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cappt
22nd Feb 2018, 03:13
In laymens terms>> "JUST SIT THERE, DON'T JUST DO SOMETHING"
Unless you're in a small handful of situations there's time, time you can use to process, plan, act, evaluate.

ironbutt57
22nd Feb 2018, 04:33
inbuilt dihedral and engineered stability take control.

the airplane has anhedral...

Machinbird
22nd Feb 2018, 04:52
Yes, it most certainly does.
However, swept back wings create an aerodynamic effect similar to dihedral, so those clever aerodynamicists had to reduce the strong dihedral effect by adding anhedral.:8

Volume
22nd Feb 2018, 07:17
L@ser based speed sensors are in R&D phaseLDA, L@ser Doppler Anenometry, is used in wind tunnels for at least 25 years now. It works perfectly.
The only issue: now you do not have only one hole to clog, but (simply stating) two l@ser and one camera to be covered by ice... So the risk of failure is trippled.
You may operate it through the cockpit window just like some optical devices on modern cars, so icing/contamination of the windscreen is evident to the pilot and can be counteracted by the wipeers or the window anti-ice. But pitot heat off should be evident to the pilot as well....

Kulverstukas
22nd Feb 2018, 12:08
This is report of incident of same type (Angara An-148 RA-61710 27/05/2015) take-off with Pitot covers not removed. In russian.

https://1drv.ms/b/s!AlxnCD1GL6iNhMYWfv2EdSjObcM-fw

gums
22nd Feb 2018, 16:45
If the laser systems being considered are using the "color" to measure doppler effect, then the laser and detector do not need to face forward. That could help with de-icing problems.

The technique is doing well on my oxygen/pulse meter that provides oxygen saturation using the color of my blood.

Mac the Knife
22nd Feb 2018, 17:56
"Laser based speed sensors are in R&D phase, Airbus have done trials. Cost is an issue, so defense applications are likely to be first customers."

I was measuring the velocity of red blood cells in the skin with a laser doppler flowmeter 30 years ago, so it is hardly a new technology.

'Scuse me for buttin' in…


[The laser has to face "forwards", but high powered modern solid-state lasers are cheap as chips now. You could probably buy a dozen for the price of an electrically heated pitot-tube]

gearlever
22nd Feb 2018, 20:26
Okay all 3 AIS went downhill.

What does this mean to the autoflight system on AN-148?

brak
23rd Feb 2018, 01:11
This is report of incident of same type (Angara An-148 RA-61710 27/05/2015) take-off with Pitot covers not removed. In russian.

https://1drv.ms/b/s!AlxnCD1GL6iNhMYWfv2EdSjObcM-fw

Apparently (page 9, bottom), total loss of airspeed indication is not a thing in An-148 flight manual.

Kulverstukas
23rd Feb 2018, 07:25
Rosaviation letter on accident (https://1drv.ms/b/s!AlxnCD1GL6iNhMYYZ6lfQkSox0UaUg). In russian. On page 2 it mentions takeoff with MEL and refers to Angara incident as well as Tu-204 RA-64017 incident (http://law.rufox.ru/view/19/93002362.htm) (23.03.2001) in Vnukovo - takeoff with AoA malfunction.

akaSylvia
23rd Feb 2018, 08:53
AV Herald seem to be referring to the letter above with this information.

On Feb 22nd 2018 Rosaviatsia recommended based on preliminary findings (without disclosing those findings) to pay attention to following points:
- preparation of aircraft for flight and decision making about conducting a flight with delayed failures and malfunctions in accordance with minimum equipment list requirements
- interaction between crew members, in particular to continue running the relevant checklists after being interrupted or when a checklist section has not been completed (e.g. turn on heating of pitot probes)
- performance of standard operating procedures in standard, non-normal and emergency operation
- crew actions in case of aircraft system failures (flight and navigation systems, control systems)

SINGAPURCANAC
23rd Feb 2018, 09:23
a few quetsion from russian report:
Captain had ATPL dated 27.12.2017???? ( svidetelstvo linego pilota)
Copilot had 812 hours TT- ATPL 21.06.2107 . 672 hours on type. since when? since june 2017, or he flew commercially without ATPL licence??? and final one 812-672= 140 Hours .
How is the possible to obtain CPL with 140 hours ( SE, Time building, IFR,ME ) and immediately after that ,without single additional hour to cockpit with 70 passengers?
How, please enlighten us.

Kulverstukas
23rd Feb 2018, 14:56
Cpt has just going through med check (it was his first flight after). FO is ex cabin crew, graduated Chelavia private flight school - yes, 140hr at Tecnam P2002 and P2006 and then 672 on type.

And last rumor from "sources who listened to CVR" - it was Cpt who take control and doesn't listen to FO which disagreed with his course of action and suggested right things, unfortunately in vain.

HowardB
24th Feb 2018, 19:24
I was thinking about this and the Air France A330 that crashed in the South Atlantic tragic loss of control due to instrumentation issues, while I was reading an article in Defense News about the F18 crew who recovered their plane after suffering from a major A/C problem that caused their cockpit & instruments to ice over. It is reported that they were able to recover the plane because they had a Garmin watch which provided basic speed and altitude information.

As a card carrying member of the SLF there does appear to be some logic to having a completely separate system available when all else fails.

twochai
24th Feb 2018, 20:45
You are absolutely right, of course, and every FAR25 (or equivalent) aircraft is required to have a totally separate and independent source and displays of aircraft attitude, altitude and airspeed. But in a genuine upset situation such as this it's easy for panic to develop and for the pilot(s) to become confused with what is really happening.

Training and vigilance is required in such situations to maintain situational awareness.

gums
24th Feb 2018, 21:34
@ Howard and Two......

With the FBW flight controls on these newer planes, there's a lot more than you may understand regarding backup systems and displays.

I also wanna see the report Howard mentioned regarding the F-18 saved with a wristwatch. My handy iPhone GPS app shows groundtrack and speed and such, but I am more interested in speed thru the air molecules. 'course, that iPhone navigation stuff could come in handy if it could update from cell towers of maybe a satellite.

Kulverstukas
25th Feb 2018, 10:45
I would not expect an An-148 driver to need to wear such a watch.

They definitely need not. Except unreliable air speed data (we don't know what FO pitot measured but let's suggest it was zero too) they has ground speed, altitude, AoA, engine params, ground position etc...

Moreover, from first warning till ground impact there was solid 4 minutes of flight and at least 3 minutes of controlled flight.

gearlever
25th Feb 2018, 11:02
@Kulverstuk

I always appreciate your comments.

BTW, what would have happened keeping the AP ON and maintaining eng power?

Kulverstukas
25th Feb 2018, 11:23
@gearlever, keeping the AP on with unreliable airspeed is against SOP, so we can only speculate.

FullWings
26th Feb 2018, 08:33
Having done unreliable airspeed in depth in the sim last week, there can be quite a bit of “startle” when it comes to diagnosing the problem, depending on what/where but as I’m on a Boeing, once you have made the decision and done the recall items, it then becomes more of a management issue rather than OMG we’re going to die.

It would be interesting to know what Antonov state in their QRH/FCTM about UAS events and the procedures to be used...?

IcePack
26th Feb 2018, 10:14
Funny how difficult today’s crews find flying. Back in the day the sim session would often include no airspeed or compass information (E2b available) All came down to flight deck management (crm not invented) have the pm act as a talking autopilot e.g roll wings level now, set body angle to, thrust set, etc. Of course this assumed both of you had been taught to fly the jet properly in the first place. (Handling the big jets a good start) yes I know back in the day etc but doing an initial IR using a Relitive Bearing Indicator certainly made sure you could think & fly. Weeded out those that couldn’t.
Then Airbus & Boeing decided to dum down flying to automatic everything & so no more pilots just system operators. Classic own goal which has lead to too many deaths despite over all a reduction in the accident rate.

ATC Watcher
26th Feb 2018, 11:11
From a Controller point of view, I had many moons ago the "chance" the have an African registered DC8 on the frequency that did experiment a total electrical failure ( pre-RAT days) and requesting assistance , the old trained phraseology came handy : : start turn left now , stop turn now. " calculate distance vs altitude and say "start descent now 500ft/min" , etc.., the guys were completely lost over a foreign country (for them) in IMC. A GPS would have come handy but we got them down safely after finding a VMC open suitable airport below (was not that easy ), and all this using an old 6 RPM long range primary radar ( update every 10 seconds.) of course with no mode C altitude reporting.
I wonder how many controllers and pilots are trained today on this.

Heathrow Harry
26th Feb 2018, 11:40
"Classic own goal which has lead to too many deaths despite over all a reduction in the accident rate."

That's a dumb statement - you forget all the accidents avoided by modern technology - hence the decrease in accident rates even as the amount of flights has shot up........

aterpster
26th Feb 2018, 12:53
In particular TCAS and EGPWS.

SLFinAZ
26th Feb 2018, 13:46
I don't think it's "dumb" at all. While there is no question that advances in technology have made commercial aviation (in particular) safer overall the simple truth is that the human (read corporate) response to those advances has led to the degradation of many pilots ability to function as an aviator vs. as a systems manager.

So while over all safety is certainly better the percentage of accidents directly attributable to insufficient aviating skills has risen alarmingly.

Flying a complex plane under stress and in a degraded condition is a perishable skill, this is compounded when a systemic discouragement of hand flying skills is culturally institutionalized across the industry resulting in confusing button pushing and knob turning with actually "flying"...

notfred
26th Feb 2018, 15:07
Funny how difficult today’s crews find flying. Back in the day the sim session would often include no airspeed or compass information (E2b available)No airspeed available is very different from recognising that you have one available but it is wrong.

alfaman
26th Feb 2018, 16:37
So while over all safety is certainly better the percentage of accidents directly attributable to insufficient aviating skills has risen alarmingly. That could just as easily be attributed to the improvements in design & engineering, & a reduction in maintenance issues, though. Lies, damn lies & statistics etc.

Chronus
26th Feb 2018, 18:51
Kulverstukas apologies if you have already posted it, but do you happen to have the METAR for the t/o time. I am wondering, if it was pitot icing, then how come they iced up in less than 4 minutes. A particular type of ice crystal known as graupel is about all that I can think of to have clogged up the tubes so quickly.

gearlever
26th Feb 2018, 18:53
Metars:
UUDD 111330Z 14006MPS 4000 -SHSN BKN007 BKN030CB M05/M07 Q1019 R14R///99// R14L/590392 TEMPO 1200 SHSN
UUDD 111300Z 14006MPS 9999 -SN BKN007 M05/M07 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L/590392 TEMPO 1200 SHSN BKN012CB
UUDD 111230Z 13005MPS 8000 -SHSN FEW008 BKN026CB M05/M07 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L///99// TEMPO 1200 SHSN
UUDD 111200Z 13005MPS 1900 R14R/2000D R14L/1900D SN SCT007 OVC026 M05/M06 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L/590491 TEMPO 1200 SHSN BKN012CB
UUDD 111130Z 13006MPS 2100 -SN SCT008 OVC026 M05/M06 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L/590392 TEMPO 1200 SHSN BKN012CB
UUDD 111100Z 14006MPS 1800 R14R/1900U R14L/1800U SHSN BKN007 BKN026CB M05/M06 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L/590392 NOSIG
UUDD 111000Z 14005MPS 8000 -SN BKN009 M05/M07 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L/590392 TEMPO 1000 SHSN BKN012CB
UUDD 110930Z 14006MPS 9999 SCT009 BKN036 M05/M06 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L/590392 TEMPO 1000 SHSN BKN012CB
UUDD 110900Z 15006MPS 9999 BKN020CB M05/M06 Q1019 R14R/590293 R14L/590392 NOSIG
UUDD 110830Z 13005MPS 5000 -SN SCT007 M05/M06 Q1020 R14R///99// R14L/590392 TEMPO 0700 +SHSN BKN010CB
UUDD 110730Z 14005MPS 2600 -SN SCT008 OVC030 M05/M07 Q1020 RESN R88/590392 TEMPO 1000 SHSN BKN015CB
UUDD 110700Z 14005MPS 1400 1000NE R14R/1400N R14L/1100D SHSN SCT006 BKN026CB M05/M07 Q1020 R14R/590392 R14L///99// TEMPO 1000 SHSN Crash: Saratov A148 at Moscow on Feb 11th 2018, lost height after departure, pitot heatings off (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b4cb236&opt=0)

Espada III
2nd Mar 2018, 11:29
If a bus driver can follow her training when everything goes t**s up, and simply releases the brake, to let equilibrium regain control, why can't a pilot simply let go of the sidestick, and use pitch/power when the pitot gets iced??

Near-miss bus driver: 'My training kicked in' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-43255368)

10 DME ARC
3rd Mar 2018, 06:17
Some observations as a controller who's training 36 years ago was defiantly in the non automation era. Are we approaching a reverse of the improved accident rate with automation/technology where the accident rate will increase with lack of experience when things go wrong??
Plus with all this automation why can't a heater for pitot or static source automatically turn on when needed??!!

Heathrow Harry
3rd Mar 2018, 06:26
No - one accident does not reverse the incredible improvement in accident rates

We have different accidents these days - or more likely we always had accidents like this - it's only because we've reduced the others (eg CFT, engine problems etc) that we focus on these loss-of-control occurrences

"On average, from the point of view of passengers, the airline industry as a whole, over the last five years was almost eight times safer than it was as recently as ten years ago and almost 20 times safer than 20 years ago."

Flight Accident Review of 2017

Double Back
3rd Mar 2018, 07:42
We as an industry have gotten to a point where our customers think that we can deliver a 100% on-time, guaranteed and safe flight and arrival. Only we ourselves know what can go wrong and it sometimes will. That not all the variables and threats we can control.

During one of my flights we had to cancel the flight from BKK, bound for Europe, as some catering truck driver punctuated the hull and we needed an extra nite stop. Leaving BKK back to the city I talked to a father with two accompanied kids and he said the forced (but paid) stopover in the hotel posed problems to him as the extra expenses like calling home (was in the pre-mobile phone era) was impossible. He had spent ALL his money in BKK, till the last dime! Never occurred to him anything out-of-the-expected COULD happen to them. Just reach the airport, "hop" in the plane, sit the 11 hours out and be home.

ATC Watcher
3rd Mar 2018, 08:32
@10 DME ARC : Are we approaching a reverse of the improved accident rate with automation/technology where the accident rate will increase with lack of experience when things go wrong??
That was my way of thinking as well. I can see how far training has been reduced to minimum ,partly due to automation taking over many tasks, but at the same time , how much reliance is done on humans taking over when automation fails ( or fails to warn you) . That is a problem.

@Heathrow Harry : We have different accidents these days - or more likely we always had accidents like this - it's only because we've reduced the others (eg CFT, engine problems etc) that we focus on these loss-of-control occurrences

You are probably right. A question to you if I may : Do you see the huge increase in safety regulations in the last decades having an impact on the reduction of accidents?

Herod
3rd Mar 2018, 09:17
Flying has become much safer over recent years. However, as has been pointed out, it is impossible to make it completely risk-free. There will always be occasions where the crew need to take control and fly at least semi-manually. This is where training should be focused.

10 DME ARC
3rd Mar 2018, 18:11
And it's not just one accident! Loss of control from an unusual experience, go around or a cruise disturbance are happening more and more! AFR447 was very disturbing two experienced pilots stalled the aircraft and then three couldn't work out how to recover from it! Especially leaving the most junior pilot in the captain's seat with side stick pulled back!!

Heathrow Harry
4th Mar 2018, 09:06
let's keep generic discussions of safety where they belong - on the safety thread...................

flash8
5th Mar 2018, 00:55
why can't a pilot simply ... use pitch/power...

It's a question I ask myself almost daily, but still hulls are lost every few years where recovery should have been straightforward, many often I suspect disorientated by conflicting instruments/warnings and unable to think calmly and straight. Like to think it wouldn't happen to me, but never say never, problem is situations like this escalate real fast into an irrecoverable state.

If its the case here it certainly won't be the last.

Starbear
5th Mar 2018, 06:23
Sheppey

Next time you are in a simulator ask the instructor to give you a blocked static vent before take off roll starts. First hint there is a problem is after lift off when both the altimeter and VSI fail to register. A few seconds later the ASI needle stops increasing as the aircraft climbs and then goes backwards. That may trigger a false windshear warning. Eventually the reducing IAS sets off a false stick shaker.Are you sure that the stick shaker in this case was false? It should only be triggered by AoA and is usually the one thing that can be relied upon with erroneous Air Data (certianly for Boeing and Airbus a/c). In the Birgenair incident already referred to the stick shaker was the only valid reference and they all the other warnings go off as you described. I too have done this in the sim and it w as challenging enough even when briefed.

Kulverstukas
6th Mar 2018, 09:02
Part of CVR is leaking in the media today

CPT: Up! Th-a-a-t.
FO: Just a second.
CPT: And you dow...
FO: That’s a bull****!
CPT: No, well, I think you wanted it (does not finish the sentence). And you, on the contrary - down.
FO: Okay, okay, you'll talk later. I mean everything else. So, now control everything!
CPT: Everything, everything is fine.
FO: Ok, speed is ok now.
VOICE WARNING: Speed compare, speed compare.
FO: Wo-o-ops ... 390!
CPT: Why you down?! Where you down? Why down?! Where?!
VOICE WARNING: Speed compare, speed compare.
FO: Yes, because stop f*****g talking, speed is 200, f*****g ****!
CPT: Altitude! Altitude! Altitude!
VOICE WARNING: Terrain ahead! Terrain ahead! PULL UP! Terrain ahead!
CPT: Up!
VOICE WARNING: Terrain ahead! Terrain ahead! PULL UP! Terrain ahead!
CPT: That’s f*****g finish.
STOP OF REC


PS: is it fake or not is quite unclear. There is two major flaws:
- TAWS at An-148 speaks russian (and at this "transcript" it's in english) confirmed that there is EGPWS MK V on this plane
- unreliable speed warnings timings are not "in line" with MAK preliminary report - according to it, AP was switched off only after second one.

Kulverstukas
7th Mar 2018, 06:58
According to Rules for Investigation of Accidents and Incidents with Civil Aircraft in the Russian Federation (Gov.app. of June 18, 1998 No. 609, red. No. 854 of November 19, 2008) in 30 days after accident must be published itinerary report if investigation continues.

czarnajama
9th Mar 2018, 14:12
According to Rules for Investigation of Accidents and Incidents with Civil Aircraft in the Russian Federation (Gov.app. of June 18, 1998 No. 609, red. No. 854 of November 19, 2008) in 30 days after accident must be published itinerary report if investigation continues.

Would the actual CVR recording be released? That (somehow!) was done for the 10 April 2010 crash of the Polish Presidential Tu-154M near Smolensk, and combined with other data (e.g. photographs, Google Earth etc.) allowed Prof. Pawel Artymowicz (University of Toronto) to construct an independent dynamical model of the final sequence of events (largely in agreement with Russian and Polish official simulations). His brother Andrzej was later attached to the official prosecutorial investigation and was able, in Moscow, to obtain much better playback and re-recording of the actual CVR, providing the best evidence to date of what actually happened (a matter of the greatest political significance in Poland). Although it is never done in the West, the release of the actual CVR recording in the end led to a much better investigation, even if highly uncomfortable for, and still suppressed by, the Law and Justice party, elected to government in Oct. 2015. In countries where government agencies are not widely trusted, the release of such material provides an important degree of transparency and allows the truth to be determined.

Kulverstukas
9th Mar 2018, 14:49
Would the actual CVR recording be released?

Not in the interim report. I think in final report it will be published, at least key parts, as MAK usually did.

core_dump
9th Mar 2018, 15:35
Not in the interim report. I think in final report it will be published, at least key parts

czarnajama was asking about the actual recording audio, not a transcript.

Although it is never done in the West

It certainly was done in the past. I forget what year we outlawed that here; I want to say early 1980s?

Kulverstukas
9th Mar 2018, 15:44
czarnajama was asking about the actual recording audio, not a transcript.


AFAIK it was done by polish media, not officially.

flash8
18th Mar 2018, 20:29
From the CVR transcript

That’s f*****g finish.

Probably translated from the Russian p**detz if I had to guess, hard to translate it and convey exactly what it means (this is one interpretation), but I'd be almost sure that would have been the translated word.

mikeepbc
19th Mar 2018, 17:16
AFAIK it was done by polish media, not officially.

Large parts of the CVR recording (including the most disturbing final part) were officially released by MAK in 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucfMbPt8xRw

Kulverstukas
19th Mar 2018, 20:05
Large parts of the CVR recording (including the most disturbing final part) were officially released by MAK in 2011.

According to my memory and Wiki MAK published CVR only after it was done by Polish media which get it from Polish team involved in investigation.

Kulverstukas
20th Mar 2018, 12:28
Authorities grounded all flights of "Saratov Airline" (they also has five Yak-42D and two E-195) and all An-148 in other airlines (Angara airlines — 5; Rossya SF — 6; EMERCOM/MChS — 2; AirForces — 12)

Kulverstukas
21st Mar 2018, 05:04
Angara airlines dismissed information that it's fleet of An-148 was grounded.

Austrian Simon
21st Mar 2018, 17:45
Authorities grounded all flights of "Saratov Airline" (they also has five Yak-42D and two E-195) and all An-148 in other airlines (Angara airlines — 5; Rossya SF — 6; EMERCOM/MChS — 2; AirForces — 12)

Russian Media had claimed a Rostransnadzor official had talked to them and told them Saratov would be grounded until April 27th 2018 and all AN-148 would be grounded. Turned out untrue.

This is the official Rostransnadzor statement released Mar 20th 2018 around about 17:00Z:

http://rostransnadzor.ru/ob-itogah-proverki-rostransnadzorom-aviakompanii-saratovskie-avialinii/

Google Translation:
On the results of the Rostransnadzor check of Saratov Airlines

As a result of an off-site on-site inspection of Saratov Airlines, Rostransnadzor issued an inspector's order to take a decision, within the aviation safety management system, to suspend flights on all types of aircraft operated by the airline (where violations were found), to assess factors risk and taking corrective actions necessary to maintain an acceptable level of safety, and to eliminate identified violations of air legislation.

Based on the results of checking the airline "Saratov Airlines" Rostransnadzor is currently conducting unscheduled inspections in other airlines operating the AN-148, for compliance with established standards of airworthiness of aircraft. Based on the results of the inspections, a decision will be taken within the framework of the powers of Rostransnadzor.

Capot
21st Mar 2018, 17:50
Also reported in the latest update in Avherald's account (https://avherald.com/h?article=4b4cb236&opt=0)

Kulverstukas
18th Apr 2018, 19:02
Preliminary report is out.
https://yadi.sk/i/4tE_yw7h3UXBjx

It's in russian and it's quite breef.

In summary, what was not on the previous lists: crew was distracted at Before TO checklist and newer read it. They TO with bunch of yellow messages on the KISS (Incl. three NO HEATING).