Jet goes down on its way to Medellin, Colombia [Archive] - Page 4

Double Back

7th Dec 2016, 08:24

The real question here is that the pilot had altitude, speed, wind, pressure, distance to r/w and no power, and lacked the necessary skills to fly the aircraft until a safe landing. Coulda and shoulda made it. Sorry if this sounds harsh.

Disagree. This was no "Sully" situation like VMC in daylight.
Failing instruments, dark and in IMC, lack of exact position knowledge, high elev airport with even higher surroundings, very likely lack of any crew management with dreadful authority gradients, the anxiety once they realized they had made a terrible mistake, the list of those items goes on and on.
Even with 23500 hours I would never say I could have saved the day from there on. Yes, in hindsight and from the couch it can be done, as sim reruns with a pre-warned crew will prove in the future.

The story evolves as one big scam with more than only the crew involved.

For me the most interesting part stops at the flame-out. Their fate was signed at that moment for 99,9%, it would require an expert and trained crew, or a fuel tank of luck to get more or less alive out of it.

How in the world they got themselves in that situation is the main question, not the fatal emergency descent/landing.

Blondie2005

7th Dec 2016, 08:26

Hence my use of "not often", though I can't think of many European cities that are more than a 4 hour direct flight from the UK.

And a 4-hour flight equates to 2-3 days on the road, so the OP's point is valid - IMHO it's likely that the team's kit was also travelling on the flight.

You might be right and I don't want to derail the thread with a discussion how leading football teams send their kit and equipment to away games so I'll say no more than I line managed the lady who did all team travel arrangements incl booking the planes and it's not what we did! But enough from me.

AerocatS2A

7th Dec 2016, 08:49

Disagree. This was no "Sully" situation like VMC in daylight.
Failing instruments, dark and in IMC, lack of exact position knowledge,

They had a VOR, ILS and DME, what more do they need?

wiggy

7th Dec 2016, 08:51

Failing instruments, dark and in IMC, lack of exact position knowledge, high elev airport with even higher surroundings, very likely lack of any crew management with dreadful authority gradients, the anxiety once they realized they had made a terrible mistake, the list of those items goes on and on.
Even with 23500 hours I would never say I could have saved the day from there on

Agree entirely. It's one thing playing around in the sim, possiby in simulated VMC and possibly simulated daylight, quite another matter pulling it off in the real world in the circumstances you describe.

The route cause of the fatalities isn't the lack at an attempt at an engine out apporach.

ATC Watcher

7th Dec 2016, 09:01

in IMC
Is this an established fact ? from the R/T transcript pilot said they were in sight of the ground. But they could have become IMC later .

MartinM

7th Dec 2016, 09:24

They had a VOR, ILS and DME, what more do they need?
Most probably -> Fuel and more altitude

deefer dog

7th Dec 2016, 09:47

They had a VOR, ILS and DME, what more do they need?

Just your experience and expert guidance AerocatS2A!

portmanteau

7th Dec 2016, 09:55

Damages claims based on negligence will be enormous. LaMia's insurers (if there are any) will be liable for around USD 10 million just to pay the minimum required to the pax under the Warsaw/Montreal Conventions.

sabenaboy

7th Dec 2016, 09:56

Please stop throwing red herrings into the equation!. From all that is known so far, the accident occurred because:
1. Main factor:
The flight was planned with insufficient fuel for the flight in violation of ICAO and national regulations;
2. Contributing factors:
a. the PIC failed to declare fuel emergency when it became apparent that the fuel was below the established minimuns. Mayday was never heard;
b. After the flame-out, the crew did not possess the skill to glide the plane to the airport.
The investigation may unearth additional causes. But, discounting an attempt at a cover-up, it would be extremely surprising if it came out with something substantively different from the above.

marie, your main and contributing factors will probably be mentioned in the final accident report. However, the contributing factors are totally irrelevant. The main factor is the only thing that's worth investigating and I hope it will be a thorough one! As soon as I heard that they were trying to fly a 4:22 hrs long flight in an Avro RJ85, fuel starvation immediately came into my mind.
It turns out that they had performed several earlier 4 hrs+ flights before with this RJ85.
Sorry, but I can not imagine any pilot in any serious company in Western Europe would be foolish enough to attempt a flight where he knows he will be arriving with just a few minutes fuel left.
IF(!) the investigation is done seriously, I'm sure the report will be mentioning criminal negligence, not only from the captain, but from many other people from the company. Lack of oversight from the Bolivian authorities and likely corruption are probably larger contributing factors then the one you mentioned. I know that saying this is not politically correct but anyone with a little bit of common sense will probably agree. May I suggest you let go of your political correctness and give some credit to people displaying some common sense.
The only one I feel sorry for, apart from the innocent victims of course, is Celia Castedo. If she really tried to get answers from the crew about their filed FPLN, only to be sent away, she did more then should be expected from an ARO clerk.
Let's hope that the true criminal responsables for this event fail in trying to make her the scapegoat!

DaveReidUK

7th Dec 2016, 10:13

However, the contributing factors are totally irrelevant.

I very much doubt that any AIB would conclude that.

directKORUL

7th Dec 2016, 10:16

@marie paire,

Are you a new mod on the thread?

PashaF was writing about contributory factors, and quite reasonably IMO. The extra load would have required more fuel.

The a/c was full of fuel so the possible extra weight would only mean a few minutes of lost range and they might have made it. But, if this pilot/airline were doing this flight on a regular basis this was always going to happen one day.

Soave_Pilot

7th Dec 2016, 10:25

212man

7th Dec 2016, 10:47

They had a VOR, ILS and DME, what more do they need?

On the battery only? I doubt it. This picture seems to show what a battery only cockpit looks like:
http://cdn.airplane-pictures.net/images/uploaded-images/2009/8/15/57745.jpg

MartinM

7th Dec 2016, 10:52

Lol, I get more indicators on my EC120B with battery power than this. I doubt that this is in ready state. I think master avionics switch 1 and 2 is off. ;-)

CDU would be on, with battery power, I am pretty sure.

let me double check this with a friend of mine that flies Avro 100

212man

7th Dec 2016, 11:06

My last type had almost nothing on the battery - it's primary function was to start the APU!

Hippy

7th Dec 2016, 11:10

The captain was playing russian roulette, he also flew 4 other times with limited fuel onboard. One othe them flying the Argentinian soccer team from Buenos Aires to Belo Horizonte, Brazil (high traffic Class C airspace) with Messi aboard. The total flight time was 3 hours 18 min :eek:
This would require 7th freedom rights. Is this likely, considering 6th freedom was not granted?
(I know nothing about the Chicago Convention :confused:)

Lancelot de boyles

7th Dec 2016, 11:31

It strikes me as the revelations keep coming, that far from being a tragic case of utter incompetence on behalf of the captain/crew/company, this is growing to include-

Dispatchers and other ground staff- if one is already seeking asylum, misguided or not, so she must have some serious fears about her own safety. The response by her own government does little to reassure, which then warrants an in-depth look at how they apportion blame and responsibility.
Handlers- there was mention earlier about the company arriving with dry tanks previously, yet this didn't end there.
Company owners- the surviving members, because surely this could only happen in a company whose culture is deficient at best, and utterly corrupt at worst.
Local CAA- nepotism has already been exposed in the aftermath, but where was the oversight? How long had been operating in this way? Surely, if adequate records were kept then the signs were there previously, and if the records are a mess, that in itself warrants serious attention.
Football team owners/management (I know next to nothing about football)- granted, concepts such as duty of care may have little meaning there, but the team has been nearly wiped out. All of the time/investment being lost. Who looked into the operating standards to ensure that the investment and assets were safeguarded?
Football association- As above.
The other teams who by now might well be thinking that the fun trips before were in fact a close call with disaster only minutes away. Where was the 'due diligence' on their behalf?
Even Diplomatic relations across borders are going to be tested

With suggestions that threats had already been made towards the ATCO, this is going to be a mess, and the final outcome I suspect is going to be quite unpalatable to most.

AerocatS2A

7th Dec 2016, 11:37

On the battery only? I doubt it. This picture seems to show what a battery only cockpit looks like:
http://cdn.airplane-pictures.net/images/uploaded-images/2009/8/15/57745.jpg

Do you make a habit of using Airplane-Pictures.net for your systems information?

Unless there was something wrong with the aircraft other than a lack of fuel, they had the #1 VHF Nav and the #1 DBI. They also had standby airspeed and altitude. They had everything they needed in order to know where they were, where the aerodrome was, and where the ILS was.

deefer dog, I'm not saying I could've landed on the runway, just dispelling the notion that they had no nav.

david1300

7th Dec 2016, 11:39

It seems odd that the pilot didn't ask for a straight in approach from altitude before he entered the hold? Did I miss something?

Yes - reading the first 30 pages of this thread, where the reasons are given and discussed quite a few times :ugh:

212man

7th Dec 2016, 12:03

Do you make a habit of using Airplane-Pictures.net for your systems information?

Unless there was something wrong with the aircraft other than a lack of fuel, they had the #1 VHF Nav and the #1 DBI. They also had standby airspeed and altitude. They had everything they needed in order to know where they were, where the aerodrome was, and where the ILS was.

No, but your comment is the first definitive statement about what services the crew would still have that I've seen here. Given that the aircraft uses engines 1 & 4 for primary generators, and a (engine driven) hydraulic system for the standby generator, and has an APU, I didn't expect to see much on the battery. There's not much in the public domain to confirm what's left.....

chadavman

7th Dec 2016, 12:22

DaveReidUK

7th Dec 2016, 12:38

Given that the aircraft uses engines 1 & 4 for primary generators, and a (engine driven) hydraulic system for the standby generator, and has an APU, I didn't expect to see much on the battery.

Battery capacity and longevity are greatly affected by how much TLC or abuse they receive in service.

Given what we now know about the operational practices of the airline in question ...

zero/zero

7th Dec 2016, 12:46

marie, your main and contributing factors will probably be mentioned in the final accident report. However, the contributing factors are totally irrelevant. The main factor is the only thing that's worth investigating and I hope it will be a thorough one!

Incorrect. Regardless of your bloodlust, the primary aim for any investigation is to learn from mistakes and prevent reoccurrence. The main factor is often the easy bit and it's the contributory factors where the real learning takes place.

Where negligence has taken place, someone will need to be held accountable, but that doesn't mean we should ignore the other contributing factors :ugh:

learner001

7th Dec 2016, 12:48

The real question here is that the pilot had altitude, speed, wind, pressure, distance to r/w and no power, and lacked the necessary skills to fly the aircraft until a safe landing. Coulda and shoulda made it. Sorry if this sounds harsh.

Could write a book about that but, very briefly, there's a hughe difference between:

Relaxed and undisturbed, sorting out well ordered, hindsight immagination

and

real-time anxiety, when the brain is (pre-)occupied, sorting out lots of additional totally (ir)relevant matters. (even including matters from the (very recent) past).

All at the very same instant, whilst the clock is ticking much faster than in the 'armchair' . . .

In addition: You're also not alone, up there . . .

RAT 5

7th Dec 2016, 13:02

Among the survivors is the technician Erwin Tumiri.
Meanwhile "flight technician" Erwin Tumiri still can't accept the crash was due to lack of fuel and believes it to be faulty APU.

And there I was hoping that Erwin might be sitting in the flight deck and be privy to the fuel discussions and shed some valuable light on the chain of events. APU's tend to be faulty if they have no fuel to start up with. Does he think the APU could have replaced the engines?

It turns out that they had performed several earlier 4 hrs+ flights before with this RJ85.

There should therefore be a paper trail of the FPL's for those flights and perhaps the dispatchers alive to comment. There should also be a paper trail of the tech logs and fuel receipts after uplift to analyse those flight profiles. i.e. a history can emerge of what 'the norm' was. Then questions can be asked as to how 'the norm' was allowed to continue.

sabenaboy

7th Dec 2016, 13:16

Where negligence has taken place, someone will need to be held accountable, but that doesn't mean we should ignore the other contributing factors :ugh:

No need to start banging your head, 2 x zero!
I talked specifically about the other contributing factors that marie mentioned! (I thought that would have been clear from my previous post)
i.e.
a. the PIC failed to declare fuel emergency when it became apparent that the fuel was below the established minimuns. Mayday was never heard;
b. After the flame-out, the crew did not possess the skill to glide the plane to the airport.

I really don't care if lives could have been saved by declaring mayday 3 minutes earlier or if the plane was still able to make it to the airport when it became a glider. (Or if he would have made it if the other planes weren't there)
What we should be really interested in is how it became possible that this captain thought he could get away with what he did (including all contributing factors leading to that state of mind)

Allow me to suggest an aspirine for your headache. :}

ATC Watcher

7th Dec 2016, 13:34

There should also be a paper trail of the tech logs and fuel receipts
I would not put too much hopes on paper trail of Fuel receipts. knowing the inflation rate and actual use of local currencies in that part of the world , fuel bills are most likely to be in US $ . Now seen the financial status of the airline I doubt they did have a fuel credit, and if they did not, they most probably have had to pay their fuel bills in cash on the spot.
Not been to Bolivia or Venezuela recently , but when I was last, when handling US $ you got a handwritten paper receipt not worth much in modern accounting, and negotiations started on how much you wanted written on it.

And the economic situation was much better then than it is now.

zero/zero

7th Dec 2016, 13:34

I really don't care if lives could have been saved by declaring mayday 3 minutes earlier or if the plane was still able to make it to the airport when it became a glider. (Or if he would have made it if the other planes weren't there)
What we should be really interested in is how it became possible that this captain thought he could get away with what he did (including all contributing factors leading to that state of mind)

That's exactly my point... I do care if it the aircraft could have been saved by declaring a mayday 3 minutes earlier as we can use that knowledge to improve training. Same for the gliding - if the aircraft could have made it, then should we training more for such eventualities in the sim?

ciderman

7th Dec 2016, 13:38

What I initially said was the cause seems to be an irrefutable fact now. I don't hold out much hope for any enquiry/investigation. As with lots of things in that neck of the woods, the enquiry will exonerate the one with the deepest pockets and some poor individual will end up in jail. Or am I just being cynical again?

sabenaboy

7th Dec 2016, 14:01

I do care if it the aircraft could have been saved by declaring a mayday 3 minutes earlier as we can use that knowledge to improve training. Same for the gliding - if the aircraft could have made it, then should we training more for such eventualities in the sim?

Euh, you mean,... You want to be put in the sim in a scenario were you have just a few minutes of fuel left and have to enter the hold and then be told during debriefing that you should have called mayday 3 minutes BEFORE the engines went dead? :p

Practising an all engine failure glide to land once in a while might be useful (and fun) but if the investigators would recommend more of such training in their final report because of this crash, they would be making fools of themselves.

Talking about this event in a CRM course might be useful. You're not going to need a sim for this one.

alanraymond

7th Dec 2016, 14:04

The question needs to be asked why the football club didn't charter a longer range aircraft to fly them directly from Chapeco airport (which has a 2475m runway) to Medellin rather than flying commercial via Sao Paulo to Santa Cruz and then booking what should have been a two leg charter. That would be 4 sectors in total which probably isn't ideal preparation for a cup final. It wasn't that the charter was cheap. From what's been published it would appear that the price of the charter was way in excess of what would be reasonable presumably due to various backhanders from the airline to officials in the football world.
It would appear that either the club were in on the scam or the Brazilian FA or CONMEBOL instructed them to use LaMia however inconvenient it was.
I read in the Spanish press that they had flown this airline before and it had brought them good luck

bloom

7th Dec 2016, 14:15

Oh my! There is an emergency ahead of me and I'm out of fuel. Enter a holding pattern ?

Hell no !

Land in front of them and get rear ended ? Save lives perhaps.

Land behind them and rear end them ? Save lives perhaps.

Land parallel in the grass? Save lives perhaps.

But run out of fuel ?

You declare an emergency and all the rules are off! You don't go into a holding pattern and use up your lifeblood.

jess15

7th Dec 2016, 14:17

And there I was hoping that Erwin might be sitting in the flight deck and be privy to the fuel discussions and shed some valuable light on the chain of events. APU's tend to be faulty if they have no fuel to start up with. Does he think the APU could have replaced the engines?

^ snipped

Acc to Tumiri's latest newspaper interview ( surprised he's still not been interviewed by the investigating team) , he says he flew with LaMia only 3 times previously, first flight with them being in August. He qualified in 2015 and "I belong to a mechanics company in Cochabamba called Bacams."
Also he qualified as a private pilot in 2016.

(Maybe FA Suarez is not speaking to the press because she's more astute, Tumiri keeps changing his account, so best taken with a pinch of salt. )

some bad translations from the links:
About the fatal accident, Tumiri reiterated his responsibility in this event, is as a crew member, he considers that they lacked leadership. "That leader should coordinate with all team members. That should be the responsibility of the pilot. I was commissioned to write down details, like what time we are taking off, landing, if there was hydraulic, water flow, if there was gasoline, those details ".
He said that he filled up to the max with fuel and that it should make a stop at Cobija to re-fuel, but at the time of departing the pilot said we'd go straight to Medellin. "If the problem had been fuel, was due to the fact that we charge in Cobija, I did check the gas to Cobija, but from when I said they would go straight to Medellin," he recalled.
However, Tumiri does not believe the accident was due to lack of gasoline or an electrical problem, but rather a failure, "a generator that goes in the back of the plane, called the APU, which already not enter gasoline and did not generate more electricity. On the other hand, he said the pilot only mentioned that the crew prepare for landing and it was not until the stewardess told him something was wrong, he was concerned. "The pilot only mentioned that we prepare for landing, we were not alarmed because the decline we did was the type of movement to land. There was no panic or anything. The only detail was that the stewardess told me to fasten well, then something happened."

In the second link, he says that, after departure, it was engineer Angel Lugo who informed him they were now not re-fuelling at Cobija.
The journalist's questions in italics, also at that link is the later description of the crash and moments leading up to it.

What was your role?
Check that the aircraft is well, it is all quiet, everything is airworthy. That's my job, refuelling, checking the oil, under the rules we have and the plane's manual.

According to the flight plan too?
The flight plan is separate from that, the dispatcher is responsible.

Was it the first time that fuel may have been lacking?
I'm not so sure it's the fuel. I could tell you yes, but we must still wait investigations . Now it is said to be fuel issue and could also say that, but I'm not so sure.

You, as a mechanic, you know how much fuel the plane was carrying?
I did know.

In this case, for the flight to Medellin?
I filled all fuel to full, well overdone.

That was enough to get to the destination?
I coordinate that with the dispatcher. If the dispatcher tells me x many liters, or full, I do it. In this case I said it's 'fulee' and I did. Then I told YPFB (Bolivian Fiscal Oilfields) to make an invoice to Cobija. But during the flight, Angel flight engineer, told me the plane will no longer go to Cobija, but up to Medellin.
The invoice was to resupply at Cobija?
Yes. But it was night and all that, they knew that the Cobija airport does not work at night.

Were you surprised that no refuelling is done in Cobija? Did not it generate an alert?
Yes, but they are responsible for their own administration, their own money. Part from the head of them coming orders. I have to fulfill. My role is to check that the plane is in good condition and is filled with everything that has to be filled: lubricants, oils, fuels.

Tumiri hace nuevas revelaciones y funcionaria busca asilo: LaMia | Diario Correo del Sur: Noticias de Sucre, Bolivia y el Mundo (http://correodelsur.com/seguridad/20161206_tumiri-hace-nuevas-revelaciones-y-funcionaria-busca-asilo-lamia.html)

?Cuando se prendieron las luces de emergencia Ximena presintió que algo pasaba? | Noticias de Bolivia y el Mundo - EL DEBER (http://www.eldeber.com.bo/bolivia/prendieron-luces-emergencia-ximena-presintio.html)

On engineer Angel Lugo who died - he'd worked for LaMia for 2 years. "Lugo had already spent 5 years in the area Avionics Engineer and Technical experience encompassed maintenance planning and Engineering Technical Support."
Habla el primo de Ángel Lugo, el técnico aeronáutico venezolano que murió en la tragedia de Chapecoense (http://noticiaaldia.com/2016/12/habla-el-primo-de-angel-lugo-el-tecnico-aeronautico-venezolano-que-murio-en-la-tragedia-de-chapecoense/)

katekebo

7th Dec 2016, 14:26

The question needs to be asked why the football club didn't charter a longer range aircraft to fly them directly from Chapeco airport (which has a 2475m runway) to Medellin rather than flying commercial via Sao Paulo to Santa Cruz and then booking what should have been a two leg charter. That would be 4 sectors in total which probably isn't ideal preparation for a cup final. It wasn't that the charter was cheap. From what's been published it would appear that the price of the charter was way in excess of what would be reasonable presumably due to various backhanders from the airline to officials in the football world.
It would appear that either the club were in on the scam or the Brazilian FA or CONMEBOL instructed them to use LaMia however inconvenient it was.
That was their intention - to fly with Lamia from Brazil to Colombia (with a re-fuelling stop). However, Lamia, being a Bolivian airline, is not allowed to operate flights between Brazil and Colombia (the flight has to originate or have the ultimate destination in Bolivia). This is why they took commercial flight from Brazil to Bolivia first.

dmba

7th Dec 2016, 14:31

They were already in Sao Paulo having played against Palmeiras on the Sunday evening. The played on Sunday and stayed in Sao Paulo until the Monday. This lack of research which leads to assumptions is really quite incredible.

Lonewolf_50

7th Dec 2016, 14:51

Hippy

7th Dec 2016, 15:10

None, other than that there appears to be a cosy relationship between the South American football confederation and this particular operator. A relationship that is surely about to be scrutinised in minute detail. Maybe.

alemaobaiano

7th Dec 2016, 16:58

As I am not familiar with standard routes in South America: are there scheduled flights daily from Sao Paulo to Medellin? Is there a reason that a Brazilian team would not take a Brazilian charter to Colombia from Sao Paulo? (Asking out of sheer ignorance due to lack of familiarity).
Avianca, Copa and LATAM all have one stop flights from São Paulo to Medellin, so there is no lack of options.

I've also seen reports (unconfirmed) that GOL was willing to run the charter for a price very similar to what was reportedly paid to Lamia.

sAx_R54

7th Dec 2016, 18:36

She almost certainly got the job because she knew someone who knew someone who knew someone else etc. She won't be well educated.
I believe she went as far as she could without jeopardising her job -

As staggering an assumption you're ever likely to find! The investigation can conclude now...just let us know when you have almost certainly concluded the final report.

foresight

7th Dec 2016, 19:15

I was merely trying to paint a picture of the sort of 'burócrata' she is likely to be and the gross unfairness of attaching blame to her.
Anyone who has lived/worked in Latin America and had dealings with government departments will be familiar with such people. And yes, that is how many/most of them get a job. I am not being judgemental, that is the system.
It may be an assumption, but a fair one.

The AvgasDinosaur

7th Dec 2016, 19:19

Greg_S

7th Dec 2016, 21:54

https://panampost.com/karina-martin/2016/12/05/bolivia-investigates-possible-case-of-corruption-leading-to-lamia-plane-crash/

"Vargas Villegas served as Director of the Aeronautics Registry for DGAC and was therefore responsible for giving out flying licenses to companies like LaMia, and would have given one to his son."

chuks

7th Dec 2016, 22:16

Nothing quite like waiting to see what happens next, is there? Perhaps we shall get an honest report out of all this mess. Who knows for certain?

Let's wait and see, shall we?

lemme

8th Dec 2016, 04:26

Thanks for your attention and comments to my posting on this accident. I have added a fair amount of additional material over the last few days to answer some lingering questions. Let me know if something is wrong or missing. Of course, with real flight data a more conclusive analysis would be possible, plus awareness of the actions onboard.

Having dug as deep as I can with the limited information at hand:

1) The flight plan from SLVR to SKRG with 77 aboard is beyond the legal range of this airplane, even with auxiliary tanks. The same plane had flown the same city pair in reverse on Nov 4, with with even a longer stage length of over 4:33. The investigation will have to conclude on this point as it appears the flight planning was reckless.

2) FEED LO LEVEL warning would have been raised at least 150 km from SKRG. Each feed tank has a dedicated gage for constant monitoring. There can be no doubt the flight crew knew they had a little more than 20 minutes of fuel left, at that point, and counting.

3)There appears to have been sufficient fuel for a straight-in approach, and after one circuit around the holding pattern. The decision to turn outbound on the second circuit left fuel exhaustion inevitable.

4) ADS-B position data appears to be driven from an IRS source, not GNSS. The departure position was offset by 2 km. Evaluating a few other flights of similar duration suggests another 2 km drift could be expected, or for this flight the position uncertainty is about 4 km (2 nm). The northern arrival suggest an easterly offset of less than 1 nm.

5) LMI2933 entered and held over RNG VOR/DME. The reported position was offset about 10 nm south of the VOR. While IRS error might account for 2 nm of the error, the remaining 8 nm offset is puzzling. The final resting place and the actions through the last few minutes are most consistent with the airplane operating 8-10 nm south of RNG. This issue should be resolved in the investigation.

6) The necessary glide ratio while holding at 21,000 feet peaked at about 11:1 on the backside of the pattern (to SKRG runway 01).

7) The necessary glide ratio from the last reported position had increased to 13:1 (due to there relatively steep descent).

8) The RJ85 operates with no fuel (windmilling engines, no APU, no standby generator) by using a battery to power one comm/nav set, standby instruments, and hydraulic power for landing gear extension and braking. The pitch and roll controls are mechanical. The rudder control is possible only if the windmilling on Eng 3 is sufficient and only if the crew isolates the standby generator. Flap, spoilers, air brake: are not powered. Plan on flaps up landing.

9) RJ85 predicted glide ratio is 15:1 flaps up at best glide speed.

10) Normally should only extend gear when landing is assured, as glide ratio drops to 6:1 with gear extended.

11) LMI2933 descended from 21,000 feet presumably under power, with flameout approximately at 15,000.

12) In the descent the airplane was slowed to what appears to be flaps/gear down approach configuration.

13) The estimated glide ratio from the last reported position to the crash site is about 5.7:1 (matching predicted gear down glide ratio of 6:1).

14) LMI2933 appears to have been capable to glide to SKRG runway 01 until the point that the flight crew (apparently) pre-maturely extended flaps and gear.

I have extracted info from a copy of the RJ85 FCOM vol 1. It would help if someone could send me vol 2 and vol 3.

Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick (http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933-lamia-avro-rj85-medellin.html)

lemme

8th Dec 2016, 05:21

The cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder operate on ESS AC power. The flight data acquisition unit operates on ESS DC power.

With all engines off and no APU, the only source of power is battery to EMERG DC/AC.

The recorders would not be operating on battery power, and would not record the information from the point power was lost (flameout).

Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick (http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933-lamia-avro-rj85-medellin.html)

RV8GGRVy

8th Dec 2016, 05:57

Quote from the individual controller at La Guardia working - "Sully" Hudson Splash 1549 in 2011.

"When a pilot says Mayday or declares an emergency, you go from a focused state to a hyper-focused state. You focus in on the emergency and figure out the solution to the problem".

How sad there was no MAYDAY at Medellin, (better) early or (worse) late.

AerocatS2A

8th Dec 2016, 06:59

No, but your comment is the first definitive statement about what services the crew would still have that I've seen here. Given that the aircraft uses engines 1 & 4 for primary generators, and a (engine driven) hydraulic system for the standby generator, and has an APU, I didn't expect to see much on the battery. There's not much in the public domain to confirm what's left.....

No worries. Here's the relevant page from the emergency checklist regarding the "Emergency Power Level" and some glide info.

I think all going well they could have at least crashed on the runway. Of course, all going well they would've stopped for fuel along the way.

MartinM

8th Dec 2016, 07:44

AerocatS2A

8th Dec 2016, 08:02

I told a lie, the DME would be unpowered so that complicates things a little.

MartinM

8th Dec 2016, 08:10

I told a lie, the DME would be unpowered so that complicates things a little.
Yes and no.

They still got the LOC and GS

Gear down at 1nm and 1000ft. LMI2933 lowered gear between FL170 and FL120

sabenaboy

8th Dec 2016, 08:17

I find this additional info recently added on avherald.com (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4a16583c&opt=0) very interesting. It shows that even without payload they would have been approximately 1450 kg short of a legal blocks fuel to perform the flight. I think it's pretty sure that they departed very much above Max TOW. Even with optimistic weights being used, there would have been less fuel in the tanks then the required trip fuel! :uhoh:
Fuel Computations

A dispatcher at a large airline together with input from The Aviation Herald computed various flight plan possibilities with respect to distances and fuel needed according to Bolivia's law. During the accident flight the enroute winds averaged at a headwind component of 4 knots.

In summary it can be said, that flights from Santa Cruz (VVI) to Medellin (MDE) or Bogota (BOG) could not have been planned legally, even if the aircraft was equipped with pannier tanks. Even in optimistic computations the computed trip fuel alone, without any taxi, contingency, diversion or reserve fuel, would have exceeded the standard fuel tank capacity (9362kg).

The dispatcher computed three different flight plans, see in detail at the PDF (http://avherald.com/files/lamia_flightplans.pdf):

Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota with no payload: Trip Fuel 8,660kg, Release Fuel 11,838kg
Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,380kg, Release Fuel 12,461kg
Santa Cruz-Bogota Alternate Medellin optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,260kg, Release Fuel 12,578kg

Fuel Stop Possibilities

Along the route following possibilities were checked with respect of a possible fuel stop (rounded Great Circle distances used for first leg to fuel stop and second leg to Medellin):

- Cobija (Bolivia, SLCO, 500nm+1100nm): operating from sunrise to sunset only, not open anymore at estimated time of arrival
- Tabatinga (Brazil, SBTT, 900nm+700nm): Brazil did not permit flights from Brazil to Colombia for the Bolivia registered operator, in addition the aerodrome and fuel facilities would have been closed after 23:00Z
- Leticia (Colombia, SKLT, 900nm+700nm): The airport would be open 24/7, fuel services however officially only available until 00:30Z, too tight for estimated arrival
- Bogota (Colombia, SKBO, 1500nm+100nm): as seen above not legally possible

Summary: provided an arrangement with the fuel services in Leticia could have been reached, so that refuelling would have been possible after usual service hours, Leticia would have been an ideal fuel stop.

jess15

8th Dec 2016, 10:27

Nothing quite like waiting to see what happens next, is there? Perhaps we shall get an honest report out of all this mess. Who knows for certain?

Let's wait and see, shall we?
Totally agree in principle BUT I guess that in a place like Bolivia, without the extra pressure on the authorities from the media, there might have been less motivation to do a thorough investigation?
When I say "media", I'm referring to the South American press being able to use data from sites such as Flight24, avHerald and yes, even discussion forums such as this, in order to jump on the story and press some difficult questions from the outset.
And whilst the Anglo-speaking media has been abysmal on the basic facts & details, that extra international attention has surely been beneficial in providing extra momentum. ( That's what they are saying in the S. Am. press at any rate and let's face it Bolivia doesn't want to be downgraded again by FAA.)

For example, within 24 hrs those journalists had the info. on the aircraft endurance and within a few days were attempting to analyse it's previous flight history.

Estadão Data has analyzed all the flights of Avro RJ85 since January 31 of this year, date from which there are registrations in the site Flightradar24.com. In those 303 days, the plane left the ground on 201 occasions. In 83% of the cases where the time of the route was recorded by Flightradar24.com (151 times), the trips lasted less than two hours and a half.
Avião que caiu na Colômbia fez outras quatro viagens no limite do combustível | Futebol | Gazeta do Povo (http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/esportes/futebol/aviao-que-caiu-na-colombia-fez-outras-quatro-viagens-no-limite-do-combustivel-7l3pupr358s37v8l2vqeu7wm3)

In the interviews with the surviving owners/shareholders, it was noticeable that in the immediate aftermath, (on the 29th, they hadn't yet appreciated that the cat was out of the bag across various "rumour mills". *
This meant both the surviving owners, employees, even the son of the pilot, were all making initial statements wtte : the aircraft had the endurance to fly that distance direct. (After closing ranks, it moved to - it's all just pilot Quiroga's fault. See final link at end which claims Quiroga actually had no managerial input in the company.)

* A few examples from LaMia employees :

29.11 M. Pacheco (company spokesman) was claiming the aircraft had a "4-5 hour flight range" ! and adds that “ there were devices( dispositivi) to increase the endurance, according to the flight plan” and "The representative, however, pointed out that, depending on the level of the flight, capacity could vary. It depends a lot on the flight levels that the aircraft uses."
Mario Pacheco, portavoz de aerolínea en donde viajaba Chapecoense: nuestros aviones tienen entre 10 y 15 años de fabricación - LA F.m. (http://www.lafm.com.co/chapecoense/mario-pacheco-portavoz-aeronave-donde-viajaba-chapecoense-aviones-tienen-10-15-anos-fabricacion/)
Voo poderia parar e reabastecer mas plano B complicou, diz diretor da Lamia - Tribuna Hoje - O portal de notícias que mais cresce em Alagoas Tribuna Hoje - O portal de notícias que mais cresce em Alagoas (http://www.tribunahoje.com/noticia/197284/esporte/2016/11/30/voo-poderia-parar-e-reabastecer-mas-plano-b-complicou-diz-diretor-da-lamia.html)
30.11.owner Vargas "We have never experienced any incident before and had already made a direct flight from Santa Cruz to Medellin before,"
Lamia, la pequeña aerolínea operada en Bolivia que protagonizó el trágico accidente del club de fútbol Chapecoense cerca de Medellín - BBC Mundo (http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-38151726)

Only FA X.Suarez was upfront, after rescue - she says she had crewed the same aircraft when she worked for SAM and knew what RJ stood for and that with Lamia "the operation of the aircraft was stretched to its limit in an improper manner."

Anyway, after seeing the brief footage of the investigation team's meeting yesterday, am slightly more optimistic that this won't be a totally limited investigation. ( Att.Generals of all three nations met yesterday and their "white-board" with their flow-chart of initial questions was displayed.) At the link below, the points they say they are investigating include
- (under the sub-heading of manslaughter)Ministry of Public Works as well as Aasana, DGAC, M.Quiroga & LaMia.
- "administrative corruption"
- "relationship with ConMebol"

Jornal Nacional - Promotores de Bolívia, Colômbia e Brasil investigam acidente da LaMia (http://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2016/12/promotores-de-bolivia-colombia-e-brasil-investigam-acidente-da-lamia.html)

However, I very much doubt the investigation will go as far as this next Bolivian journalist. Corruscating and depressing. ( He's also currently in exile, in Brazil, due to reporting on Bolivian "irregularities.")
Sol de Pando. Quintana, el padrino de LaMia - eju.tv (http://eju.tv/2016/12/sol-de-pando-quintana-el-padrino-de-lamia/)

A0283

8th Dec 2016, 10:42

Adding to my Update number 3 at #729. Jet goes down on its way to Medellin, Colombia - Page 37 - PPRuNe Forums (http://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=9600625)

I found a second video showing the high ridge more clearly and from a better angle. It shows the horizontal and vertical tail still connected with relatively little deformation, sitting on the top edge of the high ridge. The tailspeedbrake is lying just a few meters away from the tail. This trends to confirm the impact and breakup guesstimate scenario.

In my update 3 - I stated that, based on the indicated seating arrangement, the three players were very lucky. I found an article which stated that at least one of the surviving players had changed seats during the flight with one of the medical staff. Which means the player moved to a seat more aft.

Still no sign of the front of the plane, neither cockpit nor front cabin fuselage, except for the captains main instrument panel plus the captains jacket. But the location where these were found is not clear. It is possible that the nose, cockpit and front are located under the large crown of the big tree that was pushed over. If so, then that would corroborate the guesstimated impact and breakup scenario. If true, then my impression is that the speed at impact was less than what is indicated in most newspaper articles.

ciderman

8th Dec 2016, 11:20

Yes and no.

They still got the LOC and GS

Gear down at 1nm and 1000ft. LMI2933 lowered gear between FL170 and FL120
Apart from all the others that this incompetent individual did that was the final straw. I heard it on the CVR that he had called for gear down but was unsure of when exactly. An experienced First officer might have "forgotten" to hear that.That was his last chance gone. Better a wheels up on the runway than what happened.

MartinM

8th Dec 2016, 11:53

Not sure about the CVR. The communications we are hearing, which leaked, i believe that it is the voice recorder from the ATC and not from the Flight deck. There were 3 persons in cockpit and you don't hear any voices loud and clear from others.

For me, so far, nothing leaked from the plane FDR or CVR. This is all TWR recordings. A pity that liveatc has an outage in SKGR since october.

Asides from this, you are correct. You will notice that on his flight profile, his speed dropped from roughly 200 knots down to 140 knots with a steady sink rate. Continuing the plot, you will realize that he ended exactly where he ended if you don't change something.

But there is a factor.
At the time when the lowered gear, they had the last drop of fuel. A few seconds after this, they don't. There was no more way to raise the gear. As per my knowledge, there is no manual handle to raise a gear.

Unfortunately, not even if we ever get to hear the CVR, we will know why he decided to lower the gear. He was still in decent, around 12nm away from the airport. He confirmed being on localizer but he was not on GS yet. Additionaly I still don't get it why they would need any vectors if previously they confirmed to ATC that they are already descending and on localizer.

And that the pice of ... already left FL210 before the ATC instructed to descend is another bad thing. he took the risk of a collision with the LAN3020 which was flying below him on FL180.

Bad airman ship!

DaveReidUK

8th Dec 2016, 12:20

For me, so far, nothing leaked from the plane FDR or CVR.

Given that the FDR and CVR are being analysed by the UK AAIB, I would be astounded if the contents of either were leaked prior to publication of the investigation report by the Colombians.

Sailvi767

8th Dec 2016, 13:14

The real question here is that the pilot had altitude, speed, wind, pressure, distance to r/w and no power, and lacked the necessary skills to fly the aircraft until a safe landing. Coulda and shoulda made it. Sorry if this sounds harsh.

The real issue is they ran out of fuel because they made a choice to ignore almost every rule involved in flight planning not to mention common sense.

Evanelpus

8th Dec 2016, 13:16

I found a second video showing the high ridge more clearly and from a better angle.

Got a link?

Soave_Pilot

8th Dec 2016, 14:35

This would require 7th freedom rights. Is this likely, considering 6th freedom was not granted?
(I know nothing about the Chicago Convention )

The flight time on that ocasion was actually 4 hours 18 min, my mistake.

portmanteau

8th Dec 2016, 15:46

Martin M, did you check Liveatc's "Interesting Recordings" ?

Hippy

8th Dec 2016, 15:59

However, I very much doubt the investigation will go as far as this next Bolivian journalist. Corruscating and depressing. ( He's also currently in exile, in Brazil, due to reporting on Bolivian "irregularities.")
Sol de Pando. Quintana, el padrino de LaMia - eju.tv (http://eju.tv/2016/12/sol-de-pando-quintana-el-padrino-de-lamia/)
Incredibly in-depth journalism by Wilson Franz García. A bit of a difficult read with Google translate, but well worth the effort .

DaveReidUK

8th Dec 2016, 16:46

Murky stuff indeed.

One thing I don't understand is the reference - in this and other articles - to Quiroga not having had any managerial responsibility at Lamia, when his LinkedIn profile (still viewable) lists him as Chief Pilot since September 2014.

foresight

8th Dec 2016, 17:36

My guess, only a guess, goes something like this:
His previous company ecojet was prevented from getting off the ground by the "government"
He had family and friendship connections with LaMia.
He was reportedly short of money.
They gave him a job flying for LaMia, though he was reportedly uncomfortable with the Venezuelan/chavista origins of the company.
So, give him the job of chief pilot in name only and don't involve him in any company decisions or dodgy dealings.
It's ironic that the same source as that article, eju.tv (http://eju.tv), reports that he hadn't been paid for 8 months.

lemme

8th Dec 2016, 18:31

No worries. Here's the relevant page from the emergency checklist regarding the "Emergency Power Level" and some glide info.

I think all going well they could have at least crashed on the runway. Of course, all going well they would've stopped for fuel along the way.

AerocatS2A - thanks for sharing the procedures - I took the liberty to add them to my post, hope OK, I mentioned the source. Can you advise what speed would be appropriate assuming something like 7,500 kg payload and zero fuel? Did the slow down to what appears to be about 125 KCAS seem about right for landing configuration? If you have the time, please let me know if I have the RJ85 features covered correctly. Thanks!
Peter
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick (http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933-lamia-avro-rj85-medellin.html)

jess15

8th Dec 2016, 19:31

AFAIK Ecojet is still operating.

Re Quiroga salary.
According to his father-in-law Pinto, at least 4 of the crew were not being paid at some point.

“Upon receipt of the proposal to form the company, it teamed with other former military pilots like him, and formed the company.They took out loans in the bank to pay Bisa insurance of the ship and civilians, and all that corresponds in the proceedings, only then could rent the aircraft. He is not guilty as they want to accuse "he added. Eight months ago he and his four associates who formed his crew could not pay their own salaries.
Piloto de LaMia pasaba apuros económicos | Noticias de Bolivia y el Mundo - EL DEBER (http://www.eldeber.com.bo/bolivia/piloto-lamia-pasaba-apuros-economicos.html)

(Don't know if Pinto is believable but the company's financials were accessed by journalists last week. On paper, they had about US $16k.) Anyway if it's true, perhaps it helps add another explanation to this shared denial & risk-taking?

Davidsa

8th Dec 2016, 21:25

AerocatS2A

8th Dec 2016, 21:25

lemme, I only have access to a BAe146-300 speed card and the speeds might be a few knots off compared to an RJ85 for the same weight. That said, it would appear they were far too slow for a glide. Speed for glide is Vfto + 30. Vfto for a 146-300 at 33000 kg is 165 knots, so best glide would have been around about 195 knots. That is with gear down or up, the only thing that would change that speed is flap selection and they wouldn't have been able to do that (unless possibly they already had Flap 18 in the hold).

For the glide, once you get the gear down, if you are unable to select flap, then you increase speed to maintain the 1NM / 1000' gear down glide profile. In other words that 1/1 profile is an easily remembered target that is achievable with the gear down rather than the best the aircraft can do.

lemme

8th Dec 2016, 22:56

Map Shift?

The ADS-B data coupled with the nature of the actions taken in the final descent and the location of the crash site have brought out a puzzling issue. The ADS-B position while LMI2933 was holding at RNG VOR/DME are displaced about 10 nm south of the VOR itself. Either the ADS-B IRS position has drifted exceptionally, or is it possible the moving map shifted because of a bad navaid update?

The use of inertial data introduces drift. Normally, aircraft navigation systems account for drift by applying radio-nav updates to null out any accrued errors. I have no expertise with the RJ85 flight management or navigation system, so I can only guess what might have happened based on general experience (and happy to receive any suggestions or corrections).

When a moving map is provided, a navigation data base presents the fixed features, and the IRS provides the position and heading source.

IRS drift can be measured by comparing radio navigation aids to reveal any offset. Inherent in this calculation is the navigation data base that stores the location of the navaid.

The favored update is to take intersecting DME measurements from two VOR/DME. In the event only one navaid is available, a VOR/DME measurement may suffice.

A map shift is when the map moves suddenly to reflect a radio navaid update. Normally a map shift takes out the error, but in this case the question was it putting in an error.

If the DME or nav data base readings were in error on LMI2933, where LMI thought the navaid was in a different place displaced south by about 10 nm, then the flight crew might be confused and follow the map guidance without picking the error (by using DME 1 or DME 2 raw readouts, or looking at the VOR DBI when crossing over and turning outbound).

The flight crew had power when they started their emergency descent and were probably thinking they will make it.

The flight crew were diving for 10,000 feet by the final approach point (FAP), just 0.63 nm north of the VOR. They were setting up for capturing the 3 degree glide slope at the FAP.

If there was no map shift, and the moving map was correct, we have no answer for the decision to operate to the south.

LMI2933 powered rate of descent and configuration would be without regard to the issue of flameout.

If the flight crew knew where they were (assuming ADS-B reports are correct), then they still had 5,000 feet to the FAP in about 10 nm (or about 1,000 fpm).

If they thought they were operating north of where the ADS-B reports portray, because of a bad navaid map shift, then they might have thought they need to lose 5,000 feet to the FAP in just a couple of nm (or about 5,000 fpm).

The last report showed their rate of descent at around 2,500 fpm (prior to flameout). That suggests a map shift may have disrupted situational awareness and that they were thinking that they were much too high for the approach.

The extended glide slope would have been at about 13,000 feet 20 nm out, and 16,000 30 nm out. LMI2933 would have been above the glide slope before the engine flameout, yielding no useful information beforehand.

Note that DME is lost on EMERG AC/DC power, and if the crew looked at the VOR once power was lost (from the moving map), it would have shown the same radial in either case.

The ADS-B data itself is more consistent with a 2 nm error in reported position (noting that the ADS-B data source probably does not reflect radio navaid updates), which suggests a gross error in technical performance to the holding pattern. A map shift is one explanation. This is a quandary that will be cleared up with the official report.

lemme

8th Dec 2016, 23:10

MotoMendez

8th Dec 2016, 23:29

Oh and the Government has grounded TAM, the military airline .....
Hi all. Just a bit of clarification on the above. I'm sat in La Paz watching the evening news as I type. The Minister of Public Works wrote to AASANA today requiring that TAM suspend commercial civilian flights for failing to meet ICAO operational safety requirements. This is what is also being currently reported online. However, while there were some cancellations earlier, TAM are very much still operating this evening. TV is showing both a copy of the letter to AASANA and live footage from one of the Santa Cruz airports.

jess15

8th Dec 2016, 23:40

There is an article on Celia in the current "El Deber" which includes her statement giving her side of the story and explaining her presence in Brazil. She says she has been under pressure to alter her original report.

The statement shows as a jpg file and needs magnifying to make it legible. It confirms what is already know rather than add much that is new.

Castedo: "Me ordenaron modificar el informe" | Noticias de Bolivia y el Mundo - EL DEBER (http://www.eldeber.com.bo/santacruz/castedo-me-ordenaron-modificar-informe.html)

Oh and the Government has grounded TAM, the military airline .....

It's good that she is getting her account out there. She's been given temporary asylum for a year, until Brazil can legally assess her application, apparently. (Chapo fans hacked Asaana's website the other day but perhaps their target is too low?) Anyway it appears she will be giving investigators her statement in Brazil and there are hints of some support from Brazilian authorities. BTW she says she wrote her FP objections report before the crash, not afterwards as some have posted.

Yes, the investigation seems to be finally gearing up, as the Bolivian opposition parties have said it was far too slow, they've only just sealed LaMia's office and owner Rocha has done a bunk, but they appear to have tracked him down in Colombia.
Headlines from just one of the nationals:
-Lamia manager ex-General Vargas has been formally charged with Culpable Homicide and other charges, currently in jail on remand.
-His son has been arrested. DGAC offices raided. ( Guess they've been busy shredding since the 29th Nov! )
-DGAC and Asaana lawyers contesting who is responsible for authorising flights and one of the Att Generals has relayed his exasperation at not being able to establish this basic principle.
-Attorney General Brazil has begun to look at Lamia flight authorisations over Brazil and LaMia's links to football clubs.
-Some investigations started of "technical staff at Santa Cruz VV.
- TAM confusion , as posted upthread. ( Headless chickens, an FAA downgrade in mind?)
- Journalists starting to uncover the sub & contractor links between LaMia and Star - the go-between for the Lamia quotes to football clubs.

Re the 2 non-operational Lamia planes stored at the hanger:
After an inspection in the hangar of the Bolivian Air Force (FAB) in Cochabamba, a departmental committee of prosecutors ordered the sealing of the two aircraft company Lamia, for research purposes and possibly so they can be used in payment of compensation The anti-corruption prosecutor, Jaqueline Ponce explained that these aircraft are available to the Public Ministry. They are sequestered as they are related to a crime, are proceeds of crime and it will also serve to pay damages ," Ponce said.

Considering that we've been told over and over, that LaMia only leased these from the notorious Albacete, not sure how they can propose that?
Fiscalía secuestra los dos aviones de LaMia en Cochabamba | Los Tiempos (http://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/economia/20161207/fiscalia-secuestra-dos-aviones-lamia-cochabamba)

MotoMendez

9th Dec 2016, 00:51

More info on the TAM (non) suspension, again from Bolivian TV news this evening. There is a turf war on between the military and civilian authorities. TAM have said that only the head of the armed forces or Minister of Defence have the authority to suspend their civil passenger services. Ergo, we currently have the situation of a Bolivian operator still able to run scheduled commercial passenger flights, beyond the reach of the country's civil aviation authorities, despite government criticism for failing to meet ICAO safety standards. Hopefully this will cast some light for those not so familiar with Bolivia on the culture and industry background against which LaMía were able to operate.

Hippy

9th Dec 2016, 02:10

Wow, just wow. For once PPRuNe is spreading the news, rather than just writing it.
This thing is massive and has more layers than a French pastry.
Keep up the good work guys, great journalism and forum inputs coming from South America right now. (your Northern counterparts could learn a lot)

Hippy

9th Dec 2016, 02:27

About the descent from the hold speculation -
SKRG 290300Z VRB02KT 9999 -DZ BKN015 SCT080 17/16 A3025
Might they have been diving below that layer at 8000agl (FL150), knowing they had lost, or were soon to loose, nav instruments and hoping to get visual?
I'm not a fan of speculation, but I'll put that up there as a counter to all the ADSB drift cruft.
The investigation will answer the questions about what happened during that fateful flight. I'm more interested in keeping the conversation directed toward revealing the murky truth surrounding the preceding years that lead up to it.

thcrozier

9th Dec 2016, 02:54

On paper, they had about US $16k [$16,000 United States Dollars]. Anyway if it's true, perhaps it helps add another explanation to this shared denial & risk-taking?

Does anyone here know any of the following?:

1) How much would it cost to refuel this aircraft, assuming virtually empty tanks, in that region?

2) Had LaMia been put on C.O.D. (Cash On Delivery) by its vendors and suppliers?

3) Did LaMia have any credit facilities or were they traveling with cash to pay for fuel?

4) What would be the landing fees and related costs to land in Medellin, and for a fuel stop in Bogota or some other airport?

DaveReidUK

9th Dec 2016, 07:05

If the flight crew knew where they were (assuming ADS-B reports are correct), then they still had 5,000 feet to the FAP in about 10 nm (or about 1,000 fpm).

The fact that the ADS-B data being sent was subject to inertial drift doesn't necessarily imply that the crew didn't know exactly where they were. I haven't seen any suggestion that while they were flying the hold, prior to it all going quiet, they didn't have a working VOR/DME. (Well OK, the RNG DME could theoretically have been sending duff data, but Occam's Razor applies here).

It's analogous to an observer using ADS-B to monitor the height of an aircraft on approach, forgetting that it's displaying QNE whereas the crew will be seeing QNH-adjusted height on their altimeter.

ADS-B tells its own version of the truth.

learner001

9th Dec 2016, 07:49

Over the years I observed pilots ignoring / not noticing / even not believing, very accurate 'raw data', favouring 'more comfortably feeling', but (due falsely corrected or not corrected drift, shift etc.) very inaccurate, sophisticated (situational enhancing, moving map type, etc.) data.

When I questioned this, the answer was: "Too much work and NOWADAYS errors are USUALLY negligible..."

'Attitude' / Airmanship ?

Never give up on your 'basics', no matter what you fly!

jess15

9th Dec 2016, 11:57

Found one source linked to what I've been looking for:
One claim, that supports the allegation that Albacete (Venezuelan fugitive in Spain) may still own the LaMia planes, received income from the charters.

8th Dec . Wife of dead LaMia FA- David Vacaflores - reveals some of what she knows to a journalist and she says, wtte - although Albacete's version is that he isn't linked to LaMia Bolivia, she's saying he doesn't know meaning of truth, he needs to come and face the music, the suffering of the bereaved.

“The ownership structure of Lamia is a mystery. In an interview with the newspaper El Confidencial in Spain , Albacete said that was not part of the company, only he rented their planes in Bolivia. But Pamela Justiniano, widow of the head of the crashed aircraft cabin, David Vacaflores, told Univision that this version is false. "Mr. Ricardo is also a partner of the company, it will not be rented planes '' she said.
According to several sources consulted in Bolivia, Vargas negotiating with those who wanted to hire Lamia's services. Albacete received into bank account payment for these services.

At the insistence that in Spain the businessman said a different version, Justiniano shot back: "Truth what a shame with him, did not do shame of not being able to add value and come to face and know all the suffering that we are having now?"
The widow of the head of the ill-fated airplane cabin, Pamela Justiniano said that, in the regular operation of the company, Albacete received payment for the income of flights and then the money was distributed to employees.
"What I know, he also received the payments, he also deposited it to the accounts payments teams.

El turbio pasado de LaMia: la aerolínea a la que los futbolistas confiaban sus vidas - Univision (http://www.univision.com/noticias/accidente-aereo/el-turbio-pasado-de-lamia-la-aerolinea-a-la-que-los-futbolistas-confiaban-su-vida)

Also here's a basic diagram charting 8 flights CP2933 made between Aug – Nov 2016. (Nothing new, just based on FRadar24 data.)
Antes de estrellarse, el avión de LaMia forzó la reserva de combustible en otros ocho vuelos - Univision (http://www.univision.com/noticias/accidente-aereo/antes-de-estrellarse-el-avion-de-lamia-forzo-la-reserva-de-combustible-en-otros-ocho-vuelos)

lemme

9th Dec 2016, 14:54

The fact that the ADS-B data being sent was subject to inertial drift doesn't necessarily imply that the crew didn't know exactly where they were. I haven't seen any suggestion that while they were flying the hold, prior to it all going quiet, they didn't have a working VOR/DME. (Well OK, the RNG DME could theoretically have been sending duff data, but Occam's Razor applies here).

It's analogous to an observer using ADS-B to monitor the height of an aircraft on approach, forgetting that it's displaying QNE whereas the crew will be seeing QNH-adjusted height on their altimeter.

ADS-B tells its own version of the truth.
Hi DaveReidUK,

I apologize for my wording. I assume the pilots were talking stock in the moving map as their source of position. My concern is whether the map may have shifted, putting the map position about 10nm north of the actual position. This would explain the decision to descend so rapidly and early landing configuration.

I think the ADS-B data is accurate to a couple of nm. I have looked at four flights on this airplane and can confirm its performance. It was disappointing that the IRS was not aligned at takeoff, with a 2000 meter offset evident.

Of course there is more information available to the investigation that should end any speculation. I have no other insight other than an apparent map shift to explain all the data we have released.

MartinM

9th Dec 2016, 15:54

Martin M, did you check Liveatc's "Interesting Recordings" ?
Yes. Thats not the CVR, but the TWR Frequency. And it is not full length. You cannot hear the complete ATC of the day or after ...

portmanteau

9th Dec 2016, 16:53

Yes definitely not CVR, this is LiveATC remember...
You mention TWR frequency,(the recording does not indicate the frequency unless you have found it somewhere) but this controller is dealing with Approach Control procedures involving several aircraft including LaMia. Not normally handled by Tower controllers but can be at non-busy airports. ( But no radar control going on here as I have mentioned before which if true is a little odd. There are several radars covering the Medellin Terminal Area).

lemme

9th Dec 2016, 17:30

For those wondering about the Cockpit Voice Recorder stopping when the airplane reverted to EMERG AC/DC power. There is a mandate for a 10 minute Remote Independent Power Supply (RIPS) for the CVR that applies here in the US to newly manufactured airplanes starting in 2010. I doubt that CP2933 was modified voluntarily to add this feature.

The flight data recorder relies on a cascade of sensors that are not reliable under EMERG AC/DC power, along with the drain to power the acquisition unit and the data recorder. Keeping in mind that the battery is needed for the continued safe operation, data recording takes too much current.

FYI, there is an ICAO GADSS initiative that in 2021 mandates an autonomous tracking system that will operate on its own power, but the jury is out whether ELT or ADS-B will be used for compliance. I am hopeful ADS-B, but it will take work to make it self-sufficient.

A0283

9th Dec 2016, 19:37

Update 5 - Impact and breakup sequence

@Evanelpus -Got a link?

I caught your question when catching up on reading the posts. Do not have the link immediately available I am afraid.

I have seen 2 videos made when circling the southern and northern side of the crashsite.

The first video, available early on, was shown on a website which showed a tv show named "JG". On this low quality video the horizontal and vertical tail are shown white. Which made it look like a wing or piece of tail.

The second video was from a spanish/portuguese language website and dated I think from december 1st (I found it december 7th). This video clearly shows the horizontal and vertical tail and the colored lines livery. The leading edge of the vertical tail is pointing down. The horizontal tail is still connected.

One of the photos that I found earlier, viewpoint from below, clearly shows the tailspeedbrake folded. Part of the horizontal tail (left hand half) is clearly visible higher up and behind it.

What is striking is that there is as far as I know no trace of the cockpit section and forward fuselage section. My impression is that it is more probable that these can be found near the main wreckage. But it is not impossible that it could be found on the initial impact side. All POB have of course been accounted for. So people on location and the investigation will know.

What strikes me too is that both recorders have been found in the first days, but no mentioned has been made of their contents at all. You hope of course that they were both switched ON and operating. What you would have expected is a general statement that confirmed that the plane ran out of fuel.

Based on the publicly available information you also begin to wonder if the crew had issued a warning to crew and passengers at some stage. The available witness testimony appears to suggest that POB were very surprised when the lights went out. Hence their reaction. You almost get a 'cognitive dissonance at play' feeling of how the cockpit crew would have perceived possible low fuel warnings. You would need both CVR and FDR information to substantiate that. But if found true it will become one of the most exceptional examples of CD.

DaveReidUK

9th Dec 2016, 21:16

What strikes me too is that both recorders have been found in the first days, but no mentioned has been made of their contents at all.

I don't see why that should come as a surprise - see my previous post on the protocol of accident investigation.

The Colombians have sent the FDR and CVR to the UK AAIB at Farnborough for analysis (which is probably where they still are). The AAIB will not under any circumstances announce their findings publicly as that would be a breach of the convention that the country responsible for the investigation under Annex 13 should be the sole source of published information.

How and when the Colombians do that remains to be seen.

unworry

9th Dec 2016, 22:26

At least eight flights made by the aircraft Lamia Airline prior to the incident in which players Chapecoense crew died, violated aviation regulations relating to weight and jet fuel, as is apparent from a table of itineraries obtained by Univision Investiga and analyzed by experts.

It was only a matter of time ...

http://i.imgur.com/3zYKjmk.png

http://i.imgur.com/hVIhEAt.pngg

DaveReidUK

9th Dec 2016, 23:04

The autonomy of Avro RJ85 flight
It is about 4 hours and 22 minutes

At least eight flights made by the aircraft Lamia Airline prior to the incident in which players Chapecoense crew died, violated aviation regulations relating to weight and jet fuel, as is apparent from a table of itineraries obtained by Univision Investiga and analyzed by experts. You (and the "experts") might want to spend a little time studying the tradeoff of payload vs range for the RJ85 (or indeed for any aircraft):

28 Oct. Cochabamba-Medellin. Traveling empty.The 28 October flight, for example (2800km/1510nm), is well within the capability af an RJ85 with zero payload, as were the other 3 positioning flights quoted. :ugh:

Obviously the revenue flights weren't, but that's another story.

A0283

9th Dec 2016, 23:22

@DaveReidUKI don't see why that should come as a surprise - see my previous post on the protocol of accident investigation.

Dave I am quite familiar with the protocol of a SAFETY investigation and agree with you 100% on the UK AAIB role. AAIB shall stay silent both from a safety and from a criminal investigation point of view. The fact that we have a UK manufacturer here makes that requirement even more strict.

So what I am talking about is the way in which this multinational mixed investigation is running.

What happens here is that the investigation till now is a confusing mix of criminal and safety investigation. We have seen in for example the Lubitz case that a (French) criminal prosecutor operates under different rules. And also that that investigation was neither a showcase for clear separation between criminal and safety investigation.

In the LaMia case a number of people have been arrested and interrogated before safety investigators have had any chance (as far as we know) to interview them. And others probably have a warrant out for them. Which can be seriously 'damaging the cause of safety' from a purely safety investigation point of view.

If this investigation would predominantly be a criminal investigation, then it is surprising that a number of government and public officials have their verdict out before presenting any facts. Innocent until proven quilty and such. Surprising even if we assume that in a number of cases part of their 'message' will be 'lost in translation'.

In both criminal and safety investigation cases there are means and protocols in place that allow investigators to initiate and publish 'early' recommendations and actions.

In this case there appear to be a number of issues ... the 4h22/4h22, and the fact that flight release authority is not clear, ... that might not need to have to wait for publication of 'suggestions' in tandem with the first preliminary 30 days report.

Still striking.

unworry

9th Dec 2016, 23:28

A0283

9th Dec 2016, 23:40

@lemme - have you already reached a stage where you have an estimated speed just before impact ?

AerocatS2A

10th Dec 2016, 02:18

@Dave, you are of course correct, but the infographic is an interesting representation of recent flight history benchmarked against the duration of the final flight.

Would anyone care to elaborate on the range empty?

Performance manual only has distances up to 1800 NM, which at ISA, landing weight of 30,000 kg (lower weights not provided), and cruise at FL350, would use 8290 kg. About a 1000 kg reserve available, but subtract 350 kg or so for start, taxi, approach, and landing.

To put it another way, a fuel plan for a 1650 NM flight empty would look something like this:

Start/taxi: 150 kg
Burn: 7590 kg
Approach: 143 kg
Total required: 7883 kg

Margin available for reserves = 1477 kg

You wouldn't run out of fuel but I don't think that is enough margin for a typical alternate + reserves.

lemme

10th Dec 2016, 04:23

@lemme - have you already reached a stage where you have an estimated speed just before impact ?
There is no way to know as the transponder reports stopped nearly 8,000 above the crash site. I would assume the speed of about 125 KCAS would have been maintained.

If it had been flaps up gear down, the airplane would have been flying more like 195 KCAS. Just for reference, as it appears they were flaps&gear down.

Correcting for 7,000 feet altitude, that is 140/215 KTAS.

Vertical speed flaps up gear down would be about 3,500 fpm.

Assuming the same for flaps down, for I have no other data, it would be about 2,400 fpm.

There was a slight headwind which would reduce the ground speed.

DaveReidUK

10th Dec 2016, 06:31

Would anyone care to elaborate on the range empty?

http://www.avgen.com/RJ85%20payload-range.jpg
Source: BAE SYSTEMS 2004

The solid line applies as the LAMIA aircraft didn't have pannier tanks, so range for a positioning flight with zero payload and JAR reserves is roughly 1700 nm.

ATC Watcher

10th Dec 2016, 08:01

A0283 : the investigation till now is a confusing mix of criminal and safety investigation.
This is unfortunately the trend those last years , while in France (the example you quoted) there is and always was a technical safety investigation ( the BEA) and in parallel a so called " administrative" investigation one done by the Judiciary ( usually a special branch of the gendarme/police ) what is new is prosecutors wanted to make a name for themselves jumping to the media hours after an accident divulging information from the Safety investigation and pointing at " culprits " to blame. .

This new tendency is going absolutely against Safety , as it encourages people to refrain from talking freely to Safety investigators

last bit , you said : the 4h22/4h22, and the fact that flight release authority is not clear
Yes it clear in any " normal " AIP : an ARO cannot refuse to transmit a PLN to ATC ansd SAR ( because it is all she does here ) because of values put on the Endurance and Flight time boxes if the Pilot in Command ( or his delegated idividual ) insist on them . Which appears to be the case here.

AerocatS2A

10th Dec 2016, 08:49

Is the range / payload chart for a FL 310, 330 or 350 capable aircraft?
Difference between FL310 and FL350 over 1800 NM at 30,000 kg landing weight is only 140 kg.

Heathrow Harry

10th Dec 2016, 09:30

You can argue about payload etc etc but that chart of recent flights clearly shows he was constantly pushing the limits - you get away with it for a while but eventually ..................

portmanteau

10th Dec 2016, 10:01

Were any of LaMia's other flights captained by someone other than Quiroga or was he the sole perpetrator of this tragic scam?
Flight Plans are submitted so that ATC can extract the information they require for ATC purposes. They are not required to be checked for accuracy of every entry though gross errors such as this one would, as we have seen, be picked up. And just suppose that was passed to the Tower and they refused to give start clearance, Quiroga would simply have said sorry thats an error, it should have read 0530, please change it and away they go.

ATC Watcher

10th Dec 2016, 10:31

portmanteau : Endurance and EET are not extracted/ passed on to ATC . They are only there for SAR and Alerfa purposes .

Lancelot de boyles

10th Dec 2016, 12:04

I'm curious because the Avianca pilot related that the LAM pilot kept saying "I can't remember the f*cking code!"

I have a small nagging thought about this- why would you need to remember the code, unless you don't have the relevant charts to hand? Where did this piece of info originate?

jess15

10th Dec 2016, 12:35

Were any of LaMia's other flights captained by someone other than Quiroga or was he the sole perpetrator of this tragic scam?
......snipped.

Yes to the first question. Apparently not, to your last.

Quiroga was keen on marketing through social media. So you can still access his FB profile and superficially"cross check" flights (as well as the riskiest flights) they made against his FB photo record of who is crewing.
Quiroga is most frequently photo'd as the captain (& self-described there as Chief Pilot. Rocha annotated as Chief of Operations.)
Rocha ( owner 2, still in Paraguay,) is very occasionally, the captain, more often co-piloting. Ex-General Vargas also in his uniform co-piloting some of the flights, Co Pilot Encina is there too.

Incidentally, photos also seem to show that Quiroga brought along his child (teen son) for the previous Chapo game ( Cobija flight to Barranquilla for Copa Sudamericana Oct 18 flight.) Also photographed - his Ipad clearly propped on flight deck tracking routes etc. Quiroga also photographed his pilots licence, ratings, the company's licence, trips to Vigo in Spain (where Albacete lives) , flights to Sierra Leone etc etc.

Anyway, more important than his photo albums, would like to know how they managed to pay for their insurance, maybe there's another backer?
(ie. Last week, company records said LaMia had only US$16k, on paper, at time of the disaster. It has since been clarified that they did have valid insurance, although only to $25 m.)
Every report just generates more questions- hard to entangle amongst all the political infighting within the Govt.

In other MSM news: Brazilian Att General also reported that they managed to get the charters for 25 football teams between Aug & Nov 2016. (It's no wonder that, the morning after the crash, Vargas Snr, described the company's growth as "booming".)
Quiroga F-in-law ( the ex senator in exile) , claims he has documents to show the Lamia planes' leases were due to end on 31 Dec 2016 and that the company was already in negotiations to lease a fleet of five 757 from Brazilian & Spanish companies.

deefer dog

10th Dec 2016, 12:58

I also wondered what this could have meant. Perhaps someone familiar with the language could confirm whether a VOR or LOC frequency would be referred to as a "code?"

DaveReidUK

10th Dec 2016, 13:24

As I understand the story so far, the aircraft operated at FL 280 and 290 on this flight.

There is a couple of hours of cruise flight missing from the ADS-B trace (because of lack of receiver coverage).

Immediately before that segment, the aircraft was climbing through FL300.

aterpster

10th Dec 2016, 13:34

Lancelot de boyles:
I have a small nagging thought about this- why would you need to remember the code, unless you don't have the relevant charts to hand? Where did this piece of info originate?

If the required instrument flight procedure charts were or were not on board, I would trust that would be discovered in the human-factors investigator's inventory at the crash site, since there was no fire.

Trav a la

10th Dec 2016, 13:52

Would Celia have had any involvement in the previous eight questionable flights?

jess15

10th Dec 2016, 14:17

Celia Castedo only worked in the Asaana office at Santa Cruz, at VV airport

In the chart I posted yesterday you can see which flights operated out of that airport:

Also here's a basic diagram charting 8 flights CP2933 made between Aug – Nov 2016. (Nothing new, just based on FRadar24 data.)
Antes de estrellarse, el avión de LaMia forzó la reserva de combustible en otros ocho vuelos - Univision (http://www.univision.com/noticias/accidente-aereo/antes-de-estrellarse-el-avion-de-lamia-forzo-la-reserva-de-combustible-en-otros-ocho-vuelos)

Presumably the Colombian Att General's team is looking at flights/flight plans outward from Medellin etc. ( No comment made by them on that AFAIK)
OTOH His Brazilian equivalent has said he is looking at all Brazilian flight plans authorised via their national offices.

Other
Lamia lease financials released - apparently US$ 35k a month to lessor. ( Compare this figure to the earlier posts I made re. a supposed (unconfirmed) plan to dry lease five 757 as of next month and what's been released about the company's assets, on paper. )

Loose rivets

10th Dec 2016, 14:30

Could the code simply be Ident? Though I can't see him getting so worked up about that.

marie paire

10th Dec 2016, 14:35

Portuguese Diário de Notícias is reporting that Celia Castelo has been indicted by the Public ProsecutorGomer Padilla (Colômbia - Ministério Público da Colômbia acusa técnica que alertou para pouco combustível (http://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/ministerio-publico-da-colombia-acusa-tecnica-que-alertou-para-pouco-combustivel-5544654.html)).

portmanteau

10th Dec 2016, 15:04

ATCWatcher, have to correct you. Unless things have changed radically since my day, the ATC FPL is seen in its entirety by the departure aerodrome ATC who, as the form tells them, are not required to send the supplementary information to other ATC units along the route. However they are required to pass it to other ATC units if asked for it in the event of an incident/accident anywhere along the route involving SAR and its Incerfa/Alerfa/Detresfa phases. Hence the need for the dep ATC to have the supp info to hand for as long as necessary.

grizzled

10th Dec 2016, 19:00

portmanteau,

With respect, I have to correct your correction of ATCwatcher...

In most cases (internationally speaking) the full FP is not seen by the ATC unit at departure -- unless the FP was filed directly with that unit. If the FP was filed through AIS or a Flight Plan office, then the ATC at the departure aerodrome do not routinely get sent the entire FP. They of course might see it, if they had reason to ask for it.

testpanel

10th Dec 2016, 20:12

https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/world/colombia-plane-crash-murder-according-bolivian-minister

Airbubba

10th Dec 2016, 20:20

There is a couple of hours of cruise flight missing from the ADS-B trace (because of lack of receiver coverage).

Immediately before that segment, the aircraft was climbing through FL300.

Also, looks to me like the flight was level at FL300 for a while when it came back into receiver coverage approaching MDE, about 0217Z to 0233Z, before starting down in this FR24 data:

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/cp-2933/#bbef1b9

thcrozier

10th Dec 2016, 21:16

@jess15:

Do you have a link to any of LaMia's financial reports?

Yankee Whisky

10th Dec 2016, 21:37

Also, looks to me like the flight was level at FL300 for a while when it came back into receiver coverage approaching MDE, about 0217Z to 0233Z, before starting down in this FR24 data:

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/cp-2933/#bbef1b9
Service Ceiling 9.449 (10.668) m31.000 (35.000) ftRange2.908 (2.963) km1.570 (1.600) NM
1.807 (1.841) mi.

Great circle distance 2975 km !!! The specs show they're, in theory, 12 km short and that looks like about what happened !

TylerMonkey

10th Dec 2016, 22:18

Remember also they were in holding pattern 10 mins ?
So they flew farther than 2,975.

jess15

10th Dec 2016, 23:48

@jess15:

Do you have a link to any of LaMia's financial reports?

No, I've only reported what's been in the press, it's just scraps of info. eg. Lamia's total of $16K was reported by Minister Claros, in a previously posted link.

The reported US$35k per month for the LaMia CP2933 is from here:
Albacete cobraba un alquiler de $us 35 mil por la única aeronave con licencia de LaMia | ANF - Agencia de Noticias Fides (http://noticiasfides.com/economia/herbas-revela-que-albacete-cobraba-un-alquiler-de-us-35-mil-por-la-unica-aeronave-con-licencia-373109)

Then I compared it to 2016 leasing prices for Avro RJ85, for example:
New RJs Cause Incumbent Types to Fall - Aircraft Value News (http://www.aircraftvaluenews.com/new-rjs-cause-incumbent-types-to-fall/)
but I'm not qualified to make any inferences from that, that's for some of your members to make. Is 35K a month a significantly cheaper deal in S. American context?

don't have any real financial info - just more scraps:
""A flight in other airlines costs between $ 150,000 and $ 200,000," he said. "LaMia's ranged between $ 80,000 and $ 100,000," he added"
Procurador diz que 25 times usaram Lamia desde agosto e cita 7 brasileiros - Futebol - UOL Esporte (http://esporte.uol.com.br/futebol/ultimas-noticias/2016/12/09/procurador-diz-que-25-times-usaram-lamia-desde-agosto-e-cita-7-brasileiros.htm)

on the alleged plan to lease the five 757 - source is either fibbing or maybe they really did have a wealthy backer? ( Paraguayan CP Encina's wife said previously, he was there as there was plan to make him a future LaMia rep in Paraguay so perhaps they had big plans.)
Pinto defiende la legalidad de línea aérea que se accidentó (http://www.opinion.com.bo/opinion/articulos/2016/1209/noticias.php?id=206608)

What FAB say that they are owed by Lamia - US$ 48k
Dois aviões da LaMia são confiscados pela Bolívia, diz jornal | Mundo | G1 (http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/dois-avioes-da-lamia-sao-confiscados-pela-bolivia-diz-jornal.ghtml)

confirmation of LaMia's insurance, apparently:
Gobierno dice que el seguro es suficiente | Noticias de Bolivia y el Mundo - EL DEBER (http://www.eldeber.com.bo/bolivia/gobierno-dice-seguro-suficiente.html)

and here, Vargas Snr (now in "preventative custody",) seems to say it would have cost them $6k to re-fuel.
Accidente del Chapecoense: el dueño de la compañía cuestionó el accionar de su socio fallecido (http://www.clarin.com/deportes/futbol-internacional/Accidente-Chapecoense-cuestiono-accionar-fallecido_0_1697230327.html)

Bigger news was that another journalist is asking how LaMia could operate the 11th Nov flight with the Argentine team. Belo Horizonte, Brazil to Buenos Aries ( it's on the chart on previous page) when they do not have the bilateral agreements either, Brazil's ANAC now under fire for corruption too:
"This company should not be allowed to fly from Argentina to Brazil. Not part of what is known as the "Seventh Freedom" Chicago Convention …...there should be bilateral agreements, which in this case do not exist. As researched, at the time of application for authorization for this flight plan, the official who was in charge ANAC in Ezeiza is called Gregorio Borda and his boss is the General Manager of the ANAC, Juan Pedro Iirigoin. ANAC under the Ministry of Transport of the Nation, headed by William Dietrich. The pilot in that journey was the M Quiroga....."
El vuelo de la selección argentina a Brasil está bajo sospecha de corrupción - Huarpe (http://www.diariohuarpe.com/actualidad/nacionales/el-vuelo-de-la-seleccion-argentina-a-brasil-esta-bajo-sospecha-de-corrupcion/)
ANAC's response to journalist's query is in Portugese, maybe there's a Brazilian FM who can translate it?
Anyway link^ explains the connection between the company "Star" and how Lamia tendered for the flights (2 simultaneous bids) and the trail that leads to the Football. Asscn. and on and up, presumably.

ATC Watcher

11th Dec 2016, 10:43

Portmanteau : the ATC FPL is seen in its entirety by the departure aerodrome ATC
No, grizzled already replied , but let me explain , also for others here, how a flight plan is distributed .
First Every State has its own variation of the form itself .Only the fields 1 to 19 are ICAO standard, the rest is not. The box " accepted by" we see on the Bolivian photocopy of this flight is a local Bolivian addition.
If you take a European one ( I have the German DFS form in front of me ) it just says " Signature of pilot or representative , and another box beside it : Signature AIS ( who has received it ) period,
Second : the boxes Endurance, POB, RMK, Emergency radios and dinghies, color a/c name PIC etc, are all part of the Field 19 labelled : Additional information " this box is only for SAR purposes and is not transmitted to ATC .

Now that said , transmission to the first ATC unit ( generally the TWR or the departure airport if departing from a Controlled aerodrome, otherwise the ACC above it ) is as follow :. They will only receive fields 7 to 16 ( ending with Destination aerodrome) .
Field 17 ( Total EET and Alternate aerodromes )are of no interest to the Departing unit and Field 18 (Other info) is normally not processed unless it contains pertinent info for ATC ( example > if ZZZZ set as destination if going to a airport which does not have an ICAO designator , then it will say : DEST/ and name in plain language , that may be transmitted , but not always .
This is the reason why in case of problems the first things a controller will ask you is how many souls on board , eventual endurance, or alternate A/D.
because he/she does not have the info ( he could get it of course by making a phone call but it will take time )

So in short : Unless Bolivia as a State has a specific procedure elevating the responsibilities of an ARO to refuse a PLN , and therefore a flight to depart , under normal ICAO standards, there is no way miss Celia had the authority to do so, not did the first TWR controllers since they did not have the " wrong fuel" info ( only the lack of SID would/may have been queered.)

Finally a Flight plan, by definition is only is only that : a plan , it is not a set in Stone Document once airborne. It can be modified in Flight no problem . Change destination , route, land in between , whatever. Even by ATC : think for instance a Military exercise area being prolonged forcing a change in routing, Capping flight to a lower altitude affecting range and therefore destination , etc...I have done this many times , and you've seen it too especially in your days

So using a Flight plan to explain this accident or worse we see blame people for it is for me absolutely ludicrous.

Sorry for long post , raining and cold outside..:E

andrasz

12th Dec 2016, 01:59

Is 35K a month a significantly cheaper deal in S. American context?

A lessor tried really hard 10 years ago to lease to us three good condition sister ship RJ85s for $60k per month. Did the math, with the maintenance overheads on the four hairdryers we reckoned that they would need to go down to $25k a month to match the econmics of a comparable twin for $80k a month (they stopped at $40k which says a lot...). I don't think the RJ economics would have improved much with all the third gen twins coming to the secondhand market, $35k / month does sound like a negotiated if a tad expensive market rate.

AerocatS2A

12th Dec 2016, 04:59

That depends on whether you look at LRC, Intermediate or the other one (I know the tables only have the 30,000 kg LW).

As I understand the story so far, the aircraft operated at FL 280 and 290 on this flight.
The question was regarding max range, so I looked at LRC.

H Peacock

12th Dec 2016, 11:50

The question was regarding max range, so I looked at LRC.

LRC parameters are usually, by definition, not the best way to get maximum range. The LRC data invariably has a bias to slightly increase IAS by a corresponding small reduction in range. ie, you save a bit of time at the expense of a slightly higher fuel burn.

Wind velocity also clearly plays a part.

If you really do want to achieve maximum range you have to fly at an IAS that corresponds to minimising: (Fuel Flow)/GS

AerocatS2A

12th Dec 2016, 11:53

LRC parameters are usually, by definition, not the best way to get maximum range. The LRC data invariably has a bias to slightly increase IAS by a corresponding small reduction in range. ie, you save a bit of time at the expense of a slightly higher fuel burn.

Wind velocity also clearly plays a part.

If you really do want to achieve maximum range you have to fly at an IAS that corresponds to minimising: (Fuel Flow)/GS
LRC is the maximum range cruise profile available in the flight planning section of the performance manuals. I'm not about to delve more deeply than that for the sake of a PPRuNe thread.

aterpster

12th Dec 2016, 12:09

By the time the PIC was desperately pleading for radar vectors the airplane was well below the lowest possible MVA of 11,000 feet. In the U.S. many mountainous area TRACONS have an emergency video chart with more contours and only 300 feet of obstacle clearance. This is known as the EOVM or emergency obstacle video map. Colombia may not even have EOVM video maps.

They aren't of much value in any case, especially with a transport airplane in the dead-stick mode.

H Peacock

12th Dec 2016, 12:18

AerocatS2A, I'm not criticising your use of LRC data, but simply highlighting that, if you really do want to achieve maximum range, LRC is invariably not going to be the speed to fly at.

DaveReidUK

12th Dec 2016, 14:40

Here are links to the subsections. Please let me know of any corrections or missing aspects.

The statement

LMI2933 operates with Enhanced Mode S (not technically ADS-B).is a tad confusing, and not strictly correct.

Mode S Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) and ADS-B aren't mutually exclusive - most aircraft nowadays have both - and the LAMIA RJ85 was no exception.

The data that FlightRadar24 captured appears to be exclusively from ADS-B squitters (albeit subject to the positional errors previously discussed).

It would have been interesting had FR24 also captured the additional EHS data that the flight would have been sending, such as TAS, IAS, heading, selected altitude, etc (although decoding those is a bit more challenging).

lemme

12th Dec 2016, 15:45

Hi DaveReidUK,

Thanks for your advice, I got twisted around by squawk and squit. I will redraft those words to better explain the differences between responding to an SSR (squawk) with elementary or enhanced surveillance and ADS-B 1090 Extended squitter.

I share you desire for more information, and I have appealed to flightradar24.com for as much.

Airbubba

12th Dec 2016, 16:50

The data that FlightRadar24 captured appears to be exclusively from ADS-B squitters (albeit subject to the positional errors previously discussed).

It would have been interesting had FR24 also captured the additional EHS data that the flight would have been sending, such as TAS, IAS, heading, selected altitude, etc (although decoding those is a bit more challenging).

It looks like FR24 had six receivers near MDE that could provide multilateration location data on playback. Some of the other flights depicted on the playback animation seem to be MLAT only with occasional position shifts due to terrain and receiver geometry.

I think FR24 will default to displaying ADS-B data when it's available. I'm wondering if MLAT data for LMI2933 is available somewhere in the FR24 database for comparison to the transmitted ADS-B track.

Were the pilots of the RJ85 seeing a map display updated by radio navaids while the ADS-B was sending inertial only data?

Or, was the cockpit nav display also showing the wrong shifted position for some reason? The fact that the plane crashed so close to the VOR instead of the runway threshold makes me wonder.

portmanteau

12th Dec 2016, 18:55

This ATC translation covers the last 6 minutes prior to crash. It comes off the screen of Youtube ATC recording posted by VAS Aviation and there seems no reason to doubt its authenticity. It illustrates the complexity of the situation facing the Medellin Approach Controller LMI 2933 and other aircraft in the vicinity. The Approach and Aircraft R/T continues without a break for all of the 6 minutes. To say the Approach Controller is to be commended is an understatement.

00:00 LMI 2933: FL210 inbound and we request priority for the approach. right now we have a fuel problem
Approach: LMI 2933 understand you request priority to land with fuel problems as well? correct?
2933: Affirmative
Approach: OK be advised I'll give you vectors for the localizer and for the approach. It'll be in approximately 7 minutes
2933: for vectors LMI 2933
Approach: Lan Colombia 3020 cleared for ILS Z approach runway 01 QNH 30.27 report established on localizer
3020: Cleared for the approach Lan Colombia 3020 we'll call established
Approach: LMI 2933 say heading
2933: 1...179 outbound leg
Approach: maintain present heading and wait to start - continue descent
2933: maintain present heading and we're visual with the ground
AV 9771: Medellin Approach, Avianca 9771, is it possible to continue our outbound leg for 5 more miles until 15 DME?
Approach: Negative Captain I need you to do the inbound leg. The aircraft ahead is 1 mile. I need to start the descent for that traffic. He requested priority to land
9771: Roger we start the inbound leg, Avianca 9771
Approach: Yes please, thanks
2933: Requesting vectors for inbound leg ma'am
Approach: Standby I have a traffic just below doing the approach and also they are doing a runway inspection. How much time do you have for a landing LMI?
2933: We are with emergency fuel ma'am. We're established on final approach course. request immediate descent, LMI 2933
Approach: Lan Colombia 3020, cancel approach clearance. Turn left heading 100 now
3020: left turn heading 010 (?)and what altitude?
Approach: Maintain 13000 feet
3020: 13000 Lan Colombia 3020
Approach: LMI 2933 you can just turn right now to start your descent. You have traffic 1 mile and below
2933: Traffic in sight, no factor(?) and we request to join the localizer for once (?)
( another voice in cockpit: Gear Down)
Approach: Captain you are at FL 210. I need you to descend. You'd have to turn right to start your descent
2933: Negative ma'am we've started the descent and we're going to the localizer
Approach: Avianca 9771 turn immediately left heading 270
9771: Turning left heading 270. Avianca 9771, confirm the other traffic has already declared?
Approach: Lan Colombia 3020 maintain heading 090
3020: 090 Lan Colombia 3020
Approach: Avianca 9356, immediately turn left 290
9356: left turn 290 Avianca 9356
Approach: LMI 2933 you have traffic ahead, 18000 feet, A320
LMI 2933: We have it on TCAS and just above. ma'am we're on final course
Approach: That aircraft is at 18000 feet Captain. it is leaving just off to your left and another traffic - alright,(?) left 18500 feet
2933: In sight and we're at 18000 feet, 2933
Lan 3020: Lan Colombia 3020, how longer should we keep this heading?
Approach: Stand By , LMI 2933, 17700 feet, continue the approach, wet runway, let us know if you require any assistance
2933: we will for the assistance and we're through 16000 feet for the localizer
Approach: Set QNH 30.27
2933: 30.27
Lan 3020: Request right turn Lan Colombia 3020 due to bad weather
Approach: You're cleared Lan Colombia 3020, right turn... heading 200 is OK?
3020: Heading 200, we start the turn and let you know
LMI 2933 Ma'am LMI 2933 is with total failure, total electric and fuel
Approach: Runway is clear, LMI 2933 and fire services are rolled
2933: Copied, LMI 2933... vectors vectors ma'am vectors to the runway
Approach: We lost radar signal. I can't see you. say heading now
2933: We're heading 360
Approach: With heading(?), turn left 010 to the localizer, Rionegro VOR- a mile ahead the VOR. Right now you are- correct, I confirm- left turn 350
2933: Left 350
Approach: Yes correct, you're 0.1 miles from Rionegro VOR
Approach: I can't see your altitude, LMI
2933: 9000 feet ma'am
2933: vectors vectors
Approach: You're 8.2 miles from the runway
Approach: What's your altitude now?

06:15 Approach: LMI 2933, say your position
No reply.

Airbubba

12th Dec 2016, 21:42

Neither. The aircraft electrics were down at the emergency level. Some pages back you will find a list of what was available.

Somehow, I don't think that holding pattern depicted on the FR24 data was done after the engines quit.

Livesinafield

12th Dec 2016, 21:59

Very interesting article on Av herald, about a dispatcher who used the details of this flight and created a plog, the fuel requirements make interesting reading, bottom line was around 11800KG of Fuel

lemme

12th Dec 2016, 22:10

It looks like FR24 had six receivers near MDE that could provide multilateration location data on playback. Some of the other flights depicted on the playback animation seem to be MLAT only with occasional position shifts due to terrain and receiver geometry.

I think FR24 will default to displaying ADS-B data when it's available. I'm wondering if MLAT data for LMI2933 is available somewhere in the FR24 database for comparison to the transmitted ADS-B track.

Were the pilots of the RJ85 seeing a map display updated by radio navaids while the ADS-B was sending inertial only data?

Or, was the cockpit nav display also showing the wrong shifted position for some reason? The fact that the plane crashed so close to the VOR instead of the runway threshold makes me wonder.
It would not take too many MLAT measurement to rule out an 8 nm error in the FR24 reports, which I believe to represent raw IRS 1 position.

I dwelled a lot in the blog on how the GNS-X computes composite position for LNAV, and how this could be a factor (map shift?) in leading the flight crew to believe they were operating much closer to MDE than they may have been. But this is just a convenient explanation, I don't have anything to say that is what happened.

The descent captured to the last reported position (FR24) aligned (with a reasonable offset) to the final resting place, both in range and bearing.

The transponders are lost with EMERG AC/DC. As is EFIS. And DME. The crew would resort to LOC on the standby Attitude Indicator and VOR on the DBI, neither of which would reveal the displaced position since they were flying along a line (the VOR cross-over would be noted). They were above the G/S until after flameout.

If the FR24 data was wrong, that LMI2933 was operating much closer to the airport than recorded, than the final resting place does not add up assuming a controlled descent generally northbound. It would imply something like a 5,000 fpm descent rate which makes time aloft a question too (need to look into that from the transcript). Another option is a circling descent, but again that does not seem consistent with the pilot reports.

The glide ratio (flaps up or flaps down, gear ***DOWN***) is 1 nm per 1,000 feet (6:1). It is arguable what the descent rate would be for flaps down, assuming both are flown at best glide speed. They lost engines about 8,000 above the runway, which means they should have been able to glide some distance (8 nm?). I was assuming a V/S of about 2,500 fpm would yield about three minutes of flight at about 140 KTAS or about 7 nm.

Glide Ratio (Flaps Up, Gear up) is 2.5 nm per 1,000 feet.p (15:1).

The SSR data will resolve this point, and maybe the flight data recorder will offer some insights.

AerocatS2A

12th Dec 2016, 23:56

AerocatS2A, I'm not criticising your use of LRC data, but simply highlighting that, if you really do want to achieve maximum range, LRC is invariably not going to be the speed to fly at.
Ah yes, fair enough. In fact the LRC technique for the 146/RJ isn't even a traditional LRC, it is a single indicated airspeed (235 KIAS for the RJ85) that is used regardless of weight. At heavy weights it is slower than ideal and at light weights it is faster. Something else you can do if range is critical is to disengage the autothrottle and manually set the power.

DaveReidUK

13th Dec 2016, 06:35

The glide ratio (flaps up gear up) is 1 nm per 1,000 feet.

Are you sure about that ?

That's about 6:1. The conventional wisdom is that a typical two-engined narrow-body (A320, say) can achieve about 17:1 clean.

Clearly a short, stubby, high-winged, 4-engined aircraft won't do as well, but is the difference really almost 3 times worse ?

SteinarN

13th Dec 2016, 07:40

I read some place, forgot where, but it semed like someone who knew what he was talking about, or maybe it also was a link to some paper included, anyway, he claimed the glide ratio was about 13:1 in clean configuration. I think he said that the ratio with gear down was only like 6:1, but dont quote me on that last number.

lemme

13th Dec 2016, 07:52

Are you sure about that ?

That's about 6:1. The conventional wisdom is that a typical two-engined narrow-body (A320, say) can achieve about 17:1 clean.

Clearly a short, stubby, high-winged, 4-engined aircraft won't do as well, but is the difference really almost 3 times worse ?

Sorry, typo. I fixed it. I have two references in the blog. Flaps up Gear up clean is 15:1. Flaps up or down, gear down is 6:1.

Owain Glyndwr

13th Dec 2016, 12:53

On the A320 the lowest drag with full flap and gear down is twice the best clean aircraft value. The RJ landing gear is quite short in comparison so the difference would not be quite so pronounced. 6:1 sounds a little low starting from 15:1

A0283

13th Dec 2016, 12:54

Update 6 - impact and breakup sequence - background information published 12/12

... Rafael Henzel (43yr) journalist "No one told us to fasten our seat belts," he said. "Every time we asked when we'd arrive we were told '10 minutes'." "Then the lights and the engines went off. That scared us somewhat, but we weren't warned of anything. We didn't know what was going on," Henzel said. He recalled how people rushed back to their seats when the plane went dark. But he said that no-one had expected the plane to crash. Return home - The journalist described sitting in the penultimate row of the plane, between two other journalists.

FE Hoppy

13th Dec 2016, 16:47

Avro clean will glide at 2.5nm per 1000' according to the manufacturer. that's about 15:1

They suggest staying clean until you have 1000'=track miles then configure and maintain 1000'per nm.

FCOM vol 3 Part 1 Ch10 Topic 8.5.

lemme

13th Dec 2016, 18:20

In 2010, a City Jet RJ85 encountered a low fuel situation. If only LMI2933 had learned these lessons.

At 17 h 26 min 16, while the BAe146 was 1.8 NM from the runway threshold, the crew of the A319 not having taken off, the tower controller told them : “stop immediately, hold position, repeat, stop immediately, a BAe 46 on go-around“. Then he asked the crew of the BAe to make a go-around. The latter refused because they did not have enough fuel and requested that the A319 vacate the runway.
Note: At this time and according to the airline’s analysis, the quantity of fuel remaining was estimated at 1,400 kg. The nal reserve is de ned as 850 kg.
At 17 h 26 min 36, the controller ordered a go-around, which the crew performed.
At 17 h 26 min 58, the crew stated: “we are declaring a fuel emergency now we request priority vectors for landing“.
The tower controller contacted the approach controller by telephone. They decided to have the airplane climb to 6,000 ft on the extended runway centreline and to “make it as short as possible “. The tower controller asked the crew to climb to 6,000 ft and to change frequency.
At 17 h 28 min 23, the crew of the BAe 146 contacted approach control: “Mayday Mayday Mayday, City 108X, declaring fuel emergency, request priority landing“.
After ensuring that they had the runway in sight, the approach controller offered the crew of the BAe 146 a visual approach, which was accepted.
At 17 h 34, the crew landed.
On the ground, the quantity of fuel remaining was 1,220 kg.

The Captain stated that he declared an emergency because:
ˆ He did not know the number of aeroplanes on landing there were in front of him and considered that if there were 5 or 6 aeroplanes, his landing fuel would be below the minimum regulatory quantity;
ˆ He had a low-level fuel caution.
He stated that he did not apply the “low fuel quantity“ procedure as he had priority
to land and he was concentrating on the visual circuit and the landing procedures.
CONCLUSIONS
The incident was due to the late communication by the crew to the Air Traffic controller of their low fuel situation and their emergency situation. This led to the controller being unaware of the emergency situation.
The following elements contributed to the event:
The lack of an appropriate “minimum fuel“ procedure associated with the remaining flying time.
Notion of minimum fuel
The notion of minimum fuel defined by ICAO allows a crew to describe to the air traffic services a potentially critical situation during a diversion while avoiding the declaration of a distress or emergency situation.
This notion of minimum fuel is not defined in the European regulation.
In its report on the serious incident on 28 August 1999 at Paris Charles de Gaulle (95) to the Boeing 737-528 registered F-GJNF operated by Air France, the BEA had already recommended that the DGAC define the “Minimum fuel“ callout. In answer to this recommendation the DGAC considered that: “The minimum fuel callout is a source of confusion. This callout does not lead to any action by ATC, so the crew must then declare a distress situation as soon as the quantity of fuel planned for the landing is lower than the final reserve“.
In the light of this event, the BEA recommends that:
€the DGAC and EASA implement the “minimum fuel” message already defined by ICAO, with the associated procedures. [Recommendation FRAN‐2012‐026].

https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2010/ei-w100617.en/pdf/ei-w100617.en.pdf

Chronus

13th Dec 2016, 19:20

Ex ATC :

(1) ."2933: Requesting vectors for inbound leg ma'am

(2). 2933: We are with emergency fuel ma'am. We're established on final approach course. request immediate descent, LMI 2933

(3). Approach: LMI 2933 you can just turn right now to start your descent. You have traffic 1 mile and below
2933: Traffic in sight, no factor(?) and we request to join the localizer for once (?)

(4). LMI 2933: We have it on TCAS and just above. ma'am we're on final course

(5). LMI 2933 Ma'am LMI 2933 is with total failure, total electric and fuel
Approach: Runway is clear, LMI 2933 and fire services are rolled
2933: Copied, LMI 2933... vectors vectors ma'am vectors to the runway"

In 1 they request assistance for landing and yet in 2 above the crew appear to know their position.
At 3 they seem to be making a rather strange request.
At 4 once again it would seem they know their position, that they are aligned with the rwy.
At 5 they are calling for assistance to steer them towards the rwy.

Seems very confusing just reading it at my desk on the ground. I wonder what it must have sounded like to the controller.

lemme

13th Dec 2016, 19:39

My best guess:
(1) vectors was for separation, they knew their own position, they were looking for clearance.
(3) i have no other info, but was it localizer for oh one, zero one, runway 01?
(4) this could be on course for intercept, or on extended localizer
(5) with EMERG power, navigation is down to loc deviation and direction bearing with VOR and no DME. The VOR signal seems accessible, but the loc may have been lost as they descended too low.

thcrozier

13th Dec 2016, 20:59

Is it possible that the last request, though unstated, was a panicked cry for vectors Around the mountain?

Hotel Tango

13th Dec 2016, 21:06

If they could see it, they could vector themselves around it.

thcrozier

13th Dec 2016, 21:12

But they couldn't see it, they just knew it was there.

Lonewolf_50

13th Dec 2016, 23:56

It was dark, in support of thecrozier's point.

mickjoebill

14th Dec 2016, 01:56

But they couldn't see it, they just knew it was there.

If they knew they were dropping below glidescope, does it follow that they knew they would hit the mountain without vectors?

The latest report from a surviving passenger is that no PA was made to the cabin, would the PA have been working after the lights went out? He also said people had been standing. This is corroborated by the surviving crew member who said that passengers were standing and shouting during "the situation".

If they were standing before the lights went out, as claimed by the passenger, had word filtered back from cockpit that they were in strife?

At what point did cockpit crew realise they were doomed and would the PA have been working at that point?

For 4 passengers this was a survivable accident even though they apparently were not prepared. How many more could have survived had they adopted a brace position?

Perhaps the fact that Erwin Tumiri, the flight engineer who is one of the two crew members who survived, had prepared himself for the crash, is an indication that more passengers could have survived if they had been warned?

There are no reports yet of cabin crew running down the aisles instructing passengers to brace.

Shortly after the crash, Tumiri, a flight engineer, reportedly told media outlets that he survived by curling up in the fetal position with a bag between his knees as the jet careened toward the mountainside.

“I put the bags in between my legs to form the fetal position that is recommended in accidents,” he told Fox Sports Argentina in Spanish. “During the situation, many stood up from their seats, and they started to shout.”

lemme

14th Dec 2016, 03:26

From FCOM Vol 1, similar RJ85, while on EMERG DC:
Passenger Address should be functional through audio channel A.
Cabin interphone is inop.
The right hand mic is inop.
Is there a portable cabin megaphone?

Lonewolf_50

14th Dec 2016, 13:18

I think it fair to say that the flight deck crew were behind the aircraft as soon as it went dark. That suggests to me that they lost enough SA to be unaware that they needed to warn their passengers ... but wouldn't the "fasten seat belts" sign have already been put on before they began descent, or did they forget to do that as well when the fuel/time problem cropped up due to the instructions to hold?

MATELO

14th Dec 2016, 14:19

That suggests to me that they lost enough SA

Didn't that happen even before take off?

cwatters

14th Dec 2016, 22:51

If there was no PA then presumably the fight engineer knew to brace because he heard the engines wind down or had he been looking at his watch? Wonder if he told others to brace?

MartinM

15th Dec 2016, 07:41

Not only this. I wonder what the passengers did, when the emergency lightning turned on

lemme

15th Dec 2016, 08:33

LMI2933 seems to have been holding at GEMLI prior to a planned RNAV approach, indeed!. They started down under power. Last ADS-B report was at 15,500 feet near GEMLI, over 3,000 feet above the final approach. It appears they had extended gear and flaps in anticipation of continued flight worthiness. They crossed through the final glide-path at about 10,500 feet about 3 nm south of the FAP (KUNGU) at 9,700 feet and crashed near the RNG VOR. With the loss of power is the loss of RNAV (EFIS, FMS). The crew would have the option to use ILS, LOC, or VOR radio navigation tuned manually, and make mention of LOC.

The crew's actions while under power on their final descent seem reasonable if assuming that they don't flameout.

In hindsight, with the Feed tanks on fumes, the crew may have had an option to descend flaps up gear up. Once they configured for landing and by diving to capture the glide path, they lost any option to make it. There is no option to raise flaps and gear once all power is lost.

Revised my blog to reflect the RNAV approach, thanks for the help.
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick (http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933-lamia-avro-rj85-medellin.html)

donotdespisethesnake

15th Dec 2016, 08:33

Quote from Chapecoense air crash survivor: 'Crew gave no warning' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-38293253)

A survivor of the plane crash in Colombia in which 71 people were killed including most of Brazil's Chapecoense football team says the crew never gave the passengers any warning.
Rafael Henzel, a 43-year-old journalist travelling with Chapecoense on board the LaMia plane, said they were not even told to fasten their seatbelts.
Mr Henzel is one of only six people to survive the crash on 28 November.
Investigators believe the plane crashed because it ran out of fuel.
In his first interview since the accident, Mr Henzel told Brazil's Fantastico TV programme that the passengers had no warning of the impending crash.

"No one told us to fasten our seat belts," he said. "Every time we asked when we'd arrive we were told '10 minutes'." "Then the lights and the engines went off. That scared us somewhat, but we weren't warned of anything. We didn't know what was going on," Mr Henzel said.
He recalled how people rushed back to their seats when the plane went dark. But he said that no-one had expected the plane to crash.

It seems the flight crew were in a deep state of denial.

Hotel Tango

15th Dec 2016, 09:03

It seems the flight crew were in a deep state of denial.

I think that with what they were being confronted with, turning the seat belt signs on was the last thing on their minds!

donotdespisethesnake

15th Dec 2016, 09:11

I think that with what they were being confronted with, turning the seat belt signs on was the last thing on their minds!

True, saving passengers lives was not high on their priority list, the decision not to stop for fuel demonstrates that.

DJ77

15th Dec 2016, 09:20

It seems the flight crew were in a deep state of denial.

maybe.

But (apologies if this have been mentioned already) steep descent and deceleration may have caused the fuel boost pumps to unprime, preventing the use of whatever remaining fuel they believed was still usable.

mickjoebill

15th Dec 2016, 10:26

Not only this. I wonder what the passengers did, when the emergency lightning turned on

According to a survivor, passengers were standing and shouting about "the situation" before the lights went out.

jess15

15th Dec 2016, 11:20

On page 40, post 792 I pasted some links relating the crew survivor's account.

"When the emergency lights were lit Ximena (FA) sensed that something was happening" said Erwin Tumiri.
?Cuando se prendieron las luces de emergencia Ximena presintió que algo pasaba? | Noticias de Bolivia y el Mundo - EL DEBER (http://www.eldeber.com.bo/bolivia/prendieron-luces-emergencia-ximena-presintio.html)
In ^ he also refuted the previous Radio journalist's report - says he never actually said that he got into foetal position etc.
And he also refuted the earlier report about panic:
The pilot only mentioned that we prepare for landing, we were not alarmed because the decline did was the type of movement to land. There was no panic or anything. The only detail was that the stewardess told me to fasten well, then something happened.
http://correodelsur.com/seguridad/20161206_tumiri-hace-nuevas-revelaciones-y-funcionaria-busca-asilo-lamia.html

Whether he's believable or not is moot but note that he had only flown with LaMia on three occasions.
OTOH the first statement from FA Suarez suggests that she knew, before they crashed, that they had run out of fuel. You can read the post-rescue comments attributed to her here:
"El avión se apagó por completo antes de caer" | Noticias de Bolivia y el Mundo - EL DEBER (http://www.eldeber.com.bo/mundo/avion-apago-completo-caer.html)

OTOH the surviving journalist Henzel, here says the alarm was due to "turbulencia" and he was seated in "penultimate row".
http://eju.tv/2016/12/el-periodista-rafael-henzel-da-detalles-del-accidente-de-lamia/

Other updates
Co-pilot, Ovar Goytia, was not authorised to fly the Chapo charter, co-owner Rocha was meant to be flying. (Arrest warrant imminent for Rocha, his lawyer has confirmed his whereabouts.) Goytia had previously flown many of the football charters with LaMia and was also ex-FAB and according to his son, had "decades of flying experience."

re compensation offer from LaMia: USD 165K compensation per person offered to the families of the 71 people who died.
La absurda cifra que ofrece LAMIA para indemnizar a familiares de las víctimas del Chapecoense - eju.tv (http://eju.tv/2016/12/la-absurda-cifra-que-ofrece-lamia-para-indemnizar-a-familiares-de-las-victimas-del-chapecoense/)

Bolivian Defence Minister statement: "the fact that Lamia travelled with insufficient fuel to other countries shows that the company had it's influence beyond Bolivia." (This Minister has been throwing quite a few accusations around in the press re PF Quiroga's Father-in-law Pinto. )

re TAM. Opposition politicians increase pressure noting that TAM were also flying in contravention of ICAO rules, without valid insurance for some of their commercial flights and not all their planes were registered with the DGAC.

The last director of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC), Virgilio Pereira and previous incumbent Luis Coimbra, will be subpoenaed to testify. Press reports that the latter had refused to give LaMia it's operator license and then was sacked and replaced by Pereira whereupon the license was approved very quickly. ( All these organisations are governed through political appointments of ex-military men into powerful positions but I suppose it's a positive sign that currently the investigation is extending beyond middle management figures. )

ATC Watcher

15th Dec 2016, 15:19

Joss 15 > lots of BS in there .Journalists fishing or speculating to write something ( a bit like some of the posters here :rolleyes:)

They reported LaMia has no cashflow , did not pay its staff last months, but LaMia now offering 165K per pax compensation? , and 3 lines later they were flying without insurance ?
and : " the fact that Lamia travelled with insufficient fuel to other countries shows that the company had it's influence beyond Bolivia"
What a lot of BS.

jess15

15th Dec 2016, 18:34

Since the disaster turned into a scandal, around 30.11., there appears to have been multiple forces at work. There's a blame game played out in the media, political in-fighting, a right-wing opposition who want to- rightly or wrongly-implicate the govt. at the highest levels, axes to grind, govt ministers calling out pilots as "murderers". Then there's lies (mixed with a few truths I assume), alongside a desire to minimise the scope of the investigation but be seen to be doing something, to avoid an FAA downgrade. Then throw into that mix the interests of Brazil & Colombia .

The lack of due process & the course of the official investigation may be piss-poor by our standards but I'm actually pretty impressed with the tenacity & quality of most of these Latin American papers when I compare it to UK equivalents and when I consider what they are up against.

So as the story has evolved you also have the Defence minister publicly asking - WHO paid for the insurance and who gave them the start-up capital?
LaMia's lawyer states that they have insurance cover for USD25million, journalists saying the individual offer is paltry.
Quiroga's wife & father claims the crew were not paid for months and that there were no secret financers.
They've reported Milton Claros ( minister public works) saying that LaMia company records showed LaMia had USD 16K on paper but according to Quiroga's family they were about to lease a fleet of 757s in 2017- clearly incompatible.

Which of those ^ are BS? Eeny, meeny, miny, moe

spagiola

15th Dec 2016, 20:25

Mickjoebill writes:
Perhaps the fact that Erwin Tumiri, the flight engineer who is one of the two crew members who survived, had prepared himself for the crash, is an indication that more passengers could have survived if they had been warned?

That Tumiri braced himself was said in early reports; in later interviews, he denied doing that, said there was no indication from the flight crew to the cabin that anything was amiss, the first indication being when the lights went off. At that point, he says he did "put on the harness", which I take to mean the shoulder harness on the crew seat (as he'd earlier said he had the belt fastened). So, no brace position, but he was somewhat better prepared than the others if he had a shoulder harnesss on.

noflynomore

15th Dec 2016, 22:56

WingNut60

15th Dec 2016, 23:53

....... His remarks seem to me to be based on observation from the cabin rather than the flight deck but it isn't too clear.
Yes "nofly", I'm reading it the same way.
And, I wonder if he wasn't sitting with his back against the FD door bulkhead; or something similar.
That sort of arrangement might have had a very significant influence on his survival.

I have been lead to believe that one significant factor in deaths in accidents involving rapid deceleration (eg plane crash) is the tearing of the pericardium and the encapsulated heart from their internal anchoring, and that that is less likely to occur if the accident victim is seated facing away from the point of impact.

jess15

16th Dec 2016, 11:48

Do we know who was on the jump seat? Surely the third pilot rather than the engineer? His remarks seem to me to be based on observation from the cabin rather than the flight deck but it isn't too clear.

Once again poor translation and incorrect usage of English is muddying the waters. He was an aircraft engineer, not a flight engineer. For the benefit of those (many) here not au fait with aviation terminology this means he was ground maintenance personnel. NOT flight crew.

I think I've pasted "flight technician" with anything I've posted about Erwin Tumiri.
With the same links, he describes his location at impact. With Suarez.

As yet, there is no further info, in any language, as to the location/role of the rest of the so-called "tripulacion" on this flight. There simply isn't the info out there- beyond Quiroga and we are now told Goytia may have been co-pilot. That's it.
Copiloto de LaMia no tenía autorización de vuelo | ATB Digital (http://www.atb.com.bo/seccion/sociedad/copiloto-de-lamia-no-ten%C3%ADa-autorizaci%C3%B3n-de-vuelo)
Encina's wife has also already given (upthread) her understanding of why her pilot husband was on this flight.

Further links upthread also have an interview where Tumiri describes his role with detail and his history with LaMia - which in itself, he says, was very limited. He also referred to his exchange with the flight engineer about refuelling.

None of us can verify the contradictions in Tumiri's own recollections but we can note the discrepancies. Perhaps the reporter simply invented the "foetal... suitcases.... shouting" elements? Surely the default is: first read what is said without relying on a single bad translation; secondly treat everything with caution even if it comes out of the mouth of the Defence minister; third, appreciate that these events occur in a Bolivian context.
Doubtless, it'll still require the same approach even when the final report is released and when the legal cases are complete.

FE Hoppy

16th Dec 2016, 17:21

There is no flight engineer on an RJ.
Trust me, if there was they wouldn't have run out of fuel.

aterpster

16th Dec 2016, 18:00

Isn't that the truth!!

Melax

16th Dec 2016, 19:40

Yeah right !!
Why don't you tell that to the passengers of AVA52 !!

portmanteau

16th Dec 2016, 20:50

Nice try Hoppy but it aint necessarily so. I assume you are suggesting an FE would not have let the flight depart. And nor would any of the many FE's that I had the pleasure of flying with. However a lot of people were involved in this LaMia fuel scam so I am not convinced that anybody would have been above reproach. Wasnt Tumiri the "FE" anyway when the aircraft was on the ground and therefore had the opportunity to alter events but evidently did not take it.

lemme

16th Dec 2016, 22:42

There are versions of the ATC transcript recording that have been edited and are not reflective of real-time, beware. I have annotated MSL altitude versus UTC time with the transmissions from LMI2933. The information correlates well with the ADS-B reports.

Added to the blog entry
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick (http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933-lamia-avro-rj85-medellin.html)

https://i.imgsafe.org/478a20cbcc.png

https://i.imgsafe.org/4789a0a70a.png

ATC Watcher

17th Dec 2016, 08:55

Lemme , while I am impressed by your talents , playing home-made accident investigator can be dangerous for other people, especially when you appear " an expert" to the public and journalists that might take your version of events as established facts.
An example here on your beautiful graphs is you separate the aircraft transmissions from those of ATC , inducing to the non-professional the idea that the pilot was in distress requesting assistance ( vectores, vecrores Senorita.." ) and got no responses..

But even if you do include the ATC transmissions , they will be misleading unless you add that a controller can only give vectors if/when he/she actually sees the aircrfat position on radar. This was not the case , as she states she lost him ( whether due terrain or loss of electric on transponder still needs to be established )
Accident analysis it is a bit more complex that just taking You tube videos and Flight radar 24.

Finally ,as you said there are different VHF/ATC transcripts around, and the exact time stamps will be critical to establish the actual sequence of events.

Speculating of what might have happened is what we all do here, nothing wrong with that , but playing amateur incident investigator delivering home made " facts" is playing with fire. .
Before posting things , think of the effect this will have on the surviving people , the air traffic controller on duty and the families of the victims if you get it wrong.

SteinarN

17th Dec 2016, 10:14

@ATC Watcher,

I think what Lemme do here is well within what we can expect, and in fact what we should appreciate on this forum. I think everyone reading here is capapble to understand that Lemme has no access to the complete data and as such his teories and findings might get revised at a later stage. Something he has said and done several times in this case already.

Speaking for my self I, can say that I find what Lemme has said in this topic to be very interesting and enlightening to read all while I am fully aware that the complete picture is by no means available yet.

As to what you say about the ATC transmissions missing in the above post from Lemme, I am sure everyone that have read this topic in only the most superficial way am aware that the ATC transmissions is missing and that his post is only indended to give the approximate timeline for the LaMia transmissions and the aircrafts height at each of those transmissions.

Edit: And, by the way, I am a non-professional, and I am still fully able to understand the non-completeness and potential inaccuracies in Lemmes posting.

ATC Watcher

17th Dec 2016, 12:15

SteinarN : I basically do not disagree with what you say , but this thread is not only read by people having a sound understanding of the "unsaid" and " not shown " items. They are used by many , including journos , as a kind of an " expert source" .
The headlines of some newspapers in Columbia were harassing the Controller for not having helped...and pointing fingers at her.. with her full name attached. No need to revive this.

Yes Lemme is doing good posts, but those are only speculative . An example out of many : Lemme , like many others who have posted here, are taking it for a fact that the gear must have been down because the words " gear down" can be heard on the background of one transmission.
But there is no factual info that this was indeed the case. Could have been words on a check list , to which the Capt replied : No keep it up" for instance.
Only the investigation team and/or FDR will tell us if it was indeed down and when. Only then you can start talking about gliding ratio and " blaming" pilots for putting it down so so high...

noflynomore

17th Dec 2016, 14:04

Surely r.o.d in the last stage of the flight indicates gear down, as does speed (indicating landing flap, ie landing configuration). Maybe not "Proof", but no one would imagine full flap without gear down, would they? - warning horn and all?

cappt

17th Dec 2016, 16:14

Typical seating arrangement.
Notice the aft facing attendant seats behind the aft bulkhead. This is most likely where Suárez and Tumiri where seated.

http://i1322.photobucket.com/albums/u569/capt6/cityJet-charters-avro-rj-488x800px_zpsahifwzdn.png

aterpster

17th Dec 2016, 18:06

Melax:

Yeah right !!
Why don't you tell that to the passengers of AVA52 !!

Unlike the current case, they departed with adequate and legal fuel.

Melax

17th Dec 2016, 18:28

Yes indeed you're correct, I was however addressing his ludicrous statement, That "if they had an FE they would not run out of fuel" :ugh:

Chronus

17th Dec 2016, 18:56

There is no flight engineer on an RJ.
Trust me, if there was they wouldn't have run out of fuel.
May I be so bold to presume what is postulated here is that such a FE would have unstrapped hisself, stood up, reached in his kit bag for one of his meaty adjustable spanners, klocked the captain round the head with it and safely landed the plane at the nearest for a quick sip of fuel. Now before you all start screaming and saying it is not cricket, not the proper thing to do and all that, just remember the good old days when such a suitable object was standard eqpt in the rear cockpit within easy reach of the instructor.

lemme

17th Dec 2016, 19:35

SteinarN : ...this thread is not only read by people having a sound understanding of the "unsaid" and " not shown " items. They are used by many , including journos , as a kind of an " expert source" .

Yes Lemme is doing good posts, but those are only speculative ...
Only the investigation team and/or FDR will tell us if it was indeed down and when. Only then you can start talking about gliding ratio and " blaming" pilots for putting it down so so high...
I had responsibility for both flight data recording and communications while at Boeing, continuing most of my career on communications. One area we, as an industry, have been seeking is telemetry for use in both operational quality assurance and for air-safety investigation. Like it or not, the public has little tolerance for the glacial pace of aviation evolution, especially in the area of accident investigation.

Mode S transponders and ADS-B open up an new generation of analysis unrelated to air traffic control or collision avoidance.

Public companies like flightradar24.com have crowd-sourced a very comprehensive set of data and make this available in real-time. Not only can we examine the flight of interest, we can look at all the other flights too. This adds a whole new dimension of insight.

I have personally undertaken a quest to see how far I can get with the ADS-B data as the core of an analysis. I am only operating with position, track heading, ground speed, pressure altitude. There are other parameters available, and I am advocating for them as an enhancement to investigation. Only by working through the analysis am I able to fully appreciate what is missing.

I have looked at other accidents, notably EK521 and the Pence LGA overrun. In those cases, I was able to find the likely sequence of events (failure to add go-around power, landing long) right away.

I am not looking at assessing blame. I am trying to understand what happened. That does required digging deep and wondering about scenarios, and that does reek of speculation.

LMI2933 had significant loss of life, and therefore is much more deserving of analysis - it is the nature of aviation to learn from catastrophe.

I am looking for help to be sure my analysis reflects the technical issues accurately, and so I have decided to join pprune.org and airliners.net bulletin boards.

I find a litany of statements everywhere. Most of it is piece-meal, missing context. Some of it is plain wrong. Some of it is mis-guided. The point of the blog was to give me (and you) a single reference point from which I would aggregate all the info I stumbled upon, and then add considerable analysis based on my personal expertise.

If you tell me something is wrong, I will go hunt it down until it is for-sure, and I will revise the blog. No worries, I don't know everything, and I love to learn new things or think from unexpected perspectives. Running down a wrong path is not a waste, because you learn more about it and that can pay dividends.

I was lead engineer (control laws) for Boeing automatic flight controls, Thrust Management, for 757, 767, 747-400 and am very familiar with airplane systems. If you fly those planes, or 777 or 747-8, you are using thrust management, data link, flight data recording, and satcom systems I once led, or are directly based on developments I played a principal role in.

As supervisor for data link and satcom, I led the ability to for satellite voice and for ACARS/FANS to connect pilot and controller, to which I spend considerable time dealing with human factors and having to invent "comm messages" as a whole new category.

As a manager for terminal-area projects, i was tasked to work with NASA and the FAA to look at ways to reduce accidents in the terminal area, and we as group studied every accident report going back 20 years to search for improvements.

I am very accustomed to looking at a subset of data and applying it to complex systems and to airplane operation. As a (not current) private pilot (SEL, SES) with instrument rating, I have had a chance to try it all myself. But I am no line or experimental captain (plus I am not current anyway), and for this I am looking for help.

Also, I am not that familiar with the RJ85. I have only a subset of the manuals. For sure, love to hear from those with first-hand experience.

Forgive my writing style. I am a systems engineer at heart, so I write everything into positive statements that may come off as too confident or assured. I make mistakes, I get tunnel-vision, I can be over-confident, and I for sure don't know everything. But I love to learn, and I am not afraid to make a mistake.

I appreciate your suggestions. I have seen some people react almost with anger that I dare publish any information. I want to understand what those concerns are so I can address them. In the end, I am really just trying to figure out if we can use ADS-B to make aviation safer.

These observations stem from sparse ADS-B reports, an unauthorized copy of a related RJ85 Flight Crew Operations Manual, Vol 1. plus other references not known to be accurate in comparison to CP2933 airplane combined with best-intentioned judgements and helpful advice from online commentators, may have errors, and are in no way a substitute for the official accident investigation.

ATC Watcher

17th Dec 2016, 21:06

Lemme :
Thanks for your detailed list of qualifications. very impressive indeed . I went to visit your web/sire Blog and read some of your Tweets and likewise I was very impressed . You also seem to spend a tremendous amount of time doing this.
The first question that come to my mind is why are you doing this? Is it just a hobby or is it professionally motivated, like selling a technology or a project/ idea ? or just wanting to show what people can do with FR24/ ADS ?

The problem I have is that your presentations are using sentences like , the aircraft did this, the crew did that, ATC replied, etc.. like these were factual .
one example : quote from your blog :
The airplane initially arrived with conceivably enough fuel to complete the approach and landing safely
How do you know ?
But in fact a lot of this is taken unofficial sources like newspaper coverage, so called witnesses , You tube R/T transcripts of unknown origin , posts in forum by unknown " experts" etc..
To be fair, you do mention this in your introduction : These observations stem from sparse ADS-B reports, an unauthorized copy of a related RJ85 Flight Crew Operations Manual, Vol 1. plus other references not known to be accurate in comparison to CP2933 airplane combined with best-intentioned judgments and helpful advice from online commentators.
But to the uniformed non aviation specialist , the end product on your blog looks very much like a serious accident investigation. And it is not. And there lies my problem . You become yourself another informed source for the uniformed . Kind of he blind leading the blind .

Another and final example to prove my point : as far as I know there is so far no real official statement coming from a bona fide source like the NTSB or the UK AAIB that this accident was due to a fuel exhaustion, and even if it really was the cause (although it looks like it was) , I personally very much doubt that the 4 engines would quit at the exact same time .But i am not an expert in RJ fuel systems . cross feeds and pumps, so I leave this part for those in the know. . Anyway all that can be very easily verified in a sim. And that is where the real accident investigation team comes in , and look at the facts.

H Peacock

17th Dec 2016, 21:52

On all of the various jet aircraft that I have flown, a windmilling engine (ie flamed-out but not mechanically failed) would still drive the relevant hydraulic pump(s) fast enough and therefore maintain adequate pressure in that system.

Having watched thousands of engine start cycles over the years, the Hyd pump coming 'on-line' is invariably one of the first things to occur as the engine rpm builds.

When airborne, I know an engine's windmilling rpm is a function of IAS, but are the RJ85 guys telling us that these guys having flamed-out all 4 engines would have had the indications of a total Hyd failure?

lemme

18th Dec 2016, 01:45

lemme

As to (roll) spoilers, they operate off the Yellow system and will float up with the loss of that system.

I agree I was confused and confusing. From my fallible understanding the airbrake will stow in response to loss of power and may trail slightly open with loss of hydraulic power. The lift spoilers will remain locked down. The roll spoilers use a mechanical actuated hydraulic servo off of yellow.

Could windmilling #2 drive yellow enough to power the roll spoilers - that is the question.

A related issue is mentioned in the rudder discussion, where it is stated that

Hydraulic power is not available to the rudder from engine 2 because the power is absorbed by the standby fuel pumps. When main DC is lost, the standby fuel pumps:
• Automatically run
• Cannot be selected off.

So if yellow can't drive the rudder will it drive the roll spoilers?

This schematic seems to stack the services in order, and if nothing gets past the standby fuel pump to the rudder, it seems the roll spoilers are not going to work. I found no such reference, and appreciate your comment that they will float up a bit in response to bernoulli.

https://i.imgsafe.org/5f58da559b.png

PS - this is a personnel quest along a professional curiosity.

cats_five

18th Dec 2016, 09:01

I need to complete this analysis before the official release, or my analysis would be tainted. it is a good study even if I get it wrong, because we can figure out what was missing or where it went awry.

If you get 'it' wrong - or partly wrong - how can anything meaningful be drawn from 'it'? How will we know if you got 'it' wrong until the official report is published?

alemaobaiano

18th Dec 2016, 09:56

I need to complete this analysis before the official release, or my analysis would be tainted.

Your analysis would be tainted by the official investigation?

Given the nature of the internet I suspect it would be other way round, especially as official reports tend to take 12-18 months. The amount of information, correct or not, that you are presenting would become the received version and any divergences from the official report would be seen as a cover up by those who lack the patience to wait for the official release.

safetypee

18th Dec 2016, 13:02

Too many people inferring what happened from limited, low accuracy information and from unsubstantiated references.
The key to understanding why this accident occurred, which may provide value to future safety, is by considering a range of possibilities (irrespective of any official report), starting from a view that the crew were trying to do a good job.
They did not set out to kill themselves.

The departure fuel load may have been insufficient for the plan, but there was probably an unrecorded plan to make an en-route tech stop to refuel. What aspects could have affected the decisions related to this.
Was the departure fuel as stated, were the indications correct, were there gauge errors or MEL items, or possible fungal fuel contamination which can give erratic fuel indications.

If the en-route refuel option was rejected then what influenced the decision; fuel gauging issues as above or mistaken use of of the fuel planning page on the GNS. Who made the decision, were they aware of the pitfalls of the planning page or gauging inaccuracies.
If the decision was made to press on, then why no change of plan when a preceding aircraft required priority and the crew were requested to hold.

The easy view in hindsight is to blame the crew, but the balancing view is that the crew may have believed that the fuel state was sufficient; if so, why.

noflynomore

18th Dec 2016, 14:38

fungal fuel contamination which can give erratic fuel indications

It can????

The easy view in hindsight is to blame the crew

Who on earth else is involved? Crew ordered the fuel. Crew were happy with it even when questioned. Crew did not divert. Gauges??? This wasn't a minor 100Kg infraction of min flight fuel for God's sake!
I know there is a stubborn resistance here to accepting that pilots can screw up monstrously even when it's plain as daylight but surely this is so clear-cut no one can imagine any outside help was needed in this case?

iceman50

18th Dec 2016, 14:49

SafetyPee

You really need to wind in the "how do we understand this accident" it might be this it might be that it, wasn't the crews fault some more consultant BS. This was entirely the fault of the man in command!

safetypee

18th Dec 2016, 14:55

lemme, et al.
Most of the diagrams presented are too simple for this discussion.
Fortunately the aircraft systems were designed to be simple in operation, or as depicted to the crew. Generally you the pilot, had whatever was available / indicated.

If AC1 and AC2 are lost, for whatever reason, then the StBy gen will start automatically; provided it is armed. The crew can override this by manually selecting 'on' or, inappropriately 'off'.
When the StBy generator is running, this section of the green hydraulic system, including hydraulic accumulator, is protected from the rest of the green system.

If the yellow pump fails, then preference is for emergency gear locking and brakes, via the DC pump /accumulator; other services are not available/only available at higher pressures - see engine windmill.
If the green pump has failed then all green services are isolated and unavailable except as for StBy Gen via PTU.

There are a significant number of scenarios for system operation and indication as the engines shut down /fail, but the bottom line is that the crew will have emergency elect instruments, gear free fall and hyd locking, emergency brakes; but probably flapless.

If the gear and flaps were down then more likely this used intermittent pressure from a failing engine or when windmilling at high speed. The engine windmill characteristics involve a relatively fast N1 but slow N2, even to the point of stopping (170kts?).
Hydraulic and elect services require high N2. Normal operations use a flight idle stop.

Flap extension requires elect and hydraulic power. Flap extension takes time, e.g. 0-18, ~ 20 sec.
Without elects, flap position indication is not available, thus crew have to respect airspeed according to the last indication (not selector handle) or the flap position indicated on the wing markings as seen from the cabin (requiring a torch?).
The air brake will 'blow back' towards closed, according to airspeed.

Irrespective of rudder fixed angle or spoiler float, flight control should not be an issue, (some views were that the aircraft was easier to fly without spoilers!). Please avoid the auto systems view 'speed on elevator'; pilots 'fly' an aircraft to achieve an objective, even though the objective may be incorrect.

Some of the calculated speeds appear very slow for what could have been a low or zero flap setting. Thus unless the flaps were selected before all power loss, it would be more consistent speculation to consider stall or near stall conditions.
From deep and failing memory, I recall that the stall warning was available on essential AC and possibly emergency DC.

Other aspects to consider should include resetting/checking the st by altimeter pressure datum, instrument flying accuracy using st by instruments, particularly airspeed ... at night, using emergency lighting.

CAVIAT, any technical inexactitudes above relate to the quest for simplicity; particularly where the simplest view of an accident is often correct.

flynomore; fungus, yes it can, first hand experience of gauging problems, world wide; and corrosion (Columbia!). Also there were reports of possible fuel pump blocking and engines stopping - far east.

Blame implies error or irrational decision and action, for which I prefer more modern views of 'error'.

Simplythebeast

18th Dec 2016, 15:56

Pilot in Colombia plane tragedy that killed most of Brazilian football team 'was not trained properly' - The Telegraph
https://apple.news/Abrq6ZRpqS3C-WXCoq2yi-A

Old and Horrified

18th Dec 2016, 16:23

Am I the only one who thinks that all this discussion about which hydraulic system drives which control surface and how much power is available in a windmilling engine and so on is entirely irrelevant to the cause(s) of this accident?

If you wish to discuss such issues, can I suggest a new thread in Tech Log?

lemme

18th Dec 2016, 16:25

Very telling.

If you get 'it' wrong - or partly wrong - how can anything meaningful be drawn from 'it'? How will we know if you got 'it' wrong until the official report is published?Your analysis would be tainted by the official investigation?

Given the nature of the internet I suspect it would be other way round, especially as official reports tend to take 12-18 months. The amount of information, correct or not, that you are presenting would become the received version and any divergences from the official report would be seen as a cover up by those who lack the patience to wait for the official release.

I have stated my prime interest is to use ADS-B data as a tool for air-safety investigation. My interest is solely to piece together what happened to the airplane.

MS804 data stopped suddenly, but helped locate the recorders, which is always the primary goal. The media was incensed that we had yet another accident over water and did not know what happened. We got an ELT burst on impact, too. I appealed that we were following the script, that the onboard recorders were the goal for the investigation. But MH370 haunts us in the public eye. GADSS 2021 (autonomous) is still in work, and I think ADS-B would be better than ELT, especially if we can augment the data set. The goal of GADSS is location, but I am trying to work in rudimentary investigation tools.

In EK521, I could see that it floated and let speed bleed off and finally crashed to the runway. It was apparent thrust had not been added in a timely manner.

In the Pence overrun, it was clear the airplane landed long.

The American engine failure did not have any interesting ADS-B aspect.

The FedEx FLL was on my list, but got overtaken by Lamia.

Having examined a lot of data throughout my career, I have found that it is far easier connect the dots when you know what happened.

My challenge is to figure out what happened with the limited data set in hand. As more and more factual information becomes known, I can go back and say that the data showed any new supposition. It is far easier to solve the problem when you know the answer. So I did not mean that the information would be tainted in any way, but that my experiment of using the data as a tool would be.

I have never suggested that my blog be a substitute for the official investigation. I expect the official investigation will reveal information that is not consistent with my analysis. I will be watching closely and will come to grips with it at the time.

I have no interest in blame. Or why a decision was made other than assuming best intent. I am interested in what happened to the airplane. Unfortunately, that takes context. So the sphere of interest expands and touches the soft parts of the equation.

Did Lamia suffer fuel starvation or exhaustion. Exhaustion is a matter that can be fairly easily assessed assuming full tanks. Starvation opens up a whole universe of possibilities. If exhaustion matches the data, then it becomes the path of least resistance. There are scenarios that could lead to starvation, and the flight recorders will open that case clearly. As well as exhaustion. In the end, there is nothing in the ADS-B data that could distinguish them.

What I am learning is that if I park an assumption in piecing the data and drilling down to understand it, that the community gets upset that I am not considering other possibilities. I will try to do a better job explaining this in the blog. I am not trying to rule out anything, so please forgive any misunderstanding.

DaveReidUK

18th Dec 2016, 16:41

I have stated my prime interest is to use ADS-B data as a tool for air-safety investigation.

Out of interest, can you think of any accident investigation where ADS-B has provided more of a clue to probable cause than the evidence provided by the FDR and CVR?

lemme

18th Dec 2016, 16:57

lemme, et al.
Most of the diagrams presented are too simple for this discussion.

agree. Your description is marvelous, thanks! Designing a four-engine airplane with loss of all engines is a fascinating challenge. The devil lives in the details. I dig deep to understand these issues in my blog.
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick (http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933-lamia-avro-rj85-medellin.html)

The engine windmill characteristics involve a relatively fast N1 but slow N2, even to the point of stopping (170kts?).
Hydraulic and elect services require high N2. Normal operations use a flight idle stop.

I believe they established about 125 KIAS from 16,000 down. From your statement, that would not generate much windmill hydraulic power (if any).

Some of the calculated speeds appear very slow for what could have been a low or zero flap setting. Thus unless the flaps were selected before all power loss, it would be more consistent speculation to consider stall or near stall conditions.
From deep and failing memory, I recall that the stall warning was available on essential AC and possibly emergency DC.

I think that they configured for landing under engine power ahead of flameout. It does not look like a deep stall scenario, rather a steep, controlled descent. They had 11,000 feet to lose by the FAP in about 16 nm, and they started clean.
from FCOM: There are two electronic stall protection channels: channel 1 and channel 2. Either channel can provide stall warning and stall identification. With one channel failed, the working channel can provide complete stall protection. Each channel requires power from the ESS AC and the ESS DC busbars.

flynomore; fungus, yes it can, first hand experience of gauging problems, world wide; and corrosion (Columbia!). Also there were reports of possible fuel pump blocking and engines stopping - far east.

noted, I have one referenced.

lemme

18th Dec 2016, 17:25

Out of interest, can you think of any accident investigation where ADS-B has provided more of a clue to probable cause than the evidence provided by the FDR and CVR?
No, and I can't imagine a case of where it ever would. But I will say that having ADS-B data from surrounding flights, and from preceding flights, is an added dimension. On EK521, for example, I could watch the tail-wind shear evolve on each successive plane on the approach. I could compare the Pence plane path in space to those ahead of it.

But what if we don't recover the recorders?
MH370. All we have are a handful of indirect position estimates.

Or what if it takes nearly two years to recover the recorders?
AF447 made a lot of hay over a handful of ACARS messages that implicated air data faults.

MS804 ADS-B data was catastrophic, and an ACARS message showed smoke. Six months later forensics are describing evidence of explosives.

We started flight data recording over 50 years ago with altitude, airspeed, heading, and vertical accelerations as a function of time. That is about where we are with ADS-B telemetry, and I foresee a chance to build out an acceptable data set.

misd-agin

18th Dec 2016, 18:57

As engines spool down you can try and move flight controls. HYD pressure on other jets is typically present with approx 5% N2. At approx 8% N2 it appears to have enough pressure to perhaps move the flight controls on the ground with no air loads.

Chronus

18th Dec 2016, 19:16

More I read of lemme`s post the more I begin to understand that his interest in this particular accident is academic. It appears to me that he is trying his level best to engage with pilots, rattle some inadvertently of course, in the process, in order perhaps to expand and advance his knowledge on his chosen field of endeavour. Namely ADS-B and Flight Data Monitoring as a tool for telemetry in aviation. Nothing new really, it has been going on for some time now. However I would suggest that this particular accident involves relatively few and fairly straight forward circumstances. At this juncture, known facts may be few but are overwhelmingly persuasive as to cause. I therefore cannot quite see how an all dancing singing FDM system with ADS-B could possibly have made a difference. Look at the Azores Glider event. A much larger aircraft , A330 and dead stick 65 miles out from 34,500 ft. at dead of night with nothing but ocean all around. What was the difference but the two guys up front, nothing else. In this particular case they were near enough on top of the rwy and what did they do, they stuck the nose right down and headed for the VOR. So what`s all the hydraulics and windmilling fan blades got to do with anything. For me the olde proverb says it all, thrust is a must , but lift is a gift. So no use just sitting there hammering at the top of the instrument panel insisting, demanding I must have thrust, look N1 says I do and all the time looking the gift horse in the mouth.

ATC Watcher

18th Dec 2016, 20:37

Lemme :
I think I too start to understand your motivation in doing this ( although you choose not to reply directly to my questions on my first post on this subject).

Yes ADS-B down-link parameters can be useful in the early stage of an investigation if you do not have other surveillance means which are independent like radar, and if CVR/FDRs are not recovered/usable or simply absent ( small a/c types)
However in most cases , and in this one in particular, there is multiple radar recording available, and FDR and CVR were recovered in good shapes.
FR24 provides some form of data, and one can use this to draw some conclusions before the Investigation team does its work. Nothing wrong with that.That is why we come to this forum .
What I object in your case is that you present this FR24 data, correlate it with info collected on Internet to present your version of the " facts " ahead of the preliminary report of the official Investigation team and fool people with such detailed and specialized info that most will believe that what you present are " facts".
Lot of persons died in this accident and for me at least, you should have respect and refrain from assuming or worse stating what the crew did or did not do because there you have no idea.
Finally a word of caution , never forget the " D" in ADS . It is only dependent of what it reads and what is manually inputted . BS in , BS out.

I know I am probably not going to convince you to call it a day and wait a year for the preliminary report, but you are not going to convince me that what you do is " scientific" either.

MartinM

18th Dec 2016, 20:42

No, and I can't imagine a case of where it ever would. But I will say that having ADS-B data from surrounding flights, and from preceding flights, is an added dimension. On EK521, for example, I could watch the tail-wind shear evolve on each successive plane on the approach. I could compare the Pence plane path in space to those ahead of it.

But what if we don't recover the recorders?
MH370. All we have are a handful of indirect position estimates.

Or what if it takes nearly two years to recover the recorders?
AF447 made a lot of hay over a handful of ACARS messages that implicated air data faults.

MS804 ADS-B data was catastrophic, and an ACARS message showed smoke. Six months later forensics are describing evidence of explosives.

We started flight data recording over 50 years ago with altitude, airspeed, heading, and vertical accelerations as a function of time. That is about where we are with ADS-B telemetry, and I foresee a chance to build out an acceptable data set.
AF447 had very usefull ACARS messages from the start. No one believed them until the day of the report came out.

I don't remember that short haul aircrafts, like the RJ100 are zrasnmitting ACARS. I never heard of it. As such I. an be very wrong, i admit.

DaveReidUK

18th Dec 2016, 21:27

Some RJs do, for example the Brussels and Swiss RJ100s, but CityJet's don't, so it's very unlikely that the LAMIA did.

Airbubba

18th Dec 2016, 21:30

I had responsibility for both flight data recording and communications while at Boeing, continuing most of my career on communications. One area we, as an industry, have been seeking is telemetry for use in both operational quality assurance and for air-safety investigation. Like it or not, the public has little tolerance for the glacial pace of aviation evolution, especially in the area of accident investigation.

Mode S transponders and ADS-B open up an new generation of analysis unrelated to air traffic control or collision avoidance.

Public companies like flightradar24.com have crowd-sourced a very comprehensive set of data and make this available in real-time. Not only can we examine the flight of interest, we can look at all the other flights too. This adds a whole new dimension of insight.

Our planes, even older ones like the RJ85, are spewing streams of data that can be harvested for forensic and a lot of other purposes. And much of it, like ACARS and ADS-B is sent totally in the clear with little authentication to prevent spoofing, interception or hacking. I can see where security is being added as an afterthought in some of these protocols. In the meantime we amateurs can track Air Force One and Tyson One going south for the holidays.

I was lead engineer (control laws) for Boeing automatic flight controls, Thrust Management, for 757, 767, 747-400 and am very familiar with airplane systems. If you fly those planes, or 777 or 747-8, you are using thrust management, data link, flight data recording, and satcom systems I once led, or are directly based on developments I played a principal role in.

As supervisor for data link and satcom, I led the ability to for satellite voice and for ACARS/FANS to connect pilot and controller, to which I spend considerable time dealing with human factors and having to invent "comm messages" as a whole new category.

Many of us here have used those systems over the years, thanks for your efforts. Trying to do a user interface for messaging and ATC with the installed base of text screen user terminals and FMS boxes must have been a challenge.

Having examined a lot of data throughout my career, I have found that it is far easier connect the dots when you know what happened.

And, here on PPRuNe, we have sometimes found the smoking gun in an accident investigation long before the report comes out a year or two later. Or, at least, some of us think we have.

In the 1997 SilkAir 185 crash a poster here correctly gave the probable cause within a few days. Was PPRuNe still an e-mail list back then? Or had Danny started the web page by then? I can't remember. For some of us, server crashes and lost passwords in the early days have given us an 'adjusted date of hire'.

Similarly, the likely cause of the 1999 Egyptair 990 crash was revealed here long before the official reports were published. I was assured by others on PPRuNe in those pre-911 (and pre-Germanwings) days that it couldn't be suicide because the captain was a Muslim.

A poster named Uncle Jay posted his early speculative analysis of the 2009 Colgan Air 3407 mishap as a stall-spin accident and nearly nailed it in my opinion. For some reason his post was summarily removed by the mods.

So, why not just wait for the accident report to come out? Why look at the publically available information and data trails and form opinions and have these sometimes heated discussions?

For some of us in the flying business the lessons from a mishap may have practical application long before the final report is published. A suspected battery fire, fuel exhaustion mishap, or long landing runway excursion causes us to think twice about how we would avoid or handle those undesirable situations as we operate aircraft in just another day at the office.

And sometimes the final report just doesn't past the smell test based on what we have learned and discussed here and elsewhere. The Egyptair 990 report issued by Egypt's ECAA concluded that Gamal El-Batouti did not crash the plane despite fairly persuasive published evidence from the wreckage and investigation. Similarly, the Indonesian NTSC was unable to find the cause of the Silk Air 185 crash. In both of these cases the NTSB concluded that the probable cause was intentional control inputs by one of the pilots.

As Professor Feynman famously observed, often we know much more than we can prove. And as President Reagan's favorite Russian proverb dictates, trust but verify.

TowerDog

18th Dec 2016, 21:59

Well spoken Bubba, agree with everything.
Egypt Air was pretty obvious, the F/O piece of :mad: was flying home to be fired, too many complaints about him, and he knew it.
Many of these accidents being discussed on PPRuNe seems to be spot on long before the report comes out.
Gulf Air Bus: Those guys did not know how to do instrument flying, they lost control of a perfectly good plane.
Same with the bus in Libya, they cocked it up and crashed a brand new airplane.
I remember those discussions and threads very well. :sad:

lemme

18th Dec 2016, 22:20

Lemme :
The first question that come to my mind is why are you doing this? Is it just a hobby or is it professionally motivated, like selling a technology or a project/ idea ? or just wanting to show what people can do with FR24/ ADS ?
(apologies, off thread) This is an unpaid personal quest looking at options for telemetry (not system health monitoring). I am on pprune.org seeking help to answer questions (crowd sourcing). I have responded to questions I have studied thinking to be helpful, and that has brought some interesting new aspects to light. Challenging assumptions, looking at the data again, running down a dead-end...maybe we don't find something new or wrong, but sometimes we pick up a gem that becomes instrumental in unexpected ways.

I keep assembling more and more information in my analysis. I am sharing the blog because I think others might have similar questions and may find the information helpful. The fine line is to not represent it as a factual report, which of course, it is not. I cannot attest to the flightradar24.com data as factual, just for starters. But I am mindful of correlation in data sets too, so agree have to tread carefully. My stock is in the flightradar24.com ADS-B data, the BAE FCOM Vol 1, photos of the crash site, the approach transcript, Google Earth and Excel. I have great trust in the BAE marketing brochure and information relating to engine off glide matching from two different sources.

jack11111

19th Dec 2016, 00:02

Lemme,

As you describe your background in aviation, it sounds well rounded and solid.
I don't believe you are trying to fool any of us here on the forum.
Follow your passion and worry not about the static in the air.

ATC Watcher

19th Dec 2016, 06:57

Ok last try :
Jack11111: worry not about the static in the air.
I've been called a lot of things in my days but this one is new :)

Airbubba : In the 1997 SilkAir 185 crash a poster here correctly gave the probable cause within a few days
I was there also and remember well. You correctly say "probable cause " because it still is the the theory that best fit the event but no hard evidence of it was ever produced as far as I know,.
If you look at the CRJ/Sweden report being discussed right now, the final report gives a totally different answer as what was discussed here , and also perhaps add another possibility at those accidents of 20 years ago.
Similarly the discussion on Asiana 777/SFO . Those "idiots" that could not fly a visual, remember ? but the final NTSB report gives a very different picture that rather aim at the manufacturer and the airline than to the " idiots "pilots up front. Sometimes we are our worst enemy here.

Towerdog :Egypt Air was pretty obvious, the F/O piece of :mad: [...]
Many of these accidents being discussed on PPRuNe seems to be spot on long before the report comes out.
Gulf Air Bus: Those guys did not know how to do instrument flying, they lost control of a perfectly good plane.
Same with the bus in Libya, they cocked it up and crashed a brand new airplane.

Thanks for proving my point . No further comment .

Finally Lemme :
Thanks for replying to my questions . I get it now . It is a fee space here, and you have followers, Jut be careful not to hurt anybody in the process because you are swimming in murky waters and I may add , at night . . I cannot attest to the flightradar24.com data as factual
and :I have great trust in the BAE marketing brochure
Good luck. see you back when the report is out.

portmanteau

19th Dec 2016, 20:22

Preliminary report will be published on December 22 says Director of Colombia Civav.

aterpster

19th Dec 2016, 22:58

I'm curious whether they had the required nav charts on board.

n5296s

20th Dec 2016, 00:21

Those "idiots" that could not fly a visual, remember ? but the final NTSB report gives a very different picture that rather aim at the manufacturer and the airline than to the " idiots "pilots up front.

I hadn't seen the final report for this, thanks for pointing to it. But I don't think it supports what you say here. Both the probable cause and 3 out of 5 contributing factors relate directly to the specific performance of the crew, not to the manufacturer or the airline. Yes, the 777 autothrottle design seems highly perverse, and the airline clearly didn't encourage the kind of in-flight experience that would have equipped the crew to treat this approach as routine. But still, most of the reports fingers point at the crew.

Report conclusions below for those who don't want to wade through 129 pages. The Recommendations section is about training to prevent a recurrence, and therefore by nature says nothing about the specific crew - I'd imagine they won't be flying airliners again anyway so it would be irrelevant. Or if they are, they will have received a LOT of training.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the visual approach, the pilot flying’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances. Contributing to the accident were (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing’s documentation and Asiana’s pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error; (2) the flight crew’s nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems; (3) the pilot flying’s inadequate training on the planning and executing of visual approaches; (4) the pilot monitoring/instructor pilot’s inadequate supervision of the pilot flying; and (5) flight crew fatigue, which likely degraded their performance.

ATC Watcher

20th Dec 2016, 08:02

n526s :

This accident report is extremely interesting , especially beyond the 130 first pages. If you have a bit a of time go through the Board members comments . Very interesting personal comments in there .
Especially that one from Bob Sumwalt ( page 136) : a small extract :Contrary to what some may believe, this accident is not just another “pilot error” accident. Like most accidents, the causation of this accident is complex and involves the interaction of several elements of the system. It involves a set of circumstances that came together on this day to produce a tragic outcome.
I believe setting the stage for the crash was expectancy; the pilot flying expected the airplane to do something that it wasn’t designed to do. Specifically, he expected the autothrottle system to provide speed control for him, but unbeknownst to him, the system would not do so while in a HOLD mode.
This pilot was not the only one who didn’t understand this nuance of the automation,
The Comments from Korea are also worth looking at , but of course will be called biased , however this fact below is interesting , as they say it is in contradiction with FAA certifications requirements :
the B777 low-speed alert was a caution that did not require immediate pilot actions, and generated a master beeper that sounds identical to more than 60 other problems on the aircraft.

The devil is nearly always in the details ..and I would not be surprised a little bit if this is the same in this RJ case. Too much focus on "bad pilots" and fuel imho.

H Peacock

20th Dec 2016, 10:23

I don't dispute that is indeed what was stated, but the guys in the front had a duty to monitor their 777's performance. They got way too slow and didn't notice it = an error by the pilots! Great if we have a system to help us out and control the airspeed, but your job as an airframe-operator is to: Understand its systems fully; Monitor it!

Way too many accidents when, for whatever reason, the system doesn't do what is expected but the aircrew either don't notice or over-react! Inevitably lessons to be learned about the possible lack of understanding of the automation/monitoring, but you can't absolve the aircrew from not doing what is surely their primary role - flying the aeroplane.

Back on thread, unless the Lamia RJ suffered a totally unexpected and simultaneous loss of thrust on all 4 engines, I can't see how their subsequent reaction was anything other than woefully inadequate. And that's before there is any mention regarding their planning and fuel uplift.

A0283

20th Dec 2016, 11:40

Just wondering ... maps ...

Descending (fast) from 21,000ft through 19,000ft under highly stressful conditions ... Maps give Trans Level FL 190 and Trans Alt 18,000ft ... what altitude setting were they on ... (if not reported, then you would of course need CVR and FDR to answer that one)...

Comparing IAC maps with Jeppesen maps ref indication of ground contours/altitudes. IIRC in for example the Guam case there were comments on the contours/alts, the impact area not being properly indicated. In this case the Jeppesen appears to be superior to the IAC map. The Jeppesen contours say 8,000ft by the way.

There is a nasty isolated hump along the approach path around D5 IMDE. On the IAC map it says 8040ft (but you might overlook that). On the Jeppesen it says 8157ft (indicated more clearly, but i had to check if it said 6157 or 8157 because of the contour line).

So pilots who had been there before and pilots who looked at their maps, forgetting the 12,600/13,100 ft MSA, in an emergency would probably make sure they would stay well above 8,200ft.
Which triggers the question who was PF. The FO being reported talking to ATC, would suggest the Capt to be PF. How familiar was the PF with this specific airport. What kind of terrain map would he have had in mind.

IIRC the Lamia flight at some stage reported being 'visual with ground'. They were flying in the dark. The most likely visual might have been La Ceja. If you look at videos from the approach and aerial pictures, then La Ceja has quite typical contours. Wonder if having grating type contours of towns on the maps would be beneficial in this specific area.

Just wondering ...

Lonewolf_50

20th Dec 2016, 11:49

This accident report is extremely interesting , especially beyond the 130 first pages.
If you are 35 knots slow on final, you fail your check ride.
If you are 30 knots slow on final, you fail your check ride
If you are 25 knots slow on final, you fail your check ride
If you are 20 knots slow on final, you fail your check ride
If you are 15 knots slow on final, you fail your check ride.

And you really fail your check ride if you get into those conditions on final and 1) you don't act to correct it and 2) you don't initiate a go around before you get to 35+ knots slow on final. That a training captain was in one of the seats is deeply disturbing from the PoV of the system and culture in that airline. I appreciate Mr Sumwalt's points on how the pilots ended up in a situation where they failed their check ride with a plane full of passengers, in terms of training and culture. There is certainly an element of habits that will hopefully be addressed in that company.

This accident, however, is from a significantly different organizational set up and culture. Asiana is a major airline with some depth. This company, LaMia, was small and has/had no depth. From an organizational aspect, they were more vulnerable to any problems in culture, training, and habits. Fewer opportunities for the 'system' to catch aberration.

PEI_3721

20th Dec 2016, 12:26

But ...
Passing your check ride will not ensure that you act correctly in all situations, especially in circumstances which demand high mental workload or rely on experience.

ATC Watcher

20th Dec 2016, 13:05

Lonewolf : I am not a 777 pilot , but I am a Human factors guy, and I would bet those guys all passed all their check rides on the Knot, but the interesting bit for me is why they dot not monitor speed this time : lapse, negligence or training issue ?

And the answer is in the report : they all 3 said expected the automation to protect speed in all modes but they stated they did not know it would not do so when in the " Hold " mode " . Further the PF sated he never did a visual approach without a Glide slope before.
Those were not inexperienced pilots, both in the 10.000 hours range.

The aircraft is know to have a few automation traps ( most a/c do, not only Boeing 777s ) and the airline recognized those were not emphasized or taught to the crews during their training although the philosophy of the Airline was to : "make full use of all automation and did not encourage manual flight during line operations " (quote from the report)

So negligence from who ?

sorry for the thread Drift..

Oh, and by the way Lonewolf, totally agree with your last paragraph. Although one could debate that the what I would call "military Cockpit authority culture" could perhaps apply to both LaMia and Asiana. .

A0283

20th Dec 2016, 15:55

Just wondering ... maps ... again

In my post #974 my area of interest was on what ground you might expect between the VOR "RNG" and Cordova airport.

The next map in my stack was a Visual for Medellin airport. That showed more ground contour information. That map color-indicated the VOR plateau at 8,000ft without showing specific peaks/ridges.
Bit of a surprise then when taking the AIP Colombia next which gives the DVOR "RNG" an elevación of 8,669 ft.

No problem at all if you are following MSA guidance, but can give you a nasty surprise if you do not take a detailed look at the available information in an emergency descent.

When you go to the AIP SKRG Visuals you find values of peaks/ridges around the VOR of between 8,450-8,900 ft.

I dont know the altitude of the initial impact ridge. A rough estimate is that it is at the VOR altitude level plus/minus a few hundred feet.

Gives a bit of a 'Guam' feeling.

It suggests that the "map resolution"/"cut-off" criterium for VFR is indeed different from that of IFR and neither shows consistency in application.

Best advice with these maps appears to be to ignore all specific peak/ridge information and just add 1,000ft to all contour information. Which means in this case that the plane should have stayed above 9,000 ft over the VOR.

Lonewolf_50

20th Dec 2016, 18:06

But ...
Passing your check ride will not ensure that you act correctly in all situations, especially in circumstances which demand high mental workload or rely on experience.
Not a good reply, since it implies that the only time you have to be "on" is during a check ride. We both know that isn't so. Many companies have FOQA programs ... can't recall if Asiana does or not, but I suspect they do. Let's not forget the general requirement for a stabilized approach applies to the visual approach, does it not? Being 20 knots off is hardly stabilized in the end game, no less 35 or so.

If you aren't maintaining airspeed, and correcting it when it's wrong, you aren't flying the plane, the plane is flying you. Apologies for further digression, will stop.

@ATC: I fully embrace the importance of human factors, based on the mishap I was in and the ones I investigated. I also used to teach CRM. I understand the issues of supervisory/cultural errors, and the power of norms both formal and informal. On top of that, I am very cognizant of cockpit gradients since during my time in the Navy, flying, that particular issue got massive amounts of attention and the difference between what goes on in a cockpit in 1983 and 2003 was profound. Beyond that, I was once getting a check ride from the Naval Air Forces NATOPS evaluator who, inadvertently, while giving me a simulated engine failure actually pulled the engine off line. (hehe, the debrief on that one was good fun). We put the bird on the deck, got it all started again, and proceeded to complete the check ride. (We handled the engine loss as a crew right out of the PCL/emergency action items, just as you'd hope).

If we are to try and compare Asiana with LaMia, perhaps the only useful point of comparison is in the cockpit gradient on the flight involved -- but I am guessing at that. We have one report and not the other one to refer to.

A0283

20th Dec 2016, 19:45

@lemme - your photo clearly shows what i call the saddle - on the left 8,232ft then the downward curve and up the 8,127ft to the right.

When you are not sure about your heading, even if you know your DME distance, you would have to add the 1,000ft i mentioned in my previous post to the 8,000ft before you could think about starting a descent. So even if they had cleared the VOR ridge there would have been a real risk of hitting either side of the saddle. And if they had kept that safer 9,000ft it would have forced them into a steeper descent on finals.

Hotel Tango

20th Dec 2016, 21:01

Lemme, your posts help me get to sleep in the evening. Thank you.

CHfour

20th Dec 2016, 21:27

@HT
Lemme, your posts help me get to sleep in the evening. Thank you.
Uncalled-for :(

Hotel Tango

20th Dec 2016, 22:29

@ CHfour

Uncalled-for

We can all speculate until the cows come home, but lemme takes it to another level. I just do not see any value whatsoever in his lengthy and detailed speculations. What does it achieve?

testpanel

20th Dec 2016, 22:44

Bolivian Minister of Public Works Milton Claros told reporters: "After investigations we have concluded that the pilot of the plane and the airline LaMia are responsible for the crash."

So!

Full article:

Bolivia: Human error caused crash that killed soccer team - CNN.com (http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/20/americas/bolivia-plane-crash-human-error/index.html)

A0283

20th Dec 2016, 23:13

@testpanel - an interesting (short) CNN article:

A Bolivian government minister talking about investigation results.
An investigator talking about people that have been arrested.

Never too old to be surprised.

@Hotel Tango - no need to speculate indeed, the cows are already at home :-)

On a much more serious note - Earlier in the thread i mentioned that i hoped someone would separate the international safety and criminal investigations and make the result public. I am still hoping. Does not make the ICAO job of the Colombians easier.

Right Way Up

20th Dec 2016, 23:19

Why does anyone think that a person who will willingly depart with insufficient fuel will have any capacity to consider terrain clearance.

Lets keep our eyes on the ROOT cause!

A0283

20th Dec 2016, 23:42

@Right Way Up

Don't you think that terrain clearance is one aspect that can be discussed to try to test that capacity. The way you phrase it could be extrapolated to any aspect. It would surprise me if that is what you mean to say.

In my view there never is a single root cause. A 4D interrelated chain of events is a better description. Discussing the root cause that you probably refer too must wait till an investigation publishes an extensive set of documents. That's something you might expect from/in a US NTSB investigation docket, but not per se from this multinational investigation.

YRP

21st Dec 2016, 01:16

But A0283 surely any root cause(s), if there are multiple causes for this particular accident, had to be before the departure. The fuel calculation, the decision to depart with that fuel load and flight plan without a fuel stop, all these are the root cause.

Perhaps there could be other causes that influenced that decision, eg commercial pressures, some misguided belief that the plane used less fuel than the book said (hypothetical speculation here), etc. But anything that happened after they pushed the throttles forward on departure is just reaction not cause.

Sure they might have been able to get recover, get away with it, save the day with some skilled cool headed flying. Then it would have been a near accident caused by the fuel decision. That decision was still the cause.

The improper handling of the fuel emergency (by the pilots) was not great. But the previous aircraft getting priority did not cause the accident. ATC did not cause it. Those two didn't even contribute. Maybe it was unlucky that that airplane was there. But flying isn't supposed to depend on luck.

SteinarN

21st Dec 2016, 06:59

Regarding the root cause, I would say it is simply that the airline company and the pilot/owner was a "cowboy" totally neglecting any prudent planning and industry standard for flight planning, safety margins, CRM and whatever. So, the root cause goes well before what happened on the departing airport.

ATC Watcher

21st Dec 2016, 07:11

Looking at the Aerosucre 727 attempted take off video on the other thread reminds me of my early days looking at CL-44s out of Luxemburg and brings me the following question:

For those in the known : how far can you stretch the MTOW on an RJ ? 2 tons ? (5% ?) or is it not possible at all on this type?

AerocatS2A

21st Dec 2016, 08:12

No idea. Have only ever been landing weight limited, not take off limited.

Capn Bloggs

21st Dec 2016, 08:21

how far can you stretch the MTOW on an RJ ? 2 tons ? (5% ?) or is it not possible at all on this type?
5% easily on any type, I'd say, provided you could takeoff at the legal MTOW ie not performance-limited). Just don't have an engine failure.

Double Back

21st Dec 2016, 09:06

SteinarN,
Agree with You, see previous post of me.
But hopefully not only the crew will be blamed, it is the system that allows these kind of operators, cowboys if You will, to start up and keep on going, with everybody looking away. Or worse, being paid to look away. This kind of people will always be pushing the limits, until they run out of luck if not stopped by the system.

Now I am not that an EU fan, but at least they have a reasonable system to keep operators like that outside the EU.

safetypee

21st Dec 2016, 09:35

lemme, your speculation increasingly relies on assumptions of what the crew were thinking; their plan at the time, not ours with hindsight.
For future safety it's good question why did an aircraft with a reasonable chance of achieving some form of landing, ended up on a hill side; particularly when the industry recalls at least two previous events with a successful outcome (Gimli, VIE), involving higher tech aircraft, in a similar technical scenarios, and of the same certification basis.
The degree of success depends on being on/off an airport, the distance vs altitude available, weather, and terrain. The latter two in this event were unfavourable.

A pilot might be more interested in conserving altitude, not descending early to meet some objective, particularly if this is defined by range information which the crew may not be aware of (no DME display). Also, the speculative 3-4D navigation assumed that the crew had accurate altitude information; this required resetting the StBy altimeter scale; the alternative is ILS GS. Is there any evidence that ATC broadcast the airfield datum.

I doubt that the crew would recall the glide ratios for configuration; I would not recall 15:1*, but for other reasons 6:1 is remembered, 1nm/1000 ft (note range requirement). Thus a plan might involve stretching the glide until committed to the final configuration selection.

Emergency navigation information is shown overlaid on the StBy attitude gyro (not IRS) as a two axis cross pointer. Without care this display could be interpreted as a FD command.
With a VOR tuned the lateral axis would provide directions to the ground station; I cannot recall what the vertical axis displays, but if shown and followed as a FD command, then a null reading could result in unmonitored flight into terrain. AFAIR there is no range information.
With an ILS tuned then both axis would be valid, but the aircraft would have to maintain flight at or above the GS. If the display was used as a FD command with the aircraft closing from above or being on the GS, then there would be a point at which the aircraft would be unable to maintain both speed and GS if fully configured (but 15:1 clean or low flap, low wt vs high alt, might be an interesting challenge).

* 20 years on type, including steep approaches.
The 146/RJ aircraft types have never to date, suffered 'deep stall'. The 'straight' wing design has a conventional stall which is forcefully assisted with a stick push for the manual controls.

AerocatS2A

21st Dec 2016, 11:38

Safetypee, I think the stby attitude nav display is for ILS only. If ILS is not tuned then the bars move from view. The #1 DBI is available at the emerg power level with a bearing pointer for tracking a VOR or NDB. The possibility of treating the stby ILS bars as a flight director is very real and could easily lead to trouble.

A0283

21st Dec 2016, 12:24

Thanks for responding.
@YRP But A0283 surely any root cause(s), if there are multiple causes for this particular accident, had to be before the departure. … But anything that happened after they pushed the throttles forward on departure is just reaction not cause.

That depends on definitions. Some may find that academic, but aerospace is ‘art and science’ if we like it or not. If you use the word “cause” then you would have to define the difference between root and general causes. Root suggests main or single. If you use the word “cause” at all, then in my perception an accident always is a series of (minor, medium, major,...) causes. A cause would then be something going wrong that is not limited (minor,medium, major,...) by the ‘aerospace system’. There are a lot of ‘limiters’ in the system, examples are redundancy, training, experience, procedures, rules, etcetera. For an accident to happen you need multiple causes with multiple limiters failing along a specific timeline. Based on that, your “reactions” are causes. Also, reaction may not be a conventient word. In some cases accidents happen because people/systems react, but in others because they do no react. So in general you will have multiple causes even after you push the throttles forward. After takeoff the FO might have said “we will not be able to make it” and say “I take control and we return”. The FO might have reacted to the low fuel warnings (if they got them) by a Pan or Mayday... etcetera. In each case there would probably be serious @#$%, but not an accident.

@SteinarN Regarding the root cause, I would say it is simply that the airline company and the pilot/owner was a "cowboy" totally neglecting any prudent planning and industry standard for flight planning, safety margins, CRM and whatever. So, the root cause goes well before what happened on the departing airport.

If it turns out that the company/pilot was a ‘cowboy’ then big questions would be how did they get in that position, how did they stay in that position (introduce Venezuela), and even why they and their crews survived for such a long time. Which means you also have to look at the multiple causes and limiters in the years before and on the pre-departure side. Indeed well before what happened on the departing airport.

@Finally, accident reports generally talk about cause(s) and contributing factors. In some cases the investigation runs into issues that are neither but should be mentioned. In this case doubts about the quality and consistency of the various AIP maps should be mentioned.

safetypee

21st Dec 2016, 13:35

Thanks Aerocat, aah the S2 (never had the pleasure).
You are correct, just found my reference. This makes sense with the VOR as bearing information, the ILS as a beam.
The GS display had conventional scaling, and presumably suffered beam 'reversal' at excessively large deviations (as for a 6:1 glide).
Also was the DME powered as part of Nav 1 and displayed on the DBI?

Oh for a list of all those forgotten things ... at least I know that they are forgotten, ... I think.

gsxrpilot

21st Dec 2016, 19:01

lemme's analysis is some of the only intelligence on this entire thread and I've been enjoying it. If his speculation is a waste of time, then entire thread is certainly a waste of time.

Good stuff lemme, keep it up.

truckflyer

21st Dec 2016, 23:12

I think the issue with "Lemme's" post, and I am not criticising him for what he has written, but it the professional commercial aviation world it's a pointless exercise.

You are not supposed to in Commercial aviation rely on the fact that you "might" be able to glide in to the runway so you can safe fuel, and extend your endurance.

I believe all this speculation if they could have made it in without fuel, shows that there are many "flight sim" pilots here trying to work out some absurd theories.

Medellin was they final destination, they should have arrived Medellin with "minimum" fuel to an alternate + 30 minutes final reserve. The fact is that they knew already at departure that they did not have this, makes them criminals, and that they did not divert them en-route makes them criminals.

When they started their descent into Medellin, they did NOT have this fuel, at this point when they was aware of this, any PROFESSIONAL pilot would have declared a fuel emergency.

Of course that would have meant they would have had to answer to the Colombian authorities why they left with insufficient fuel, and why they did not divert en-route.

I guess they took a massive gamble, and wanted to avoid a Colombian jail (which they deserved), and instead got the death penalty.

The tragedy is all the innocent people they took with them on their narcissistic final flight.

It's irrelevant if they could have reached the runway from their current position when they ran out of fuel, even speculating about this is just childish.

How do you expect someone who have already committed the most basic errors and ignored the most basic of all regulations, to suddenly have the skill set and mental capacity to glide the aircraft without fuel.

Fact is that he should NEVER have been in that position anyway. This is not a scenario I would expect ever to need to practise, as you should never get yourself into this situation from start anyway. :ugh:

Iron Duck

22nd Dec 2016, 07:55

How do you expect someone who have already committed the most basic errors and ignored the most basic of all regulations, to suddenly have the skill set and mental capacity to glide the aircraft without fuel.

I think the point is that even after all that - knowing that even if all went well they would arrive with dry tanks - nonetheless they seemed unprepared for actually running out of fuel, were apparently caught out by it, and look as if they handled it badly. They appear to have had no Plan B even though it was highly probable that they'd need it.

That's Denial with knobs on. Perhaps the Captain really was a very good handling pilot who, based on his overconfidence, decided his exceptional skills could increase the flight's profitability by overflying the refuelling stop, and then simply refused to believe it when they actually ran dry. [I don't really believe missing the stop was to avoid loss of face. The football team had already changed travel plans just to be able to use this airline. I don't think an additional stop would have been likely to put them off.]

It wouldn't be the first time this sort of thing has happened. Aerosucre could easily turn out to be something similar.

It appears to me that Lemme thinks the final report might not be entirely objective, and wishes to try to establish as disinterested and factual a narrative as he possibly can first, perhaps to hold some feet to the fire. That's understandable. I've read similar sentiments concerning Metrojet and Egyptair, among others, and I daresay some Aerosucre people at this moment might well be wondering how best to cover their backs.

ATC Watcher

22nd Dec 2016, 08:24

Iron dick :
It appears to me that Lemme thinks the final report might not be entirely objective, and wishes to try to establish as disinterested and factual a narrative as he possibly can first,

Using FR24 ? and giving on a plate lawyers arguments to fool victims families and try to nail some people? very dangerous game . This is what I was trying to warn lemme about , but he is on a crusade... words won't stop strong believers.

Same for Aerosucre, everyone mentions overweight and start hammering the crew. .But no-one knows for sure , could also be an engine failure past V1 on a very short runway on a hot day...

H Peacock

22nd Dec 2016, 08:35

Same for Aerosucre, everyone mentions overweight and start hammering the crew. .But no-one knows for sure , could also be an engine failure past V1 on a very short runway on a hot day...

It may well have been an engine failure, but surely their limited Mtow should have factored this in. If an engine stops above V1 you'd be expected to continue the takeoff and have the required performance to get airborne before you run out of runway. They clearly didn't achieve that, so if it was just an engine failure I think you can still safely conclude they were indeed too heavy!

ATC Watcher

22nd Dec 2016, 08:40

H Peacok : Good point . yes, you are correct .

AerocatS2A

22nd Dec 2016, 08:50

Part of the issue with Aerosucre is that there is footage of a take-off from the same runway on a different day and they very nearly did the same thing. That would suggest that they were playing with fire and got burnt.

ATC Watcher

22nd Dec 2016, 09:13

Trial by You tube !
Well " Comparison is not reason " always hammered my philosophy teacher in high school.
I think we are entering a era where everything is instantly visible on FR24, Live ATC leak, You tube, Twitter etc.. and everyone wants to play judge and jury. Getting closer and closer to public mobbing with no chance to reply.
Then come people like lemme who think he knows and brings this to yet another level. And the someone here ( Iron Dick) even suggesting the reason for doing this is that he thinks the final report will not be objective! but lemme suggestions based on FR24 are?
That worries me . But maybe I am just getting too old for this . :rolleyes:

His dudeness

22nd Dec 2016, 09:19

It may well have been an engine failure, but surely their limited Mtow should have factored this in. If an engine stops above V1 you'd be expected to continue the takeoff and have the required performance to get airborne before you run out of runway. They clearly didn't achieve that, so if it was just an engine failure I think you can still safely conclude they were indeed too heavy!

Or its an engine failure and the remaining donks weren´t up to it...

alemaobaiano

22nd Dec 2016, 09:28

AerocatS2A :

Trial by You tube !
Well " Comparison is not reason " always hammered my philosophy teacher in high school.
I think we are entering a era where everything is instantly visible on FR24, Live ATC leak, You tube, Twitter etc.. and everyone wants to play judge and jury. Getting closer and closer to public mobbing with no chance to reply.
Then come people like lemme who think he knows and brings this to yet another level. And the someone here ( Iron Dick) even suggesting the reason for doing this is that he thinks the final report will not be objective! but lemme suggestions based on FR24 are?
That worries me . But maybe I am just getting too old for this . :rolleyes:

Well put, I think we need to start a club for us oldies :}

Iron Duck

22nd Dec 2016, 09:58

Er...

Not to drift the thread, but:

Trial by You tube !
Well " Comparison is not reason " always hammered my philosophy teacher in high school.

The YouTube stuff is clearly documentary - it wasn't generated by a flight sim - and shows a succession of takeoffs that would brown most peoples' trousers. No matter why Aerosucre were doing that, you'll get away with it until one day you won't.

Then come people like lemme who think he knows and brings this to yet another level. And the someone here ( Iron Dick) even suggesting the reason for doing this is that he thinks the final report will not be objective! but lemme suggestions based on FR24 are?

I think we're all familiar with the 'whitewash'. It appears to me that Lemme thinks (note the language construction) that by using new sources of 'independent' data he can construct a narrative that makes a whitewash less likely, or easier to invalidate, than was possible before the advent of services such as FR24. I don't have the knowledge to judge whether or not he's made a success of it.

That's all.

AerocatS2A

22nd Dec 2016, 10:05

AerocatS2A :

Trial by You tube !
Well " Comparison is not reason " always hammered my philosophy teacher in high school.

It's a datapoint and a thorough investigation would take it in to account and give it the weight it deserves. For us plebs on the sideline we don't have access to much of the information and so perhaps we give the datapoint too much weight, or maybe we are right on the money.

I think it is normal for an investigative team to ask "what normally happens in this operation?" IF the marginal take-off by the previous Aerosucre flight is what normally happens then it is not very surprising that they eventually crashed.

Likewise we might ask "how does LaMia normally operate their long distance flights?" If it is found that there was a culture of eating into their reserve or not planning for any reserve at all then again, not very surprising that they eventually run out of fuel.

I don't have an opinion on what Lemme is doing. The only thing I thought when I read some of his material is that he has too much time on his hands, but I understand that people develop an interest in things that don't interest me to the same extent.

I would rather see someone put some critical thought into their amateur sleuthing the way Lemme is, rather than the useless dreck that the more ignorant put out.

For what it's worth I think the comments about objectivity are the wrong way around. Lemme wants to investigate as much as he can with publicly available information and doesn't want the official report to bias his own work, in other words, he's not worried about the official report being objective, he's worried about his own objectivity being biased by knowledge of the final report. Basically he doesn't want to know the answer before working it out for himself.

Another poster commented that Lemme's interest is academic, and I think it is exactly that, a very academic interest in accident investigation via publicly available information.