Air Cadets grounded?

[Engines]

Perhaps I could add a few comments that might be of some help.

The first is the use of the term 'pause', which was used in this case. Of course, it's a political tactic, but one that obscures the truth, which is never a good thing. This is a grounding. Or it could be called a 'cease flying' order. The reason? The ATC aircraft fleet is non-airworthy. It's non-airworthy (as far as we can tell in the absence of much information) because the RAF lost control of the material state of their aircraft, either via inadequate documentation of servicing and repairs, or inadequate documentation of modifications. Or some of both.

I had direct experience of 'cease flying' orders issued by the RAF, and in both cases they were inadequately staffed and missed the crucial element - a plan to get the aircraft airborne again. I know that the RAF were capable of issuing perfectly good technical orders - sadly, I was clearly unlucky. Having a recovery plan was a key lesson drilled into RN Air Engineers, and on the three occasions I was involved in aircraft being grounded, a recovery plan was set in place straight away. (I can only offer the observation that when you are on a ship a long way away from help, and you ground the aircraft, the Captain is EXTREMELY keen to know how and when you are going to get the aircraft fixed).

This has been a pure shambles, and I say that because I can't in all honesty see why it has taken so long to get a fleet of extremely simple and basically well designed aircraft back into the air. Grounding a whole fleet at multiple locations also points also towards a serious systemic failure within the accountable organisation. And, in my personal opinion, this is where some key points around the MAA arise.

The MAA says that it is an 'organisation responsible for the regulation, surveillance, inspection and assurance of the defence air operating and technical domains'. (my bolds).

Again just my personal view, but the main thrust of the Military Aviation Authority (incidentally, not the 'Airworthiness Authority' recommended by Haddon-Cave) to date seems to have been in the area of regulation. So, we've had a complete 'rewrite' of the books, but as Tuc and others (including the new DMAA) point out, this has really been a reissue of the old regs. (Unfortunately, in some areas, the sense of the old regs has been diluted or lost). We've also had a mighty edifice of authorisations and certifications erected, with Letters of Delegation (or whatever they are called this month) extending to tens of pages, and every single person associated with aircraft support being required to be certified as 'SQEP'. As well as the 'Duty Holder' system, which has had the effect of moving decision points at least two ranks upwards from where they were.

What's not as evident (to me) in the MAA's activities are surveillance, inspection and 'assurance'. What does the MAA think of a 'pause'? Did it support it? Or of a 'pause' that lasts well over two years? What about that? Or why an RAF owned servicing organisation got into such a state, despite the MAA's surveillance, inspection and assurance' regime? Why hasn't the MAA opened an inquiry into this debacle?

This is a common issue with other accidents. The MAA reveals that they couldn't find any documented records of an organisation's decision making process around an RTI that was directly linked to the death of a Red Arrows pilot, and then....silence. Where was the MAA mandated 'pause' for 22Gp's engineering management team? No safety case for an ejection seat - where was the MAA mandated 'pause' on the responsible PT? Assurance, anyone? Why does the MAA keep issuing SI recommendations that, as Tuc so excellent points out, amount to no more than 'comply with mandated regulations'? Why not do something about the organisations that didn't do their job?

Surveillance and inspection? I've worked in PTs that didn't carry out the most basic elements of airworthiness assurance. (Examples - proper control of airworthiness files, effective configuration control, management of modifications - I could go on). And these PTs sailed through MAA 'inspections'.

My final thought - I'd be a lot more comfortable about the MAA if it started withdrawing some of its approvals for organisations that have manifestly failed to operate correctly. Same goes for individuals. Let's see some Duty Holders relieved of their duties.

Sorry if I've gone on a bit here - it's just that I feel strongly about this stuff.

Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right things,

Engines

[tucumseh]

Engines

Excellent, as ever. I, too, could offer many examples of each point you make, but the comment that strikes home most is this;

My final thought - I'd be a lot more comfortable about the MAA if it started withdrawing some of its approvals for organisations that have manifestly failed to operate correctly. Where is the authority to do this? Well, it used to be in the only airworthiness-specific procedural Defence Standard, which was mandated in every aircraft-related contract. But it was cancelled, without replacement, in 2008; having been ignored since 1992, by order of AMSO. (An order that was ignored, until those who routinely used it moved on). Or, rather, the MAA attempted to replace a small part of Part 1 (of 2), but in the first page got the basic definition wrong and promptly went off at a tangent never to return.

That Def Stan describes very important MoD and Industry appointments. In MoD, the Technical Agency, the named man in the contract, with the signature over all the elements of airworthiness Engines mentions. The TA has the power of God over his counterpart in Industry, at each firm, because the company merely propose their man, and the TA appoints him. This is unique. The reason is simple. Airworthiness. Again, uniquely, that appointee is granted authority to commit MoD funding without having to seek the TA’s approval. The sole purpose of this is to nip safety problems in the bud. No need to even phone – he self-tasks in the certain knowledge he will be paid. If he doesn’t do his job properly, his appointment is withdrawn by the TA. I only had to do this once. The word soon gets round. I forced the company to replace a senior manager with a recently retired RN Chief Petty Officer (whom Engines will know), whom I considered the only suitable employee.

I do not believe the MAA has anyone junior enough to be a TA. (Discuss!) I doubt if they have anyone experienced enough, as one of the criteria is to have maintained, and preferably trained maintainers and diagnosticians, on the equipment or aircraft he is responsible for; at all Depths. Again, discuss – what became of MoD’s natural recruitment ground for such people? Bottom line – these perfectly good regulations are simply not implemented.

[POBJOY]

Engines Thankyou for the missive; the real 'shock' to many of us on here (who remember and were involved with the earlier wood days) is how the back up system has failed to keep up with changing times. It is not as if we were dealing with complicated systems and pyrotechnics/rocket fuels but no one can really see how the RAF/MOD has allowed itself to get into such a mess with really simple equipment,and or why there is a lamentable lack of Tech expertise in the upper echelons of decision making.What makes it even more unbelievable to those of us that operate in the civil world of EASA and LAA/BGA that operate similar types (some to Public Transport Cat) is the complete lack of accountability as to why the Air Cadet fleet was allowed to decay its ability to maintain standards to the point that it had to be grounded. This is not just a reflection on the Air Cadet organisation itself but also the mainstream MOD/RAF system that seems to have lost all control and actual expertise on basic airworthiness issues that the civvy world seem to manage even under commercial cost considerations. With no 'changes' to the upper 'management' how is the system supposed to heal itself for the future.

[clivewatson]

Hi Pobjoy, hope you are well.

I agree with your sentiments entirely, except that you included the word "accountability" and the acronym "EASA" in the same sentence!

[Chugalug2]

POBJOY:-
With no 'changes' to the upper 'management' how is the system supposed to heal itself for the future.

It was 'upper management' that sabotaged UK Military Airworthiness in the first place, mainly in the form of RAF VSOs. Ever since then 'Upper Management' has engineered a cover up which not only prevented the truth being discovered by various BoI's into airworthiness related fatal air accidents, but ensured that UK Military Airworthiness remained compromised and dysfunctional to this present day. Indeed, it has worsened over the years, as the missing and incomplete documentation that is the very essence of ensuring continuing airworthiness has dragged many more fleets into this morass.

You may well ask how simple structures such as the ACO gliders should fall foul of this scandal The answer is that simple gliders or complex systems (such as ejection seats), all require that continuous paper trail to prove that all that is right has been done, and all that is wrong has not been. Without that assurance unintended ejections, spontaneous explosions following AAR, collisions between aircraft using illegally fitted HISLs, blue on blue shoot downs and, to this day, unexplained impact into rising ground, can and have caused avoidable deaths; 63 killed in airworthiness related fatal accidents featured in this forum alone.

If the MOD had taken its primary responsibility as UK Military Air Regulator to heart and ensured that airworthiness be returned to the UK Military Airfleet, rather than protecting those who had initiated this scandal, many of those lives would have been saved. It didn't and they weren't. Thank your own AOC for grounding his fleet before more lives joined that count!

The only solution to reinstating military airworthiness is to make the Regulator and Investigator separate from the MOD and from each other. At the moment the DG DSA is responsible, inter alia, for assuring UK Military Airworthiness and for Investigating the lack of it! Even Sir Humphrey would baulk at such effrontery.

All of this edifice built upon sand was the result of the biggest lie ever told regarding Air Safety; the Haddon-Cave Report. It is quoted as holy script, instead it is a travesty of history and a formula for failure.

It will be a long hard road to rebuild military airworthiness so the sooner that first step is taken the better, which must be to march out of the morass that is the MOD. Those that complain about the CAA (I certainly have in my time!) and EASA should reflect that whatever their shortcomings, they never set out to subvert the very Regulations for which they are responsible. The MOD did, and good people died.

Like others have said, I am indebted to tucumseh and Engines for their knowledgeable and experienced contributions. I know that there are many others like them, qualified and dedicated engineers, who daily see the depths to which UK Military Air Safety has sunk. Please add your thoughts to this thread. You will be surprised how many will read what you have to say and take note.

Self Regulation Never Works, and in Aviation It Kills!

[POBJOY]

Chug I understand all that but who is actually going to make the changes required and are they actually capable of knowing how to go about it.
Is it possible that they have so little expertise in their own system (at top level) they will have to import a 'team' from a known capable organisation outside (poss major airline) that operate to the very highest public transport regulations that can advise them. As stated if there are no changes to the present 'staff ' who are supposed to be dealing with this how will it CHANGE.
I am afraid my opinion is rather non PC on this but i always have doubts on organisations that have 'names' in charge rather than those with a proven background in the actual job in hand. With the Air in Air Cadets being a bit of a clue one would expect some suitable air qualified people running the show.The fact that this is not the case is now well proven by the current situation. Perhaps an airline that ran a Mach 2 airliner in the commercial arena could point the way.

[POBJOY]

Clive; When did you learn to read and write and use such impressive words. When i saw you last you were signing with a cross!!!
Anyway such is progress;I only mention EASA as this is what we have to work with (or around). It always amuses me that the 'Europeans' manage to find the most complicated way to tell the Americans* how to operate and maintain an aircraft that they*designed,built,certified,fitted with their own avionics and engines plus most of the systems. We do have some good people over here but they just get lost in the sea of bureaucracy that seems to have overtaken basic engineering safe practice. Europe is a nest of vipers with bureaucracy and it seems the RAF has been bitten. I was only joking about the cross i think someone else did that for you.Our esteemed ex WO eng at Kenley would have wept if he could see what goes on nowadays. Glad you are still up and about.

[Chugalug2]

POBJOY:-

Chug I understand all that but who is actually going to make the changes required and are they actually capable of knowing how to go about it.

If there were an easy answer then I'm sure that even H-C or Lord Philip would have come up with it and it would by now be well established. The dedicated men and women that worked so far behind the scenes that I was blissfully unaware of them when I was a mere GD/P have long since gone. Those that replaced them are now gone, hounded from their posts or leaving of their own accord because those that would not suborn the regulations when ordered to do so were persecuted, their health ruined. Those that remain are, as tuc says, their replacements. Ignorant of long since forgotten regulations and procedures. Whatever is to be done, the present status quo is not the answer. The MAA is not the answer, nor is its overlord the DSA.

The expertise that you seek has to be relearned, the old regulations have to be resurrected before they can be then amended, the old procedures re-applied. The only body capable of assisting in that is I believe the CAA. If the new MAA were 'sistered' alongside the CAA, the cross fertilisation should lead to proper Regulation by an independent Authority. Similarly I would restore the MilAAIB, sister it with its civilian counterpart, and practice professional independent military investigation (which would be a first!).

Of course there are a thousand and one reasons why such a solution would not work. Certainly it would require strong leadership and steely determination to make it work, but as long as Military Air Safety lies within the maw of the MOD I see no chance for Air Safety, let alone Airworthiness, being regained in the UK Military Airfleets.

The only reason that it worked in my day were those anonymous dedicated engineers of whom I spoke, and the honourable VSOs that ensured that they could carry out their essential work unhindered. Once that situation was turned on its head there was no going back. Reputations are more valued than honour these days, which is why I repeat:-

Self Regulation Never Works and in Aviation It Kills!

[POBJOY]

Chug The CAA is but a shadow of its former 'engineering' self,with many of its former 'inspection' type of operations now reduced to 'audits' and more audits, and with few actual engineers out there.
More and more the real experience and expertise is with the 'operators' who see and deal with day to day incidents and have to make the system work and keep fleets flying in the 'safe' PT environment. I think a system that kept the aforementioned Mach 2 airliner in daily service must have been both capable and able to attend to maintaining standards and a commercial service together. This must have been a quality operation that could not 'fudge' the numbers and therefore has merit in the setting of a viable system that would work for the military.Do we have to have 'another' inquiry to tell us what we know already that the Military have lost their way, and need to find a way back to reality.
Clive How do you manage with 'check lists' that you cant 'biro' on your hand as per CISTRS and CBSITCB. !!!

[Chugalug2]

POBJOY, point taken re the CAA, and indeed EASA, Clive Watson! I don't pretend to offer a blueprint for sorting out the scandal that is UK Military Airworthiness, but others created a system that assured it in the past. The trick is to do the same, but this time to ensure its independence of the operator (aka the MOD) and the investigator (which must be made independent of both).

You speak of Mark 2 airliners, but their airworthiness was assured by that very arrangement in civilian aviation. Those engineers that were so engaged did so under the authority of an independent Regulator, just as the ones who assured the airworthiness of lesser technologies, such as gliders. Even the engineers who maintained and serviced these different types did so under the authority of the Regulator, rather than that of their employer. If that system that worked so well has been "mended" then I would question the efficacy of doing so. The military system though is well and truly bust and has to be mended! I still say that the civilian model of Operator, Regulator, and Investigator, all separated from, and independent of, each other is the way to go.

All that said it will take a great deal of time to return Military Airworthiness to a functional state. Anything worthwhile takes years to build and mere minutes to destroy. So it was with UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Maintenance. As I said before this will take real leadership to achieve. A new Trenchard is needed, someone whose name will be forever linked with this essential reform.

The very first requirement is to acknowledge the situation and to start that reform on its way. Perhaps the CAS, who has personal experience of the realities of conducting an investigation into a military aircraft accident when not independent of the operator, might be so minded...

[tucumseh]

There are a few fundamentals that must be understood before tackling this failure.

1. It is systemic. Refusal to recognise this results in the immediate problem, in the aircraft under discussion, being resolved, but the same problem in others being ignored. The Nimrod Review accepted this (he didn't actually reveal anything new) and recommended an MAA, not a Nimrod authority. With Nimrod now scrapped, hey presto, most of the problem is gone. No need to do much else. Let's *** off early, it's Monday afternoon. Until the next imminent grounding or fatality.

2. Airworthiness and serviceability are two different things. The former facilitates the latter. There is no need to work backwards through the problem. What MoD won't acknowledge is that this is well known. It was the subject of numerous scathing reports in the late 80s and 90s, and formed the basis of the main evidence to the Nimrod and Mull of Kintyre Reviews.

3. Attaining and maintaining airworthiness are different from Fitness for Purpose. With all due respect to Service engineers at front line (and I've done 1st, 2nd and 3rd maintenance, and managed 4th), they seldom see the first two. If they do, the system has already failed, big time. Their focus is on FFP; as is the MAA's, only they don't realise it. They think they're addressing airworthiness but six years on haven't started. I'm sorry if that upsets them, but the proof is in the pudding. Moreover, it was predicted here on pprune before they were even stood up; and confirmed almost immediately when it became known who was conducting their initial audits (as mentioned by Engines). This is why you get people on here denigrating those who attain and maintain - "It's all bollocks, let's just get on and fly". The reason why they never saw or even heard of this before was because it was done quietly and efficiently in the background, as a core subject by properly trained people. This is not a 2 year tour job, it is a long term vocation. MoD personnel policy militates against this.

Normally, one would revert to known good practice. There is very little evidence of this in MoD today. It is actually formal policy not to employ people who would provide it. It is therefore ludicrous to expect MoD to resolve this in a reasonable time without serious help. Worse, one cannot expect more than a mere handful to recognise the warning signs and see it coming; so help is sought far too late. That, despite the Nimrod and MoK Reviews pointing the way; not to mention a raft of Inspectorate of Flight Safety and Internal Audit reports from the 90s. Significantly, hubris plays a major part.

A few years ago, the Chief of Defence Materiel, Bernard Gray, submitted a report to the Labour Government that got perilously close to suggesting going back to mandated policy. He was then appointed by the Tory/Lib Dem Coalition to implement it. He called "his" initiative "GOCO", Government Owned, Contractor Operated. The trouble was, none of his lackeys had told him it was 95% mandated policy, and that a detailed submission had been made to one of his predecessors in January 2000 suggesting the same thing. (No reply). As soon as this was put to MoD, by a Lib Dem Minister, they promptly denied Gray had even mentioned it. Hubris again. But, it is actually a good idea. No one is left in MoD to do this work, so get a decent industrial partner to help.

An effort was made to implement GOCO. Word is, it failed (in its original form) because (a) MoD could not articulate the requirement, and hence (b) Industry could not cost it. (I'd add a third - no competent company bid, probably because they saw that MoD hadn't a clue, so trouble loomed). Where does it tell you how to articulate and how to cost? (And even how to control the data required to do it). The cancelled Def Stan I mentioned before. All roads lead it. It is THE Bible. Again, hubris, because MoD don't want to admit the solution is staring them in the face, but they have instructed staff not to implement it.

[POBJOY]

Well TUC We knew it was bad but we did'nt know how bad.
In fact it looks 'terminal' for gliding 'as was' and thats before they realise they have lost most of the staff one way or another.
There is no confidence in the organisation and its leadership anymore,and missives from 2FTS are worthless.In reality there are so few Air Cadets this will not be a national scandal and with Scouts numbers of 573,000 and rising perhaps they will take on the mantle of more gliding activity.
Lowering the age limit may appear to increase numbers but when they find out how long they must wait to go solo (even if this is still an option) then the incentive evaporates. Pretending that the supposed increase in AEF will save the day will do little to stop the rot because no one believes anything that comes out of Cranwell or Syerston. 75th anniversary of the organisation and its effective death knell is all they can celebrate.

[Chugalug2]

POBJOY:-
In fact it looks 'terminal' for gliding 'as was'

In truth it looks terminal for UK Military Aviation, because the systemic failures of which tuc speaks permeate it throughout. You may be sure that this is a major preoccupation for those at the very top. No doubt the grounding of the ACO fleet is as much to do with behind the scenes politics as it is to do with Air Safety.

On the face of it the ODH is to be applauded for taking such decisive action and indeed should be, but the airworthiness problem doesn't stop just there. It infects every other fleet, and what are their ODHs to do? They are on their own because the Authority that should back them has no real authority, and those that do have a much greater priority than the mere airworthiness of the RAF, FAA, or AAC, and that is to protect their 6 o'clock. It is the cover up that is the real threat, because while it continues no acknowledgement of the problem, let alone reform, can happen.

That is the nature of this scandal, the protection of VSO reputations threatens the fighting capability of UK Air Power. One or the other must end soon...

[A and C]

I doubt that the current airworthiness situation debilitating as it is would have much effect on the air fighting capability of the U.K.

In a national Emegency all the airworthiness bull and those who spend a working day polishing their rear ends on office furniture while debating the correct formular of rubber for use in wheel chocks will be brushed aside.

I am old enough to have been apprentice to a bloke who was maintaining RAF aircraft in 1939, he told me that within days of the declaration of war a whole raft of piece time maintenance practices had been swept away and did not return until well into 1946.

No doubt the rate of maintenance related aircraft losses was just lost in the fog of war and considered just part of the cost of doing business.

[tucumseh]

A and C

all the airworthiness bull

To which the standard reply is, what regulations should be done away with? I'm sure the MAA are open to suggestions.

[Chugalug2]

We're not talking about maintenance, A and C. We are not talking about serviceability (please read tucumseh's post #2511 above). We are talking about a lack of airworthiness of unknown extent. That is already affecting the air-fighting ability of the UK as it inexorably and persistently reduces aircrew and aircraft numbers. When we go to war those costs will accelerate as war-time reality overtakes peacetime complacency. 10 died in a Hercules because it wasn't fit for the purpose for which it was designed, ie as a tactical transport. 14 died in a Nimrod because its fuel system lacked the airworthiness required of it. Both aircraft were on active duty at the time, ie at war!

[teeteringhead]

As a general comment on wartime risks, I think it's true to say that more aircraft are lost NOT due to enemy action in most wars than losses directly attributable to enemy action.

I believe this to be true for WW2 and Korea and Viet Nam - I know it to be so for GW1 ..... :( ..... GW2 and Afghan anyone? Falklands?

[Chugalug2]

That may well be true, teeteringhead, but in a struggle for aerial supremacy it is better to avoid as many such losses as possible, so that more Air Power can be brought to bear were it is most needed, ie against the enemy. If such a struggle for Air Supremacy is much accelerated in the future (a debatable point, I'll admit) then such unnecessary and avoidable losses are all the more costly, because of the lack of time to make them good. To avoid that you need to ensure airworthiness beforehand, ie in peacetime, lest not doing so enables a more thoroughly prepared enemy to prevail.

[tucumseh]

teeteringhead

-re GW2, there were three losses in one day due, according to the BoIs, to airworthiness failings. Nine dead. All the stated failings were notified to the relevant 2 Star at least 4 years before, and he ruled the aircraft need not be safe when delivered to the Service. The frustrating thing was that in each case the "system" I describe above worked perfectly well up to the point of his ruling. There was adequate funding and perfectly good designs. In each case, it was actually easier, cheaper and quicker just to stick with those designs. Huge resources, both in MoD and Industry, were expended arguing the case. Industry and most of MoD wanted the aircraft to be safe; some seniors didn't and they just issued an overrule. A possible solution emerges. Sack them.

[clivewatson]

Perhaps someone who knows the facts should petition parliament? I'm sure that thousands of cadets, their parents and the VGS staff could make up the numbers to get this matter debated, or at least get the fiasco in front of a wider audience.

https://petition.parliament.uk/

Any volunteers? (not more than one petition though, otherwise the effect will get diluted)

[POBJOY]

Hi Sunbeam What it needs is a 20ft x 50ft banner going past Parliament with an image of a Viking snapped in two and the message THE AIR CADET FLEET IS BUST !! That will get the media on the case big time. PP

£1,000 for the banner, A time ex pilot, a good lawyer to get him out of jail !!!

If it is flown past Cranwell then we just need the banner.

[coptordoctor]

Just a quick word as to the grounding, haven't read the whole thread but i believe i can shed some light onto why they were grounded. Due to the H-C enquiry all military aircraft powered and non powered were required to have a certificate of airworthiness (ARC). Due to this being completely new to the military it required a huge amount of work to achieve this. The military in their wisdom sub contracted a lot of the work out to a civilian company to do the work, unfortunately money was an issue as usual and everything had to prioritised, hence front line aircraft were top of the pile and gliders were at the bottom. Now the front line kit has all but been sorted the gliders are now coming into view again, moves are afoot to have them all inspected and ARC's issued. Once this has been done then everything should be rosy again......should?!?

[clunckdriver]

I hope you guys fix this mess ASAP, my wife tells me its making me very grumpy every morning after I read the latest F-----up from the bozos who have managed to destroy what was once a well run operation using VOLENTEERS, not a bunch of totally incompetent Blimps! As one who owes everything to the ATC {Military pilot, airline pilot, ag pilot, company owner and corporate pilot along with vintage aircraft owner} I just cant believe the total mess created by this mob. Were I a bit younger and allowed to work in the UK we would come over and do what we did in Canada, that is maintain/fly/fix a fleet of thirty aircraft with only one bent aircraft in 26 years, it aint rocket science folks, just common sense and motivation. There, now I feel much better!

[POBJOY]

CLUNK You must stop holding back on your thoughts and start telling it as it is !!

[clunckdriver]

Pobjoy, if I did the Mods would ban me for life! What bothers me most is that the UK has a reputation and a history of well run volunteer organisations and trusts, how come they have been pushed aside with such disastrous results? Time to house clean methinks!

[POBJOY]

Clunk we are now the victim of a huge CF that has even affected the simple operation of gliders.
It is the classic 'could not run a sweet shop giving away free sweets' scenario and yet the top end is stuffed full of complete non-doers,and no hopers.
All they are capable of is Yuk Speak as Uncle Roger used to say in Flight.
Well they have finally driven a very long nail into this coffin of what was excellence.The simple truth is in the great scheme of things the Air Cadets are now so small and low profile no one will notice what we have lost.
Sad to say it has become a home for pension top ups and post filling rather than a bastion of leadership by example. The real loss is the VGS set up that kept the basic operation going against an increasing load of bull ****.
Deeply sorry it has come to this and that so many youngsters will miss the experience we had and valued. As there are NO VOTES for anyone in this do not expect any real searching questions as to how and why. Cranwell and Syerston (even before 2 FTS) have been seen to be negligent in their overseeing of this great organisation, and yet the gravy train rolls on 'through' the buffers with no end in sight. I hope the Scouts pick up some of the pieces and expand their operation. As to those paid staff that have let this happen shame on you letting this situation develop.

[Milts613]

I could not agree with you more POBJOY. Beyond a shame.

[Pegasus107]

Whilst gliding is a hot subject at present, it is only a part of the 'greater' ACO. Yes, there are many cadets who have not flown throughout their cadet career, but there are many more areas that little Johnnie/Jane can participate. Some will say that flying is an issue, but that is only with 5AEF, some will question shooting is an issue, but not really.

Was there this much verbal bashing of the CoC in previous reductions in gliding, or any other area, in the past. I doubt it.

Whilst gliding is not happening, many areas/activities are being delivered across the ACO, and long may it continue. The issue is here and it is not an easy win or go away quickly. Going on about 'what if' and complaining about the CoC is not going to help.

[EnigmAviation]

Pegasus old chap,


Agreed it is but a part of the whole activity spectrum, but the key clue lies in the first word of the organisation ACO - i.e., "AIR". If they want to major on filling customer's shopping bags in Supermarkets, Sport and cookery then remove the word "AIR" from ACO, give them an apron and a pair of plimsolls.....................


With regard to your comment about previous reductions in Gliding - I can't remember any in my 40 years - if anything they were the halcyon years of new aircraft, new all sorts. The hooo haaa now and the > 500,000 hits on this web site are the result of an extraordinary cock up in dealing with maintaining a relatively simple aircraft fleet, whether it be the RAF or their MoD appointed sub contractors. One thing for sure is that whether it was direct labour or indirect who failed in their duties, the overall Supervisory responsibility for the current farce remains with the RAF Officers at ALL levels who have failed to supervise the Eng function - largely I suspect as the RAF were metal centric and lacking expertise in GRP aircraft.


There's not even a guarantee that the current plan will deliver and yet despite that risk, considerable sums of mine and your taxpayer cash has been spent on building residential facilities at so called "Centres" - some of which have no guaranteed future and one or two with no decent Wx - well at least they can have a Cotswolds short break without any flying - mind you based on the current number of serviceable A/C, ( last heard of as 10 of which 3 have had to go back) , there's a good chance that it could be a long time before too many Cadet backsides get off the ground. £22M spent thus far, and not a lot to show except new buildings here and there.


Never mind, a new incumbent of the office of 2 FTS in 2017 may have a new plan, but meantime the Commandant kept her backside in the air recently wing walking on a Stearman. Probably the sole flying for the ACO 75th Anniversary year !

[wroxhambarns]

As a former air cadet I too am saddened by the recent announcements detailing the gliding reductions. However, given the much pointed-out priority of cadet forces and the ever dwindling funding I am glad that the 'pension topper ups' managed to retain as much capability as they have - small mercies perhaps?

[Wander00]

We had better watch the QBHL next month.....................

[longer ron]

Peggy107 wrote

Was there this much verbal bashing of the CoC in previous reductions in gliding, or any other area, in the past. I doubt it.

Whilst gliding is not happening, many areas/activities are being delivered across the ACO, and long may it continue. The issue is here and it is not an easy win or go away quickly. Going on about 'what if' and complaining about the CoC is not going to help.

It is not so much what has happened to ACO 'gliding' - it is more the way that the whole sad affair has been conducted - I think many of us would have more respect for the Brass if they had been upfront about their plans to cut the Gliding Squadrons but instead they carried out their plans under the smokescreen of 'The Pause' and treated the VGS staff with complete disdain - with no respect for their years of service.
Trust is a 2 way thing - who is going to trust the present Brass in the future ?

[POBJOY]

Brave post 107 and I understand your viewpoint ,however whilst the current website and ads still run the ACO are misleading youngsters as to what is really available and quite frankly I do not think it will improve. if a Squadron can survive on its own merits** then that's great, but to give the idea that a meaningful amount of flying and or gliding is available is not being honest, and Cranwell should accept that and stop the hype.
The way that skilled capable volunteers have been treated is unforgivable and those at the top have to accept full responsibility for that.
The same goes for 2FTS Syerston which is just a name with no meaning now.
The whole debacle is shameful, and I do wonder where they will attract adult staff to try and run the organisation.
** Some Squadrons will be able to offer facilities that are attractive in their local area ,this will be down to the skill of a particular CO and the support of the staff, however the problem will be finding those people prepared to serve under a total lacklustre leadership at the top. OF Course for the pension pushers higher up the food chain recruitment will be easy.

[clunckdriver]

My wife tells me I'm still grumpy in the mornings over this mess, so having been married to the same gall for 53 years you guys really have to fix this problem, less you cause me to join the "Alimony Club" of ex pilots who meet every week in the local pub! On Monday {its a long weekend over here} I intend to fly my very old airplane to three airfields all within an hours flying, the intention is to sit and watch the ATC gliding going on at each one of these fields, Maybe I wont be so grumpy after this therapy! This will be taking place all over Canada, in spite of the vast distances that the gliders have to be aero towed to give every ATC unit an equal chance learning to fly, so why in a country which would fit inside one of our lakes cant it be done? How about just firing the dead wood at the top and have the private gliding clubs run it? After all, this worked pretty well during WW2 when most of the EFTS schools were run this way as part of the BCATP.

[CoffmanStarter]

Clunck ...

Perhaps a few pics might help as I'm sure this thread is still read by a 'wide' audience ... If you know what I mean ;)

Suggested Working Title for your pics ...

'If our Canadian cousins can do it ... Why can't we'

[Lordflasheart]

Nice bit of sideways work by the OC No 2 Overseas (Gibraltar) Squadron.

RAF CADETS TAKE FLIGHT ON-BOARD ROYAL NAVY HELICOPTER ? Gibraltar Chronicle (http://chronicle.gi/2016/05/raf-cadets-take-flight-on-board-royal-navy-helicopter/)

I don't suppose there's much gliding on the Rock.

LFH (onetime Sgt ATC.)


............................

[POBJOY]

Clunk We thought about firing the dead wood but shooting now in question !!! Have a good outing with the Hornet.


LFH Is that a Leggo Lynx !!!

[squawking 7700]

Someone over on Gliderpilot.net is looking for a two drum winch - anyone know where there might be one available? :O


7700

[POBJOY]

Syerston has one,but they need a staff cadet to show them how to use it !!!!
Suggest the Air Scouts buy 10 of the old Munster VG (4 for bits) as a start to building themselves up.
Suggest we send a Viking over to China then they can build us 50 by Xmas 2016.

[Flugplatz]

Po'boy, you may not be too far from the truth, have you seen what people are doing with 3D printers these days? How long before someone realises a basic glider printed and assembled in kit-fashion would be quite a practical proposition?

Flug

[ATFQ]

This GOV.UK link becomes live tomorrow morning at 9.30 am. It will include ATC and CCF(RAF) cadet strengths (numbers) for 1st April 2016 for anyone who is interested.

https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mod-sponsored-cadet-forces-statistics-2016

[Sook]

I wonder if this will effect the Tutors or whether the Grob modification has already been fleet embodied. One would hope it's the later or ACO flying could be even further restricted.


http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/EASA_AD_2016_0091.pdf/AD_2016-0091_1

[Pegasus107]

Doubt it as it as it was only issued on 16 May 16 with effective date of 31 May 16. They don't work that fast!!

[Wannabeupthere]

I was quite surprised to see at RIAT this year they will be having an ATC display of gliders through the history of the cadets. Isnt that a bit ironic considering they haven't done any for a good while now?

[incubus]

I was quite surprised to see at RIAT this year they will be having an ATC display of gliders through the history of the cadets.

Why surprised? Gliding used to be an important part of the ATC and deserves a place in any historical display in this 75th anniversary year!

[Freda Checks]

Gliding used to be an important part of the ATC and deserves a place in any historical display in this 75th anniversary year! ....and some of us even remember the looks on cadets' faces when we sent them solo!!

Sadly all part of the UK Air Cadet history now.

[Prangster]

Ah yes first solo in a Mk111 brick. Rules Don't enter cloud...er dump the cable before you reach it laddie (800ft base with scudding lower cloud down to 500) If it starts snowing ignore it, it will be a passing shower (it wasn't) You can cope with a tad of crosswind can't you, keep wide on finals and don't hit the bloody caravan.

I survived.

[Wander00]

Air Cadet gliding will be in the historical section of the static display, will it?

[POBJOY]

Already going through the system at about two a week because it is a relatively simple fix and covered by EASA rules.
Helped by the fact that this is supported by a manufacturer still in business.

[POBJOY]

I really think it is about time that the Air Cadet Organisation should be considering its position with regard to its name,as under any sort of 'advertising' rules it falls well short of being honest with the public about its 'Aviation input'

Perhaps RAF Cadets would be more honest as judging by the latest AIR CADETS' newsletter the official spin just goes on and on.

Cmt ACO states that 'Less gliding does not mean less flying;indeed there will be more flying opportunities available !!!!

Reg Cmt Wales and West extols the virtues of his 3 solo's in a MK 111 some time back yet fails to mention that this has all been binned.He then states that the 2nd and third parts of the Royal Warrant are the more important ones now.

OK if that is the case then lets really be truthful and say that we are a Cadet organisation that offers lots of opportunities for youngsters with the possibility of some flying experience.

For an organisation that now has very little to do with flying it begs the question why are all the top 'paid' jobs needed.

[Pegasus107]

Flying opportunities do not only fall within the remit of HQAC (through Regions/Wings) to arrange, squadrons can also look for opportunities.

Contrary to the lack of flying that POBJOY is pushing, believe it or not, squadrons in our Wing have already got cadets up this year in Hercules, Pumas, Chinooks, King Airs, Squirrels; through the hard work of squadron staff trying to organise trips for cadets. And don't forget that AEF is still happening, even 5 AEF have started to fly at weekends.

Flying has not stopped in the ACO, just gliding........

[tucumseh]

My understanding was that Air Cadets actually took control of gliders. If all they wanted to do was be a passenger in an aircraft, Mr O'Leary would oblige for twenty quid.

[POBJOY]

Flying has not stopped 'just Gliding'

Just about summs up the current thinking in the organisation.

Lets be clear Gliding was the Corps USP where a youngster from any average background had the opportunity to be taught to fly on his own and gain a BGA certificate (the only qualification in the gliding world)
All other flying in the organisation is a 'ride' and in most cases other than Tutor no handling.
Not to belittle any flying but lets be clear it is not what the ATC was special for.

All thrown away by staggering incompetence, and a lack of leadership at the top.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Flying opportunities do not only fall within the remit of HQAC (through Regions/Wings) to arrange, squadrons can also look for opportunities.

Contrary to the lack of flying that POBJOY is pushing, believe it or not, squadrons in our Wing have already got cadets up this year in Hercules, Pumas, Chinooks, King Airs, Squirrels; through the hard work of squadron staff trying to organise trips for cadets. And don't forget that AEF is still happening, even 5 AEF have started to fly at weekends.

Flying has not stopped in the ACO, just gliding........


Hear hear.

Flying has not stopped 'just Gliding'

Just about summs [sic] up the current thinking in the organisation.

Lets be clear Gliding was the Corps USP where a youngster from any average background had the opportunity to be taught to fly on his own and gain a BGA certificate (the only qualification in the gliding world)


To you maybe. I did three years in the ATC in the 90s and never even set eyes on a glider - had far too much fun going on camps and flying in Chipmunks. Powered flying as a cadet definitely motivated me to aspire to a flying career.

Not to belittle any flying but lets [sic] be clear it is not what the ATC was special for.



It looks awfully like you are belittling other types of flying available to cadets as well as those (both ACO staff and aircrew) who try to provide it. I would suggest that the cadets who were on board a multi-aircraft assault of Nesscliffe Training Area on Ex Dragon's Claw recently, as one example, would judge that to be as special as flying in a glider.

[Subsunk]

They won't have a frame of reference to judge otherwise, will they?

Any air experience is a precious thing, and as such reflects well-deserved credit on the adult volunteers and regular units who make it happen.

The worst part of this whole train smash is that in the last couple of years, the ACO ceased to have any confidence in its gliding community's ability to fly safely. This shift in judgement was based on no evidence whatsoever. There is always, always room for improvement and never any scope for complacency, but the VGS community were largely doing it right and an ex-VGS person would be more than welcome on my team. Can't say the same for their parent organisation who have shown only that they can add up several problems and deliver a total catastrophe.

[cats_five]

gain a BGA certificate (the only qualification in the gliding world)

You've not heard of the FAI, and the Silver, Gold & Diamonds then?

[CoffmanStarter]

Heads up ...

Putting the air in the Air Cadets at 75 - AVM ANDY TURNER explains the changes to flying in the UK’s ATC youth organisation

Royal Aeronautical Society | Insight Blog | In the latest AEROSPACE magazine - June 2016 (http://aerosociety.com/News/Insight-Blog/4386/In-the-latest-AEROSPACE-magazine-June-2016)

Has anyone had a read yet ?

[Rigga]

I haven't read all of this v. Long thread, in fact I've only read from page 125 to this.

I've read that there was some question of the validity of MAA 'Reviews' of which I have only experienced one...It had four findings of which the two I remember were:

1. A Fire Door in the Hangar was a 15 minute door that should be a 45 minute door.

2. The (private organisation) flight coveralls were Dyed a different colour and could not be proven to be fire tested to the same level as RAF green coveralls.

With the very apparent problems and issues that surounded the circumstances of these observations, that the MAA could only register fault with one hangar's corner door, that should not concern an aviation authority, this was absolutely astounding.

[POBJOY]

Yes the BGA issued them in the UK. The A&B was/is an International Cert as the C and the rest.
Cadets got a proper little book signed by Brab which had some meaning if you then went to a club.

[cats_five]

The fai only recognise silver, gold & diamonds. The bga validate those in the uk, and also issue their own a, b & bronze badges. The c badge is no more. The pre-silver badges don't mean anything outside the uk though bronze plus xc endorsement is equivalent to a ppl.

[POBJOY]

My point being a 16 year old Cadet was able to attain this certificate before he could drive a motor car. This was the USP for the organisation and a source of pride on the Squadrons. Was sadly replaced with oodles of dual and One solo.

A Cadet could then apply for an advanced course (more solo's and check out to single seater), and the keen ones would get into a school as a SC.

Brilliant system that made the ATC different to all other organisations,and it was the SOLO aspect that gave the Cadets the inspiration and confidence.

[side salad]

Worse is to come sadly. I understand the experts who got us into this situation now what to change the commission structure and smash volunteer morale even further. Give it a couple of years and ATC squadrons will be closing through a lack of staff. It's almost as if they want to have a smaller organisation, maybe this is budget cutting through the back door. Either way as someone who is now a senior manager in industry, responsible for employee engagement for a large number of people, I have a new case study of how not to engage a workforce.....

[tucumseh]

Royal Aeronautical Society | Insight Blog | In the latest AEROSPACE magazine - June 2016 (http://aerosociety.com/News/Insight-Blog/4386/In-the-latest-AEROSPACE-magazine-June-2016)

Why does the RAeS get involved? If it didn't support the RAF would the current CAS do what a predecessor did and threaten to withdraw membership?

[cats_five]

The BGA had to come into line with EASA and the age for solo was lowered to 14 some time ago. Even at 16 it was still before the legal driving age.

[brokenlink]

Read AVM Turners article. It speactaculary fails to provide any information on how and why the cluster f@@@ that was the maintenance occured nor whether the MoD has clawed any money back from the contractor responsible or whether anyone has been censured over this.
Letter inbound to MP.

[POBJOY]

S-Salad What happened to the Prime ministers statement about increasing Cadet Units in Schools. Was this just an idea or have the schools failed to engage with it.

[The B Word]

This recent interview will cheer you up (not):

Interview with Air Vice Marshal Turner, HQ RAF - Military Training International (http://www.mti-dhp.com/defense-news/interview-with-air-vice-marshal-turner-hq-raf/)

It looks like they are planning to spend £1/2bn to merge all initial training at Cranwell at some point. Somehow, someone thinks spending £1/2bn will save £1bn over 10 years - I would like to see the maths for that utter folly. I wonder if this will be another bright idea like the one to move Cosford to go St Athan, hold on lets go to Lyneham, in fact let's leave Cosford where it is because we can't afford it! With MFTS and legacy flying training at Cranwell, and RAFCAM expecting to move there as well, plus an expanded UAS/AEF, and then the usual Cranwell stuff one wonders where it will all fit. There is a shortage of Married Quarters in Lincolnshire and so where is everyone going to live? Is this the end of Henlow, Honington and Halton? They're building a massive new med centre at Honington so it must be time to close it!

I wonder how many gliders we could buy with £1/2bn?

The B Word :ugh:

[side salad]

Pobjoy - My understanding is that whilst they wanted to expand cadet forces in schools, they didn't want to pay for it in full and expected the schools to stump up most the cash, schools had other ideas. I did have one local (state) school ask me for advice given my background but funding was the killer....

[The B Word]

Official Cadet figures here: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/526131/MOD_sponsored_cadet_forces__statistics_2016.pdf

Released this week...:sad:

[tmmorris]

100 new CCF units in state schools already up and running. Under resourced but happening thanks to LIBOR money.

Now they want 150 more by 2020. Not going to be easy as all the low hanging fruit has been picked...

But at the same time, the numbers in existing cadet units are falling.

[POBJOY]

Lots of scrambled thinking to go with the scrambled egg.
If I was running the Air Force I would wonder why all this wonderful system stuffed full of high ranking staff could not keep a fleet of Gliders operational !
It beggars belief. Mind you website operational capability spot on and twatter/facebook 'cascading' at an all time high. The government had budgeted £50 million for Cadet expansion yet numbers fall, and there is a Staff/Cadet ratio of approx. 3.5, so huge amounts of money going somewhere but not getting any results, also not doing any 'actual' gliding but the 'enabling' of facilities for the PTT at the surviving VGS is alive and well.
Any reasoned look at the situation would find it hard to believe someone was actually in charge of this current state of play; not to mention being paid for it.

[Chugalug2]

Any reasoned look at the situation would find it hard to believe someone was actually in charge of this current state of play; not to mention being paid for it.

Oh, there's someone in charge all right, POBJOY, but their agenda is different to ours. This charade was brought about by those who were in charge whereby
this wonderful system stuffed full of high ranking staff could not keep a fleet of Gliders operational !

Their agenda now is to protect those who created that wonderful system and those who have ever since covered that up. There is something rotten in this State and it needs cleaning out ASAP.

We now have a situation when previously respected and honourable institutions such as the RAeS, even the RAF itself, have been infected by this corruption and act as apologists for the MOD. Time then for a latter day Trenchard to step forward and purge the system, reinstate UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation, and then reform the MOD itself.

Tall order, but if not then we may see the demise of the world's first independent Air Force before it even reaches its centenary.

[A and C]

The original reason for setting up the RAF was strategic use of air power, this was first identified in the report by LT Gen Jan Smuts in August 1917, Smuts commented

"the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of miltary and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate".

Following the demise of the Vulcan some say that the RAF can no longer forefill the role it was set up for and should be dissolved back into the other services.

I do not hold this veiw but as you raised the prospect of the end of the RAF I was think it was time to play devils advocate.

[Chugalug2]

A and C, thank you for your post. You are quite right that some people do indeed question the need for a separate UK Air Force and would like to see it returned to the separate air arms of the Army and Navy from whence it came. That rather misses the point that I was trying to make though, and obviously failed to do so. My fault, for which I apologise.

By using the word demise I was trying to imply a withering away of a once powerful force to a state of impotence, due to the ever spreading contagion of unairworthiness amongst its fleets. That is the real implication of the grounding of the ACO fleet, a fate shared with the RAF's maritime fleet. It is the tip of an airworthiness iceberg that infects every RAF fleet, operational or otherwise.

All that is needed to start the long hard road of regaining control of airworthiness is for the RAF to acknowledge that it was its own VSOs that caused this situation and for its subsequent cover-up. Then and only then will the vital need for separate and independent Regulator and Investigator, from the MOD and each other, be made clear.

That isn't going to be achieved by committee, it can only be done by one person, of sufficient stature and power, to force through such an acknowledgement. Once that happens then the real work can begin, and the sooner the better.

Time is of the essence, for the withering away continues until such time that it can be checked.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation It Kills!

[A and C]

We are in violent agreement about independent regulation and I have to work under the oversight of EASA/UK CAA who are not slow to let you know if you are falling short of the mark.

[teeteringhead]

100 new CCF units in state schools already up and running. Under resourced but happening thanks to LIBOR money.

Now they want 150 more by 2020. Not going to be easy as all the low hanging fruit has been picked... Although the new initiative now extends to the "Devolved Administrations" - i.e. Wales, Scotland and Norn Iron - the original CEP (Cadet Expansion Programme) was for England only as Education - under whose remit it falls - was a devolved responsibility.

[Lima Juliet]

A & C

I beg to differ on EASA/CAA airworthiness in respect of pilot licencing, supervision, recency and competence. In fact, I would be so bold to say that in some areas of their responsibility it appears to be non-existent compared the supervision of commercial air transport.

As an EASA licenced pilot there is little supervision of what I do and in the very unlikely event of being caught by the CAA doing something wrong then it can take years for them to do anything about it. I also hear rumours that there are rogue maintainers within the GA community that only get caught out when there is an accident - I think the accidents in Caernarfon and Cranfield in recent years are indicative of that?

So maybe all is not as rosey in EASA/CAA land in the non-commercial sector?

Chug

You often espouse that the MAA is not fit for purpose regarding its independence. What is your suggestion, then? But before you answer I would offer that even if the CAA oversaw MoD aviation then the fact that these are 2 Governent bodies means that they cannot be truly independent? Furthermore, if an independent body were set up outwith the Government then who pays for that? One could argue that it is almost impossible to achieve true independence without taking people out of the loop - everyone has their own centre of gravity to lean one way or another!

--------------------------------------

Back to the thread. I believe that taking gliding out of MAA-land and into EASA/CAA/BGA-land would be a good thing. Having a tiny fleet of 75-odd MAA regulated gliders makes no sense at all - in expense, manpower and effort. If we wanted some more independent oversight (but even then not 100% independent) then flying gliders under EASA/CAA/BGA rules and regs would save a whole load of heartache and the ability of enjoying synergy with the civil regustered fleet. You can still put a roundel on a civvy reg aircraft and even apply for an exemption from the CAA to carry military registrations - trying to run them on an airworthiness system from the MAA is just plain dumb...:ugh:

The vast majority of gliding carried out by the military in the last 26 months (yes, that's how long it has been!) have been on JSAT courses or via the 3 Single Service Gliding Assocs - funny old thing they fly EASA/CAA/BGA gliders that cost about 3/4s of the cost to run one than those on the military register. Taking that example, if we can only afford to run 75 Vikings then we could have 300 Grob 103s running for the same cost. Utter madness...:ugh:

IMHO of course! :ok:

LJ

[Chugalug2]

A and C, thank you for your "violent agreement"! I understand that the MAA is counting as independent airworthiness auditing the issue of ARC's by EASA. I am very suspicious of such moves by the MOD. I don't doubt for a minute the strict compliance that EASA demands of commercial aviation that you refer to, but does the same go for the military airworthiness of member states? The words "bite", "hand", and "feed" come to mind!

Unless and until Regulator, Investigator, and Operator (aka the MOD) are separate and independent of each other, UK Military Airworthiness will continue to remain blighted.

[Engines]

Chug, Others,

Perhaps I might be allowed to offer a couple of observations here.

I think A and C brings up a good point - just how WOULD any organisation run (presumably by the government) that was 'responsible for the regulation, surveillance, inspection and assurance of the defence air operating and technical domains' (this text taken from the MAA website) be truly 'independent'?

I've suggested before that the RN, ARMY and RAF should all have organisations in place to 'enhance the delivery of operational capability through the continual improvement in military air safety, appropriate culture, ....and practice'. The MoD should properly be the guardian of higher 'joint' regulation affecting air safety. My suggestion for more 'independence' would be met, in my view, a (very active) supervising board made up from recognised experts and professional organisations. But hey, that's just my view.

The reasons I make these points is that the Air Cadet gliding scandal (and scandal it most certainly is) raises some issues that should, in my personal view, be addressed in public. These are simple training aircraft being used by school children and flown by volunteers. Here's my stab at a starting list I'd like to see answers to:

Was a full airworthiness and safety audit of the fleet conducted on their initial introduction to the Military Register and who signed it off? (As Tucumseh would remind us, this has ALWAYS been a requirement). Did the Vigilant and the Viking have proper safety cases and risk registers? Did they have approved and controlled configurations? Did they have proper accredited DA support?

What had 22 Group RAF been doing with the Air Cadet Fleet since 2010 when they took full charge? Who has been responsible for supervising the maintenance of the fleet? How about the PT in DE&S? Plenty of very senior people around there who should be answering some questions.

What exactly was it that was serious enough to warrant, in 2014, the whole fleet of ATC gliders and aircraft to be grounded over an Easter week, which is one of the Air Cadets busiest? Can't have been 'technical issues' across two fleets, could it? Are we looking at a systemic issue?

But to my mind, one of the biggest questions to be answered is this - where was the Military Aviation Authority? Hadn't they carried out audits of the Air Cadet Fleet? (They were, after all, RAF aircraft). Wasn't the PT checked out? Hadn't they checked out 22 Group?

My final point - these issues deserve much better answers than the spin and froth that has recently been offered up in an RAeS publication.

Anyone on PPrune got any details on these issues?

Best Regards as ever to those trying to get Cadets into the air

Engines

[Chugalug2]

LJ:-
You often espouse that the MAA is not fit for purpose regarding its independence. What is your suggestion, then?

Sorry Leon, we clashed (posting that is ;-). Of course, no system is or can be perfect. No doubt an independent MAA, or just as importantly MilAAIB, will be open to much justified criticism. My hope though is that it could at least be free of the malevolent influence of the MOD (and the RAF Star Chamber!) if placed outside that body.

AFAIK, the CAA is a Self Funding Public Corporation. Of course, it is still prone to government pressures, but at least it is not dependent on it for its very existence. In any case, the parlous state of UK Military Airworthiness was not brought about directly by UK governments per se, but rather by the incompetent and malevolent action of RAF VSOs desperately trying to claw monies out of ring fenced Air Safety budgets that their own gross negligence dictated. The possibility that such illegal action and orders could be resorted to had never been anticipated, but they were, and in covering that up to this very day UK Military Air Safety continues to be subverted.

My solution? Well, I could suggest that by sending an SAE and Postal Order for 10/- to I, Horace Batchelor, at Dept 1, Keynsham (spelt K-E-Y-N-S-H-A-M), Bristol, you too can receive my famous Infra Draw Method of Independent Air Regulation and Investigation, but I might fall foul of some EU regulation or other!

Suffice to say that this is truly a matter of National Security, way above my OAP rate, but can and must be attended to. The real difficulty isn't the solution but the opposition from the MOD. That must be met head on and overcome. When we have an independent MAA and MilAAIB (wedded to the CAA and AAIB? Mixed civilian and Service staffed? Why not?), then I would suggest a complete reform of the MOD might be a good idea, but let's do one thing at a time!

As to funding, this would come from the long suffering British Taxpayer, via HM Treasury. Yes, I can see the problems too, but as I said earlier, the real cause of this was RAF VSOs within the MOD, not HM Government. The problem with my solution will be the personnel rather than the money. Would a dedicated branch (Air Safety?) of professional military regulators and investigators help get the Star Chamber off their backs? You are more in the know regarding the modern RAF than I. How bad is it?

[Wander00]

Just noticed the bit above about the change from A&B Certs to "one solo". IMHO, one solo proves little (but is great achievement), it is post solo consolidation that counts. For example at the Club I flew with in France there was requirement for 12 post solo consolidation flights - I was lucky as I got the Pegase in comparison to the young French boys and girls who had to do it in the Marianne - a heavy glass 2 seater. When I finished a course in UK 3 years ago, BGA even found my old A&B record and issued a duplicate certificate (photo was a tadge different though). If the ACO cannot (eventually) get the boys and girls to A&B could there not be a deal with service gliding clubs to take them on and finish the job, so to speak.

[A and C]

I tend to agree about the private pilot licensing however I was referring to EASA145 maintenance standards and the quality assurance standards that are part of EASA145 regulation as the ATC glider issue is one of engineering quality assurance.

[Chugalug2]

Engines, you ask some critically important questions of the MAA, DE&S, 22Gp, and last and least, of me. For myself, I have tried to answer similar questions from Leon. I truly believe that the MOD's ability to ensure airworthiness for the military fleets via its subsidiary the MAA to be unviable.

Tucumseh has described better than I ever could the profound effects of the attack on Air Safety by RAF VSOs in the late 80s/ early 90s and of the subsequent cover up by the MOD. It is the latter that has caused the really long lasting damage. The one hope was the Nimrod Review. If Haddon-Cave had reported the facts of that attack, then reform could have been commenced to ensure that no such attack could happen again by putting Regulation and Investigation outwith the MOD. Instead he described the period of that attack as a Golden Period of Military Airworthiness. Now why would he do that? Why?

So instead of reform the deck-chairs were rearranged and the "Independent" MAA had as its subsidiary the "Independent" MilAAIB! Even the MOD has belatedly seen the nonsense of that, so more deck-chair layouts have given us the Defence Safety Authority, of which the MAA and the Defence Accident Investigation Branch are subsidiaries. The MilAAIB is no more, but the DG DSA now oversees both Regulation and Investigation as part of the MOD!

The cover up continues, the lack of independence continues, the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness continues. I hope that you get your answers from others that you question but with respect the answers are known already. ACO aircraft have been grounded because they lack airworthiness. Other RAF fleets have not been grounded. Are they airworthy? How can they be when the system is so badly broken?

We can carry on counting the number of fairies on a pin head or we can face up to reality, slaughter a few sacred cows, and reform UK Military Airworthiness. We are talking about lives being at risk, we are talking about valuable resources being at risk, we are talking about this nation's security being at risk. Or are we instead talking about certain VSOs' reputations being at risk?

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

By using the word demise I was trying to imply a withering away of a once powerful force to a state of impotence, due to the ever spreading contagion of unairworthiness amongst its fleets. That is the real implication of the grounding of the ACO fleet, a fate shared with the RAF's maritime fleet. It is the tip of an airworthiness iceberg that infects every RAF fleet, operational or otherwise.


What's wrong with, for example, the C-17? Voyager? Herc?

[Chugalug2]

ToD:-
What's wrong with, for example, the C-17? Voyager? Herc?

I've no idea, which of course is irrelevant. You need to ask your question of the MAA, the same Authority that presided over the Safety Case of the MB Mk 10 seat that killed Flt Lt Cunningham. Turned out there wasn't one, but they didn't know. What makes you think they know the answer to your question?

I'm sorry, I realise my post sounds truculent. It isn't meant to be. It merely illustrates the systemic dysfunction of UK Military Airworthiness. This explains it better than I can, though it gets longer as more is added :-

https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/

[tucumseh]

As usual, Engines and I are in agreement. An excellent post and, as he says, the same old issues arise in this case as did on Nimrod, Chinook, Hercules and the rest. THIS, I believe, is what any campaign should concentrate on. (I'm pretty certain we don't actually have a campaign here). After all, it is what won these cases, and rather easily if I may say so. It is great that the issues are aired here, but a higher profile must be attained. The media and MPs need to be aware that we've been here before, MoD has been castigated by a series of independent Reviews and Inquiries, but it is STILL happening.

But to my mind, one of the biggest questions to be answered is this - where was the Military Aviation Authority? Hadn't they carried out audits of the Air Cadet Fleet? (They were, after all, RAF aircraft). Wasn't the PT checked out? Hadn't they checked out 22 Group?

Precisely, and MoD's machinations are clearly aimed at deflecting attention from these departments. It is now 6 years, but I recall being alarmed at who the MAA appointed to do one particular aircraft audit, which was the subject of a legal Review at the time. That aircraft had not enjoyed a Local Technical Committee (whose job, ultimately, is to deliver a valid safety case) for over EIGHT years. The auditor said so what, I always ignored that mandated requirement as well, and nothing more was said. A little digging by the MAA would have revealed the number of deaths arising from this, but they don't seem interested in such things. Or at least, the senior MAA staff don't allow the concerns of knowledgeable MAA staff to be printed. I mention the LTC because it is the process that it controls that has broken down in this ATC case.

And that is linked to Leon's question of Chug about what to do. Understanding the simple chain Build Standard > Safety Case > RTS reveals where the boundaries of responsibility must be established. No MAA document goes remotely near this, hence the bugger's muddle we see. The mandated Standard that does spell it out was cancelled without replacement in 2008. As I tend to say, a solution emerges..... If the MAA want a copy, they only have to ask, but alternatively they could nip down to Neighbourhood 1 at ABW and just ask for current contract documents which continue to call it up. Unsurprisingly, they are the projects that run well.

[tucumseh]

If I may just add something on the issue of cost. Doing the job correctly in the first place is invariably cheaper and better in the long run.

The example I always use involved multiple fatalities in 2003. The mandated regulations were ignored and an unsafe design was installed. Boscombe refused to issue MAR recommendations but the 2 Star ruled that (any) aircraft need not be functionally safe. The correct design in one aircraft had been costed at a mere £50k. Correcting the unsafe design cost £4.4M and lost the programme 5 months (which was recovered as the TI didn't have any faults during trials). But the other aircraft was not corrected, and two died. Not counting the tragic loss of aircrew, this single event cost MoD around £60M (not sure of cost of the aircraft, and accept that cost is sunk anyway). The same applied to Nimrod - just add another few zeroes. And Chinook Mk3, around £300M. Please don't mention cost and alleged unaffordability. There's a reason why we don't have the money and it's nothing to do with budget cuts. It is all about not implementing the same regulations and systematically and quite consciously wasting money.

[Engines]

Chug,

Thanks for coming back, I really appreciate it. Discussion is always good.

I fully agree that the move of merging the old RNAIU (renamed and expanded to become the MAAIB) with the MAA was a nonsense on stilts from the very start. Moving the Defence Accident Investigation Board (DAIB) away from the MAA has to be welcomed.

The DSA is (in my view) a renaming of something that that actually existed for many years, most recently as the Defence Safety Board. It provides (again my view) a necessary 'safety focus' at the relevant level to allow the MoD to properly discharge its safety responsibilities, both to its own personnel and the wider public. The DSB was supported by a number of organisations that had built up excellent safety records, such as the Ordnance Board (the old 'OB') that looked after weapons, CINO (Chief Inspector Naval Ordnance), and the RN's Nuclear Safety Committee. I'm struggling to find a better place for it within MoD, unless it went to VCDS or someone of that ilk.

The key point was that these organisations did their jobs properly. They ensured that people understood the regulations and implemented them via clear lines of responsibility. The problem that Haddon-Cave (in my view correctly) established was that successive reorganisations in military aviation administration, many in the name of 'jointery', had diluted and confused the lines of responsibility. The problem he didn't identify so clearly was that the essential safety relevant regulations had also been mangled (and in some cases deleted altogether) as part of the reorganisations. (JSP553 was a particularly bad publication that should have been strangled at birth).

I do think (and I know you'll disagree, and I understand why) that the movement of the MAA to the DSA, and the relocation of the DAIB are at least in the right direction. Having the MAA as a three star fiefdom outside the MoD's safety management organisation was another 'nonsense on stilts'.

I do agree that there has been a scandal with regards to military aircraft airworthiness. I also agree that the RAF's senior officer cadre has a hell of a lot to answer for. However, where I must (respectfully) part company with you is the 'way forward'. I've not set my ideas out clearly enough, and my apologies for that, so here's my 'nice to see it happen' list.

First, get a panel of experienced 'greybeards' to scrub the MAA regulations and restore the intent and the detail of the missing DefStan that Tuc so often (and quite correctly) refers to. Also, restore and emphasise the basic principle of 'Build Standard-Safety Case - RTS' to the regs.

Second, restore some sense to the system and devolve responsibility for the detailed management of airworthiness engineering back down to the people who should be doing it - the Chief Engineers. MAA should set out high level policy and regulations, the Chief Engineers should issue the relevant orders and instructions to implement them. They are the people who need to re-establish LTCs, MCCs, and CCBs that actually do what they are supposed to do. The MAA's current effort to run the whole world of aviation engineering from the centre is not going to work in war, and that (last time I looked) is what Joe Public pays the Services to do.

Thirdly, start training a cadre of airworthiness engineers to implement proper airworthiness standards and practices. Give them clear lines of responsibility to their Chief Engineers, and the power to say 'NO'. Especially to say no to aircrew, whatever their rank.

While that lot is going on, have the public enquiry. Hang the guilty b******s. It will put the fear of God into those in the MoD who persist in failing to implement mandated regulations.

That's just my first stab, I'm sure others have better and more relevant ideas. I'm not sure that any public enquiry will happen soon, but perhaps the Air Cadet glider fiasco could be used to get MoD to answer what I think is the $64,000 question:

'Has the RAF been flying school children in non-airworthy aircraft?'. Yes or no answer please, preferably from AOC 22Gp.

Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing at the right time

Engines

[tucumseh]

Engines

Spot on about the Ordnance Board. Throughout my career it was patently obvious to me where competence was taught and demanded in MoD, and the OB was one. It was a disgraceful decision to disband it, on a par with AMSO's 1987 policy to waste money and his successor's policy to run down airworthiness management.

Turning to these senior oversight committees, the Defence Airworthiness Group was established in March 1993; I'd like to think as a direct reaction to AMSO's policies kicking in with a vengeance that year. The committee was a good idea but the members were somewhat lacking. They oversaw the disbandment of LTCs in June that year; which is the evidence that prevented any legal action following the Nimrod Review. (The IPT should have inherited a safety case, but it was no longer policy to have one). Their first real decision was to rob aircrew of a major defence in depth! If I say that one of them was ACAS, who a few months later made a false declaration in the Chinook Mk2 RTS (see Philip Report), then you get the idea. On the other hand, another member was Commandant A&AEE. I wonder what the topic of conversation was at the first meeting in 1994? You ****, you're asking for trouble ignoring the mandate that Mk2 isn't airworthy. And then the next one - Told you. 29 dead. Those events set the tone and MoD has never recovered. The membership was 12, two of whom were your FONA and Controller Navy. History tells us the vote would have been about 7-5 in favour of airworthiness, but the person most involved in practical implementation would have been against. The following year the RAF Chief Engineer took over that particular post, so nothing changed. Lesson - it's all about people.

[Chugalug2]

tuc:-
Lesson - it's all about people.

Spot on, tuc! That is the real conundrum. You can have all the committees and appointments imaginable but if the man at the top says jump, what do you do? That is why Regulators and Investigators have to be entirely separate from the Operator and from each other, lest that one illegal command comes down from above to suborn the regs and/or fix the investigation. Both have happened in the past under the present arrangement of all three in the same bed. The results are still with us and, arguably, now worse than ever.

Engines,

First, get a panel of experienced 'greybeards' to scrub the MAA regulations and restore the intent and the detail of the missing DefStan that Tuc so often (and quite correctly) refers to. Also, restore and emphasise the basic principle of 'Build Standard-Safety Case - RTS' to the regs.

The MAA in other words has failed utterly to do so in the last 6 years. Why? Because they are stymied by the very report that is their raison d'etre, Haddon-Cave's. There is nothing wrong with the present system because he commends it! Until that lie is faced up to, nothing will change.

have the public enquiry. Hang the guilty b******s. It will put the fear of God into those in the MoD who persist in failing to implement mandated regulations.

Which is the very reason that no-one wants to touch this with a barge pole; the RAF Provost Marshal, the civilian police, HoC select committees, HoL committees, the UK Government, MPs, Coroners Courts, FAIs, even the media. That just about ticks off the whole of the UK Establishment I think, but if it doesn't I suspect that those not mentioned would concur with the rest.

As tuc infers, any system is only as strong as its weakest link. That turned out to be people being forced to choose between their careers and their duty. Most chose the former, and so people died. We will go on being in disagreement on this key issue I'm afraid. Separation and Independence is what keeps civilian aviation safe. It could do the same for military aviation and thus maintain our Air Power for use in war (its ultimate purpose as you so rightly point out).

[Avtur]

I very much enjoy reading your well articulated posts and agree wholeheartedly with your stance and opinions of the lack of independence of the MAA, MAAIB, and any other acronym they have rebranded.

Is there a focussed and formal effort/campaign, beyond well written posts on a public forum (not meant to be derogatory), that is actively taking HMG to task over this scandal? My blood boils when I realize what has gone on/is going on, and I am hoping that knowledgeable professionals such as yourselves are taking these issues to task formally. Having lost several close friends on Nimrod XV230 and being proud to have gone solo on a T21 glider as a 17 year old Air Cadet, I am keen to see this shambles proved as such publically and a fit for purpose replacement introduced.

[Chugalug2]

Avtur, thank you for your kind words and support for those like tucumseh and myself who want to return airworthiness to the UK Military Airfleet. I must correct you on one point though, tucumseh is very much the professional of which you speak, but I am but a mere spear-carrier, entering from stage right; an ex-driver airframe.

Like most of my genre I had little or no idea of what airworthiness was, other than it was obviously a jolly good thing to have. My involvement in the campaign therefore began with the Mull of Kintyre thread (29 Killed) and the obviously unjust assault by RAF VSOs on the reputations of the deceased pilots.

That campaign eventually succeeded, not only in restoring the pilots' reputations but in revealing that the aircraft was flying under an illegal RTS and grossly unairworthy. Similarly the Iraq (Parliamentary Questions) Hercules (10 killed) thread proved the aircraft to be knowingly unfit for purpose and resulted in the retrofit of Explosion Suppressive Foam (ESF) into the rest of the fleet being used on active duty. Other threads have revealed the illegal replacement of anti-collision lights with High Intensity Strobe Lights (HISLs) on the Royal Navy's Sea King ASaC's (7 Killed) when two of them collided in poor visability, the known IFF lack of failure warning when a Tornado (2 Killed) was shot down in a blue on blue tragedy, and the complete lack of a safety case for the MB Mk10 seat fitted to the Hawk (1 Killed). Then we came to the Afghanistan Nimrod (14 Killed) that your friends died in. Again, knowingly flagrant breaches of airworthiness regulations in the fuel system were revealed.

So, 63 avoidable deaths in 6 airworthiness related fatal accidents with 7 aircraft lost covered in this forum alone, and then followed by the grounding of the entire RAF Maritime capability. All avoidable predictable tragedies. The solution to all of this waste was supposed to be the result of the Nimrod Review, but Haddon-Cave reneged on his duty, fudged the report and protected the VSOs who had perpetrated the original attack on Air Safety, which still renders UK Military Airworthiness dysfunctional to this very day because the cover up continues.

All of this is in the way of pre-amble to answer your question:-

Is there a focussed and formal effort/campaign, beyond well written posts on a public forum (not meant to be derogatory), that is actively taking HMG to task over this scandal?

The answer is yes, but it needs people like yourself who are professionally outraged that what was once a source of justified pride, UK Military Air Safety, could be reduced to such a parlous state. In retrospect the individual campaigns were the easy bit; ESF, Fox's Mull Statement, even getting the MAA and MilAAIB, were all tangible outcomes. The big one of course is to get Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation working to restore UK Military Airworthiness. The MAA as presently constituted can't do that, the DSA can't, the MilAAIB is already history. The only solution that can be depended upon is independent and separate Regulation and Investigation, from the MOD and from each other.

I don't take offence about your comments about our efforts on this forum, but I would encourage all like yourself to join in. The internet is the game changer. The people who instigated this scandal in the 80s/90s never imagined that their illegal actions could become the subject of comment on a world wide basis. They bullied those who enforced the regs into suborning them instead. Those who wouldn't were moved and replaced by those who would, mainly because they were untrained and inexperienced. Now those who learn of the persecution of their forebears can fight against that injustice, the fatal damage done to their profession, and for those whose very lives depend upon it. Which rather brings us back to the Mull pilots again...

[Avtur]

Chug; thank you for the informative reply. Although I understand the value and merits of a web campaign, which has clearly had the success you describe, I was wondering whether there were any other lines of attack ongoing, say for example broad sheet newspaper articles, petitions, or getting MPs on side to fix the MAA construct? Perhaps the public who do not frequent aviation forums et al may be disturbed to keep reading in "hard" media or perhaps on programmes such as panorama (if that still exists) how unfit for purpose the military airworthiness system is today, and why. When you present facts like you did, it is hard not to be appalled and alarmed. Thanks for all you are doing.

[tucumseh]

Thank you avtur.

Today is the 22nd anniversary of the Mull of Kintyre crash. Yesterday, the Coroner agreed to reopen the Birmingham pub bombings inquest as hitherto concealed evidence had been revealed. If the legal system agreed to do that for Military inquests/FAIs, it would be snowed under; but if someone grasps the nettle may I suggest starting with MoK and Sea King ASaC, where MoD serially lied in court and contaminated the entire process. There is another similarity - in all three cases the innocent were blamed. In many ways, ASaC is the worst of them all as MoD maintain their stance, in the face of written, photographic and recorded evidence proving innocence. The truth is easy. When you are up against this level of Department of State sponsored deceit, justice is more difficult.

[Chugalug2]

Avtur, you are absolutely right that once the extent and depth of the malevolent attack on Air Safety, and perhaps even more importantly the continuing cover up of that by the MOD and the RAF Star Chamber, is understood then there is indeed shock and outrage as a result. I remember my own reluctant realisation that part of the leadership of my own Service had acted illegally and wilfully in destroying an entire system merely for their own short term purposes. You will see from the list of institutions in my #2590 above, some of the representations and evidence that have been presented to date. When a QC is given clear evidence of subvertion of the regulations and turns it on its head by calling that a Golden Period you get a real idea of the mountain that has to be climbed to get the message accepted and acted upon. Similarly the media, both broadcasters and newspapers, are prepared to highlight tragedies such as Mull, but balk at spending half the programme or article in explaining what airworthiness is, let alone describing the system that is supposed to provide and maintain it, and then further explaining the systemic damage that prevents that being done. So it isn't easy, but TV productions, radio interviews, newspaper articles, have all been produced with campaign input. MPs have been lobbied, ministers quizzed and informed differently to what has been "staffed" to them, evidence presented to military and civil police authorities. As has been made clear by the tenacious efforts of those campaigning re the Hillsborough and Birmingham scandals; justice delayed is truly denied, but better late than never! Just so with this scandal, the importance is to prevent recurrence, in our case of Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents. That has to start with the acceptance of what has happened, the reform of the system so that it cannot happen again, and rebuilding it so that it can once again provide for Air Safety.

The one great thing that militates against getting all that out into the public arena is us, the aviation professionals. We all discourse with our own jargon, with acronyms that are constantly shifting so that Bletchley Park would have trouble keeping abreast of them, and starting out with a level of knowledge completely denied to the layman. That has to be overcome if we are to build up an awareness of the problem and what we think needs doing about it.

Some here will almost certainly dismiss my proposals re independence and separation for example. Unless there is an agreed agenda then there is no campaign, just noise. That is why I believe that PPRuNe is so useful. Many who read these threads never post, but may well pass on what they learn to others, spreading the word. Those who do post can fashion their style so that when they post to their MP for example, it is in a concise, informative, and authoritative style. Some MPs have already got the message and questioned ministers accordingly. There is no Golden Bullet, especially when the opposition lies, misrepresents, and generally obfuscates. Persistence is the key, and the more that join in the sooner we will prevail.

Sorry, a lot of words which generally implies little to say. We are always open to suggestions and guidance. This is a many headed Hydra that we have to slay. A few heads have already been felled so come on in and join the fray!

[CoffmanStarter]

Gentlemen ...

Some might recall that I wrote to my local MP requesting that he present a very specific question to PUSoS for Defence, Mr Julian Brazier TD, MP.

I now have a reply ...

Just to recap on my specific question (Bold) and context (Bold) for that question ... here is my original Post (2272/Page 114).

PUBLISHED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST


Dear Mr Merriman …

I watched carefully the debate held yesterday at Westminster Hall entitled ‘Future of Gliding and the Air Cadet Organisation’

Parliamentlive.tv - Westminster Hall (http://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/e3469e6a-cf30-4b4a-b0a4-808b82ec9f6e)

I would have liked to write direct to the Minister, Julian Brazier, but it is clear from his Constituency Web Site that he only replies to correspondence emanating from a Kent Constituency Postal Address. I am therefore writing to you to seek an answer to a very specific question about this issue as my MP.

There has, as yet, been no satisfactory explanation as to ‘How and Why’ the entire Air Cadet Glider Fleet (of some 146 aircraft) suddenly became un-airworthy/un-serviceable which necessitated the ‘Grounding’ of the entire fleet for some two years. I’m afraid I don’t have the detail on the original Total CapEx Spend back in the early 90’s for the 81 Grob Viking Gliders and 65 Grob Vigilant Motor Gliders, but I’m informed that the Vikings alone cost c. £7m when acquired some 25 years ago … so in total, for the entire fleet of 146 aircraft, a not insignificant original investment by the MOD/RAF.

So as a UK Tax Payer I believe I’m entitled to ask for an explanation as to ‘How and Why’ the entire Air Cadet Gliding Fleet became un-airworthy/un-serviceable.

I’m aware from Hansard that Serco was awarded a ‘Glider Maintenance Contract’ of £9.4m for a seven year period from Feb 2008 to Mar 2015. Without prejudice I ask … Did the contractor fail to provide the service they were contracted to supply, either through poor engineering practice or record keeping ? Did the MOD/RAF fail to effectively ‘Supervise’ and/or ‘Oversee’ the contractors work ? Or was it a combination of both these possibilities or were there other reasons ?

To be clear, I’m well acquainted with the detail of the proposed current ‘Recovery Programme’ put forward by the MOD/RAF, and whilst these plans are most lamentable, they can detract attention away from the specific question I have asked above.

Yours sincerely


Here is the reply from the PUSoS for Defence. I have only redacted reference to my name and address.

http://i1004.photobucket.com/albums/af162/CoffmanStarter/MODAC01F_zpsgk7yrhtn.jpg

http://i1004.photobucket.com/albums/af162/CoffmanStarter/MODAC02F_zpsccarepcb.jpg

Without prejudice ...

I intend to reply to the PUSoS, via my MP, this Month. To be clear, whilst I lament the drastic reduction in the scale of Air Cadet Gliding (when fully recovered), it is clear that cost economics (rightly or wrongly) are now the primary Drivers. By that I mean the 'cost' of maintaining continuous airworthiness of a reduced fleet (to MAA Spec) and what appears to be a desire to increase the life of the aircraft assets.

I'm still not quite sure if it was CAMO (something new to me), which was created in 2014, or the MAA, created in 2010, that detected the original 'configuration control discrepancies' ... What prompted this action ... Was it a 'Compliance/Enforcement' intervention by the MAA ... Or did 22Group put their hand-up. In any case, what went on (or didn't) prior to 2014 ... Was it the loss of experienced staff through headcount/cost reduction, plain incompetence or other contributory factors.

Whilst I won't presume to 'advise' the PUSoS ... But it seems a bit odd to me for the 'contributory parties' to 'discuss the apportionment of respective liabilities' ... that, IMHO, should be done by an independent arbiter and the outcome made public (as we are talking about Public money).

Please feel free to add on this Thread or PM me ... But I'm going to stick to the scope of my original question to the PUSoS in my reply, as I feel decisions are now 'fixed' in terms how the Air Cadet Gliding will work in the future :(

Coff.

[tucumseh]

Well done Coff.

I'm still not quite sure if it was CAMO (something new to me), which was created in 2014, or the MAA, created in 2010, that detected the original 'configuration control discrepancies'

Neither. The failure is systemic and it was noted in numerous internal MoD audits e.g. 1988, 91, 96, 97, 98...... In 1991 AMSO issued an edict that CC would NOT be maintained. In March 1999 Sir Robert Walmsley, the Chief of Defence Procurement, admitted the systemic nature to the Public Accounts Committee. Neither knew the significance of his statement, so nothing was done, except CDP reiterated to his staff that it would NOT be carried out. That year, I know all my CC funding for 2 complete aircraft fleets was withdrawn. Every last penny. If an equipment or aircraft is not under Configuration Control, one cannot have a valid Build Standard or Safety Case. It is much more than historical maintenance records. It is fundamental airworthiness certification documentation.

When MoD claim they can't find such records, it is odds-on they haven't bothered to ask the person who is paid to ensure they are retained. Phone the holder, pitch up, look up archive register, pull files, photocopy...... The MAA don't employ anyone junior enough who would know where to start.

[CoffmanStarter]

Thanks Tuc ...

Let's see what others have to contribute ... But you make an observation that I'd like to follow up by PM (not immediately) if I may :ok:

[Wander00]

Coff - well done - and I am with you on the financial point - looks a lot like "let's see what we can get away with"

[Avtur]

Chug;
Sorry, a lot of words which generally implies little to say

Not at all. I am very grateful for your, and everyone else's detailed and very explicit answers to my original question, and I also applaud Coffman, for his well targeted questioning to his MP. These were clearly the questions that were not asked/avoided at that farcical parliamentary "debate".

Since my initial question yesterday, I am quite reassured that there are many activities being undertaken to address these issues. I cannot say enough how grateful I am for all these efforts. The safety of our military aviators must not be put at risk because of systemic failures and cover-ups that are wholly preventable and immoral. Good luck.

[Chugalug2]

Indeed Coff, excellent work! Yours is an example for all by showing the concern and insistence that will not accept bland assurance as explanation. I would though remind everyone that annoying and frustrating as the ACO grounding (sorry, pause ;-) is, mercifully this is not an airworthiness related fatal accident thread. We can all have our own ideas as to why this fleet rather than any other has been grounded, but nonetheless it was the right action taken by AOC 22 Group. Make no mistake, the permanent paper trail is vital to ensure the integrity of airworthiness. Put any of it through the shredder and you've basically done the same to the aircraft itself.

Oh, one more thing. Remember that two stars and above are inviolate, one star and below are disposable. Note that when the "apportionment" is eventually handed out! Always amusing when Haddon-Cave is mentioned as the mark of quality assurance. The words "built" and "sand" come to mind...

PS Just noted your post above, Avtur. Thank you!

[DaveUnwin]

Well, I guess that the sorry saga of the ATC’s grounded gliders has just about run out of steam – and what a tragedy it is. For what its worth, this is my recent column for Pilot magazine.

Last year I wrote about the scandal of the Air Training Corps glider fleet being grounded, and wondered why such simple sailplanes had been grounded for almost a year and a half. Well, by the time you read this only a few gliders have been made airworthy, but even more shockingly the number of Volunteer Gliding Squadrons has been more than halved, from 25 to 11 despite 2016 being – rather ironically - the 75th anniversary of the ATC. Furthermore, the geographic disposition of the few airfields that will be home to the greatly depleted number of VGS’s means that – for many cadets – although gliding isn’t completely out of reach well, it might as well be. Critics of the plan (of which there are many) point out that although there are nebulous plans to utilise some of the Grob Tutor fleet to at least try and get some cadets airborne through ‘Air Experience Flights’, this is a very poor substitute for actually going solo. Let’s face it; - being flown in an aeroplane really isn’t that big a deal. Babes-in-arms and great grandmothers are flown in aeroplanes every day. To paraphrase (I think Lilienthal) "to be flown in an aeroplane is nothing - to fly an aeroplane, everything!" Everyone remembers their first solo, and as a confidence-building exercise for a teenager well, it takes some beating.
Furthermore, when the cadets fly (or to be more accurate, are flown) at an AEF, that’s all they do. Hang around in the crewroom until it’s their turn, have a brief ‘experience’ flight, then more hanging around. Whereas another of the great things about old-school ATC gliding (quite apart from the fact that a lot more cadets actually get to fly, and solo) is that by its very nature everyone's involved. A full day’s gliding was not only a very tactile experience and also quite tiring, but everyone worked together to achieve a common aim. Consequently, although a cadet could take pride in a wonderful solo achievement, it was an achievement that was simply not possible without teamwork.
I spoke to Scott Pendry at the Air League about this, and he takes a very dim view of this debacle. He told me “let’s be clear about this, the new plans are effectively a ‘bums on seats’ approach, meaning many Cadets (especially those from Wales And Scotland where all units (bar one in Scotland) have been disbanded) will have to travel huge distances for a mere 20 minutes flying experience, rather than learning to fly to solo standard. For so many young people, Air Cadet gliding opens the door of opportunity to young people wanting to fly. That the door is now closing is a real tragedy. The RAF is set to lose a ready supply of Aircrew and Officers and, additionally, the whole GA flying community will suffer due to the decreasing levels of involvement from young people.” Scott is completely correct – there simply isn’t room here to list all the Air Chief Marshals and Air Vice Marshals who started out in the ATC, let alone all the BBMF and Red Arrows pilots, or the tens of thousands of airmen and women, or even people like me – or you – who are engaged in aviation in one way or another and who first flew as a cadet. And have you noticed that there seems to be quite a lot of adverts regarding joining the RAF on TV recently, while the numbers of new recruits to the ATC continue to drop? Funny, that.
Another disturbing facet of this sorry saga is the way the VGS staff has been treated. I can’t remember who said “one volunteer is worth three pressed men” but it’s undoubtedly true, and the VGS had a solid core of approximately 4000 knowledgeable, dedicated volunteer staff – and these people have been treated appallingly! In fact, having served the ATC faithfully and diligently for many years, some only found out via social media that their posts had been dissolved, as the Ministerial Statement found its way online before the Air Cadet organisation’s did, which was very shoddy. The volunteers are – understandably - extremely upset about this, and a petition to reverse the cuts is gathering momentum.
But as much as I feel sorry for the VGS volunteers, it’s the cadets I’m really sad about. I was helping out as a Basic Instructor at Buckminster GC recently, and met a girl who had been a cadet for over two years, and had never been in a glider. I was determined to give her a good flight (so we’ll gloss over the first one!) but on the second – and more by luck than judgement - I scraped away from a rather indifferent winch launch, clawed the K-21 up to 2,000ft while she followed through, and then let her fly for the next 50 minutes while I just coached. By the time we reached cloudbase at 4,500ft she was enthralled, entranced, engaged and extremely enthusiastic! It was a great flight and I enjoyed flying with her as much as I hope she enjoyed flying with me. I also hope that she's still telling her friends about it - and I just wish that all the people who have - for whatever reason - done their best to destroy ATC gliding, could've seen her face after we landed, and then reflect on what they have done.

[clunckdriver]

Daveunwin,, well said! Two days ago I was flying my toy at a local airfield when two cadet volunteer's came to pick up the L19 and 233 which had been based there for a month or so flying local Cadets, now going to another small town to provide the same service, { via Aero Tow by the way} and yesterday the local Cadets were marshalling at the local "Fly In Breakfast" they were in sharp contrast to the kids I encountered hanging around the local mall, for the UK to have messed up such an organisation will have far reaching effect on tomorrow's society and leaders, shame on those guilty of destroying such an organisation!

[Freda Checks]

Based on the Canadian example shown above perhaps there is an operation that has been overlooked??

Instead of taking the cadets to the (decreasing number of) Gliding Squadrons, why not take the gliders to the cadets??

When I was living in France there was an operation that had a prime mover winch with a glider trailer with K4 on the back. They towed it to all the centres of population and based it on the local airfield for a few days. With appropriate publicity they kept the glider flying for the duration of the visit with lots of locals being able to benefit from a flight in a glider.

The ACO have lots of unused winches, lots of towing vehicles and lots of trailers from what I have seen of Syerston.

What they don't have (now) is willing volunteers (and gliders)!!

What a really embarrassing and sad (for the cadets) c****** f*** that will go down in the history of the Air Cadet Organisation.

[Arclite01]

FREDA

That was the benefit of the motor gliders - they used to be ferried to locations which were not as busy as main bases or to avoid exercises or to be nearer to far flung ATC squadrons.

618VGS certainly operated the Vigilant at Manston and Lyneham even though their home base was Odiham................... and 612 operated the Vigilant at several other sites.

They took advantage of local fire cover and the only requirement was a briefing facility (basic) for students).

Another example of the lack of forward thinking and flexibility being destroyed by people not really familiar with the 'Organisation' and operational possibilities.

Obviously not such a practical option for the Viking.


Arc

[Wander00]

Freda - certainly 2 or 3 years back they were still doing that with a motor glider - came to Niort certainly

[Avtur]

DaveUnwin; Good article but many Cadets (especially those from Wales And Scotland where all units (bar one in Scotland) have been disbanded) will have to travel huge distances for a mere 20 minutes flying experience

You forgot Northern Ireland.

[bobward]

Avtor,
So did HQ Air cadets.......:(:(

[Avtur]

Big time, bobward. The whole thing stinks.

[DaveUnwin]

Sincere apologies Avtur - I thought that NI was retaining a VGS.

[RUCAWO]

No it's gone ,apparently NI is supposed to use Kirknewton, staff have been offered places there, going to be "interesting" and costly getting over 400 cadets there annually for gliding....................That's going to happen !!

[Subsunk]

Dave, many thanks for expressing in a wider forum what we have been banging on about in this thread.

I'm bracing myself for the next phase in this sorry, shoddy, saga, which is likely to be official decorations and promotions where possible. Royally undeserved, but generally how MoD puts distance between poor-quality leaders and the messes they create.

Our local VGS is getting its 'Part Task Trainer' and the PR smokescreen around these devices suggests that the ACO is trying to build up pretend flying as a substitute for the real thing. There are benefits, for instructors who have lost their medical and who want to stay in the game (a bit like a battered partner in an abusive relationship) but that's about it.

Not playing Air Cadet volunteer any more, gone flying instead.

[Avtur]

Thanks Daveunwin; perhaps a few words in the next issue? Although all regions have been hit massively, NI has been completely overlooked (will refrain from using the word that describes it more accurately), and I cannot see how it is feasible for any Cadet or volunteer to travel across the water for a spot of gliding given their likely work or school commitments.

[Onceapilot]

Well said DaveUnwin. The whole saga has the smell of subterfuge to me, aimed to cut the budget. Sorry for the youth who will never know and, for those who put so much into making it all happen in the past. Gone!:uhoh:

OAP

[Milts613]

Firstly, I am shocked and appalled by the closure of the VGS's. I spent 25 happy years instructing at 613VGS. Very mis-guided decision with long term, far reaching effects in my opinion.

A couple of off-topic points though...

I am creating a montage of the VGS's that have closed and would like to get a jpeg of their crests. Any idea of how to get them.

Also, I left a few years ago, but would like to get a copy of my flying tests etc. I heard that they have been shipped back to Cranwell. Any ideas on how to get them? There is a lot of nostalgia there, and I would like to be able to show my daughter as well as keep them for posterity. Everything from my G1 ride in 1988 with Malcolm Marshall to my A2 with CFS.

Milton

[Innominate]

Milts

For unit badges, try the Air Historical Branch [email protected] - they are the official repository for badges of disbanded units. If the schools haven't been disbanded yet you'd probably need to contact them direct.

You should be able to make a request for personal data to MOD https://www.gov.uk/get-copy-military-service-records/apply-for-your-own-records.

[DC10RealMan]

Sir John Middleton, for services to the Air Cadet Corps.

I wouldn't surprise me!

[Freda Checks]

Well he did succeed in cutting the incident/accident rate in Air Cadet gliding since this debacle began in February 2014. :D Well done that man :=

[klingonbc]

Here is an idea. Forget the MOD/RAF/ACO. Go commercial and get sponsorship from business (big business) to fund an alternate organisation for the youth of the country to get airborne gliding again. There are lots of you out there (former VGS now by the look of it). Many of you will have good contacts in the commercial world. There is nothing quite like competition to embarrass the people responsible for the current debacle. The commercial world might just leap at the opportunity to invest in the youth of the country? So there is the challenge - sadly not for me anymore - but someone out there might just see a vision?

[Subsunk]

KlingonBC, the example your post puts me in mind of is the Fleet Air Arm Officers' Association, which for years has quietly and efficiently run a gliding scholarship scheme based on Royal Navy gliding & soaring clubs - as I understand it, FAAOA members sponsor a place on an ab-initio task week for a suitable young person. Often, FAAOA members arrive in their own aircraft during the course to give a powered flying experience to the course.

Cuts the flying well, well away from service politics during a time of shrinking budgets and increasing risk-aversity. Fails to keep a huge career pyramid erect, but that is no bad thing at all.

[Milts613]

Hahahaha. Seriously. Services for being "the worst thing to be involved in the Air Cadets since 1941."

What a legacy.

[cats_five]

Why do you want to start a new organisation, which will need places to fly, gliders to fly in a means of launching them, somewhere to keep them, instructors and at the very least toilet facilities? The many BGA clubs already have all this, along with an established training scheme. By all means get sponsorship to help with the costs of both flying and travel, but if you want something 'right now' starting afresh (e.g. reinventing the wheel) is not the way to do it.

[Whizz Bang]

I think the idea being to highlight how ineffective the bureaucracy and many full time staffs are. If the Grob 109B can be operated by clubs for £40-50 per hour GS courses as were could be offered for £500 each. I would love the Vigilants to be disposed of and flying within 6 months... but I doubt that will happen.

[cats_five]

That makes it sound like a vanity project.

[Freda Checks]

I would love the Vigilants to be disposed of and flying within 6 months... but I doubt that will happen. I think in a sane world this is what most of us wish.

But with the CYA attitude shown by our current VSOs they are much more likely to be scrapped with a capital "S". This will stop the skilled people out here demonstrating that they can make them airworthy and get then flying again safely.

Come on VSOs, we know you read these forums. Just prove us wrong!! Release them to the civi market :D

[Arclite01]

At least 3 years before any would be released I reckon (if ever)

Anyone know how the 'Recovery' of the other airframes is going ??

Arc

[VX275]

It would be interesting to know the Vigilant disposal plans as I doubt if any will fly again, afterall the might of the RAF failed to achieve that so what chance a private individual. Gone also are the days of letting the station fire section burn an airframe for practice and I understand that as they are glass reinforced plastic, crushing and disposing as landfill is also prohibited. A friend who works in local government tells me that the best disposal method is high temperature incineration, a specialist method that, guess what? Costs money ie 2-3 thousand per airframe

[Wander00]

Sounds like they would make good coffins for cremations.......................

[POBJOY]

ARC Rumour has it that Serco not 'assisting' SS in speedy recovery.


Those that 'can not' or actually do anything seem to be telling those who can how to do it !!


Unfortunately no one on the customer side who has any idea about anything anymore.

[ATFQ]

Here's the recent article in 'Aerospace' (Royal Aeronautical Society magazine) that a friend has just sent to me. It's written by AOC 22 Group and is titled 'Putting the air in the Air Cadets at 75'. The introduction says: 'Air Vice Marshal, Andy Turner, RAF, AOC 22 (Trg) Gp, explains the thinking behind controversial changes to gliding in the UK's Air Training Corps which this year celebrates its 75th anniversary'.

Some of you will want to read and analyse what he has said.

[Chugalug2]

The RAeS is fast becoming the voice of the MOD, a process begun by its refusal to publish a paper about Mull produced by "The Three Fellows", as "Airworthiness is no concern of the RAeS" !

[EnigmAviation]

It would be interesting to know the Vigilant disposal plans as I doubt if any will fly again, afterall the might of the RAF failed to achieve that so what chance a private individual. Gone also are the days of letting the station fire section burn an airframe for practice and I understand that as they are glass reinforced plastic, crushing and disposing as landfill is also prohibited. A friend who works in local government tells me that the best disposal method is high temperature incineration, a specialist method that, guess what? Costs money ie 2-3 thousand per airframe

The last I heard in fairly knowledgeable circles was that they were going to use a disc cutter and/or other power tools to scrap the airframes that were deemed B.E.R. This would then void the embarrassment of them re-appearing in a few months in a civvy club in good order !:ok:

[tucumseh]

"It was simply not an option to continue to operate without a safety case"

A brave statement from AVM Turner, given the significant number of his colleagues who disagree, and continue to brief against those who prefer meeting legal obligations. Notice, no mention of there being no safety case in the laughably inept MoD letter Coffman Starter posted last week; although it did admit configuration control problems without offering that, by definition, this contaminated any safety case. The reason is now clear - like the Hawk/Tornado ejection seat, there was no safety case to begin with.




"Airworthiness is no concern of the RAeS" !

Careful Chug, the last time I directly quoted the RAeS's Chief Executive, the apologists had a rant.


Someone should write a book.....:oh:

[tucumseh]

airframes that were deemed B.E.R.

If anyone is actively investigating this aspect, may I suggest you seek out DGDQA Standing Instruction 0136 and DEFCON 112(Repair), or any replacement standards. Were they called up in the contract?

Who set the BER rate? There is only one person with that authority. The project manager in the Glider project team. At a stretch, you could say his boss could overrule, but in all my years I've never known it. Anyone with this authority is required to be experienced in Depth C repair, to component level, of the item under consideration, or something very similar. That means, fitter, diag, supervisor and QC, at least. He must also have a detailed understanding of the costs involved as he must make a written declaration that they are "fair and reasonable" or "excessive". To make a false declaration is to commit fraud by misrepresentation.

An example. When setting the BER rate, is it 30% of the cost of a new glider on a one-off basis, or 70% of a new glider based on a production run of 50? SI 0136 details the authority of the PM to set this rate, and his signature constitutes a contract amendment and is immediately binding - which MoD commercial people are taught cannot happen. (Which is why they hate applying the correct contract conditions, effectively throwing blank cheques at contractors).

A lot falls out of this one simple statement.

[Engines]

Tuc, Chug,

I have already written to the RAeS expressing my concerns at the way that they are printing articles that are no more than propaganda for RAF Senior Officers. The 'Thinking to Win' article was the first one, the Air Cadet gliding article is another one, in my view. This needs to stop, and quickly.

Tuc, excellent spot on the lack of a safety case. This could be set to become an major scandal. Are we about to find out that the RAF have been flying school children in aircraft that were, by any sensible definition, totally non-airworthy? Because that's what the lack of a safety case would mean.

Best Regards as ever to those exposing the truth.

Engines

[tucumseh]

Engines

Thank you.

My take on this is that there is a convoluted history of who has been contracted by MoD. When discussing airworthiness and the safety case the important contract is PDS, not spares, repairs or production. On the others, "all" you have to do is follow the regs and normal good practice. The contracts have tangible outputs and success can be measured. PDS, to most, is an intangible. It is not volume related. Most of it costs the same if you have one or one thousand aircraft. The supply manager AMSO decision to lump it together with the others revealed a dangerous lack of understanding, and MoD has never recovered. For 25 years PDS has taken a pro rata hit with every cutback, which became (to coin a phrase) positively dangerous by about 1996. Demonstrably, 99% of the problems we discuss on here, and most of the recommendations in the Nimrod Review and many BoI reports, amount to "implement mandated PDS regs".

My gut feeling here is that, in the dim and distant past, there was a valid safety case or, as it used to be called, safety argument. Then, PDS was run down, or the contract handed to an inappropriate organisation whose contract no longer called up the regs; which were eventually scrapped without replacement some years ago. Lack of configuration control is the giveaway, and CDP) admitted the systemic failings to the Public Accounts Committee in March 1999.

This is precisely the problem the Nimrod IPT faced in April 1999 (that date again). The dreadful decision by Haddon-Cave to name and shame Gp Capt Baber ignored the fact that decisions of 1991 militated against him having a valid safety case. He let a contract to resurrect it, which he should have been praised for. H-C conveniently omitted to mention who allowed this situation to develop - instead praising it as the "golden period". (And therein lies the link to the RAeS). That CDP had admitted the failings the previous month, simply highlighted the fact he should have stepped forward in 2009 to tell Haddon-Cave he was wrong.

Yes, the truth is coming out, but as ever it is merely a minor variation on what was exposed on Chinook, Nimrod, Hercules, Sea King, Hawk, Tornado and more. Any "campaign" or letters to the media has to emphasise this point. Not a single word of this is new.

[Cows getting bigger]

tuc, the history lesson is good and for sure needs following through. However AOC 22Gp, as an individual, inherited this mess and has to try and figure a way forward. It seems to me that he is working in the right direction, yes?

[Chugalug2]

CGB, AOC 22Gp has already taken the most important decision, which was of course to ground the ACO fleet. Other AOC's may not feel a similar freedom to do likewise with the vital RAF operational fleets for which they are responsible, but make no mistake the airworthiness shortcomings that caused the ACO gliders to be grounded are systemic, as tuc says.

AOC 22Gp may well have a cunning plan to rearrange the deck-chairs for which he has responsibility, but the ship they are on is foundering. To save it needs urgent and radical action which must start by the RAF admitting that Haddon-Cave got it wrong, that his "Golden Period" was instead a time of deliberate and malevolent destruction of the UK Military Airworthiness system by certain RAF VSOs from which it is yet to recover. The MAA that was founded on the Haddon-Cave Report is compromised by that lie, which is why it must be exposed before the system can be reformed by protecting it from any future such interference.

Time is of the essence and lives are at stake. The reputations of those certain RAF VSOs should be of a secondary consideration against the security of the Nation !

[Arclite01]

Do they really believe that absolute cobblers they are putting in their about getting people in the fast jet pipeline at age 12, the introduction of 'different colour badges', the transition of Vigilant pilots to Tutor and the creation of an 'Aviation Centre' at Kirknewton ?? etc...............

The only truth in the whole thing is that Air Cadet gliding is not going to be anything like what it was................. or anywhere near as good.

Arc

[andyi]

Does anyone know the current state of the disposal of Vigilant air frames, I'd like to understand the likelihood of obtaining an air frame for a local ATC squadron for use in training and fund raising events.

[tucumseh]

CGB

The history is very important if one is to learn and avoid recurrence. The important point in all the cases we discuss is that lessons were ignored, so we had recurrence. This gliding case is nothing new. It is caused by precisely the same failings as every other case. Yet again, MoD tries to compartmentalise, and people are falling for it.

Yes, the mess was inherited. But one needs to know when it started, why and under whose orders (all well known and notified to Haddon-Cave, Ministers and the MoD), because one cannot simply draw a line and say "move forward". You are left with huge holes in the audit trail. This is precisely the mistake the MAA made, although at first we thought they were doing the right thing by ordering audits of the project teams. But, surely, the audit of the gliding team revealed no safety case? If not, then those who conducted it are incompetent. If it was revealed, then a conscious decision has been made to gamble with Air Cadet lives. Which is it to be, because either way sackings should follow?

I think we need to read between AVM Turner's lines. The man is probably apoplectic. I wonder if his article, admitting there is no safety case, is laying down a marker. Don't blame me. It is a pity Gp Capt Baber didn't say the same thing after being named by Haddon-Cave. I would also like to think AVM Turner is sending out a message to the very top - whoever thought the MAA was the answer asked a bloody stupid question.

What nails MoD here is the timeframe. Not just 6 years since the MAA knew. The MAA was initially formed by combining existing departments. They simply re-badged the people who had overseen the problems for 20 years. If they knew, then they shouldn't have been given the same job. If they didn't know, they were incompetent and no amount of training would make them suitable. This is utterly damning; heads should roll and Knighthoods and CBs taken away.

[VX275]

The last I heard in fairly knowledgeable circles was that they were going to use a disc cutter and/or other power tools to scrap the airframes that were deemed B.E.R. This would then void the embarrassment of them re-appearing in a few months in a civvy club in good order !http://cdn.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

And just what are they intending to do with this (large) pile of scrap plastic? As I 've already pointed out they can't stick it in the dustbin and hope the council can deal with it (illegal to dump it in land fill), a fire on the corner of the airfield at Syerston is likely to be noticed and the specalist waste disposal firm who can dispose of it in their fancy incinerator will be laughing all the way to the bank. I suppose they could be offered as museum pieces, but are there enough museums that will want one?

[Subsunk]

A very close watching brief needs to be kept on these airframes, if scrapping of unserviceable aircraft by any means to avoid institutional embarrassment is the case.

As far as I am concerned, any serviceable aircraft at all is pretty much critical national infrastructure - we cannot tell what kind of future leader will get their first flight in an aircraft and base their future decisions accordingly.

I can be challenged on this, but my first impression is that Vigis have been exceptionally well-cared for by their previous users and represent a good buy for clubs and syndicates. Their destruction merely to save face would top everything else so far - after all, we need some air-minded young people...

PS I'm not after one, huge bill inbound for our syndicate's aircraft.

[tmmorris]

ARC Rumour has it that Serco not 'assisting' SS in speedy recovery.


Those that 'can not' or actually do anything seem to be telling those who can how to do it !!


Unfortunately no one on the customer side who has any idea about anything anymore.
I'd heard that too. Rejecting recovered airframes for imaginary faults (eg grease the wrong colour so they said it wasn't to spec - when it was just a different make). Almost as if there were sour grapes.

[POBJOY]

TM Methinks once this referendum is out of the way certain MP's need to be brought on the case to examine the 'public spend' issue here.
This will of course include not getting a return on surplus airframes.
On the basis that all previous ATC machines have been available for purchase how can they make a case for doing anything different now.

Suggest careful watch made on 'storage facility' to prevent unfortunate fire !!!!

This is so out in the open now and there are plenty of qualified engineers out there (plus civvy Grob machines) that there is no way they can fudge an excuse to destroy them. In fact it would be a good idea for SS to make it known they will take the lot,and that will be a difficult arrangement to argue against for the Government. Remember 'ALL' the expertise is outside of the MOD/RAF so they can hardly make a case themselves.
SERCO need to be sitting in front of a Commons committee explaining why we are in this situation and how much compensation they are going to pay !!!!

[Engines]

Pobjoy,

Plenty of people need to be sitting in front of a Commons Committee. But in my book (and it's just mine) I wouldn't be starting with SERCO.

I'd start with CAS, and I'd like the MPs to ask him for how many years the RAF were flying children in aircraft that were not, by definition, airworthy. (If you don't have a full auditable record of the material state of an aircraft, and don't know what the current configuration is, then it's not airworthy). By the way, for what it's worth (and thats not much) I'd guess around ten years at least.

I'd then follow up and ask him how he knows that the rest of his aircraft aren't in a similar condition. But that's just me being picky.

I'd then like to see them get ACAS up and ask him who cleared the aircraft for service - who signed off on the RTS in the first place, and on what evidence. And how often he reviewed that release, and on what evidence, and how recently.

Then it would Chief Engineer RAF, to explain to the MPs how his staff made such a poor job of carrying out their mandated supervision and quality assurance functions. As admitted by the MoD.

Then ex OC 3FTS for the MPs to ask him what HIS engineering staff were doing from 2010 to 2014.

Then it would be the turn of Chief Defence Materiel for the MPs to ask him what his staffs were doing to properly support the aircraft. and ensure that they were being kept in an airworthy state. If DE&S placed the contract with Serco, I'd like the MPs to ask CDM whether the contract was checked by DE&S's own in house cost investigations team before it was placed. (Come to that, it would be nice to know exactly who placed what contracts associated with the ATC fleet).

After all that, I'd like to see the MPs ask SERCO about the contract that they signed, how it was supervised, and what controls the RAF and the MoD (DES) placed on them. And what rates they charged and how much profit they made.

I must declare an (old) interest. In a previous appointment I was responsible for supervising a Serco contract to carry out deep maintenance on front line aircraft - we had some initial issues when the contract was starting up, but because I had a team of experienced engineers to help me, we were able to get a very good service out of Serco. Contractorisation does not equal problems.

I am afraid that in suspect that there will be a determined PR effort by the RAF to shift the focus of interest on to the contractors. This is a full blown scandal and people will be running for cover.

Best regards as ever to those fixing the fleet and getting the Cadets safely back in the air,

Engines

[Freda Checks]

I'd start with CAS, and I'd like the MPs to ask him for how many years the RAF were flying children in aircraft that were not, by definition, airworthy. (If you don't have a full auditable record of the material state of an aircraft, and don't know what the current configuration is, then it's not airworthy). By the way, for what it's worth (and thats not much) I'd guess around ten years at least. Methinks it would be easier to get a Van Gelder winch through the eye of a needle than see the above happen:ugh::ugh:

.......oh, I wonder what has happened to the Van Gelder winches, are they rusting in the corner of a disused airfield somewhere?

This is what they used to look like:D:D

http://s0.geograph.org.uk/geophotos/01/78/14/1781481_19bb537e.jpg

[Mandator]

FC - they are being sold off through the MOD vehicle disposal contractor, Witham Specialist Vehicles at Honeypot Lane, Colsterworth, Lincolnshire.

This is the old North Witham airfield, so yes, you are right, they are rusting in the corner of a disused airfield.

[POBJOY]

Engines My point is that as the 'contractor' they have to accept responsibility for the situation even if they are not fully at fault.

If they had to justify the situation before a committee then they could bring out the lack of control from the MOD/RAF as a 'circumstance' and the committee could then call on the 'control body' to explain themselves. The problem being i suspect the various 'people' will have retired by now and therefore there is little chance of recourse.

[Engines]

Pobjoy,

I understand where you are coming from, and yes, I'd be wanting to make sure that Serco had carried out (or not carried out) their responsibilities.

The point I would make is that the contractor is only responsible for what they are contracted to do. I don't have sight of the contract, but I think it is a fairly safe bet that the RAF kept the overall responsibility for the material state of the aircraft, and their airworthiness.

This comes down to supervision of the contracted activity, and the application of absolutely normal quality assurance procedures - such as regular checks on aircraft condition, checks on aircraft condition when going into the contractors facility, and checks when coming out. Formal agreement on content of work packages, including modifications, and inspections to make sure that the mods have been done.

Oh, and regular checks on all documentation, especially airworthiness related records, and proper management of all the records.

The RAF and the MoD can't walk away from these. Bottom line - if you have the aircraft on your register, and sign off the RTS, you are the responsible person.

Best regards as sever to those holding the babies,

Engines

[squawking 7700]

With regard to documentation, isn't one of the issues that there is no maintenance history beyond three years old? as that was mandated by the MAA? why only keep records for three years? is it because if something goes wrong outside of that timeline then no one can be held accountable.

And as far as maintenance of these gliders and motorgliders goes, all the MAA had to state was that they're to be maintained in line with EASA for the aircraft type and the manufacturer's service and repair instructions.

Civvy aircraft have their engine and airframe logbooks going back to the time they left the factory - way beyond three years.

It really ought to be the many parents of the cadets asking the questions to the PM as, as we've seen, asking MP's gets the usual answer that everything's in hand - several thousand parents writing to the PM and (copying national newspapers) asking why their children have been flown in aircraft with a dodgy maintenance history is a surefire way of bringing it in to the public domain.

If the Vigilants are to be disposed of they would realise £15K-30K each, 20-30 sold would go some way to paying for the Vikings to be 'recovered'.

Referring to my previous post - anybody up for a lottery on when Vigilants and Vikings will be disposed of because ultimately that's what's going to happen.

[tucumseh]

Engines. Excellent as ever.

On 11 January 2000 a submission was made to Deputy Chief Executive of DPA (now part of DE&S). It broke down the entire process into the roles of each post holder; then the current status. Not one single function was carried out properly. Some were fragmented, many not done at all. DCE did not reply or do anything. Mr David Gould if you're wondering.

Don't hold your breath about CDM. He was tasked in January 2011 by Minister for the Armed Forces, Nick Harvey, to respond to formal proposals that would have resurrected the functions. He did nothing and, because convention dictates new Ministers don't (officially) know what went on under their predecessors, he was allowed to get away with it because Harvey left post. This is what makes any campaign difficult. The continuity is in the media and they can be your friend if you find the right trigger. Gambling with the lives of 16 year olds could do it. Try the Guardian (Norton-Taylor), Independent (Owen) (edit - sorry, he's now freelance) or Sunday Times Insight (Calvert). Don't go into too much detail. 1. Mention Nimrod Review and poor safety case. 2. It's got worse, as there isn't one for gliders. 3. The gamble. Best of luck.

[Engines]

Squawking,

I might be able to help clarify retention of documents here, but not much, I'll try to explain.

As far as I can see (and I'm very happy to be corrected) the main reference in the new regs for retention of documents seems to be found at RA 4813, which in turn calls out MAP-01 Chapter 7.6. The key bit seems to be 'Category A' documents, which have to be retained for the life of the aircraft plus 5 years. No other categories have mandated calendar retention periods, but rather confusingly some Cat B docs have to be treated as Cat A - this includes records of repairs. So why not make them Cat A?

There is some nonsense here, such as the non-retention of completed Lim Log and ADF entries. Yes, they are all superseded when transferred or cancelled. But, if you are trying to find out what happened to an aircraft inservice, these provide an excellent 'diary' of the aircraft history. Same for Maintenance Logs. Try working through a stack of MWOs some time.

This set of regs is, to me, an excellent example of what can be done when too many people have too much time on their hands to write regulations. I can absolutely assure you that had I submitted this pot mess to my boss for approval and signature, I would have been given what I believe is called an 'interview without coffee'. Seven overlapping categories?? Give me a break.

However, this is (probably) a moot point, as we don't actually know when the documents that related to Air Cadet aircraft airworthiness were shredded. The MoD answer carefully avoids specifying that. Were they disposed of under the new MAA regs, or the old ones? If it was the old ones, a simple guide was 'retain if it could be required downstream'. Any and all files that were assessed as 'Airworthiness files' were specially marked and controlled as classified documents in separate storage areas. I can absolutely assure you that this simple and effective practice is no longer followed in many DE&S PTs.

You are right on the money about the best way to apply pressure. Parents need to be asking why the RAF was not keeping their children safe.

Hope this helps a little,

Best Regards as ever to those working through the paperwork

Engines

[Chugalug2]

Engines, a very good post #2646, Sir. I would suggest that others read it and then reread it. That is where the responsibility lies now, in the RAF High Command, and where it lay at the very beginning of this scandal almost 30 years ago. That is how long it has been allowed to fester, infecting fleets and systems ever since.

Of course other VSOs have been before Commons committees before, and purported to state as fact that which was merely conjecture, and to state as truth that which was not. Here we have the real issue. The maintenance of Airworthiness is a very technical and defined set of procedures that few are familiar with, and many can thus be seriously misled by those who choose to do so. You can brief members of committees to your hearts content, but in the main little of it will stick, and a determined witness will simply point the finger at a junior (in an organisation where Air Commodores and below are seen as expendable) and regretfully suggest that there is the place to look for any failings. Add to that the default assumption that VSOs are men and women of honour whose word is above suspicion and you get the utter failure of HoC's and HoL's Committees, Coroners Courts, FAIs, etc to uncover the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness.

That is why I call for an MAA and MilAAIB to be made independent of the MOD and of each other. That will offer some protection at least from the stranglehold that the RAF Star Chamber has over Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation now. If any one person in the RAF leadership spoke out about the subversion that destroyed the UK Military Airworthiness system, and owned up to its subsequent cover up, then I might be more flexible in my attitude. None have, and after all this time I doubt they ever will. If the RAF leadership won't grasp this nettle then it must be grasped for them. That would then add humiliation to the shame that has already been placed upon a proud Service. It deserves better than that, much better!

[POBJOY]

Engines This is what makes the whole episode so sad. The VGS and the 'Schools' before them operated a system that was both simple and safe. In fact I doubt if there is a flying training system anywhere in the world that had such a good record. The fleet was not going to fall out of the sky and the schools would not have operated them if there was a risk as they had decades of experience behind them that kept a close watch on things at the coal face.


If the same level of capability and care was present in the full time paid system we would not be in this state now. I would say that system was safe; but only because those at the sharp end knew their business.

[CoffmanStarter]

Gentlemen ...

Further to my Post 2596/Page 130, I have sent the following letter to my MP requesting clarification on points made by the Minister in his letter of the 16th May 2016.

My eMail was dated 16th June 2016 ... I delayed posting until I received positive confirmation that my MP had received my communication.

PUBLISHED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST



WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Your Ref: XXXXXXX
MOD Ref: XXXXXXX


Dear Mr. Merrimen,

Air Cadet Glider Fleet

Firstly, I’d like to thank both you and the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for your replies to my original correspondence dated 14th April 2016. As invited by you, I have now considered the Minister’s comments and feel I must respond and seek further answers from him, via your office.

The MOD has invested a significant sum of Public Money in a fleet of some 146 Grob Viking Gliders and Grob Vigilant Motor Gliders for use by the Air Cadet Organisation. I think I am correct in assuming these aircraft are subject to Military airworthiness regulations. The Minister mentioned the ‘Configuration’ state and I understand this to mean that being both ‘Correct and Maintained’ is a prerequisite to the aircraft being considered airworthy. It is equally important that the information about the 'Material' state of the aircraft is collected and retained, and I am disappointed that in this case the records would seem to have been destroyed. May I ask when this was discovered and what action is being taken to prevent recurrence?

Turning now to related Public Domain information, I note from the minutes of the Public Accounts Committee, which sat in March 1999, some eight or nine years after the Release to Service of the Grob Viking and Vigilant, that the question of a lack of ‘Configuration Control’ is publicly aired.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmpubacc/300/9030301.htm

So when the Minister mentions ‘Configuration Control Discrepancies’ in his third paragraph, I feel compelled to ask what protocol was adopted for the Air Cadet Glider Fleet from its inception? Particularly so, as some limited research of Public Domain information makes uncomfortable reading on the issue of a wider lack of ‘Configuration Control’ within other MOD aircraft fleets. For example, was the configuration ever controlled, or was the practice cancelled at some point? If so, by whom?

Similarly, when the Viking and Vigilant aircraft were Released to Service, was there a valid Safety Case? If not, why was the aircraft released? If there was, when was it cancelled or withdrawn, and who approved this?

What is concerning here is that the PAC heard evidence from MOD’s Chief of Defence Procurement admitting poor Configuration Control in other aircraft. See specifically the Q&A response to Q35 on the above URL link. On a prima facie basis, this appears to have been a serious failing by the MOD. It therefore seems clear that over a period of time from the beginning of the 90’s, the original ‘Safety Case’ for the fleet became progressively invalid, even under pre MAA Regulations. If this is the case, then those responsible need to be held to account. I have read, for example, the Nimrod Review, which would seem to articulate similar failings.

In the above context, I note the comment made recently by Air Vice Marshal Andrew Turner CBE, MA, MSc, BA, FRAeS FCMI, RAF, AOC 22 Group, in his paper published by the RAeS in their ‘Aerospace’ magazine.

"It was simply not an option to continue to operate without a Safety Case"

So yes, while the Minister is quite correct in saying ‘The safety of Air Cadets must remain paramount’ and ‘Any doubt regarding the airworthiness of an aircraft in which they fly is unacceptable’, it would appear that for many years MOD has not implemented its own regulations to ensure the safety of the Air Cadets. My question, as a layman, is how can an entire fleet be without a Safety Case? On the face of it, this is worse than the Nimrod, which actually had a safety case, albeit invalid.

Finally, whilst I won’t presume to advise the Minister, even if the MOD/RAF may have disputes with its contractors, it seems odd to me for the ‘contributory parties’ to ‘discuss the apportionment of respective liabilities’ as mentioned in the Ministers letter. That, in my opinion, should be done by an independent arbiter and the outcome made public, as we are talking of Public Money.

I look forward to receiving the Ministers reply,


Yours sincerely,



I will update IDC.

Coff.

[dervish]

Well done Coff

[Whizz Bang]

Well done that man, it may take a long time but hopefully this is the road toward some real answers.

[Chugalug2]

Great letter, Coffman. Well done. The reply will be interesting for what it doesn't say, of course.

[Mandator]

Thanks for that link Coff.

Does the HoC debate not show the real elephant in the room - finding the funding for LITS?

[CoffmanStarter]

Mandatory ...

You are probably right with your comments for back then ... However, I understand LIS was implemented. I avoided including a reference to LITS (as it was then known) as this would have been a distraction to my specific challenge to the Minister.

[EnigmAviation]

Terrific letter Coff, will be interesting to see whether they have any credible answers to your very detailed questions. It will be very revealing to all VGS staff like myself who spent years in these aircraft - all of us perhaps mistakenly believing that our Engineering was all up to correct standards. There is a very serious case to answer both in the blue suits and the contractors departments, and as I said before, they need to haul up a lot of people to appear in front of a Select Committee who should be primed by people like yourself to ask questions and pin them down.:D:D:D

[Mandator]

HI Coff:

I agree - don't sidetrack them from your excellent letter with reference to LITS/LIS. However, it does seem to me that the airworthiness cutbacks coincided with the high-paid help looking for money to pay for the computer.

[Jimmyjerez]

Can anyone give me some infomation about mid air collision stuff - mate tells me apparently Tutor has TCAS and FLARM after accidents. VIgilant and Viking had nothing not even Mode C transponders (money?) but apparently it was mandated they had to have it all fitted before flying cadets again. Now they are doing some flying cadets again at sys-ton and VGS restarting has all this stuff been fitted now? See a lot of civvy schools got FLARM now

[cats_five]

Vikings are pure gliders, I have no idea how much they ever get out of the circuit in Air Cadet flying. The commonest device for lookout assistance in gliders is FLARM which comes in at under £600 for the most basic version - the difference with more sophisticated models is not in the FLARM itself but if it's an IGC logger or not as well.

In the many club & private gliders that have it fitted it is often simply stuck on top of the instrument cover with something like very heavy duty Velcro. It needs a 12v power supply, it's very tolerant of low voltage, the big gotcha to be careful of is that the way the power is supplied won't interfere with ejecting the canopy. In some gliders the area it's normally mounted leaves with the canopy, in others it stays with the glider.

[Arclite01]

Jimmy

The Vigilant had a Mode C Transponder (not Mode S although the entire Avionics pack was due for upgrade to Mode S and 8.33 plus some glass instruments as I understand it)

Viking had nothing apart from standard VHF Radio (non-8.33), the dual battery pack of the Viking means it could easily support FLARM but also some of the new Mode S Transponders (low draw) that are being developed.

Is any of it necessary for the type of flying the ACO did (not does.............) ?- you decide..................

Arc

[Freda Checks]

Arc

You know that they will fit the most expensive Flarm kit and upgrade the radios to 8.33 spacing, just like they had to have the best parachutes available.

They have (at last) bought the best winches (although modded to diesel), so they will do the same for the gliders.

Would be nice to see them flying again......oh, I forgot no staff cadets to lay out the field for the newly qualified instructors!!

[NutLoose]

The Air cadets getting some air under the wings at Cosford

https://c4.staticflickr.com/8/7702/27907354835_d5de748d53_c.jpg


As to the gliding issues, as an LAE, Chief Engineer and Camo, I cannot comprehend how anyone could destroy documents pertaining to an aircraft.
Civilian wise, the tech logs and work packs are all deemed to be part of the logbooks and are retained for a period of time after the aircraft is lost, scrapped or written off.. it just beggers belief they were being shredded.

I can remember when the Gliders were introduced around 1990, because if memory is serving me correctly one of the first things the RAF did was to take one and cut access holes into the wings to inspect the structure, this wrote it off in the military eyes so it was disposed off cheaply, I knew the person who bought it and he carried out perfectly legal repairs to this new glider and If I remember correctly registered it.

.

[tucumseh]

Nutloose

I agree. I always thought that those who destroyed such records (to conceal embarrassing truths) got away with it precisely because it was so unthinkable that nobody guarded against it. After one fatal accident in 2003, the BoI report prompted such panic there was wholesale destruction of files. You can see the same panic seeping through this case. Maintenance records? They are money in the bank. I think MoD doth protest too much in the letter to Coffman.

[Engines]

Nut, Coff and Others,

The letter from Julian Brazier was trying to shut down further questions. I've seen a few like it in my time, and it's always worth reading them carefully to see what's been left out. Follow on questions then arise.

The reference to documentation being 'inadvertently' destroyed raises an obvious one. Who authorised the destruction? Because destruction of ANY document requires a deliberate and documented decision, which should also have been countersigned by an appropriate officer (or civil servant). Did this happen? Or was there a breakdown in the systems being used to handle airworthiness documentation? By the way, I pose this question in a rhetorical sense - many people who have worked in DE&S recently know that this breakdown occurred some while back. I have personally seen airworthiness files (marked as such with a big sticker) stored in unlocked drawers, being handed around an open office with no control or records of who had them, or what was in them.

Doing this stuff right is just so easy that it beggared (my) belief that it wasn't being done. What was even worse was that the (quite junior) officer responsible for these files didn't even known that they shouldn't have been handled that way.

Well done Coff.

Best Regards as ever to those asking the questions,

Engines

[tucumseh]

Well said Engines.

MoD's letter presupposes only MoD had a copy of the documents. This is seldom the case. Design Authorities are paid to retain insurance copies of much of the airworthiness audit trail. The same contract maintains the safety case. Lord Philip knew what to do. He simply got in touch with retirees who had followed instructions and kept their own copies of documents they'd signed. This won't be possible with all documents, but the rules allow one to make an engineering judgement on the evidence available.

MoD will go to extraordinary lengths to perpetuate the lie. On a number of occasions I've reached the situation above, only for MoD to claim the produced documents do not exist - so they must be forgeries. On one unforgettable occasion a Gp Capt even denied the existence of the aircraft under discussion, when his department (in AML at RAF Wyton) was caught red-handed destroying files. We fell about laughing as there was a photo of the aircraft on the wall behind him. (Nimrod R). At the same meeting, it was put to him that his department had actually scrapped Reference Systems (fundamental to functional safety and, hence, a valid safety case). His reply was that the company (GEC-Marconi Secure Systems in Basildon) had stolen them and the police should be called. GEC promptly produced the letter telling them to break down the rigs and return them to 14MU, and the resultant delivery notes. You really can't make this stuff up.

[Engines]

I'd like to clarify my thoughts on the documentation angle here, but first a sincere 'well done' to Coffman Starter for keeping the pressure on.

The basic fact here is that the RAF has shown itself unable to properly manage the airworthiness of a fleet of basic and uncomplicated commercially sourced aircraft. In issues like this, there are often two scenarios to consider - I often called them 'Marx Brothers' or 'Machiavelli'.

In the 'Machiavelli' scenario, records have been deliberately destroyed to protect those who failed to manage the aircraft properly. In the 'Marx Brothers' scenario, the records have ben inadvertently destroyed because those charged with managing them had no idea how to do the job, and have simply cocked it up. I admit that I tend towards the latter explanation. Mainly because I've seen the loss of basic expertise at first hand, and also how basic requirements for maintenance of an auditable airworthiness trial have been ignored in PTs within DE&S as well as at RAF departments and units.

I'd like to make it clear that I don't blame the more junior personnel involved in these 'Marx Brothers' antics. They simply haven't been giving the training or guidance required to undertake what should be (and was) a fairly simple technical administration task.

But the elephant in the room here is this. If it's a 'Marx Brothers' issue of incompetence, then where does the systemic issue stop? How many other RAF aircraft fleets now have gaps in their documentation following blind and dull adherence to poorly drafted MAA regs?

Sorry, just thought of another elephant. When were these documents destroyed? (That should be an easy one to answer, as there will be destruction certificates - won't there?). So, for how long were the RAF flying schoolchildren around in non-airworthy aircraft?

Best regards as ever to those following up the leads,

Engines

[tucumseh]

Engines. Quite right. It is easy to date the instructions not to maintain airworthiness, as the evidence exists in (e.g.) reports from the Director of Flight Safety. But if or when they were implemented in individual projects teams is a different thing, as many simply ignored the orders, while others gladly obeyed. Much depended on the background of the project manager. In AMSO, the pressure was on from 1990, and by June 1993 any thought of a full audit trail was long forgotten. That was when the admin section in Military Aircraft Projects supporting HQMCs was closed. This was MoD's depository for many of the records necessary to demonstrate airworthiness - it was closed precisely because AMSO had chopped all funding and they no longer had any "customers" as the engineering staff had been told to get other jobs. (I left my post in August 1993). A matter of weeks later, the offices and storage facility were deserted and we could not access historical or even current records. (Little or nothing was on computers in 1993, and there was no e-mail). The staff were gone and there was no evidence they had even been tasked to archive the data. In turn, this led to your other point. There were no jobs, so no one was recruited or trained. In 1996, PE staff were thrown to the four winds, and when we moved to AbbeyWood I'd say about 90% of paper files were destroyed. On the Friday you'd sign over 10 filing cabinets to the contractors in London, and on Monday one would turn up in Bristol. It was completely random which one. The same year the Chief of Defence Procurement confirmed he no longer needed engineers managing engineering projects, so very few were left to train new entrants anyway. (And in any case, the new entrants skipped the previous 5 or 6 grades, so had no grounding and no concept of what their predecessors had been required to know. None even asked the question). By announcing this just after staff and their families had been posted to AbbeyWood, with half of MoD(PE) spending their time searching for houses, schools and the like (and, now, new jobs) very little attention was paid to the practical effects of his policy. Now and again it would be raised in Post Project Reviews, but it wasn't until Haddon-Cave noted the shortfalls that it received wider attention. Even then, he dated it to 1998, conveniently protecting those responsible.

While it would be a huge effort to reconstruct the glider audit trail, I believe it possible. The practical problem is MoD doesn't have sufficient expertise, and will be reluctant to issue a contract to those who do; to do so would be to admit incompetence and lack of corporate knowledge, which of course are components of airworthiness. I suspect a very small team of ancients are gradually picking through this, but wonder if the MAA are doing what they were advised to do in 2011 - submitting bids to resurrect the core, centralised functions. The evidence suggests not.

[Engines]

Perhaps I can shed a little light on this issue of 'documentation' - particularly for those aircrew who might be reading some of the recent posts with both bemusement and exasperation.

First, thank as ever to Tuc for another piece of evidence about the organisational chaos that hit the MoD in the 90s. I can attest to the fact that when the department I worked in moved to Abbey Wood in 95, a newly drafted in civil service 'admin expert' set a target of 70% of all files to be 'disposed of'. She then declined to set any guidelines or instructions for said 'disposal'.

I thought it might be helpful to give a brief summary of the types of 'documentation' held by the MoD that may have gone missing, and why they are important.

The first and most obvious one is the maintenance documentation. That is, the documents that record what happened to the aircraft after it was delivered to the RAF. These will have recorded all servicing (including application of technical instructions) repairs and modifications. The key documents would be the servicing records, rectification records (MF707), modification record log cards, and the airframe and component log cards. In sum, these documents assure the condition and configuration of the aircraft presented to the aircrew for flight. This set of documents is maintained by what is now called the 'CAMO' - basically, the 'in service' engineering teams based on stations and at support units. Back in the day, as documents were filled in, they were sent off for long term storage. As Tuc has posted, here's the first potential source of gaps - many have been destroyed.

The next back are the documents normally held by the organisation that managed that front line support. In the case of the gliders, we're looking here at the engineering staffs in 22Gp. These are important, because they have key roles to play in ensuring that the stuff at the front line is happening properly, and also in developing and applying technical instructions. Their documentation would have mainly been in the form of files containing correspondence, and particularly records of decisions that affected airworthiness. This would have included the results of 22Gp's supervision and quality assurance checks being applied to maintenance carried out in service as well as any that was contracted out. They would also have included records of any amendments to maintenance publications, as well as records of compliance with modification programmes and tech instructions.

Many of these files should have been marked as 'airworthiness files' and subjected to controls similar to those applied to classified information - held in secure cabinets, signed in and out, regularly reviewed and any destruction requiring special authorisation. Looking at the recent MAA report on the Hawk XX156 fatality, where 22Gp were unable to find any records of a long series of meetings related to the development of a safety critical TI, it's possible that there might be some gaps here.

The next set of key documents would have been those held by the departments that procured the aircraft and provided the ongoing support. In the old days, the procurement was carried out by the MoD(PE), and support was provided by DGSM, who became DLO, who became...well, too many acronyms. These two functions were merged and nowadays, it's the DE&S PT that holds the information.

Again, there would be a set of files recording all decisions and purchases made for the aircraft fleets. I'd also expect there to be a set of files holding key documents such as certificates of design, modification leaflets, drawings, repair schemes, technical instructions, results of technical investigations, as well as all the safety related information and the RTS. They would also hold the 'safety case' - the controlled suite of documents (almost all of the above) that specify the configuration of the aircraft, demonstrate that its design is safe and can be released to service as per the RTS. There should be a lot more 'airworthiness' files here, see my earlier posts on how some areas of DE&S have forgotten how to manage these. Again, looking at XX156, where the PT didn't even hold a safety case for the ejection seat, one gets an idea of the possible gaps in the glider fleet documentation.

In the really old days, MoD Project Offices would have held a thing called a 'Tech Data Pack', or TDP. This was a set of documents comprising drawings, certificates and technical information that were maintained by the Design Authority under a dedicated PDS contract, and copies delivered to the Project Office. Regular updates were supplied and incorporated into the TDP. As Tuc will confirm, the supply of these TDPs was one of the casualties of the spending cuts, and the responsibility for holding the documentation was passed on to the Design Authority. If you were dealing with a company that knew their way around the various DefStans and requirements, and had a decent contract, this wasn't too much of an issue. However, I could see that an outfit like Grob, responding to a requirement for a quick contract agreement (if it was an in year underspend purchase) would probably have had some issues in complying with all the MoD documentation requirements. Or not, I'm really speculating here. The real damage done in this area was the wholesale slashing of the budgets for the PDS contracts that (among other things) existed to pay the companies to maintain these documents.

Really sorry if this has bored some readers - but I thought it might help some of the pilots understand what might have gone missing and who might be responsible. My final point - this might look like a really complicated picture, and one might think 'no wonder they had problems'. Dead wrong. This was once a well understood and straightforward system. It required a bit of experience in key posts, and people putting in a proper days' work. For a fleet of off the shelf gliders with no engines, no power flying controls, almost no avionics and simple strong airframes, it should have been an absolute doddle. The RAF need to find out why it wasn't. And fast.

Best Regards as ever to those having to wade through my ramblings,

Engines

[NutLoose]

Didn't anyone ever audit them, Christ, I have the CAA visit either annually or bi annually and they audit me to ensure the records are up to date and accurate, they do sample checks throughout the fleet logbooks, calling for work packs they wish to see, then do a traceability through the stores system to confirm parts used are correct, recorded and can be traced back to manufacture.
Any repairs are looked at and if drawings are used, that they are correct and that the paper trail is in place to backtrack what has been carried out, finally they also do a sample check of the fleet, to check the aircraft and ensure any Airworthiness Directives and lifed items are up to date and current. They then do a full facility and documentation audit , to check all manuals and data is current and the tooling is calibrated and in date .
I cannot believe how lax the RAF has become, how the hell can you ascertain the current build, mod state or fit of each airframe without documentation in place to show that.

[Arclite01]

Nutty

I'd suggest 2 things;

1. That when people outsource (not just the RAF) they think that they have absolved themselves of any responsibility for the end product (i.e. they just become 'consumers' rather than 'stakeholders')

2. That actually the RAF is so thinly spread that they don't have the amount of suitably qualified/experienced manpower to supervise the contractors anymore. So they have to 'trust' them

The impact of which we can see for ourselves..........

Arc

[Chugalug2]

Engines:-
In the 'Machiavelli' scenario, records have been deliberately destroyed to protect those who failed to manage the aircraft properly. In the 'Marx Brothers' scenario, the records have ben inadvertently destroyed because those charged with managing them had no idea how to do the job, and have simply cocked it up. I admit that I tend towards the latter explanation.

tucumseh:-
It is easy to date the instructions not to maintain airworthiness, as the evidence exists in (e.g.) reports from the Director of Flight Safety. In AMSO, the pressure was on from 1990, and by June 1993 any thought of a full audit trail was long forgotten........The same year (1996) the Chief of Defence Procurement confirmed he no longer needed engineers managing engineering projects, so very few were left to train new entrants anyway. (And in any case, the new entrants skipped the previous 5 or 6 grades, so had no grounding and no concept of what their predecessors had been required to know.

"Machiavelli, meet the Marx Brothers..."

[Whizz Bang]

Jimmy

The Vigilant had a Mode C Transponder (not Mode S although the entire Avionics pack was due for upgrade to Mode S and 8.33 plus some glass instruments as I understand it)

Viking had nothing apart from standard VHF Radio (non-8.33), the dual battery pack of the Viking means it could easily support FLARM but also some of the new Mode S Transponders (low draw) that are being developed.

Is any of it necessary for the type of flying the ACO did (not does.............) ?- you decide..................

Arc
Some Vigilants had Mode C but only where absolutely operationally necessary. For instance, despite their proximity to Brize, 612 did not have Mode C transponders.
It would have been one of the cheapest mods to enhance conspicuity but was never rolled out fleet wide... despite MAC being the highest risk. A lot of effort went into Power FLARM with a negligible result.

I think that says it all really.

[Engines]

Arc,

The audit measures that Nutloose describes were, for all of my career anywhere near front line engineering, absolutely ops normal. They were carried out by ship, station and HQ staffs. What's more, they were exactly the same as the checks carried out on maintenance carried out by contractors. Nut's excellent question 'Didn't anyone ever audit them?' begs some really hard questions for 22Gp's staff. If any engineers in the RAF thought that outsourcing an activity absolved themselves of any responsibility they were ignorant of the content of their contracts, and of their terms of reference.

It's also all too easy to blame one's ills on lack of resources. Lack of suitably qualified/experienced manpower is (in my opinion, and thats all it is) normally down to lack of proper training and career progression. As Tuc has so eloquently said many times, if you make a management decision that you don't want engineers to run engineering projects, and then get rid of the engineers, you run out of experience and qualifications. Quickly.

The RAF has shrunk. All three of the Armed Forces have. The Civil Service has. It's the job of the senior staffs to manage the change and ensure that performance of key functions (like airworthiness) is maintained. Moreover, if you go out and buy what was, apparently, the largest fleet of government owned gliders in the world, it's incumbent on the owner to make sure that those aircraft are properly supported and looked after. These aircraft weren't.

Best Regards as ever to those sorting out the c**p,

Engines

[NutLoose]

It's a glider for Christ sake, how long does it do to do a physical inspection to see if any repairs have been carried out and inspect the airframe, log any serial numbers of parts and if needed send them off for overhaul or replace them on a rotating basis, similar with lifted components, if no record, replace them, they must surely have basics like tech logs or logbooks (700 Or whatever it is called these days) to go by. You would at least be able to reintroduce parts of the fleet relatively quickly, heck you could rob other aircraft that have a paper trail for some of the components until you have generated several airframes, and then sort out the others.

[Chugalug2]

Engines:-
Really sorry if this has bored some readers - but I thought it might help some of the pilots understand what might have gone missing and who might be responsible. My final point - this might look like a really complicated picture, and one might think 'no wonder they had problems'. Dead wrong. For a fleet of off the shelf gliders with no engines, no power flying controls, almost no avionics and simple strong airframes, it should have been an absolute doddle. The RAF need to find out why it wasn't. And fast.


Engines, speaking as an ex-driver airframe, the last word that would describe your posts, or tucumseh's, is boring. Unbelievable at first perhaps, but long since replaced by horror. The RAF VSOs that perpetrated this scandal achieved more than any enemy ever did by compromising the RAF's most basic attribute, the very airworthiness of its aircraft.

As tuc tells us repeatedly, the damage is systemic. No fleet or system is spared, and the very institution devised by Haddon-Cave to cure the Service of this ill is itself compromised and by H-C himself. By not telling the truth, that this was a deliberate and malevolent attack on Air Safety for short term financial return, he denied the MAA the very weapon it needs above all to destroy this canker, its independence from the MOD.

You are right to be angry, NutLoose. Cultivate it and use it!

[cats_five]

It's a glider for Christ sake, how long does it do to do a physical inspection to see if any repairs have been carried out and inspect the airframe, log any serial numbers of parts and if needed send them off for overhaul or replace them on a rotating basis, similar with lifted components, if no record, replace them, they must surely have basics like tech logs or logbooks (700 Or whatever it is called these days) to go by. You would at least be able to reintroduce parts of the fleet relatively quickly, heck you could rob other aircraft that have a paper trail for some of the components until you have generated several airframes, and then sort out the others.

I get the feeling you think it takes a couple of days... It will take longer, how much depends on what is found - for example evidence of a repair. The only way to be sure an undocumented repair is done correctly is to replace it. :( Robbing other airframes won't help unless their paper trail is complete.

[Engines]

Nutloose,

My thoughts exactly. The recovery process for this fleet should have been fairly straightforward.

The number of calendar, usage or fatigue lifed components on these aircraft has to be tiny. The gliders mainly consist of a collection of lumps of glass fibre, which I would expect to be maintained by regular visual inspections for impact image or possibly crazing. Yes, there might be repairs, but these should be fairly obvious. Again, the standard of the repairs should be apparent from a visual examination, or in extremis an NDT check would help establish the condition.

As Cats Five says, if all else fails, it's remove the repair and replace - but that's not a big deal on these airframes. In extremis, scrap the affected part.

The key point here is that recovery of this fleet would be fairly straightforward if the documentation set was in anything like the condition it should have been in. (Non-recording of repairs is something that, unless this had happened, I would have considered almost incredible). The time taken so far to sort this out shows that there could have been a severe breakdown right across the whole documentation trail that I outlined in a previous post. I sincerely hope I'm wrong here.

I'd like to see as many PPruners as possible start applying pressure across the MoD and Government establishment to get a proper investigation carried out, with the results published.

Best Regards as ever to those working through the docs,

Engines

[tucumseh]

In the really old days, MoD Project Offices would have held a thing called a 'Tech Data Pack', or TDP. This was a set of documents comprising drawings, certificates and technical information that were maintained by the Design Authority under a dedicated PDS contract, and copies delivered to the Project Office. Regular updates were supplied and incorporated into the TDP. As Tuc will confirm, the supply of these TDPs was one of the casualties of the spending cuts, and the responsibility for holding the documentation was passed on to the Design Authority.

I think it important for people to understand that these "spending cuts" were what Haddon-Cave confirmed as "savings at the expense of safety" (a line he lifted from the main submission to his Review). But it is even more important to understand WHY the cuts were thought necessary. H-C implied, and most inferred, they were Government imposed. They were not. In June 1987 AMSO developed a policy that consciously wasted astronomical sums of money; especially on avionics. Having scrapped well over £100M (one hundred million) worth of equipment (and that's just in the section I worked in), the SAME DAY it raised requisitions to replace the kit, because of course the "computer" promptly showed a shortage and contractors were screaming that we were in contractual default. Where did this money come from? It wasn't in the budget, because it had already been provided and spent. The incumbent (an ACM) left post in late 1987, and his successor developed a cunning plan over the next 3 years. In 1990 there commenced an arbitrary 25% per year cut in support, with the vital PDS activity Engines mentions (hitherto, ring-fenced) taking 3 consecutive 28% cuts. Director of Flight Safety highlighted the 1992 cut as one reason why Chinook, Puma and Wessex were not airworthy. This effectively stopped most of the work Engines mentions, and in January 1993 AMSO issued an edict that "all safety related work must cease". Completely missing the point that ALL PDS work is safety related. As I said, some tried to ignore this illegal order, which is why some equipment and aircraft are better served than others (it's more complicated by that) but his will prevailed and the HQ functions that control all this ceased in June 1993.

Nutloose - I share your frustration but if you tried to contract this, and called up the current MAA regulation in a contract, the contractor would be dazed and confused because it gets the basic definition wrong and wanders off at a tangent. As for audits, bear in mind that the first thing the MAA did in 2010 was initiate audits of projects teams. And still we have reached this stage, which tends to confirm what happens when you task malleable, unqualified and inexperienced staff to judge their own case.

[NutLoose]

I get the feeling you think it takes a couple of days... It will take longer, how much depends on what is found - for example evidence of a repair. The only way to be sure an undocumented repair is done correctly is to replace it. http://cdn.pprune.org/images/smilies/sowee.gif Robbing other airframes won't help unless their paper trail is complete. I understand that, but what I was trying to get across is if you find an aircraft that has had none recorded repairs on it, it goes to the back of the queue, you then look at the other components on it and if you have items that have a paper trail, you rob those to service items on the fleet that haven't, those items that haven't are then dispatched for overhaul or replacements ordered, you then eventually end up with parts of the fleet returned to service relatively quickly and can then start on rectifying the problems on those with repairs etc.
As said it is all a mess.

Tucumseh,
Over complication, trying to fit a square peg in a round hole, unfortunately I should imagine it is a one standard contract format that covers everything from a simple glider up to a A400.
Even the CAA or should one say eASA, realise there are differences and the licencing and approval systems differ in both compliance and complexity requirements.
Totally agree Engines, they are making mountains out of molehills.

[tucumseh]

Nutloose

You are correct but, like me, living in the past! The old regs call up 20 specs (part 2 of the mandated Def Stan). The practice, on avionics, was for each DA to have a single contract, with a series of Annexes for each equipment. So, in the early 90s you knew there were 73 contracts to renew periodically. Contracts Branch barely got involved - it was all done by the Technical Agency (the named MoD employee with technical authority and delegation). Spec 19 told them how to cost the work and format the quote (and still does if MoD would use it). Spec 20 was used to control information. Contract award, start to finish, was days if you were busy. Aircraft, rightly, were a single contract per aircraft, with (at worst) Annexes for Marks. When stove-piping really kicked in with IPTs being (re)formed in 1999, each Annex became a separate contract, taking up and wasting huge resources, both in MoD and industry. I don't profess to know much about gliders, but by the comments here I'd be looking at a single contract on the DA, with directed sub contracts on suppliers. It isn't quite as simple as a single contract format, as a contractor might have their own terms and conditions - for example, if MoD is paying for a licensing agreement. But yes, you work it out once and at each renewal 95% of the work is already done. In this case, it's a matter of digging out an old contract, or asking the company to retrieve one from archives. Either way, any project manager would be mad not to have retained a copy of sample contracts for every company he's ever worked with.

[ACW342]

Coff, Please check your PMS

A342

[CoffmanStarter]

ACW342 ...

Very happy to help get your MOD correspondence posted here ... PM Reply with you :ok:

Coff.

[CoffmanStarter]

I just wanted to express my gratitude to our resident experienced Aero Engineers (Tuc, Engines and Nutty ... I hope I haven't missed anyone else out) and Chug, who have contributed to this debate and continue to show their professional interest in the engineering aspects of this sad story. Clearly I'm waiting for a reply to my recent letter to the Minister ...

Coff.

[Engines]

Thanks Coff, but all the credit lies with you for pushing for the answers.

Looking back at this very long and very active thread, it's clear that there is a real hunger for facts. To date, we have had almost no real explanation for why the fleet was grounded, and why it is taking so long (and probably at some substantial cost) to get them back in the air. As recent posts indicate, the extent of the engineering failings (and let's be absolutely clear, this one is a pure engineering foul up) may be determining the length of the recovery. Bigger mess, bigger clean up.

There are clearly efforts under way in the MoD to keep this story below the radar, and avoid embarrassment. That is probably why the information released to date has been so sketchy and non-specific. By the way, for those who really appreciate the way governments can act if not closely watched, a reissue of JSP440 around 2010 added 'protection of departmental reputation' as a justification for classifying information. In a strange way, you had to admire the brass neck of stuff like that.

Well done to you for doing the digging so far - do please let any of us know if we can lend a hand.

Best Regards as ever to those doing the tough stuff,

Engines

[tucumseh]

Nutloose -re contracts, I stupidly forgot that by 1992 at the latest there was a database in the MoD(PE) DG Defence Contracts which held sample development, production, spares and repair contracts for each of the hundreds of contractors. (As I said, PDS contracts were done separately by TAs, basically because the work was 100% airworthiness related). The Executive Officer (Ray S) who developed it will hopefully forgive me. Clever bloke. His DG (2 Star) at the time was a jock who used to put the fear of God into wayward contractors.


Engines - I think your analysis correct. Bits and pieces have emerged. I wonder if AVM Turner's admission there is no safety case is the least of it? And similar to your JSP400 example, Ministerial briefings have to include a risk assessment discussing the possibility of the correspondent revealing all to the media or in print. It's amazing how often they say "no chance" and get Ministers to lie.

[Chugalug2]

tuc:-
In June 1987 AMSO developed a policy that consciously wasted astronomical sums of money; especially on avionics. Having scrapped well over £100M (one hundred million) worth of equipment (and that's just in the section I worked in), the SAME DAY it raised requisitions to replace the kit, because of course the "computer" promptly showed a shortage and contractors were screaming that we were in contractual default. Where did this money come from? It wasn't in the budget, because it had already been provided and spent. The incumbent (an ACM) left post in late 1987, and his successor developed a cunning plan over the next 3 years. In 1990 there commenced an arbitrary 25% per year cut in support, with the vital PDS activity Engines mentions (hitherto, ring-fenced) taking 3 consecutive 28% cuts. Director of Flight Safety highlighted the 1992 cut as one reason why Chinook, Puma and Wessex were not airworthy. This effectively stopped most of the work Engines mentions, and in January 1993 AMSO issued an edict that "all safety related work must cease".
Or in other words, it was Mr Machiavelli wot dunnit! The cover up ever since by the RAF Star Chamber has been the real cause of the continuing endemic damage to UK military airworthiness, that has stripped this nation of its Maritime Air capability, of its Air Cadet gliders, and the spread of uncharted but extensive unairworthiness within its military airfleets, not to mention the considerable blood and treasure expended already. It has to stop, Sirs!

[cats_five]

remove the repair and replace - but that's not a big deal on these airframes. In extremis, scrap the affected part.

It's not a big deal for a glider workshop with the correct information about how to repair, though it can take time. I saw an ASH25 wing that had to have a hole cut to fix a problem with one of the rods inside the wing. The hole was about 10cm, but to repair it it was scarfed to about 25cm, and there were a lot of layers in the repair. It was on the underside and the final repair was just about invisible.

Sometimes repairs show in one light and not another, or on a damp day rather than a dry day.

If the extremis is to scrap a part given you are scrapping the fus, a wing or the tailplane, that's scrapped the whole glider.

[Engines]

Cats,

Very good point - yes, repairs to structurally significant bits of composite require careful scarfing and insert repairs - but that's been true since the days of wooden aircraft. Nothing new or unexpected. I seem to remember that Grob Astirs came in four main bits - one fuselage, two wings and one tailplane. I'm not sure if they were interchangeable between aircraft, but with an outfit like Grob I'd have expected them to be. That should have been in the requirements document in any case. That would help recover a large fleet like this. You're also right that any proper composite repair is barely detectable from the outside - but it would be very visible from the inside. A decent set of flexiscopes and a hole here or there and a full check of the interior could be done without too much trouble. Or NDT. But we shouldn't really have to be resorting to this sort of approach. The real problem here is that we are talking about the RAF a having large fleet of aircraft with an unreliable record of airframe repairs. I can't stress how improbable this sounds to engineers like me. Please let me explain why.

In the first instance, most repairs to a damaged aircraft should have been preceded with an incident report. Back in the days before the MAA, the rules were fairly simple - if an aircraft sustained any damage requiring a repair, an incident report would have been raised, even if the damage were found post flight. There's 'Point One' of the data trail.

Next, a Work Order with a SNOW number plus a special code to identify it as a repair. Those details were all held on the computers at MACD, and searchable. Point Two. The mantra was always 'No Work Order - No Work'. Next, if the repair was outside the limits set out in the Topic 6, a repair scheme would have been required from the RAF Repair and Salvage Unit (used to be at Abingdon, then moved to St Athan, I think). RSU would have records of their repair activity. Point Three

Any repair to an airframe, inside or outside Topic 6 limits, should have been recorded on the Airframe Log Card - this is part of the records held by the owning unit that allow the engineers (and aircrew) to know what the configuration of the aircraft was (delivery standard (details in the log card pack) plus mods (in the log card pack) plus repairs). Point Four. Once completed, the Work Orders would have been retained then sent to storage. Point Five. Were these aircraft on LITS? If so, there would have been a Point Six.

The reason I'm (probably) boring the pants off any aircrew reading this is that there is a robust, comprehensive and (above all) easily managed system that exists to control and record what the hell the aircrew are signing out when they go flying. What we seem to have here is a situation where not one of the data sets that should have been kept were properly kept. Nor did anyone seem to notice that they weren't being properly kept. I can't try hard enough to get over to our aircrew brethren how strange and improbable this whole thing sounds. We recorded all our repairs not because we were a race of superior beings who couldn't make a mistake, but because it was just the routine, normal, easy, standard, commonplace, obvious, way we did things. Not recording a repair would have run against so many parts of basic training that I would have viewed it as 'nearly impossible'.

Something serious has gone wrong here, and very probably systemic in nature. Anyone climbing into an RAF aircraft who assumes that "Oh, that was just a problem for ATC gliders" is probably making a mistake. Let's have the facts, so let's keep supporting Coff.

Best Regards as ever to those trying to join up the dots,

Engines

[Chugalug2]

Engines, can I once again assure you that your posts are not boring but essential education to we professional aviators who are not engineers? When I first started getting involved in this campaign it was to discover that one of the first priorities was to spell out the difference between airworthiness and serviceability, before then going on to reveal the hit that the former had taken in UK military aviation.

Hopefully most here have absorbed that first lesson by now, but it is the informed posts by those engineers such as yourself, tuc, and others that give us a glimpse into the arcane world that used to ensure that, when signing for the temporary loan of one of HM's aircraft, one could be assured that those who had serviced it were but part of a supporting team that extended way back to before its manufacture so that it could be relied on to do what it was supposed to do and not to do otherwise.

That I was blissfully unaware of that band of brothers and sisters when I served testifies to the effectiveness of the system then. Out of sight and out of mind they dedicated themselves to our welfare. Decades passed as the system was refined and made ever more efficient, but it took mere months to destroy it. What was done in those bleak months was a betrayal of those who sought to protect us and those who were thus left unprotected.

It is now payback time. Many have suffered under this malevolent attack, some have even died. Those responsible should be brought to account. The Royal Air Force should stop being in denial and face up to its prime responsibility which is to defend this nation with airworthy aircraft, and not to protect Air Officers who have failed in their duty instead.

[cats_five]

The glider I was referring to didn't have an incident report. We tried to rig it, couldn't make one of the connections in the fus, noticed witness marks where the rod went through the fus, so packed it back up and took it to a repair shop who did the repair super-fast as we were due to fly a comp the next week.

Club gliders where I fly have needed repairs because someone has done a good DI and spotted an issue.

So it's not safe in my experience to assume an incident report will always precede a repair.

If you have to make a hole do to an inspection then it has to be repaired, properly. You could end up chasing your tail.

Also wings and maybe tailplanes are not necessarily interchangeable. We had to have a new wing on a K21 and part of the process is fitting that wing to that glider. Whilst Grob don't build K21s I doubt the process is different on their gliders.

[Engines]

Cats,

I'm sorry, I didn't make myself sufficiently clear in that post - my apologies.

What I was trying (badly) to say was that there are a number of potential data points around airframe repairs. Incident reports would have been one, but you are absolutely correct in that not all airframe damage would have come from an incident - my bad.

On interchangeability of glider parts - I know from bitter experience that even in very expensive military aircraft, it's not uncommon to experience a problem where parts that are designed to be interchangeable aren't - early Hawk canopies were an example. That was just poor manufacturing techniques. For aircraft built in very limited numbers, I wouldn't be surprised if wings weren't interchangeable.

I assumed that Grob wings would be interchangeable because I had been told by an owner that they had gone out of their way to move to a more 'mass production' system for their products, with tighter tolerances and the aircraft designed to make interchangeability easier. As I said earlier, anyone purchasing what was (I think) the world's largest glider fleet of a single type should have mandated interchangeability of major airframe components as a way of ensuring that the fleet would be supportable in service. That was an RAF policy dating from at least the mid 80s.

The biggest problem here is lack of information. I'll hold back on the speculation for now until we get some info out of Coff's sterling efforts. And I apologise for any unwarranted speculation beforehand.

Best Regards as ever to those who know whats going on,

Engines

[ACW342]

To carry on with Engines points trail, point 7 should be the records held by the Squadron Flight Safety Officers throughout the country, who, at least in the case of 664 VGS, will be the person conducting the initial unit investigation into an incident or accident.

As SFSO I reported on one aircraft incident and one aircraft accident, and assisted, after retirement, into a second aircraft accident. On each occasion, as laid down, the following questions were asked and investigated on - What Happened? Were there any injuries? What was the damage? And who or what circumstance caused it to happen?

In each case, statements were taken from all involved, photographs of the damage taken, and explanatory drawings made to amplify written statements. Subsequently, a report was written, complete with my summary as to the cause, and submitted to the Squadron commander who, on each occasion, accepted it and submitted the report to CGS.

So there is another way of confirming the status of all aircraft whilst in squadron service. These reports should not only still be held at squadron level, they should also still be be held at CGS. So, even if all the Aircraft Document Sets were destroyed, (and it is still my contention that those that were destroyed, were destroyed deliberately) There should still be, as stated, records at CGS. If they have coincidentally been destroyed, there should still be the SFSO's copy of the reports generated, signals sent, and results of the unit enquiry. And, of course, the wise person will retain their own copies. I consider myself, in this context, to be wise.

[cats_five]

Unlike cars, gliders are hand-made, which makes interchangeability of major components tricky. Grob might have made all sorts of soothing noises about their products & production methods (or an owner might have thought they had!), but I would be amazed if wings can be interchanged especially not singly. You mention canopies - I have a feeling they aren't interchangeable on gliders in general as well.

To be dull & nail it down, not all airframe damage would have come from a reported incident, and in the case of many of the Grob single-seat gliders, the metal frame that holds the wheel can simply reach the end of it's life even without successive heavier than ideal landings. I have no idea if the trainers have the same weakness.

[tucumseh]

The question of interchangeability (or otherwise) is managed under PDS. The top level drawings will have a series of "call ups". The Requirements Manager (or whatever he's called now) is required to be aware of the major issues - a typical example is differences in dimensions/tolerances between production runs and he has to make sure this is flagged in any proposed contract or modification submission. After MoD stopped doing this in June 1993 enormous numbers of mod sets were scrapped annually; made to fit one batch, and didn't fit the rest. And it was one of the howlers on Nimrod as the mainplanes were hand built, but RAF engineers were ignored. Nothing new I'm afraid.

I tend to agree with ACW342. Long experience tells me destruction of MoD-held records was quite deliberate. But they almost certainly exist elsewhere.

[Engines]

Cats,

Thank you for coming back. I absolutely agree that not all airframe damage would have come from a reported incident. It was my bad for inferring that this would have been the case. But please allow me to outline a couple of points about how a military aircraft should have been bought and how it should have been maintained. (If you know these I apologise- I thought it might help those of a non-engineering background).

First, interchangeability. I'm not fully sighted on the details of how the Grob aircraft are built, but anyone buying a large fleet of gliders that are designed to easily come to bits on a regular basis (unlike normal military aircraft) should have made d**n sure that those bits could be swapped around, or replaced if required. In fact, I would have expected spare airframe parts to have been bought, with the requirement that these parts would have fitted any of the aircraft. Hand made or not.

Let's look at repairs, which are clearly of some interest. First, remember that we are talking military registered aircraft here. They have to comply with a series of key requirements to enter and stay in service, one of which is a comprehensive and accurate set of maintenance documents. One of those documents is the Topic 6, which is the repair manual.

A Topic 6 has to contain all the information needed to carry out repairs to the aircraft. It will contain standard approved repair schemes. (To pick up your point of a metal frame failing before the end of its life, that would normally have attracted a MF760 investigation, the end result of which could have included a new Topic 6 'standard repair scheme' to replace the frame).

It would also include a detailed map of the aircraft, telling maintainers what parts of the aircraft are 'primary', secondary', or 'tertiary' structure. These are usually colour coded. With this information, maintainers know what repairs they can apply to what areas of the aircraft. As I've previously posted, any such 'standard repair' would have normally been documented in a number of routine, well understood ways. Any external quality checks carried out by 22Gp, or the organisation that placed a support contract, would have checked routinely documentation of repairs.

if the damage found to an aircraft fell outside the information in the Topic 6, or fell into an area in which 'standard' repairs were prohibited, any Service unit would then raise a 'request categorisation' signal to the RAF's Repair and Salvage Unit (RSU). RSU would have inspected the aircraft, developed a repair (usually with DA support) and then applied the repair. RSU would have then made the relevant entries on the aircraft's documentation. There will be records of these routines.

What I'm trying (badly) to put over here is that on a Service aircraft repairs are easily and routinely managed and documented. And controlled. You simply don't go drilling holes in the structure, unless the Topic 6 says you can. You don't no 'non-standard' repairs - that's what RSU are for. The Topic 6 should also be maintained at a standard which allows maintainers to respond to emerging 'damage events'.

I said I wouldn't speculate any more, and I won't. All I will say is that not having a comprehensive and up to date Topic 6, or not funding MF760 investigations will, sooner or later, hazard the airworthiness of an aircraft fleet.

Best Regards as ever to those doing the repairs,

Engines

[tucumseh]

This is where Engines and I complement each other!

I said I wouldn't speculate any more, and I won't. All I will say is that not having a comprehensive and up to date Topic 6, or not funding MF760 investigations will, sooner or later, hazard the airworthiness of an aircraft fleet.

Instructions issued in January 1993 to stop such work and for Service Engineering Authorities not to submit MF760As (Requests for Investigation). Most tried to ignore it and the compromise was save them up for 6 months and submit an Omnibus. Then you'd get the DA to do the investigation and charge it to travel and subsistence or whatever, so AMSO couldn't see money was being spent on maintaining airworthiness. Yes, I know, it made the audit trail difficult (which is what we're discussing here) but you either disobeyed an illegal order and tried to make the aircraft safe, or followed orders by committing fraud by misrepresentation. The point is, the information exists, but sometimes not always in, strictly speaking, the correct place.

Excellent summary Engines.

[Chugalug2]

tuc:-
but you either disobeyed an illegal order and tried to make the aircraft safe, or followed orders by committing fraud by misrepresentation.
..and thereby potentially saved lives or betrayed those who unknowingly depended on you to do your duty.

To those who did the right thing and disobeyed those illegal orders, as ex-aircrew thank you!

To those who continue to protect those who issued those illegal orders; your duty is to your Country and to your Service, not to them!

[Mandator]

For those looking for a six-drum glider winch - one careful owner:

You are bidding on Direct from the UK Ministry Of Defence an MEL Mobile Glider Winch. This is a (http://www.bidspotter.co.uk/en-gb/auction-catalogues/witham/catalogue-id-witham10019/lot-7e6f9912-e59b-425b-9ac7-a63900d09daa)

[tucumseh]

Defence Select Committee - Tuesday 5 July 2016

This evidence session will now take place in: Committee Room 6, Palace of Westminster

Witness:

At 11.45am

· Air Vice-Marshal (retired) Paul Luker CB OBE AFC DL RAF, Chief Executive, Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Association, and Clerk, United Kingdom Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team

The Committee will hold its second oral evidence session for its inquiry on the outcomes of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review for the Army. Areas which the Committee will seek to examine include:

· Progress in the delivery of the Army 2020 programme.



Here's an idea. Get an Army officer to chat about the Army, and ask the AVM about gliders.

[Pegasus107]

He does have a link with the ACO; he's Honorary President of the Hampshire & Isle of Wight Wing.........

[tucumseh]

Thanks P107. I wrote to the committee secretary and, separately, a few members. Worth a try but...

[tmmorris]

AVM Luker is the chief exec of the council of RFCAs i.e. the support organisation for reserve forces. I'd expect him to have a lot to say about Army 2020 as reserves are a rather large part of it. Cadet support is merely part of his job (in which capacity I've met him a few times). No idea if he has a view on gliding though it's certainly been discussed in meetings where he's been present...

[teeteringhead]

And of course AVM Luker was Staish at Odiham, where there was a VGS. Don't know if her flew with them, many Stn Cdrs did..........

[snapper1]

Good to see at least one Air Cadet glider in top condition.

Quote from 621 VGS Historic Flight. (I have no connection with them but have great admiration for the work they have done on this glider and the the other aircraft in their care).

''Ladies & gentlemen it gives me great pleasure to announce this years winner of the best civilian aircraft in show at the Royal International Air Tattoo 2016 - The Slingsby T.21B Sedburgh WB922 of the 621 VGS Historic Flight''. - http://www.pprune.org/members/219027-snapper1-albums-photos-picture416-13580383-898945110217562-9018246234119174928-o.jpg

[Rigga]

Nutloose said: "As to the gliding issues, as an LAE, Chief Engineer and Camo, I cannot comprehend how anyone could destroy documents pertaining to an aircraft."

From my perspective, also as an LAE, QM and CAMO since leaving the service, the RAF always disposed of maintenance paperwork that was seen as 'surplus' in that the requirements were (prior to 1999) that any maintenance records that had since been repeated could be disposed.

When the MAA was formed, this practice was still in use by most Eng Records Sections who positively and regularly shredded documents and records. Workshops/Bays were also allowed/required to dispose of records over one year old without the need for permission from anyone outside their domain. The components they referred to may still have been on shelves waiting to be installed.

When I was employed by a large contractor to assist in the implementation of MIL Part M, that company wisely opted to retain all aircraft documents for 10 years beyond the withdrawal of the FLEET. This was done to protect the company from any of the customers 'disputes'. I believe that this policy is still the case, and their records now occupy several large warehouses across the country because they didn't see the need to digitise their records.

One of my (requested) submissions to the company (and the customer) was to enable the MAA to issue ARCs (Airworthiness Review Certificates) to the fleet. the plan was to allow approx 18 months to build enough components under ARC-worthy conditions and rebuild histories on safety critical components from a known point, to recreate a parts tracking system of at least those components and install them onto post-major maintenance aircraft. At the time the LITS system was proven to be error filled and only capable of knitting the fog it generated.

Therefore creating a baseline of known history components into a 'reconditioned' aircraft with at least a best guess at its condition seemed to be a high priority.

Surprisingly (not) the plan to re-baseline the status of the fleet was not adopted.

[Sky Sports]

I've seen quite a few photos pop up recently on my Facebook and Twitter feeds, of Air Cadet 75th anniversary parades and such like. What is noticeable in all the pictures is the lack of cadets wearing wings.

A recent group photo in Leicester showed well over 200 cadets, and only 3 high ranking staff cadets had gliding wings!

[EnigmAviation]

Are we really surprised at the lack of Wings badges on Cadets when there has been no VGS activity for well in excess of two years, and fairly limited prospects looking ahead too with so many VGS Units disbanded ??

[VX275]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned the aircraft that won the best civilian aircraft award at RIAT............ The VGS Memorial Flight's Sedburgh.
I can't help thinking it was partly a sympathy vote from the judges.

[clunckdriver]

As an ex cadet living in the colonies for the last 65 years and owing a great life in aviation to the start I got in a little wooden glider in the UK,I wonder if the bozos responsible for this shambles have any sense of shame at what they have destroyed, or how many good kids denied going into aviation due to their total stupidity? Lets just get some fresh, qualified maintenance bods involved and get the kids back into the air for Pete's sake!

[Arclite01]

They don't do shame just 'self congratulatory back slapping' and the 'blame game.................'

I bet they can't believe their luck that the EU Referendum, the CON leadership and LAB leadership fiascos have cropped up. People have many other things to think about now................. this will just quietly be swept under the carpet.

and future generations disenfranchised.

Arc

[Wander00]

VX275 - See snapper 1's post just above

[WE992]

VX275 I take offence to your post about a judges sympathy. The aircraft has been lovingly restored to better than new by people that are interested in preserving their history.

[VX275]

992 you misunderstand my reference to a sympathy vote. It was not a slur on your Barge, it was intended to imply a sign of disgust by the judges at the neutering of the VGS system. Ask yourself this, would someone who calls themselves VX275 be anti Barge?

[Pegasus107]

Why are people stuck on the fact that cadets only get 'gliding' wings, what about ACPS wings?!?!

There are still ACPS courses going on, in fact uptake for these courses is strong.

Its not just about gliders.........

[Ottama2]

Why are people stuck on the fact that cadets only get 'gliding' wings, what about ACPS wings?!?!

There are still ACPS courses going on, in fact uptake for these courses is strong.

Its not just about gliders.........
How many per year as a ratio of the cadet population?
How does that compare with the past ratio of gliding wings?

[longer ron]

Genuinely interested in a high-flying career? Why not aim for one of nearly 140 light aircraft courses available to air cadets each year at Tayside Aviation in Dundee?

A further 27 places are available at the Air Experience Flights (AEF) embedded with the RAF’s University Air Squadrons across the UK. Take a look at our map to find your nearest AEF.

Yes for 167 lucky cadets it is a wonderful scheme,but it was always easier to get a place on a gliding course and go solo - and arguably a much richer experience than power flying for cadets.
Power flying and gliding are totally different experiences and ACPS courses really are for a tiny percentage of the total cadet numbers.

[clunckdriver]

When I was a young cadet the ratio of powered flying scholarship's and glider training must have been at least two hundred to one, on top of this the gliding schools were located all over the country, indeed I rode my bike to Kenley, on top of this the involvement in the total operation and the physical activity from sun up to sun down was extreme, I for one slept like a log at the end of each day and as a distance runner I was in pretty fair shape to begin with. Also this the powered courses seemed to go to those from rather elite schools rather than us from les well healed part of the population, probably not so today methinks? Regardless of these factors, for crying out load get rid of the dead wood and get the kids back in the air!

[POBJOY]

CLUNK The sad fact is incoming Cadets will never know what is lost to them.
The reason this thread has run for so long is because 'like you' and indeed me in a slightly later era we experienced a life changing opportunity without realising it at the time. Thousands of ordinary youngsters engaged in an activity that allowed them to fly a mil reg glider SOLO.Those like myself that were able to continue as Staff Cadets; and indeed Instructors, gained an experience and a first class entry into decision making and (unknown at the time) responsibility and organisation. We were given a huge amount of leeway in operating equipment and the running of an airfield so no wonder when we finally eased into the real world of employment nothing seemed impossible. There are thousands of us still out there who were given this opportunity, and are downright angry that such crass incompetence of the 'paid staff' have destroyed a wonderful organisation that was World Class. Just today i was lying on the grass under an aircraft fitting on a tow cable and thinking it all started 55 YEARS AGO at Kenley, and how lucky i was that i had the chance to have that opportunity. And whats on offer Part Task Trainers; might as well lay in a bath with a lap top, what a joke.

[Frelon]

Hi Pobjoy

While you were fitting on a tow cable I was at 5,000 feet over the beautiful South Downs of the UK doing my 5 hours to complete my BGA Silver C badge. I managed my silver height last week whilst at Aston Down! Now to many glider pilots this Silver C award is just a small milestone (stepping stone to greater things) but to me it was finishing something started many years ago with 615 Gliding School at Kenley. Took me 48 years, but I did it!!

I achieved my silver C distance (60km) from RAF Kenley in an Air Cadet Swallow in April 1968. Achieving something like this with the Air Cadets was considered unusual in that the Air Cadet gliding movement then had 6 Swallows for instructor "advanced" training. These Swallows did the rounds of the gliding schools but we were only allocated our six week "slot" every two years - invariably during the winter!!

I spent 20+ excellent years at Kenley, and like you, consider it home. I actually flew at Kenley with Surrey Hills Gliding Club in February of this year, trying to maintain my winching currency. Sadly not with the Air Cadets, their hanger looked very forlorn and unused. I looked at my log book and realised that my last flight there was 39 years ago!!

So after a busy career, bringing up a family and holding down a mortgage I am now retired and enjoying getting back into gliding after a 23 year "break".

My love for gliding/flying has never left me and is all down to the two days I spent at Hawkinge in 1959 getting my A & B with the Air Cadets. ( I actually spent five days there but did my A & B in the first two days, so did not get to fly again that week). Following on from this I managed to achieve a Flying Scholarship at Biggin Hill - many thanks again to the Air Cadets.

Perhaps we should get the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, to kick some arse/sack those responsible for the current, ongoing, debacle to ensure that Venture Adventure puts back what is missing from the Air Cadets - "Air"

[clunckdriver]

Pobjoy,Thank you for so very eloquently expressing what I and many others are feeling these days! This side of the pond we sometimes watch the BBC, last week there was some bod complaining about the youth in the UK being without direction and aims in life, no s---t Shylock! I for one would have finished up as a "guest" of Her Majesty in some delightful institute without the boost given to me by the ATC, in particular the gliding program, alas, we have beaten this to death by now, but it seems that vested interests and egos are in the way of fixing the problem. We will be in the UK at the end of the month attending the Moth fly in at Old Warden, a huge percentage of attendees at a similar gathering last year had in fact been members of the ATC and started their careers in those little wooden gliders, they were clear in stating that without the ATC gliding program they would never have aspired to owning an aircraft. Maybe we could meet there and try to get the press on side?

[Cows getting bigger]

OK, this may stick in some throats but.....

Like many, I miss the good old days chasing gliders all over the airfield (RAF Catterick), frosty mornings, winches that struggled with the Barge (even worse when the first plastic-fantastics came along), hands torn to shreds having repaired cables, wet feet, washing gliders with cold water in the dark, the cold, more cold, and the absolute euphoria brought about by a single 5-6 minute circuit. I ABSOLUTELY LOVED IT and would return to those days at an instant. But, that just isn't going to happen. Let's get over it and do the best we can, with what we have, for our cadets. If the best you can do is reminisce about the past and bitch about the various heads that should roll, then perhaps it is time to move-on. Aren't those of us in the 'front-line' in the business of setting an example to the kids?

[clunckdriver]

Cows getting bigger, Why is it not going to happen? The only obstruction I see preventing the Cadet Gliding program rising from the ashes is the WRONG folks are calling the shots,, just put the whole mess into the hands of the volunteer's who ran it so well in the past, and hand the maintenance over to one of many organisations who have a history of quality work in the glider/GA field. If the likes of my wife and I managed to run six flight schools and a charter operation, safely and successfully ,surely within the industry in Britain there must be enough talent to mange such a simple flight operation! As for setting an example to the kids, the example being set at this time hardly seems the right one.

[longer ron]

Frelon
While you were fitting on a tow cable I was at 5,000 feet over the beautiful South Downs of the UK doing my 5 hours to complete my BGA Silver C badge. I managed my silver height last week whilst at Aston Down! Now to many glider pilots this Silver C award is just a small milestone (stepping stone to greater things) but to me it was finishing something started many years ago with 615 Gliding School at Kenley. Took me 48 years, but I did it!!

I just wanted to say - congratulations on your Silver Badge :)

[Wander00]

I flew a Silver C at North Hill 3 years back, but the bl****dy recorder did not play the game. Friend in the other Junior flew his at the same time and the recorder worked! Nice to know I have flown the trip, even nicer to have the certificate! That was also having come back to gliding after 4x years!

[Chris Gains]

Some of us have tried to move on and help the new organisation despite our squadrons being closed. We have volunteered to move to those that have survived the cull. But after two months of being told of our transfer we have yet to hear from either our new SQN's or 2FTS. It seems that maybe our services are not as needed as we were lead to believe.....
Time to move on and find something more constructive to do with our time. In the words of Douglas Adams 'So long and thanks for all the fish'...

[Tingger]

Some of us have tried to move on and help the new organisation despite our squadrons being closed. We have volunteered to move to those that have survived the cull. But after two months of being told of our transfer we have yet to hear from either our new SQN's or 2FTS. It seems that maybe our services are not as needed as we were lead to believe.....
Time to move on and find something more constructive to do with our time. In the words of Douglas Adams 'So long and thanks for all the fish'...

Your gaining unit won't have been given any contact details for you, probably best to contact the OC/adj of where you intend to move to and initiate your transfer with your loosing OC

[brokenlink]

Transferring should be relatively straightforward. Loosing unit transfers personnel to new one on Bader. The paperwork catches up ...... Eventually!
.

[Chris Gains]

Coms have been attempted by myself and others but replies have not been forthcoming.

[Tingger]

Coms have been attempted by myself and others but replies have not been forthcoming.

Depends where you're trying to go I guess, either you're using a pseudonym here are aren't on the lists!?!?

[Burtonwood Aviator]

Having been associated with Cadet gliding now for some 60 years ending up with the privilege of commanding the top school in the country. It is with great sadness and disbelief that the organisation has deteriorated to an almost nil, real aviation one. My early experiences were the true feeling of flight, lifting my bottom off the ground in a flying machine that I would be controlling on my own. All this was being provided by the Air Training Corps for free. It was this experience that persuaded me to attempt to give service back to the organisation and cadets of the future. Sadly this seems to have gone down the pan along with any hope for the future. Maybe ‘Chilcot’ will be asked to do a report on what has brought this sorry state of affairs about. His previous report conclusions seem to follow along the same lines as what has happened the Cadet / RAF Training Organisation.
For my two-penny worth they seem to have missed some important points.
• Why solely go for cable launching gliders? This is a backward step when airfields are reducing in the UK and those that are open and willing to take gliding do not want cables wrecking their airfields. Transfer from Burtonwood to Samlesbury would not have taken place nor would Sealand to Woodvale be possible with out self-launching gliders.
• Doing away with the volunteer element also spells doom for a very cost effective operation. The spread of schools (sorry Squadrons) across the country meant reduced travelling time and hence fatigue. Centralising into smaller locations no matter what the accommodation, means weather will play an important part in complete cessation of flying some weekends. Ie not cost effective.
• Air experience although important, does not come up to a young person actually taking control of one of Her Majesties Aircraft. Giving them self control and responsibility for the future. Who are going to push and handle the cable-launched gliders over 2-5 days missing regular schooling? I cannot see paid RAF personnel doing this. Having new 6 drum winches will therefore be unnecessary as the manpower to serve them would not be there.
• Although lip service has been given to retaining some of the Vigilants it is obvious they will be disbanded within a short time. Who will maintain them in the mean time and if they can find someone to do this why not repair or renew them? What about having apprenticeships in GRP manufacturing employing cadets?
• Set up a proper procurement organisation with follow through procedures and monitoring systems and most importantly “value for money criteria”.

I am sorry to have gone on and vented my spleen, but I do feel qualified after so many years of involvement with what was a unique organisation.

One good thing out of all this is that all the redundant volunteers will no doubt be now joining the “FOGGIES” (Former Old Gliding Instructors Extension Society).
For information their email address is [email protected].

Please note however that the views above are not the official views of FOGIES merely an astonished observation from one who started life with the Air Cadets clad in a dog collar hairy uniform.

[Jimmyjerez]

Apparrently they've given up on fixing any more vigs and only 5 vikkings done and months for any more. Rumour around the boys from someone in the know that best case is only three schools will now come back and big cheeses are even considering pulling the plug totally and paying other glidding and flying clubs to do scholarships and stuff.

[Wander00]

CCCC -if you are on here could you please e-mail or PM me - on a different topic. Have lost your e-mail address.


Thanks W/RAFA Sud Ouest)

[John Purdey]

Burtonwood Aviator. Well sad; You must be BT; I m MJA!!i

[tucumseh]

Indeed, well said Burtonwood Aviator.

When you say
Maybe ‘Chilcot’ will be asked to do a report on what has brought this sorry state of affairs about.
may I recommend the Nimrod Review by Charles Haddon-Cave QC. In your mind, substitute "Nimrod" with "gliders" and it says it all. The necessary internal reports were written many years ago and buried, but when handed to H-C he lent his support to their conclusions. You will see that, if implemented, this sorry state of affairs would have been avoided.

[Chugalug2]

JP (or rather MJA):-
Burtonwood Aviator. Well sad; You must be BT; I m MJA!!i

Sad doesn't begin to describe this scandal which can be traced through high level cover-up back to VSO Gross Negligence in 1987. Seems like only yesterday, doesn't it JP?

[Burtonwood Aviator]

SorryI'm not BHT but PMcL

[bobward]

If they bin everything, and 'contract out' why couldn't they have done this three years ago? At least then we'd have given our cadets the chance to glide. I've now got cadets on my unit who're about to leave to go to higher education who have not had this amazing opportunity. Granted they have been able to fly in one of the Queen's machines. But does an hour in the back of a Chinook or Herc really compare?

If the fleet is scrapped, why not contract out all cadet flying to civilian training schools. All civilian FTO's are supposed to be CAA approved and audited, or doesn't that count?

There must be any number of these organisations across the country that could offer a service much closer to the cadet units than those locations currently being mooted.

Departs into back garden to dig a trench to avoid incoming......

[EGXY]

Chris Gains, and perhaps others.

I have been assured that anyone who requested a transfer of VGS, or requested to move to an AEF, was informed of the outcome through their OC in early June. This was a delay over the intended date, as a number of individuals had not provided any indication of their desired intent until then - and some still haven't!

If you have not heard, then an email to the 2FTS Admin address on the 'Future Gliding' form you would have completed to request a move will get you a very prompt response. Of course, if you didn't complete the form, which was sent to the most up-to-date correspondence address of every individual on the CGS database, then you may not have received a response.

The remaining VGS remain open for transferees, although some have proved very popular and so may now have waiting lists.

Despite his 'rumour', JimmyJerez is completely incorrect as the plan remains as per the Ministerial Written Statement.

[clunckdriver]

EGXY, your post came from Washington USA, we have a saying in Canada, "never trust anyone from inside the beltway", so maybe to avoid your post being looked upon with great suspicion, you would be kind enough to give us, {that is the large number of ATC cadets who finished up in Canada} a clue as to where you obtained your information and what you do for a living? The reason I'm asking should be obvious, especially given the fact that you are a new poster, Regards, Clunck. Ex RCAF .

[Jimmyjerez]

EGXY - sorry just what heard from old mates on messages and stuff good news that it is all still going well and what people were saying is wrong

When is date first School going to be back flying now? And when will all of them be back up and Running? Thanks for the info

[Sook]

clunk - you can put whatever location you like in your profile, it doesn't mean you are actually there. Of course EGXY is the ICAO code for RAF Syerston...

[EnigmAviation]

Well now, there's a surprise, fancy someone using EGXY nom de plume and making a post that sounds just as though it's been written by OC 2 FTS !! But just to ensure that we know that the nom de plume is just that or whether it is OC2FTS, perhaps a full and truthful response to Jimmyjerez may provide us all with some enlightenment !!

[dervish]

making a post that sounds just as though it's been written by OC 2 FTS

Exactly. Would someone please spell out in words of one syllable just WTF is going on and why heads haven't rolled due to this scandal. It speaks volumes that we have gone from desperately seeking volunteers to waiting lists.

[Engines]

Posting as a former (and extremely grateful) Air Cadet who got his first taste of real aviation at Manston on Kirby Cadets in the 60s, this is a desperately sad situation. What most upsets me is the cynical use of a well known tactic called 'deflection'.

The RAF are using a variety of channels (including, disgracefully, the RAeS) to put over a message that could be paraphrased as: "Yes, we had some airworthiness challenges which concerned us, so we paused flying while we developed a new plan to address these challenges. We are now implementing a new plan which will deliver an even better aviation experience to Air Cadets." It's really a classic of the genre. Downplay how you got to this point, stress how caring and proactive you are being, and how great the result is going to be. Use the phrase 'going forward' as often as possible. (Clearly, time travelling backwards has been ruled out). Don't use 'damaging' words like 'grounded' - go for nice fluffy ones like 'pause'.

Let's be clear what has happened here. In the 90s the Royal Air Force went out and bought the world's largest single fleet of advanced gliders (and support kit) for the ATC. The gliders were proudly listed on RAF declarations of fleet strength for many years. However, over the years these simple, basic, non-complex, robust aircraft were so badly maintained that by 2014 they were no longer airworthy. Over two years later, it appears that no more than a handful are flying again.

Schoolchildren have been put at risk by being flown in non-airworthy aircraft. Public money has been hosed down the drain (and how much exactly?). Young people who joined the ATC on the promise of gliding have been let down. But the most serious question has to be this - how on earth did the RAF let this happen? This is the most important question because this is probably a systemic issue - it could be happening to another RAF aircraft near you. Or one you're sitting in. Or one you're underneath right now.

There needs to be a thorough enquiry by a truly independent body - and I have to conclude that the MAA won't cut it this time. Why? Because at some stage between 2010 and 2014, they had to have carried out some form of audit or inspection on the RAF organisations that allowed this to happen. My best suggestion would be the RAeS, which is really independent, and has plenty of good engineers and maintenance professionals on tap. However, i'm not holding my breath.

More in sorrow than in anger, best regards as ever to all those picking up the bits,

Engines