills, it's worth noting that - assuming the reports are accurate - some very basic automation would have saved the day. Nearly every western airliner built in the last 30 years has automatic pitot probe heat as a basic feature. Had this relatively new aircraft had that basic automation we wouldn't be having this discussion because there wouldn't have been an accident to discuss.

[liider]

The 45-year old FO of this flight was a former steward, who got his license in June 2017 after 10-month courses. All his 812h are on AN-148, no other experience.

The Captain was an ex-military, with a total of more than 2000h on AN-148, but (not officially confirmed yet) only 58h as Capt.

[blind pew]

My first two flag carriers did and probably still do hand flying on a nice day.
My last did It when the weather was cr*p especially sensible because of intrusion of unmonitored general Aviation in our airspace on nice days.
When things go wrong it’s often on those dirty days when you are tired...anyone can fly and trouble shoot on a sunny morning.
After the frogs got it wrong there was a similar incident out east..the crew said they only just managed and if it hadn’t been in relatively good weather at the start of their day it would have probably turned into another accident.

[Double Back]

To a certain extent I can understand forgetting to turn on the pitot heat (who didn't miss an item in his career?), but a plane like this doesn't it have a clearly visible lighted annunciation of that situation? No "all indicator lights out before T/O" philosophy?

But let's face it, we have been taught, trained to the limit, brainwashed, programmed to always trust Your instruments. Now suddenly You AND Yr mate, amidst solid IMC, need to step back and use other sources/procedures to guide Yr plane.

Of course I also flew through sim sessions in which You knew this event was going to be "played". Easy stuff. But I was happy that I never had to tackle a situation as happened here, even if it was because of their own (?) omission.
Unlike an explosive engine failure, this one slowly creeps upon You, which makes is even more deadlier.

[Martin_123]

To a certain extent I can understand forgetting to turn on the pitot heat (who didn't miss an item in his career?), but a plane like this doesn't it have a clearly visible lighted annunciation of that situation? No "all indicator lights out before T/O" philosophy?

It does actually.. pictures on the Russian forums are floating around with very prominent yellow warning messages displayed on ECAM should the heating be off or failed

[fortybelow]

As a humble turboprop pilot I rarely venture into these lofty realms - however, many moons ago as a F/O on a venerable Convair 580 turboprop freighter operating downunder, I had the misfortune to experience a complete failure of the pitot static system on takeoff at night into a low overcast and driving rain.

The usual pitch attitude did not (apparently) give the expected performance, so I reduced the pitch angle from (the usual) 7deg nose up to 5 deg. Speed and ROC continued to (apparently) decrease. I was about to reduce the pitch further when (mental) alarm bells started ringing. I was well below 1000 a.g.l at night, both engines were running and yet the instruments wanted me to pitch forward.

I announced to the Captain that there was a serious issue with the pitot-static instruments and I was reverting to power and attitude only. Won't bore you with the rest of the details; I will only say that the urge to pitch forward to "regain airspeed" was almost overpowering. Watching the ASI decrease towards (and eventually below) stall speed was terrifying, knowing that I was betting our lives on my assessment. The ol 580 didn't have checklists for these situations.

All ended well but it remains the single most terrifying few minutes (and also my proudest) of my career to date.

I can only imagine what this crew was thinking and trying to understand and my heart goes out to them, having some tiny inkling of the confusion they must have felt.

[pilotmike]

Shaggy Sheep Driver:
They had all the AIs showing pitch attitude massively high....
Ample time to do an instrument scan and note the excessive nose-up pitch attitude.

Really? What is the source of your (mis)information?
SSD: When the captain came back onto the flight deck to a scene of chaos and panic, but in plenty of time to recover the situation, why did he miss that massive pitch-up indication?

Probably because there wasn't a massive pitch-up indication. Again, what is the source of your information? Exactly what pitch up attitude are you calling "massive"?

Confusing pitch attitude and angle of attack is a very basic error, especially for a pilot claiming as much experience as yourself.

Many might believe that any of the pilots on AF447 could and should have assessed what was going on from the combination of instrument indications, however your confusion perfectly illustrates some of the issues about assumptions, training, experience etc. They were dealing with it in the air, under pressure, for real, as it happened. You are relaying 'facts' (read assumptions) from the ground, not under pressure, with the benefit of hindsight and years to review the reported facts.

[WHBM]

Fortybelow :

That's a belter of an account, and all credit to you for how you handled it. How did the story continue back to landing ?

Given that GPS will also provide quite reasonable approximate values for these items, is there not scope nowadays for it providing a backup display.

[safelife]

I can second what fortybelow wrote. Lost all ASIs on a Citation X in a stormy day, the urge to pitch down to recover the ever reducing indicated speed was definitely there.

[wiedehopf]

WHBM

gps is always ground speed. so no gps is not the solution.

you may lookup the airbus backup speed scale.

what may be feasible but still highly unreliable was a good wind data base in combination with gps.

[Sunamer]

Flying in Russia was (still) includes some of the most regulated professions there and basic flying training was far above some western standards. ?

That is simply not true( I mean, the second part of your statement). There is nothing useful if out of all western standards, you are above only 2 of them...(and only nominally and only on paper).
When you look at normalized statistics of crashes (aka the reality), you can clearly see who has better training standards. Just saying

[Ramjet555]

Well here is the first real answers from the Flight Recorders
It appears they either ignored or glossed over their check lists and missed the Pitot Heat.

Black Box Data Tells of Chaos Before Plane Crash Near Moscow
Black box data recovered from the ill-fated airliner that crashed outside Moscow last week suggests that the plane’s pilots had received different speed measurements preceding the crash, leading to chaos and hampering attempts to stave the tragedy.

Saratov Airlines Flight 703 plummeted in the Moscow region four minutes after departing from Domodedovo Airport on Sunday, claiming 71 lives.

The pilots' "inarticulate cries" can be heard on the flight recorder immediately before the crash, the Kommersant business daily reported on Thursday.

Citing an unnamed source familiar with the black box data, the outlet said that it showed “the pilots didn’t understand why distorted speed readings showed up on the displays,” hampering efforts to bring the critical situation under control.

According to the data, the pilots had failed to turn on the heating of the An-148 aircraft’s pressure measurement equipment before takeoff, despite the procedure being listed on a preflight checklist.

The pilots reportedly got into an argument about the data while trying to solve the problem, increasing the speed and tilting the plane to the ground preceding the crash.

Earlier, Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) said that the pilots had failed to turn on the heating unit for the plane’s pressure measurement equipment, which displayed incorrect speed readings in cold weather.

Russia’s Investigative Committee said Thursday that it would consider the black box data in its criminal investigation of the crash.

https://themoscowtimes.com/news/black-box-data-tells-chaos-before-plane-crash-near-moscow-60528

The Sorry State of Russian Aviation Safety
“If we don’t urgently deal with this problem, these tragedies will simply continue to happen”

The plane was in the air only five minutes before its steep fall began. Left dead were six crew members and 65 passengers, including three children and a Swiss national.

Flight 703 only made it 80 kilometers southeast of the capital after departing Domodedovo Airport on Sunday afternoon. Operated by Saratov Airlines, a regional carrier, the An-148 aircraft was headed for Orsk, a city in southern Russia between the country’s border with Kazakhstan and the southern tip of the Ural Mountains.

Sunday’s scenes were all too familiar for Russians: It was the third major civil airliner disaster in recent years.

Even though 2017 was reportedly the safest year yet in commercial passenger jet travel worldwide, the spate of crashes in Russia, experts say, will continue unless the country's civil aviation agencies are overhauled.

What caused the latest tragedy is only in the early stages of being pieced together.

Investigators said that they are exploring a wide range of possibilities, including poor plane maintenance, inclement weather and human error — though terrorism was ruled out quickly, with the Investigative Committee saying that the plane was intact before the crash.

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-sorry-state-of-russian-aviation-safety-60475

Russia: Plane crash caused by pilots’ error on speed data

MOSCOW (AP) — Investigators say the crash of a Russian passenger plane that killed all 71 people on board may have been caused by the pilots’ failure to activate heating for pressure measurement equipment, resulting in flawed speed data.

The Interstate Aviation Committee said Tuesday, after studying the plane’s flight data recorder, that Sunday’s crash occurred after the pilots saw varying data on the plane’s two air speed indicators.

The flawed indication came because the pilots failed to turn on the heating unit for the plane’s pressure measurement equipment prior to takeoff.

The pilots put the An-148 on autopilot after taking off from Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport but took manual controls back when they saw clashing speed data.

The plane plummeted into a snowy field six minutes after takeoff, killing all 65 passengers and six crew.

https://apnews.com/ce5fca8731de4c09a7679378195ce080

[VGCM66]

Flying in Russia this time of the year without the pitot tube heaters on, yeap, that will do it. And from just 6000 feet and maybe even a cloudy day, no way for a recovery. On top, not too many hours on type. Not a chance.

Cheers,

[AAKEE]

I guess the An-148 has alfa/AoA-protection? Does it present AoA to the pilots?

[safetypee]

Assuming that the Russian certification requirements are similar to EASA/FAA, which from my experience they are, then one area for accident investigation would be on the pitot heat alerting system.
Was an alert given;
no; then why not, given the requirements below? (if...then this failure must be indicated).
yes; then why was it not observed / acted on? (is there a condition where a pitot heat failure is masked by a collective icing alert relating to another failure or MEL item).

Re AAKEE, is the AoA heating part of the pitot heating system?

Extracts from EASA CS 25
CS 25.1326 Flight instrument external probes heating systems alert
If a flight instrument external probe heating system is installed, an alert must be provided to the flight crew when the flight instrument external probe heating system is not operating or not functioning normally. The alert must comply with the following requirements:
The alert provided must conform to the Caution alert indications.
The alert provided must be triggered if either of the following conditions exists:
The flight instrument external probe heating system is switched ‘off’
The flight instrument external probe heating system is switched ‘on’ and is not functioning normally.

AMC 25.1326 Flight instrument external probes heating systems alert
CS 25.1326 requires that if a flight instrument external probe heating system is installed, an alert must be provided to the flight crew when the flight instrument external probes heating system is not operating or not functioning normally.
It is expected that probe heating system failures are indicated to the flight crew if such failures have an impact on the performance of the heating system to the extent of having an “effect on operational capability or safety”.
... a Caution category of alert is required ... for immediate crew awareness and subsequent crew action. It should be assumed that icing conditions exist during the failure event. The decision to provide heating system failure indication should not be based on the numerical probability of the failure event. If the failure could potentially have hazardous or catastrophic consequences, then this failure must be indicated.
The reliability of the system performing the probe heating system failure detection and alerting should be consistent with the safety effect induced by the failure. Refer to AMC 25.1309, ... for more detailed guidance.

[Kulverstukas]

Black Box Data Tells of Chaos Before Plane Crash Near Moscow

I want to warn posters here, that "CVR transcript", widely quoted everywhere, is from "undisclosed source", leaked through MASH telegram channel widely known as unreliable source, does not has any proof link and was officially refuted by MAK/IAC.

[sheppey]

Next time you are in a simulator ask the instructor to give you a blocked static vent before take off roll starts. First hint there is a problem is after lift off when both the altimeter and VSI fail to register. A few seconds later the ASI needle stops increasing as the aircraft climbs and then goes backwards. That may trigger a false windshear warning. Eventually the reducing IAS sets off a false stick shaker.

if in IMC and if you have not seen this event in the simulator before, some pilots will react by lowering the pitch attitude to gain lost airspeed. Others will confirm correct climb power is set and correct nose attitude for climb and disregard the erroneous airspeed and altimeter readings.
This exercise in the simulator you will never forget:ok:

[AAKEE]

Re AAKEE, is the AoA heating part of the pitot heating system?


Nope.

But is a good help if ASI fails. If AoA shows normal values during 1G flight( and not very high AoA) the speed can not be low, provided you still think AoA information is valid. AoA-information should be very easy to check that it is not "frozen" on the same value.

Not that there most certainly was enough information to continue fly anyway.

[Kakaru]

wiedehopf

Imo, in certain cases GPS can give invaluable information. Yes, it's a ground speed you will see there, but in this particular case of low altitude flying, even with crazy wind fluctuations, you could at least avoid STALL by maintaining around 250-300 kt GS, which in theory should give you some safety margin even in clean configuration.

Then power and attitude.

[duinsel]

Isn't GPS is decent backup source for altitude data as well? In case of trouble on the primary instruments, like the frozen ports, it seems to be an alternate source of information that is read out in a completely independent and unaffected way.

[DaveReidUK]

Assuming that HAE is available to the crew. Is it?

[Ramjet555]

Sheppey,
Thats great information about a stick shaker going off.

According to
Antonov An-148 Passenger Transport Aircraft - Aerospace Technology (http://www.aerospace-technology.com/projects/antonovan148/)

"The An-148 features a partial glass cockpit which can accommodate four crew members. The cockpit is equipped with five 6in×8in multifunction LCDs developed by Aviapribor and fly-by-wire flight controls."

The flight profile shows a cycle of climb and descent, and assuming GPS AirSpeed and GPS ground speed were displayed, at least one pilot may have freaked out at seeking zero air speed and kept lowering the nose to see what he wanted to see, "airspeed" and then rather than checking or listening to the other crew, became even more convinced of his own false narrative.

It makes you wonder how they can build a Fly By Wire aircraft and then have a "partial glass cockpit" when all the components of an AHRS system are available on E-bay.


Even if we ignore the "transcript" of the CVR, then there is still a failure to use the check list which would have mentioned the Pitot Heat and or Pitot Heat Failure, and assuming separate systems from left to right, it also has all the hallmarks of a captain seeing what he wanted to see etc.

That's not unique to the Russian Culture where fear terror and intimidation is found as normal on the dark side of Russian culture.

[gums]

What kinds fly-by-wire(FBW) system are we talking about?

Way too many loose references to FBW and not enuf details. Many planes have had electrical and electro-mechanical connections to the control surfaces and such for 50 years. Dampers, "control augmentation", control stick steering and the beat goes on. But few have had true fly-by-wire with zero mechanical connections from the yolk/stick to the ailerons, elevator and so on. Many, if not most jets from the early 50's drove the flight controls with pure hydraulic pressure or a combo of hydraulics and cables/pushrods. That ain't fly-by-wire. Electronic limiters and inputs that supplement basic hydraulic/mechanical implementations ain't FBW.

So the crew of the ill-fated plane may have turned off the autopilot, but what did the FBW system do? Was the system still using the bad air data? Were they in "direct control" as with the arbus implementation?

I have a very hard time understand a prolonged 30 degree dive until impact. I only saw that kinda pitch angle when delivering ordnance or performing aerobatics.

The scenario deeply disturbs me, and not just because the crew didn't turn on the heaters. The probes could have frozen anyway or ice crystals in the lines could have made things crazy. Oh well.......

[Kulverstukas]

It's true FBW system with mechanical backup. Pilots only switched off AP (as we can understand from IAC report). To get "direct control" they had also switch off Electronic Steering System with overhead switch. Without doing this they still faced interfering electronic system, that regulated steering effectiveness relating on unreliable speed data.

[PPRuNe Towers]

I do wonder about that overhead electric steering mode switch.

I didn't mention heading at any point in my analysis Kulverstukas as it never varied from a track of 045 even after they had gone manual and were fighting with the aircraft. Limited my comments entirely to pushing and pulling.

Rob

[up_down_n_out]

I have a very hard time understand a prolonged 30 degree dive until impact. I only saw that kinda pitch angle when delivering ordnance or performing aerobatics.
The scenario deeply disturbs me, and not just because the crew didn't turn on the heaters.

Idem the lunatics that crashed perfectly flyable a/c in Perm, Petrozavodsk , Sochi 1, or Sochi 2 (*RA-85185), or DME (RA-85744).

What were they thinking? Brains not in gear? :rolleyes:

[flash8]

I appreciate comments from amateurs can at times be valuable but this is just plain wrong and insulting.

[gums]

Thank you, Flash. Was thinking same thing about previous post.

I raise the FBW issue after seeing a few thousand posts about the Airbus FBW and the layers of reversion modes. Thanks to Kulvers once again about a hint of this plane's system, so it does seem possible to eliminate at least some of the computer commands that are based upon air data and body rates and even attitude ( Airbus pitch and roll correction to the gee command).

The biggie is how much "authority" the human has versus the machine laws. Did the crew even try to revert to a semblance of hydraulic/mechanical control?

My point is that the crew may have been facing a more complicated scenario than several here have assumed. A straightforward pitot/static failure on older systems was not real hard to handle. This is not so with the FBW systems, as we saw with the "not to be referenced thread".

[Centaurus]

I have a very hard time understand a prolonged 30 degree dive until impact. I only saw that kinda pitch angle when delivering ordnance or performing aerobatics.

It happened to the FlyDubai Boeing 737 too. Steep dive after a go-around not helped by the pilot holding full forward stab trim all the way down.
See:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flydubai_Flight_981

[costalpilot]

It does actually.. pictures on the Russian forums are floating around with very prominent yellow warning messages displayed on ECAM should the heating be off or failed

THIS I dont get. its supposedly a dark panel, right?? i mean, yellow isnt supposed to be there. is it?

[DaveReidUK]

I didn't mention heading at any point in my analysis Kulverstukas as it never varied from a track of 045 even after they had gone manual and were fighting with the aircraft. Limited my comments entirely to pushing and pulling.

The track of 045 is just FR24's incorrect interpretation when, as in this case, an aircraft sends zero values for the two ADS-B airborne velocity components (N-S and E-W).

The absence of any groundspeed in the ADS-B data, once airborne, is for the same reason.

[Kulverstukas]

I do wonder about that overhead electric steering mode switch.

Rob

Under "steering" I also mean pitch and angle control, which is affected by airspeed through FBW which changed coefficient of effectivenes on column move.

https://img-fotki.yandex.ru/get/909849/89902986.a/0_196586_b6a1cf40_orig.jpg

[Kulverstukas]

This is not so with the FBW systems, as we saw with the "not to be referenced thread".

Plausible scenario for me right now is not "pilot dive the plane to regain speed" but after they recognize malfunction and switched off AP, PF makes "small moves" to check if plane is still under control, hence "level flight with +/- 05G overload" from MAK report, but probably one move - amplified by wrong speed data - put them out of range of recovery.

[PashaF]

I don't get it anymore. Why we have pressure censors under toilet seats but Pitot tubes are "Trust me i am OK" instrument?
I swear with my electrical engineering diploma, you need like 20$ investment (20000 with certification and such) to install the device which can inform pilots about ice buildup inside a tube.

[Kulverstukas]

They are not. In this case they have plenty of warnings, starting with yellow "[HEATER IS OFF]" on the middle screen and following with red "[SPEED COMPARE]" twice with added sound effects.

[PashaF]

With all respect.
There is fine line between the data you need to process through your mind and clear malfunction warning.

[Grunff]

The scenario deeply disturbs me, and not just because the crew didn't turn on the heaters. The probes could have frozen anyway or ice crystals in the lines could have made things crazy. Oh well.......

Unfortunately, to me it sounds like typical swiss cheese hole scenario:

1. Airplane type has manual pitot heat (first hole)
2. Tired crew forgets to turn them on (another hole)

speculations:
3. Pitots start freezing at worst time (climb-out, going through possible precipitation, third hole)
4. *Indicated* airspeed starts declining, pilots do what pilots tend to do: keep speed alive. "Speed is life". Full power and stick forward to regain the airspeed. "we do not want to stall"
5. Being on climb out, there is very little time and height for crew to recognize the underlying issue. A/C overspeeds. Nose is tucking down (or Ukranian FBW is doing funny things based on unreliable speed input) and stick starts to loose authority. Lot's of alarms are sounding (I bet stall alarm was blaring at the same time as A/C was overspeeding, adding to confusion).
6. At low height, there is no time to regain control and A/C augers in.


FBW or not, all kinds of bad things can and will happen with unreliable airspeed if you are caught in bad moment :(

[Kulverstukas]

With all respect.
There is fine line between the data you need to process through your mind and clear malfunction warning.

Exactly. So fine line was between warning which they get at takeoff and they have at least 4 minutes to "process it through their mind".

If you want to discuss automation of pilot heating, welcome to aviaforum.ru, there are over 170 pages on this in An-148 thread now.

[gearlever]

I swear with my electrical engineering diploma, you need like 20$ investment (20000 with certification and such) to install the device which can inform pilots about ice buildup inside a tube.

In use since many years..., called "Ice detector".

[PashaF]

Kulverstukas

I am okay with manual switches.
The point is. Regardless to the origin of this malfunction. (Which is so far attributed to the pilots inability to follow checklist and they nonexistent response to the warning lights)
This was a sensor malfunction! Something literally stopped working.
(Moreover, poisoning other instruments with misleading data flow )

This can't be right.
This is critical to flight instrument and you can easily theorize a lot of situation in which the clear knowledge about Pitot tubes malfunction couldn't be substituted by "your speed is messed up" warning.

[Kulverstukas]

9Rqg1LJFNJ8

[gums]

Once again we must understand the control laws on these FBW fxlight control systems to come up with or actually determine a "cause".

- Upon determining unreliable air data, the Viper I flew all those years ago used one of two "gain" values depending upon gear up/down. So body rates and AoA became more important in the computer algorithm. We even had one guy flt for 7 or 8 minutes with ZERO air data and no AoA probes due to a 40 pound bird strike on the nose.

- The Airbus longitudinal control algorithm uses pitch attitude and roll to modify the gee command. Also has the AoA input to "keep you from stalling". Such an implementation in this case may have helped a lot depending on all the reversion sequences. Hell, we went thru all this for a year on the "other" thread.

Hopefully, this accident will provide a strng basis for much better training and maybe even some control law improvements as well as better alert indications.

[PPRuNe Towers]

The track of 045 is just FR24's incorrect interpretation when, as in this case, an aircraft sends zero values for the two ADS-B airborne velocity components (N-S and E-W).

The absence of any groundspeed in the ADS-B data, once airborne, is for the same reason.

Ignored it as a null as readouts are there for the taxi before takeoff Dave

Rob

[gums]

How did the plot get altitude - agl or baro?

[guadaMB]

@Kulverstukas

A simple curio: the cockpit shown in your last video is a Russian or an Ukrainian AH-148?
AFAIK there are differences...

[Kulverstukas]

RA-61702 (https://russianplanes.net/reginfo/1218)

Russian (VASO).

[ATC Watcher]

Kulverstukas : thanks for that video on the An148 cockpit . The avionics look very " Western": one questions if I may : what is the large red handle for on the left of the FMS ?

[Vendee]

Could it be something like a gust lock?

[Kulverstukas]

what is the large red handle for on the left of the FMS ?

Parking brake

https://img-fotki.yandex.ru/get/478621/6154164.2a7/0_bfde5_70321b5f_L.png

[Turbine D]

Thanks Kulverstukas for all your photos and explanations. :ok: They are very helpful to those of us that are technically interested but not pilots...

[ATC Watcher]

Thank you Kulverstukas for the explanation . On the aircraft I fly/flew, the parking brake was always a small insignificant grey or black lever. Do you know why it is so prominent in the An148? Is there a specificity that makes it so important ?

And are the forgotten on/switch for the sensors heaters a prominent one(s) of a standard square one with an illuminated bar, like the many that we see on the video.

[AmericanFlyer]

I am not a pilot, but why would an aircraft designer not automatically have the pitot heating turned on if needed instead of a manual item on a checklist?

[gearlever]

Somewhere here I read AN148 has a pitot heating element which would overheat on grd/still air. But I understand your concern, it's not rocket science to have a sensor in it for temp reg.

BTW even the airbus changes heating mode concerning grd/inflight, but yes it's fully automatic.

[cappt]

Pitot heat on when parked will overheat and cause burns if anyone accidentally touches it.
Therefore it needs to be turned on for taxi and definitely on for T/O. Different manufacturers have come to different solutions for handling this. Yes auto on for T/O if not already would seem the most logical and safe.

[PJ2]

Kulverstukas, if I may impose on your time, where are the pitot heat switches located, (overhead panel, I suspect, but where?). Also, I assume they are set to "ON" using either the after-start or before-takeoff checklist; would those checklists be available?

I understand each air carrier may develop their own checklists but the manufacturer's checklists would likely be available, would they?

Many thanks per your fine contributions.

[Volume]

would seem the most logical and safe.
Logical perhaps, but not neccesarily safe...
The Spanair accident in Madrid was (partly) caused by such an automatic failing.
It probably is a philosophical question, but having the pilot in the loop will increase awareness, any automation creates a potential for being taken for granted, and being missed in case of failure.
So you have to add an automatic monitoring and warning to the automatic pitot heat, just increasing complexity.

it's not rocket science to have a sensor in it for temp reg.
It obviously is... There were such devices many years ago, but their reliability was poor, so everybody switched back to the dumb heatings... Maybe today with solid state devices being able to handle the high power a more reliable, integrated temperature control would be possible.

[Flocks]

Plane I currently fly, Pitot heat are with a manual switch overhead panel.
We have 3 differents caution warning (yellow) associated to each heating element.

We switch the pitot on, before takeoff and off after vacating rwy. If taxi is planned to be long in bad ground potential icing condition (Amsterdam rwy 36L for exemple), on cpt decision, pitot heater can be turned on for taxi.

Just to say, I don't see the problems of manual or automatic. If we forgot with the checklist, I ll have 3 big yellow warning. Takeoff without warning is a mandatory SOP in my airline. We will go only if a warning is already known and under MEL.

[ATC Watcher]

Based on what I read so far, and thanks to Flocks especially , above , lets turn on the speculation mode :
They seem to have "forgotten" to manually turn on the heater(s) as I do not think with the weather at the time one would have done this voluntarily. Now the system , as I understood it, should have generated 3 ECAM yellow warnings .
Maybe ( speculating) those messages were not visible because of possibly another warning , that superseded those in the priority tree, and that warning was OK on the MEL.
We do not know enough about the Russian avionic ECAM logic , but that could have added a hole in the cheese layers.

[physicus]

Can warnings be cleared and only resurface in a recall mode like on the 744?

[Kulverstukas]

Kulverstukas, if I may impose on your time, where are the pitot heat switches located, (overhead panel, I suspect, but where?). Also, I assume they are set to "ON" using either the after-start or before-takeoff checklist; would those checklists be available?

I understand each air carrier may develop their own checklists but the manufacturer's checklists would likely be available, would they?



(2) Heating swithes (buttons) - yellow text [OVERHEATING]; white [OFF]
(3) Heating CHECK

https://img-fotki.yandex.ru/get/770851/6154164.2a7/0_bfde6_61ddb325_XL.png

Checklist AT LINEUP (BEFORE TO)
Pitot heating ..... ON
Warnings .......... NONE

https://img-fotki.yandex.ru/get/909751/6154164.2a7/0_bfde7_bf0ff7c0_XL.png

Time allowed of Pitot heating on the ground .... 2 min
Time before Pitot OVERHEAT warning ... 5 min
Manufacturer data of max time of heating without external cooling ... 10 min

UPD: OVERHEAT on-ground warning is linked to LMG ground sensor

[Super VC-10]

So, if I understand it correctly, pitot heat is required at all times whilst an aircraft is in the air. Why not link it in with the WOW switches, using the logic that if WOW = OFF, then Pitot Heat = ON ?

[Kulverstukas]

Maybe ( speculating) those messages were not visible because of possibly another warning , that superseded those in the priority tree, and that warning was OK on the MEL.
Can warnings be cleared and only resurface in a recall mode like on the 744?

AFAIK it's NO for all three suggestion/speculation.

[Kulverstukas]

Super VC-10

Pitot system on this plane is exactly the same used on Yak-42. You don't think that any design bureau develops their own and not just buy which available at the market?

There was no known accidents on Yak-42 because of Pitot heating so far.

[Intrance]

So, if I understand it correctly, pitot heat is required at all times whilst an aircraft is in the air. Why not link it in with the WOW switches, using the logic that if WOW = OFF, then Pitot Heat = ON ?

That is basically how it works in the CRJ (at least from 700 onwards, don’t know about the 200 and before). We can mess with the switches all we want, but taking off with the switches in off position doesn’t matter, it will go to full heat anyway.

[Volume]

Why not link it in with the WOW switches, using the logic that if WOW = OFF, then Pitot Heat = ON ?Because in real cold and messy conditions it would be too late to turn it on when lifting off. The logic needs to be a bit more sophisticated, which also makes it more vulnerable. It may be linked with the take-off configuration warning, if you apply more than x% power it switches on...

[Mac the Knife]

So tie it to the parking brak

[Pilot Otto]

Intrance

CRJ100/200 has exactly the same logic: on ground with engine generator online - heated @1/2 power, wow OFF - heated @ full power.

[wiggy]

If we are debating automated pitot heat I’ll chuck into the mix that on some types it’s any engine engine running = pitot on....(with an EICAS message if it fails).

Having the trigger for heat being handbrake release means the probe heat is on for towing ops, which may not be desirable on some types and certainly could get messy if the aircraft is towed for maintenance purposes with the covers on...

Having probe heat being turned on at a particular thrust setting above idle could IMHO cause probs in icing conditions on the ground or early on in the takeoff role....on some types on the ground you only nudge the power up to start taxiing, most of the time you are taxiing with the thrust back at idle.

[Vendee]

Mac the Knife

The parking brake isn't always on while on the ground.

[MATELO]

Surely, in this day and age, there must be a better way than a hole in a tube.

[Kakaru]

Time allowed of Pitot heating on the ground .... 2 min


IMO, not the best design. During taxi the pilots can get unexpected delay, switch off the pitot heating in order to stay within limit, and then, after being distracted by radio communication, simply forget to switch it on.

[Kulverstukas]

Then they must skip Befote TO checklist point about pitot heating (post #223, second red line) and dismiss three yellow warnings on screen (post #223, third red line) and three "OFF" lights on overhead pannel (post #223, pos (2)).

[donotdespisethesnake]

Some reports referred to a ground delay of the accident flight while the pilots were resolving technical issues. If that is true, it might be a factor in the accident.

[Kulverstukas]

Some reports referred to a ground delay of the accident flight

Correct, flight was delayed for 21 min and AFAIK it was holding in queue at lineup, so it might be a factor.

while the pilots were resolving technical issues.

This is not correct, "we need to consult with ground" on ATC recording belongs to different flight.

[Vendee]

Surely, in this day and age, there must be a better way than a hole in a tube.

You mean like an iPhone app? :rolleyes:

I don't think there is a better way. The data from the pitot and the static ports is used in several systems, from airspeed indication to engine fuelling.

[MATELO]

No I did not mean like a phone app. I believed it was a genuine question to ask.

Having a hole drilled into the side of a plane that is 18th century technology seems a little bit archaic.

The space shuttle didn't have pitot tubes and they had her velocity to a tea in orbit.

from the boffins that have given us hover boards and tractor beams, maybe there could be a better way. Like I said.

[wiggy]

....The space shuttle didn't have pitot tubes ......

Err.......looks like in reality when it came to aerodynamic flight at lower altitudes the boffins didn’t have a better way...

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/reference/shutref/orbiter/avionics/gnc/ads.html

[MATELO]

so, there isn't a better way then.

We can move on.

[AmericanFlyer]

Regarding the difference between airspeed and ground speed and several suggestions about using GPS, recall that GPS was jammed in the Southern California area including Las Vegas and Los Angeles for several hours each day from January 26th to February 16th. This means that there should be no critical systems on aircraft that depend on GPS.

[donotdespisethesnake]

so, there isn't a better way then.

Laser based speed sensors are in R&D phase, Airbus have done trials. Cost is an issue, so defense applications are likely to be first customers.

Really a discussion for another thread.

[cappt]

Better training on recognizing and handling unreliable airspeed events has been a focus the last couple years at my airline, it can be eye opening even when you know something is up.
I will reserve judgement on this accident because I don't know the intricacies of the AN-148 FBW logic when faced with differing airspeeds and alerts. I would hope that full control would be available at the stick?
This is something we will need to know and understand as the next generation of FBW airliners come on line.

[Kulverstukas]

. I would hope that full control would be available at the stick?


It will although it's sensitiveness will be affected by wrong speed data if pilot don't switch off FBW by double overhead switch (post #195).

[up_down_n_out]

My original admittedly very rude post about the growing number of Russian air accidents now becoming attributed to pilot error in its various forms was actually about CRM.

In this case (and in AF447) it appears that the combined resources of numerous brains end up reaching the same wrong conclusions leading to CFIT on perfectly functioning aircraft.
Why not just ONE that works on a hunch that something is not logical and work on the basis of counter intuition?
Eg. Question what the rest of the crew is doing?

It does appear from the various hints, panic took over and CRM once again "went to pot". It was the same in AF447.

Does it take a flash of genius to do the right thing (which we now take for being genius or hero status) when we get a Sullenberger or Alrosa pilot who can fly a plane which actually has a major failure and not kill everyone?

What is it about Russia that causes this rash of fatal accidents down to various kinds of illusions/spacial disorientation or clear CRM failures.
This is the "human element" which is supposed to save lives, understand when sensors or instruments are faulty and fly a plane not do like the growing list like Kazan, Sochi to name but 2.
Training?

[Pilot Otto]

By the way, this tragedy has interesting backround that is clearly seen from Russia. CAA of Russia uses this crash and the fact that FO was graduate of non-state-owned flight school to finish off all "bad" pilots( everyone except those who graduated CAA-owned flight schools ). I think constant pressure experienced by first officer who was one of potential victims of this CAA's on-going rampage contributed to human error, if one took place. Just remember Andreas Lubitz who feared to lose his licence. Meanwhile, russian CAA is already working on new massive list of pilot licenses to be revoked.

[underfire]

The Laser Air Speed Sensing Instrument (LASSI) which is being exhibited at this year’s Farnborough International Airshow sets itself apart from conventional methods as it accurately measures velocity even at low speeds.

Conventionally, air speed is determined using pitot tubes – which protrude from aircraft and sense variations in air pressure with speed. Although usually heated, these tubes are vulnerable to blockage in icy conditions. They could also be damaged by collisions with birds and when the aircraft is on the ground.


https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/bae-systems-develops-laser-airspeed-sensor-for-aircraft

[Heathrow Harry]

It's tough to unthink years of training in 4 minutes........

[scifi]

There is one school of thought that says, if anything goes wrong with your flight, you should step down a level of automation, i.e. switch the auto pilot off, and manually fly the plane.
But have we forgotten that there is still one less level of automation... Release the stick, and let the inbuilt dihedral and engineered stability take control.
This usually results in a phugoid oscillation in pitch, which has a definite time period, but eventually reaches some equilibrium.
.