Pax sue Boeing in DBX crash

[underfire]

More than a dozen passengers aboard an Emirates airline flight that crashed in August 2016 sued plane-maker Boeing on Tuesday in Cook County Circuit Court, blaming an allegedly defective switch.

The Boeing 777-300 flight was headed to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from India.

All 300 people aboard Emirates Flight EK 521 survived the crash-landing in Dubai, scrambling down emergency slides before flames consumed the plane, but one firefighter was killed battling the blaze. It was the worst crash in the airline's history.

The lawsuit alleges, among other problems, that the aircraft's system prevented the operation of a switch at a critical moment and that the plane didn't provide any warning to the crew that the switch wasn't working.

The plaintiffs, who are residents of the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the UAE and Turkey, suffered serious physical and psychological injuries that will result in future medical bills and lost earnings, the lawsuit says.


Passengers sue Boeing in Cook County court over worst crash in Emirates history - Chicago Tribune (http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-boeing-emirates-crash-lawsuit-0817-biz-20170816-story.html)

[Chris2303]

Can a mod please correct the airport code in the title?

[B2N2]

UAE investigators will look at the actions of the flight crew after no problems were found with the aircraft's systems or engines, according to an Aug. 6 interim report from the the UAE's General Civil Aviation Authority.

A'righty then, which switch was it?

[PoppaJo]

What was the end result with the two pilots? Are they still there?

[White Knight]

What was the end result with the two pilots? Are they still there?

No.............

[Eau de Boeing]

It was the TOGA switch on the thrust levers. It was inhibited in ground mode so therefore when he pressed it, it didn't work. However they assumed it did and climbed away from the ground at idle thrust.

The pilots were decorated in the New Year Honours List accordingly........

[B2N2]

That's a failure of systems knowledge not a systems failure.

[RickNRoll]

If you push the switch and it is in a mode which stops it doing anything, do the pilots get a warning that it's not going to do anything?

[Eau de Boeing]

No, apart from good old fashioned airmanship and checking what you command is what you have.........

I don't think Boeing published in any training course that it was inhibited, but I bat for the French side now in airliners so stand by to be corrected.

[Piltdown Man]

If you push the switch and it is in a mode which stops it doing anything, do the pilots get a warning that it's not going to do anything?

Sometimes yes and sometimes no. For example if you press the the autopilot button when on the ground in my aircraft, nothing happens. Nothing! But move a power lever beyond a certain value and the takeoff configuration warning is activated even though no engines are running and you are parked at the gate. Other times certain modes don't as advertised and at other times they just refuse to engage. But overall it doesn't really matter. We've been taught for the last 25 years or so to look on the FMA bar and engine performance displays to determine what the aircraft thinks is going to happen. If you don't like what you see, you do something about it. That's why we still have a job.

These compo hungry passengers would be better off taking Emirates to court in erm... Ah. That's a problem! Maybe people should think who they fly with for when things really go wrong.

PM

[topgas]

The preliminary report into the incident, published on 5th September, is at

https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/90/2016-2016%20-%20Preliminary%20Report,%20AAIS%20Case%20AIFN-0008-2016%20-%20A6-EMW.pdf

[Pontius]

Five Boeing types and it's always been in the manual. Just piss-poor systems knowledge and assuming instead of checking. Boeing is certainly not to blame in this matter; the culpability lays firmly with the pilots.

I can't abide these ambulance-chasing scum; they're screwing up the world for the rest of us with all the nanny state, we-know-better rules we have foisted upon us because of greedy people and greedy lawyers.

[RAT 5]

What happened after the B777 crash in SFO. The pilots thought the auto throttle would save the day. Some guys chimed in here that there was a gotcha and they enlightened ones trained it to their pilots, others didn't. Was the gotcha a published one or a 'discovered' one? Did any pax start a class action claim against Boeing? I confess my ignorance and hence the question.

In Emirates case should the claim be against Boeing; others have said the switch did as advertised, so was it a known factor? Or was it more a training fault at Emirates? what is the Emirate SOP for a GA? Does it include 'check the power reading before raising the gear'? Is it written has it been trained? i.e. should the claim be against Boeing or Emirates?

[fox niner]

Go-around
Flaps20
CHECK THRUST
Positive rate - gear up.

If you do and say this, you will live.

[RAT 5]

We know that, and it has been said previously. My question is, what is written in Emirates SOP? If it is, and the crew didn't do it, then Emirates might be the target, not Boeing.

[OldLurker]

It's usual in these cases to sue everyone who might have a deep enough pocket. I'm surprised they're not suing the engine manufacturer too (Rolls-Royce). But the primary target of the lawsuit ought to be Emirates: perhaps they can't be sued because they've no corporate presence in the US, and/or because they're owned by Dubai government?

[M.Mouse]

Five Boeing types and it's always been in the manual. Just piss-poor systems knowledge and assuming instead of checking. Boeing is certainly not to blame in this matter; the culpability lays firmly with the pilots.

I can't abide these ambulance-chasing scum; they're screwing up the world for the rest of us with all the nanny state, we-know-better rules we have foisted upon us because of greedy people and greedy lawyers.

Completely agree.


What happened after the B777 crash in SFO. The pilots thought the auto throttle would save the day. Some guys chimed in here that there was a gotcha and they enlightened ones trained it to their pilots, others didn't. Was the gotcha a published one or a 'discovered' one?

Lack of systems knowledge. Should have been covered in training and is explained in the manuals.

Go-around
Flaps20
CHECK THRUST
Positive rate - gear up.

We know that, and it has been said previously. My question is, what is written in Emirates SOP? If it is, and the crew didn't do it, then Emirates might be the target, not Boeing.

Yes it is written in the SOPs apart from being basic airmanship.

[PDR1]

The lawsuit alleges, among other problems, that the aircraft's system prevented the operation of a switch at a critical moment and that the plane didn't provide any warning to the crew that the switch wasn't working.



Me = lowly lapsed PPL, so more than happy to be told I'm wrong, but surely:

1. The switch WAS working precisely as advertised and described in the technical specifications and manuals for the aeroplane. That the switch didn't produce the desire effect is no more the manufacturer's fault than it would be if a car's accelerator pedal failed to make the car go faster when the gearbox was in neutral.

2. The aeroplane surely provided more than adequate warning that the driver's switch selection wasn't causing the engines to go to TOGA thrust by the way that the engines remained at their previous setting. The crew would get audio, tactile and instrument indications of a thrust change (never mind the movement of the thrust levers) which clearly didn't happen.

3. Any driver who initiates and sustains a TOGA climb when the airspeed is clearly dropping through the floor (TOGA button or no TOGA button) should be moved to another seat - not one of the good ones at the front.

Am I wrong?

PDR

[cessnapete]

PDR1
Correct! It's EK and the crew at fault if any suing to be done.
The aircraft worked as taught in the conversion Course. Non adherence to SOPs and a huge lack of basic airmanship. which seems to be sadly lacking in recent EK incidents.
You won't climb for long with the thrust levers at idle.

[PDR1]

But what kind of pilot maintains a climbing attitude with the airspeed unwinding like a big fast unwinding thing? Even if he/she was too busy/stressed to notice the lack of engine winding-up sounds or to take in the lack of increased engine rpm on the gauges during his scan SURELY any "emergency climb" manoeuver involves scanning the ASI to hold the aeroplane at best climbing speed (or at least note that they hadn't pulled it too hard)?

Is it really true that a current ATPL could just hit the TOGA and assume it was safe to pull to max alpha or sommink? I really struggle with that!

PDR

[Skyjob]

PDR1 - complacency is the word in many event cases involving automatics as they rarely go wrong these days, assuming in equally many others as why would the automatics not work as expected when commanded, finally lack of airmanship in most cases as the above could be prevented if good airmanship was displayed.

Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
Start at number 1, aviate

[cessnapete]

PDR1
EK and several other ME/FE Airlines seem to teach by rote/numbers, no common sense or airmanship allowed in the operation.

[RAT 5]

EK and several other ME/FE Airlines seem to teach by rote/numbers, no common sense or airmanship allowed in the operation.

How many cadets do these airlines recruit? I doubt many. They recruit from already trained, but not widely experienced pilots. I doubt they can de-train pilots so it might suggest that the recruits they choose come from a similar background philosophy and thus fit the mould.

[alf5071h]

If this goes to open court it would be interesting to see how ‘the law’ interprets human behaviour.

The ‘expert’ views in this forum might overlook if it is realistic for a crew to remember every single detail of a system operation, particularly those with caveats only applicable for a limited time scale, small altitude range, and having rare exposure.
Whilst it could be argued that the altitude limit could be interpreted from audio callouts (is this applicable in all aitcraft), these calls are often used subconsciously as part of the landing skill - or only consciously checked as a how goes it if the landing task is difficult.
How capable might crews be able to relate subsystem knowledge with altitude during during high workload landing flare.

The other interaction was from the recently installed runway alerting system, where an unexpected call triggered the need to GA. Had the crew been sufficiently well trained for this situation, had the crew been exposed to the callouts, of was the particular situation sufficiently well defined by the operator who selected the programmable point of alerting.
Did this system introduce conflict, the crew were just about to touchdown, longer than normal, but sufficient for the runway length; they may have judged this as they would have done many times before - it was their norm. Yet a system call out conflicted with this assessment - like a human criticising your judgement. Was the crew’s judgement correct, do they believe their human judgement, or a rarely encountered machine call out, who's validity might not have been established previously - training or real exposure.
What was the effect of policy on using automated call outs - EGPWS always react; the runway alert was part of the EGPWS - same voice, urgency, relevance? Yet the system was marketed as ‘advisory’.

How do humans perform after a surprise, the capacity to change the course of (successful) action. What effect does startle or conflict of perception, reduce the ability of humans perform expected actions, checks, calls, using other sensory input - obvious in hindsight, but unknown at the time.

A standard of human behaviour less than that required is not been tested in court. As for the manufacturer, they could always do better, see the foreseeable and judge the ‘unforeseeable’ ( I don't believe the human could do that) in system design; with or without hindsight. No A vs B argument, but B appears to have its share of AT issues; would previous events with hidden modes of quiescent operation (Asiana) be held against them, particularly where it has been argued that improvement is warranted.

Perhaps with the industry's drift towards automation the gaps in system operation should be closed - reduce the opportunity for error. Particularly if it is judged that with the increasing complexity of systems integration, operational scenarios, and demand for efficient, yet safe operations, place too greater responsibility on pilots in surprising and rarely encountered situations.
Modern pilots may not be a able to gain levels of experience previously seen; whereas those who criticise may have, but then fail to relate this difference.

We cannot be both judge and jury; yet pilots are best placed to put themselves in the situation faced by this crew, never the same because of hindsight bias, but also because of human nature; we love to blame … but would this be a defence for the manufacturer?

[320goat]

We cannot be both judge and jury;

You've been a member of PPRuNe for how long?

This, in my opinion, was an accident waiting to happen. Over reliance on automation causing complacency, lack of training, fear inducing company culture, possibility that the pilots involved were flying fatiguing roster patterns, lack of understanding of the aircraft and its possible pitfalls (as apparently explained in manuals). I know that other companies in the region are now training this exact scenario in the sim, fortunately for them it wasn't their horse that has already bolted!

The fact of the matter is the TOGA switch performed as expected and as Boeing explains in its manuals so I don't think the plaintiffs will get too far.

[RAT 5]

This, in my opinion, was an accident waiting to happen. Over reliance on automation causing complacency, lack of training,

In some cases that is proved to be true: however, these were not inexpereinced pilots. They had flown other less automated types.

Flaps20
CHECK THRUST
Positive rate - gear up.
If you do and say this, you will live.

No doubt this is how they had been trained on other types, as it is pretty standard, especially with less automated types. The physics haven't changed.

I often wonder why pilots bin their experience from previous days when they are told to 'let the automatics do it for you, stop cross checking': 'follow the FD' etc.etc.

[Passenger 389]

Probably some key considerations include:

1. Was an international flight. Montreal Convention applies.

2. Montreal Convention contains various limitations on liability. Not as severe as Warsaw Convention, but still no cakewalk. And interpretation of some provisions (such as damages for 'emotional distress') reportedly varies by country.

I will defer on that question to those with greater expertise with Montreal Convention.

3. Unlike the airline, Boeing is not protected by Montreal Convention. Or by sovereign immunity.

4. Cook County - where Boeing is headquartered - is known for large jury awards. As is most of US, compared to other countries.

(Also known as "jury roulette" - spin the wheel and see. You may get nothing, or a dollar, or maybe ten million dollars, or much more).

5. Aviation lawyers in US have plenty of experience suing in Cook County. And most such firms are large enough to shoulder burden of subsidizing case until it is resolved. (Client may pay nothing until then, depending on what arrangements are made).

6. How much might be awarded in UAE (if pax could and did sue Boeing or Emirates there)? And who decides how much to award? My guess is it wouldn't be jury roulette as in US.

Weren't many passengers coming from India, perhaps including laborers, domestic help? What would they be valued at in a UAE court?

Those suing are from US, Europe, plus Turkey and UAE. Again, how much would UAE be inclined to award them?

7. Welcome any aviation law experts who (despite their occupation) care to share their insights.

[Chronus]

Touch down 1100 meters from threshold at 162 kts ! I would say Boeing deserve to be applauded rather than sued for having designed an intelligent machine against human stupidity. What could have happened without the RAAS does not bear thinking about.

[safetypee]

320goat, I will rise to the challenge, ‘it was an accident waiting to happen’. #25.
If so then why wasn’t this identified beforehand and avoided.

Being entitled to have an opinion is no longer true. You are only entitled to what you can argue for, and in safety terms what you do about your 'opinion'.

RAT, “if you do and say this, you will live” #26, but in circumstances like this what we do is not always what we say (vice versa), or what we think we see, nor understand why.

Why do pilots bin previous experience; good point, ‘first taught best remembered’. Perhaps current training requirements expect operators to train-out experience; focus on SOPs … all circumstances will be covered. But who saw this one coming.

[Chronus]

Quote safetypee : "But who saw this one coming."
The answer must be, the old wise instructor who once said " one of the most useless things is the rwy behind you".

[ManaAdaSystem]

Touch down 1100 meters from threshold at 162 kts ! I would say Boeing deserve to be applauded rather than sued for having designed an intelligent machine against human stupidity. What could have happened without the RAAS does not bear thinking about.

They would have done a long, but safe landing.

[Chronus]

They would have done a long, but safe landing.

Which translates to RAAS compromises safety. Best tell Honeywell.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Which translates to RAAS compromises safety. Best tell Honeywell.

Not if you understand it's limitations. Landing 1100 m down a 4500 m runway is not smart, but it's not a problem.
I bet the EK manual says you have to abort the landing if a warning occurs. If you don't obey = a trip to the boss and possibly a warning letter.
You add the two together and if the manouvre is not performed the way it should, and you get one 777 written off.

[320goat]

Basics, basics, basics......

Basic flying skills would obviously have saved the day but how often are commercial pilots applying these basic skills on a day to day basis. Restrictions on when A/P can be taken out, A/T must be used at all times, ILS must be flown if available, blame culture.......to name but a few reasons why you see folks put the A/P in at 200' and take it out again at 500'. Unless you fly for fun in your spare time your skills are being eroded.

I agree this scenario should not cause any problem whatsoever, but the fact is it did and has brought many things to light. Friends on the Boeing have suggested that they could well have been caught out and I applaud them for their honesty, it is too convenient to just say there were a couple of numpties up front that day and it will never happen again. I know some colleagues have now changed the way they brief missed approaches and include balked landings as a way to mitigate against the same mistake happening again (or at least run through it quietly).

If they had pressed the TOGA switch in the flare we would not be having this discussion but the fact is it happened after touch down. How many of us have thrown away landings after touch down? I know I haven't, the closest I got was around 5' to 10' on one occasion on a short runway in Greece. On this occasion it appears TOGA did not perform as PF expected. Should he have advanced the thrust levers?.........of course, was he in a habit of not doing so?..........who knows.......was there deficiency in training in Emirates?.......I don't know. I would be interested to know if many other Boeing pilots out there started to wonder whether they were physically advancing thrust levers or just pressing TOGA.

As an industry we were lucky that there were not many more deaths that day and hopefully those of us that needed an attitude adjustment towards basic skills and automation have learnt a valuable lesson. Those of you who are perfect.....move on nothing to see here.

Safe flying

[RAT 5]

Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem
They would have done a long, but safe landing.
Which translates to RAAS compromises safety. Best tell Honeywell.

This reminds me of the discussion about the A380 division from MAN to LHR. Human judgement seemed superior to computer judgement, but the commander could not take the risk to over-ride the computer. He had a cast-iron alibi, diverted, and the company picked up the bill and the disgruntled pax had to put up wth it.
Have we really progressed? The days of pilot redundancy are drawing closer. We'll never disappear for PR reasons, but our authority, influence and interjection will be further diluted. Will safety improve? Ask me later.

One wonders if the amount of money spent on technical back-ups to be pilot replacement aids, or back-up systems to prevent pilot screw-ups, or systems to alert pilots that they are screwing up, or systems to............had rather been spent on training to ensure pilots did their daily job properly, we might have prevented all the accidents that required all the back-up systems to prevent pilot screw ups in the first place.
Somehow we are inventing accidents so that we need to invent preventions. The checking process is so outdated and addresses problems that are not relevant. Accidents are happening for other reasons than V1-cuts.
Somehow it use to be easier in the steam driven days. It was a harder work-load, navigation, yes, but we were more 'on top of it'. I enjoyed moving from steam driven to EFIS & EICAS. I thought it was wonderful. It reduced the work load so that I could manage, plan, control and manipulate the flight, during all it phases, in a more relaxed and accurate manner; both manually and via automatics. It was superb; because the old skills were not tossed in the rubbish bin, but kept and alive and kicking and sat there in the back-ground watching over the operation. Airmanship, aeronautical physics have not changed and been over taken by technology. The basics still apply and need to be taught and respected. That teaching has disappeared and will come back to haunt those advocates who allowed it to happen.

Back to the future!

[MartinAOA]

Forgive my ignorance, but is it not required/necessary to have one hand placed on the throttle levers during a critical phase of flight?

[Prober]

Airmanship seems to have been thrown out of the window. Who on earth would command a G/A and not monitor the thrust levers (by feel if nothing else)? Further B’s training demands checking the FMA’s (G/A G/A/ G/A) as the flaps retract and you rotate. If you really cannot – or feel that you dare not do that for some reason – then clear off and leave aeroplanes alone. The other thread which mystifies me is the taxiway line up at LAX. If I was waiting for departure on that taxiway and heard an aircraft query the runway, I would have at least looked up if I had not already been doing so and, though I was not there, I am pretty sure I would have come to the conclusion that the aircraft on finals was heading straight for me. Just one quick flick of the nosewheel light would have ended the problem. What is happening to people? :{
Prober

[zlin77]

FCTM makes reference to TOGA being inhibited on the ground.

[M.Mouse]

Forgive my ignorance, but is it not required/necessary to have one hand placed on the throttle levers during a critical phase of flight?

Yes but as during a normal takeoff at the V1 call or Vr if the two are coincidental both hands are placed on the control column. So it is not unusual to take one's hands of the thrust levers during a go-around once the TOGA switches have been pressed and you have verified that the required power is being provided or, as in the case of a rejected landing after touchdown, once the thrust levers have been manually positioned to provide sufficient power.

On the wider subject of training and standards I have been involved in some training for Emirates of experienced, but new to Emirates, co-pilots. Without exception those who I had any dealings with were all very competent, diligent and keen. Emirates training is also comprehensive, thorough and the standards set are high.

With an airline of their size and with the number of pilots employed it is inevitable, as with any airline, that someone somewhere will make a mistake. In this case the mistake really should not have happened but that can be said of many aircraft accidents.

The landing was deep but in Emirates a 'Long Landing' warning from the RAAS is a compulsory go-around. Without the RAAS system the landing would probably have continued, there was ample distance to stop easily.

[Basil]

How about we design all our wonderful modern computerised aircraft and our operating SOPs and our training around what comes most naturally to a pilot?
Just advance the thrust levers!
Caveat - advice follows upon evening in pub with old pilots.

[Capn Bloggs]

How about we design all our wonderful modern computerised aircraft and our operating SOPs and our training around what comes most naturally to a pilot?
Just advance the thrust levers!
Or design the system logically: if the TOGA buttons are pressed, the engines go to TOGA, with no caveats. Or if you're stalled, the stall warning remains on below 60KIAS...

[Start Fore]

Hang on a minute, so if you're on the ground and the TOGA buttons get touched by accident, you want TOGA power! You're kidding right?!?!? This is why it's inhibited.

The EK 777 prang was due to incompetence, not Boeing's fault.

[B2N2]

TOGA are Take Off Go Around buttons not Touch and Go.
The logic needs to stop somewhere.
You want Take Off thrust on the ramp when TOGA is pushed?
After specified amount of time it goes into ground mode.
3 sec or 5 or whatever it is.
They're a system convenience not a "safe me" switch when you've cocked it up.
A lot of things went wrong and all the holes in the cheese lined up and the auto throttle systems had TOGA to do with it.
( pun intended)

[Capn Bloggs]

Here we go. I thought some of you would have more sense than to bring up the "jeez I just hit TOGA on the blocks and it went to full power! What a stupid idea!".

Perhaps you could explain why you wouldn't design a system where if you had just touched down, hitting TOGA would give you TOGA power for a touch and go?

You guys have NO IDEA about how the real world works these days. We are generally NOT ALLOWED to practice all these "weirdo" manoeuvres, and if you do it's canned, in the sim, so you know what's coming. You can sledge the drivers all you like, but this stuff will keep on happening until "weirdo" practice increases.

Welcome to Prune, Start 4.

[Centaurus]

You want Take Off thrust on the ramp when TOGA is pushed?

But isn't that what happens in a 737 if you accidently hit TOGA while on the ramp engines running and pushing back and the AT has been armed as part of the before start checks? It used to be that arming the AT was SOP only after you lined up for take off - for the good reason if it was armed earlier (as it is now current SOP) and you stumbled and touched a TOGA button inadvertently, the engines would go to full power. Not a good thing.

[galaxy flyer]

Bloggs,

Perhaps because touch and goes are not a normal operation, the most common outcome is land and stop. Having TOGA available at all times introduces all sorts of failure modes.

Then again, I was on a delivery, new crew wanted some landings and touch and goes. All pre-briefed, SOPs covered, reviewed upon entering pattern. I reset flaps and trim, state "GO"; pilot hails back on yoke putting us in a very untenable position. Survival instinct in me, shoved both throttles forward rapidly followed by Global Express rocketing away at Vref-a bunch. Pilots should be able to do touch and goes--it's basic training.

[RickNRoll]

Five Boeing types and it's always been in the manual. Just piss-poor systems knowledge and assuming instead of checking. Boeing is certainly not to blame in this matter; the culpability lays firmly with the pilots.

I can't abide these ambulance-chasing scum; they're screwing up the world for the rest of us with all the nanny state, we-know-better rules we have foisted upon us because of greedy people and greedy lawyers.

I don't agree with the lawsuit but "Modal" controls are notorious for helping to cause errors. A simple "BZZZZZT" alert may be all that is needed to remind a busy crew that this control is not going to do what you thought it was going to do. When TOGA is required it could be assumed that things are not going according to plan.

[wiggy]

But isn't that what happens in a 737 if you accidently hit TOGA while on the ramp engines running and pushing back and the AT has been armed as part of the before start checks?

I'm pretty sure that'll happen on the Triple on taxi out as well but I'm not going to volunter to test if on my next outing....

Apologies if this has been covered previously but as I understand it the thrust element of TOGA is "disarmed" just before touchdown to prevent inadvertent application of TOGA thrust during the landing flare/roll which could lead to a runway excursion...as GF has said: " touch and goes are not a normal operation, the most common outcome is land and stop. Having TOGA available at all times introduces all sorts of failure modes. "

[FlyingStone]

What has happened to pressing TO/GA, pushing the thrust levers an arm's length forward, and then PM (or A/T if engaged) can fine tune the G/A thrust setting?

[ManaAdaSystem]

TOGA thrust is inhibited after touchdown, but should be made to engage if the aircraft becomes airborne again. The combination of having to press TOGA and be airborne again would eliminate the error factor, and help those pilots who doesn't understand that the levers betweeen the pilots must be pushed forward when you want to go up.

[ManaAdaSystem]

What has happened to pressing TO/GA, pushing the thrust levers an arm's length forward, and then PM (or A/T if engaged) can fine tune the G/A thrust setting?

That is called muscle memory, and went out of the window a long time ago.
It has been transfered to the finger. CLICK.

[RAT 5]

That is called muscle memory, and went out of the window a long time ago.
It has been transfered to the finger. CLICK.

Presumably these systems have been designed by techies. Why? Because they can? Someone, or team, has discussed this and decided that simplifying some aspects of flying is better & therefore safer. That philosophy is now open to question, after various misunderstanding screw ups. There is talk about removing muscle memory and the years old intuitive actions with various manoeuvres. The conclusion comes that this over-simplification via automatics is not safer. It removes tactile feedback to the pilot. I wonder if human behaviour experts were part of the design team when basic manual actions were designed out by automatics.

[CurtainTwitcher]

Having flown both Boeing & Airbus, personally I find the Airbus Go-Around system much more intuitive and user friendly (although, even that isn't foolproof: Go-around event Melbourne Airport, Victoria 21 July 2007 (https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/793232/ao2007044.pdf) ).

It is interesting that despite the normally static thrust levers, Airbus in their wisdom decided to utilise the instinctive method of power application to switch to GA mode.

The BEA did a study on GA accidents and incidents in 2013: Aeroplane State Awareness during Go-Around (https://www.bea.aero/etudes/asaga/asaga.study.pdf)

[Piltdown Man]

I think the 'human behaviour experts' were test pilots. They design, test and approve all sorts of things with their own (very poor) concept of what constitutes a typical line pilot in mind as they do so. Their views are reinforced when they show prospective customers what they have dreamt up. Airlines don't send their worst pilots to look at new concepts, they send their best. Their 'club' also extends to the staff in certification authorities. They got to be where they are because of their background, the same that of a test pilot. What we need are airliners with systems designed by very poor, below average pilots capable of been flown by the very best.

[Capn Bloggs]

Well said, Piltdown Man.

[peekay4]

I think the 'human behaviour experts' were test pilots. They design, test and approve all sorts of things with their own (very poor) concept of what constitutes a typical line pilot in mind as they do so.
Incidentally, during certification the 787 primary test pilot got surprised by the same A/T behaviour that tripped up the Asiana 214 crew. FAA then required explanatory notes to be added to the 787 manuals as part of its certification. But the same notes were not added back to the 777's.

[alf5071h]

Over the years Pprune has provided a view of the wide range of human behaviours.
This thread continues the education; there are those who cannot deviate from innate bias seeking to blame who or whatever.
Some posters are pilots, a surprising indication of the ineffectiveness of HF training; and if any of these graduate to management then what hope of a just culture.
The more enlightened, increasingly struggle with the incredulity of human activity, but perhaps overlook the subtleties of change, both in technology and how it is being used - training.

The legal issues might involve a comparison between operational views and those of the designer.
It might be reasonable to conclude that the susceptibility for error in this situation was high, particularly in the short time scale and low probability of occurrence, whereas a manufacturer with longer time scales, research and development, and in-service feedback should have provided greater protection.
And what if there had been similar situations, but recovered by the crew. Or what if these is evidence of system weakness in other areas or in similarly designed aircraft.

CT, #53, is an astute observation of differences amongst types; not that one is better than the other, but more about the choice of how systems are integrated, and the interface with the human, and operational situations.
In this accident there is evidence that the crew detected the error, but were not able to react in time. How many similar situations involving human ‘saves’ have not been reported, because the error was corrected. How many of us have had to repress the TOGA switches or reset AT arm to achieve take off thrust, how did we detect the error, what time did had we have to correct it?
Is it easier to detect an error in a system involving a button press and then look for thrust lever movement; or in a system where the thrust levers must to be moved to activate the change and then look at (confirm) the thrust setting.

For the legal beagles; is aviation approaching a point where conventional legal process cannot be applied; like very complex fraud cases where significant expertise is required to argue and judge the technicalities?

[RAT 5]

FAA then required explanatory notes to be added to the 787 manuals as part of its certification. But the same notes were not added back to the 777's.

IMHO that seems a little odd and questionable. Why leave a gotcha waiting to bite someone when you can issue an AD and alert everyone?

[Chronus]

alf5071h`s post is by far the most thought provoking thus far on this thread. I would humbly respond as follows.
Advances in automation have reached a level such that a threat of unintended consequences may be in emergence. The original intention of these advances were to assist and ease pilot work load, enable him to remain mentally alert and physically fit to deal with any possible threats that may be encountered. However these advances also mean that pilot work load has been reduced to such a low level that the pilot is inactive for long periods of time and loses concentration. He is carried rather being the carrier. He becomes a passenger and is no longer the pilot, the person whose mind and body commands and directs the flight.
An understanding of HF in this scenario does therefore require require significant expertise to argue and judge the technical, mainly the psychological issues involved. Inevitably and increasingly, the legal beagles do inevitably need the opinion of an expert witness in cases coming before the courts.

[safetypee]

A continuing concern is how many posters profess to understand the system operation; TOGA is not prevented by wheel touchdown, etc, instead the logic involves rad alt and time.
Many operators in previous threads declared their poor knowledge of the TOGA logic, or even whether the information existed in their manuals. What hope of pilots being able recall the need to change procedures in a rare and obscure situation, particularly when it is not even recalled from the comfort of the arm chair.

A changeover point of 2 sec below 5 ft to a designer might be reasonable approximating to being on the ground (without having to involve squat switches, etc, etc), yet the most likely situation where the aircraft still airborne after 2 sec is a long floating flare as in this case, just when a distance alert and GA are required. But the TOGA system has changed its mode of operation without annunciation.

And some forgotten points in a previous thread: http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/582568-b777-logic-balked-landing-ga-after-touch-down.html#post9464755

PM, CB, not that the tp community needs defending, but it may help the wider audience if alternative views of the design, development, and certification processes were researched.
Much of the success of our industry stem from these activities, as it does from operational feedback and learning from previous events.

[wiedehopf]

i wonder how many improvements are prevented because the manufacturer is afraid of lawsuits.
probably important to have the ntsb issue an suggestion or even an ADR.
in that case changing something is not an admission of guilt. could still be used in court i guess but the manufacturer has no control over it so it's not a reason not to change sth :)

[HPSOV L]

It's all very well in theory but unless there's a strong muscle memory associated with repetitive practice of a manoeuvre then the intuitive response under stress may not always be what you might expect. That we mentally associate thrust increase with TOGA switch operation on takeoff could short-circuit the mental process in this unpracticed configuration (coupled with a startle factor from the RAAS).
Touchy feely nonsense? Given there were two guys with normal backgrounds at the centre of this it begs the question of what proportion of a representative sample of "normal" pilots would have made the same error under the same circumstances. 1%? 20%?
The exact combination of factors happens very rarely so the data is not available; however I think there is a fatal gap in airliner auto-throttle logic (and not just in this respect) that is fixable yet remains unaddressed.
The comments about getting back to basics etc, while understandable, kind of distract from the reality that humans will always be the weak link and the systems can be improved.

[Passenger 389]

On 18th Aug 2017, at 21:42, wiedehopf wrote:

i wonder how many improvements are prevented because the manufacturer is afraid of lawsuits.
probably important to have the ntsb issue an suggestion or even an ADR.
in that case changing something is not an admission of guilt.Did some quick research. (Seemed more interesting than what I was supposed to be doing).

1. In the United States, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 addresses this issue for cases litigated in federal court:

Rule 407 – Subsequent Remedial Measures

When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove:

•negligence;
•culpable conduct;
•a defect in a product or its design; or
•a need for a warning or instruction.

But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or — if disputed — proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures. (emphasis added).


2. Important: the Federal Rules do not govern cases litigated in a state court -- and this case was filed there. (Whether it will remain in state court, or be moved to federal court, is beyond my limited knowledge.)

3. Each state enacts its own Rules of Evidence. Sometimes those rules may mirror the federal rule (here Rule 407). But a state can also choose to write its own version.

4. Adding to the confusion, State legislatures sometimes enact laws that may be determinative on an issue yet are not found within the state's formal "Rules of Evidence." Appellate court decisions can have the same affect.

In 2010, Illinois promulgated a more comprehensive formal "Rules of Evidence." The Committee that drafted it cited that as a key reason why the new version was needed:

"Currently, Illinois rules of evidence are dispersed throughout case law, statutes, and Illinois Supreme Court rules, requiring that they be researched and ascertained from a number of sources."


5. So what is the Illinois version of Federal Rule 407 (subsquent remedial measures)? Hard to say. (groan)

The Committee that promulgated the "Rules of Evidence" (adopted by the state Supreme Court) wrote in 2010 that:

"The Committee reserved Rule 407, related to subsequent remedial measures, because Appellate Court opinions are sufficiently in conflict concerning a core issue that is now under review by the Supreme Court."

In other words, the Committee left Rule 407 blank for now ("reserved.")

6. As of today, the Illinois Supreme Court's website continues to show Rule 407 as "reserved."

Would have preferred to have a clear answer for you, but .......

7. You are correct that a directive of some sort from a government body might provide a little protection.

However, if a key question in the case is the "feasibility of precautionary measures" -- then the directive (and compliance with it) might tend to show the precautionary measure was in fact feasible.

[Onceapilot]

One thing that might have influenced events is throttle handling and power setting. Maybe someone can advise on the 777-300, how often pilots will hand set TO or GA power? Without TOGA activation, is there any indication of the actual GA power setting to refer to?
I can imagine a situation where a pilot is unsure what power to manually set, especially if there is no reference to what that power setting should be?

[tdracer]

There is a 'target' bug on the EICAS N1 display, and there is also an 'N1 Command' bug. Manual power set is done by moving the throttles such that the Command bug and the target bug pretty much line up. While the engines are spooling up there is also what we call a 'command sector' - an arc between the N1 actual and the N1 command. Manually setting N1 command to the target is pretty close to trivial (especially on the 777 which has what I believe to be the best throttle Boeing's ever done).
Sadly, if someone never does a manual power set, they likely don't know or have forgotten about it...

[galaxy flyer]

As a pilot, not an eminent engineer (:ok:), move the throttles until I start getting the performance I expect or need. One exception, C-5 AAR, doing so could result in significant damage, but the engineer's tone usually gave a clue.

[hec7or]

setting TOGA thrust without TOGA actuation will result in a no FD raw data GA, also undesirable.

[EMIT]

OAP

The thrust lever position for a Go Around is pretty simple - full forward until it is stopped by the forward limit of the slot it moves in. Rather hard to forget that one.

[Dan Winterland]

That's the Airbus philosophy and it works very well. Personally, I never liked this aspect of the Boeing autothrust system on the 744. I recall being told about it in training, but I suspect the lesson could easily be forgotten in the situation of a long landing with the RAAS going off.


I don't like RAAS either. My airline didn't fit it. It was considered to be too much of a distraction.

[FlyingStone]

Unless flap lever is at zero. Then it becomes very funny...

[RAT 5]

will result in a no FD raw data GA, also undesirable.

Undesirable, maybe; difficult for a properly trained pilot, no.

The thrust lever position for a Go Around is pretty simple - full forward until it is stopped by the forward limit of the slot it moves in. Rather hard to forget that one.

It was the case on the Boeings that I flew that GA thrust was a 'straight arm' not to the stops. It is also the case that full power is not necessary on an all engine GA. However, if made within kissing distance of the ground I can understand why guys might want all they can get, initially.
On B777 FBW is the power/pitch couple taken care of by more automatics and much of the pitch trim removed? On steam driven a/c it could be quite a handful at full power to keep the nose from being over enthusiastic as you pull back and power up.

[Onceapilot]

tdracer
Thank you for your reply. Can you just confirm what the target bug would display in a non TOGA situation that they had? Would there be a bug in that circumstance? Would it be a weight-related GA power? How do the pilots access the full thrust bug info, is the max always bugged? Thanks

[Onceapilot]

RAT 5
Yes, weight related GA is commonly used. However, full thrust is also handy to have bugged somewhere, in case of engine failure and GA.

[alf5071h]

Dan, #69, agree, and a similar dislike for RAAS, but why, yet there are some very good bits.
One aspect is that the ‘SmartRunway’ feature may be less accurate than pilot judgement, creating cognitive dissidence,- ‘do I believe this or not’ feeling, but of course it is installed to catch those conditions when the computation may be better than the human, but how might we know.
One question in this accident is if the alert was appropriate for the situation, i.e. proportional to the actual distance available and aircraft performance.

Another problem is that the ‘SmartRunway’ appears to be certificated as ‘advisory’, or at least that's the title of the system.
How can a regulator or airframe manufacturer approve a system which offers ‘advice’, requiring a high level alerting, but the advice given might not be the best option. The risk in this is passed to the operator, who has a choice for some of the functions and distances alerted, and in operation, there could be a choice for the pilot. Apparently none in this accident, follow the SOP, but what if the trigger conditions for the SOP are inappropriate. The crew would blamed for not following the alert, but also blamed for not ignoring it.

Then there is the interaction with the aircraft, TOGA. Who holds the responsibility for appropriate operation. The pilots should know but perhaps don't, the operator should but didn't think about any adverse reaction, the system manufacturer (RAAS), but is not his aircraft (and it only advisory), or the airframe manufacturer who ‘must’ know about TOGA, but didn't or did not have to know about add-ons (not my job), or didn't fully consider the interaction with an add-on installation.
What responsibility does the regulator have in this, certification, operational approval, do they talk to each other; problems of supplementary type certification (STC) ?

“Responsibility lies with those who could act but do not, it lies with those who could learn but do not and for those who evaluate it, can add to their capacity to make interventions which might make all our lives the safer.” Phillip Capper - ‘Systems safety in the wake of the Cave Creek disaster

[Sailvi767]

Interesting thread and comments. Perhaps the throttles should be designed so if you want power you simply push the throttles up! Oh wait, they do that already!

[hec7or]

will result in a no FD raw data GA, also undesirable.

Undesirable, maybe; difficult for a properly trained pilot, no.


I think you have been a bit of a lightweight in your response here, a properly trained pilot will use his knowledge of SOPs as dictated by the SFI/TRE cadre, as opposed to a properly experienced pilot who will fly the aircraft comfortably using raw data.

Here's the issue, press TOGA and nothing happens, oh dear, advance the thrust levers to GA thrust, brilliant, now what? No FD! Something's wrong, but what I've got a full script of SOP call outs to make, but no prompts from the FMA. What do I do? No Flight freeze and no one to ask, only a first officer who is just as whacked out as I am after a long sector.

In the 21st century, we are scared to fly outside the SOP box due to the brainwashing from the SOP brigade and we have noise sensitive tracks to follow and altitude constraints to observe, so raw data is a brave option.

Until the OPC/LPC includes TOGA switch failure in the tick box, and an SOP is written, this will be a recurrent (no pun) challenge.

BTW, I've recently flown a raw data takeoff following TOGA switch failure and also a GA from platform alt where TOGA doesn't engage and can confirm that it's much harder than you'd imagine.

and... Flown gliders, singles, single engine jets, RAF, TRI/TRE

[Herod]

There is always a lot of talk about loss of flying skills. Yes, the accountants like to see automatic flight where possible, since it saves money. However, automatics should be considered aids. Maybe airlines should encourage manual flight below, say, 1000' in good conditions. In this case, had PF been using manual control, including manual throttle, might this have been prevented? Caveat: I last flew an airliner in 2004.

[CDRW]

And no one remembers this!!
Similar ??

[Ian W]

There is always a lot of talk about loss of flying skills. Yes, the accountants like to see automatic flight where possible, since it saves money. However, automatics should be considered aids. Maybe airlines should encourage manual flight below, say, 1000' in good conditions. In this case, had PF been using manual control, including manual throttle, might this have been prevented? Caveat: I last flew an airliner in 2004.

It is actually a little worse than that. The certification of many of the automatics is based on them being considered 'aids'/'support tools'. This makes their testing and certification easier because failure modes can be expected to be dealt with by the flight crew. So the software is built with a design that when things get too difficult (the otherwise case ) it hands the decision to the crew as a bag of bolts for the sky-gods to take over.
Thanks to the actions of the beancounters the and senior pilot/managers that scrutinize FOQA and the SOP writers, the 'aids' and their 'advice' are required to be treated as infallible. But they were not designed to be perfect they are intended to assist and reduce workload.
This is a major systems analysis failure by the designers and a missed 'cheese hole' by the regulators.
Also, IFF, the systems are not for sky-gods but instead are designed to be perfect and not fail as the current senior pilots/managers/beancounters wish them to be; then there is no need for sky-gods, indeed no need for even cruise-pilots - as the 'automatics' now do it all themselves and do not have an otherwise case. That is where the attitude always follow the automatics, always obey RAAS, always use TOGA, always follow SOPs is leading. The day is not far off where even remote pilots will be unnecessary - because of the attitude to automation, exhibited by suing a manufacturer because the crew treated advice as an edict and were unable to carry out a simple go-around without the assistance of automatics that were limited in their operation to cope with possible crew error, without that limitation on TOGA to avoid human error the automatics would have worked alone RAAS could have triggered TOGA and the FMS fly the aircraft.

I (unfortunately) can remember when elevators all had operators, when trains always had drivers and when there were no automated cars. This court action will hasten the demise of the job of pilot.

(And before anyone asks - yes I would fly in an unpiloted aircraft - the one I am in is currently on full automatic operation over the East Atlantic and the automatics will be in control until a few hundred feet on finals in Atlanta, and that could easily become an autoland.)

[Capn Bloggs]

This court action will hasten the demise of the job of pilot.
What it should hasten is more sim time for exploring/practising weirdo stuff so we can better cope with a out-of-left-field event such as this.

[Intruder]

I (unfortunately) can remember when elevators all had operators, when trains always had drivers and when there were no automated cars. This court action will hasten the demise of the job of pilot.

(And before anyone asks - yes I would fly in an unpiloted aircraft - the one I am in is currently on full automatic operation over the East Atlantic and the automatics will be in control until a few hundred feet on finals in Atlanta, and that could easily become an autoland.)
I, too, remember those days. Tomorrow I will fly my last flight as a 747 Captain.

Unlike you, I would NOT fly in an unpiloted airplane. While you can point to the vast majority of uneventful flights, a significant majority of them were uneventful ONLY because of pilot intervention. The simplest of ATC events - a deviation for other traffic - cannot today be easily accomplished automatically. In the US, we cannot even use CPDLC in 99% of airspace. While ADS-B may make controllers' lives easier, it has no similar benefits for pilots - yet.

The next level of intervention is that for weather avoidance. An autopilot cannot rely on radar returns, because they, too, are not reliable enough for complete confidence. At one end of the spectrum, an autopilot would chase false or spurious returns in circles forever; at the other end it would fly right through an area of visible weather that does not show on the radar.

Finally, there is the [in]ability to deal with non-normal and emergency situations. These are the times when an experienced pilot is most valuable and most needed. Even a 'drone operator' in some control station on the ground would be hard-pressed to analyze some of the situations I have dealt with in the air. Add to that the fact that one of those emergency situations - or a result of some other failure - may be loss of communication with the ground operator!

If you want to risk your Amazon Prime package to a drone, that's fine. It just isn't a reasonable option for passenger airplanes in the foreseeable future.

[Ian W]

What it should hasten is more sim time for exploring/practising weirdo stuff so we can better cope with a out-of-left-field event such as this.

Perhaps if the court action was against the airline, but it is against the manufacturer. The airline does not want to 'pay' for more sim time, so will agree it is the manufacturer's 'fault' for making it difficult for the flight crews. Then that leads to the reasoning I gave above.

[Ian W]

I, too, remember those days. Tomorrow I will fly my last flight as a 747 Captain.

Unlike you, I would NOT fly in an unpiloted airplane. While you can point to the vast majority of uneventful flights, a significant majority of them were uneventful ONLY because of pilot intervention. The simplest of ATC events - a deviation for other traffic - cannot today be easily accomplished automatically. In the US, we cannot even use CPDLC in 99% of airspace. While ADS-B may make controllers' lives easier, it has no similar benefits for pilots - yet.

The next level of intervention is that for weather avoidance. An autopilot cannot rely on radar returns, because they, too, are not reliable enough for complete confidence. At one end of the spectrum, an autopilot would chase false or spurious returns in circles forever; at the other end it would fly right through an area of visible weather that does not show on the radar.

Finally, there is the ability to deal with non-normal and emergency situations. These are the times when an experienced pilot is most valuable and most needed. Even a 'drone operator' in some control station on the ground would be hard-pressed to analyze some of the situations I have dealt with in the air. Add to that the fact that one of those emergency situations - or a result of some other failure - may be loss of communication with the ground operator!

If you want to risk your Amazon Prime package to a drone, that's fine. It just isn't a reasonable option for passenger airplanes in the foreseeable future.

But the point is that more cases are being reported of the flight crew being unable to recover when automation hands them the bag of bolts. The events you quote are completely true; for today's automation that was [I]designed to be an aid to an experienced pilot not a automation that must be obeyed. But now we see airline management insisting that the advice must be obeyed, and pilots who appear less capable when the magenta line is pulled from their grasp. This is leading to a significant change in design specification for avionics systems. They will not chase in circles as you suggest. You are doing the equivalent of comparing car cruise controls from the 1990's to a google self-driving car.

The more manufacturers are hit by litigation due to flight crew misunderstanding/mishandling decision support tools the more those tools become fully capable automation and the role of the flight crew is diminished. Eventually, all that is left is automation and as the beancounters will tell you at every opportunity, automation does not need 401K or pensions.

[RAT 5]

What it should hasten is more sim time for exploring/practising weirdo stuff so we can better cope with a out-of-left-field event such as this.

What I've seen over 35 years causes me some discomfort regarding pilot training & pilot performance. Ian W makes some excellent points commenting on what is becoming an all too common and perhaps unwelcome culture. After Air Taxis, Biz-jets and even crop spraying I found myself in a B732. Very basic nav sets and some very basic destinations. Piloting skills trained & encouraged, strict but reasonably brief SOP's, daily demonstration of those manual skills. VOR nav, DME descent planning and CDA being the norm. SA was always a priority in 4 dimensions.
This culture was carried forward onto EFIS/EICAS a/c. We didn't throw airmanship & piloting skills out of the window, we used the automatics as aids to reduce the workload, improve SA, make our management of the flight more accurate, efficient & safer. In other words the basic skill foundations were maintained & strengthened, not diluted. Management was pilot orientated, but also with attention to a budget. The new kit, all the bells & whistles were fun to use. We already had the basic piloting foundation, we were now taught about the automatics in depth and how to use them as a tool. The philosophy was NOT to transfer command to them, but use them to make our life easier. The pilot was still the boss.
I then moved on to young growing airlines who had entry pilots direct onto EFIS/EICAS a/c. The TR course was very much automatics orientated. Fortunately, the destinations were very varied from full blown auto land to cloud-break NDB's. Thus manual flying was encouraged and developed on the line. IMHO there was still too much magenta line following, both lateral & vertical. The monitoring of profile & SA was not good enough; it had not been stressed nor taught, but at least the guys could manoeuvre the a/c manually when the tarmac was in sight.
I then moved on to airlines that had also transferred from basic technology to new bells and whistles at the same time as rapid expansion. During the TR course 90% of attention was automatics, rigid SOP's profiles. They were taught only one way to do anything; rather than learn what the systems were capable of, i.e. in depth knowledge. They had no idea what options there were; there was only one way to do it. Thus if the world threw a googly at you you had an armoury of knowledge to choose the correct weapon to win the battle. Added to that, manual flying was not encouraged. Thus the basic piloting foundation we had, before learning the new technology, is missing. You don't fly a Boeing like a Cessna. On a normal day the SOP worked fine, you could be in your comfort zone; but the pax expect us to have a broad comfort zone, not a narrow one. They expect us to be able to bat away googlies. So did the old pilot orientated FLT OPs management. It seems nowadays, as Ian W surmises, there is an attitude that things will not go so wrong and thus the depth of skill & knowledge & training does not need to be so comprehensive.
That is a very dangerous slippery slope, especially as the command upgrade, and cadet entry, threshold has been lowered so much. IMHO there house is built on sand. The basic foundations are not a strong and durable as they used to be, and should be. A strong stormy day stresses those foundations close to their limits.
I was always astonished at some F/O's reaction to a new scenario. Occasionally there was not a rigid SOP, just a 'normal way of doing it'. Circumstances changed and I might utilise a technique from the FCTM. It worked fine, of course; or it was just good old basic piloting. The F/O would comment afterwards, "are we allowed to do that?" They saw the good common sense, understood the following explanation and wondered why they felt it was not allowed. They were so used to being told every minutiae and thus didn't recognise when some liberal thinking was necessary & possible.
Earlier in this ever circular discussion that has been aired for years on Prune, someone made a very valid point.
"The autopilot is not there to control the a/c because you can't. The automatics are there as a tool & aid, not to be in command."

[Vessbot]

There is always a lot of talk about loss of flying skills. Yes, the accountants like to see automatic flight where possible, since it saves money. However, automatics should be considered aids. Maybe airlines should encourage manual flight below, say, 1000' in good conditions. In this case, had PF been using manual control, including manual throttle, might this have been prevented? Caveat: I last flew an airliner in 2004.

Did you mean to say above 1000?

[Herod]

No, I meant below 1000'. Too much emphasis on autopilot in immediately after take-off, and out at the last minute. The automatics are great, and necessary, when the weather is bad, but are they really needed in clear conditions? As for above 1000', the automatics can fly better and cheaper than the human, especially in the cruise. In retrospect, perhaps I should have said below 5,000'.

[Vessbot]

That's a little more agreeable to me. Below 1000, there's barely any flying left to do. No power changes, no trim changes (due to flaps or otherwise), no airspeed changes, no vertical speed or altitude captures, no course or glideslope intercepts, no heading changes... no nothing. You're just handed a steady state condition and have to maintain it.

If we're talking about that being the hand-flying envelope to increase to, that's truly pathetic. This is not a slam on you, but on the situation that has led to you saying that. That's why I thought you accidentally inverted the above/below in your previous post. Some are concerned about the prospect of riding on pilotless airplanes, but don't realize that we already are.

[RoyHudd]

I've been flying Airbus types for 18 years (and F-27's and the like before). I have never followed a line, magenta or otherwise. Beam bars, Flight Directors, yes, but following a line? What is meant by that? Is it a navigation thing?

As for fully automated flight of large jets full of passengers, I just cannot see that happening within the next hundred years. I have sat there with colleagues and pondered this issue, and we always arrive at the same conclusion. Uniformly.

I do think that those advocates of non-pilot flight are both drastically ill-informed and perhaps envious. The term sky-god is ludicrous for today's commercial pilot. We are average people, with an unusual skill-set. Our level of intervention with the flight of an airliner is high, as can be the number of judgement calls.Try programming a suitable set of diagnostics and responses for a burst tyre at high speed, say 15 knots before V1. Considerations such as fuel lines, hydraulics, gear retraction, climb performance, continuation of flight landing performance with a variety of damage possibilities again involving fuel and/or hydraulics, return to overweight landing, request for runway inspection, etc. The list is long. And meanwhile the aircraft needs to be flown safely in possible bad weather. Most parts of the world do not have, and will unlikely ever have decent radar for weather. And even the US has its limitations.

I do agree that the standard of airmanship has diminished amongst some of the new cadets, which is carried through to the first 3,000 hours or so of airline flying. And I agree that the use of automation, although necessary, has lowered our hand-flying skills and scan efficiency.

Much can be improved, but is unlikely to be, due to commercial considerations. Air safety may well decline. However, airliners without pilots? Or Air Traffic Controllers for that matter? Impossible within the foreseeable future.

[GICASI2]

This, in my opinion, was an accident waiting to happen. Over reliance on automation causing complacency, lack of training,

In some cases that is proved to be true: however, these were not inexpereinced pilots. They had flown other less automated types.

Flaps20
CHECK THRUST
Positive rate - gear up.
If you do and say this, you will live.

No doubt this is how they had been trained on other types, as it is pretty standard, especially with less automated types. The physics haven't changed.

I often wonder why pilots bin their experience from previous days when they are told to 'let the automatics do it for you, stop cross checking': 'follow the FD' etc.etc.

I am afraid it is even more basic than this: Power Attitude Trim is(/was/will be) taught and is the panacea, no matter what aircraft you fly. (Mine was solo on a C150 to left seat on the 747 and 777 for a legacy carrier). Never mind all the (distracting) FMA calls, which hardly anyone gets correct, the basic procedure still works (and was not followed in this case):
- Hand on the THR LVRs
- Straight Arm (whilst communicating to the other guy your intentions)
- Wait for the engines to spool up (pointers moving towards Max THR)
- When the other guy calls ROTATE, smoothly select the correct attitude
There is plenty of time to select the TOGA mode when airborne as the runway will give a good indication of which direction you should be following! And after a big breath, read the FMAs for the subsequent board of inquiry.

No, these bozos did nothing correctly. EK, not BOEING, should be in the dock for this one and MacDonald's should have a couple of new burger flippers. They should never be allowed near another aircraft.

[Vessbot]

I do agree that the standard of airmanship has diminished amongst some of the new cadets, which is carried through to the first 3,000 hours or so of airline flying. And I agree that the use of automation, although necessary, has lowered our hand-flying skills and scan efficiency.


What's supposed to change in the airman after the 3000th hour of taking the controls established on the localizer and glideslope, on-speed and configured?

[Piltdown Man]

PM, CB, not that the tp community needs defending, but it may help the wider audience if alternative views of the design, development, and certification processes were researched.
Much of the success of our industry stem from these activities, as it does from operational feedback and learning from previous events.

Maybe I have been a little unfair. Test pilots will have helped develop, test and improve many systems including those seen and unseen on all aircraft. But part of the process must be to include the rationale behind the way a system works. We are just given a "Push button X and this will or will not happen". We are not supplied with the story behind the logic. Surely communication to the end user should be part of their remit?

[cessnapete]

A friend of mine in a British airline recently converted to the A380. During route operations has never flown the aircraft with manual thrust control, strict SOP bans manual practice in any circumstances. Apart from takeoff and initial climb,has only "flown" the aircraft manually when established on final approach, normally well below 1000ft. As a passenger I find this frightening.

[Chris2303]

One thing to say.

QF32 without humans on the flight deck?

[Ian W]

I think you underestimate what could be done with avionics these days. The more 'cruise pilots' show themselves unable to recover from relatively benign events like loss of airspeed indication, the more it becomes sensible for the avionics to do the work and not even go into a degraded mode (alternate law) where the pilot need be involved. There are now adaptive avionics that will allow military aircraft to recover after extreme and random battle damage as if they are flying normally. So do not make the mistake of underestimating how far automation and autonomous aircraft have come. Every time a human pilot screws up and loses the aircraft the argument is made again that the automatics could/would have made a better job of recovery had they been programmed to do so...

[etudiant]

This line of argument is certainly plausible, plus the freight services provide a tailor made entry ramp for field testing the concept. The ATC interface will need some work though.

[ShotOne]

Ian W, that argument may have be made but in no way proven: you base your case on (rare) situations where the automatics have failed and pilots have failed to intervene correctly. Who knows how a fully automatic system would have responded Hardly convincing!

Similarly your earlier post spoke of being on board an aircraft in fully automatic operation. No you weren't. The autopilot was human programmed and under full human control as was every aspect of decision-making for the entire flight including failure cases.

[Herod]

One other thing puzzles me about this accident. Admittedly, I don't have access to the CVR tapes, but according to the FDR, the gear was selected "up" some six seconds after the go-around was started. The aircraft reached a max RA height of 85'. Was "positive climb" ever spoken, or the "gear up" command given? Again my caveat: I've been out of the business over twelve years.

[Nightstop]

Don't know the answer to that Herod but, before the "Gear Up" order is given by PF, we require a positive climb indicated on the Radio Altimeter, VSI and Baro altimeter. One or two out of the three isn't good enough. It is the task of PM to observe those criteria and make that call. I also brief that we may receive a Config Warning if the aircraft temporarily touches down on the runway during the go around, this is a normal temporary consequence due to the landing flap and gear configuration. That Config Warning can be mistaken for a Fire Warning though, rather distracting if you're not expecting it.

[Piltdown Man]

Battlefield "get-you-home" modes do show what is possible and it is clever stuff. But we are talking here about an autothrottle system that appears to have functioned as designed. Unfortunately, it was not what the handling pilot anticipated and by the time the pilot monitoring noticed, too late. So this means that these pilots did not know how to do a manual go-around or perform a rejected landing. So has this been forgotten or was it never taught? And have these procedures been practiced by Emirates' training department and acceptance pilots in a 777? If not, something has been overlooked. What else has been forgotten? That aircraft in their fleet will not perform as expected means there is something deficient in the user. They in turn may ask Boeing why the documentation of autothrottle modes were not fully described or there again, maybe they were and their impact was not fully understood.

Talking of fully autonomous aircraft, the flight control software is only one part of the project and let's face it, what we have is still seriously lacking. With the exception of flight in smooth air through fog, I've not flown an aircraft where the automatics are more capable than Mk. I humans. Flight through rough air, windsheer, strong crosswinds are all situations where the automatics perform worse than humans. And if we want to take automation further, who will write the algorithms to determine where you point it, how high and how low, and when you go? We haven't got the existing stuff sorted out yet. Get that done and then work on the future.

[B2N2]

A friend of mine in a British airline recently converted to the A380. During route operations has never flown the aircraft with manual thrust control, strict SOP bans manual practice in any circumstances. Apart from takeoff and initial climb,has only "flown" the aircraft manually when established on final approach, normally well below 1000ft. As a passenger I find this frightening.

That's because you practice in the simulator and not on a revenue leg with pax on board.
That comment may have been taken out of context.

My first captain on my first jet coined the term "pilot stuff".
As in once in a while you'll be called upon to do "pilot stuff".
Most of the time you sit there looking out the window enjoying the world going by essentially waiting for the next time you'd have to do some "pilot stuff".
Whenever we had a non-normal condition creep up inside or outside of the airplane he'd kinda shrug his shoulders and say " it's time to do some pilot stuff".
This includes malfunctions, weather, arrivals or departure procedures going pear shaped on you.
In the above discussion we're getting bogged down in the procedure bs technique argument.
We should never forget we get paid to do the occasional "pilot stuff".
The airplane can be on autopilot but the pilot isn't.

So we have a fender bender in traffic.
What do we do? Blame the car/driver in front of us?

[RAT 5]

"Do some pilot stuff", wonderful, I like it. It's what the pax expect us to be; the insurance policy that saves the day when the fridge catches fire and the toilet starts to leak.

There is no doubt that at the end of a long working day, possibly with not a full nights sleep, using the automatics to bring the a/c to 1000' stable on finals is the way to go. It is also more often the case that a/c arrive onto finals via radar control. You are told altitude, speed & HDG. It is easier to dial the number into MCP. However, and sadly not so common anymore, it is wonderful to have open skies, the runway in sight from 30nm out, switch it all off and have a silent raw data relaxed arrival via a CDA to a smooth touchdown. Very satisfying and totally gob stopping for the cadet whose only manually handle was during base training.
I do not have any problem with full use of the automatics. The problem I have is with the philosophy & culture that has replaced the basic handling skills with full use of automatics, so that when the automatics fail or malfunction there is a nervous fall back rather than a confident one. The automatics must supplement the basics not replace them. Modern guys always try to solve problems in the automatics by selecting further modes of automatics, when the best manner might be to disconnect and sort it out with some analysis.
The video 'Children of the Magenta Line' states this wonderfully. Select the level of automation that is best for the moment, and that could zero. The problem is that for some zero is both heresy & terrifying.

[cessnapete]

But in many airlines the option of a fully manually flown approach and landing, for handling practice, is not allowed, even in low workload severe CAVOK.
For example Virgin allow it when weather and workload conditions allow, BA completely ban the practise.

[Ian W]

Ian W, that argument may have be made but in no way proven: you base your case on (rare) situations where the automatics have failed and pilots have failed to intervene correctly. Who knows how a fully automatic system would have responded Hardly convincing!

Similarly your earlier post spoke of being on board an aircraft in fully automatic operation. No you weren't. The autopilot was human programmed and under full human control as was every aspect of decision-making for the entire flight including failure cases.

So the uploaded FPN from dispatch was written by the crew? The weight and balance was created by the crew? More and more you are passengers watching the automatics implement flights that were (or could easily have been) given the flight information uploaded automatically from dispatch rather then go through the intermediary of a flight crew - and the bean counters will point to the number of basic errors, like the one in this thread - failure to ensure that power was coming on and a positive climb before lifting the undercarriage.

There are many UAS operating that have not had problems of the kind that are always quoted. The argument made by crews will need to be significantly more convincing than "honest we deal with problems every day that the automatics cannot". Tell that to the people that have created UAS that do automated/autonomous air to air refuelling then recover to automated/autonomous carrier landings.

[M.Mouse]

Flight through rough air, windsheer, strong crosswinds are all situations where the automatics perform worse than humans.

I really have to disagree with you. Certainly on the B777, on which I have around 5,000 hours, the Autothrottle is outstanding and, from my observations when observing from a jumpseat, when a pilot overrides the Autothrottle on a gusty approach because he/she thinks it is not responding quickly enough he/she is normally wrong and causes the Autothrottle to immediately reduce power because he/she has caused a large speed increase. In my view the inertial systems, which ultimately are controlling the Autothrottle, sense changes and trends far more accurately and quickly than we humans ever can.

Similarly the Autopilot/Autothrottle system on the B777 is certificated to autoland the aircraft on one engine with a 25 knot x-wind.

In my last company we were allowed to autoland the aircraft up to the aircraft x-wind limit in greater than Cat I conditions. I know of one trainer, severely caught out by an extraordinary set of circumstances (like all these things it is a long story but for another time) who autolanded with a 40 knot x-wind in unforecast Cat II conditions.

Both the B777/787 FCOMs state that a windshear escape manouevre can be flown automatically and the advice contained therein states that SEVERE windshear MAY exceed the performance capability of the automatics and the pilot flying must be prepared to disconnect the automatics and fly manually.

I have personally been in severe turbulence twice and, although the situation was alarming, both autopilot and autothrottle coped admirably before we escaped from the conditions.

[Piltdown Man]

That's not all aircraft then. But I'm glad to hear some do but frankly I'm not surprised that an aircraft like the triple is so capable. I just wish this level of functionality was available in more aircraft.

But in many airlines the option of a fully manually flown approach for handling practice, is not allowed, even in low workload severe CAVOK.

So was/is Emirates one of these? If it was, they had better get their cheque book out - unless local law prevents them from being sued. And maybe the shareholders of airlines where manual flying is banned should be informed. Shareholders (and more importantly, passengers and those on the ground) doesn't expect perfectly serviceable aircraft to be crashed because its pilots are neither trained nor familiar with manual flight. As RAT 5 and B2N2 have said, it is expected by everybody (except airlines it appears) that we have to "do some pilot stuff" every now and again to make up for unusual weather and deficiencies in current aircraft design and manufacture.

[M.Mouse]

But in many airlines the option of a fully manually flown approach and landing, for handling practice, is not allowed, even in low workload severe CAVOK.
For example Virgin allow it when weather and workload conditions allow, BA completely ban the practise.

On the BA B777 and the B787. Flying manually is OK with cloudbase above 1,000', Autothrottle off is discouraged but not banned.

[H Peacock]

Now that's refreshing to hear that a company can encourage/discourage rather than simply mandate 'you are to' or ban 'you are not too'. Whilst the latter does have its place, so many things in aviation are grey rather than simply black or white!

[safetypee]

PM, #91, I agree that pilots need an understanding the rationale behind systems operation, but modern aircraft systems are now so complex the task of describing them in piloting terms approaches practical limits of training, knowledge retention, and recall.

Thus the point becomes the depth of knowledge required to operate in the expected range of situations. This is often translated into training ‘mechanistic’ SOPs, where the background to the procedure does not need to be known.
Training now focuses on ‘what to think’ opposed to ‘how to think’ about operating aircraft, the latter providing some protection for the unexpected. And when the industry ‘discovers’ a new ‘unexpected’ situation a solution is to create another SOP or train for the exception, effectively doubling the training task with further dependance on the crew for recall and action.

There must be a limit to this, if not we will spend more time training than flying. Cost effectiveness will prevail, but when. Perhaps the time is right for operators to question the expansive demands of training and regulatory compliance; we need an alternative model.
Automation and SOPs should be seen as tools to aid flying, not the means of achieving safely; that requires thought which uniquely requires pilots.
Management have the better opportunities for thinking; don’t expect pilots to rethink a systems interface problem in the last few feet of a landing. Pay attention to ‘small’ changes - modifications, SOPs, training, they may suddenly escalate to big problems.

This accident illustrates the difficulties in this area, particularly the effect of ‘add-on’ equipment.
The aircraft manufacturer has a well proven procedure based on previous designs and operation - TOGA; the avionics vendor recommends the use of existing aircraft procedures, but who brings the two together and asks the difficult questions which are much clearer with hindsight.
Does the new equipment change the assumptions in the original aircraft design.
Will a ‘long landing’ call result in greater exposure for the use TOGA below 5ft.
What are the differences between a pilot judged need for GA vs a machine generated alert.
Will an automated call surprise crews, slowing their reaction and cross checking.
Who holds the responsibility for considering these aspects; perhaps this will be the crux of the legal action.

[cessnapete]

B2N2
Yes of course these things are practiced and taught in the sim. But are you saying that when "horrors", the aircraft is full of pax, BA discourage manual handling? Not much of an advertisement for their pilots expertise, or lack of, if the automatics fail.
In my time on the B744 when conditions allowed, weather and workload etc. Hand flying AP/ out A/t out was encouraged.

[lurkio]

I'm starting to wonder how the hell we, and a hell of a lot before and after, managed in the classic 747 without FFRATS. We did though and times have moved on. The airlines now want to mitigate all risk out of flying by reducing manual anything but I can only feel that they are storing up a big problem for themselves with the colusion of the regulator. The answer? I do not know, but I hope it does not take a large loss of life to force a rethink.

[M.Mouse]

So let me see, pilots skills are being eroded so this is going to lead to flying becoming more dangerous. Is this the premise?

[pilot9249]

alf5071h`s post is by far the most thought provoking thus far on this thread. I would humbly respond as follows.
Advances in automation have reached a level such that a threat of unintended consequences may be in emergence. The original intention of these advances were to assist and ease pilot work load, enable him to remain mentally alert and physically fit to deal with any possible threats that may be encountered. However these advances also mean that pilot work load has been reduced to such a low level that the pilot is inactive for long periods of time and loses concentration. He is carried rather being the carrier. He becomes a passenger and is no longer the pilot, the person whose mind and body commands and directs the flight.
An understanding of HF in this scenario does therefore require require significant expertise to argue and judge the technical, mainly the psychological issues involved. Inevitably and increasingly, the legal beagles do inevitably need the opinion of an expert witness in cases coming before the courts.

Can only agree with this.

Automation has replaced advancing a lever always used, with pressing a button almost never used.

The designer of that button has responsibility to make it as safe or safer than that which it replaced.

Did they succeed?

Many on here are undoubtedly right that the crew failed.

They make reasonable statements about this, but then draw conclusions that fail a simple test of logic.

They assume that because the crew failed, therefore the design of the button did not fail.

That conclusion simply does not follow.

If this button is going to remove your hand from a perfectly natural control, and then isn't going to do the only thing you could possibly intend it to do, why ISN'T that even enunciated?

[cessnapete]

M.Mouse
Certainly, already happened with Airbus Air France, and Air Asia A320 and SFO 777 mishap.
All caused by simple manual handling failure issues.
If my BA friend has only ever hand flown the A380 route flying, on take off and early initial climb, and then usually well below 1000ft when established on final approach. I find this worrying.
All mandated by rigid Company SOP which appears to discourage airmanship, and flying skills other than in a Sim.

[safetypee]

cessnap... perhaps you should challenge yourself to provide the evidence for your conclusions. Loss of skills vs automation is still an open issue but the balance to date favours degraded mental skills over manual skills.

This accident appears to be more associated with cognitive skills than manual handling.
The action to move the thrust levers forward requires an understanding of the need to do it, which implies an understanding of why thrust did not increase automatically as demanded. The mental model was for automatic thrust, the situation required a change of view to that associated with manual operation. How is this achieved, how do pilots change mode, what might impede this, time, experience, memory recall, startle … https://www.halldale.com/files/halldale/attachments/Martin.pptx

What features contributed to the need for pilots to change their mental view? And could this change be achieved in a timescale no longer than it takes to read this post?

After though: if pilots were faced by this situation in late Jan 2008, how many would focus their attention on engine malfunction.

[Piltdown Man]

If this button is going to remove your hand from a perfectly natural control, and then isn't going to do the only thing you could possibly intend it to do, why ISN'T that even enunciated?

The GA button is part of the thrust lever assembly, is a just ahead and slightly underneath the highest point of the levers. You don't take your hand off the levers to use it. Old fashioned gits like me hit the switch and follow the levers forwards to make sure the thing has worked. As you press the button, you call "Go around..." to put your colleague in "go around mode" you pitch up and carry on flying. If you are lucky, your well rehearsed go around procedure then takes place as the pilot monitoring looks for go around power, a positive rate and an appropriate airspeed.

The announciation is not important. The thrust, positive climb rate and appropriate airspeed are. At about 400' the lack of go around guidance, lateral and/or vertical will probably be noticed and then alternative steps will be taken to ensure an appropriate flight path. After landing, you call your technical support people and ask about what just happened. Then the learning starts.

You will find that lots of modes and buttons do not work as advertised. Sometimes you get a message or a ping, sometimes you don't. What is important is that you carry a mental model of what you would like to happen before you need it. Then when you are let down you use another method to get what you want. Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable.

[sleeper]

Our company taught us to always advance the throttle manually together with pushing the G/A button versus only using the button. You would then have the tactile feedback of the A/T taking over. Only then would I release the thrustlevers. Pm moniters power output, fma etc.
This was on Boeings and I retired on the B777.

There was a company tendency to use the automatics, but manual flying was not discouraged or forbidden. I normally flew the departure to above 10.000 and the landing from above 10.000, A/T off in all but low cat 1 and cat 3 wx. This depending on flightduration , crewing or crew workload.

[cessnapete]

safetypee

Thats just the point, to Go Around to increase power, you/ TOGA move the thrust levers forward, simple 'pilot stuff'. If you have an automatic aid to help, you don't discard the 'pilot stuff,' if the auto system is mishandled as in this case, or fails, you just sit hands in lap and crash?? Most airline SOP would have hands on thrust levers at least below 500ft.
Crews are loosing the ability to instinctively back up with the 'pilot stuff'.
There was no systems failure in the DXB case, just failed basic airmanship.

[RAT 5]

What is important is that you carry a mental model of what you would like to happen before you need it. Then when you are let down you use another method to get what you want. Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable.

Spot ON. However, there are operators that teach only one method of doing anything; they do not teach all the capabilities of the systems. Thus, when the primary method doesn't work there might not be enough knowledge of the alternatives; or they might be too scared of SOP police to attempt any. Meanwhile the can or worms is getting bigger as lack of action kicks in. By the time WTF has passed and been replaced by a little panic mode it could be too late. Even more undesirable is where the primary method doesn't work and then the guessing starts and the pilot makes it worse and the spiral tightens.

Regarding FMA call outs or not: the monitoring of FMA's is often doubtful. I see people call out FMA's without first thinking 'what is it I want to see'. If you do that first then the actual FMA crates a feedback loop in your brain. I want to see XYZ, I do see XYZ, therefore I've got what I want'. Or not, and then you do something about it. That concept is not taught by most: it is just SOP push this button at this time and the a/c will do that.
I had this interesting moment more than once: we were in the cruise approaching TOD in VNAV PTH. ATC cleared us to descend and PF dialled in the new FL in MCP. Just as they did that FMA changed to ALT HLD. The a/c did not descend, I called "ALT HLD" - PF replied "Check" and we carried on in level flight. This process was repeated and ATC repeated the descent clearance. PF looked at MCP and saw the lower FL and looked confused. I again said "ALT HLD". There was a question mark of 'how did that happen' rather than do something about it. I was then accused of being unhelpful in not alerting PF what to do in the first instance. OMG as eyes rolled to the heavens. You can stare at the FMA all you want, but only if you understand them. In B738 rolling in V/S doesn't always work, unless the FMA pitch is in the correct mode first and MCP adjusted. That causes some confusion and piano playing on the MCP.

It's not quite the same sentiment, but it does add to the concept of 'being ahead of the game'.

An NTSB investigator once said, "A pilot should not take their a/c to a place their brain had not already been a few moments earlier." Add this to the sentiment above and you can have a nice relaxing and successful day.

[cessnapete]

In passing, in my early career 747s had no TOGA, hadn't been invented.
We did though have a sort of TOGA assist , it was called a Flight Engineer. He certainly wouldn't sit and watch the thrust levers at idle in a Go Around.
The advent of automation on the -400 did initially tend to modify your 'pilot stuff' On an early conversion Sim I pressed the new fangled TOGA switches on take off, released the brakes, and transferred my gaze out of the window. At about 30 kts I noticed the power still at idle and called Stop. The Training Captain queried my actions, after I replied "the TOGA has failed". "What's wrong with your arm?" he said, good advice!

[safetypee]

PM, ”Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable”.
Many pilots would agree with that view; I would also agree providing the situation is considered and stated, place the activity in context.

Over the years aviation has changed dramatically with increasingly complex operational situations and technology, yet the human has not changed. The industry appears to be approaching the limits of human effectiveness, particularly with decreasing opportunity to gain experience - learning on the job.
Thus it is even more important to consider what we might expect of human performance in specific situations, and if we judge that unacceptable, then action is required to alleviate the human limitation (automation, decision aiding, annunciation) or protect them from the situation (system operating logic).

More often this judgment is made by pilots, particularly in this forum. We harshly judge ourselves, especially when we know the outcome of accidents; we conclude (with subconscious hindsight bias) that ‘we would not make that mistake’, and thus expect others to act similarly.
We are our worst enemies; we have grown up with the changes which we may not have noticed, and overtime gained experiences well beyond that which might be found today.
In order to judge - comment, we must identify what has changed, systems and situations, and then consider the effect of these in limiting human performance.

It's not where the line of judgement is drawn, but who makes that judgement. Look to management, regulator, and manufacturer, but first look to ourselves.

Compare with http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/597956-asiana-214-777-crash-old-post.html#post9853313

cessnap.., ”Crews are loosing the ability to instinctively back up with the 'pilot stuff'.”
I agree, but why blame individuals if they are trained or encouraged to think otherwise, or are unable to achieve a level of experience or confidence to do something which deviates from SOPs.
This accident highlights the limitations of an SOP mentality (depends on the identification of all possible situations); what do you do if the expected changes do not occur; seek an alternative published SOP, or an unpublished ‘airmanship’ SOP ?

RAT :ok: but what happens if the brain has never been in the situation before, or even biased not to think about these situations.

[Piltdown Man]

I don't disagree with you safetypee but although it's implied I'm not criticising the crew. They were just unfortunate to be at the the sharp end when things went wrong that day. They were let down by the system that placed them there and 'unexpected' modes designed into the aircraft. So questions have to be asked as to why this crew first found themselves into a position that required a late go around and then why the manoeuvre was executed in the way it was. So the only solution to incidents like this is a proper investigation into the human factors, training and culture behind this incident - as ever. And then maybe, just maybe, the investigators will consider the questions surrounding rigid SOPs and manual flying.

[akindofmagic]

Now that's refreshing to hear that a company can encourage/discourage rather than simply mandate 'you are to' or ban 'you are not too'.

Explicitly encouraged at my outfit, in the OM-A, and in practice on the line. I try to impress upon the FOs I fly with the importance of being absolutely comfortable with the aeroplane regardless of the level of automation used.

My personal preference, heretical as it is on the Airbus, is to use manual thrust whenever I fly manually.

[RAT 5]

They were just unfortunate to be at the the sharp end when things went wrong that day. They were let down by the system that placed them there and 'unexpected' modes designed into the aircraft. So questions have to be asked as to why this crew first found themselves into a position that required a late go around and then why the manoeuvre was executed in the way it was.

You're asking questions about root cause. Good idea. The GA, we are told, was called by RAAS (I think) Is the SOP a mandatory GA? What I am asking is, if the captain, who is good visual at a familiar runway, could treat the auto-call of long landing as advisory, would there have been a GA at all? Or rather a successful landing with no worries. i.e. is the root cause an SOP that is stubborn adherence to a computer call?
(I apologise if I'm in error with some technical jargon)

[M.Mouse]

A 'Long Landing' automated callout is a compulsory GA in Emirates. The airline is very strict on adherence to SOPs.

[Hibernia]

Good grief! If you want to mitigate against the 'creativity' of the dumbest pilot in the room, buy Airbus and keep your fingers crossed nothing goes badly wrong. If you actually believe in the superiority of a properly trained crew and experience based airmanship, buy Boeing and get your ass behind evidence based training.

This crash was caused by fear of going off the reservation with Emirates famous balls-in-a-vice SOP regime. Let's just pause a moment. This aircraft would have landed long, but safely. Poor old Pavlov's dog. Screwed up approach for sure. Earlier go around a better idea for sure. Same as Ryanair and a growing number of others. "We legislate for every contingency." Follow the SOP with a truly missionary zeal and nothing can ever go wrong. Right? Do you own thing, demonstrate independent thought, judgement or, heaven forfend, airmanship (draw breath sharply) and several hurdles will appear in your immediate future.

Consider the provinence of nascent commanders these days. Straight into an FAR25 jet as first officer fresh from flight school with maybe 200 hours. Left hand seat three years later and all you've ever known is rigid SOP and a carefully constructed climate of fear if you dare to deviate. Bored with that after 1000 hours in "command" and off to bigger metal we go. Hooray! Then training department, for the fundamentalists, and even management for those truly devoted to doctrine.

Evolved SOP, CRM, lower authority gradients and all that good stuff still brings us to this point, time and time again. It ain't the manufacturers that have screwed the (Pavlovian) pooch on this one folks. Chicago lawyers take note.

"For though the world has stood up and stopped the bastard, the bitch that bore him is in heat again."
Bertolt Brecht.

[RAT 5]

It can be sometimes confusing and disturbing that commanders are chosen, selected and trained because they have demonstrated that characteristic of being able to make competent decisions under different levels of stress: plus of course being cognisant with SOP's and one would hope standard handling capabilities.
Then, the desk jockeys make SOP's that, at real time, do not seem to be the best choice to handle the situation. However, the commander's decision making discretion is confined to the trash. Bring on the single pilot and dog. Why have a commander and then handcuff them?
Oh, and then when the poo hits the air-conditioning in a non SOP environment, the commander is expected to magic-up a solution.

"We legislate for every contingency." Follow the SOP with a truly missionary zeal and nothing can ever go wrong."

There are those who do just that, except it's impossible. The real world does not operate to the plans & whims of the SOP department. It is trying to find loopholes and cracks in your operation all the time. The SOP guru & trained monkey philosophy can succeed on an ideal day; but how many of those are there? That method of operating tends to be reactive, not proactive. One of the prime characteristics of good crews was to be proactive to prevent the problem occurring. That requires not only monitoring of trends drifting from the norm, but being well ahead of the a/c and even preventing the trend starting. It's called being 'on top of things with an eye on the ball'. That type of pilot is in decline because they believe the SOP's will provide a protective bubble, and the a/c has so many automatic warnings & back up systems that human monitoring is not required.

This long landing warning being a mandatory SOP was also highlighted at MAN and caused, what some believe, to be an unnecessary diversion to LHR. Should it be an advisory? Was it designed to be an advisory? There have been comments that modern electronics and systems were designed as an aid & tool, not to be in command. Some SOP's have not followed that format. We all know computers can hiccup. What we need are pilots who do not.

[M.Mouse]

In an earlier post I posted a graph of accident statistics over the past 40 years. For some reason it disappeared.

The statistics are easy to find with a simple search but my point earlier had been that despite all the huffing and puffing contrary to the impression that lack of manual handling skills and rigid adherence to SOPs is making things more dangerous the statistics would indicate otherwise.

I do not have the answers but in my view the accident in Dubai was caused by a poorly flown approach leading to a deep landing followed by a mandatory GA due to the 'Long Landing' warning. The PF clearly did not fully understand the TOGA system nor did he follow through on the thrust levers which, again in my opinion, is basic airmanship.

The PM did not follow SOPs by NOT ensuring thrust had been applied which was compounded by calling a positive climb due to the inertia of the aircraft giving just that, albeit very temporary.

So if PF had understood the system and PM monitored the application of power by following the SOP then the accident would not have happened.

[Capn Bloggs]

the impression that lack of manual handling skills and rigid adherence to SOPs is making things more dangerous the statistics would indicate otherwise.
While automation (and in particular GPWS) has improved safety, lack of manual handling skills and rigid adherence to SOPs are causing the few accidents we are still having.

So if PF had understood the system and PM monitored the application of power by following the SOP then the accident would not have happened.
You can only "memorise" so much out of a book. Had that crew regularly practised bounced landings/touch and goes (the most dangerous thing we do), this would never have happened. It's called muscle memory, and it is why the old-timers still fly the pants off the magenta kids. They did it (or similar) all the time; it was "SOP" to always push up the throttles or look at the N1s to make sure Capt Joe Bloggs did actually push the throttles up.

When did that crew last practice a "startle" touch and go? We do it, canned, in the sim; the last thing you do is pull the nose up immediately. The fact that the Captain did just that indicates to me he was either startled badly or hadn't had much practice at touch and goes. Given that a probable time to get that "Long Landing" is just before or after touchdown, it is incumbent on the operator to make sure that it's pilots could cope with/be good at it. Did it?

[HPSOV L]

Was the approach poorly flown?
By my calculation the density altitude was about 4500'.
IAS across the threshold was within stabilisation criteria at target plus 7 giving about 171 TAS. The temperature was 48 C so ISA plus 33. An RNAV approach was flown and I figure the temperature error would result in a 3.4 degree approach angle. Given the turbulent conditions and tailwind changing to headwind, hot runway and visibilty only the length of the runway, I'd say landing longer than 3000' was almost a probability for the average pilot.

[cessnapete]

So why go around with 9000ft plus remaining??

[Herod]

Because it was mandatory, iaw SOP. The first hole in the cheese.

[The Fat Controller]

I had a conversation with an Emirates 777 crew before they flew me home from Dubai, my understanding from our chat was that the "long landing" warning meant a go-around before touchdown but was only an advisory once you were on the runway.

[Ian W]

So the RAAS warning comes at 30ft in the flair and by the time pilot has reacted the aircraft has all main wheels firmly on the runway - what does the SOP say about that? If you are going to insist on SOPs being followed as rigidly as if they were a computer program then you have to treat them like programming and consider every potential case. The pretense that SOPs improve safety was shown up in this case. All SOPs do is reduce training expenditure as you teach your crews to fly by SOP numbers.

[The Fat Controller]

@Ian W, so what if it is in the flare, the aircraft has NOT landed so the go-around should commence even if the wheels subsequently touch the runway and as far as I can see, TOGA mode would have still been available in that position.

[PEI_3721]

Recent post are grasping for straws:-
How does the Smart Landing feature work, features, function, input, output. When will it warn, what optional settings and calls has the operator chosen.
How does the TOGA switching work 30 ft ok, < 5 ft +2 sec inhibited.
Does the aircraft have a rad alt call at 5 ft, or is it pilot judgement - measured wheel height vs view from the flight deck.
Do Smart Landing alerts override a rad alt call; what's the priority for a rare advisory alert function vs rad alt callout used every day.
A new SOP for all of the IF - THEN situations, but be very, very clear about the EXCEPT, because they are the gotchas.
Quiz in 5 mins time, or later during a slightly extended flare on a very long runway.
Fix the system (technical and organisational), not the pilot.

[Vessbot]

Fix the system (technical and organisational), not the pilot.

Why not both?

[Ian W]

@Ian W, so what if it is in the flare, the aircraft has NOT landed so the go-around should commence even if the wheels subsequently touch the runway and as far as I can see, TOGA mode would have still been available in that position.

Read the conditions I start from again:

So the RAAS warning comes at 30ft in the flair and by the time pilot has reacted the aircraft has all main wheels firmly on the runway

So although the aircraft was airborne it touches down before the PF selects TOGA - and therefore TOGA will be inhibited.

Just identifying a case where the simplistic SOPs would not be applicable but are mandated.

[galaxy flyer]

Had that crew regularly practised bounced landings/touch and goes (the most dangerous thing we do), this would never have happened. It's called muscle memory, and it is why the old-timers still fly the pants off the magenta kids.

I did 63 touch and goes and 3 full stop landing, in the plane (C-5), in one week. Some of them tactical arrivals from 10,000 at night to a runway lacking any visual glide path guidance and 7,000' long. Never thought it dangerous even once.

GF

[GICASI2]

Read the conditions I start from again:



So although the aircraft was airborne it touches down before the PF selects TOGA - and therefore TOGA will be inhibited.

Just identifying a case where the simplistic SOPs would not be applicable but are mandated.


TOGA is a tool to give VERT and LAT guidance AND indicate the GA THR limit. That is it: a TOOL. We pilots must fly the aircraft first - POWER, (when the thrust is established) ATTITUDE and then trim. Even the C150 kids can do that! After we have done the pilot's stuff, then we can do some (video game) FD following. There is NO excuse for the actions (or lack thereof) of the EK crew. How many more muppets are out there, taking money under false pretences? There are only 3 critical phases in a commercial pilot's life: takeoff, landing and go around, the rest is mundane. If you cannot accomplish these 3 tasks in an exemplary fashion, 100% of the time, look for another career.

The post from our US MIL C5 colleague above says it all!

[RAT 5]

Tools, and their evolution in our modern world e.g. FBW. There have been any wonderful improvements made via technical advances. I wonder if there are some that have, subtly, been less perfect.

In underslung engined basic control a/c you increase umph and the nose rises. You feel this in your backside as well as see it outside or on the PFD. Your stretch your arm and your body gives some feedback that thrust has been applied. This happens without having to apply back elevator. That is done to expedite the change in V/S from -ve to +ve.
There is also the large trim change, usually from nose up on approach to having to take some off during the rotation to GA attitude. This elevator force, plus your backside, inform your senses that thrust has increased. If I understand correctly FBW removes this trim change. Thus, for us older pilots, a physical sensation, and tactile action, of GA has been removed. I appreciate that pilots who've flown only FBW will not miss anything, but I wonder if removing all these various sensations is in fact an improvement. The debate about non-moving thrust levers on AB has been beaten to death with no firm conclusion. Those against that philosophy thought that allowing thrust to change with out any tactile indication, or trim change on the elevator, isolated PF a little from what was going on.
I've never flown FBW or manual approaches with A/T. It disturbed me, and caused a comment, when I watched F/O's as PF on autolands, not follow through on the controls all the way down. On choppy days it was reassuring to feel the control column and A/T doing their thing, and then feel the nose up trim come in <500'. It connected you to the machine. Even more important if it was only a CAT 1 ILS to man land. You were more in tune with the machine and the elements. I wonder if FBW, where it seems you just point the a/c where you want it to go and auto-trim & auto-throttle take care of everything else, is the B's & E's it's all cracked up to be?
Those who've made the transition will have helpful educational comments, I'm sure.

[Capn Bloggs]

Never thought it dangerous even once
My point exactly. Do them enough so they aren't an issue. Does Emirates?

The post from our US MIL C5 colleague above says it all!
It sure does. Train your pilots and their job will be a walk in the park.


Originally Posted by PEI_3721 View Post

Fix the system (technical and organisational), not the pilot.

Why not both?
Because when you fix the system, you also fix the pilots.

[OldLurker]

With all the discussion about TOGA (or not TOGA), another aspect of this crash (or hole in the cheese, if you like) seems to have been lost to view: the crew selected "gear up" as soon as go-around was called, less than 85 feet off the ground and before confirming positive rate of climb. As I understand it, even with the mix-up over TOGA, if the gear had been down when they sank back onto the runway then although they might have gone off the end, the final crash would have been much less serious.

[M.Mouse]

Thus, for us older pilots, a physical sensation, and tactile action, of GA has been removed. I appreciate that pilots who've flown only FBW will not miss anything, but I wonder if removing all these various sensations is in fact an improvement.

A B747-400 did a GA where, because of the pitch/power couple with a light aircraft is so pronounced, that they allowed the airspeed to deteriorate to such an extent that the aircraft was close to stalling. Had the GA altitude not been so low, causing the power to come off and assist in getting the nose down, the management team investigating the issue believe that the aircraft would have stalled.

Pilot mishandling for sure but another side of the coin.

[PEI_3721]

Vessbot, #136, "why not both" - system and pilot.
A glib response would be because you can never be sure that you have fixed the pilot, every single one, and for all of the situations that you can imagine.
Thus concentrate on the system, its never perfect because that also involves the human, but you should be able to improve previous efforts - learn and amend. And do not forget to place your trust in pilots because sometime they may be able to deal with those situations which management are unable to imagine.

‘You fix what you find; you find what you look for”. This crux of the point is that if you first focus on the pilot then the safety efforts may not progress any further.
Start with the system, this will involve humans; focus on how the system might help the pilots function - to do the day job, and not the other way round.
‘Fixing’ pilots in this incident (there were ‘fired’?) will not help the next crew faced with this or a similar dilemma.

[safetypee]

OldLurker, :ok: the crew selected gear up …
Historically GAs have been trained as requiring urgent action. Way back in the distant past a critical issue was obstacle clearance for the GA flight path with engine failure. Nowadays with power excess, improved engine reliability, this is not a significant concern, indeed the regulators are focusing on all aircraft having automated reduced thrust for a GA (yet still require on pilots to select higher when required - but how might they know, I digress).

The aerodynamics of a GA are no different than for landing, except with added thrust you reach a point when the aircraft will not land; add more thrust it begins to climb. This is like a takeoff, retract flaps to improve ‘takeoff’ performance, retract the gear in the same way as for take off, no rush, minimise the opportunity for mistakes, …
The problem is founded in history, it is exacerbated by todays lack of joined up thinking between certification requirement, training regulations, safety management, and human factors; regulatory authorities cover all of these areas, but are they in ‘ivory towers’ (without windows).

[GICASI2]

Tools, and their evolution in our modern world e.g. FBW. There have been any wonderful improvements made via technical advances. I wonder if there are some that have, subtly, been less perfect.

In underslung engined basic control a/c you increase umph and the nose rises. You feel this in your backside as well as see it outside or on the PFD. Your stretch your arm and your body gives some feedback that thrust has been applied. This happens without having to apply back elevator. That is done to expedite the change in V/S from -ve to +ve.
There is also the large trim change, usually from nose up on approach to having to take some off during the rotation to GA attitude. This elevator force, plus your backside, inform your senses that thrust has increased. If I understand correctly FBW removes this trim change. Thus, for us older pilots, a physical sensation, and tactile action, of GA has been removed. I appreciate that pilots who've flown only FBW will not miss anything, but I wonder if removing all these various sensations is in fact an improvement. The debate about non-moving thrust levers on AB has been beaten to death with no firm conclusion. Those against that philosophy thought that allowing thrust to change with out any tactile indication, or trim change on the elevator, isolated PF a little from what was going on.
I've never flown FBW or manual approaches with A/T. It disturbed me, and caused a comment, when I watched F/O's as PF on autolands, not follow through on the controls all the way down. On choppy days it was reassuring to feel the control column and A/T doing their thing, and then feel the nose up trim come in <500'. It connected you to the machine. Even more important if it was only a CAT 1 ILS to man land. You were more in tune with the machine and the elements. I wonder if FBW, where it seems you just point the a/c where you want it to go and auto-trim & auto-throttle take care of everything else, is the B's & E's it's all cracked up to be?
Those who've made the transition will have helpful educational comments, I'm sure.

I have had experience of FBW on Mil hi-perf jets, Airbus 330/340, and 777. It is just another tool. What is happening in the real world is crucial and, I'm sorry to say yet again, no different to a C150 no matter what systems are there to 'help'! And, yes, I would expect all my Capts and FOs to be fully conversant with the technical side of their aircraft - it is not a lot to ask as a fare-paying pax. Oh, and I have spent many years on steam-driven 747s as well... an aircraft is an aircraft...

[GICASI2]

And a successful landing is only the result of an approach that didn't end as a go around. Plan for and be prepared for a go around up to the point that reverse thrust is selected has to be the only way a professional aviator approaches the job!

[RAT 5]

And a successful landing is only the result of an approach that didn't end as a go around. Plan for and be prepared for a go around up to the point that reverse thrust is selected has to be the only way a professional aviator approaches the job!

Indeed. An RTO or a GA should never be a surprise.

[pilot9249]

The GA button is part of the thrust lever assembly, is a just ahead and slightly underneath the highest point of the levers. You don't take your hand off the levers to use it. Old fashioned gits like me hit the switch and follow the levers forwards to make sure the thing has worked. As you press the button, you call "Go around..." to put your colleague in "go around mode" you pitch up and carry on flying. If you are lucky, your well rehearsed go around procedure then takes place as the pilot monitoring looks for go around power, a positive rate and an appropriate airspeed.

The announciation is not important. The thrust, positive climb rate and appropriate airspeed are. At about 400' the lack of go around guidance, lateral and/or vertical will probably be noticed and then alternative steps will be taken to ensure an appropriate flight path. After landing, you call your technical support people and ask about what just happened. Then the learning starts.

You will find that lots of modes and buttons do not work as advertised. Sometimes you get a message or a ping, sometimes you don't. What is important is that you carry a mental model of what you would like to happen before you need it. Then when you are let down you use another method to get what you want. Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable.

The GA button is part of the thrust lever assembly, is a just ahead and slightly underneath the highest point of the levers. You don't take your hand off the levers to use it. Old fashioned gits like me hit the switch and follow the levers forwards to make sure the thing has worked. As you press the button, you call "Go around..." to put your colleague in "go around mode" you pitch up and carry on flying. If you are lucky, your well rehearsed go around procedure then takes place as the pilot monitoring looks for go around power, a positive rate and an appropriate airspeed.

The announciation is not important. The thrust, positive climb rate and appropriate airspeed are. At about 400' the lack of go around guidance, lateral and/or vertical will probably be noticed and then alternative steps will be taken to ensure an appropriate flight path. After landing, you call your technical support people and ask about what just happened. Then the learning starts.

You will find that lots of modes and buttons do not work as advertised. Sometimes you get a message or a ping, sometimes you don't. What is important is that you carry a mental model of what you would like to happen before you need it. Then when you are let down you use another method to get what you want. Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable.

Sure, but you miss the point.

I never disputed that the crew failed, or that the overwhelming majority of crews would not fail.

Nevertheless, the crew did actually command thrust.

The aircraft did actually silently ignore that command.

Do you believe that the automatics had a better view of the suitability of the commanded thrust level than the crew did?

I think the result says no, and on this edge the automatics has a fault in it.

Perhaps this isn't the most brilliant example.

However, there is a limit to the acceptable sum total of "modes and buttons that do not work as advertised".

Even assuming this case fails, I see no harm in court cases like this playing a role in establishing where that limit lies.

[Start Fore]

You push the TOGA buttons to bring the flight directors into Go Around mode, and you shove the thrust levers forwards, and perhaps the autothrottle will assist, maybe not, and you're away.

Simples really.

The A/T has a habit of failing, and is indeed inhibited in a touch and go scenario, so good airmanship dictates you manually apply thrust as well.

If you tap the toga buttons then place your hand back on the control column then you are an utter idiot who has no place in the flight deck. Definitely not mine.

But who does 'airmanship' any more these days? Certainly not muppets like this coming up through the ranks.

Good grief, give me strength.

[Piltdown Man]

spt - You totally miss the reality. This crew DID NOT, EVER command go-around thrust. The PF just pressed a button. The thrust levers, the things that actually command thrust did not move forwards until just two seconds before impact. There was also no indication of any increase of thrust. This is very basic stuff. A home analogy would be where a tap in your bathroom doesn't turn off when you turn it off. Do you let your house flood and sue the tap manufacturer? No. You turn off the tap isolator. Later, at a time of you convenience you replace the ceramic shut off valve in your still dry house. If that doesn't work you turn off the mains and open every other tap in the house to reduce the impact of the recalcitrant tap. You then install an isolator and replace the valve. When we first learn to fly we are taught the aeronautical equivalents of these fixes. This is basic, basic stuff taught from Day 1 and certainly re-inforced every time we go to the sim.

If my aircraft doesn't automatically give me take off power (and it will not if certain criteria are met) then I make sure it bloody well will. If the gear doesn't come up and I need it up, it will (subject to certain criteria) come up, if I need more thrust than permitted, I will have it. My colleagues and I have had many, many training sessions battling with usual, unusual and unexpected mode failures dreamed up by the psychos in the training department. The deal is always the same. You are flying and you are in charge. If things don't work as advertised is not important and certainly not a big issue. You are still in charge and there is a very, very simple way out that you have to take. No ifs, no buts.

Yes, a court case might be the best place to test this and I do hope common sense prevails. And if I was Boeing I would drag this out until it hurts the opposition. Anything to stop the greedy and ignorant from initiating cases without merit.

PM

[pilot9249]

spt - You totally miss the reality. This crew DID NOT, EVER command go-around thrust. The PF just pressed a button. The thrust levers, the things that actually command thrust did not move forwards until just two seconds before impact. There was also no indication of any increase any thrust. This is very basic stuff. A home analogy would be where a tap in your bathroom doesn't turn off when you turn it off. Do you let your house flood and sue the tap manufacturer? No. You turn off the tap isolator. Later, at a time of you convenience you replace the ceramic shut off valve in your still dry house. If that doesn't work you turn off the mains and open every other tap in the house to reduce the impact of the recalcitrant tap. You then install an isolator and replace the valve. When we first learn to fly we are taught the aeronautical equivalents of these fixes. This is basic, basic stuff taught from Day 1 and certainly re-inforced every time we go to the sim.

If my aircraft doesn't automatically give me take off power (and it will not if certain criteria are met) then I make sure it bloody well will. If the gear doesn't come up and I need it up, it will (subject to certain criteria) come up, if I need more thrust than permitted, I will have it. My colleagues and I have had many, many training sessions battling with usual, unusual and unexpected mode failures dreamed up by the psychos in the training department. The deal is always the same. You are flying and you are in charge. If things don't work as advertised is not important and certainly not a big issue. You are still in charge and there is a very, very simple way out that you have to take. No ifs, no buts.

Yes, a court case might be the best place to test this and I do hope common sense prevails. And if I was Boeing I would drag this out until it hurts the opposition. Anything to stop the greedy and ignorant from initiating cases without merit.

PM

Understood.

No doubt the court case will focus on whether pressing TOGA at 100 knots was a clear and unambigous command for thrust.

Or whether the crew pressed it inappropriately because of a leaky tap.

Let's see what happens.

[Capn Bloggs]

Piltdown Man, I think that you are missing a bit of reality.
My colleagues and I have had many, many training sessions battling with usual, unusual and unexpected mode failures dreamed up by the psychos in the training department.
Did these guys practice, in the Sim, startle touch and goes?

And if I was Boeing I would drag this out until it hurts the opposition.
That's bordering on the ridiculous. It's stupid that TOGA isn't available at 130kts after touchdown. Yes yes yes you don't want it available on the blocks after start but there are plenty of other system (antiskid, for example) that don't work depending on the speed). Just like it is stupid for an autothrottle to stay asleep on final with the speed at Ref-20. Ideological nonsense.

These guys got set up by the system (design and regulatory), far and square. Sure, they stuffed it, but they are not solely to blame.

[CurtainTwitcher]

Ask yourself the following two questions: Which of the two possibilities would likely prevent another DXB / SFO autothrottle type accident:
1) System enhancement by Boeing of the autothrottle to account for known design issues.
2) Successful defence in court by Boeing of the current autothrottle system design.

Second question, which of these two outcomes would likely reduce the likely probability of future similar event, ie which would be the best safety outcome?

[tdracer]

Bloggs
So, Boeing keeps TOGA active after touchdown. Some pilot inadvertently commands TOGA after landing, the aircraft goes off the runway. There would be a 50 page thread here discussing how stupid it is that Boeing didn't inhibit TOGA after landing.
As a designer, you simply cannot protect against every inadvertent switch or button push. If you want to claim no pilot would ever inadvertently push TOGA after touchdown, I can provide a list as long as my arm of cases of pilots who have inadvertently actuated flight deck switches, including shutting down engines (or the wrong engine) - and two cases where the pilot shut down BOTH engines at less than 3,000 ft. during takeoff. :ugh:
As a designer, we also have to be extremely sensitive to 'unintended consequences' where you change the design to address one failure mode, and create a new failure mode that is even worse. A very unpleasant example is the 'fix' for the Cranbrook 737 crash (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_Western_Airlines_Flight_314), where they rejected the landing after the T/Rs were deployed, one reverser didn't completely stow and lock prior to liftoff. The aircraft design removed hydraulics from the reverser in 'air' mode and the aero forces redeployed the reverser at low altitude. The 'fix' - auto-restow -was ultimately responsible for an even worse crash - Lauda 767 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lauda_Air_Flight_004) when it allowed hydraulics to the T/R in-flight...

[galaxy flyer]

Bloggs,

What's a "startle touch and go"? Touch and goes are planned maneuvers, I thought. The crew was apparently doing a go around. Should the T7 or any plane have a A/T touch and go mode. They were trained in go arounds, presumably, and both pilots messed it up, full stop. Are we now saying pilots are startled by a go around?

BTW, the EK SOP on "long landing" is a system error. They employ pilots to make landings which require judgement inherent in being a pilot.

GF

[westhawk]

Pushing a button is meaningless until you see proof that the commanded action is actually occurring. Even pushing throttles up is merely a command until you see/feel/hear evidence that thrust is actually increasing. It is not acceptable for a pilot to trust any system unconditionally. Each commanded action must then be monitored to the extent necessary to verify execution, then that the desired result is achieved.

Think of like this: Button pushes are mere rumors until actual results are observed to occur! It's a crying shame that any pilot would actually place their passengers and their own safety in the hands of a mere rumor...

So follow the A/T with the hand if they move, and verify engine acceleration by instrument indications/human senses whether they move or not. Just because one thinks they remember having ordered another scotch doesn't necessarily mean it's been served and consumed. That feeling in the throat will be a better indicator!

[RAT 5]

Ask yourself the following two questions: Which of the two possibilities would likely prevent another DXB / SFO autothrottle type accident:
1) System enhancement by Boeing of the autothrottle to account for known design issues.
2) Successful defence in court by Boeing of the current autothrottle system design.

3) Train pilots correctly!!

So follow the A/T with the hand if they move, and verify engine acceleration by instrument indications/human senses whether they move or not. Just because one thinks they remember having ordered another scotch doesn't necessarily mean it's been served and consumed. That feeling in the throat will be a better indicator!

LoL: mine's a double just to make sure.

Pushing a button is meaningless until you see proof that the commanded action is actually occurring. Each commanded action must then be monitored to the extent necessary to verify execution.

Spot ON. Remember the Air Kenya B737 crash at night where they spiralled to the ground after takeoff. The captain thought he had engaged the autopilot and then directed his attention to Wx avoidance while the a/c slowly rolled into a spiral. They did not get the A/P disconnect warning wailer; I can't remember if they got CWS. Either way the button push did not have the desired effect and they did not check/confirm and died. I don't remember a great out-pouring of wrath that Boeing should have designed it such that the A/P disconnect wailer should have sounded with the failure to connect. That indeed could have been a good idea.

In the DXB case if there had been an A/T disconnect siren when it failed to connect?????? but there isn't such an alert even during a normal disconnect. Should there be? Disconnects are normally a manual action, but any electronic system can go AWOL. Should they all have audible warnings? Not only for disconnect, but also for failure to connect? The list would never end. The design philosophy must have been that visual alerting is enough as that is what pilots are supposed to do, monitor and confirm, and should be trained to do so. A symphony of differing audios is not the best way. If it was a voice saying "auto-throttle disconnect" perhaps that might work. Remember the B737 confusion between the audio take-off config warning & cabin altitude warning. The fix was a visual addition to solve the confusion. OK, B737 doesn't have voice alerts, (except EGPWS) but it is known that they are more affective (except to certain Spanish speaking DC-10 pilots)

But we are back again to training and individual standards. That conclusion keeps cropping up in many occurrences. People keep saying that technology has made flying safety with less crashes per.........etc. However, I'd guess that in decades before there were more crashes due to malfunctions in the aviation system, and then human mis-actions, than direct simple screw ups. There have also been many instances where technology screwed up and the human went back to basics to compensate and avert disaster. The human, and there are many links in the chain, has always been identified as the weakest link. Technology has been used to try and solve this problem, and to some degree succeeded, and still does.

It is deeply worrying that in the past decade there have been quite a few perfectly serviceable a/c that have speared in due to the crew not understanding this supposedly life saving technology, mismanaging it, or not being able to compensate for its malfunction. The back to basics approach was not available or not applied.

[Piltdown Man]

Capn Bloggs - I'm totally with you. I'll bet this crew had never practiced this manoeuvre. Furthermore, I'm not so sure that their company's attitude to safety is entirely commensurate with aviation in the 21st century. I know a few people there and find some of what they tell me quite alarming. Like their charming "Final Written Warning" letters, unpleasant chats with those in the office, behind the scenes "heads-up" for check pilots just before sim sessions and their corrosive reporting culture where one colleague drops another in the mooh.

And no, I don't necessarily want TOGA button availability on landing roll. As long as the thrust levers move and the engines spool up I'll do the rest.

Boeing's job is to design and document how their products are built. It is the user's task to take the finished product and design a training programme around their pilots and the aircraft so that most foreseeable eventualities will have been covered to an acceptable standard. It is also the user's task to ensure that a sufficiently flexible set of SOP's are designed so that pilots can continue to hone their flying skills during normal operations. Rigid, "one size fits all" SOPS result in crews losing their ability to think and their flying skills being eroded.

These guys got set up by the system (design and regulatory), far (sic) and square. Sure, they stuffed it, but they are not solely to blame.

I totally agree.

PM

[M.Mouse]

In the DXB case if there had been an A/T disconnect siren when it failed to connect?????? but there isn't such an alert even during a normal disconnect.

How can you have a warning that a system which by deliberate design is inactive has not engaged?

In normal use of the AT there is an audible and visual (EICAS) warning of disconnect.

[RAT 5]

My point exactly. It was slightly sarcastic. One claim has been made that Boeing were in error for not having a warning that the TOGA button did not activate. It performed as designed, but some feel that is not enough because pilot memories are fickle. (I did not know about the audio for A/T disconnect in normal circumstances, only the visual)

[alf5071h]

This thread continues to demonstrate the range human thinking (see # 57). Perhaps this reflects modern society, instant answer web search, knowledge retention not required, text a question to provoke reaction, and litter the thread with lengthy quotes like a wiki with meaningless content.
Some have suggested a like / dislike button response, but explanation would better develop understanding which is an objective of this forum.
Perhaps an APP which prevents posting without first visiting previous pages, it might provoke thought or even answer questions.
The moderators have a difficult task, but has the balance between free expression (even commercial influence) detrimentally changed the high ideals of Pprune.

Relating the above to the thread subject; why don’t the regulators intervene, identify threats and then strengthen technical and operational defences; preferably proactively, or at least in response to an accident
But there are always external influences; commerce rules the world, modification will cost someone, but without cost, financial, thinking, or action, then where will the safety improvements which the industry need come from.
What was the last major independent intervention - U.K. CAA Stick shaker? Trans Atlantic harmonisation is good, but compromise often results in the lowest acceptable level of safety.

Some views suggest that we are safe enough - low stats, others judge that with increasing traffic low stats will not be enough.
Boeing appears to follow the stats; similarly for regulators, both avoiding change based on history and certification like grandfather rights or ‘acceptable’ system weaknesses (sleepy AT Arm (777), rad alt monitor (737 AMS). This attitude overlooks the changing operational environment and decreasing training resource, and the unchanging, limited human capability, or even degraded capability due to societal effects as above.
This is not to blame manufacturers or regulators, they depend on the same human judgement which pilots are required to execute, but they might have the greater capacity for change and time to do it - it is their day job.
We must not ask pilots to do something which manufacturers or regulators are unable to do.

Society has the right to judge the line of acceptability; the court in Chicago will make a judgement, but whatever the result, will this add safety value. Out-of-court settlements might be a better commercial value than retrospectively modifying aircraft; but without change the industry will be the poorer. Safety requires an appropriate culture, will a court judgement change safety culture; one small step to improve culture or a giant leap backwards.

Wild speculation and inaccuracy in this thread will not help; we need to re-establish the valued ‘Pprune’ culture.
We should be concerned about the unhelpful range of views appearing in an aviation forum possibly influencing the unwary pilot or ‘wannabe’, and also concerned that these views might be held by the public or those selected as a jury, but that's freedom.

[Sailvi767]

Sure, but you miss the point.

I never disputed that the crew failed, or that the overwhelming majority of crews would not fail.

Nevertheless, the crew did actually command thrust.

The aircraft did actually silently ignore that command.

Do you believe that the automatics had a better view of the suitability of the commanded thrust level than the crew did?

I think the result says no, and on this edge the automatics has a fault in it.

Perhaps this isn't the most brilliant example.

However, there is a limit to the acceptable sum total of "modes and buttons that do not work as advertised".

Even assuming this case fails, I see no harm in court cases like this playing a role in establishing where that limit lies.

The crew never commanded thrust. They used a mode disabled for the phase of flight they were in. In the 777 if you want trust you push the throttles forward. Anytime you use the GA trust or other automatic mode you follow the throttle movement and assist if neccesary. Failing in that basic item of airmanship they could have considered all the other cues of a lack of thrust.

[zlin77]

Maybe I'm a little odd, but whenever I select TOGA in a 777 I always manually push the thrust levers to the stops.....what do other 777 pilots do?

[Fursty Ferret]

I was about to ask this - as an Airbus driver it's instinctive for me to push the thrust levers forward to instigate a go-around / baulked landing.

Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?

[RAT 5]

What is the SOP in Emirates regarding following thrust level movement on takeoff? Do they just press TOGA and hands off, or does someone follow them through to the correct setting? I've read a long way back that the SOP call for GA includes "check thrust" before raising the gear. That should be a given, command to not. However, if the SOP technique on takeoff is to follow through, then why not also on GA? Guys are talking airmanship in saying that they always do, and they believe all self respecting pilots should do so. In this day of 'SOP says and monkey does' we have to be careful in such assumptions.
The crew forgot to 'check thrust' before raising the gear, as per SOP. An error, critical. If the SOP/technique for takeoff says PF or PM follows the TL's until thrust is set, is that the same for GA's. And if not, why not. IMHO GA's should be as similar to a normal takeoff as possible to avoid the often quoted screw ups. Pilots blame lack of practice, startle factor etc. I found in some operators the difference in GA procedure to takeoff procedure did not help matters. Guys had to remember 4 differing profiles: normal takeoff, normal all engine GA, EFATO and engine out GA. Why not try and make them as similar a possible? The same with an RTO. It can be very similar to a normal landing if you so design it. That way the startle factor will less likely cause a screw up.
Will an Emirates pilot comment of the takeoff & GA TL techniques please.

[Sailvi767]

I was about to ask this - as an Airbus driver it's instinctive for me to push the thrust levers forward to instigate a go-around / baulked landing.

Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?

Depends on the mode. In the mode they were in after touchdown they would remain where you placed them.

[suninmyeyes]

Maybe I'm a little odd, but whenever I select TOGA in a 777 I always manually push the thrust levers to the stops.....what do other 777 pilots do?


Zlin, If you are manually pushing the thrust levers to the stops you are overriding the automatic function that provides you with a 2000 fpm rate of climb. There is a reason for that function, full power can lead to other problems especially with a low level off altitude.


I find in the 777 sim when it comes to a goaround the majority of pilots push a TOGA switch and then immediately transfer the thrust lever hand to do a two handed rotation because on takeoff they are used to rotating with two hands. When I do a goaround having pressed TOGA I keep my hand on the thrust levers for that little bit longer to ensure they have moved forwards significantly before transferring it to to the control column.

[M.Mouse]

Maybe I'm a little odd, but whenever I select TOGA in a 777 I always manually push the thrust levers to the stops.....what do other 777 pilots do?

I do find that a little odd. The AT system will give you sufficient power for a 2,000fpm ROC so pushing the thrust levers to the stops will have the AT system trying to retard the thrust levers with the clutches slipping until you take your hand away.

If you want more power pushing the TOGA buttons twice gives you full GA thrust.

Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?

Why are the TOGA buttons 'silly'? And the answer is no.

[tdracer]

As M Mouse notes, pushing to the firewall for a GA on Boeing may not be a good idea - for aircraft handling reasons GA thrust is often less than full takeoff thrust. It's normally not a big deal, but there are cases (such as doing a GA with an engine inop) when it may cause problems.

[GICASI2]

For a 'bolter' GA on the runway, we teach and practice the following procedure (assuming THR REV has not been selected - if it has, a full stop MUST be achieved. We also calculate the 'last touchdown' point prior to TOD):

- PF selects TOGA and applies THR to the 'straight arm' level. PM follows the selection through to ensure ~ GA THR has been achieved
- WITH the engines spooled up (!) PM calls ROTATE at >Vref
- PF selects ~ 12°PA and when airborne, With TOGA armed once more, presses TOGA once to give a commanded 2000fpm and calls 'GA FLAP20' to signal a 'normal' GA package is now required

So, muscle memory is invoked by pressing TOGA on the runway; however, our pilots know that they HAVE to select GA THR manually. (It has surprised me how many B777 operators I have spoken to (mainly residding in the desert) are not aware of or have practiced this scenario! I know which airlines will NOT be getting my holiday $s!). No reference is made to the automatics, at all, until the aircraft is flying, at the correct attitude, speed and THR setting. Once all this is achieved, the automatics are reinstated. We have a company rule that prohibits, for sound reasons, turns below 400ft AAL; so the vertical portion of a MAP is achieved and the lateral portion will be, post 400' and TOGA selection. In fact, most of our pilots wait for 400' AAL to be passed before selecting TOGA to avoid rushing and subsequent pigs!

[RAT 5]

A.N.C. does not stand for "Automatics. Now do nothing. Confusion."

[FIRESYSOK]

Not sure what the two-handed technique achieves.

I see so many 'new' pilots who require two hands to land after reducing to idle. Majorly flawed method and an indicator of poor coordination. Arm rest down, the outboard appendage should be able to smoothly fly in most any regime.

[Vessbot]

It definitely helps me fly smoother and with more precision. Even with the armrest down. But this is outweighed by the need for potential quick power in the flare.

[Centaurus]

Good airmanship dictates the PF always should have one hand on the thrust levers and the other on the control wheel on final approach, flare and after touch down. The control forces at the flare are not that heavy that you need two hands in a modern jet transport.

[Start Fore]

Unless you're a snowflake, of which there are many these days :rolleyes:

[tdracer]

Or you're already doing something stupid :rolleyes:
Boeing FBW provides tactile feedback through the control wheel forces to simulate what the pilot would experience in a non-FBW aircraft. During the Asiana SFO investigation, Boeing stated that the control wheel feedback would have been ~80 lbs., which somehow failed to alert the PF that something wasn't right...:ugh:

[Flight leveler]

The system that advised a Go-around in DXB in error that not enough runway was available when it obviously was.... I feel is possibly where the main systems error lies...and where the lawyers should also attack Boeing and Emirates.
I also question the rostering wisdom of crewing an Arab National personality with an Australian personality...a fear of loss of face combined with a lightning quick actioning Aussie is basicly poor rostering of two crew members profiles...could anyone seriously expect these diverse personalities, nationalities,and religions to actually work well as a flight team?
GF 072 cockpit was legally stuffed with basicly incorrect rostering profilesc....in these two cases lessons need to learned regarding rostering poor cross cockpit profiles...there is no flight engineer these days to keep these rostering personalities defects under control.

[tdracer]

The system that advised a Go-around in DXB in error that not enough runway was available when it obviously was.... I feel is possibly where the main systems error lies...and where the lawyers will attack Boeing.

Except that RAAS is basically an aftermarket system that was not part of the Boeing type cert. It's part of an "STC" (Supplemental Type Cert) that would normally be done without Boeing input (disclaimer - I'm not familiar with RAAS so I don't have any way of knowing if there was any Boeing input into the RAAS certification - I just know that STCs don't normally include airframer inputs).

[galaxy flyer]

Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) is a standard part of Honeywell's EGPWS, as such, probably on all EGPWS-equipped planes. Activation, modes used and alerts are up to the operator. It's all dependent on the "strapping". But, with lots of time using it and demo'ing it; it can be useful. BUT it is advisory, it doesn't replace pilot judgement which in the EK SOP, it does. The combination of SOP and FOQA as discipline is to blame.

[suninmyeyes]

Firesysok


I agree the approach, flare and touch down on the 777 should be done with one hand on the thrust lever and one on the control column. The nose is only raised 2 degrees or so in the flare.


However a goaround is normally performed with 2 hands on the control column after the TOGA switch has been pushed as the nose needs to be raised 15 degrees or so. I would like to bet that on the Emirates that there was a quick push of the TOGA followed by a 2 handed rotation. Good airmanship would dictate that the non handling pilot should follow through on the thrust levers to make sure they go forward as was done by a flight engineer in the old days.


Unfortunately if ATC shout a command at the second the goaround is initiated and the co-pilot is looking for a positive climb (which he saw) and FMA indications of Thrust TOGA TOGA and raising the gear in response to the call of gear up and trying to acknowledge the ATC instruction he may not have had his eyes where they should have been. This is understandable when people are taught Pavlovian responses to FMAs rather than monitoring the basics, ie a goaround or rejected landing needs 2 key ingredients, pitch and power. The latter was omitted by both pilots until shortly before ground impact.

[safetypee]

A good point t.d. #179, however perhaps a legal interpretation might judge otherwise.
My company’s policy required an understanding of all commercially rated add-ons, this was recorded and the technical and operational judgements were shared with operators and regulators. This provided a basis for a defence, with a fall back of proving that the change was not known of.

In the ‘Executive’ market where there were many more enhancing ‘gismos’, the policy was even more ridged.
The add-on had to be formally approved to the standards of part 25 - technical equivalence, usually requiring a company evaluation / fight test; or if not, then the modification centre / operator were informed of the reasons why a device would not be approved or the outstanding risk which they held; i.e. preventing part 23 or lesser quality ‘STCs’.

Many of today's ‘add-ons’ apply to a wide range of aircraft types and operations. System vendors often cover this with let-outs; ‘not for primary use’, or ‘advisory only’ (how can enhancing awareness be advisory - having to ignore something already known).
This leaves a safety gap to be closed by regulators, yet even they duck the issue with ‘the operator must show, etc.’
Another complication is that the originating aircraft type certificate (country) is often transferred to another county's regulatory system without amendment or knowledge of what responsibilities that carries - i.e. questioning add-ons. Similarly with operational approvals, usually based on vendor material (insufficient thought about the ‘get outs’), or again transferring the judgement to the operator.

The primary manufacturer exports a design /operational culture - the aircraft and training, the system vendor similarly, but not necessarily identical technical or operational cultures.
A third party applies his version of these cultural aspects in operations; any disparity enabling opportunity for error.
Not an A vs B point, but compare cultural views amongst designs, operations, training and support.

The crux of your point is who approved the system interface and operating procedures, but I suspect that will not be the key issue in law.

[M.Mouse]

.....and FMA indications of Thrust TOGA TOGA.....

Except with the TOGA mode inactive the FMAs would indicate no such thing!

[underfire]

However a goaround is normally performed with 2 hands on the control column after the TOGA switch has been pushed as the nose needs to be raised 15 degrees or so. I would like to bet that on the Emirates that there was a quick push of the TOGA followed by a 2 handed rotation.

All of this 2 handed talk. (lost on Bus drivers)

I have flight tested procedures with some of the best of the best drivers the manufacturers, and airlines have...I have NEVER seen anyone of these drivers use 2 hands for a GA, balked, EO approach/missed or any other flight validation exercise.
Who needs 2 hands to pull back, and someone else to work the thrust?!?!?! If you are EO approach, especially on a twin, you need to be workin it.
We were in so much turbulence in a 738, could not read the numbers, teeth rattling, including about the max crosswind, ( the rwy lined up with the right seat side window) and the driver had 2 fingers (not two hands) on the yoke, the other working the crab with both thrust levers...
Granted, we are always pushing the system with all of the possible scenarios, but still...why leave all of the the thrust possiblities/combinations out of the equation and assume pressing TOGA and pulling back with 2 hands will save you?

Bounce the ac, press TOGA and pulls back with both hands....see where that gets you.

In the grand scheme of things, looking back, there is clearly not enough attention (or criteria) placed on balked landings and the myriad of if/then parameters.

[RAT 5]

In some of the airlines in my portfolio I was always disturbed by how the GA was 'stressed' to be a rapid actioned manoeuvre. Why? It will be at a lower weight than a Takeoff; OK more drag initially with flap, but nothing needs to be rushed. Some of the rote SOP mouth music caused this rush atmosphere. All so unnecessary. Wow, I've changed my mind, let's throw the one away, let aviate away from terra firma smoothly: Let's do the A bit. Now we are climbing away, power's good, flaps have been selected, let's raise the gear, let's select a NAV mode. Now relax, the crucial part has been achieved. OK, what's next? Let's clean up the flaps. Later, when clean let's do the N bit. So now we know where we are and we are safe let's do the C bit and make a plan. What's the rush?
There are some guys who emphasise that flaps need raising at 400'. Why? At takeoff it's at 1000'; what's the rush? It all increases the risk of mistakes.

[underfire]

Rat, very good post.
The GA has been vilified as some sort of failure, but yes, it should be like missing an exit on the freeway...not set up. go around to the next exit.
Stress about it, hit the brakes, change lanes, disengage the cruise control, speed up/slow down....you increase the stress and crash potential.

In reality, the issue is capacity, hence the stress to land. Not to mention that in a few airports, you really have to land, as the missed is well, damn.

In the aviation world, missing the exit doesnt mean a 5 minute delay, going through the clover leaf, a simple circle and getting back on the right exit...all good.
it means the COST of driving 400 miles to the next one, missing the slot, missing the gate, and missing the dep slot...with the associated ramifications to the driver, airline, and passengers.

As an example, an A388 GA at DXB cost $400K as it had to be routed to AUH because of crew issues, while even the casual GA cost $100K.

Cant imagine any pressure or stigma on GA....

[galaxy flyer]

underfire,

Go take a check in Canada where balked landing is a checking item--even OEI at 50'RA. I got them every sim recurrent.

[safetypee]

RAT, galaxy, http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/598438-pax-sue-boeing-dbx-crash-8.html#post9872445 (#145).

How quickly the industry forgets why some thing was done, and if it still required or even if new suggestions will conflict with existing practices; leaving the pilot to manage the resultant complexity.

[underfire]

underfire,

Go take a check in Canada where balked landing is a checking item--even OEI at 50'RA. I got them every sim recurrent.

Per the post, do you require 2 hands on the yoke, even for the bus?

Per my post, we test balked touch and go....you mention 50'...not touch down and GA.

As there is no criteria for balked, would like to see the requirements, especially on each aircraft variant.

[pilot9249]

The crew never commanded thrust. They used a mode disabled for the phase of flight they were in. In the 777 if you want trust you push the throttles forward. Anytime you use the GA trust or other automatic mode you follow the throttle movement and assist if neccesary. Failing in that basic item of airmanship they could have considered all the other cues of a lack of thrust.

They hit the ground at 125 knots.

I never claimed the crew didn't fail. The crew failed. Did I mention that the crew failed?

For the avoidance of doubt, the crew failed. Is three times enough?

I take issue with ascribing zero blame to the automatics.

The automation silently refused a command for thrust with airspeed above 125 knots without weight on all the wheels.

Instead of describing why the crew effed up (they did, that's four times), can anyone describe why the automatics were perfectly correct?

[autoflight]

In some cultures a missed approach is somehow considered as a loss of face. e.g. the perfectly good Gulf Air A320 flight crashing into the water years ago while orbiting on final rather than completing a missed approach, Asiana at SFO and many more. Feeling forced to avoid a missed approach, regardless of all the circumstances, is something I have frequently observed in others. A written report and meeting with fleet chief actually confirms misconceived attitudes to missed approach.
The sooner all cultures accept a missed approach as a normal manoeuvre the sooner aviation safety will improve.
Missed approaches are practiced in the sim, often EO, unusual config or other emergency conditions. We need to look more at the all engine, no emergency missed approach in the sim, with brief/debrief emphasising that it is as normal as a take-off or landing. Just not performed as often.
How much grief will be avoided if this message bears fruit.

[galaxy flyer]

sptraveler,

Because the automatics aren't "right" of "wrong"; they just are. They are inanimate objects that do as commanded. Garbage in, garbage out. The crew, for reasons not yet explained, didn't know they were doing the "garbage in" part; their training should have ensured that they added power manually when the throttles didn't move.

And, as has been stated, "fixing" the automatics may well ontroduce others risks.

GF

[Capn Bloggs]

Bounce the ac, press TOGA and pulls back with both hands....see where that gets you.
I sincerely hope you are not suggesting that "pull" means a good old yank, because as you would know being a rated pilot, all that is needed is a gentle control input to achieve the required result.

The reason, I suspect, that some pilots (not your "best drivers from the manufacturers") use two hands during a GA is because that is what is done during takeoff. The captain's right hand goes off the throttles at V1 onto the control column so there is no/less temptation to reject after V1. Isn't that what you do?

Secondly, I find that I can fly the thing more accurately with two hands (especially if major roll inputs are required after a failure on a turning SID) but as quickly as I can, get back to one hand because it forces me to get the thing in trim.

TDRacer, ask your mates down the road at Long Beach about GAs on the ground. While you're there, get them to give you a brief on "Lo Speed Protection". ;)

[Capn Bloggs]

What's a "startle touch and go"? Touch and goes are planned maneuvers, I thought. The crew was apparently doing a go around. Should the T7 or any plane have a A/T touch and go mode. They were trained in go arounds, presumably, and both pilots messed it up, full stop. Are we now saying pilots are startled by a go around?

A touch and go is not a planned manoeuvre. What does the 777 FCOM say about a touch and go or bolter? Mine (not a 777) doesn't say anything... I think I mentioned earlier, we do practice them in the sim, though. And it is not a go around-type manoeuvre.

BTW, the EK SOP on "long landing" is a system error. They employ pilots to make landings which require judgement inherent in being a pilot.
Are you suggesting that the EK captain uses his judgement and ignores the RAAS and then gets sanctioned? This is the real world, you know...

SPTraveller, I wholeheartedly agree with your posts.

[galaxy flyer]

I didn't say that the automatics couldn't be better, just the pilots must understand them and not blame an inanimate object for their own failures. The pilots in thus case didn't accomplish the most basic task of ensuring thrust was there.

I agree with your opening sentence post 194, just that you can't blame the automatics, especially on such a proven design, for pilots' failure to comply with training and SOPs, training and SOP designed to back up the automatics.

Bloggs, WRT to pilots exercising their judgement, then disciplined for doing so repulsive, but then again I never have, nor will, fly in such an operation. FOQA wasn't intended to be a discipline tool, but rather a tool to refine the operation, identify training problems, uncover systemic failings. having done literally thousands of touch and goes, I never thought them as "unplanned". Intend, both Civil and military flying shouldn't involve unplanned or intrajned maneuvers by line pilots. A go around is trained and checked at each session. A heavy jet likely will touch in a balked landing from very low heights, this shouldn't be a problem.

BTW, I was one of "not your best drivers from the manufacturers". I was with a manufacturer and "not your best driver, too. :E :cool:


GF

[Oldaircrew]

I think we're arguing the wrong point. Whether the crew or aeroplane failed is moot. The real question should be: why did they go around in the first place?

I'll start digging my foxhole and put my helmet on.

[galaxy flyer]

I'll be in there with you! :D

GF

[RAT 5]

Are you suggesting that the EK captain uses his judgement and ignores the RAAS and then gets sanctioned? This is the real world, you know...

The real question should be: why did they go around in the first place?

Indeed. It has been suggested the A/T in TOGA mode worked as designed and educated. The A/T is a tool to help work load under design conditions; as are most automatics add-ons. It has also been said that RAAS was designed as an advisory tool. EK decided it should be a command not an advice, with punishment for disobedience. Is that correct?

From the inside what has been EK reaction?
1. train all crew more diligently in an RAAS GA manoeuvre including bounced recoveries and GA's.
2. rewrite the RAAS SOP to be advisory.
3. Fire the crew and ignore it ever happened.

[OldLurker]

I think we're arguing the wrong point. Whether the crew or aeroplane failed is moot. The real question should be: why did they go around in the first place? I'll take the bait ... According to the preliminary report (linked at post #11 in this thread) they went around because wind conditions changed, they were landing long, and they sensibly thought "let's get out of here and do it again" or words to that effect.

IMHO the question should not be "why did they go around"? Go-around is a proper option, to be encouraged, if an approach doesn't look good or even if a touchdown doesn't look good – as others more qualified than me have said here, go-around is an option until thrust reverse is selected. Airlines who penalize crew for go-around are (IMHO again) completely misguided.

The real question should be: why did they screw up the go-around?

[GICASI2]

I'll take the bait ... According to the preliminary report (linked at post #11 in this thread) they went around because wind conditions changed, they were landing long, and they sensibly thought "let's get out of here and do it again" or words to that effect.

IMHO the question should not be "why did they go around"? Go-around is a proper option, to be encouraged, if an approach doesn't look good or even if a touchdown doesn't look good – as others more qualified than me have said here, go-around is an option until thrust reverse is selected. Airlines who penalize crew for go-around are (IMHO again) completely misguided

The real question should be: why did they screw up the go-around?

Because: the captain failed to apply thrust; the FO failed to ensure the thrust levers advanced to a GA thrust level as indicated on the EICAS; the captain rotated to the GA attitude before the FO called rotate (which he didn't) at Vref (and with no thrust, I doubt Vref was ever achieved); NEITHER noticed and called a negative speed trend; the FO allowed himself to become distracted at a critical time (!) and unquestioningly raised the gear lever on command. Lots of failures and a perfectly serviceable jet was destroyed.

[Ian W]

They hit the ground at 125 knots.

I never claimed the crew didn't fail. The crew failed. Did I mention that the crew failed?

For the avoidance of doubt, the crew failed. Is three times enough?

I take issue with ascribing zero blame to the automatics.

The automation silently refused a command for thrust with airspeed above 125 knots without weight on all the wheels.

Instead of describing why the crew effed up (they did, that's four times), can anyone describe why the automatics were perfectly correct?

The automatics did precisely what they were designed to do nothing more nothing less. As such they were perfectly correct.

As you have said multiple times the crew failed to confirm power was actually increasing.

What you are really saying is 'can anyone describe why the automatics were designed like that?'.

That question should be followed with:

'Why is it necessary to have a button that does just what a competent crew could do with a straight arm and maintenance of control of the aircraft during a go around?'

then

'Why is it necessary to ensure that the button does not cause the engines to go to full throttle on the ground as a competent crew would not press buttons inadvertently?'

I put it to you that both of these questions are answered by 'the designers believed that they had to design the TOGA button for less than competent crews'.

What they failed to check for was the competency required to know the limits of the TOGA button.

Of course the design could have been that the RAAS operation automatically initiates TOGA regardless of weight on wheels. The automatics retract undercarriage once the aircraft is climbing with climb power then raise the flaps at the correct speeds, then fly the circuit using the uplinked trajectory from the ATC automation then autoland and taxi to the gate. But there were some designers that thought the crew would be competent. :)

[Capn Bloggs]

Lookout, UAV Ian has arrived! :)

I put it to you that both of these questions are answered by 'the designers believed that they had to design the TOGA button for less than competent crews'.
I hope you say that tongue-in-cheek. Obviously, with today's high performance engines, having a crew (PF then the PNF) mucking around trying to manually, accurately set a thrust (takeoff, GA or whatever) is silly. Hence a button that will do that (and in Boeings, incorporating at two-step thrust limit for GAs to help prevent gross overshoots, as has happened on Scarebusses). So as far as I can see, there is a useful purpose for TOGA buttons.

The issue here is only that it doesn't work in a Bolter situation. On other jets, it does. If you don't practice bolters regularly, then you're probably going to stuff one up if you have to do one, especially if, as in this case, you have plenty of IAS and things look OK on the ASI and therefore haul it back into the air. So much to do in so little time, with the aeroplane reacting, initially, as you would expect. And because you never handfly, you've lost that seat-of-the-pants sinking feeling when the bottom starts to drop out of it with no thrust on. Throw in a distracting radio call and...

[Oldaircrew]

Oldlurker,

I hear what you are trying to say.

However, the report is worded so that very little blame is placed on the shoulders of the operator and the manufacturer. While I believe the conditions changed in that instant, the company culture is such that the captain felt he had to go around or be called in for a safety debrief(possibly not his first, which would have made his decision making much harder) and therefore went around even though the landing could be completed safely.

The strict adherence to SOPs(with little common sense being allowed) instilled by this operator, placed this crew in an untenable and unenviable position.

I also find it amusing that we have a system in place(RAAS) to prevent us going off the end of the runway but which uses the beginning of the runway as a reference.

[Ian W]

Lookout, UAV Ian has arrived! :)


I hope you say that tongue-in-cheek. Obviously, with today's high performance engines, having a crew (PF then the PNF) mucking around trying to manually, accurately set a thrust (takeoff, GA or whatever) is silly. Hence a button that will do that (and in Boeings, incorporating at two-step thrust limit for GAs to help prevent gross overshoots, as has happened on Scarebusses). So as far as I can see, there is a useful purpose for TOGA buttons.

The issue here is only that it doesn't work in a Bolter situation. On other jets, it does. If you don't practice bolters regularly, then you're probably going to stuff one up if you have to do one, especially if, as in this case, you have plenty of IAS and things look OK on the ASI and therefore haul it back into the air. So much to do in so little time, with the aeroplane reacting, initially, as you would expect. And because you never handfly, you've lost that seat-of-the-pants sinking feeling when the bottom starts to drop out of it with no thrust on. Throw in a distracting radio call and...

Yes of course it was somewhat tongue in cheek - though it is as you suggest "If you don't practice bolters regularly, then you're probably going to stuff one up if you have to do one," So the TOGA button is put in and someone says ahh but what happens if.... and they put in a simple WOW switch to stop an embarrassing taxiing incident. But the crew either didn't know about that inhibition and/or failed to check the power. It would have been better if the designers had used weight on nose wheel.

[Sailvi767]

There is a lot of strange stuff being posted here. Love the two handed comments. When you hit the ToGA buttons on the 777 the nose pitches up nicely on the 777 with little yoke pressure needed. In any case as you are hitting the TOGA buttons you push the throttles up anyway. It's a natural motion with how the buttons are placed. If you need two hands to fly the plane you need some gym time!

[cessnapete]

Im amazed at the stuff being written here by pilots re hands on controls. Surely every pilot from Cessna150 to B777 etc is taught to fly with one hand on the control column/yoke /stick and one hand on the power management control/s from before the flare, to touchdown/go around. Especially in aircraft with automatics, to cover the failure, mismanagement of said automatics.
Its simple pilot stuff, or airmanship, which seems to be disappearing in some airline SOPS.
Not being sexist, but even my mates slim lightweight daughter can fly a B744 with one hand, normal SOP in her Big Airline.
Not having flown with it, but a system which says 'long landing'' mandating a a crew to perform a go around (botched) with 9000ft plus runway remaining, defies logic.

[Vessbot]

What are you amazed by? I didn't see anyone advocating to land with both hands on the yoke. Nor to go around starting with both hands on the yoke. In fact, the general consensus is that this was the cause of the crash.

[pilot9249]

Because: the captain failed to apply thrust; the FO failed to ensure the thrust levers advanced to a GA thrust level as indicated on the EICAS; the captain rotated to the GA attitude before the FO called rotate (which he didn't) at Vref (and with no thrust, I doubt Vref was ever achieved); NEITHER noticed and called a negative speed trend; the FO allowed himself to become distracted at a critical time (!) and unquestioningly raised the gear lever on command. Lots of failures and a perfectly serviceable jet was destroyed.

You have described in graphic detail how many ways the crew failed. It's surely almost unimaginable that any crew could catalogue this absurd collection of failures. It's ridiculous. Unbelievable. WTF?

But it happened.

Let me pose a question.

If when pressing TOGA the automatics had enunciated "TOGA. Ignored.", would the outcome most likely have been harmed or improved?

Is there any way that this could possibly have made things worse?

[galaxy flyer]

I wouldn't see any harm in message being posted like "TOGA DISARMED" or your example. But, if they missed the throttles not moving; I suspect they'd miss the more subtle EICAS message.

How does the Airbus system work in a similar situation? I know the pilot has to retard the throttles out of some detent prior to touchdown.

[galaxy flyer]

I would think the rather large throttles NOT moving would be a more than adequate signal that pressing TOGA didn't work! That's the point of moving throttles--tactile signaling of thrust position. Most pilots can readily identify thrust by merely feeling the throttle position. Heck, years of formation flying and I can hear the thrust from the sound of the engines.

[H Peacock]

If you want to start adding EICAS messages etc then why not go the whole hog and put the TOGA button under your right thumb on the yoke - you wouldn't ever have to let go of it and reach for the pesky throttles!

The more this thread goes on I can see some whacky lawyer successfully arguing to a bewildered jury that this was all Boeing's fault and not down to the crew/airline simply not prioritising the 'aviating' aspect of their operation.

[HPSOV L]

Why not have the TOGA switch make a 'BZZZT!' sound when pushed after the Boeing autothrottle system has inhibited itself with one of it's famous 'indirect mode changes'?
Or how about when it's in Hold on approach below 1000'?

Not manly enough? Tell that to the passengers involved in a crash after the humans up front make one of their periodic cock ups. Personally I think attitudes to improvements in safety still have a long way to go.

It's a bit of a stretch to sue Boeing who designed the best system they could with the technology available at the time. But that doesn't mean it can't be improved with the benefit of experience.

[Doors to Automatic]

Apologies if this has been asked before but according to the official accident report the aircraft touched down approximately 3600 feet (1100m) past the threshold of 12L. Whilst long, by my calculations this would still leave around 8,200 feet of runway ahead. This would be around twice as far as the aicraft needs to stop with firm braking on a dry runway and indeed more than Gatwick, Manchester, Newcastle and Birmingham have available after the correct touchdown point. So why go-around in the first place?

[H Peacock]

So why go-around in the first place?

RAAS activated due to the perceived long landing! It didn't understand that there was ample runway remaining, the crew simply (tried) to follow the RAAS command!!

[Snyggapa]

Why not have the TOGA switch make a 'BZZZT!' sound when pushed after the Boeing autothrottle system has inhibited itself with one of it's famous 'indirect mode changes'?


The universally accepted sound to be used in this situation is the "Family Fortunes ECK-UUUUUURRRRR" noise

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XMW6Z_Oq38

Could also use it on "gear up without positive rate of climb"

[galaxy flyer]

RAAS activated due to the perceived long landing! It didn't understand that there was ample runway remaining, the crew simply (tried) to follow the RAAS command!!

And, where they went from pilots to bring pax with a forward view.

[GICASI2]

I wouldn't see any harm in message being posted like "TOGA DISARMED" or your example. But, if they missed the throttles not moving; I suspect they'd miss the more subtle EICAS message.

How does the Airbus system work in a similar situation? I know the pilot has to retard the throttles out of some detent prior to touchdown.



As has been said before, on the BUS, TOGA is selected by pushing the thrust levers to the fully forward detent. And this system was (reluctantly) designed by an engineer! However, it works and this accident would not have occurred on an AIRBUS (never say never in aviation!!!)

[Capn Bloggs]

Almost...

Jetstar makes changes after go-around mishap | Australian Aviation (http://australianaviation.com.au/2010/03/jetstar-makes-changes-after-go-around-mishap/)

[glofish]

In any case as you are hitting the TOGA buttons you push the throttles up anyway. It's a natural motion with how the buttons are placed.

I must assume that you have never touched a T7.

The TOGA switches are on the front side of the levers. They are actually very easy to push in the idle position, but quite twitchy when the levers are pushed up, you need a awkward wrist torsion to really push them. So nowhere near to a natural motion. It is actually almost easy to push them in the retarded/idle position and then "assume" that TOGA is selected. Especially the former Airbus pilots tend to not follow the lever movement, thus not feeling alarmed if they do not move (btw one of the many reasons i propagate to leave AB ab initio trained pilots on AB and vice versa).

The Airbus system by positioning/clicking the motionless lever to the TOGA position has its advantage here. Although it has its own trap, namely the non movement can lead you to assume that the system has not switched and not increased power, even though you checked the FMA. You need to confirm by looking at the N1 indicator and in stunned moments this is not easy. Asseline got trapped by that and re-clicked, therefore delayed the spin-up -> result known.

The best TOGA system is on the good old MD11. It has a palm switch that can hardly be pressed in the retard/idle position. You basically must shove up the levers to be able to push the switch with your palm, so you can hardly forget the shoving up.

(BTW it also had a very handy last resort or brain fart switch: A spring loaded bar at the firewall position. Push through it and gives you at any time AP/AT off, full available thrust, wings level and max climb on the FD. Very handy for botched landings at any rad alt, wind-shear or GPWS)

[underfire]

Bounce the ac, press TOGA and pulls back with both hands....see where that gets you.
I sincerely hope you are not suggesting that "pull" means a good old yank, because as you would know being a rated pilot, all that is needed is a gentle control input to achieve the required result.

I am certain everyone understands what happens when you pull vs pull too hard. How is pulling too hard suggested? Aside from that, read in the context of the response, it was meant to show the difference between a balked, and a balked with touchdown.
Sensing weight on wheels initiates a cascade of variables, and simply pressing TOGA may not solve your problem.
That is why I wondered what the poster was talking about by stating they had trained all of the pilots to balked, especially balked with touchdown. What is the standard or criteria?
Just so you are aware, the RNP procedures are coded to include missed, so we do the balked and balked with touchdown to see how the automation and coding work together, and to make certain in these conditions, that the ac stays withing the specified containment area.

About 2 hands, that is simply a preference, but about the explanation on TOGA being same as takeoff, steering may be better, but once you rotate, 2 fingers works it, even on the 748.
I really not sure why you minimize the experience of some of these drivers, they are the chiefs from QANTAS, ANZ, United...and the manufacturers.

I will run the balked with touchdown scenario in detail, but with all of the emphasis on training new drivers, sim time is virtually impossible these days.

[RAT 5]

If you want to start adding EICAS messages etc then why not go the whole hog and put the TOGA button under your right thumb on the yoke - you wouldn't ever have to let go of it and reach for the pesky throttles!

On my TomTom it is possible to activate voice commands to enter your destination. The first words uttered, usually at the start of a GA are "Go Around" (with or without the A). Go the whole hog and design voice activated manoeuvres. :ugh: Oh, and don't forget to monitor the automatics do what you just screamed for. Uh; isn't that what we're supposed to do all along? Damn & blast, Moriarty: That's another wiz-bang idea up the swannie. So, Batman, how to improve the monitoring of the automatics? And make the human more involved and ensure they 'follow through'. How shall we do that? Got it, by jove I've got it. Let's remove the automatics so there is no confusion. Save 000's of washers on all that fancy codswallop stuff as well. 'Heavens to murgatroid'. Bingo.

I wonder what would happen after "W.T F" was screamed in panic?

[galaxy flyer]

Capt Bloggs,

Reading the Jetstar report, is it true then that to both select TOGA and have the FMS cycle to GA, the pilot HAS to select full TOGA power? There are no separate TOGA buttons, just the throttle being positioned in TOGA?

In any case, in the EK event, an AB pilot would have had to do exactly what the T7 did NOT do--correctly position the throttles!

My experience with A/T was in BBD business jets, mostly Global. I thought it was fairly intuitive--buttons on the side of the levers were TOGA and were disarmed on touchdown. For take-off, the pilot had to advance the throttles to about the 2/3rds forward position to have the automatics take over. Fortunately, the C-5 had the exact same button arrangement.

[GICASI2]

Almost...

Jetstar makes changes after go-around mishap | Australian Aviation (http://australianaviation.com.au/2010/03/jetstar-makes-changes-after-go-around-mishap/)

And this incident only reinforces the need to fly the aircraft in the prescribed manner, as laid down by and certificated by the manufacturer. Many better and bigger brains are available to Airbus and BOEING than at an outfit like Jetstar et al to ensure the safety of the walk-on freight!

[RAT 5]

RAT 5 – voice commands – why not?
"Alexa, go around!"

Damn: I forgot; that's what we already do, and that is why there is a PNF. Now, if we could get rid of the PNF and automate the voice commands and all the Thrust/Gear/Flap operations we'd be down to PF + a dog. Now what happens when the CP + HOT make the SOP manual as thick as the Bible. (in some companies it is even more important in saving your soul), and PF can't remember the correct wording. Lots of screaming & yelling until PF succeeds or 'Sharon' the ex-trolly dolly says "there is an error in your command" and you spear in.

There are enough pilots with more divorces than inflight hot toddies. Going to work and not being listened to by some half-wit computer will not help your blood pressure or zen. The medical failure rate will soar and there will be a severe shortage of pilots. The pilotless a/c will loom large on the horizon and there will be a severe shortage of pax.
Managers will run around like headless chickens and we will all learn to enjoy our own backyard that little bit more. Businesses will be concluded via conference video holograms and holidays will be with virtual reality goggles.
It grieves me greatly to watch Federer and the world's perfect backhand, on a grass fresh air court, being reduced to some muppets in front of a Wii screen in their lounge. Or trying to beat Rory Mc' on the links in their attic.
The world is crazy already, let's not accelerate it demise. But, heck, something sure needs fixing.

[Capn Bloggs]

And this incident only reinforces the need to fly the aircraft in the proscribed manner, as laid down by and certificated by the manufacturer.
Read the post by Glofish re FMAs...

The only REAL verfication of "Max" or "GA" thrust is the N1s. Bla bla bla the FMA all you want, if the N1s say you've got the grunt, you've done the deed.

is it true then that to both select TOGA and have the FMS cycle to GA, the pilot HAS to select full TOGA power? There are no separate TOGA buttons, just the throttle being positioned in TOGA?

In any case, in the EK event, an AB pilot would have had to do exactly what the T7 did NOT do--correctly position the throttles!
Dunno, don't fly 'em! But that is my understanding; throttles to the stop and GA mode engages. No need to press any buttons, which seems like a better idea than pressing a button (that doesn't @#$%^& work!) and pushing up...

My experience with A/T was in BBD business jets, mostly Global. I thought it was fairly intuitive--buttons on the side of the levers were TOGA and were disarmed on touchdown.
They would have to be different. The side buttons disconnect the ATS in my machine.

Glofish describes the best system... "Through the gate, Bloggs!!".

[arketip]

You might not want full power everytime time.

[Capn Bloggs]

I think it's called TOGA-Tap. :ok:

[GICASI2]

And as I said before, unless this is a certificated and approved method, as opposed to a 'mates' one, why do it? Unless you can stand in the dock and say 'it was the safest procedure to employ' and be grilled on your understanding by a scheister then I will ask again 'why do it'? BTW my comments have nothing to do with FMAs but what is happening in the real world!

[GICASI2]

I think it's called TOGA-Tap. :ok:

For instance:

Q. How long do you have to leave the THR LVRs at the TOGA detent for the refresh rate of the sensor to log the command?
A. Dunno - a mate told me it was a good way of getting skyward not too quickly

Q. What happens if you are too quick and move the THR LVRs away from the TOGA detent before the command is logged?
A. Ehm.... (You make an a&-e of yourself like the Jetstar crew)

If the big guys (test pilots) haven't done it there is no need to do it!

Thread drift 🚨 alert!

I hope BOEING's lawyers crush this idiotic case quickly. There have been untold numbers of TOGA engagements without incident. I believe EK and ETIHAD removed the pertinent info from their FCOMs - they should be the ones under the microscope not BOEING IMHO.

[M.Mouse]

I believe EK and ETIHAD removed the pertinent info from their FCOMs - ....

I can categorically state that the information has not been removed from Emirates manuals. No idea about Etihad but doubt they have removed it either.

[RAT 5]

Still waiting for an answer reference EK SOP's. (I fly more simple Boeings)

ON takeoff who does what with power levers? SOP
e.g. PF pre-sets TL's; presses TOGA: PF/PM follows through and confirms required thrust is set, then Captain sets hands on TL's until V1. Rotate, +ve rate & gear up.

On GA. who does what with TL's as "Go Around " is called. SOP?

IMHO I would expect the duties to be similar to reduce risk of errors.

[GICASI2]

I can categorically state that the information has not been removed from Emirates manuals. No idea about Etihad but doubt they have removed it either.

So, no excuse then - definitely not spending my $s on Emirates! Etihad B777 skipper had no knowledge of the TOGA inhibit and couldn't find it when he looked.