Air Cadets grounded?

[cats_five]

However, over the years these simple, basic, non-complex, robust aircraft were so badly maintained that by 2014 they were no longer airworthy

Most of them are probably airworthy but its the paper trail showing they are that is really badly maintained.

[tucumseh]

Engines

Well said (again) although I would reservations about the RAeS being independent when it comes to MoD's airworthiness failings. Individual members have spoken out robustly against MoD's behaviour, but some very senior people in the Society have defended the indefensible and proven themselves morally bankrupt. On many occasions over the past 15 years it has acted as the mouthpiece for the RAF Air Officers who oversaw this debacle and, when cornered, has simply said that airworthiness is none of its concern. Which may come as a surprise to its Airworthiness Group.

I'd like to see the members of this Group prepare an independent report, along the same lines as the "3 Fellows" report by members of the Flight Operations Group in 2000, which the hierarchy - at the RAF's behest - distanced themselves from and ordered "burned", but which remains perfectly valid to this day. In fact, the later airworthiness appendix to this report would be an excellent starting point. You only have to delete Chinook and insert Gliders.

[clunckdriver]

Well, I guess I'm not the only one smelling a rat in this particular post. We are on our way to the UK this week to attend a DH vintage aircraft function, the last one we attended there was much talk from some very qualified folks as to how the Cadet Gliding was going, {or more to the point, not going} maybe this group who run and keep a large fleet of vintage aircraft in the air should be given the task to fix this mess, the expertise in this organisation must be tenfold the bozos who have created this mess!

[Engines]

Cats Five,

Sorry if I didn't make myself clear - if the paper trail is badly maintained, and become inaccurate, then the aircraft is, by definition, non-airworthy. If you don't have a full record of the configuration and the state of the aircraft, you simply don't know whether it's airworthy or not. You can't make the most basic of airworthiness declarations. As I've posted before, it's not a hard thing to do right.

As to the actual state of the aircraft, I've done many inspections of aircraft maintenance organisations. I've been responsible for managing maintenance contracts, and for the maintenance of military aircraft fleets. My experience (admittedly limited) is that if you find problems in the paperwork, you need to start looking hard at the aircraft. Why? Because poor documentation standards are almost always accompanied by poor standards of work on the aircraft. Any good technician knows that the paperwork has to be right.

Making sure that the paperwork IS being done right is also down to strong unit management, good supervision and an effective system of external inspections. QA, TQM, Quality circles, EFQM, 6 sigma, take yer pick. Just choose one and do it properly. In this case, the RAF appears to have failed to do that. It badly needs to know why. From its public statements, it's not asking itself that question. I hope I'm drawing the wrong conclusion here, I really do.

Tuc, I agree that the RAeS hasn't covered itself in glory over the past few years, but it has the right people and the right charter to to a decent job. Perhaps the Public Accounts Committee might want to look at the financial aspects?

Clunk, good suggestion - I'd suggest that there needs to be a tough debate on whether the taxpayer should be shelling out many millions of pounds (and that's what we're talking about here) to allow the RAF to support its recruiting activities. On the (limited) evidence, these millions have not been well used. Perhaps the civil route would be cheaper, and probably safer.

Best regards as ever to those footing the bills,

Engines

[J1N]

Aren't there actually two separate points here which require answers:


Firstly, the airworthiness problems and related issues, including the financial and contractual circumstances and consequences, and the managerial failings this points to in respect of RAF, MOD and contractor staff


Secondly, the way in which the "pause" seems to have been cynically exploited as a smokescreen for a large-scale dismantling of the former VGS network?


I have to add my dismay to that of many ex-cadets on here who benefited from a marvellous opportunity to fly which in practical terms no longer exists.

[tucumseh]

J1N

Correct J1N but the two are inextricably linked because those who cynically exploit have most to lose if the airworthiness failings and consequences are exposed to detailed scrutiny. They are permitted to judge their own case, so concocted the "pause" nonsense. In doing so, they protect their predecessors/mentors, to whom they owe their current position.

The systemic problems that caused the basic failures are actually well known and documented - simply an extension of the failings confirmed by Haddon-Cave, who in turn merely summarised internal MoD audit reports from 1988, 1992 and 1996 (but attributed them to 1998).

The Inspectorate of Flight Safety issued their own report in 1992, the first (that we know of) in a series of damning such reports which all said the same thing. Implement your regulations. As Engines said, it's not a hard thing to do. The same thing happened back then. The persons to blame were the recipients of the report, so got away with burying it. It emerged in 2011, MoD's Controller Aircraft from the time inadvertently revealed he'd never seen it, and it immediately became the most significant evidence to Lord Philip - and MoD lost another case. (A recurring theme, and it never learns).

MoD always seek to compartmentalise these things, claiming isolated event. It isn't. It's all part of the same malaise. This glider issue is not new. I've seen the report that warned of it from about 7 years ago. I suspect this was prepared after the Nimrod Review, when a degree of panic reigned as IPTs sought to work out how bad their own situation was. As has been suggested here before, I believe the Air Staff would have prioritised corrective action. (At least those few who weren't in denial. I wonder if they have given any thought to their post-Nimrod Review claims that there have never been airworthiness failings?) The "top down" approach was to establish the MAA. Over 6 years later, it is still in its infancy and essentially toothless. But as the problems were well documented, a "bottom up" approach was easy to implement, but would require political will, funding and, importantly, serious engineering expertise. This has not been MoD policy since 1990, when specialist airworthiness staff were deemed the "rump end of MoD(PE)" and given transfer notices as they'd nothing to do, as funding was being chopped. It was said at the time that it would take decades to recover from this act.

[cats_five]

I didn't explain myself well. When the gliders are inspected to reinstate the paper trail I suspect the majority will be fine, though it will take a long & detailed inspection to resolve the paper issues. However I am sure issues will be found, some of them might be very big issues justifying the grounding and re-inspection of all of them.

[Engines]

Cats Five, no need to apologise at all - I wasn't all that clear in the first post of this series.

Like you, I suspect that the majority of the aircraft will be Ok, unless the RAF's maintenance systems and standards have collapsed completely, which I don't think is the case. I've often posted my admiration for the professionalism and quality of the RAF personnel I've worked with.

But something bad has happened here. Actually, it shouldn't take a 'long and detailed inspection' to resolve the paperwork issues - again, these are simple aircraft. Extremely simple. As simple an aircraft as you can get into the air in. No systems to speak of, simple construction, low stress levels in operation, low g limits, and so on. So what the heck is taking two and a half years and counting? We've had a number of good informed guesses, but b****r all decent information.

The best I can come up with (and this comes with a 'speculation alert' - sorry), is that the following issues might have had a part to play:

1. Repairs not being recorded on the Airframe Log Card
2. Lack of a proper Topic 6 leading to repairs that don't have a full approval
3. Lack of a proper support contract and a proper Design Authority
4. Poor supervision and inspection of contracted maintenance activity (already admitted to)
5. Poorly contracted support (cheapest always wins)
6. Organisational 'churn' in both MoD and RAF leading to loss of focus on the fleet
7. Premature destruction of maintenance related records (this has already been admitted)

It would be interesting to read any reports eventually issued (yeah, right) to see how far on or off target I was.

Best Regard as ever to those untangling this lot,

Engines

[1.3VStall]

If I was a UK taxpayer, and totally ignorant about aviation, I would be moved to ask my MP to investigate why the RAF - which operates state-of-the-art platforms like Typhoon, Voyager, and soon Lightning II, - is incapable of assuring the airworthiness of a fleet of simple aircraft with fixed undercarriages (thousands of which operate safely worldwide).

And also, while you are trying to find the answer to this question Mr MP, could you also find out how much this has cost/is costing the taxpayer and who, exactly, is responsible for this utter fiasco? And will anyone be made culpable? And why is there no independent oversight of the RAF's activities?

I won't hold my breath!

[tucumseh]

1.3

Unfortunately, my new MP has a policy of not replying to constituents' letters. I wrote to Tory Central and they said they have no control over how an MP conducts his business. I'm sure they'd both be more receptive if I offered a donation.

[1.3VStall]

tuc - that's democracy in practice: shameful!:ugh:

[Chugalug2]

1.3VStall:-
I would be moved to ask my MP to investigate why the RAF - which operates state-of-the-art platforms like Typhoon, Voyager, and soon Lightning II, - is incapable of assuring the airworthiness of a fleet of simple aircraft with fixed undercarriages (thousands of which operate safely worldwide).


In which case I would advise him not to assume that the state-of-the-art platforms that you list, or indeed any aircraft or systems currently in use, are airworthy. One of the default MOD procedures following any airworthiness related accident is to stove-pipe discussion to that particular fleet rather than promote the obvious thought that such deficiencies might affect other fleets, other systems. As has been stated here time and time again, these issues are generic, there is a systemic problem in UK Military Airworthiness Provision to all UK Military Airfleets, it doesn't work and hasn't worked for decades.

Haddon-Cave is quoted and revered as if it were holy script. It is instead part of the disgraceful cover-up of VSO incompetence, malevolence, and gross negligence. Faced with evidence that clearly laid down the time-line of cause and effect as starting back in 1987, it could have created the foundations of a reformed authority that would enable the return of airworthiness to the UK military airfleet. It chose instead to distort that time line to the extent of labelling the time of the suborning of the regulations as a "golden period" of airworthiness, and recommended instead the establishment of the toothless and clueless MAA.

Why would it do such a perverse thing? Simply to protect those VSOs who were responsible. It chose instead to name SOs who were staked out as scapegoats to protect those guilty VSOs. But all that is par for the course in British Establishment self protection. The difference here is that an opportunity to return the UK Military Airfleet to airworthiness was missed, and our airforces remain thus compromised until real reform happens. More treasure and blood must be lost until then, and the fighting capacity of those airforces will continue to be compromised likewise. All this to protect those guilty old men...

Lack of airworthiness is like a canker. You can be blissfully unaware of it and carry on as normal. All appears from outside to be well, but little by little it is gnawing away at the innards and eventually, and too late to avoid, will have its way. Thus 63 deaths have been ascribed as such on this very forum. Whatever hit the ACO has taken it has been mercifully spared that. Others must fly to defend us, not knowing for sure about the innards, and having those who only do blood letting with leeches as a palliative to reassure them. Ask your MP how he feels about that!

[Engines]

I might be able to help explain the potential link between the MAA issues as set out by Chug and the scandal of the ATC gliders.

The fact here is that a fleet of military aircraft (and that's what these are - aircraft on the UK Military Aircraft Register) have now been grounded for around two and a half years, with little or no explanation from the RAF as to why. There could be many reasons why so little information has been made public, a probable one (alert - just my opinion here) being the potential for Joe Public (or Joe Newspaper) to ask why schoolchildren were being flown around the sky in aircraft that weren't being maintained in an acceptably safe manner. (One RAF officer has already said that they didn't have a safety case).

One question that needs a good answer is how the MAA has allowed this to happen. It's spent years and millions writing new regulations, setting up new occurrence reporting systems, conducting assurance activities, publishing reports (some of which read like Stalinist tractor production reports). Yet all the while the RAF was flying kids around in what appear to have been wholly inadequately maintained aircraft. What assurance activity had the MAA conducted on the FTS or 22 Gp?

This isn't an isolated case.The XX179 ejection seat accident report revealed that the seat had no safety case - but the MoD PT responsible must have been audited (and approved) by the MAA.

What I'm (badly) trying to point out is that the MoD's response to Haddon-Cave -set up a new organisation, write a load of new regulations and set up loads of 'top down' safety management systems - might just not be working as intended. Certainly not in the RAF's gliding organisation.

And that's a worry. Or it should be.

Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right things,

Engines

[Chugalug2]

Engines, thank you for yet another excellent post. It confirms yet again that the ACO Gliders, and the Hawk Mk 10 ejection seat, together with airworthiness related fatal air accidents involving the Chinook Mk2, the Nimrod Mk2, the Sea King ASaC Mk7, the Hercules "K model", and the Tornado GR4, all share with the MAA itself the dubious distinction of being victims of the aftermath of an AMSO 1987 policy decision that led directly to "savings at the expense of safety".

That policy has cost this country dear, in blood, treasure, and capability. The least of that cost is the grounding of the ACO fleet. That is not to understate that particular cost in any way. It will manifest itself for decades to come I have no doubt. What is scarcely mentioned though is that list of aircraft and systems above is merely what is in the public domain, due mainly to airworthiness related accidents and subsequent inquiries and reports. They are but the tip of an iceberg upon which UK Military Aviation has foundered. In most other regimes something effective would have been done by now, no doubt surreptitiously, in order to assure national security. This regime though is different, whereby national security must take second place to a higher consideration, that of the reputations of RAF VSOs!

That is the real scandal, a cover-up involving succeeding generations of RAF VSOs that has prevented proper reform of what is now a terminally dysfunctional system. The only way that reform can happen is to free both Regulator and Investigator from the MOD and from each other. Then at last the MAA can begin to get its own house in order, reject the lies of Haddon-Cave, relearn the arcane art of airworthiness provision and maintenance, and then implement that into the UK military airfleet. In the course of which it would be monitored by a renewed and independent MilAAIB so that it can be found wanting as a regulator when airworthiness accidents occur (as they inevitably will of course).

The obstacle to all this is the MOD. It has to be overcome, or the outlook for the UK Air Forces is nothing short of bleak.

[ACW342]

I feel that this thread has now passed me by in that it has reached a level of discussion well beyond my ken, and that is as how it should be, gathering more and more evidence and piling on the pressure. That pressure should be renewed now that M. Lancaster, TD, MP is now the relevant minister. It is of interest that part of his portfolio is as the minister responsible for the Armed Forces Covenant. As the majority of posters on this thread appear to be both serving and retired members of Her Majesties Armed Forces I would suggest that we are entitled to a much greater level of information with regard to everything in this thread than we are currently receiving.

Might I suggest that ALL of you are who are flying or flew, or flew in, in what can now be described as Non-Airworthy military aircraft, ask the minister as to why your life is being or has been put at risk above and beyond the normally accepted risks of flight in a military aircraft.

Now that we have a new minister I have copied a couple of eMails to the previous minister via my quietly effective MP lady sylvia Hermon and the replies fro J Brazier, TD MP. I'll start with parts of my email asking questions in relation to the written ministerial statement to the house of commons and the reply to my MP. I might add that I also wrote a separate email to the Office of The First Minister/ Deputy First Minister at Stormont, cc'd to the First Ministers for Scotland and Wales. I also wrote an email to the chair of the Public Accounts Committee at Westminster. To date I have received NO replies from these four.

"As stated, and to re-iterate:

• Has the Minister been asked as to why this fiasco has come about?

• Is he aware that up to 146 aircraft document sets (ADS) are missing, most likely illegally destroyed.

• What were the RAF officers who held the SO1 and SO2 posts doing whilst their apparent incompetence allowed a private company to charge for work that was not done, work that was done without being asked for and in a manner that left aircraft in an un-airworthy state, signed entires in official documents (the aircraft Form 700 series, comprising part of the ADS) as having overseen work that was neither done nor overseen?

• Has he been asked as to why it has taken so long to get such a limited number of aircraft back to an airworthy state?

• Why were the Vigilant aircraft engines not replaced/refurbished at 2000 hrs which is their designed life between overhauls.

• Why, indeed, were the aircraft allowed to fly with engines past their “Life-ex” number of hours

• The reason for there only being 15 Vigilant aircraft available to 2019 is that someone found 15 replacement engines in boxes in the 2 FTS engineering facility.

• Whilst travel, accommodation and messing on residential courses is free, cadets will, of course, require “pocket money” for the week. The parents of some cadets may find it difficult to fund their offspring with such.


There are many more questions that need asking and many many anomalies to the plans drawn up by 2FTS and as presented to the minister who has, I believe, been treated to a smoke and mirrors job that in no way reflects the reality of the current situation.

Lastly, does Lady Sylvia not think that charging the MoD for work that was not done, work that left aircraft in a dangerous state and the illegal destruction of official (and possibly incriminating) documents are crime in themselves, and furthermore, the apparent lack of any form of official investigation into this possibly criminal fiasco?

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My reply to the above.

ear Lady Sylvia,
Very many thanks for sending me copies of the letters to you from the minister for reserves, J Brazier TD MP. I have already part written a reply to his first letter dated 03/05/16. Personal circumstances have precluded me from finishing it until now. I will add my comments in relation to todays reply (26/05/16).

First of all let me start by saying that I mean no disrespect to Mr. Brazier whatsoever. I save that for the very senior officers in both the ACO and the RAF who have, to my mind, fed the minister a diet of bovine faeces.

I am afraid that he has been poorly and incorrectly briefed. His letter is full of inaccuracies, in places totally wrong and certain conclusions are not fact but, to my mind, terminological inexactitudes, uttered to support 2FTS’s discrimination towards Self Launching Motor Gliders and civilian volunteer instructors in that neither hold no place in glider training to solo for the Air Cadet Organisation. I will, if I may, address each paragraph in turn.

Paragraph 1.

“ Northern Ireland will be losing its gliding squadron but gaining (for the first time) powered air experience flying for cadets in the Province”

This is factually wrong. 13 Air Experience Flight (AEF) has been flying as part of Queens University Air Squadron (QUAS) since the 1950s until the closure of QUAS in 1996. Indeed my first ever powered aircraft flight was with 13 AEF in 1964, in a Chipmunk aircraft, flying out of RAF Aldergrove. That was my first ever time upside down and pulling “G”. I have been doing just that for most of my life ever since.

Paragraph 2.
“Our aim is that a new Air Experience Flight (AEF) will be created at Aldergrove with three Grob Tutor aircraft. There are currently 427 RAF cadets in the Northern Ireland Wing, meaning there should be approximately one aircraft per 140 cadets. This compares very favourably with the cadet to aircraft ratios found in similar sized Air Experience Flights in mainland United Kingdom.”

The above are admirable aims. However, the Grob 105 tutor is only being released for AEF duties as they are no longer required for Ab-Initio RAF flying training. These aircraft as explained in paragraph 7 are owned and maintained by the M.o.D. contractor Babcock. under this contract each flight is costed at circa £500/hour. The contract with Babcock finishes in 2019. Therefore, the aim to have all cadets having three flights per year from 2018 will only last for one year. Will the Babcock contract be extended or renewed and, either way, will the contract cost then come from the ACO budget?

Notwithstanding the above, in order to maintain the aircraft Babcock will either have to employ suitably licensed A & C aircraft engineers locally or have the AEF staff trained in pre & post flight servicing of the aircraft, (an aircraft which is somewhat more complex than the Vigilant) and have the aircraft flown to a maintenance facility across the Irish Sea. There is a third possibility in that a local company may be sub-contracted to perform the maintenance and ground handling. this though will put the ACO back to the same situation they were in with SERCO and Soaring Oxford.

Paragraph 3.
“The part task trainer (simulator) which is currently located at Newtownards will also be relocated to Aldergrove, with the aim that it will be fully operational there by the end of 2016. Cadets currently have access to the part task trainer at Newtownards as and when the Volunteer Gliding Squadron (VGS) staff are available. A new training syllabus for the part task trainer is being finalised and our instructors will be retrained throughout the summer to deliver this new training at Aldergrove.”

The so called “simulator” or part task trainer is a form of PC simulator game called X-Plane. I have this on my iMac at home and, like its competitor Microsoft Flight Simulator X, shows that I have safely landed a Boeing 747 at KaiTak International Airport in Hong Kong (Where my family and I lived for two years). Any one who believes that is probably living in Cloud Cuckoo Land. It bears no resemblance to real flight and can lead to the introduction of bad habits, which can lead to problems for cadets when being instructed for real. There is also a question hanging over the purchase of these so called “Part Task Trainers. Was there a proper tender process or was it, as has been suggested in some quarters based on a friend or family member of someone employed at 2FTS “knew someone in a computer company and could get a good deal”? As for the purchase of an end user licence for each computer, was this the standard Program Licence and EULA or was it the “X-Plane for Professional Use” with the appropriate hardware and software as mandated by the FAA?

With the closure of 664 VGS, who is going to be retrained to be a game instructor? I very much doubt that any of the instructors at Newtownards would wish to sit in a replica cockpit and never get off the ground. I know that of the 4 staff who could possibly convert to the Grob 115 Tutor, One is now too old and another is unlikely to be considered for reasons of past ill health. Of those instructors left three are hoping to gain places on the staff of Kirknewton VGS but I suspect that the attendance requirements will negate these desires. Who then, as asked, will give up their weekends to play computer games? If not these, will ATC squadron personnel be required to attend a course at 2FTS to 1. Be taught to fly and 2. Taught to instruct?

Paragraph 4.
The reformation of 502 Sqn. R.Aux. A.F. is a red herring. It has absolutely nothing to do 664 VGS (Which will soon be no more)

Paragraph 5.
Whoever wrote this letter for the ministers signature cannot even get their facts right. 664 VGS is based at Newtownards airfield, Co. Down. NOT at RAF Kirknewton.

Paragraph 6.
As Paragraph 5. Totally wrong in that cadets have NEVER had to pay the Cadet Contribution to Messing when attending flying training and gliding induction. There is no facility for providing messing in any shape or form at 664 VGS other than a ‘fridge and an electric kettle for staff tea and coffee. Cadets were advised to bring their own packed lunch or use a local fast food outlet.

Paragraph6.
The time scale to resurrect 12/13 AEF and bring the AEF flying program on stream is probably circa 2018. As stated earlier, the Babcock Tutor contract expires in 2019. So, at present this looks like only a years air experience flying in the province. As for the value of second hand Grob 109s, I suggest the minister should look again. A good condition G109 with a low hours engine is going for around £40K.

Paragraph 7.
The summary is, just as the rest of this letter is, plain wrong. As I said in my reply to Paragraph 1 the “new” AEF will not allow cadets powered flying opportunities for the first time. It was being done for many many years by 13 AEF before it was closed down as part of the closure of QUAS in 1996. The hope of getting gliders available in quantity by 2018 is not, on current releases back to service likely by 2018. I suspect that Kirknewton being the only non English squadron will be the last to be outfitted.

As for the letter forwarded to me today, I can only agree that the safety, not only of Air Cadets, but also of the volunteer gliding staff, who fly many hours per year to provide such training for the ACO, is paramount.

With regard to Mr. Braziers statement “I accept that, except for the Air Cadets themselves, every element of the Air Cadet gliding operations and support organisation over a long period of time shared some responsibility for the erosion of confidence in the airworthiness of MOD gliders which led to the pause” I take exception to the above in that I do not believe that those at the coal face of squadron level engineering part of Air Cadet gliding operations were part of the problem. I suspect that after the privatisation of ACO gliding engineering at the then CGS/3FTS, the only place where aircraft servicing requirements were meticulously carried out was in fact at squadron level. I can tell you that if I am going to fly in an aircraft I will ensure that at squadron level everything is done properly and by the book. No shortcuts. Never. Not if my cadets are going to fly in one of our aeroplanes. However the way in which the people who actually run the Volunteer Gliding Squadrons, and who have given given freely of their time and effort, have been treated by the ACO and 2 FTS in particular was, and is, totally abysmal.

Furthermore, that it is taking the might of the Royal Air Force, (in which I served for twenty two years) and MoDUK (AiR) up to FOUR YEARS to recover a small fleet of the simplest of aircraft to an airworthy state is totally shameful! To my mind an awful lot of posteriors are being covered.

In relation to the CAMO and MAA, I would suggest that the minister pay heed to the “Air Cadets Grounded” thread in the Military Aviation Forum on the Professional Pilots Rumour Network, PPrune.org. There has been a lot of discussion by both serving and retired persons, who hold, or have held very senior positions, on the efficacy, or lack thereof, of the MAA.
I would be obliged if you would forward this email to the minister in it’s entirety. I do not need a reply. Nothing that I, or any other, can say or do will change the direction that one man has decided is the future way. The damage has been done. and in the recovery, the ACO and 2FTS have destroyed something that not only worked but worked well. The Air Cadet Gliding organisation will never be as good as it was and in the destruction a lot of goodwill and effort has been destroyed.

As for those staff cadets who have had the good fortune to have had the fires of their aviation ambitions fanned by 664 VGS, I wish them well for they are the last in Northern Ireland. There will be no more now that 664 VGS is no more.

As for those responsible for this debacle, shame on them.

With thanks for your continued interest I remain,

Yours Sincerely

X X Xxxxxx

Cadet Sergeant, 2178 (Holywood) Squadron, Air Training Corps

Corporal, Assistant Air Traffic Controller, Royal Air Force

Adult Warrant Officer and Officer Commanding (pro tem) 2178 (Holywood) Squadron, Air Training Corps

Civilian Gliding Instructor, 664 Volunteer Gliding Squadron

Squadron Flight Safety Officer, 664 Volunteer Gliding Squadron

And the final reply,

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I haven't bothered to reply to the above. Obviously the person who drafts these things, ready for the bosses signature, aren't aware that the majority of us know about composite repairs. As for "..that Northern Ireland cadets will in future have the same opportunities as cadets throughout the country to undertake wings course and experience flight up to solo standard" That I think is a load of bollows. Some cadets may get a course, but attend for six or eight week-ends on the trot?
Parents driving up to 2 hours to BFS or BHD on a Friday evening for the squeezy to EDI and the same again on a Sunday. And what about when the squeezy goes "tech" at EDI and is cancelled. Who's there to look after wee John or Janet. And, of course, what about the FSCs from NI, Wales and those in Scotland well above the central belt? they,ve had their lot. No going on to advanced, G2 and G1 etc. The same road that one of our FSCs took and is now on his first tour on Typhoons.

Apologies for the lengthy post but do compare Mr Braziers replies to me with the ones you have received - a carbon copy with only the names changed to protect the guilty mayhaps ? For those of you who haven't yet written to the minister now is a good time to do so in order to welcome him to his new job

A342

[ACW342]

I should have started with many many thanks to Coff for his educating me on how to post images on PP.

Thanks Coff!!

a342

[Rigga]

Well done that man!
The BS about repairs is all they could come up with, but even those could be 5 to 10 aircraft repairs at any one time with as little as three or four folk on the shop floor.
A poor excuse, not a valid reason.

[chevvron]

Has no-one thought about contacting Slingsbys at Kirbymoorside to ask their opinion of the viability of these repairs?

[tucumseh]

ACW342

Superb. Well done.

[Frelon]

ACW342, well done.

You have conveyed our thoughts completely. I am happy that I am not having to volunteer my services to the current bunch of losers.

This past week my gliding club has had two ATC cadets join (separate squadrons), very frustrated that 2FTS cannot get their act together and offer them the gliding that so many of us enjoyed some years ago.

[Mandator]

Chevvron:

Slingsby was taken over by Marshall. 'Nuf said.

[Wander00]

Mandator - that is something I did not know - that firm, for whom I worked on Concorde nose and visor, seems to have its tentacles pretty well spread, aviation wise, apart for being main dealer for more car marques than I can count

[Chugalug2]

ACW342, the pages of this thread have never accommodated such an uplifting post as yours! Quality and length combined in one! It recalls the title of the 3 threads that started the PPRuNe airworthiness campaign, reversed the ROs' infamous finding, and focussed attention away from the supposed Gross Negligence of the pilots and towards that of the RAF VSOs that had knowingly put a grossly unairworthy aircraft into squadron service via an illegal RTS, and then ordered that it be used to transport over two dozen of the nation's top security specialists on a routine flight that inevitably ended tragically:-

http://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/39182-chinook-still-hitting-back-3-merged.html

Time now for this thread to start hitting back with this excellent initiative!

[Engines]

ACW342,

May I add my congratulations for an excellent post - hammer, nail and head are three words that come to mind. BZ.

The explanation given in the reply concerning GRP repairs is, frankly, risible. It smacks of exactly what happened in the Mull of Kintyre saga, where Ministers were being fed inaccurate or incomplete response to fair questions. In particular, GRP aircraft are not, by any stretch of any imagination 'one of the most complex aircraft to maintain and repair'. I think that aircraft with thick stretch formed metal skins, machined frames and complex fasteners get that prize.

But as Tuc would probably ask (so i will) 'what are the RAF trying to hide?' about the standard of repairs on the ATC fleet?. To repeat some of my previous guesses:

1. Repairs not being recorded on Airframe Log Cards
2. Lack of a proper Topic 6 leading to repairs that aren't approved.

Add in poor supervision, and you're lining up a lot of holes in a lot of safety related swiss cheeses.

A bit like Nimrod, Chinook, Tornado.....I'll hazard a guess that some MoD rear ends are puckering just a bit right now.

Best Regards as ever to those who really walk the airworthiness walk,

Engines

[Mushroom club]

ACW342

Excellent post. Well said!

At first I thought this was just a paperwork cock up in that the gliders were probably "serviceable" but the audit trail was inadequate. It is obvious now, from reading PPRUNE, that it's far far worse. I'm familiar with Tuc's numerous posts about the systemic failings but naively assumed this was something else. It seems, to me at least, that it is all part of the same problem. A sad day and I sympathise with fellow ex VGS chaps and ladies who have been let down so badly. Not to mention the cadets who will never get the fantastic opportunities we had.

It is such a shame that just when the VGS staff needed some real leadership it was lacking.

MC

[clunckdriver]

My wife and I have just returned from the DH Moth gathering held at the Shuttlewoth Trust in the UK, {ate too much, drank too much!} whilst there we met a young female Flight Leutenant who is involved with the ATC, a most impressive young lady indeed. The conversation between my wife, myself and her turned of course to the ATC gliding shambles, she explained to us the lengths she has gone to get cadets into the air, albeit being just a shadow of what the full gliding program was in the past. To meet someone with her grasp of the importance of the ATC organisation, and her efforts to fix things was in fact inspiring, with the likes of this officer there is light at the end of the tunnel, lets hope its not a train coming in the form of the bloody fools who have created this mess!

[tucumseh]

ACW342

If I may say again, your dissection of MoD's lies is admirable.

The phrase that grips me in the letter of 11 May is "poor practice went un-noticed". This is a damnable lie. One need only read the Airworthiness Reviews by Director of Flight Safety to the RAF Chief Engineer and ACAS to see that both knew of systemic failings in August 1992. CE claimed to the media (BBC, 2011) that he implemented the recommendations, but further reports by DFS between 1992 and 1998, and the Chief of Defence Procurement's admission to the Public Accounts Committee in March 1999, reveal the truth. The Nimrod Review confirmed these failings remained in 2009, and you are finding out what has been done to correct them since the formation of the MAA in 2010. The CE's claim is compounded by the fact that in December 1992 his subordinate, a 2 Star, threatened engineering staff who had been complaining about the failures since 1988 with dismissal if they persisted. The audit report designed to protect those staff was submitted direct to PUS in June 1996, confirming the failings. I have just outlined a long, unbroken audit trail proving very senior officers, officials and Minsters have known about this for the best part of 25 years.

Later this month a book will be published (Kindle version available now) which will help you in your efforts. I have no intention to discuss it further, except to say it was submitted to MoD, the Defence Select Committee and Cabinet Secretary for vetting, and passed.


https://www.amazon.co.uk/Their-Greatest-Disgrace-campaign-Chinook/dp/1526204460/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1469118596&sr=1-1&keywords=their+greatest+disgrace

[Engines]

To all PPruners reading this thread:

May I urge you all to take a look at the book that Tuc mentioned in his previous post - it's required reading for anyone who wants to understand just how far off track the MoD has been as far as airworthiness is concerned. Profits from sales also go to a damn fine charity (MSF).

Tuc's point about poor practice going unnoticed is, as he so correctly says, a damnable lie. The poor practice has happened and is still happening at many levels, from various MoD departments down to the front line, and this has been admitted following a series of reviews going back to the early 90s right through to 2011. Now we've got another 'occurrence' dated somewhere between 1995 and 2014.

If I might, I'd like to try to briefly explain what Tuc is so bothered about (as well as Chug), and why they post about this stuff so repeatedly. It's this - the systems for producing airworthy (and hence safe) and operationally suitable aircraft, especially in the RAF, went badly off track in the late 1980s, mainly due to massive cuts in admin and support budgets. These have led directly (read the book and you'll see what I mean) to accidents. And loss of life. Avoidable loss of life.

Haddon-Cave identified the symptoms, but got the root causes wrong because he was fed a series of lies, including about when the cuts happened. These lies were designed to protect senior officers and civil servants. As a direct result, the solutions Haddon-Cave came up with were aimed at the wrong target - organisation and regulations. Yes, by 2008 the regs were in a mess, and yes, the lines of accountability had got badly tangled. But they weren't the core problem. Nor were the people he publicly fingered the real culprits.

The real problem was that existing, perfectly good mandated regulations weren't being followed. The real culprits were the people who had made conscious decisions not to do so.

Why bother with this stuff on the 'Air Cadets grounded' thread? Because what has happened to the ATC fleet is just another manifestation of the core problem - MoD and the RAF still aren't doing 'airworthiness' correctly. The Hawk XX179 fatality proved it (again) and the ATC glider scandal is just another ''data point' on a VERY ugly graph.

What to do? Here's my starters for ten (hat tip to Tuc for most of this).Restore the key features of the airworthiness management systems that used to work - such as Modification Committees staffed with technically qualified people, Configuration Control Boards that actually control configuration. Make Critical Design Reviews actually critically review the design. Restore proper 555 acceptance conferences. Reintroduce 'Requirements Scrutiny', using people who know how to do it. Introduce proper technical oversight of MoD projects to avoid some of the nonsenses happening right now in a PT near you.

But most of all, read the book - it's a cracker.

Best Regards as ever to all those who want to sort this lot out,

Engines

[The Nip]

Maybe if the Air Cdre spent less time on Facebook and Twitter, and more time in the real world, then they would see what is right under their nose.

[Chugalug2]

Engines, an excellent post as ever. Might I though take gentle issue when you say:-

Haddon-Cave identified the symptoms, but got the root causes wrong because he was fed a series of lies, including about when the cuts happened.

He was given evidence that identified exactly when the cuts happened and how they were implemented, which included the issuing of illegal orders to subvert the regs and the threat to sack those who would not comply (as mentioned by tuc above). No doubt he received a different version of events from the ever helpful ministry special advisors, but it was his duty to sort the wheat from the chaff. Instead he decided to print the Establishment lies about a "Golden Period", and so the Report became part of the cover-up instead of exposing it.

That is the bitter truth about this scandal; the Establishment in the form of Coroners, VSOs, Ministers, MPs, HoC and HoL committees, the RAF Provost Marshal, the Deputy Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, to mention just a few, just didn't want to go there, though with some honourable exceptions. This is a scandal greater than the Dreyfus Affair in my view. Not only has it persecuted the innocent while protecting the guilty, but it has led to loss of life and wasted resources. Most damningly of all, it has seriously compromised our nation's Air Power. That is why I say the thoughtful measures that you propose must be under the auspices of an independent Regulator, ie independent of the MOD. Likewise with the Investigator, which must be independent of both, so that neither can be compromised by those who would again wish to do so.

[Engines]

Chug,

I suppose that where we might (gently) disagree is the way forward from where we seem to be. Also, I think it's important to try to post stuff for those reading this thread who are still doing the job - we owe it to them to not only tell the truth, but also to explain and where we can, offer a way forward. And hope. In this case, for the Air Cadets. Let's try that first.

I think the majority of the aircraft will be fixable. Cost and lack of technical expertise (to allow fast and good decisions) will, however, slow the process. On the bright side, no cadets or instructors (to my knowledge) have been hurt, and some will get back into the sky in airworthy aircraft. Keeping them that way will be the challenge. For gliders like this, that's not a big challenge. Honestly, it's really not. The big danger is that the RAF and the MoD go ahead and repeat the same mistakes they have been making now for some years. I'd suggest that one way to ensure a good organisation emerges from this would be to form a 'greybeard' team under the auspices of, oh, I don't know, let's suggest the RAeS's Airworthiness and Maintenance Group, to offer sage and experienced advice. I've seen it done in the US to very good effect.

I also believe that a full independent enquiry into this latest airworthiness scandal (judge led and staffed by reputable aerospace experts) is needed to really get the lessons out there.

I absolutely understand your point about needing a regulator (and inspector) that is more independent. My problem is not so much the idea, as where it would be located. Outside of HM Government? Funded how? Charitable giving? ANY organisation that gets money from the Government eventually becomes part of 'the Establishment'. At the end of the day, the MoD and the RAF have also to heal themselves. In my view (and thats all it is) the key way forward will be with good young engineers given a chance to do the right things at the working level. I always have huge confidence in the ability of young people to do amazing things. For all our opinions, right now the future is in their hands - and I trust them to get it right.

Best regards as ever to all the young engineers out there

Engines

[Chugalug2]

Engines, your gentle disagreement is gently acknowledged. In reality it is more a difference in emphasis, and I absolutely agree that the ACO fleet needs to get airborne ASAP to continue its vital work in ensuring tomorrow's engineers and aircrew for HM Forces, particularly the RAF.

My problem with your long term approach is that the "Savings at the Expense of Safety" were made to compensate for AMSO's disastrous 1987 policy of disposing of bulk spares holdings. The inevitable consequence of massive cost increases was entirely self induced and independent of government policy. That is why the previously ring fenced Air Safety budgets were plundered. It was not the British Establishment that initiated this scandal but RAF VSOs. The Establishment's part was, and still is, the subsequent cover-up. My solution to the crisis, to make regulator and investigator independent of the MOD, will by definition require the Establishment to acknowledge cause and effect and hence end the cover-up.

My two-penneth worth as to how to do that is to keep it simple; sistering the MAA with the CAA and the MilAAIB with the AAIB, with civilian heads to both. Obviously it won't be simple at all, but at least the respective Director Generals can then be free to perform their duties unmolested and begin the very long haul back to ensuring UK Military Airworthiness again. At the moment there is no such freedom to do that.

May I also endorse the book linked to by tucumseh? The author not only reveals where the real gross negligence lay in the 1994 Mull of Kintyre tragedy, but how it was not unique to that terrible loss of 29 lives, nor unique to that fleet, but to UK Military Aviation as a whole. Which brings us back to the ACO fleet...

[Engines]

Chug,

Good suggestions for the MAA and MAAIB - 'sistering' with the CAA and AAIB would be a good way forward - and would encourage transfer of best practice.

However, having had a little experience of how the system works, I'm not sure that this would then lead on to any admissions of responsibility or guilt. As is often the way of things, the cover up will gently run on, occasionally muddying the waters, until the key VSOs are no longer around to care.

I know that sounds a bit cynical - but in my view (alert - personal view there) the focus now has to be rebuilding the necessary technical expertise at low to middle desk working levels in MoD and RAF HQs. A limited rework of the regs would also be needed to restore the administrative and organisational tools and procedures required to build and maintain airworthiness. Again, here's a task that a good 'greybeard' panel could really help with.

Please note - I'm not angling for a job here!

Best Regards as ever to all those who can help fix this,

Engines

[Chugalug2]

Engines, I am delighted that we are in violent agreement as to a possible way forward. Your point about the "British way of doing things" is well taken. The silver lining though, to the black cloud of the cover up, is that those who perpetrated this scandal will know that they will indeed sooner or later be outed by the historians. It may well be after they have quit their mortal coil; leaving their titles, honours, and awards vulnerable to being subsequently reclaimed. Such bling is important to them, and the nagging possibility that their obituaries will be subject to such revision will indeed be an awful ordeal to bear.

Whatever be their fate the important preoccupation for us now is to return the UK military Airfleet to airworthiness ASAP. Time is of the essence, and certainly cannot wait for the convenience of those responsible for its subversion to pop their clogs. Aviation doesn't know of such social graces and will continue its cull of men and machines until constrained again by the regs (which always worked when enforced, as you say) being properly enforced again. If that needs a recall to the colours of the greybeards, then send out the press-gangs now I say!

Careful, Engines, you may well find a coin of the realm in the bottom of your next pint!

[tucumseh]

A limited rework of the regs would also be needed to restore the administrative and organisational tools and procedures required to build and maintain airworthiness. Again, here's a task that a good 'greybeard' panel could really help with.

In 2001 my boss was asked if I could be released for 2 days a month to oversee the up-issue of the key procedural airworthiness Def Stan. This is how the system works - D/Stan don't actually employ experts on each standard. It's a boring task, but 2 days a month makes it bearable. The reason it's boring is because most amendments are simply reflecting the perpetual organisational changes within MoD. The actual procedures have been well known and barely changed since Marconi was an apprentice. Anyway, my boss was the wrong person to ask as he simply cited policy of the day (safety cases are irrelevant and a waste of money) and the request was refused.

The D/Stan lady in question is now long retired. The standard in question has been cancelled without replacement, and MoD don't even have an old copy. All the ART reports from the 90s, various audit and Parliamentary reports, the Nimrod Review and the current glider issue can all be summarised - "implement that standard". Yes, it requires expertise, but no company can be appointed a Design Authority without demonstrating it, so even if MoD doesn't want to do the job properly, many can. What MoD must provide is leadership in the form of someone with the balls to stand up to those who don't see the need. When the MAA was formed I predicted they'd have a hard time in this respect. This glider issue would suggest they have rolled over. The Independence pillar of airworthiness was knocked down many years ago. It is now being pounded into dust.

[Engines]

I wonder if any of the PPruners out there could help clear up one aspect of the ATC glider scandal that has been bothering me.

Who is the Design Authority? I have assumed that it was Grob at the time of the purchase, but does anyone know whether they were certified against the key DefStans at the time? Since then, there have been mentions of both Slingsby and Marshalls - I know the latter are certified for some aircraft, but I've never seen them as a glider DA.

Anyone got any reliable information out there, please?

Best regards as ever to all those working with their certified DAs,

Engines

[Mandator]

Hi Engines:

Marshall is the DAOS for the Viking. Helpful list from the MAA here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/509623/daos_approved_orgs.pdf

Can't find Grob or the Vigilant on it though (only a quick search mind you).

[tucumseh]

Being on the DAOS list and holding a Design Authority or Design Custodian appointment are two different, but related, things. The DA holds and maintains the Master Drawings. A DC can be contracted to do much of the day to day work (maintaining the Build Standard), but has a directed sub-contract to the holder and maintainer of the Drawing Set (who often wants to retain control for commercial reasons, but is not interested in the work). The DA/DC need not hold the repair/maintenance contracts.

A company may hold DAOS "approval", but if the MoD Technical Agency (the named person in the contract responsible for the Build Standard, which is what we're talking about here) deems them unsuitable, or decides their performance has deteriorated, he can (indeed, is obliged to) suspend their appointment. A suspension does not affect the company's DAOS status, largely because the DAOS section in MoD is interested in company processes and jumping through hoops, whereas a TA is interested in whether the company can do the job properly. This authority vested in the TA is frowned upon at a certain level in MoD, because by definition the posts are filled by the two lowest technical grades in DE&S; and only then if they have the requisite competence and experience, which must include, as a minimum, hands-on engineering repair and maintenance of the equipment and/or aircraft, QC, Design, and other related disciplines. Observers of current MoD practice will note these are infinitely more demanding posts than the more senior positions in the MAA, which is perhaps why so few civilian engineers would wish to be promoted into the MAA, and then forced to dumb down!

The key postholder at the DA/DC is the PDS Officer (PDSO). The company nominates him to the TA during contract negotiations. His is a personal appointment of the TA. He is, uniquely, granted financial delegation to commit MoD funding. This, because he must have the wherewithal to immediately launch, for example, fault investigations when the immediately safety of the aircraft or equipment is at risk.

My guess is no Glider DA/DC or MoD Glider Team staff have applied these mandated regs in 20 years!

[Engines]

Mandator,

Thank you so much for coming back with this - I could (and should) have done that search myself. Accept my apologies for not doing so.

Looking at the list, there are a number of varying formats and types of DAOS approvals here, which is what you'd expect. Some are general in nature (e.g. 'Aircraft' for BAES), some are specific (look at the approval for Boeing UK). Some are highly detailed down to subsystems (e.g Honeywell).

The one for Marshalls at Cambridge is fairly sketchy, though. it reads:

a. Modifications and special installations in fixed wing aircraft.
b. Modifications and special installations in Viking Glider aircraft
c. Modifications and special installations in helicopters.
d. Special test and support equipment for items a,b and c.
e. Flight testing. Authorised flight testing is Ltd to: Quantitative assessment of aircraft performance and avionic and engineering systems on fixed wing aircraft.

What I can't see there is anything to do with being an approved DA for the Viking structure, or the aircraft, just 'mods and special installations'. There's nothing in the list for the Vigilant, nor do Grob or Slingsby appear elsewhere.

So. The follow up question to all you PPruners out there (including anyone involved in this cluster***k who might want to open up a little) is this. Who is the Approved Design Organisation for the Viking and Vigilant aircraft? Put another way, who issues their Certificates of Design? Or put another (possibly less fair) way, has the RAF been operating these aircraft without an ADO? If the answer to the last is 'yes', one has to then ask the question WTF?

Best Regards as ever to all those who help the discussions along

Engines

[BEagle]

The Summer 2016 edition of the RAF Club's magazine arrived today. It includes an article from an unnamed author titled 'THE SKY'S THE LIMIT. The Air Cadets at 75', which includes:

...In sum, as we entered the Air Training Corps' 75th anniversary, we were faced with a challenge that could not be ignored. The gliders were grounded for sound reasons and it was simply not an option to continue to operate without an assured safety case in place. Two years of technical analysis led to a difficult position where the cost of Vigilant recovery was actually greater than the acquisition of new aircraft and so the RAF senior leadership resolved to field a new system instead...


Interesting. 'it was simply not an option to continue to operate without an assured safety case in place', eh? Use of the word 'continue' seems rather to be an admission that they'd been operating without an assured safety case hitherto.

:hmm:

[Mandator]

Hi Engines:

Fair comment with respect to the formal scope of the Marshall approval for the Viking. However, I would hazard a guess that within the MOD, the Marshall DAOS is probably viewed from the perspective of Marshall being the DA.

One thing that does stand out is that most of the companies on the DAOS list are huge and would not, I suspect, have the first idea about supporting light aircraft. I think there is only one minnow on the list - de Havilland Support Ltd - which looks after a light aircraft in the form of the Chipmunk.

[Engines]

Mandator,

Thanks for coming back.

I think you might not be completely right about Marshall's here - but in the absence of hard information, I'm guilty of speculating - sorry if I get this wrong. The DAOS approval is given to a specified company for a specified set of activities. (Note that D stands here for design, there's also a MAOS scheme that looks after maintenance).

This looks as if Marshalls have a DAOS approval that is restricted to designing modifications and 'special installations' (whatever they are) for Viking. That does not make them the ADO (Approved Design Organisation) for the whole aircraft.

If this is true, it's not in the gift of anyone in the MoD to view them as anything else. They are either a full ADO or they aren't. Binary choice.

As far as company size goes, getting DAOS approval rests on submission of a 'design exposition' which is then examined and vetted by the MAA. They're not outside the competence of any normal; aerospace engineering firm to prepare. I've seen a few of these, and they are sometimes, to say the least, variable. As Tuc would point out, the intentions are good but the MoD's ability to tell the difference between a proper 'exposition' and what is actually happening on the ground has been weakened over the years. It's now more of a box ticking exercise, with the final decisions being made by VSOs who respond to political pressures.

Example - there's at least one organisation on that list which is approved to 'design' modifications to an in service aircraft - in actuality, they cannot 'design' anything, as they have no authority to issue drawings for that aircraft.

The other thing to note is that heavy, light, fast or slow, if its a UK military aircraft it needs an RTS to fly. Only an ADO can issue a Certificate of Design. No C of D, no RTS. No RTS, no fly. It's really as easy as that. Honestly, it's straightforward.

You're hearing it here a lot, but it bears repetition. The problem is not the regulations. It never was. It's that people aren't implementing them. Why? In large part, because they've never been taught how to do it, nor have they been required to do it. Why? Because senior people have decided that it's not worth the trouble. Or the money. That brings us to where we are now.

Question remains - who is the current ADO for the Viking? Anyone?

Best regards as ever to someone who can answer this one,

Engines

[Shaft109]

OK lets say I bought a Vigilant and paperwork as they are right now and wanted to put it on the CAA Register.

WHat would be required and what sort of cost are you looking at?

As for the engine life situation there are plenty of companies that can forge/ machine or indeed print almost any part to the required standard.

This has been happening in the vintage automotive world for a good few years now.

[Whizz Bang]

The Summer 2016 edition of the RAF Club's magazine arrived today. It includes an article from an unnamed author titled 'THE SKY'S THE LIMIT. The Air Cadets at 75', which includes:




Interesting. 'it was simply not an option to continue to operate without an assured safety case in place', eh? Use of the word 'continue' seems rather to be an admission that they'd been operating without an assured safety case hitherto.

:hmm:
Field a new system that neither recovered the aircraft nor replaced them...

Nor one that has achieved anything tangible in 2 years and 4 months.

[tucumseh]

e. Flight testing. Authorised flight testing is Ltd to: Quantitative assessment of aircraft performance and avionic and engineering systems on fixed wing aircraft.

To be fair to MoD staff who try to implement these regulations (despite the orders they are under) it is not unknown for politicians to issue an overrule, and direct that major aircraft contracts be handed to companies who (a) didn't bid, and (b) have no such approval. You end up with silly situations such as the company doing all the work being a sub-sub-sub-contractor. The first thing to go is the audit trail. Speaking of which, on 17 January 2011 the MAA and Minister for the Armed Forces were told that the work the former had put in motion post-Haddon-Cave was meaningless without regressing to close the gaps in audit trails caused by the 1991 decision to run down airworthiness management. I'd say this is a significant part of what has failed here. Later, when asked for progress by another Minister who was present, MoD denied the subject had been raised. Which is why you record meetings. There is nothing new in what's going on.

Good spot Beagle.

[Lordflasheart]

Re Beagle's post 2790 above - It includes an article from an unnamed author titled .... I imagine the unnamed author is AVM Andy Turner, AOC 22 Gp. The quote is a slightly edited third-from-last paragraph of his three page article "Putting the air in the Air Cadets ... " in the RAeS magazine June 2016 - as referred to by ATFQ (with link) in his 12th June Post # 2630 on Page 132 of this thread. LFH

....................

[ACW342]

I just watched the video of the Queens Jubilee at FY on another thread:http://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/582498-queen-s-silver-jubilee-raf-finningley.html
Just wondering, were the a/c all airworthy back then? I ask because, as per my post on above thread, while all were having a great time at FY, at Lossie we were busy trying to find out if a crashed Jag was one of hours which, unfortunately it was and, sadly, the pilot died.

[tucumseh]

ACW342

I was one of many fitters rounded up and sent to Fleetlands to get as many helicopters as possible flying for the Spithead Review. (Weather was poor on the day, and a sensible decision was made not to fly many of them). I can't say if the aircraft fleets were airworthy (better chance in those days than in the last 25 years), but there was certainly a lot of pressure to get some right old crates flying which would otherwise be stuck in a storage hangar hoping someone would set fire to them. (Arson being a not-unknown event at Fleetlands in those days, although confined to the fishing club's hut!) A couple of "events" I recall are a less-than-qualified US exchange pilot flying a Wasp calling an unnecessary Mayday resulting in a heavy landing on a cricket pitch, and a Wessex crew taking the opportunity to move a crewman's furniture to his new house during a test flight - and fracturing a fuel line with his 4-poster. I was marshaling and like a prat stood there while the crew bolted past me toward the control tower. Safety issues, certainly, not least giving me that job after 2 minutes training.

[Chugalug2]

I guess tuc's post is as comprehensive answer as you are likely to get from anyone. However, just to reiterate his point, there have always been unairworthy aircraft and, despite any palliatives offered here or elsewhere, there always will be. The entire fleet that I was on, that of the Hastings, was grounded throughout the world in 1965 following a crash on departure from Abingdon killing all 41 on board:-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Baldon_air_crash

The accident was traced to the failure of the elevator outrigger bolts. Checks on other aircraft revealed other bolts also liable to failure. All bolts were replaced with higher grade ones and a good deal of re-riveting around the tailplane area done also, again because of poor quality material. The difference then was that such a crucial part of our airlift capacity was withdrawn at an instant. No pauses, no obscuration, just action by a system that swung immediately into action and got the aircraft airworthy again.

As tuc tells us repeatedly, the problem is now with that entire system. It is both dysfunctional and incompetent. If Little Baldon happened again it wouldn't know where to start, other than to lie or to permanently ground yet another fleet, or more probably both.

[Lima Juliet]

Chug

Thanks for the link. I did note the following with great interest:

The day after the crash an investigation and an inquest were opened at RAF Abingdon. The Coroner for North Berkshire, Norman Challoner, opened and adjourned the inquest into the 41 deaths. The Air Accidents Investigation Branch convened a five-member board of inquiry at the airfield and started examining the wreckage at Little Baldon. A team from RAF Bicester arrived at the site and began salvage and recovery work

Little Baldon is in the Henley parliamentary constituency. In the House of Commons its then MP, John Hay, proposed that because of the great loss of life and public anxiety, the board of inquiry should be held in public. Denis Healey replied that "there are juridical obstacles to the inquiry being in public", but added "I will make the fullest possible statement about the findings of the inquiry as soon as I possibly can".

So if the AAIB investigated, and not the military, then why wasn't it deemed the much vaunted "independent" investigation by the MP?

LJ

[Chugalug2]

Leon, good point, and I'm not sure what is meant by the AAIB "convening a five member Board of Inquiry". The BoI would surely have been convened by the AOC (38 Gp?), and as was made clear by SoS Healey was not to be held in public. I can only assume that the AAIB took a lead role in the Inquiry and so was free to use its expertise to swiftly find the cause and have its recommendations constitute much of the BoI's findings. A rather more proactive state of affairs than occurred in the Mull BoI whereby the AAIB Inspector was greatly constrained in his role. Hopefully we can source the BoI Report and all will be made clear...

[tucumseh]

I think the article suffers a little from a confusion of terminology and the common misconceptions about the role of the AAIB (or AIB in those days) in a military accident investigation; where they don't so much investigate but examine part of the evidence. Any attempt at investigation is severely restricted by not being permitted access to key data, which means they cannot focus correctly or swiftly on areas of obvious interest (such as the aircraft not being airworthy). Also, their final reports are heavily edited and very often bear no relation to the Inspectors' reports. Chinook ZA721 in 1987 is the obvious example, where the AAIB almost immediately produced photographic evidence of most likely cause, and MoD buried it and said cause not determined.

[Chugalug2]

Thanks tuc. Unfortunately I can find no link to the BoI for TG577, but hope that others more adept at t'internet might find some link to it, if only a summary. I'm afraid that wiki is not the best authority on anything, simply the most convenient. Your point about the AAIB's role in BoI's is well made. They do not conduct the Inquiry, the RAF Board does. They merely contribute what the Board asks them to and, as you say, a great deal of that may never appear in the final RAF published report. Hence the call for an independent military investigator "sistered" to the AAIB.

[Frelon]

Shaft109 says...

OK lets say I bought a Vigilant and paperwork as they are right now and wanted to put it on the CAA Register.

WHat would be required and what sort of cost are you looking at?

Of course you don't think the VSOs would allow any of their grounded Air Cadet Grob 109s to get out into the public domain to show how easy it would be to get them into the air again:ugh::ugh::ugh:

[Chugalug2]

This link does not cover the TG577 BoI but has an eye witness claim that a CAA Inspector (?) was at the crash scene very quickly post the accident, and just as quickly searched for and discovered the fractured bolt(s). I suspect that he was possibly an AAIB Inspector who lived close by.

Thus the AAIB would have deduced the probable cause of the accident before the RAF even had time to convene the BoI. Could that be the cause of confusion in the Wiki version of events? The accident features about half-way down the page:-

Hastings Bangs and Prangs and Splashes and Crashes (http://splashdown2.tripod.com/id11.html)


The crash of Hastings TG577 at Little Baldon, Oxfordshire

Information kindly supplied by David Rayner on October 20th 2003 (June 2005 David Rayner has recently started his own website page on TG577 so if anyone can help click here http://www.aaahs.org.uk/crash1965.html )

RAF Handley Page Hastings C1 TG577 crashed at Little Baldon, Oxfordshire at 1600hrs GMT Tuesday 6th July 1965. All 41 passengers and crew on board died. The aircraft was based at RAF Colerne Wiltshire.

An RAF Board of Inquiry was opened at RAF Abingdon to establish the cause of the crash into a barley field of 100 acres at Little Baldon.

Many eye witnesses saw the aircraft in difficulties, which was full of parachutists heading for a drop over Weston-on-the-Green, the pilot radioed that he was in some sort of trouble and apparently avoided missing the nearby village of Berinsfield. The first ambulance arrived from Didcot but the plane was an inferno. There were no survivors, an all night guard was placed around the scene of the crash with many sightseers jamming the local roads.

One lady eyewitness thought the Hastings was performing stunts whilst a male farm worker who had arrived on the scene thought he saw that some soldiers had deployed their parachutes. Apparently Hastings TG577 had landed upside down in the field.

Salvage experts were concentrating on checking the elevator tail bolts connected to the tail plane, the BoI had later determined that the cause of the accident was due to metal fatigue of two of the elevator bolts, this put stress on two more bolts that failed. The Hastings climbed steeply out of control, stalled and crashed into the field. It was trying to return to Abingdon and I understand that a Beverley aircraft was already at the end of the runway preparing to take off, but TG577 couldnt make it back to Abingdon.

This in effect grounded all Hastings aircraft and only a few Hastings carried on in service being replaced by the C130 Hercules. The elevator bolt fatigue was an ongoing problem with this type of aircraft and several Hastings crashed due to this design fault since it first flew in 1946.

An Inquest was held at The Guildhall in Abingdon with a verdict of accidental death, all victims died from multiple injuries, the aircraft was reported as recently being serviced.

At this point in time this was the worst peacetime accident involving any passenger aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

Received from David Barrott on July 3rd 2004:

Reference the crash of TG577. As I recollect, (being in close contact with several RAF and Parachute Regiment personnel at the time) .

Shortly after takeoff the pilot requested a priority landing at RAF Abingdon as he was experiencing some stiffness in the elevator controls. He was asked if he was declaring an emergency and requesting emergency clearance but
declined. Shortly after the aircraft assumed a nose down attitude. The pilot corrected this, but the elevators went hard up and locked there. The aircraft went to near vertical before stalling and dropping to land inverted. The altitude at the commencement of the manoeuvre was approximately
5000'. The First vehicles on site were the ambulance and fire tender from UKAEA Culham Laboratory, who's drivers were subsequently reprimanded for leaving their base without permission although their CO was in Reading at the time. They had reached the crash site cross-country by breaching the
fence of the Culham Naval Stores depot and a bill for replacement of the fence was received within a month.

Added on 4th November 2004 by Ch/Tech Ray Bunce ex RAF Benson via Doug Adams

One specific that I have been provided with some additional comments for are your article

about the Hastings TG577 tragedy in July 1965. Most of the comments serve to complement

or supplement the fuller details already printed. My cousin is Ray Bunce who, as Chief Technician R.A. Bunce, was NCO in charge of the RAF Benson Duty Crew on that fateful evening, and took the call to attend the scene.

The crew travelled to the crash site, a barley field it is reported, travelling in the standard

3 ton Bedfords provided. The crew arrived after about an hour, presumably after the

chaps from Culham mentioned in your main article. The severity of the crash was

already known or generally anticipated as they travelled expecting only to assist in the

recovery of bodies. On arrival at the scene the only recognisable piece of aircraft was the (upside down) tail unit.


Already at the scene, presumably called from his local base or home, was the Inspector

from the CAA who straightforwardly advised that he had no doubt of the cause, fatigue in the

elevator attachment bolts and was looking for these bolts to satisfy himself this was the

case. On finding the two broken parts of one of these bolts, he reassembled it for the crew to

look at, to show how difficult this fatigue was to detect visually. (My own comment but, given all that had been said and documented about these bolts failing in other situations, why had an effective correction not been made before more crashes and fatalities?)




A rather poignant In Memoriam here which lists 30 RAF and 11 Army Airborne of the 41 total fatalities, a ratio that I was hitherto unaware of:-

http://www.parachuteregiment-hsf.org/RAF%20Hastings_Call%20Sign%20TG%20577.htm

[VX275]

A little bird told me today that the Vigilants could return to cadet flying. Unfortunatley it looks like it will be Swedish Air Cadets not UK ones.

[RUCAWO]

Sounds about right !

[clunckdriver]

Oh, that's just perfect, aircraft which were used as stepping stones to train allied aircrew are to be used by a nation which played both sides and gained financial benefits from doing so , { ask me how I really feel about this!}

[VX275]

As an ex staff member I attended 612 VGS disbandment parade today. Amongst the guests were a Lord Lieutenant, Air Chief Marshall, Air Vice Marshal, Major General, Brigadier and Colonel, as well as a number of local Mayors. Anyone representing HQAC, 2FTS or CGS were noticable by their absence.

[tmmorris]

Indeed VX275 I was there too, a great event. OC 2FTS was sadly on leave though he was definitely invited, I understand.

Spooky that a civvy glider 'landed out' on the runway while we were listening to the speeches.

I then ferried an aircraft to Membury to a hangar full of Vikings. An interesting visit... And on the way home we encountered what looked like a civvy G109.

[EnigmAviation]

just really a very sad but telling coincidence that 612 officially closes down as one of the, or THE most productive VGS in the UK on the very same day that the ACO parades itself to celebrate 75 yrs. Shame nobody publicised at the 75th Cranwell event that the opportunities we gave years ago have now evaporated into the shambles where we have very few A/C of any type operating on a VGS anywhere, where we have built accommodation blocks at questionable airfields but can't use them as they have no aircraft and as the pictures show, immaculate aircraft stood in a disused hangar posing the un-answered question of who and what are we going to do with them ? Can't help thinking despite all the "airworthiness" issues, that for a large part the Vigilant didn't fit in with OC 3 FTS vision for the future. When he finishes next year we can all evaluate his "legacy". What does it all prove? The Amateurs were the professionals and vice versa !!

[VX275]

The Cranwell parade was on Saturday, the 612VGS Flag Lowering was on Sunday afternoon. Plenty of time to drive down even with a hangover from Saturday night. Also, hadn't anyone at Cranwell / Syerston ever heard of the concept of delegation.

[sharpend]

Is there some policy afoot to stop ATC cadets from even seeing aeroplanes? As a retired RAF A2 Bulldog QFI owning my own Bulldog with a valid C of A, I approached HQ Air Cadets with a view to flying a few of my own ATC Sqn. No reply. This week I offered to just show the cadets around a very interesting hangar full of old jets. Oh dear, cannot do that, was the reply, you have to get permission, but the ATC internet is down, so you cannot even ask; moreover, you will need copies in triplicate of the airfield's public liability insurance etc. This is enough for me to think why should I even bother.

[The B Word]

Sharpy

The document you need to comply with is Air Cadet Trg Order 35 (ACTO35). There are a whole lot of qualifying criteria you need to meet. Hours on type, hours in last 30 days, Class 2 medical, under 65, etc... Lots of other stuff. When cleared, no aeros either if I recall correctly. All measures to derisk the activity as the Cadets will be doing this in Cadet time so there is a liability issue if it all goes wrong during the flight - I guess its the same showing them around a hangar as well. You'll also need to have some DBS clearance done to prove that you are able to work with children, or be chaperoned by someone who is.

I do know that a lot of 2FTS are away on summer leave at the moment as well. I have been waiting for an answer since last week on another matter from the same chap who does ACTO35 stuff. My advice is to ask for the ACTO35 from your local ATC sqn to see if you meet the criteria first.

The B Word

[tmmorris]

The problem with ACTO35 isn't the criteria, it's the process - which I suspect is just undermanned.

[bobward]

When the Corps were having problems with the Tutors I wrote to my local Wing pointing out that a local civvy flying school was available to help. The school has been CAA audited as a Flight Training Organisation (twice) and passed with no adverse comments. I was assured that details had been passed up the line, and would be dealt with in due course.

Bear in mind that this was April 2015.......... so far, nothing heard, not even an acknowledgement of having received the details allegedly passed on.

[tmmorris]

Rightly or wrongly, the RAF has decided that merely because a flying school is CAA approved (or a BGA club similarly) they still have to audit it. This means that there is no blanket permission to use either.

To be fair to them, the RN does the same with RYA centres - I am issued with an 'approved list' I can use for cadets.

Now, whether a system of approval of civilian FTOs would be cheaper than the current system is worthy of debate.

[Sky Sports]

Rightly or wrongly, the RAF has decided that merely because a flying school is CAA approved (or a BGA club similarly) they still have to audit it. This means that there is no blanket permission to use either.

This week I offered to just show the cadets around a very interesting hangar full of old jets. Oh dear, cannot do that, was the reply, you have to get permission, but the ATC internet is down, so you cannot even ask; moreover, you will need copies in triplicate of the airfield's public liability insurance etc.

A solution to the problem.

The cadets are 'on duty' for a sightseeing mini-bus ride from the squadron to 2 yards short of an airfield / civvy gliding club / any other 'highly dangerous' activity. They disembark and become 'off-duty'.
What they get up to during the day is between them and the 'host' organisation.
At a set time, they all meet 2 yards away from the 'dangerous activity' for an 'on duty' sightseeing mini-bus trip back to their squadron.
The squadron only have to complete the paperwork for a mini-bus trip :ok:

[Wander00]

Which would be OK until someone stubs their toe and 'elf and safety" and the lawyers get involved

[Cat Funt]

The problem with ACTO35 isn't the criteria, it's the process - which I suspect is just undermanned.

Requires auth at Regional HQ and HQ 2FTS. Until very recently auth at the 2FTS level was either Wg Cdr Flying or Comdt 2 FTS personally. Not that he has a fetish for micromanagement or anything...

[BEagle]

Blunty, mon brave, don't forget that this is the same RAF which decreed that an aeroplane which used to fly HM The Queen around the globe had suddenly become too dangerous to carry non-service passengers....:ugh:

PS - Didn't see you at the Bulldog / Chipmunk do at Kemble the other week?

[chevvron]

This link does not cover the TG577 BoI but has an eye witness claim that a CAA Inspector (?) was at the crash scene very quickly post the accident, and just as quickly searched for and discovered the fractured bolt(s). I suspect that he was possibly an AAIB Inspector who lived close by.

Thus the AAIB would have deduced the probable cause of the accident before the RAF even had time to convene the BoI. Could that be the cause of confusion in the Wiki version of events? The accident features about half-way down the page:-

Hastings Bangs and Prangs and Splashes and Crashes (http://splashdown2.tripod.com/id11.html)



A rather poignant In Memoriam here which lists 30 RAF and 11 Army Airborne of the 41 total fatalities, a ratio that I was hitherto unaware of:-

RAF Hastings_Call Sign TG 577 (http://www.parachuteregiment-hsf.org/RAF%20Hastings_Call%20Sign%20TG%20577.htm)
'Inspector from the CAA'
The CAA didn't exist until 10 years later ie 1975.

[Chugalug2]

chevron:-
The CAA didn't exist until 10 years later ie 1975.
Thank you chevron (I wondered who'd spot that one first, Wilson! ;-). Which perhaps makes it more likely that our man was an AAIB Inspector who had discovered the cause of the crash within hours of it happening, and hence the AAIB involvement was from the very start of the investigation. That in turn could have led to the misunderstanding that the formal accident investigation was carried out by them. It was not of course, it was carried out by a BoI.

Hope that answers your query Leon. Again, can anyone help us trace that 1965 BoI report?

[clunckdriver]

Yesterday I went to Smith Falls {CYSH} at the crack of dawn to fly my very old DH Hornet Moth, lo and behold when I got there the first thing which met my eyes in the sunrise were two immaculate gliders and an even smarter L19, having flown the Hornet {what a strange flying aircraft it is!} I decided that working on the hangar would be more fun than returning home to cut the grass, to my great pleasure a bunch of ATC honchos turned up to make sure their competency was up to date before they started flying on the weekend {the CO is an ex employee of mine} Good heavens Britain, if a huge country like Canada with a small population spread over Hells half acre can do this what in hell is wrong with you guys?

[Sook]

Meanwhile in the Senior Service....

The Sea Cadet Aviation Advanced Flying Course (http://fleetairarmoa.org/news/the-sea-cadet-aviation-advanced-flying-course)

Note the aircraft used.

[aw ditor]

(UK) CAA was formed in 1972 via' the Civil Aviation Act of 1971.

[chevvron]

But didn't start operating until 1 Jan 1975.
I can remember signing my contract after some months at Farnborough having been posted there in Sep 1974 as an ATCO Grade 4 of the NATCS which was then still administered by the Department of Trade and Industry.

[Chugalug2]

Pinch and a punch for the first of the month and no returns! Which is my way of pointing out that tucumseh's post #2777, re the publishing of the story of the 1994 Mull of Kintyre tragedy and of the associated gross unairworthiness of ZD576 and her sister Mk2's, informed us that it would be at the end of August. It is in fact today, 1st September 2016.

tucumseh:-

Later this month a book will be published (Kindle version available now) which will help you in your efforts. I have no intention to discuss it further, except to say it was submitted to MoD, the Defence Select Committee and Cabinet Secretary for vetting, and passed.




https://www.amazon.co.uk/Their-Greatest-Disgrace-campaign-Chinook-ebook/dp/B01J1YVRH0/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1469118596&sr=1-1

[Engines]

I'd like to encourage all PPrune readers who have followed the various threads and posts associated with UK military airworthiness issues to consider purchasing the recently published book 'Their Greatest Disgrace'. Easily found on Amazon UK.

In my view, it's an essential read for anyone involved (or interested in) procuring and maintaining military aircraft, or anyone who wants to know the truth about the state of airworthiness of our aircraft. And who'd like to do something about it.

I also understand that all monies raised by sale of the book are going to charity.

Best regards as ever to all those who want to do the job properly,

Engines

[jonw66]

Engines
I finished nights at half six and am half way through it.
I was at Aldergrove until 92 and though on Wessex was friends with a lot of the Chindet guys.
Thanks for the link chug and well done tuc
Regards
Jon

[G-ARZG]

Re Sook's post 2825, even the Fish Heads should know the difference between hangars and hangers (or maybe not?)

Retreats to safe distance...'ZG

[chinook240]

http://www.bucksherald.co.uk/news/air-cadets-take-to-the-skies-once-again-1-7568756

[Mushroom club]

Has there been any comms from 2 FTS regarding the return to flying. Assuming there is one!

The Halton scheme looks good on the face if it but I'm just curious if the pilots involved are checked out in any way.

[Wander00]

Seems an imaginative use of Station non-public funds. I don't recall the use of SIF money being in the station commander's remit - that is what the SIF Committee is for (or was 30 years ago) bearing in mind the fund's charitable status ( A bit an@l for a Sunday afternoon I accept)

[brokenlink]

Mushroom, nothing heard to date. I did ping OC 2EFTS a few weeks ago on the topic which was swiftly passed on to Air Cmd who responded with an abridged version of a letter already published on this thread. Not given up yet though.

[Frelon]

Squadron Leader Jocelyn Tack, OC Herts and Bucks Wing, said: “We have been trying to find a way to get the cadets up and flying again so I approached the station commander to look into how it could be financed. He came up with a solution and now we can return to making full use of the facilities here.”

Read more at: Air cadets take to the skies once again - Bucks Herald (http://www.bucksherald.co.uk/news/air-cadets-take-to-the-skies-once-again-1-7568756)

Well done to those out there who are trying to make things happen for today's cadets who are missing out on their Air Cadet gliding.

Jim Lovell (Commander of Apollo 13) said, “There are people who make things happen, there are people who watch things happen, and there are people who wonder what happened. To be successful, you need to be a person who makes things happen."

My feeling is that today's Air Cadets are commanded by people who are now wondering what has happened!! There are no positive signs coming from 2FTS or HQ Air Cadets. So sad:rolleyes::rolleyes:

Frelon

[chevvron]

Read more at: Air cadets take to the skies once again - Bucks Herald (http://www.bucksherald.co.uk/news/air-cadets-take-to-the-skies-once-again-1-7568756)

Well done to those out there who are trying to make things happen for today's cadets who are missing out on their Air Cadet gliding.

Jim Lovell (Commander of Apollo 13) said, “There are people who make things happen, there are people who watch things happen, and there are people who wonder what happened. To be successful, you need to be a person who makes things happen."

My feeling is that today's Air Cadets are commanded by people who are now wondering what has happened!! There are no positive signs coming from 2FTS or HQ Air Cadets. So sad:rolleyes::rolleyes:

Frelon
Something wrong here; Wing OCs with the ATC are normally Wing Cdr (Acting) rank. Maybe she's Wing Admin Officer.
Notwithstanding that, I'm glad my old wing has had the guts to actually do something; we were pioneers of cadet microlight flying at Halton back in the '90s.

[Cows getting bigger]

Jocelyn is WXO (Old duffers like chevvron would call it Wg Admin Officer ;) ). Good on RAF Halton.

[chevvron]

Pinch and a punch for the first of the month and no returns! Which is my way of pointing out that tucumseh's post #2777, re the publishing of the story of the 1994 Mull of Kintyre tragedy and of the associated gross unairworthiness of ZD576 and her sister Mk2's, informed us that it would be at the end of August. It is in fact today, 1st September 2016.

tucumseh:-



https://www.amazon.co.uk/Their-Greatest-Disgrace-campaign-Chinook-ebook/dp/B01J1YVRH0/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1469118596&sr=1-1
In my personal opinion, one of the root causes of this tragedy was the withdrawl of radar from Macrihanish a month or so previously.
No radar = no LARS hence the Chinook crew had to try to fly VMC below rather than above safety altitude with radar service.
As I said, just one of the causes, but the BOI wouldn't want this to be aired in public so it doesn't appear to be mentioned - I admit I haven't read the report though.

[hoodie]

Without rehashing the long Chinook thread, it's been stated that they couldn't climb to MSA due to the temperatures and lack of an Icing clearance.

[The B Word]

The Halton scheme looks good on the face if it but I'm just curious if the pilots involved are checked out in any way.

Meet the ATCO35 requirements plus cleared to fly after OIC and CFI scrutiny. Careful briefing, flying supervision by the more experienced individuals on the day and oversight by the Cadet staff (VR(T) or CFV) makes for a pretty safe environment. It is also made quite clear to parents/guardians that this is a non-Service flying activity. However, it is conducted on a Government Aerodrome with a significant amount of military oversight and best practice - is this a perfect mix for this kind of activity?

All seems very sensible mitigations; it's just a shame that Public monies can't be spent on such schemes. If each RAF Flying Club flew just 100 cadets a year then that would be 1,400 cadets a year...Halton Aero Club normally flies 100 school children in an afternoon once per year! RAF Halton Flying Club Host Young Flyers (http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafhalton/news/index.cfm?storyid=4E5C181F-5056-A318-A8BCCB92A1094E2E)

The B Word :cool:

[Cows getting bigger]

In a sense, public money is being spent as the operating costs of the airfield are probably lost in the noise. HAC is a really good Service club and it is most heartening to see them engage with our cadets. Not ideologically right, not pretty but it achieves the aim.

[Chugalug2]

hoodie:-
they couldn't climb to MSA due to the temperatures and lack of an Icing clearance.

Thank you hoodie, you beat me to it. As you say, the thread was long (and abrasive!). It divided between those of us who stated that we did not know for sure why ZD576 crashed on the Mull of Kintyre killing all 29 people on board, and those who did. What we did know was that the aircraft had been granted an RTS into full squadron service in a known grossly unairworthy condition by VSOs who had emulated the Apollo 13 commander's recommendation quoted by Frelon above (though admittedly not in the spirit it was meant);

you need to be a person who makes things happen
They were that all right, destroying UK Military Air Safety within months compared to the decades it had taken to build. The reason that the ACO is bereft of its most precious USP, its volunteer flown gliders, is for the very same reason. That is why I posted the link, that is why I commend "Their Greatest Disgrace" to all who contribute to this thread.

[chevvron]

In a sense, public money is being spent as the operating costs of the airfield are probably lost in the noise. HAC is a really good Service club and it is most heartening to see them engage with our cadets. Not ideologically right, not pretty but it achieves the aim.
It's my understanding the upkeep of Halton airfield was funded from the HQAC budget. With the withdrawl of the VGS, presumably funding will need to come from elsewhere.

[The B Word]

Chevvron

Re: Halton

It's funded by 22Gp as a 22Gp station and the Force Development Trg Centre that's been there doing gliding since 2004 from Bicester has always injected far more cash into the place than the Air Cadets.

The B Word :ok:

[chevvron]

I must admit my info is a bit old; I was told it by the CFI of 613 VGS one day when the airfield was waterlogged so they weren't operating but the Halton Gliding Club was and they were churning up the surface.(before the GSA Centre moved in from Bicester)

[ACW342]

Tomorrow is the thirtieth and final anniversary of 664 VGS, Does anyone know the total number of aircraft, of both types, now serviceable? I find that facts help me when delivering sarcasm and vituperation on the heads of those responsible for this shameful episode in the history of the ACO.

A342

[iRaven]

I understand it is 5x Vigilants and 4x Vikings...:cool:

[RUCAWO]

342, will see you there , sadly I can not get pished ,doctors orders :(

[David Thompson]

A County Durham air cadet goes solo on his Air Cadet Pilot Scheme at Dundee ;
Chester-le-Street cadet spreads his wings with first solo flight (From The Northern Echo) (http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/local/northdurham/14746146.Chester_le_Street_cadet_spreads_his_wings_with_firs t_solo_flight/)
One of 186 cadets on the scheme .

[RUCAWO]

We had sixteen cadets flown in a Puma on Monday, pilot is a former cadet on the Sqn and wanted to do something for the cadets, some have been in close to three years and this was their first flight , lots of silly grins:)

[ACW VGL]

Marvelous news to read the Northern Echo story and hearty congratulations to Adam and the staff at 1507. Time was that the draw from the 647 VGS was so strong that OC 1507 decided to ban any cadet that became a staff cadet there from promotion on the squadron. My brother ended up as a C Cat with a flying scholarship/PPL and no stripes! Where there is a will there is a way.

[Arclite01]

ACW VGL

That was common. My Squadron did not like me on the VGS one bit. As I was also a Region shooter (.303) there was always a clash of interests.

It got referred to Wing HQ (Kent) for decisions, the Squadron saying they wanted me to partake in Squadron Activities (I was the Duke of Edinburgh Award Coach), the Wing Musketry Officer wanting me to shoot for Wing and the VGS wanting me to fly weekends.

VGS won. The Wg Cdr was ex-CO of 618 VGS :-)

I do believe it cost me promotion at the Squadron though as my contemporaries (those that lasted) overtook me quickly for no obvious reason I could see.................

Arc

[UV]

Arc...Ah, that would be J.F then. You weren't the only one at the time, I knew numerous at W.M. in the same boat.
Petty jealousy.

[POBJOY]

MY Staff Cdt v Sqdn NCO thing came to blows when offered an interview for an overseas flight to Canada which would also have included visits to their Cadet organisation (and no doubt some more gliding).

The Wing panel were not impressed with my slightly grubby uniform even though i explained that the f/sgt stripes were the victim of yet another rapid intervention in clearing a fouled cable drum on the winch without time to get into denims. The next chap was an immaculately presented bandmaster Cdt WO (no gliding wings) with more gold braid and tassels than Idi Amin. No prizes as to who went to Canada.
My Squadron CO was great (ex wartime pilot) so never stood in the way of Gliding duties as long as i kept the drill standard up, and made sure we were well turned out at the Wing Parades (held on our airfield). He accepted the fact that i would arrive by landrover at the last moment having disgorged other Cadets to their various Squadrons forming up for the event. The Corps was run for flying in those days and managed in the main by ex aircrew.

[G-TYNE]

Excellent news that VGS flying has restarted at Topcliffe with 3x Vigilants working on staff currency. A drop in the ocean however slightly closer to having cadets in the air.

[Arclite01]

TYNE

That is the first positive bit of news for ACO Gliding in a long time !!

Hoorah !

Arc

[iRaven]

Isn't it ironic that the CAS's Reading List 2016 contains only one full sized picture in it - that of an Air Cadet glider in the 1960s! The same 2016 that he and his SLT cohort allowed the whole organisation to be halved after a 2.5year "pause". Further is that it all happened on the big man's watch before he handed over to current CAS?

http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/CAS-READING-LIST-2016.pdf

[tucumseh]

iRaven

To be fair to ACM Pulford (Retired), he inherited nearly 3 decades of neglect, and even if he had anyone who knew what to do about it, it would be impossible to correct matters during his short tenure. He had a double whammy to contend with because we're still waiting for the MAA to acknowledge what the root problem was.

[iRaven]

Tuc

I agree on the inherited problem, but I disagree on the 'after action'. There were options to act and get another type of aircraft for the VGS; indeed there still is. A brand new Rotax Falke is ~£70k and an ASK-21 is ~£80k, with the latter already checked out by the BSD folks with APs and FRCs already written (if they insisted on running them as military aircraft - running them as BGA aircraft would be far easier and cheaper!). Before the 'pause' it was known that the 60-odd Vigilants needed new engines and IIRC the cost of the Rotax replacement was circa £60-70k per airframe! So the money was there in the Annual Budget Cycle to do this work commencing in 2015 but was somehow allowed to be frittered away. There are other projects in the RAF where vast sums of money are being wasted - the infrastructure budget and the moving of units around at HUGE expense to provide a shiney new facility (and legacy for the senior officer that proposed it) only to move again in years few, or sometimes not at all after very costly studies (the move of RAFCAM from North Luffenham and the great St Athan/Lyneham/Cosford debacle are 2 that spring to mind). We could have found the £4-5 million to get the Air Cadets new gliders to operate if the leadership and intent was there; and as we know leadership starts from the very top. When the music stopped Pully was holding the parcel and he could have taken a better decision than to try and expand AEFs - which we know is nowhere near as good an activity as gliding for youths as it doesn't have that option send them solo. In years to come will Pully's legacy be that he allowed Air Cadet gliding to slip through our fingers?

Sorry mate, but just like a CEO or Chairman of the Board of a commercial organisation, when poor decisions are made then the heads of sheds must bear responsibility, at least in part. So having a picture of an Air Cadet glidier in his 'reading list' is a poor decision in my opinion.

All inn my humble opinion of course.

iRaven

[Engines]

As ever, Tuc hits the nail full on. Well over two years have passed since the Air Cadet fleet was 'paused', or more accurately, grounded. It's become apparent that schoolchildren were being flown around in military aircraft that were non-airworthy. Ministers have admitted systemic failings in oversight and execution of what, by any definition, was a basic engineering task. Public money has been wasted on an epic scale.

So, where is the MAA's report on all this? The organisation charged with regulating and assuring airworthiness of military aircraft for the last 6 years hasn't yet got round to telling the public what the heck was going on.

Anyone on this forum got any info or rumours?

Best regards as ever to those trying to fix the issues,

Engines

[tucumseh]

In years to come will Pully's legacy be that he allowed Air Cadet gliding to slip through our fingers?

On the contrary, (and assuming he had some personal involvement), I think he will be remembered as the man who had the balls to ground the fleet, knowing this act would serve to highlight the cowardice, incompetence and maladministration of his predecessors, who concealed the problem and were prepared to gamble with the lives of minors.

Agree about the photograph! I'd like to know if he had any editorial input.

I also agree about the astronomical waste that is, in effect, MoD policy - as it commits huge resources to defending and protecting those who insist on wasting the money. That £4Bn+ on Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 would have bought one or two gliders.

[Chugalug2]

tuc has rightly highlighted the leaden weight that the RAF is burdened with, like some monstrous ball and chain, in protecting the reputations of VSOs that conspired to rob it of the most fundamental quality of any air force, the airworthiness of its aircraft. That the CAS chose to ground the Air Cadets gliders, and thus compromise future recruitment rather than simply replace them, gives us some indication of what's at stake here.

If the RAF does not rid itself of these shackles and face up to the scandal of the cover up, then its airworthiness will remain compromised. That does not bode well for the future, either in the avoidance of avoidable accidents or prevailing over other air forces for command of the air.

[Lordflasheart]

... where is the MAA's report on all this? He's probably busy worrying about his rivet joints. Shouldn't #3 be finishing up the 'flight testing' in the US about now, that they were talking about a year or so ago ? Plus I gather #2 has recently been sent back to L3 for 'repairs following questions about its serviceability.' Apparently 'beset by technical problems.' According to AW&ST 12-25 Sept.

[cats_five]

To replace the gliders with k21s will take a long time. The order book is full, even if shleicher could double production and were willing to do so it would take up to 10 years. If wrangling about modifications started maybe it would take forever.

And unless the airworthiness issues are sorted out how long before the shiny new gliders were grounded?

[Corporal Clott]

Cats

I understand that the order books are full, but also I understand that the company would likely, for the right order, open up more manufacturing capacity if needed. The RAAF have just had a sizeable order fulfilled.

I agree, using MAA-land to engineer gliders is cloud cuckoo land. Swapping to BGA regulation would involve training up the cadre of ass/full cat instructors and BGA engineering inspectors, but a large proportion could have been done by now. What would be in it for the BGA? Go to most gliding clubs and the average age is high. The BGA is suffering like most other GA sports from a lack of youth coming into the sport - this would be an instant fix for them by delivering their syllabus and guarantee them a bright future.

Plowing on with ~70 old Grob 103 Acros and a handful of modified Grob 109s under MAA rules is an expensive folly. The 109s will be dead by 2019. So what then? A bunch of old Acros slowly being nibbled to death by regulations designed for military combat aircraft.

If you want to be really radical, the RAF have over 22 Air Sports clubs ranging from light aircraft, gliding to microlight. Get 2FTS to administer Air Cadet flying through these clubs, many of which have worked on the civil regulations for many years, and bolster the club's instructor/support cadre through the extant network of cadet force volunteers. There is ACTO35 in place at present and this could provide the mechanism to deliver if it allowed defence budget money to be used - there would be an instant saving as the cost to run a mil registered glider/motor glider is high compared to the club aircraft. I'm not saying these clubs are in a position now to deliver this, but could be with the capability/capacity the manpower within 2FTS/VGSs, with training, could provide. If coupled to the 12 remaining VGS, running on BGA regs, we might have a system that could deliver what these youngsters deserve.

CPL Clott

[tucumseh]

And unless the airworthiness issues are sorted out how long before the shiny new gliders were grounded?

It becomes more difficult and expensive to regress and take corrective action, the longer the systemic airworthiness failings exist. The MAA denied this to Minister in January 2011 and it is this that accounts for them existing for 6 years and not really moving forward. Of course, many in the MAA understand all this, but leadership is lacking.

If it did come to buying new gliders (and I'd love to be a fly on the wall during scrutiny, which is why these things drag on as those to blame need to be long gone to protect them), I'd ensure the supplier also had a long term contract to maintain airworthiness. Just take it out of MoD's hands, leaving them with the fitness for purpose decision. It hasn't been funded policy to do it since 1991 anyway and it is easier to justify paying a contractor than making the case to re-employ people in MoD, who then have to be trained. Remember, the MAA don't actually "do" airworthiness; they are meant to apply audit oversight and act as MoD's champion when bidding for resources. All of which rather raises the question of how they know what to look for (and they still haven't found it). It is not a subject for a 2 year tour. It is a vocation.

[ShyTorque]

It is not a subject for a 2 year tour. It is a vocation.

Indeed it is, or should be. I've always been of the opinion that there is an endemic flaw in the way that the RAF has traditionally allowed fundamental, long term decisions to be made by those whose main intent is looking good in the short term to facilitate a rapid personal rise to the top.

Having known the man for many years, I would by no means include Andy Pulford in the latter category, btw.

[Chugalug2]

tuc:-

It is not a subject for a 2 year tour. It is a vocation.


There, in a nut shell is the problem and the possible solution.

As Shy Torque says, this is a fundamental flaw in the system of ensuring Air Safety for the RAF. Only an independent MAA and MilAAIB, of the MOD and of each other, can provide for it again.

That will only happen when the holy scripture of Hadden-Cave is seen as part of the cover up rather than of the solution.

That will only happen when the cover up itself is faced up to by the RAF.

That has to come soon, or more avoidable accidents and needless deaths will carry on happening unnecessarily.

[EnigmAviation]

"It's become apparent that schoolchildren were being flown around in military aircraft that were non-airworthy"Not to mention, of course, the huge numbers of Officers and CGI's whose families were completely unaware of the additional heightened risks of compromised airworthiness.

Apropos CAS Andy Pulford, IMHO he was not within any conspiracy, he was in my experience a thoroughly decent and honest man who made it his business to assist Air Cadet & VGS activity on his station. At CAS level he merely endorsed decisions taken lower down the food chain - e,g., by 22 Grp and 2 FTS, relying upon integrity and knowledge at lower levels - perhaps the only error being just that - he trusted their reports !

The amazing thing is, that even now, some 2.5 years on, with precious little or no Air Cadet VGS activity taking place at the remaining 12 Units, there is no sign of an early return to levels of productivity seen "pre-pause", despite many HQAC "spin doctoring stories" on Facebook and other press releases on subjects like "Aerospace camps @ ACCGS Syerston". Additionally, there is little sign that the real scandal has been publicly aired, and even less signs that the guilty will be named, shamed and sanctioned.

This was a classic case of the Amateurs being professional and vice versa !

Maybe this is a sure sign that our MP's and Lords are far too warm and comfortable in Westminster village to be able to bring the villains to justice, and hold both the RAF and MoD contractors to the scrutiny of their work and public accountability for the expenditure incurred.

Maybe a job for dear old Nigel Farage in retirement !;)

[Lima Juliet]

Reference CAS's decision: It was his, as I know that the original plan on powerpoint for his consideration was rejected in Autumn 2015 and the drafters were told to go and think again! If I recall correctly there were about 7 options given to him and he and his fellow officers were given the decision. I've even seen the decision paper and and accompanying powerpoint presentation. He had to consult at Ministerial level. Quite why they chose the current outcome is beyond me. As others have said before, a bolstered AEF is not the right answer as this reduces the chances to go solo - to ZERO!

Posts #1200, #1201, #1267, #1662 and #1773 show that Ministers and the highest rankers in the RAF made the final decisions - sadly I think the decsion taken eventually was totally the wrong one as we seem to be very little further forward a year after these options were discussed. :(

LJ

[ShyTorque]

What progress at Syerston, I wonder? I see that the NOTAM regarding the ATZ being deactivated at weekends is still being issued.

[Lima Juliet]

I heard that Syerston has 4 Vikings and no Vigilants (the latter going to Topcliffe to get the first VGS going). Four aircraft is barely enough to keep the instructors current and checked out!!

As ever progress appears to be S L O W....

[cats_five]

I'd ensure the supplier also had a long term contract to maintain airworthiness.

It is so easy for the operators to bork airworthiness. Undocumented repairs, repairs done without a correct schedule from the type certificate holder, lost paperwork... Does any of this sound familiar?

[cats_five]

Plowing on with ~70 old Grob 103 Acros

Plenty of civilian clubs are ploughing on with old gliders with no problems. There are 31 G103s & Twin Astirs on the civilian register, four deregistered because they have gone abroad and one deregistered as it was destroyed in a mid-air collision. Thankfully all the pilots were OK in that incident.

It doesn't matter much how old or new the gliders are, if the paperwork etc. is allowed to get into the state that the gliders paperwork is in it's expensive to sort it out.

[Engines]

Corp Clott (and others),

Perhaps I might offer a couple of observations on what (to me) is one of the key issues raised in this thread - the non-airworthiness of the ATCO aircraft fleet and how that is seen to relate to new MAA rules.

It seems to be a common assumption that the problem lies with application of the MAA regulations to the glider fleet. Understandably, some appear to believe that moving over to a fleet of aircraft operated under civilian rules would avoid many of the problems that led to this grounding.

In my view (and that's all it is, please feel free to disagree), the core of the problem is simply stated - the RAF have failed to look after their aircraft properly. And by 'properly', I don't mean to the new MAA rules - I mean to long standing and well understood basic principles of maintaining airworthiness. The rules that applied when they bought the aircraft in the first place. Despite being dressed up in a new format and in new language, the aims of the MAA regulations aren't very different to those that were used (and observed) for many years. Tuc has succinctly set these out many times, my version of them is:

1. Know what you have procured - define the configuration
2. Demonstrate that it's airworthy - build your safety case
3. Release the aircraft into service (with your RTS) to that configuration, underpinned by your safety case, with all the required information and support to allow the front line to operate and maintain the aircraft so that it remains airworthy
4. When you change the configuration (repairs. modifications) document the changes and update your safety case, RTS and the publications.

I've said it before, but it bears repeating. Doing this for a fleet of gliders and low power aircraft should have been an absolute doddle. Basic. Ops normal. Choose your adjective. So the big question remains - how on earth did the RAF NOT do that? Come on MAA, people want to know. After all, they paid for these aircraft.

If you let an aircraft fleet get into this condition and then years later slap a new set of rules on them that say, in effect 'do what you should have done back in the 1990s when you bought the aircraft' - well, that's when things will go pear shaped. And they have.

Way forward? Actually, I agree with other posters that the RAF have no business providing experience and solo flights for school children in military aircraft. If it's a core RAF requirement, then justify it (personally, i think that given the current state of the Armed Forces, it needs a good hard look) and contract it out to civilian organisations better equipped to do it. Sell off the fleet (although after all this, I'd see their resale value at about nil), and let a competent organisation bring what aircraft they can up to compliance with civilian rules.

And then bring those responsible for the waste of millions of taxpayer pounds to justice.

Best Regards as ever to those having to sort this lot out - they shouldn't have to.

Engines

[cats_five]

Spot-on Engine. If the gliders were on the CAA register they would still not be airworthy as the paperwork is in a total guddle.

I also agree about air experience flying not being RAF remit. In the case of gliding, the BGA has clubs all over the UK who are teaching youngsters to fly and sending them solo as young as 14. Of course there is nothing military about a civilian club apart from (at my club) a few guys in ex-military flying suits hanging around at the launch point. That's fine, the purpose of the club is promoting flying.

[EnigmAviation]

"contract it out to civilian organisations better equipped to do it" Engines, well said in terms of how the job should have been done, and sure enough there are many RAF Officers totally responsible for what has happened.


However, I tend to disagree with the above quote; having observed a civilian Gliding Club, I witnessed what could have been a fatal accident where the cause was by lack of independent inspection following re-rig. And the guilty person was no less than a BGA Examiner!


Tuition of Air Cadets IS and WAS a part of the RAF brief, as it is the preliminary training of many who go on to great success in RAF/Army and Navy aviation pilot careers. It was on VGS units that many of today's outstanding RAF pilots learnt their trade under the discipline and guidance of absolutely dedicated Instructors. AEF flying and other Air Ex merely are the icing on the cake, but NOT the important basics ( which HQAC seem to think replaces TRAINING on VGS units). The vital blend of expertise, professionalism and discipline was endemic. Clubs would, IMHO, be a less beneficial atmosphere than flying training on a front line station where all aspects of service can be realistically experienced, The latter is what gives these young people the realistic view of service life, flying and the observance of strict discipline and rules - something they need to understand for a service and flying career.

In my time, I frequently arranged service attachments on co-located Squadrons for Cadets as a part of their training and forward planning for a service career. I can point to many who benefited from this unofficial but beneficial "parenting spin off" being based on an RAF station.


The real answer is to ensure that professionalism returns to the RAF full time Engineering staff, to match the total professionalism and dedication of the VGS staff, who had absolutely NO responsibility for this monumental cock up. Additionally we must find out and remove those who were the guilty parties as this was monumental waste of Taxpayer funding. Sadly the organisation is all but destroyed in terms of productivity in flying training, with the emphasis now being on Air Experience, not flying training and the so called Part task Trainers.


If something is broken, fix it, don't buy an alternative that doesn't quite fit !;)

[Chugalug2]

I think that you have rather missed the core point here EnigmA, with respect. I quite agree with you that the VGS's were second to none in introducing young people to the military ethos as well as the challenges of aviation. The problem is that what was a given, that the UK Military Airfleet was in the main airworthy, is no longer so. As engines says, this has not happened overnight but is the result of decades of neglect and cover up. That it has hit the ACO fleet so hard is a matter of great regret, that it has hit the operational fleets badly is a national tragedy that compromises our security.

As I have already proposed, the solution requires the RAF acknowledging the cover up, reappraising Haddon Cave therefore, and starting the reform of UK Military Air Safety by backing an MAA and a MilAAIB that are independent of the MOD and of each other. Only then can the rebuilding of UK Military Airworthiness start in earnest. It will be then further decades before the UK Military Airfleet can once again said to be, in the main, airworthy again.

What happens in the meantime to the ACO fleet is a quandary. Whereas the operational fleets must carry on as best they can, the same cannot be said for the gliders. Even if some are declared airworthy, and they may well be, who is to ensure that they will still be in the future? The MAA clearly cannot ensure it, as tuc and others have declared. The don't know how to, and are compromised by the cover up in taking the necessary steps to do so.

It seems to me that engines has it about right. If you want to get ATC and CCF cadets back into gliders ASAP, then the civilian register is the way to go. It has no doubt feet of clay, but it does have one great advantage; that Regulator and Investigator are independent of the Operator and of each other. That is the model for UK Military Aviation to emulate in my view.

[Mandator]

Although no-one here will need reminding, Air Cadet gliding has the potential to get you into the left-hand seat:

Meet the 'world's youngest female airline captain' - 26-year-old Kate McWilliams - BBC Newsbeat (http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/37469713/meet-the-worlds-youngest-female-airline-captain---26-year-old-kate-mcwilliams)

[Arclite01]

Posts #2867, #2868 and #2869 have it correct.

In the past the RAF had no interest is the VGS, no money was spent there and very little oversight of the operation was undertaken by the RAF. People posted into ACCGS and CFS Exam Wing (Gliders) saw it as a sidelining of ambition or a complete dead end from a career perspective. The bulk of the work was done by the ACCGS staff (Civil Servants in Uniform) and things motored on reasonably well.

End of Cold War, much reduced budget and much reduced career opportunities meant people had to look elsewhere to fulfill their ambitions and found a fertile breeding ground in the Cadet organization(s).

Spend some cash and ask for some Management oversight as part of the deal, rubbish the current setup, suggest it needs review and replacement - align it with the 'proper' RAF setup................. hey presto here we are..........

Arc

[Chugalug2]

A01:-
In the past the RAF had no interest is the VGS
No doubt, but the MOD as UK Military Air Regulator was mandated to take a very close interest in the airworthiness of VGS aircraft. That it failed to do so is clear, why it failed to do so is the scandal that now must be exposed. Aviation doesn't do politics, it kills given half a chance. When you are dealing with other mothers' kids that's a clear no go.

As with any air accident, there are often many holes in many slices of the Swiss Cheese to line up. The UK Military Airworthiness slice is now more hole than it is cheese!

If this was only about the ACO glider "pause", it could be turned around in a thrice. Unfortunately it is about far more than that, though the MOD would much prefer those affected to think along parochial lines. That's how they dealt with all the other fleets affected by lack of airworthiness (usually at the cost of fatal air accidents). They even have a term for it, "stove piping"!

[ACW VGL]

Corp Clott, as an ex-RAF Flying Club secretary, I couldn't imagine anything worse than 'Get 2FTS to administer Air Cadet flying through these clubs'. Not only would he have the same negative impact on the clubs that he has had on the VGS but surely you have missed the point of this whole exercise - NO CIVILIANS FLYING CADETS. As that has been achieved, why would 'they' change a great result and some well earned prestige.

[Arclite01]

ACW VGL

Aren't there still CI's on the VGS at Topcliffe then ??

Arc

[ACW599]

>Corp Clott, as an ex-RAF Flying Club secretary, I couldn't imagine anything worse than 'Get 2FTS to administer Air Cadet flying through these clubs'.<

And as a current RAFFC instructor and ex-VGS A2* I couldn't agree more. For goodness' sake don't let 2FTS anywhere near the RAFFC organisation.

[Whizz Bang]

ACW VGL

Aren't there still CI's on the VGS at Topcliffe then ??

Arc
The ambition is to uniform everyone and remove staff cadets.

Methinks this has something to do with a lack of understanding of the volunteer, their motivation and that a solution is to uniform everyone so you can command them.

They can still tell you to "do one".

The carrot is that everyone will get (allegedly) unlimited "Paid Training Days" - which can only be cheaper when there are so few left to pay...

[622]

Remove Staff Cadets?


Is that a 'feeling' or a known objective/?


I had heard of the all uniform wish but nothing about removing Staff Cadets.

[ACW VGL]

I don't think the changes are anything to do with ordering people about or training-day pay, rather post Haddon-Cave perceptions. The loss of three cadets in two AEF accidents was a watershed, generating a corporate fear that any repeat would cause the service to lose its aviation authority. I have seen other 'Write a service paper about X. I don't care what you write but the conclusion is this...' moments and this all smacks of that. The desired end state is being rolled out - fewer schools, with more visible supervision, all-uniformed staff, far fewer opportunities for cadets to fly and very rarely solo. I recently had a conversation with one of the safety engineer consultants that reviewed the safety management processes at the DT. He recollected Vigilant door opening as a prime example of safety processes not being enacted. Am I imagining signals from Syerston the VGS promulgating an additional captain's check of the trainee's door, to be reminded at every morning brief, pending a revision the FRCs, which were subsequently amended as expected.

[Wander00]

At the risk of multiple incoming, I fear that the wood and the trees are being confused and not only by 2FTS. The sad Grob accidents were wholly outwith Air Cadet Gliding. There are certainly airworthiness and servicing issues that needed to be addressed. I don't know how many cadets have been flown/flown themselves over how many hours, and what the actual number of accidents has been, but I suspect the safety record would be the envy of many organisations. The cavalier treatment of loyal volunteer gliding instructors, and now it seem Staff Cadets, IMHO is to be deplored. We can never get back to the halcyon days, but lets get cadets back I the air. If nothing else it represents the nation putting resources into developing and maintaining air-mindedness in the young, fostering a sense of wonder and adventure - oh yes and motherhood and apple pie. Don't know where, or when, it will all end but hope to heck something good comes out at the far end

[tucumseh]

I think it wise to remember that the grounding has been forced by precisely the same systemic failures that led to the avoidable deaths of scores, in Chinook, Nimrod, Hercules and other accidents discussed here. 95% of the recommendations in the various BoI/SI reports can be summarised as "implement mandated policy". Who is responsible for ensuring these recommendations are implemented? Do you think they'd done a good job? I don't.

[Wander00]

Gliding in its widest sense runs on volunteers, as it does here in France. Instructors and others give their time freely. It therefore seems logical that many years ago Air Cadet Gliding was similarly based on volunteers, as is the rest of the Air Cadet movement. Staff cadets provide the grass roots leadership for cadets attending, and that is to their huge personal benefit and development as well. This gives a valuable example to cadets and their parents, that voluntary service is valuable in its own right.

To move to a fully paid instructor system and also to abolish Staff Cadets would be to abandon many of the strengths of the former system, to no great advantage. the next cry will be that paid staff are unaffordable, and for the whole system to die. cadets will leave the Air Cadet Movement for civilian gliding clubs, which means they will fly, but lose all the other benefits of a uniformed, disciplined youth organisation. Hope the plug hole is big enough for the babies as well as the bathwater. Rant mode "off".

[Whizz Bang]

Remove Staff Cadets?


Is that a 'feeling' or a known objective/?


I had heard of the all uniform wish but nothing about removing Staff Cadets.
It came straight from the horse's mouth; they will exist no more. There was also other tosh regarding 'aircrew NCOs' and other minutiae that, I'm sure, took significant sums of taxpayers money to produce.

[Whizz Bang]

I don't think the changes are anything to do with ordering people about or training-day pay, rather post Haddon-Cave perceptions. The loss of three cadets in two AEF accidents was a watershed, generating a corporate fear that any repeat would cause the service to lose its aviation authority. I have seen other 'Write a service paper about X. I don't care what you write but the conclusion is this...' moments and this all smacks of that. The desired end state is being rolled out - fewer schools, with more visible supervision, all-uniformed staff, far fewer opportunities for cadets to fly and very rarely solo. I recently had a conversation with one of the safety engineer consultants that reviewed the safety management processes at the DT. He recollected Vigilant door opening as a prime example of safety processes not being enacted. Am I imagining signals from Syerston the VGS promulgating an additional captain's check of the trainee's door, to be reminded at every morning brief, pending a revision the FRCs, which were subsequently amended as expected.
My conclusion comes from my perception of the main personality involved; the carrot to dangle as an incentive and the stick to enforce his will.

I've not seen any evidence of his comprehension of the volunteer, their motivation nor any of the excellent points made above regarding the wider impact of, what was, an exceptionally good value for money system.

There was certainly more competent supervision at grass roots level by the 'amateurs' who also had full time jobs. Visible doesn't equal effective.

[Tingger]

It came straight from the horse's mouth; they will exist no more. There was also other tosh regarding 'aircrew NCOs' and other minutiae that, I'm sure, took significant sums of taxpayers money to produce.

That's not exactly what was said though was it. There is only an affect on over 18s. FSC 16-18 will remain.

There was always the option to become staff on a VGS at 18 that just becomes less optional now.

[cats_five]

... lose all the other benefits of a uniformed, disciplined youth organisation.

They will however benefit from the self-discipline required to learn to fly a glider and go solo, along with having to help others to do so. It's true they won't learn to march, they won't wear a uniform, but they will almost certainly go solo in however many flights it takes and can continue flying to progress as far as they want to, within their capabilities. There are some terrifyingly brilliant young (under 20) glider pilots.

[Whizz Bang]

That's not exactly what was said though was it. There is only an affect on over 18s. FSC 16-18 will remain.

There was always the option to become staff on a VGS at 18 that just becomes less optional now.
It's what I was told. There will be no staff cadets. Period.

At 18, should you wish to join a Volunteer Grounded Squadron, you will cease to be a cadet. You shall not join before 18 as a member of staff; cadet or otherwise.

Of course there is no written confirmation of this and I expect the party line has flip-flopped a few times as there is precious little else to do at EGXY.

[Tingger]

The future progressive Training package document that's been available since April shows that gold Wing courses are "Reserved for cadets wishing to pursue Flight Staff Cadets (FSC) service"

Cadets don't "join" a VGS as before they remain "owned" by their normal squadron and don't show up against the establishment which is limited but they are still FSCs. There may occasionally in the future be a point where a VGS establishment is full when an FSC reaches 18, with no post to go to in adult service with the VGS that there maybe a tough call on manning for the OC.

[Cows getting bigger]

Can someone please tell me what the V means in VGS or indeed RAFVR(T)? :}

Yep, thought as much. :)

[622]

Ref the above...it mainly means you can say goodbye at any time you like ;)


..and I am sure this whole sorry fiasco has led to a few of those!

[Sky Sports]

My son is a competent, solo, 15 year old glider pilot. He is also an Air Cadet.

What opportunities now exist for him to further his gliding within the organisation?

[Lima Juliet]

Sky Sports

To be quite honest, once solo, Air Cadet gliding could not really offer anything anyway. If you can get your young Air Cadet son to one of the RAFGSA clubs then I am sure they would be delighted to take him to the next level of gliding - RAF Gliding & Soaring Association - Homepage (http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafgliding/). When the Air Cadet competition fleet was binned a few years ago* the only way to fly 'hot ships' in competition was via the RAFGSA. Also, if he were to join the RAF at any rank then the RAFGSA can take him forward to the very heights of national/international gliding competition if he has the dedication and aptitude - regardless of branch or trade.

I wish the best of luck to him...

LJ

*= Kestrel TX1 and Valiant TX1 were Janus C and ASW19 competition gliders.

[Wander00]

What LJ said, especially the "good luck" bit

[cats_five]

My son is a competent, solo, 15 year old glider pilot. He is also an Air Cadet.

What opportunities now exist for him to further his gliding within the organisation?

There are a handful (7?) of RAFGSA clubs, but about 10x as many civilian BGA clubs.

[Lima Juliet]

Cats

In answer to the original question, the last time I looked the BGA wasn't part of the 'organisation'? :ugh:

Anyway, the RAFGSA is going to be a lot cheaper for the parents of a 'uniformed cadet' than with a civvy BGA club. RAF Gliding & Soaring Association - What will it cost? (http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafgliding/gsa/gsacost.cfm)

[POBJOY]

The 'Gliding' part of the ATC is a lost cause as are the top people supposed to be running it.
Time to bin 2FTS and let the GSA have the resources. There are no reasons why some of the VGS system could not be 'reborn' as feeder units under the GSA.
The whole (Uniform only 'no staff Cadets) scenario just shows how the Corps have completely lost its way with this, and why the cretons in charge should not be allowed to continue (and be paid) just to paper over a complete foul up of decisions and leadership. The GSA (not just RAF) have the tech ability and the people who actually make things happen;plus as alluded, have the ability to progress pilots to a higher level. Public money should not be poured into the organisation that has failed to provide a service, and has no ability or leadership to sort itself out.

[Wander00]

Just a thought, might have to look at the Constitution of the GSA (ie can they "legally" fly essentially civilians (ATC cadets) given the rules as I recall them on non-public funded activities and grants from Nuffield Trust, etc) to go that route, although it seems to have much to commend it as a way forward

[Frelon]

We have a number of ATC cadets flying at our gliding club, their flying paid for by the bank of Mum and Dad. They essentially forget the fact that they are in the ATC, having been totally disappointed and unimpressed with this continuing debacle.

As far as the club is aware they are civilian members of the club, albeit juniors who benefit from discounted flying.

They are so committed to want to fly and this route is (sadly for them) the only route open.

As a club we welcome these enthusiastic youngsters and hope they will continue to grow with the club and support us well into the future.

[cats_five]

Cats

In answer to the original question, the last time I looked the BGA wasn't part of the 'organisation'? :ugh:

Anyway, the RAFGSA is going to be a lot cheaper for the parents of a 'uniformed cadet' than with a civvy BGA club. RAF Gliding & Soaring Association - What will it cost? (http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafgliding/gsa/gsacost.cfm)

Correct the bga is nothing to do with the 'organisation', but all clubs provide very cheap flying for under 18s. For example £8.50 at my club for a launch and up to 30 minutes in the air in a club glider, and given the low number of rafgsa clubs the man who asked might find traveling far easier & cheaper to a bga club.

[Lima Juliet]

Cats

Fairy snuff, me old - some clubs are a lot cheaper than others. I guess you would also have to take into account travelling costs to get to a GSA club versus a more expensive local civvy club as well. Although you would benefit as a youngster in other ways if you want to join any of the 3 services in the future by flying with any of the Service gliding clubs (the army and navy as well as the air force ones).

LJ

[cats_five]

It's not just the cost of travelling, it's the time, and getting someone to take you given 15 year olds are some way of driving legally.

[campbeex]

Probably worth mentioning that 662 VGS (RM Condor / Arbroath) had their standing down dinner last weekend.

Sapientus Icaro.

[Mushroom club]

Sky sports

To answer your question re opportunities to glide WITHIN the cadets the answer is, IMHO, very little if at all. I suspect where you may try and take him depends as much on geography as anything else.

One thing to bear in mind is that whether he goes to a BGA or GSA club they are just that ie. clubs. The VGS organisation was run on military lines with the staff regularly checked by "trappers" from CGS/CFS. In my opinion that gave them a very different feel to a club environment and was an invaluable indoctrination regarding airmanship etc which could be useful if he's contemplating a professional aviation career. Yes I know that is a tad contentious and I am not suggesting that clubs are unsafe just that the mindset is probably different. Not wrong just different.

Which brings me to the VGS staff themselves. What they have needed, but have not received, is anything like the sort of info that one could expect in this digital age. Would it be so difficult to brief them the latest news eg Topcliffe recommencing ops? It seems so and CGB rightly reminds us what the "V" in VGS stands for!

MC

[EnigmAviation]

Air Cadet gliding could not really offer anything (post solo)anywaySorry to correct you Leon.


The VGS offered good hard working Cadets post solo, the chance to become a Staff Cadet - lots of hard work, lots more flying and the chance to become a Graded Pilot - either G2 or G1 - the latter of which entitled the FSC to legally carry Cadets for the purpose of Air Experience but with an element of basic flying training.


Many such FSC's went on to become Service and Airline pilots and some remained so loyal to their roots that they regularly came back to fly and assist - I can think of at least two without any thought process - one a currently serving RAF Wg Cdr, and the other a former RN helicopter pilot who gave many many days of service on top of his service commitment.


Thus it is just not true to say there was nothing post solo - if you were talented and not just passable, there was a huge future and "lead-in" to higher things.:ok:

[POBJOY]

Enigma You are quite correct;but the system has been slowly 'culled' over many years.
Going from 3 to one solo was hardly progress and the organisation should have seen a big red light then.
The whole CFS / 2FTS scenario has also been quite useless at promoting the situation and became a 'job' that did not really exist or was needed.
AS has now been ably demonstrated the only real expertise was with the Schools/Squadrons and they became victims of an ever increasing bureaucratic system that lost sight of the reals aims.
No one with experience of a well run 'hands on' school could be taken in with the added nonsense of someone checking 'stitching' and quite frankly i am surprised that this type of non job was allowed to pervade the coal face.
It summed up the complete loss of what the organisation did and where it was going.
Of course the blame for this has to lie with the well paid (full time) uniformed
system that had no idea of what they were doing or how well the Volunteer element had coped with an ever increasing 'box ticking' mentality rather than capability.The Staff Cadet system was an unique set up that did not need some F...W... to interfere with and as alluded the standards and progress was a major plus point for the Corps. The fact that in its 75th year ATC Gliding had gone (in real terms) must be the yardstick by which we judge the poor leadership and inabilty of those in charge .
No amount of Twatter and Facelesssbook will change the facts;they killed the organisation and no amount of PR can hide the facts.Leadership Leadership Leadership was needed and has been lacking for years.

[chevvron]

Well said POBJOY.
Although I didn't join the RAF in the end after being a P2 Grade Pilot staff cadet* (nowadays a G1), I did join NATS (actually called NATCS in those days) and had an interesting career mostly at Farnborough, keeping my association with the cadets going and eventually becoming a Squadron Commander.
Had it not been for my experiences in Air Cadet gliding I would never have thought of air traffic control as a career.
* They tried to make me a 'C' Cat instructor but I hadn't got the patience!!

[Onceapilot]

To continue the " lost " theme... What many fail to appreciate is how the progression of a 16 year old tyro was nurtured by a cheap, effort-rewarded and progressive system the Air Cadet gliding organisation was. :ok:
What I cannot understand is,....WHO decided to F it up? :mad:

Answers please...

OAP

[Lima Juliet]

Sorry Enigma, I agree that there is some progression possible, but not really advancing flying skills; I don't believe that flying the Grob Acro Twin as a FSC is allowing them to realise their full potential. That role should have belonged to the ASW19s and the Janus Cs that were binned in 2000 from the Air Cadet Comp Fleet. They will bring on a glider pilot through to Gold with Diamonds if flown properly - the Viking will struggle to get to Silver. Being a FSC isn't really a gliding achievement in my humble opinion, it's more of a leadership/supervisory achievement. :ok:

LJ

[cats_five]

Leon, I agree. To me progress in gliding is a Silver C (5 hours duration, 1,000m height gain, 50m XC flight in 3 flights or fewer), followed by Gold & possibly Diamonds. However on the day I did my 50k I could have done it in a Junior, which is pretty similar performance to the Vikings. The point really is going well out of glide range of home, though some Scottish 50k flights in wave are in theory never out of glide range!

[Lima Juliet]

Cats 👍👍👍👍👍

[GliFly]

In my club we operate a Gliding Scholarship Scheme where we take around 6 students from the local comprehensive school and train them to solo each year with successful completion being 3 solo flights (sound familiar?). They can then go on to Bronze/LAPL(S) standard on an assisted scheme where we contribute around 50% to the cost.
At present we have 3 disillusioned ATC cadets under training, one of who has just solo'ed. They also drive our vehicles, just like 'proper' staff cadets did and, once solo, drive the winches.

As a former Staff Cadet (616) then C.I from 1959 to '64 it is, for me, particularly sad to see the way the Air Cadets (should now be Ground Cadets!) has gone, but the civilian clubs can have a lot to offer, especially if they embrace the need for some sort of positive assistance to the potential young pilots via grants, sponsorship and patronage from local businesses.

[cats_five]

In my club we operate a Gliding Scholarship Scheme where we take around 6 students from the local comprehensive school and train them to solo each year with successful completion being 3 solo flights (sound familiar?). They can then go on to Bronze/LAPL(S) standard on an assisted scheme where we contribute around 50% to the cost.
At present we have 3 disillusioned ATC cadets under training, one of who has just solo'ed. They also drive our vehicles, just like 'proper' staff cadets did and, once solo, drive the winches.

As a former Staff Cadet (616) then C.I from 1959 to '64 it is, for me, particularly sad to see the way the Air Cadets (should now be Ground Cadets!) has gone, but the civilian clubs can have a lot to offer, especially if they embrace the need for some sort of positive assistance to the potential young pilots via grants, sponsorship and patronage from local businesses.

There are already quite a few organisations the provide grants, Caroline trust is one, and all civilian clubs I know have greatly reduced flying fees for under 18s.

[GliFly]

It's a good thing for young persons in gliding that the civilian clubs seem to be helping more than ever before.
We hosted a 4-Clubs Young Pilots Challenge back in August and it was great to see so many young pilots together in friendly competition. A sponsorship arrangement meant that all their launches were free, as was their food and accommodation.
It is just such a pity that on-going mis-management has ruined gliding for the ATC.

[cats_five]

Yes, it's a pity ATC gliding may never really happen again, but BGA clubs can provide everything ATC gliding should and more. Flying glider, going solo (14 is the minimum age for that), gaining Bronze, XC endorsement, Silver etc., driving vehicles, driving the winch, log keeping, heaving gliders around the airfield, getting cold, getting hot and more. Given there are so many more BGA clubs than ATC & RAFGSA sites there is probably less travelling to do as well. Some clubs are accredited Junior Gliding Centres and there is a map of them on the BGA website.

https://www.gliding.co.uk/juniorgliding

However my own club has had cadet & junior gliding as long as I've been there which is several years before we got accreditation

We have had cadets join the RAF as pilots, fly cross-country, and some have started on becoming an instructor while still a Junior (under 25). BGA won't accept anyone for instructor training of any type unless they have a Silver C.
.

[Arclite01]

Hey Cats

I think the BGA recognized ATC Instructor ratings from B Category upwards (in the old days it used to be 'B' Cat as Assistant Rated Instructor and 'A' Cat as Full Rated Instructor) and they did not recognize the G2/G1 or 'C' Category.

Whether that still holds I'm not sure but that said, there is a potential pool of ready made instructors there for the BGA !!

As someone who has lived in both worlds there is no need to have a Silver C to teach someone to glide, and experienced instructor in either camp can achieve that. I would say that ATC instructors from 'B' Category upwards have a better theoretical knowledge than many BGA Instructors but the BGA Instructors have a better knowledge of teaching more advanced exercises (including the cross country elements) - so 6 of 1 and half a dozen of the other !

Arc

[cats_five]

There is only a pool of ready-made instructors if they start turning up at their chosen BGA club and ask to instruct. Our experience is they don't.

I agree you can teach the initial stages without a Silver C, but since all BGA instructors except BIs are expected to teach the whole syllabus from ab initio to Bronze & XC endorsement, in practise a Silver C is needed. This might in part be why you have the view that they teach more advanced exercises better - they do much more of it and have more of the background.

Edit - there is an expectation a BI will progress, and most do.

Personally I never found theory hugely necessary thought it is interesting. Want to avoid stalling? Don't fly too slow. Want to avoid spinning? Ditto. Want to maximise XC distance? Fly at the right speed. Want to maximise rate of climb? Fly at the right speed. Want to make a good landing? Approach at the right speed, round out at the right place, choose the right reference point, fly a circuit that lets you do these things.

If you hunt through the old copies of gliding magazines & books online (there is a big archive at https://www.sailplaneandgliding.co.uk/archive), read what Ann Welch has written over the years. Theory in my experience often makes things complicated, she had a wonderful talent for simplifying things. We can only think about so much at a time, if the presentation is too complicated the really important simple things can get crowded out.

[HP90]

I thought all "spare" Tutors were going to the AEFs?


Finland's MoD announced on 10 October that it is to purchase 28 used Grob G115E aircraft from UK firm Babcock International


Finland buys Grob G115Es for flight training | IHS Jane's 360 (http://www.janes.com/article/64498/finland-buys-grob-g115es-for-flight-training)

[Lima Juliet]

28x plastic pigz at ~£5.5M - the MoD have got a bargain and could buy 56x brand new ASK-21s with the proceeds... and have change to spare! :ok:

[HP90]

Interesting line of thought - if more Tutors (say 60 or so) were sold at that price, how many motor gliders (i.e. Super Dimonas) could be purchased?

28 Tutors for ~£6m = ~£214k per A/C.

£214k x 60 = ~£12.8m.

Anyone know the going rate for a new Super Dimona?

[Flight_Idle]

I can hardly imagine the air cadets without gliding. The general service knowledge was good for a school kid, the annual camps fun, firing rifles a new thing for us.

The flying scholarship was the 'Cream of the cake' but going solo in a glider was something everyone could do.

Just flying a very basic machine for free.

[cats_five]

It might cover 56 brand new gliders at todays prices, but they will take 20 years or so to get delivered.

[iRaven]

20 years my @rse! :rolleyes:

The Australian Cadets have just taken delivery of roughly half a dozen per year in 2015/2016 - Defence Ministers » Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence ? Air Force Cadets receive new self-launching gliders (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/02/27/parliamentary-secretary-to-the-minister-for-defence-air-force-cadets-receive-new-self-launching-gliders/)

Also, money talks. Place an order with AS for 56 gliders and I am sure they would not take 10 years to deliver! This has to be the greatest myth going surrounding the great Air Cadet gliding debacle. When someone actually asks AS, with proper financial backing to actually pay for 56 aircraft, and gets a real world answer with an actual quote, then I'll believe it. Just because a local club might have asked for a couple of K-21s and has been told it's going to 9-12 months doesn't mean that 40 gliders is going to take 20 years! Likewise, because AS will take 2 years to deliver 11 doesn't mean that 56 will take 10 years...

iRaven

[kenparry]

28x plastic pigz at ~£5.5M - the MoD have got a bargain and could buy 56x brand new ASK-21s with the proceeds... and have change to spare!

No bargain for MoD - the aircraft are owned by the contractor, not the taxpayer.

[planesandthings]

20 years my @rse! :rolleyes:

The Australian Cadets have just taken delivery of roughly half a dozen per year in 2015/2016 - Defence Ministers » Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence ? Air Force Cadets receive new self-launching gliders (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/02/27/parliamentary-secretary-to-the-minister-for-defence-air-force-cadets-receive-new-self-launching-gliders/)

Also, money talks. Place an order with AS for 56 gliders and I am sure they would not take 10 years to deliver! This has to be the greatest myth going surrounding the great Air Cadet gliding debacle. When someone actually asks AS, with proper financial backing to actually pay for 56 aircraft, and gets a real world answer with an actual quote, then I'll believe it. Just because a local club might have asked for a couple of K-21s and has been told it's going to 9-12 months doesn't mean that 40 gliders is going to take 20 years! Likewise, because AS will take 2 years to deliver 11 doesn't mean that 56 will take 10 years...

iRaven

Money talks sure, but the whole fiasco with the Vanguard was the fact that Schleicher refused to open a production line, I do not believe that has changed at all, they are still in the very same production facilities at Poppenhausen that they were 35 years ago..

I'm part of a club who have been taking deliveries of K21s over the past couple of years, our first couple have taken an entire year each after ordering, to come as a direct result of the Australian Air Cadets getting their order in before ours, and that was just half a dozen gliders for them!
And with glue failures cropping up more and more in the ASK13 fleet the demand is continuing to pick up for those clubs needing to move to Glass Gliders or face extinction, so there is still plenty of interest in the K21 despite being rolled out in 1978!

Their website claims they can produce 70-80 or so gliders in a year, unless they open new facilities or outsource the production elsewhere (huge starting costs to then having no demand) it will surely take a number of years to get an entire fleet done, depends if people/RAF are willing to wait, AS is not going to devote their entire factory when they are already busy enough with orderbooks full with the latest kit to compete against Schempp's New Ventus 3 as well as the civilian training market.
Oh and in typical RAF fashion even after building the aircraft would then need to be "modified" to suit the RAF demands seeing as the manufacturer cannot possibly know best in what is a very simple airframe, that'd take time for sure!

Plus a K21 last year cost about £80,000 all in, I'd hate to think what that'd now be with the pound dropping like a stone.

Planesandthings

[cats_five]

Their website claims they can produce 70-80 or so gliders in a year

That is of all types, not just K21s. The others are ASH26, ASW28, ASG29, ASH30, ASH31 & ASH32. I didn't realise the ASH25 had been dropped.

Also suspect that if the RAF / ATC take it into their heads to modify any they buy I can see AS washing their hands of them.

[Arclite01]

Not going to happen. No point even wasting words................. let alone thinking time. Been there once before - didn't work.

Arc

[Frelon]

OK if we let the ATC Grob 103's into the hands of the civi clubs (or even the RAFGSA) - they would have them all checked over and serviceable in no time!! The hurdles would be getting them onto the civilian register.

As they say "Where there is a will, there is a way!"

BUT with the current crop of VSO's there appears no will to try anything to get the cadets into the air again.

Gentlemen, you should be ashamed of yourselves :mad:

[YAK HUNTER]

Having planned a weeks gliding at Kirknewton it would appear there is some sort of dispute with Edinburgh ATC.
Possibly the wettest month of the year half way up a cold damp Scottish hill very close to a major international airport and paperwork not in order. If you were trying to sabotage the operation it would be difficult to do a better job.
It's a shame the men from Colditz have passed they were on track to get a glider in the air against impossible odds. This should be a walk in the park!!!
The real casualties are the cadets, hanging around trying to fly waiting for weather is bad enough without being tripped up constantly.
I'm very happy for my tax to be used for the air cadets, squandering it with no results needs invesigation.
Has anybody worked out how much per hour it will eventually cost? Probably cheaper to hire a gold plated Lear Jet.

[chevvron]

Probably a silly suggestion I know, but if there was a 'basic' glider available off the shelf with similar performance to that of a T21b/T31, wouldn't that be a suitable replacement? After all, the main task is to get as many cadets airborne and up to solo standard as possible so you don't need a modern glass ship with a roughly 1:35 or 1:40 glide ratio.
When I flew microlight AEF at Halton, the aircraft we used (Cyclone AX3) had a cruise of about 50kt and was ideal for 'demonstrating' (couldn't actually 'teach' of course) primary and further effects and with an instructor, (which I wasn't but we had Paul Dewhurst, one of the most experienced microlight instructors in the country, with us at the time) most cadets could pick up the skill of landing/takeoff in a very short time, so something of this sort of performance would be needed.
I'm not advocating a return to the Venture SLMG by the way, I'm talking about a winch launched glider of similar performance.

[Lima Juliet]

Chevvron

I agree but microlights may not be the answer if we want to keep the G in VGS and have an aircraft that all Cadets can fly in. So I would suggest that Scheibe Rotax Falkes are purchased - just the bog standard non-turbo ones at about the same cost as a microlight to buy new. With ~500lbs of useful load then it means that the biggest Cadets can get a go, whereas most microlights struggle with useful load above 430lbs (and some even less than that).

SF 25 C (http://www.scheibe-aircraft.de/Pr/sf25c.htm)

Hell, we could even call it the Venture TMkIII...

LJ

[Arclite01]

Having flown a Rotax falke last week I think that LJ is correct - it would make an excellent Cadet training Machine. If you trebled the order it could replace the Tutors at the AEF for a fraction of the price. (It's non-aerobatic of course..........)

It would not be suitable for the Winch schools of course...............which are now in the majority by far - on paper anyway (amazing turn-around on that position from 5 years ago when the Vigi school numbers were in the ascendancy).

We'd have to come to terms with a retrograde step of returning to the Fabric covered aeroplanes !!

LJ - we could just drop the Venture bit and call it the Cadet Mk3 ;)

Arc

(Never going to happen of course - pipe dream..........)

[Lima Juliet]

Keep them on the civil register, £70k a pop, get the instructors to become SLMG instructor qualified and Robert is your Dad's brother. As for money, for every 3 'part task trainesr' we could have one of these motor gliders, plus the money spent on that gin palace at Syerston could buy a whole fleet!

http://farm2.static.flickr.com/1483/25465569630_a689552995_m.jpg

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/62/G-BYXN_Grob_Tutor_in_circuit_at_RAF_Cranwell.jpg/320px-G-BYXN_Grob_Tutor_in_circuit_at_RAF_Cranwell.jpg

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/58/Glider_Launch.jpg/320px-Glider_Launch.jpg

At present all of the eggs are in one basket with the Viking option. The amount of money being spent on these ageing aircraft is COLLOSAL and comes at significant risk that no-where near the 70-odd will be recovered to airworthy. Buying a fleet of ~30 Rotax Falkes for £2M derisks the chance of failure and being no further forward this time next year in 2017 (which I suspect is 50/50 likely). This could see a return to Swansea, Newtonards, Kinloss Abingdon and Halton - all areas screaming out for Air Cadet flying with large numbers of Cadets to get flying that have a potential mahoosive journey to their nearest on current plans. The AEF expansion is a joke as we simply don't have the pilots as we expand Typhoon and P-8 capabilities. Also, Babcock won't be giving the flying time away for free - so channel the cash into buying Rotax Falkes. The serviceability of the Tutor is a nightmare - look at your average UAS/AEF and it has 6-7 on its books; how many would you expect to see flyable at a weekend - 4 if you are lucky! If these were civvy reg Grob 115Es at a flying club being looked after by a Part M, then I would expect to see 5-6 ready to fly. Applying MAA regs to small light aircraft (on the civvy register!) and gliders is killing us in money, time and availability.

Why has the Air Force buried its head in the sand? We need airminded people for our 5th Generation Air Force that we are trying to build - without a way to get more youngsters flying we just won't have the right people in future. It's going to be hard going to build the extra Typhoon and P-8 sqns with the ever dwindling aircrew cadre we have on the books.

LJ

[Thorr]

Apparently there is a dasor out concerning a Viking which has been returned to syerston with significant faults that should have been picked up during he repair inspection process. Oh dear!

[RUCAWO]

Kirknewton, at least one of mine flown :)

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v331/sniperUK/corgi/14694617_1677560319227551_774556028_n.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v331/sniperUK/corgi/14699614_1677560589227524_1433527284_o.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v331/sniperUK/corgi/14724298_1677542002562716_555428903_o.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v331/sniperUK/corgi/14689987_1677541685896081_1192417785_o.jpg

[VX275]

Far too little, far too late and if anyone at Syerston or Cranwell is congratulating themselves they should be ashamed.

[ACW342]

Just couple of gems needed please.

What is the current level of "Recovered" aircraft?
What was wrong with the recovered aircraft which had to be returned to the "repair" facility?
What is a DAROS?
I presume that the sale of G115s to Finland doesn't compromise the AEF "what would like to do today smith? aeros, or look at your house from the air? plan

RUCAWO, what was the timings in getting your cadets from Regent House (500 yards from 664VGS, to Kirknewton, flying the cadets and returning them to Newtownards. How many flights did they get over the week-end, and how much of the syllabus was covered? Any other meaningful information would, I'm sure, be welcomed by the PPruners on this thread.

Cracking 664 farewell dinner and very well done by Antrim branch, Royal British Legion on our behalf.

A342

[RUCAWO]

342 they flew out to Edinburgh yesterday afternoon coming back tomorrow, as for what was done I will need to talk to Scotty when he gets back, and yes it was a cracking dinner ;)

[Cows getting bigger]

Far too little, far too late.....

....... but not too little for the very happy face of a content cadet.

Perhaps the picture should be sent to 2 FTS with a "How many of these do you expect to achieve each year?"

[VX275]

The grin would be bigger and last longer if it had been a solo, but they'll be fewer of those in the new scheme.......fewer than those achievable year on year by just one of the disbanded VGS.

[Sky Sports]

From the Air Cadet Facebook page;

The Air Cadet Glider Recovery Programme hit its latest milestone by returning Grob Vigilants to 645 Volunteer Gliding Squadron.
The team at 645VGS will now focus on getting all the instructors current again and ensuring the unit is operating to a required standard under the supervision and guidance of 2FTS.
Once this is complete 645 VGS will be handed over to its own executive team ready to fly cadets again in the near future where they are looking forward to welcoming cadets.

With one comment made;

I'm confused...the last I'd heard all Vigilant motor gliders (except the handful that had already been returned) were being scrapped, and motor gliders altogether were on the way out. Has something changed?


Somebody who is a bit more IT savvy might be able to post the whole link.

[hoodie]

Try this (https://www.facebook.com/aircadets/?hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE&fref=nf).

[Cat Funt]

Got an update yesterday on how the plan to augment the AEFs is hitting the skids in a number of different ways. Figured it was going to be bad before the brief, but it's considerably worse than I feared.

[Lima Juliet]

Come on Cat, spill the beans...you can't leave a rumour untold on a rumour network! :ok:

[EnigmAviation]

Vigilant fleet - the deal is like this chaps.............all 65 will be returned to Grob, and 15 will be re-furbished to the original Vigilant specification, whilst the other 50 will be stripped and convexed to Mk II standard ( i.e., what we WERE going to have under original plans before the cock up ) incl Glass cockpit, New donk etc., and then sold by Grob to the Swedish Air Force as virtually brand new aircraft. Our 15 will be given a quick gel coat polish, a couple of re-furbished seats, some new spark plugs and at no cost to the RAF - brilliant deal - really.

Trotter could not have done a better deal ! Well done Rodney !

And ...........when we have got them, we will operate them until engine life expired, expected life three years, then get rid and be totally reliant on conventional gliders, by which time we may have a couple of dozen back in service if they get a wriggle on !


By then defence estates will have closed some of the nominated VGS Viking sites where we have invested lots of taxpayer cash into residential Cadet accommodation needed because Cadets would have to travel large distances.


And, under the new regime no limited Eng authority for DI and OOPS checks by VGS staff - as we were too good at that, we never missed a thing - it will now be done by .................An ENGINEER ! Completely overlooking the fact that the big Eng problem was not at VGS level, it was at Command level !!!


Cadet Wings come with 10 Corn flake packet tops or a couple of Part Task Trainer rides, and as a final nail in the coffin, the VRT Queens Commission will be discontinued in favour of a lower grade plastic version. I think we definitely had the best years !

[Shaft109]

Would it not have been better to pay the difference per airframe and get the 15 upgraded to MK2 spec at the same time?

[Arclite01]

Surely this has got to be a p1ss take..................

Arc

[EnigmAviation]

No Arclite, absolutely not ! Even though 15 will come back, they will only fly until circa 2019 and that's it. The fleet will be conventional Gliders only thereafter, too bloody dangerous having Cadets taught to go solo with an engine ! and besides they have to work all day at a conventional Viking VGS to earn their short launches whereas at a Vigilant equipped VGS huge productivity results from a small team. :{

[Cat Funt]

Just Curious, Enigma- was the Sweden bit pukka gen? Everything else is pretty much consonant with what I've heard. Just heard nothing about disposal the other airframes that aren't being kept.

[Lima Juliet]

Do you mean Finland? They are buying some of our Grob Tutors?

[Engines]

This saga just keeps getting more and more unbelievable. Assuming the info here is accurate, and I don't doubt it, the situation could be summarised as follows:

1. The RAF purchases 65 Grob Vigilants
2. It fails to keep them airworthy, but doesn't actually know it's failed.
3. It then finds out it's failed, and grounds the fleet (sorry, 'pauses' flying)
4. It then spends two years trying to sort them out.
5. It then decides to hand over all 65 aircraft to Grob, who will bring 15 of the aircraft to an airworthy condition. However, these 15 are only sustainable for another 36 months. Then they will be withdrawn from service.
6. The other 50 will be handed over to Grob free of charge. They will be made airworthy and sustainable, then sold. Grob will then have had the unusual privilege of selling 50 of their products twice over.

I would have LOVED to have had a go at the service paper that came up with this sorry excuse for a plan. I'd have loved to had the chance to get the people behind this up in front of a proper engineering investigation to pin down who failed to do what and when. I'd have loved to be able to leak this whole saga to someone who could do the maths and work out just how much the taxpayer has ended up paying out.

Sadly, none of that is likely to happen, and that's a damn shame. I'd sincerely hope that some of the people involved in this huge waste of money have the chance, at some time in the future, to help bring those responsible to book.

Best Regards as ever to all those responsibly managing public funds

Engines

[Wander00]

Reminds me of youngest son - rang me and asked if I would like to buy his car off him - asked him why I would want to pay for it twice. He had "forgotten" we had bought it in the first place

[EnigmAviation]

Leon, No definitely Sweden

[Chugalug2]

Engines:-
I'd sincerely hope that some of the people involved in this huge waste of money have the chance, at some time in the future, to help bring those responsible to book.

When all the dots are joined up one day it won't just reveal the huge amount of money wasted on ACO gliders, it will reveal vastly more money wasted on much of the UK Military Air Fleet over the past 3 decades and, far more importantly, the many lives lost in avoidable UK Military Airworthiness Related Air Accidents. The dots will point right back to the late 80s/early 90s, and the VSOs who wrought the lasting damage to UK Military Air Safety, and in particular to the provision and maintenance of airworthiness.

That joining up of dots will not be done while the MOD has control of the UK Military Air Regulator and Air Accident Investigator. In particular the RAF High Command will continue the cover up of the illegal orders and actions of certain of its VSOs. Only an independent Regulator and Investigator can confirm that and begin the necessary rebuilding of a dysfunctional system that should, but does not, protect aircrew, passengers, and members of the public from avoidable airworthiness related fatal military air accidents. That won't even begin to happen until those dots are finally joined up!

[dervish]

Engines

It fails to keep them airworthy, but doesn't actually know it's failed.

Great post although the published evidence suggests they did know.

[Engines]

Dervish,

Quote: 'the published evidence suggests they did know...'

Thanks for coming back. My apologies for not being clearer on that point. Please let me clarify. Yes, the RAF knew, but my view is that they didn't know until 2014.

It's clear that the deterioration in the state of the ATC aircraft fleet started at some time soon after their entry to service, and continued for some years. That's the RAF's first failure.

Then the RAF's engineering management systems failed to understand what was happening to this fleet. Why do I come to that conclusion? Because they didn't do anything about it until 2014. Second failure. And probably a more serious one than the first, because it points to a major failure of basic engineering supervision and quality control. And that could very well be a systemic issue across the service.

My guess (and thats all it is) would be that the exercise to gain full CAMO status was the trigger for this realisation.

To repeat: we are talking here about a large fleet of simple and basic aircraft. A fleet that the RAF bought and were responsible for maintaining. A task that should have been absolutely routine, basic, day to day, bread and butter engineering management. The fact that they failed to do this should be a major concern. Financially, it's a disgrace.

Best regards as ever to those engineers doing the job properly,

Engines

[dervish]

Engines

Understood. I had in mind the evidence contained in a book you mentioned earlier in, IIRC, this thread. Key word, systemic. Key fact, VSOs informed and did SFA.

[Engines]

Dervish,

Thanks again for coming back.

I think there's an issue here which might best be called 'the particular versus the general'. As an old retired engineer who strove mightily and happily to achieve a rank well below VSO, I tend to focus on the 'particular'. In this case, it's the spectacle of the RAF (a service whose people I had huge respect for) failing to execute a simple and non-onerous task - look after a fleet of very simple light aircraft. And, in so failing, putting the lives of kids at risk. I'd like to see some proper transparency and answers over this 'particular'.

The 'general' issues are just as real, but harder to pin down. Once you start trying to put blame on 'VSOs', or 'systems' or 'organisations', in my experience it inevitably ends up with lots of disappointed people. Why? Well, the tendency for VSOs to protect themselves and ex-VSOs, and so on. Plus the way that bureaucracies hate to be embarrassed.

I'd just like someone to focus like a laser on this 'particular', and start hauling those directly responsible (if necessary those of relatively low rank, e.g. the people who signed off the quality audits on the glider maintenance shops) into the light and getting the facts exposed. If that leads on to VSOs, fine. But let's start digging.

Best Regards as ever to all those out there doing the right thing

Engines

[dervish]

Engines

Understood. Well put.

[Chugalug2]

Engines, I appreciate your attitude as an Engineer, "well below VSO", to want to concentrate on the particular, to drill down to the fault, and rectify. Rather like the general case that you specify though, easier said than done. When a VSO gives a clearly illegal order in front of witnesses and no action is taken, no interview, no investigation, and certainly no charges, then one can but agree with you that

the tendency for VSOs to protect themselves and ex-VSOs, and so on

is an accurate statement of the situation that UK Military Aviation is now in. Unfortunately, pursuing those of "relatively low rank" will accomplish for the MOD exactly that for which it hopes, while the truth of the scale of subversion of the system remains hidden by the much beloved stovepipes.

As Military Aviation Professionals, we should surely face the facts, or aviation will quickly bite us back. UK Military Airworthiness provision is in a dire state. Never mind unairworthy ACO Gliders, grounded Nimrods (and now Hawks?), what of the front line operational fleets? The dysfunction is systemic; no aircraft, no system, no capability, is spared from its malevolent effect. UK Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation has to be made effective again, lest the cost, in blood, treasure, and capability, continues unhindered. If the way that:-

bureaucracies hate to be embarrassed

stands in the way of that then we have to unite in insisting that reform of the MAA and MilAAIB goes ahead, by making them independent of the MOD and of each other, so that our military airfleets regain their airworthiness and avoidable air accidents are once again avoided.

[pulse1]

A friend of mine was a Squadron Leader engineer who retired in 1995. I was showing him David Hill's excellent book, "Their Greatest Disgrace" which describes in great detail the failings of those VSO's. He was very surprised that he had never heard of one of the leading villians, ACM Michael Alcock, who was the RAF Chief Engineer, and his ultimate boss at the time. It does rather suggest that those VSO's kept themselves fairly remote from the coal face and this may help to explain why the ATC gliding got into the mess it is in.

[dervish]

pulse

And yet Haddon Cave praised his "long screwdriver" management style, during the "golden period".

[Engines]

Couple of pertinent responses here, and I'd like to risk boring the a**e of other readers to respond.

I absolutely agree that 'strategic' decisions taken by RAF VSOs on budget cuts have had a very bad effect on UK Military Airworthiness. I also know that there have been occasions when senior civil servants have issued what can only be construed as illegal orders. These are serious matters.

But I think this case shows a disturbing lack of 'grip' at a relatively low level of engineering rank. Once the VSOs had decided to procure a fleet of aircraft (I believe out of RAF in-year 'underspend' - particularly galling as my own support budgets for Sea Harrier had been raided the previous year to prop up support for RAF engines) then the business of maintaining airworthiness would, quite properly, fall to the engineers at the Command, stations and units involved.

From what I can conclude from the limited evidence available, there seems to have been a severe lack of attention to detail and a reluctance to execute the basic, straightforward, easy routines that would have kept this fleet airworthy.

Yes, one can draw a line from the actions of VSOs in the 80s to these problems in the 90s and the 00s. For my part, I prefer to keep the focus on those who had the job to do and, apparently, just didn't do it. If there is ever to be a proper enquiry into this one, I honestly don't think it's worth starting with ACM Alcock's support budget cuts ten years earlier. As I've suggested, the thing to get the investigative juices should be this simple question:

'Was the RAF flying schoolchildren around in potentially non-airworthy aircraft?'

If the answer to that is 'yes', let's, for the sake of all that's holy, find out why. Start with the F700s and the correspondence and keep digging.

Best regards as ever to all those who uphold the ethics of engineering

Engines

[Avtur]

I'd like to risk boring the a**e of other readers to respond

Not so Engines. I for one appreciate reading and mostly agreeing with the sentiment of your posts. Keep it coming and keep exposing the truth behind the great oxymoron of military airworthiness.

[tucumseh]

I think Engines’ proposal would be fine if there was general acceptance in MoD that (a) the problem exists, and (b) what caused it. There isn’t. The MAA consciously took the wrong turning in 2010 and have never looked back.



So, if any submission is to be made to, for example, try to force an investigation or even inquiry, I think it should start by setting the scene. In part, this is necessary because Haddon-Cave knowingly placed the wrong date on the beginning of systemic failings, by claiming 1998. He was given actual papers demonstrating otherwise. Therefore, he and his report are part of the problem and need exposing at every turn.


My proposal would be to start with a simple paragraph reiterating three factual events.




AMSO promulgated a policy in 1987 that resulted in astronomical waste beyond the imagination of most here.
In the following years, compensatory savings were made (at the expense of safety) throughout aircraft support budgets. The example I always use is that which affected me directly (and is closely related to what Engines speaks of on SHAR). That is, AMSO’s successors attacked the direct airworthiness budget to the tune of 28% per year; compounded by the DTI aviation index and inflation bringing the real term cut nearer 40%. In my opinion, they would have been better rescinding the policy.
Sitting astride this from 1991-1994 was the RAF Chief Engineer, ACM Alcock, who became double hatted as AML in 1994, replacing AMSO. (That is, it is unfair to say ACM Alcock introduced the cuts, but he certainly knew of them and condoned them, because he was one of only two addressees on the 1992 CHART report which noted the 1992 cut and the effect it was having – which was actively concealed until uncovered during the MoK Review in 2010).

Finish the paragraph by including a Reference to the submission to Lord Philip that (a) explained this in detail, and (b) provided the actual documents; which MoD denied the existence of. (Believe me, Lord Philip was not impressed when he had to ask non-MoD civilians to supply MoD policy documents).


There, simple: now start with the stuff specific to Air Cadet gliding, because the failings are directly traceable to these three events. But if one does not explain this history every time, MoD/MAA will continue trying to re-write it with the help of tame QCs and the promise of knighthoods.

[Engines]

Tuc,

A bit of a long reply. Again my apologies to those who started this ATC glider fleet thread.

You know that I agree with your analysis and I have enormous respect for the amount of detailed evidence you've managed to lever out of the MoD. Yes, The VSOs concerned should be exposed and, I fully agree that 'the MoD' (you'll see why i have put those quote marks there) don't actually accept that they have a problem.

I also agree that the MAA's basic premise, built on Haddon-Cave's faulty conclusions, and further twists since then by the MoD, is misguided. In short, again to avoid boring the pants of those who want to read about ATC glider stuff, the MAA's approach has been to rewrite the regulations for managing airworthiness. As you so ably point out, the direction they've taken misses the key elements of configuration control, and actually adds little value to maintaining airworthiness.

Again, as you've shown, the problem was never the regulations. It was (and remains) the fact that the MoD and (in this case) the RAF simply aren't applying the rules they've been given.

Here's where, on this issue at least, we probably part company. But only on matters of emphasis, and I certainly don't wish to reduce the importance of your points. If anything is to happen about this scandal, I am of the opinion that starting 30 years ago isn't going to get the attention the scandal deserves. So where would I start?

I'd keep it simple. The RAF has demonstrably failed to keep the simplest possible fleet of military aircraft airworthy. In doing so, they may have put school children at risk. And wasted millions. This problem probably started in the late 90s, and continued until 2014. At least ten years. The reason? Simple failure to implement mandated regulations that either went undetected or encouraged. Who was responsible? Just like an account investigation - start at the grounding, and work back.

I sincerely hope you don't take this as criticism, and I urge you to keep fighting. But I honestly feel that in this case, a direct approach at the point of failure would yield better results. However, this is, as ever, an open thread, and all the above is really no more than my opinion. Other opinions are at least equal, and most probably better.

Best regards as ever to all those working for truth, however they do it.

Engines

PS: I realise that i've rather 'hogged' this thread over the last day or so, so i'll step back and let others have their say. I apologise if I crowded anyone else out.

[Chugalug2]

Engines, I'm not sure what it is you are trying to achieve by keeping it simple as you say. Haddon-Cave had much the same approach as you are taking, name a couple of relative juniors (OK they were not so junior but below the protected two stars and above Droit de Seigneur level), and presto! the problem of Nimrod airworthiness is done and dusted. Like his Golden Period it was all part of the MOD cover up. I'm not suggesting that is the purpose of your suggestion, but the ACO gliders were grounded before their lack of airworthiness killed any of your at risk school children.

As you well know, this Forum has counted 63 dead in UK Military Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accidents. We know why each and everyone of the aircraft involved was unairworthy, when that process began, and who were the VSOs involved that caused that unairworthiness to come about in the first place. That death list won't stop there, that wastefulness will not stop there, that loss of UK Military Capability won't stop there, all of them will go on eating away at UK Military Aviation Airworthiness until the system of providing it and maintaining it is fully reformed. That won't begin to happen until the Military Air Regulator and Air Accident Investigator are made independent of the MOD and of each other.

Now that seems to me far more important and urgent than naming and prosecuting a few JOs and SOs who were simply doing what they were told, or didn't know better, or indeed knowingly furthered their careers by reengaging on their duty. Who knows? This all started with members of the RAF High Command, who ensured that the process could not be reversed by ridding themselves of all those who understood the system and refused to subvert it. Even so I don't want them prosecuted out of revenge. I want them prosecuted because only then will the cover up be exposed, enabling the necessary reforms to be carried out.

Keeping it simple will merely ensure that the rot continues. This is a nettle that my own Service has to grasp. It caused this scandal and has to face up to the consequences of its actions. There is nothing simple about that, I agree.

[EnigmAviation]

Quote from recent Air Show programme at Southport Air Show - Advertisement for Air Cadets:

"Where else can you learn to fly aerobatics, go solo in a glider .........."

AEF's have NEVER taught aerobatics (officially) to Air Cadets under the terms of their brief, they have merely demonstrated them when requested as part of a 25 mins sortie. Thus NEVER achievable anywhere. Completely false statement.
AEF PILOTS are just that, and not instructors for the purpose of Air Cadet sorties
Going solo in a glider ? - When do they estimate that this may be available throughout the UK ?
14 VGS units closed, a handful of Vigilants at Topcliffe used for revalidating their Instructors, not Cadet GS training.
All the remaining Viking equipped VGS units not yet operational, nor likely to be any time soon, due to instructors 2.5 yrs out of currency, new staff to train, and lack of serviceable airworthy aircraft.
Seems like this clearly is a good piece of Spin Doctor fiction !!!:rolleyes: Spin recovery training required at Cranwell !!!

[tucumseh]

For the first time, I’ve seen the Duty Holder Advice Note from April 2014. Don’t understand why I missed it before. Old age. But it is immediately obvious why MoD has tried to keep this disgraceful saga under wraps.

At para 5, it lists “significant” airworthiness issues, including;


Lack of configuration control of the Aircraft Document Set across glider maintenance sites.
Progression of SI(T)s and MF765s not being managed effectively.
Lack of an effective Quality Management System.

Engineers will recognise these as mandated, core components of maintaining the build standard, otherwise known as Post Design Services. The primary output of such work is a valid Safety Case, supporting the Release to Service.

In 1991 this was deemed a “waste of money”, and staff have had to fight for even minimal funding ever since. That some have been successful, or found underspends/offsets, while others haven’t, explains to a large degree why some equipment and aircraft fleets are reasonably robust, while others are grounded and scrapped. The only mandated Defence Standard has not been updated since January 1992, and was scrapped without replacement in around 2008. MoD no longer has a copy; or at least Part 2. Any reference to the work in MAA documents gets the basic definition wrong, and proceeds down a rabbit hole – exactly what happened in late 1993 when the ill-fated Chief of Defence Procurement Instructions were drafted by a few graduates in DPP(PM). I see significant similarities between these CDPIs and many MAA documents.

Other serious failings are noted, such as “independent inspections not being carried out on systems vital to the safety of the aircraft”. And, “workforce carrying out unauthorised maintenance and modifications”. These are also long standing issues. The mandated requirement for independence was removed in June 1993. The unauthorised work is an inevitable product of MF765s not being progressed. This is reminiscent of the 1992 Chinook/Puma/Wessex report in which the Director of Flight Safety made precisely the same complaints to the Chief Engineer and ACAS – citing an example whereby the Chinook pubs were so poor, maintainers were using captured Argentinian books (1982), relating to a different model of Chinook (CH-47C). They did nothing, and DFS had to repeat his complaints in further reports of 1994/6/7/8. In March 1999, CDP admitted to the Public Accounts Committee that configuration control was not maintained on Chinook (which should have immediately cleared the ZD576 pilots). The following month, after IPTs were re-formed, what configuration control money existed was robbed and diverted. (Savings at the expense of safety).

Summary – nothing new. Nimrod XV230. C130 XV179. Hawk XX177. And so on, depressing so. Every single Board of Inquiry and even Haddon-Cave’s report can be summarised – implement mandated PDS regs. It is something you learn of as an apprentice at workshops. Oh, we don’t do either anymore, and universities don’t teach it. Again, a solution emerges.

[Lima Juliet]

Hi Tuc

I guess the not-so-depressing news is that they didn't wait for another Nimrod, Herc or Hawk (to use your examples) and ceased using the assets until those items you mention could be assured. Surely, that's a good thing?

LJ

[tucumseh]

Leon

Indeed, but if one studies the timelines, it is clear that the requirement for continuous feedback and review was not satisfied. Even then, why is the Duty Holder's review dated 2014, when the first thing the MAA would have done in April 2010 was to demand that IPTs demonstrate their safety cases were valid? It is not just the gliders that seem to have passed this test - the Mk10 ejection seat comes to mind.

The "pause" (grounding) has lasted 31 months and counting. The capability no longer exists yet, as we have seen, MoD continues to advertise gliding to entice new ATC members. The only difference between this and Nimrod is that PR lessons have been learned, and the JCBs have not been sent in. Some gliders are to be made airworthy, and then apparently sold off. Easier to spin to the media.

I should make it clear that I don't know how long the Duty Holder who signed this in April 2014 had been in post. He did the right thing, but the detailed timeline of events would be interesting. What prompted him? On the face of it, it is likely that MoD has knowingly flown civilian minors in unairworthy aircraft for some years. Good (or slightly better) practice now does not forgive that maladministration, and it is by the Grace of God we are not talking of more deaths. The cost of doing it properly would have been peanuts - and that applies to all the examples we discuss here.

[Pegasus107]

Gliding is still available to cadets, just not through the VGS route.

[dervish]

Gliding is still available to cadets, just not through the VGS route.

Missing the point by a huge margin.

[Arclite01]

Yep

a huge swing and a miss......................

Arc

[Exrigger]

I have been reading this subject for a while, with my interest purely from a military engineering perspective, regarding the RAF trying to implement the MAA Regulatory Articles (RAs), in particular RAs 4970 to 4974 Airworthiness Review (AR) regulations.

I have been wondering whether what has happened within the glider fleet was during the implementation of Regulatory Article (RA) 4973: military airworthiness review process, MRP Part M Sub Part I, although it does appear that there must have been major airworthiness failures within the reports that required the fleet to be grounded.

Should of said that it could also be, if evidence from reports raised on other aircraft is anything to go by, that the personnel carrying out the reviews did not know what they were looking at, as there was not much direction from those further up the chain of command and some did not actually fulfil the RA requirements to carry out the reviews, allegedly.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/460577/RA4973_Issue_2.pdf

Apologies if these regulations have been muted before, as I have missed them.

[Engines]

Exrigger,

Many thanks for a really useful post - the RA makes interesting reading. It also illustrates a key point that I and many others on this thread have been making. There is absolutely nothing in this MAA RA that should not have been happening on a routine basis for many years. To labour the point - there is not a single element of this RA that is new. Not a one. It's not new stuff.

In my direct experience, the checks the RA calls out would all have been covered by a variety of reviews. Not a complete list, but these would have included:

1. Internal QA checks of documentation and aircraft carried out on the unit - about every 3 to 6 months
2. Monthly checks of modification returns and TI compliance by station tech Support Cell
3. Regular checks on aircraft state and documentation carried out by air station or ship inspections team - around every 12 months
4. Annual inspections of aircraft and documents carried out by Station MTP (every 12 months)
5. Further checks carried out during Command inspections (every 12 months)
6. Documentation and condition checks every time an aircraft was transferred between units or entered second line work - around every 18 months
7. For the RAF, external Quality Audits (EQAs) every 2 years or so.
8. for the RN, MARTSU inspections of aircraft every 12 months - full teardown and removal of every panel and all sound proofing.

Viewed in this light, I'd ask whether the RA is actually sufficient. The 'sample checks' of modifications and components against the ADS aren't, in my view. Just my opinion.

I'm not listing all this to show how fab we all were 'back then'. We weren't. Our checks revealed many errors and omissions, which were almost inevitable in a system that depended on manual data entry. But at least we had a system that had a decent chance of catching the errors.

Sorry to repeat. Everything in the RA, plus a lot more beside, should have already been taking place from the day the gliders entered service. Every day. Every week. Every month. Every year. Normal, routine, standard, stuff. On gliders, about as easy an engineering task as you could devise. So, the big questions:

What in h*ll was going on to allow the whole glider fleet to get into a state where it couldn't pass the low bar set by the RA?

Who in h*ll didn't do their jobs? (Hint - many, many people, not just the contractors)

Why did the MAA give the RAF four years to carry out a review that should have required no more than attaching copies of the last inspections?

I sincerely apologise if this sounds a tad dyspeptic - I am honestly struggling to understand how any normal military aircraft fleet could possibly fail the MAA RA, let alone this one.

Best regards as ever to all those doing the checking - lives depend on them

Engines

[Exrigger]

Thanks Engines, I agree wholeheartedly with what you say and at my lowly level within the military and to a lesser extent within civilian aircraft industry as quality engineer, I used to try to the best of my ability to make sure I and my compatriots carried out the work to the highest possible standard, even though that was not a popular approach for the management, and some of my peers who considered promotion before airworthiness.

After leaving the service and working within a civilian maintenance organisation on a military contracts I have taken your list and amended to what happens within that arena I worked in:

1. Internal QA checks of documentation and aircraft carried out on the unit - about every 3 to 6 months - I and the other quality people did that
2. External audit by prime contractor if applicable on above, or contractors core quality team at least twice.
3. Once the MAA stood up an annual audit as above carried out.
4. Then the BMAR as per the RA posted carried out on each aircraft, then once the MARC issued this was then an annual check.
5. Input and output standards of aircraft and documentation every time an aircraft was transferred between sqn on entering/leaving maintenance.

The problems really started when the MAA sent their auditors out and tried to audit against regulations that they neither understood or followed themselves, and followed up by using CAA auditors which made the issues worse as the EASA regulations had been militarised by the MAA, hence things got even more complicated. I have been out of this area for a while now and would like to think things might improve.

And don't get me started on F765s, F760s and DASORs, at least on one platform we managed to work with all parties and immensely improve F765 turnround times.

To give an example of F760s, some of these used to go via a cell at Stafford, but we found out as Stafford was being run down the cell had gone, therefore all F760s went to Cosford training admin as they were temporary 'caretakers' during the draw down. Approached the military when Cosford contacted us and forwarded them on and they had no idea what to do with them, which probably explained why some things never got sorted.

Back to gliders, it would appear that this does display the systemic failures in the whole system and the inability of the MAA/Military management to fix things IAW their own regulations, which if they knew what they actually meant would be a start, I could be down to lost 'corporate memory' either through natural wastage, ignorance or deliberately.

[Lima Juliet]

As others have said the current problem is a factor of neglect for many years. However, I do believe that people have tried to do the right thing and I would say that there was a cultural problem close to the gliders and a lack of resource at leadership/risk holder level until 2FTS was stood up. IIRC the situation unfolded like this in recent years:

1. Gliders bought about 20-30 years ago were serviced by a RAF mobile glider servicing team until replaced by contracted engineering services without significant oversight.
2. The gliders were operated under HQ Air Cadet control for many years.
3. On the stand up of the MAA and Duty Holders then the first to oversee was I believe 1EFTS. However, a spate of incidents with Tucano meant that there was no manpower to oversee the glider operations properly.
4. Transferred to 3FTS where once again there was a problem with Tutor and so again the manpower was not available to oversee the glider operation. However, OC 3FTS acknowledged the issue and lobbied hard to stand up a seperate Delivery Duty Holder organisation.
5. HQ 2FTS formed with an OF-5 head and a OF-4 with CAMO responsibility. Within about 6-12 months of both arriving then gliding was 'paused'. Set this against a back drop of more pressing airworthiness related problems across 22Gp at the time then the already stretched A4 Eng were unable to look at the gliding operation properly prior to this due to a lack of manpower.

That's my recollection. This was another classic 'can do' that should have been stopped a while before it did. Wilful negligence? I don't believe so. Corporate/Organisational failure? Yes. However, as would have been usual after a fatal accident there would be a lot of hindsight and hand-wringing so it was a good job that the VGSs only had one fatal accident in 20 years - and that was non technical.

I standby to be corrected on the exact details on how the VGSs were passed 'from pillar to post' between organisations, but I hope it shows how the review systems fell down?

However, if your glass is half full like mine then the right thing happened in the end :ok:. But, and its a big but, the recovery to the current stage could have been done far better in my considered opinion. I am of the opinion that the volunteer staff, and more importantly the Cadets, have been let down by this whole shambles.

LJ

[chevvron]

My recollection is that Vigilant engine problems occured almost from the time they were introduced into service. Wasn't there intially a serious accident at Binbrook?
And when I did Admin. Officer on a summer course at 637 VGS at Rissy in '91, we had to supply samples from every batch of the fuel being purchased (at a local filling station) to Brize Norton to be analysed presumably for ethanol content etc.

[DaveUnwin]

The thing I still don't understand is how the Royal Air Force failed to keep a fleet of simple sailplanes airworthy. This is a task that doesn't seem to be beyond your average gliding club, many of which have no paid staff.

[The Nip]

Maybe a look at how HQ Air Cadets is run would be a good place to look. There is no shortage of funds from what I have seen.

As an aside, when compared to other youth organisations, is the ATC value for money for recruiting the future RAF?

[Arclite01]

TN

In my experience:

1. In the past HQAC was seen as a backwater and very little money was spent there. You only had to go there when it was at Newton to see that. Since the move to Cranwell IMHO that has changed.

2. Quite a bit of money has been pumped into HQAC and ACCGS (2FTS) in recent years both on kit and on facilities. How well they have been used is another question but not a lot of money is spent at either Region or Squadron level overall, and staffing costs once you move below Region level are minimal.

3. When the RAF was large and fighting the cold war no-one wanted to know about Air Cadets (lets face it, a posting to a backwater location at Newton working with RAFRO, RAF VR(T) and kids in discarded battledress or working with Aircraft over 50 years old and second rate MT on a disused WW2 airfield is not going to further your career too much). Suddenly with no cold war to fight and a much reduced RAF, the Air Cadet Organisation was seen as somewhere you could continue your career and ultimately even engineer yourself a second one for when you retired. Lots of people took an interest in it and Government Policy suddenly swung to 'looking after the Youth' - this meant funding magically became available for the 'organisation' - very little trickled down to lower levels I can assure you.

4. So in answer to your question I would say at lower levels the ACO provides tremendous value for money in terms of both the public face of the RAF and as a recruiting tool. At higher levels I would say it's an expensive edifice run by people who think they are running a corporation like ICI rather than a national Youth organization with an aviation slant.

Sad, but true................

Arc

[The Nip]

Arc,

I can't disagree with nearly all your post apart from

as a recruiting tool

When other organisations have upwards of 200k members, Scouts, the amount spent per Youth in the ATC seem out of kilter. I always believed that the ATC used to provide the most RAF pers in the past. But now the numbers paint a different picture.

I appreciate you cannot put a cost on the public face of the ATC, but the sums expended in various organisations, Engagement, Recruiting are huge.

Something needs to be done re recruiting. I am sure that all those involved are doing their upmost to encourage young people to join up.

I am not criticising the money spent, just suggesting that it is not always going to where it is needed.

[Sky Sports]

When the RAF was large and fighting the cold war no-one wanted to know about Air Cadets (lets face it, a posting to a backwater location at Newton working with RAFRO, RAF VR(T) and kids in discarded battledress or working with Aircraft over 50 years old and second rate MT on a disused WW2 airfield is not going to further your career too much). Suddenly with no cold war to fight and a much reduced RAF, the Air Cadet Organisation was seen as somewhere you could continue your career and ultimately even engineer yourself a second one for when you retired. Lots of people took an interest in it and Government Policy suddenly swung to 'looking after the Youth' - this meant funding magically became available for the 'organisation' - very little trickled down to lower levels I can assure you.


Absolute nail on the head. :D

As an aside, when compared to other youth organisations, is the ATC value for money for recruiting the future RAF?

Currently, it is not value for money. More and more cadets are starting to see the RAF for what it is, crippled by red-tape and a lack of opportunity, and are deciding to forget about a RAF career and are leaving the organisation.

Lets not forget, there is currently, no flying, no shooting and no night exercises, to name a few. :(

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Lets not forget, there is currently, no flying, no shooting and no night exercises, to name a few


Perhaps the reason cadets aren't joining is because too many of the ATC staff are not just bitter and stale but factually wrong. Do you never get bored of peddling utter b0ll0cks?

[Aggamemnon]

Lets not forget, there is currently, no flying, no shooting and no night exercises, to name a few

@TorqueOfTheDevil depending on Wing/Region that may all be true.

[Sky Sports]

Torque,

Health and safety, red-tape and bureaucracy might be your thing, that's fine, each to his own.

But just for one minute, put yourself in the mind of a 13 year old kid who has just joined the air cadets after sitting through a glossy presentation featuring all the endless possibilities to fly, shoot, explore, visit etc.
Fast forward a few months to just after enrolment, and having spoken to the other senior cadets, it becomes blatantly obvious that you may have been mis-sold something!

Facts?...........speak to the cadet who has been in 2 and 3/4 years and has just been offered his first chance to fly, an AEF in a Tutor at Cranwell. Only for it to cancelled one day before because of Cranwell 'staff issues'.
And, since he was available to fly, he will still be available to come in and clean the squadron! Are you still thinking about this as a youngster would? Are you still thinking the RAF's great, can't wait to join up?

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

depending on Wing/Region that may all be true


Absolutely, or it may not. But the naysayers usually claim to speak for the entire ACO, no doubt because they grandly assume that their knowledge and status is outstanding. Maybe it once was.

Facts?...........speak to the cadet who has been in 2 and 3/4 years and has just been offered his first chance to fly, an AEF in a Tutor at Cranwell. Only for it to cancelled one day before because of Cranwell 'staff issues'.

I recently spoke to a cadet who has been in just over one year and was on his fourth AEF sortie. That's much more than I got when I was a cadet, therefore I deduce that the amount of flying which the current crop of cadets get has increased significantly in recent years :ugh:

Despite the fact that, back then, we never had staff issues, let alone poor weather or poor serviceability :ugh:

[longer ron]

The amount of flying available has always partly depended on which sqn one was in - and either geographic location or personal contacts could make a huge difference.

Please do not forget gents that 'they' did not want a quick fix for Air Cadet gliding,the system was dismantled during the 'pause' and purely coincidentally many of those ex gliding sites are being closed.

[Arclite01]

Longer Ron

Initially I was skeptical of your conspiracy theory on this one but having seen events unfold I am 100% behind you now !!

Arc

* Although I can't believe money was the motivator since the VGS cost pennies on the Defence budget. I can however believe that the motivator was to remove them as sole lodger units at many sites so that there were no objections from the based units !! and of course the money released by selling the sites to money hungry developers is big bucks on the budget bottom line - providing it is returned to the MoD and not direct to Treasury - hey who cares about a bunch of snotty nosed kids going without a bit of gliding anyway !!*

[longer ron]

Hi Arc
Also the way things 'played out' meant that there was no chance of any campaign/consultation to save any of the VGS's.
It is scandalous that nobody stepped in to oversee changes necessary to keep the gliders airworthy,but they just left it until it broke.It was a fashionable saying some years ago - sometimes you have to leave things until they are broken until you fix them ( I never bought into that myself).
The review that started in 2012 stated (something like) - any changes should have minimum impact on ACO flying - well that worked well.
I also believe they put the 'right' man in for the job (but that is my personal opinion).
Trouble is - in the usual MOD way - any attempt to save money usually ends up costing us lots !
As usual obviously there was no plan in place to replace the fleet,this could have been done in small batches over many years - but one should really have a fleet replacement plan - especially with gliders where the manufacturers capabilities are modest.

[ExAscoteer]

Lets not forget, there is currently, no flying, no shooting and no night exercises, to name a fewUtter, utter drivel.

I have trained some 50+ Cadets on the L98A2 this year alone and many others on No.8 Rifle and the Scorpion Air Rifle. I have lost count of the number of WHTs I have done. On average we have a Wing Range Day (L98A2) per month, there is regular shooting at Camps, and Sqns that possess their own indoor or air rifle ranges regularly shoot. As an RCO I have my Cadets shooting on a fortnighly basis.

If shooting is so rare then how come the ATC cleaned up at CISSAAM recently winning the majority of prizes and Gold Medals?

I would suggest regular shooting is down to having enthusiastic RCOs and SAAIs.

WRT Night Excercises these depend upon ECOs actually getting off their backsides and generating the relevent EASPs and getting them approved by Wing or Region (dependent upon the level of the Ex / time in the Field).

It's about making it happen as opposed to whingeing about it.