Runway overrun in thessaloniki

[fox niner]

Reports of an overrun.
Astra airlines. Flight originated in Novosibirsk.

[Tacitus]

Rumor has it that the aircraft involved was a 738 wet leased for Astra Airlines from AMC Airlines of Egypt.

[de facto]

Did it go 'plouf'?:ooh:

[drdino]

Correct, 738 on wet lease from AMC Airlines (http://www.amcairlines.com/), otherwise it would've been a little cramped in the BAe-146. :p


It didn't go "plouf".

[Panos95]

It was a Boeing 737-800NG from the Egyptian Airline AMC operating under Astra Airlines' routes, since their airplanes were rented for Astra continuously. The airplane got off the runway for unknown reasons till now. All 160 passengers and the Crew are safe and sound. The airplane was coming from Novosibirsk in Russia under Astra 921.

source: 11aviation.com

Astra Airlines made a public announcement and confirmed that the airplane was from another airline and that the airplane's maintanance is handled by the original airline that owns the aircraft.

Now, from my personal experience, the fact that the plane overran the runway is pretty bad, because, here in Thessaloniki Airport (LGTS) we have two runways but one of them is closed due to a current extension program. So, we have only one runway in use; one right above the sea and one which' end is about 280 meters away from a highway. I suppose that the airplane stopped from Runway 16 heading to Runway 34's start and thankfully It didn't go much further to the highway.

[Panos95]

Here's an update about what happened.

The airplane made a quite fast approach (200kts) and it touched down quite late, right before the runways' crossing and he ended up spotting a bit away from the runway.

The METAR of that time:

150420Z 00000KT 9999 FEW030 SCT080 19/14 Q1013 NOSIG
150350Z 12004KT 9999 FEW030 17/14 Q1013 NOSIG

Number 1: Touch down.
Number 2: Full stop.

http://11aviation.com/pictures/2009.jpg

source: 11aviation.com (http://11aviation.com/aeronea.pl?id=2009)

[de facto]

But , the 800 does, the fastest v,ref in its class.

The -900 is.

[Airbus_a321]

this is LGTS RWY 10/28. but in the text is mentioned they landed on RWY 16. not properly investigated.

[Lancman]

It's the correct runway, the map just needs re-orientation. :)

[A4]

The pic posted by Panos does indeed show 16/34. The 16 threshold is on the left hand headland with the approach lights in the sea.

Not quite sure how you're aware that they approached at "200 knots" or the exact point of touchdown......unless you're on the investigation team with access to the FDR..... If they did touchdown where you indicate that leaves about 1400m at a guess - bit tight for a fast 738.....:hmm:

[BARKINGMAD]

Perhaps we could join up this thread with the AF Memmingen lookalike incident and then try working out why modern jet transport aircraft seem to come to grief, due to far too many Nanojoules or Ergs or whatever energy units we're using this week, over the landing threshold and ending up in the overrun?

Just a thought as I recall from memory the many fatal and luckily non-fatal overrun accidents over the last few years, since we were forced into aiming 300m into the concrete and carrying oodles of speed JUST IN CASE the wind reversed on a perfectly ordinary day............................!

When landing a Bae146-300 into Berne, the touchdown point was the "piano-keys", unless you held membership of the golf course at the far end, and Vref meant just that, not Vref + a bit of this and a bit of that!!!

Back to that darkened room to read the latest EASA proposals, thereby guaranteeing coma within minutes! :rolleyes:

[Machinbird]

Avherald report on this incident.
Incident: AMC B738 at Thessaloniki on Jun 15th 2013, overran runway on landing (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=463e0584&opt=0)
A 110 meter overrun is pretty awful.

[CG-23 Sailor]

Determining the TD point is a very simple matter but the above graphic is indeed incorrect. The actual TD point was much further along with even less runway remaining.

Google Earth is detailed enough at that location to get very good ground references also visible in the video. You can clearly follow along as each reference landmark passes the camera and the jolt of touchdown is easily noted.

The above graphic has the TD point after approximately 1000m of runway was used up with about 1,400m remaining to stop.

The actual TD point, determined by video reference to overhead imagery...
was after about 1,470m with only 950m remaining.

You can clearly see the closed Taxiway (the above supposed TD point) go past in the video, followed by the RNY crossing itself The actual TD takes place beyond the RNY crossing point about the point abreast of some airport field equipment seen near the service road.

Hope that answers the question of HOW the touch down point can be determined even though the above graphic is incorrect.

[PPRuNe Towers]

Interesting flap and canoe fairing angles in the video within the link two posts above this.

Rob

[R04stb33f]

Morning,

Question resulting from observation after watching the video (non pilot):

On this type/situation, would it be normal to lower the gear after setting a flap position other than up or before?

The reason for my question is that the flaps appeared to be stowed at the start of the vid, then from when they start moving, the runway is visible 29 seconds after, then touchdown at about 41 seconds...

How long does it take to get the gear down, locked and confirmed?

As pax, I have always noticed flaps being deployed before gear. (appearences only due to being in the back...) and in the vid it looks a tad... rushed

[BOAC]

They all clap - don't you love it?

Anyone want to guess the flap setting? I'm pretty sure it deploys further during the landing roll too.

[The Ancient Geek]

When will these eeejits learn to go around at the first suspicion that all is not well ?.

It seems to me that there must be some serious questions about both training and culture.

[M.Mouse]

Question resulting from observation after watching the video (non pilot):

On this type/situation, would it be normal to lower the gear after setting a flap position other than up or before?

The reason for my question is that the flaps appeared to be stowed at the start of the vid, then from when they start moving, the runway is visible 29 seconds after, then touchdown at about 41 seconds...

How long does it take to get the gear down, locked and confirmed?

As pax, I have always noticed flaps being deployed before gear. (appearences only due to being in the back...) and in the vid it looks a tad... rushed


Gear creates drag and drag requires power (fuel) to overcome,
Aeroplane wings are designed to be efficient at high speed.
The speed needed to fly with a clean (i.e. no flaps) wing is too high for landing.


So with those facts in mind wing high lift devices (flaps, slats, etc.) are used to allow the wing to generate sufficient lift at slower speeds.

The general procedure is to reduce speed at an appropriate distance from the runway extending flaps as required to facilitate that speed reduction. Gear is lowered, generally, at 1500' at the latest but often earlier. The final speed reduction and selection of landing flaps occurs shortly thereafter.

The last stages of flap create very high drag and are only used for landing. The aircraft I fly will give a warning if the last stages of flap are selected with the gear not down.

The large amount of drag created by landing flaps and gear down needs considerable power to overcome therefore gear and landing flaps are selected as late as is compatible with reducing speed and being in a stable approach configuration at a pre-determined height above the runway. Different airlines use different 'gates' but in my company the requirement is to be stable (there is a definition for stable) by 1,000'.

When I first joined my company we were shown an excellent video made by two trainers where they enacted a typical 'rushed approach'. It was very funny but an excellent teaching aid. The company had realised a long time ago how important it was to be stable on the approach to avoid just the very incident which started this thread.

There are many reasons to end up high and fast. Some can be caused by ATC restrictions or changes, some by pilot's lack of situational awareness. Whatever the reason jet aircraft take time and distance to slow down. The sin is not in ending up high and fast but pressing on despite the instability and not going around at a suitably early point.

The consequences in this case were mostly embarrassment and an airport closure but so often we see massive damage and loss of life which could so easily be avoided.

[skianyn vannin]

Perhaps they went to the Indonesian school of 737 flying. Flap 5 and Vref 220kts?

[The Ancient Geek]

The sin is not in ending up high and fast but pressing on despite the instability and not going around at a suitably early point.Precisely.
Modern aircraft even have a TOGA button to make it easier. In my day we were always fully briefed and on a hair trigger for a go around. Actual go arounds were almost always wildlife related but that was Africa. The principle remains the same though, anything that can go wrong eventually will go wrong so best to be prepared and be abort minded rather than suffer the consequences of getthereitis.

[Panos95]

Here's a video of the landing.

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=540360116028895

[BOAC]

Anyone want to guess the flap setting? - since no-one has taken up the challenge, I'll open with 15? Possibly a blow-back to 25?

[Tiennetti]

Around a the minute 01:00 you can see some land with a soccer field below the wing.
That is KalaMaria, and the Soccer field is around 3.2NM on final 16... and in the video it still looks like a clean wing :eek::ugh:

Enough said

[fireflybob]

BOAC - your estimate seconded by me!

[BARKINGMAD]

Doesn't look anywhere near F15.

I'd put my fiver on F5, there's barely any TE deflection nor droop of the canoe fairings.

Maybe it's a new low drag cheap fuel approach??

[Speed of Sound]

Actual TD point shown by yellow dot! :eek:

http://i1280.photobucket.com/albums/a481/SoS57/thes_zpsc3d446f8.jpg

[BOAC]

Ignoring the airmanship bits here, it speaks well for the stopping power of Fluf.

[Local Variation]

Maybe that's what they were applauding :\

Good job they weren't going t'other way !!

[Doors to Automatic]

......or landing in Heraklion!!!

[JanetFlight]

KMbwIARkZec

For those who dont own a FB account :cool:

BTW...few hours later again on air..?:rolleyes:

[fotoguzzi]

@CG-23 Sailor: Here is a clear need that Google Maps could fulfill with Google Runway View.

[Capn Bloggs]

Please cancel the reverse thrust before entering the dirt; it kicks up too much dust and messes up the video.

[Panos95]

The plane touched down where planes from the opposite runway touchdown..
The Final Approach speed was 264kts and the Touch-Down speed was reported being 200-220kts which is terribly fast, especially when you have some hundred meters left. I wonder, how -hard- is it to just go around and make a normal landing? The weather was perfect. Visibility was far. The runway was long. Why didn't they go around? Too bored to waste 15 more minutes of their life? What If I re-sentence myself and say "To waste their life?"

Except that, they landed with Flaps 15 where they should have landed with Full Flaps which is 40 If I am right in a B737. Full flaps could have both reduced speed and increase the aerodynamics in this case, but they made an AirShow-like approach, If not faster.

Here's a link from FlightRadar24's Database:

Flightradar24.com - Live flight tracker! (http://www.flightradar24.com/2013-06-15/04:10/12x/AZI921/1647f64)

[JanetFlight]

Another "famous" AMC Egypt video:

70LYVJEHxZ0

[flynerd]

But the main problem was not thr RT, but the length of runway behind them :ooh:

[Dysonsphere]

Really cant see any excuse for that perfect weather so just poor piloting.(shame to have to say that)

[Doors to Automatic]

The amazing thing about this video is that even though they landed at a ridiculous speed and almost within the TDZ at the opposite end they came very close to getting away with it! I wouldn't normally make armchair remarks about airmanship but in this case where the conditions were perfect I will make an exception. The two jackasses up front are as lucky as they are stupid! Lets hope they are never put anywhere near a flightdeck again!

[BOAC]

I wouldn't normally make armchair remarks about airmanship but in this case where the conditions were perfect I will make an exception. - could you highlight for us what you see as 'airmanship'?

[yeoman]

Good Judgement would be well up in the definition IMHO.

The oldies are the best - A superior pilot has superior skills and superior judgement. By use of their superior judgement they avoid the situations that would require the use if their superior skill.

Go around in other words.

[Sobelena]

could you highlight for us what you see as 'airmanship'?

Not screwing up maybe?

[BOAC]

With the recent AF 'approach' we are seeing more and more of bad decision making. Why? Personally I would not associate the word 'airmanship' with either evet.

[Doors to Automatic]

- could you highlight for us what you see as 'airmanship'?

Pressing the TOGA button when you have missed the TDZ by the length of another TDZ and are still airborne doing VREF plus 80% :p

[Capn Bloggs]

Airmanship is nothing more than commonsense/good [insert various aspects of flying] including decision-making, which is created/developed by experience and training. In both of these incidents, either the crew deliberately did it or more likely, bad airmanship prevailed.

[Hotel Tango]

Well, I suppose it's "poor" airmanship versus "good" airmanship in terms of decision making. Nevertheless the question is indeed why. As regard an apparent increase in frequency of these type of incidents, were there not just as many, if not more, incidents like these in the pre internet, phone camera times? They just didn't get the publicity back then.

[BOAC]

Pressing the TOGA button when you have missed the TDZ by the length of another TDZ and are still airborne doing VREF plus 80% - but don't you think the 'mistakes' occurred well before that? In AF's case, around 20,000', in this one somewhat before 1000'?

[Doors to Automatic]

Yes good point BOAC - they could and should have gone around at any point from the "stable by 500ft" gate

[BOAC]

they could and should have gone around at any point from the "stable by 500ft" gate - indeed, but that is FAR TOO LATE - let's not hide the fact that they should have 'gone round' far far earlier than that. To break off an approach when it just will not work, early - at say 1500' or even earlier - is so easy, no real need for TOGA/passengers pushed back in their seats (unless the crew cannot fly manually), probably no mandatory ASR - in many respects it is not even a 'go round' as such. The idea of the 500/1000' 'stable' gates is as a final check, not to leave everything until then.

[Doors to Automatic]

Or even just ask for an orbit at 2000 feet. I can't imagine that would have caused a problem at Thessalonki?

[squarehole]

I'm not a pilot but Is there any chance the flap load relief was in action a lot here? Even with the spoilers up at the start they just seemed to be fighting an ever growing battle to lose energy. Very hard to grasp why they didn't just fire back around and try again. Maybe a case of "nearly-home-itis" ?

[PieterPan]

If I'm not mistaken it only acts at higher flaps settings. To my untrained eye it seems they never got this far.

The Boeing 737 Technical Site (http://www.b737.org.uk/flightcontrols.htm)
A flap load limiter (-3/4/500) / flaps/slats electronics unit (-NG) will automatically retract the flaps from 40 to 30 (-3/4/500) / also 30 to 25 (-NG) if the limit speed is exceeded. The flaps will extend again when speed is reduced. This feature is on all aircraft even though the FLAP LOAD RELIEF light is only fitted to a few.

[RAT 5]

When you've dug a hole the primary object it to get out of it, not keep digging. This is basic of many things in life, not just aviating. However, aviating, or anything defying mother nature, tends to have a hidden big bite. Evidently, and how on earth, as it seems quite a long approach path over the sea, did they not make room and manoeuvre. At some point, a long way out, they were on the edge of a hole. They then stepped into it. Now was a good time to think this is not a comfortable place to be, but they kept digging. B738 offers you a massive amount of information to determine if you are good or not. You can interpret the basic numbers and see where you are, or the VNAV deviation gives a clue: that plus they were visual. It's mind boggling as to how they could not realise they were getting deeper in the poo. What is more staggering, considering all the publicity over the past few years of similar events, is that the F/O still did not howl and scream. There are 2 crew who are likely to die. Surely self preservation takes over from a cockpit gradient. So many prangs because the F/O was passive. I thought airmen were supposed to learn from previous mistakes and airlines had a duty to inform crews of others' failing so as to avoid them in-house. Either there was a macho dictator in LHS, or the company culture is gravely at fault. The relevant XAA, both of the airline and the charterer now has to take responsibility for its own future actions. There has to be an investigation of behind the scenes and not just the up-front cause. i.e. pilot error. too much energy. That would be a white-wash.
It has been said that pilots are naturally cautious people and take care of themselves and the pax. it was often said by some that "if you stay with me you'll be fine. I'm sitting closer to the crash, so I have a vested interest in avoiding one." It has also been said by e.g. NTSB investigators when discussing such events that led to severe accidents, is that pilots are also 'mission orientated.' They can get tunnelled vision on success at all costs and miss the alarm bells that tell them it is time to bail out. Solving that one is a training and company culture issue; hence the need for an in-depth scrutiny.

[737Jock]

Did these pilots get arrested? Or did they happily fly back 10hrs later?

[iflytb20]

@pieterpan
With the SFP package, the Flap Load Relief is active from flaps 10-40. I wonder if this aircraft had the SFP package.

[Machrihanish]

It has been said that pilots are naturally cautious people and take care of themselves and the pax.
I'm not so sure anymore. Because the industry - if it ever did - no longer waits for young people wishing to pilot, and selects, but lures to squeezes each new year of birth, and won't this increase the probability of bringing mismatches up front?

Plus, the current economy seems not at all likely to make the younger speak up and ultimately risk their income, if any, when just having been lucky enough and hired.

How long until this eats into legacies...

[NinER fIveR]

the only reasons that i can think of for having such an overwhelming urge to be on the ground are fire and fuel.

there was no fire, so.....

[737Jock]

I doubt they had Flaps 10 out, looks like 5 to me.

[Speed of Sound]

the only reasons that i can think of for having such an overwhelming urge to be on the ground are fire and fuel.

there was no fire, so.....

Unless the fuel problem developed very late in the descent, a crew with possible fuel problems would have made certain that their approach was stable enough to minimise the chance of a go around being required. :confused:

[Thunderbirdsix]

Can somone here explain how this aircraft was able to fly again ten hours after the overrun, did 737 Engineers check it out to fly, surely after going off the runway and for a good distance on grass it must have required some technical inspection, I would not have liked to be going back in that aircraft

[BOAC]

Never mind the 'aircraft' - who flew the **** thing?

[mitrosft]

Pilot command to PAX was in English:"Remain seated" so they were not Russian pilots for sure.

[JanetFlight]

Pilot command to PAX was in English:"Remain seated" so they were not Russian pilots for sure.

Nop...it seems both egyptian as the company AMC itself...BTW:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/462841-amc-airlines-737-800-paris-cdg-aug-16-2008-a.html

[No Fly Zone]

Whatever happened to STABLE approaches and Go Arounds?

[Green Guard]

AMC stable approach ? Wasn't it AMC stable landing MD80 few years ago into Istambul airport:\

[FullWings]

What's interesting is that the video shows partial speedbrake for a while, so there must have been some recognition of the energy state. Unfortunately, it retracts and they continue clean towards their fate.

If they'd deployed full speedbrake, they might have stopped before the end. OK, it would still have been a massively high energy approach and the only sensible option would have been to go-around. Maybe this result was better as it puts the spotlight on this operation and will lead to an investigation, rather than getting away with it. I'd guess AMC don't have any sort of FOQA program...

What's the gear deployment limit on the 737-8? From others' calculations, they must have been pretty close to it (or above).

[BOAC]

Whatever happened to STABLE approaches and Go Arounds? - while of course you are quite correct to ask, as with the AF Tunis cock-up, these 'gates' are the merely 'long-stops' in what should be a continual review of progress and the worrying thing in both approaches is that this did not happen.

Fullwings - Flap 1 is 250kts, gear 270kts. I also do not understand the speedbrake usage.

[Yankee Whisky]

There seem to be an inordinate amount of runway overruns taking place and this makes me think of my own experience as a glider and power pilot.
In my carreer as a private pilot I have made thousands of landings and touch and goes.
Not one of them resulted in a runway overrun. Why ???
Because, as a glider pilot, I was trained to think of the landing as the only one between success and failure, therefore, it had to be good, every time and under all circumstances !
That requires thinking and an attitude geared to meeting the criteria leading to a good landing....circuit planning, wind, pre-landing preps, base leg and finals at just the right speed and approach angle ! i.e. stabilised. What's the matter with some of our current crop of commercial pilots ! Did they not receive the proper training ? Should they have spent time flying gliders ? Should all pilots flying be required to be exposed to glider flying ? Or, what about teaching power pilots to treat all landings as dead stick ones ?:ugh:

[Capn Bloggs]

Why? Pretty simple really. Landing in the right spot on speed requires talent/natural ability, training and experience, some or all of which are increasingly missing in today's aviation scene. Throw in a bit of press-on-itis caused by emphasis on "economy" and this is what you get. :ok:

[bubbers44]

Yes, I agree, never slide off a runway because you are too fast. Landing properly means proper speed control and then you have no problem.

[mm43]

Should they have spent time flying gliders ?A good point, but cast back just over 4 years ago and a certain PF with gliding experience, managed to turn an airliner into a gliding brick at FL380.

Sometimes 'square pegs' don't fit into 'round holes' and vice versa.:eek:

[Yankee Whisky]

MM43; A good point, but cast back just over 4 years ago and a certain PF with
gliding experience, managed to turn an airliner into a gliding brick at FL380.

However, Piche dead sticked it on the deck with some blown tires !

Pearson managed all right until the nose gear gave way (he was a glider pilot)

But both pilots kept the aircraft on the runway (such as it was in Bob's case) ! ;);)

[Rananim]

We live in a politically-correct world.Airlines dont want stick and rudder men anymore.They want flight managers.Full automatics are mandated into the SOP's.Pilots never get the chance to fly the damn thing.The bean counters want free or cheap labor in the right seat and theres a waiting pool of muffins with 200 hours ready and willing to be exploited.The demise of the unions facilitates it all.
So many accidents prove the woeful state of the industry and more are waiting to happen.The AF and Buffalo crash where the pilot pulled instead of pushed,the Congonhas disaster where a pilot didnt notice that one of his engines was in CLIMB THRUST on landing,the Turkish AMS crash where pilots didnt monitor their number one flight parameter(airspeed),the countless overruns from India to Indonesia to Europe.
The way forward is to mandate a return to basics.Replace the flight manager with the traditional pilot,make manual flying with T scan and no FD manadatory,teach pilots to calculate and follow their own profile below 100 without ref to the magenta line or FMC.Teach them to fly again.These skills deteriorate quickly if not used.
Make SOP's and this QAR monitoring programme servants of the flight deck again,not the master.Pilots afraid to fly because of infringing SOP's or being hung out to dry by the QAR monitoring team are counter-productive yet theyre hailed as pro-safety.People cant see the forest for the trees.
When you see the video of this overrun or read the Air India Express accident you wonder just what the hell has happened to the industry.Where are the skills gone?Wheres the judgment gone?Who's teaching these guys to make such basic errors?

[lospilotos]

Picture this: You as a professional pilot are sitting at 18F with a great view of the clean wing as you are clearly too close to the ground for that configuration. What do you do? Do you make a fuss like you would if there was contamination left on the wing when starting the pushback or do you just close your eyes and adopt the crash position...?

Difficult isn´t it? Perhaps there is a situation warranting the non-normal configuration? But surely the commander would have informed the passengers of the non-normal situation to prepare the for the possibility of over-run, hot brakes making them stay on the runway after landing, etc etc, or?

[despegue]

Rananim,

Maybe SOME airlines do not authorize manual flying and raw data, but those with standards DO encourage raw data flying.
Any airline forbidding this in their SOP is a danger in the air. simple as that.

[FAStoat]

I agree with a previous poster,for I spent the whole of my initial flying career being informed runway behind you was a complete waste of concrete,so always a piano keys touchdown,was the correct recovery.When I had to go back to school and get my licences,it came with quite a shock to find there was a 300 metres sterile touch down area,which was now behind the socalled ILS Touchdown Point.However I was very relieved to find on my Command Training with a full load into Humberside ,it was SOP to deselect the ILS to stop the dreaded "To Low" and flying a nice safe approach and landing.Of course this was only when in full sight of the runway and confirmed able to land!!Again when on a 737,albeit 300 series,the Training Captain decided to have a bet on being able to pull off a landing at BMX 33 with an OM speed of 160Kts,I took him up on it and very red faced he opted to ask for an orbit to try again!!Familiarity tends to breed contempt,but when Manual Flying is now so frowned upon,it seems to me hand flyng should be much more of a priority,both in the Sim and Line Training.In a previous Airline it was the norm on Line Training to fly a visual approach on Finals at 3000 ft 210kts and only when the threshold was on the tip of the nose,reduce everything and stuka it down at 140 Kts and land within the normal touchdown parameters.You had to have a very Pilot Friendly Aircraft to achieve that which the 146 was in those days!!73s have to flown within the confines of a stabilised approach,even older ones.Pilots these days must be rigorously shown the results of not adhering to the appropiate Approach Profile for the Weight and Temperature and Landing Runway Available,so that it is forever hoisted into their skulls.Then these unfortunate incidents that bring us all into disrepute,would not happen.Do they not teach simulated double engine failure glide approaches,and flapless so the youngsters get the feel of such that can happen for real??That is when runway behind you is of NO use at all!!!!!!This relates to a time nearly 25 years ago,when Aircraft on the ground or just out of maintenance were used by Trainers for Training on Type in the air,with a hot shoe shuffle amonst Trainee Crews aboard! .We were given first hand experience of the full flight envelope of the aircraft,not just shown it in the Sim,hence the fact hoisted in the memory banks that 160 kts at the OM with little wind would not make a good recovery in 10 tenths blue!!That fact stuck!That also bred confidence on Type with which subsequent First Officers could be given confidence in handling,which now seems rare!!On the QFIs course we were told"Never Put Your Student In Awe Of His Aeroplane"This might stir some thoughts by some Training Captains that insist in trying to terrorise their captive audience in the Sim!Furthermore the incident at Humberside was 3 reds 1 white which in full visual conditions I would still maintain is fine,if it can reduce brake temps and make a smoother arrival,than a controlled dumping on the ground,followed by max braking and reverse 300 metres in.If you cant produce a spot landing from a visual approach ,and you cant assess high or low key points with an engine out landing,and you should not be in the seat.The early days of the CF Fan Engine 737s the richter scale frequently went past 4.1 ,which was a precautionary shutdown as I remember,and after Kegworth Full Engine out recoveries were taught by other Airlines!

[Airbrake]

Fastoat,

Your above post shows extremely poor judgement and a distinct lack of professionalism. It is totally unacceptable to deliberately duck below the glide and by definition ignore the PAPIs and go into the reds just to land short, or to try and make an earlier exit. You either have the required landing distance or you don't.

As for you and a Training Captain having a bet on who can "pull off" a landing from an approach that subsequently caused a go around I am amazed that such attitudes still exist on the flight deck.

[quickturnaround]

Ducking below PAPI and GS normally makes a shallower approach, touching down later and leaving less space to stop...
However, it was not the case here, since the aircraft was never in the landing configuration in the first place.
Flying along the white tower it should have been already in a steady flap 5 transition to flap 15 landing gear down....
I can not understand why they did not abort this approach!
Clearly there is really something wrong with AMC standards and or training!
I wonder what the HCAA is going to do about this?? And finally if it is not time to put this outfit on the EU-Blacklist!

I hope ASTRA very soon quits the wet-lease, before they get in real trouble!

[M.Mouse]

I second Airbrake's post above.

Also above Ranamin wrote:Pilots afraid to fly because of infringing SOP's or being hung out to dry by the QAR monitoring team are counter-productive yet theyre(sic) hailed as pro-safety.

Which demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of what the system is for and is actually complete tosh. I can only speak for my own airline who I believe pioneered the system when I say that no pilot fears infringing SOPs because of the system nor is anyone ever 'hung out to dry by the monitoring team' not least because the only person able to identify and contact a pilot of a flight which was flagged by the system is the BALPA rep!

As an aid to flight safety it has proved invaluable in identifying trends long before they cause an incident. Each month each fleet pilot representative publishes a synopsis of the more notable events for that fleet. If rushed approaches or deep landings feature emphasis will be made on the importance of both stable approaches and landing in the right place. It creates an awareness deigned to avoid just such situations as we saw at Thessonaliki.

[Rananim]

Previous poster is disingenuous.QAR abuse and SOP overkill are directly proportionate to automation-reliance and for obvious reasons.The more you hamstring a crew,the less free they will feel to fly and risk losing their job by busting a parameter.Maybe it doesnt happen in BA(although Ive never ever heard a Nigel offer to do a visual to alleviate the queue behind them..why is that I wonder?)but QAR's have been used to punish/intimidate/even fire crews worldwide.
It is actually rampant in Asia.

[tony montana]

It is totally unacceptable to deliberately duck below the glide and by definition ignore the PAPIs and go into the reds just to land short, or to try and make an earlier exit. You either have the required landing distance or you don't.

737fctm state:. The PAPI may be safely used with respect to threshold height, but may result in landing further down the runway

if you go all the way down 2 whites 2 reds, you will land beyond aiming point most of the time. So the point you are targeting 120nm away, the point to where is ending your descent profile may be missed and all your landing calculations a bit useless.

a good landing is on speed, aiming point, centreline, in g factor.

I don t mean that you need to dive 4 reds, i just mean put your aircraft on hte aiming point

[A4]

PAPI's can be set for different eye heights - a B747 isnt going to see the same as a Citation. They are useful as a guide from someway out but <250' they can become misleading. What they are useful for though is that they are ABEAM the aiming point so provided you keep that aiming point in the same place in your windscreen then you should arrive at the threshold at the correct height (50'AGL) ready to commence your flare.

This is basic stuff - people that chase the PAPI's <300' are setting themselves up for a fall - just keep it stable, with minimal control inputs. A GLANCE in at the V/S should CONFIRM that ROD is on target - don't try to chase or "set" V/S!

Sorry for the thread creep.

A4

[RTO]

If I'm not mistaken it only acts at higher flaps settings. To my untrained eye it seems they never got this far.

Depends on the tabulation number:
YF121 - YF460, YK176, YK177, YK661 - YR401
When the flaps are set at 40, the TE flaps:
• retract to 30 if airspeed exceeds 163 knots
• re–extend when airspeed is reduced below 158 knots.
When the flaps are set at 30, the TE flaps:
• retract to 25 if the airspeed exceeds 176 knots
• re–extend when airspeed is reduced below 171 knots.
When the flaps are set at 25, the TE flaps:
• retract to 15 if the airspeed exceeds 191 knots
• re–extend when airspeed is reduced below 186 knots.
When the flaps are set at 15, the TE flaps:
• retract to 10 if the airspeed exceeds 201 knots
• re–extend when airspeed is reduced below 196 knots.
When the flaps are set at 10, the TE flaps:
• retract to 5 if the airspeed exceeds 211 knots
• re–extend when airspeed is reduced below 206 knots.

[Capn Bloggs]

737fctm state:. The PAPI may be safely used with respect to threshold height, but may result in landing further down the runway
We need to keep this in perspective. The aim point difference from 50ft eye height (3°) to 70ft eye height is only 116m (289m vs 405m). I very much doubt if you would ever find a PAPI with a eye height of more than 50ft on a runway less than 2000m long; "Landing further down the runway" then, while technically true, is not going to mean you land with less than the distance required.

if you go all the way down 2 whites 2 reds, you will land beyond aiming point most of the time. So the point you are targeting 120nm away, the point to where is ending your descent profile may be missed and all your landing calculations a bit useless.
I may be misreading this, but a 120m difference in your aiming point will have no practical effect on your descent planning. If you were implying planing for exit taxiways, your aerodrome chart will/should have the eye heights for each runway so you will know the aimpoint beforehand.

PAPI's can be set for different eye heights - a B747 isnt going to see the same as a Citation.
Yes they will. PAPI 2W/2R is a single path to a point on the runway. The eye heights from each cockpit will be exactly the same. The wheel heights won't be, but when crossing the threshold, if published eye height is 50ft, then that's the height of the 747's and Citation's eyes.

[Frosch]

Annex14: .... to ensure that the lowest height at which a pilot will see a correct approach path indication ... provides the wheel clearance over
the threshold .... for the most demanding amongst aeroplanes regularly using the runway.

However, this incident has nothing to do with PAPI approach path angles, so may I suggest a return to the topic of this thread.

[aeromech3]

No excuse for the outcome but a Frozen flap drive system springs to mind!

[Frosch]

No. Since in this case the reference speed would reflect the flap configuration and thereby the lift. If crossing the THR on speed, you would not be even able to float those 1.3km.

[M.Mouse]

No excuse for the outcome but a Frozen flap drive system springs to mind!

In which case the correct action is to go around, assess the problem, decide whether it is possible to land or not and act accordingly.

What springs to mind is a rushed approach and appalling airmanship resulting in a runway overrun!

[The Ancient Geek]

There are no excuses.
If the approach is not perfect GO AROUND and sort it out.

Simple.

[flieng]

Capt Bloggs. You are correct, the eye height at threshold is the same for small and heavies but wheel distance to touch down not. The papis give a theoretical touchdown point without taking into account(not possible) the flare. I can tell from experience that to land a barbie jet as with T/P s at 300 m requires the pilot to try and land 150m before the fixed distance markings,I.e start dipping into 3 reds into the flare. Conversely a B747 requires the pilot to try and land at 450 m as stated in "Handling the big Jets". The papis are more suited to medium sized jets B737/A320 and should allow the pilot to aim at 300m and actually touchdown there.

[despegue]

NOT all papi's are set for the same eyeheight. some are tailored for Widebody jets. this is by the way sometimes mentioned on your approach plates.
Three reds is still ok on medium jets when visual with the threshold and no close in obstacles.
4 reds, you're dead:}

[RAT 5]

4 greens even deader as you never reach the threshold.

[B888]

http://flightsafety.org/asw/dec06/asw_dec06_p28-33.pdf?dl=1