American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming

[W9SQD]

American Airlines jet goes off runway in Wyoming
(AP)

JACKSON, Wyo. (AP) — An American Airlines jet went past the end of a snowy runway while landing at Wyoming's Jackson Hole Airport on Wednesday, but no one was injured and the plane was not damaged, officials said. Airline spokesman Ed Martelle said Flight 2253 from Chicago "had a long rollout" when it landed at 11:37 a.m. Wednesday. The plane came to rest on a hard surface and did not go off into grass or brush, he said. There were 175 passengers, two pilots and four flight attendants on board the Boeing 757, Martelle said.

Ray Bishop, director of the Jackson Hole Airport, said Wednesday that there were no injuries and no damage to the airplane, which he said went into deep snow 658 feet past the end of the runway. That distance included a 300-foot paved safety apron and 358 feet of dirt beyond that.
Light snow was falling when the plane landed, with visibility at about 1.5 miles, Bishop said. The runway had some snowy patches, but its surface afforded good braking friction, he said. Martelle said airline officials were trying to determine why the plane went off the runway.

Speaking in a conference call that began at about 1:30 p.m., Bishop said it might take an additional hour to reopen the airport and flights were being diverted elsewhere. "As you know, this is a very busy time of year for us," Bishop said. "The snow's fantastic at the ski resort." The National Weather Service said Jackson Hole had received about 7 inches of snow since midnight.

Airport officials brought stairs to the plane so passengers could exit, and crews used bulldozers to pull the airliner back onto the runway.
The airport's only runway is 6,400 feet long, which Bishop said is a little shorter than normal for airports handling commercial flights. Another airplane went off the end of the runway last month, and such events happen periodically there, he said.

[BOAC]

Another airplane went off the end of the runway last month, and such events happen periodically there, he said. - don't you just love it?

[411A]

Getting to be a somewhat regular occurance with AA.
One wonders...another low drag/reduced flap/idle reverse scenario?
Time will tell.

[Spooky 2]

411A I would have bet anything that would be one of the first here to critique this incident. The weather time was varying between 1/2 and 1 mile in snow. I find it hard to believe that the crew used anything but 30 flaps and once on the ground max reverse. The question is of course where did they touch down on the 6,400' runway and what was the condition of the runway at that time?

[ManaAdaSystem]

The runway had some snowy patches, but its surface afforded good braking friction

How does he know? Last time I flew into the US, it was standard procedure not to offer any info on braking action.

[protectthehornet]

we always get braking action reports.

I've been to Jackson (Hole) Wyoming. Magnificent terrain...awe inspiring....but any mountainous area airport can have certain visual illusions. I don't have enough data to fully understand what happened.

as most of you know, the indicated air speed is the same for an approach at high altitude airports as well as sea level airports...but the resultant true air speed makes for a higher ground speed (at the high altitude airport).

I'm sure the pilots knew that if they had been there before.

every operation at a high altitude airport should be a ''max effort'' by the crew

[aterpster]

Metar Kjac 291656z 22011kt 3/4sm -sn Bkn004 Ovc010 M04/m07 A2916
Speci Kjac 291725z 23009kt 1/2sm Sn Bkn004 Ovc010 M04/m07 A2916
Metar Kjac 291751z 22007kt 3/4sm -sn Bkn004 Ovc010 M04/m06 A2915
Speci Kjac 291843z 24010kt 1sm -sn Bkn004 Ovc019 M03/m06 A2913
Metar Kjac 291856z 24012kt 3/4sm -sn Bkn019 Ovc025 M03/m06 A2912
Metar Kjac 292051z 20004kt 2sm -sn Bkn016 Ovc026 M02/m04 A2909

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Another airplane went off the end of the runway last month, and such events happen periodically there, he said.

- don't you just love it?

Without a bit of history, the statement does seem absurd. Here is some context:

The runway is 6,300 feet in length at an elevation of 6,500, msl. The airport is owned by the county who planned a long time ago to lengthen the runway by approximately 1,000 feet. But, the environmentalists got the federal government involved in some kind of "funny" land swap, which placed the airport in the Teton National Park.

The U.S. National Park Service (USNPS) then put the lid on the runway expansion, using not only federal supremacy, but national park precepts of "park environment first." The USNPS couldn't care less about air operations safety. It's all about the environment with them. That would be "okay" except the airport was there first, then some land useless to the ambience of the park was shoved inside of the park boundaries for no reason other than to put a lid on the airport, but without limiting the overwhelming desire of the public to use this remote airport.

Another factor: the airport is literally in a hole, with high terrain all around, yet sufficient navigable airspace exists for a lengthy ILS from the north and now a decent, also lengthy, RNP AR from the south. But, because of the terrain the terminal area is a non-radar operation. (They could augment the radar with beacon interrogators, but the USNPS would likely veto that.) In any case, with radar some aircraft spacing relief would result, but because of the terrain the missed approach tracks would remain unchanged, just as the approach transitions would remain unchanged. Thus, if a missed approach is required the crew is faced with another 85-plus mile circuit to get back to the airport via the ILS (same for the RNP AR, which not all users can use, by any means). Thus, the pressure to land on a runway of marginal length is greater than most air carrier airports.

I know, the crews need to be ever diligent and disciplined. But, an additional 1,000 feet of runway would have prevented many overruns to which the gentleman referred.

[protectthehornet]

I seem to recall a USAF C130 either departed or missed at this airport and crashed into terrain due to navigational errors.

I've flown into a number of US mountainous area airports (which are designated as SPECIAL airports by the FAA). Day VFR even requires good thinking as turbulence, wind, windshear can all come out of nowhere (acutally we know where, but you can't see it).

Night or IMC is tough...you have to be right. no slop. people who learned to fly in Kansas need not apply (no offense, you guys have some t storms but that's another story).

so be careful out there.

[Halfnut]

Off another board:


"20 excursions at JAC in last 36 months when the new airport manager started keeping track (he is a retired AF Pilot). This is the first for AA. United and Skywest have the most Part 121 excursions. Corporate jets next only two were GA piston."

[safetypee]

Aterpster, I think that if you reconsider your inference at # 7, that overruns can be avoided by having longer runways, the logic of the argument is flawed.
Whatever the length of runway, and irrespective of the circumstances of it’s location, any aircraft should be able to stop in the distance available as dictated by the calculated landing weight – distance required.

Failure to stop within the required landing distance might arise from a number of sources.
The maligned primary candidate – human (pilot) error is in part considered in the calculations by provision of a distance safety margin (distance factor).
Aspects of technical failure might be encompassed by excluding reverse on the landing calculations, yet is available for most landings.
From the scant information so far, the perennial poor weather / runway conditions appear to be factors, which in turn could include poor communication to the crew – they didn’t know (but perhaps reasonably could have taken precautions).
More likely are factors of organisation:-
The FAA does not mandate the use of contaminated runway landing performance, although many operators do have and use suitable data. However, there could be many misunderstandings in its use (cf Midway), not least the FAA recommendation to use a 15 % factor which might only cover distance errors in planning and data assumption, resulting in no distance safety margin at all, and thus the need for full reverse, max braking and a ‘fair wind.

Let’s not prejudge the situation by suggesting problems and solutions, but with hindsight assessing similar events, the ‘accident’ probably commenced much earlier in the flight with information, assessment, judgement, and decision making which all came together at the runway location.
Additional length, safety areas, systems etc, only mitigate something which commenced much earlier. If these issues reoccur, ’such events happen periodically - 20 in 36 months !!!’, then this was an accident waiting to happen.

[lomapaseo]

I know, the crews need to be ever diligent and disciplined. But, an additional 1,000 feet of runway would have prevented many overruns to which the gentleman referred.

could of, should ofs regarding airport design or location are not of interest to the passenger, albeit they should be of interest to the local economy.

If it is unsafe to land then the airport should be closed or retricted to only certain types of aircraft.

[Ercos]

Jackson Hole is a rough airport, mind you not as bad as Aspen, Eagle, or Sun Valley, but still a bit tricky when the weather gets bad. I just flew out of KJAC a couple weeks ago and it was tough, the braking action gets bad fast on that runway.

That said I do think American has some serious training deficiencies. I watched years back when a Super 80 flew a very unstable approach and dragged a wing in Las Vegas after erroneously lining up with the taxiway. Landing incidents and accidents seem to happen much too regularly. Airlines that operate into much more difficult airports (like Alaska Airlines) seems to maintain a much better safety record.

[protectthehornet]

I'm too lazy to look up the charts...does this runway downslope?

[Halfnut]

It looked like another lovely day in JAC:

Plane skids off runway in Jackson Hole | KIDK CBS 3 - News, Weather and Sports - Idaho Falls - Pocatello - Blackfoot, ID - Idaho Falls, Pocatello, Blackfoot - Idaho | Local & Regional (http://www.kidk.com/news/local/112618254.html)

.......for an airport at 6,451 MSL with a runway 6,300 feet long and operating regular scheduled FAR 121 ops in snow country.

AirNav: KJAC - Jackson Hole Airport (http://www.airnav.com/airport/KJAC)

[bubbers44]

Without knowing why they went off the end, either marginal braking or landing long will probably be the outcome. Pilots who land long are usually the answer. I have landed as the first flight of the day at an airport at high altitude and in my 737 realized that when I came out of reverse at 60 knots I was going to have an overrun because of braking action nil so used reverse to stop. The brakes were useless. We had no braking action reports because we were the first flight in about 6AM and the first flight in after they closed the airport for the night.

[misd-agin]

The guys that really scare me were watching the GA jet guys. Scary stuff, especially considering their training issues, when dealing with snow and winter conditions.

[protectthehornet]

I wonder

now mind you I'm a pilot and not an engineer...but the lower bypass engines like the JT8D by Pratt and Whitney were routinely used to back up on the ground *power back procedures.

the newer high bypass engines aren't.

so...I'm thinking that when used in earnest, the older engines reverse capabilities might have been a bit better than the more efficent higher or ultra high bypass engines.

and to me, landing a 757 on a 5700 foot runway at sea level (orange county calif) is much easier than landing the same plane at a 6300 foot runway at over 6000 feet elevation.

[ATPMBA]

US Air Carriers under FAR Part 121 are suppose to land in 60% or less of the runway distance.

[Bluestar51]

braking action nil so used reverse to stop. The brakes were useless

With 14 foot Hamilton Standards the breaking action is always good.

bs

[Diamond Bob]

I'm assuming the frozen ground saved the plane from serious damage. Lucky. Then again any time there's an over run I guess you're lucky if you escape with your butt intact.

[SKS777FLYER]

Flew in and out of JAC for several years in the left seat of AA 757's as a line CKA. The south end of the runway could be slick as snot with any thaw and refreeze of water thruout winter days whenever the sun happened to break thru and cause a thawing of any ice on the first 1,000 or 1500 feet of the short runway. AA landing procedures at JAC for the 757 are 30 degrees flaps (full), wing spoilers armed and auto-brakes set at "4" or MAX, either one, at pilot discretion. In the mountain airports or anywhere on shorter or slippery runways, AA trains pilots to plan for and fly the aircraft to a firm touchdown with throttles at idle simultaneously with touchdown and immediately holding light pressure against the thrust reverser interlock detents while smoothly but quickly flying the nose gear onto the runway whereupon the reversers unlock and full reverse thrust is called for during at least the iniital rollout. Of course proper functioning of auto-brakes, spoilers and reversers are briefed to be watched for diligently.
The Captain apparently informed his passengers that the brakes were malfunctioning, who knows to what extent, but as mentioned, those big fans on the RR RB211 are very powerful stoppers, just not as good as wheel brakes once all the weight is on the wheels. Note (yes the RB211's AA uses on it's fleet are of the same family powering certain A380's of recent fame)

Many variables involved, of course, but generally for the shorter city pairs to JAC, like ORD-JAC and DFW-JAC dispatch would have us ferry fuel to save some $$$ since fuel in the mountain airports is astonishingly expensive. That would put aircraft in relatively heavy weights for arrival. My personal operating mode was to refuse ferry fuel when the runways were going to be slippery. I had another quirk that maintenance took about 4 months to adjust itself to. I demanded nearly new or new tread on my tires for mountain flying year round. The FO's loved me on those sometime cold winter days as I did the preflights, going to the tires first. After a few flights delayed for my demanded tire changes, the maintenance department was informed by dispatch whenever I was scheduled to fly to check the tires ASAP on mountain flights I was scheduled for.

At first, when a tire change was called for, a mechanic would check the tires and note the tread was usually within AA Maint/Opspecs. I would always inform them that, yes it was so; but the tires were not up to MY opspecs, for short, slippery runways and usually full of pax and ski stuff. I told my trainees on mountain airport checkouts that was a useful technique (Captains' opspecs) to keep in there repertoire for later usage.

In recent years, don't know if they still are, but suspect it is so...... AA trains pilots to "hit" cities with computer based video flight checkouts. I think Tegucigalpa might be the only city they still actually physically check out a pilot to fly to and perhaps the V-Nav approach to Eagle.

[jrmyl]

Here's a link to an onboard video. YouTube - Plane Crash in Jackson Hole (Cabin view) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTc3bQzQ63U)

[Checkboard]

A looooong way down the runway before the reversers are deployed ...

[Cough]

Agreed checkboard, but if you look closely at the reverser sleeve, it seems to shift at touchdown, then restow, then deploy...

[BOAC]

Good spot there, eagle-eye.

[Hotel Tango]

A looooong way down the runway before the reversers are deployed ...

Indeed. Unfortunately we can't see if the spoilers deployed. Certainly seemed to touchdown firmly within the TDZ as required.

[haughtney1]

Seemed to take an age (approx 15 seconds) for the reversers to Deploy....saw the little crack/movement, which would be consistent with the WOW sensor..and pulling them back against the interlock.....but they then should have deployed in less than half the time we saw.
Have had a few ocasions where I pulled a little too hard and the reverser arm doesnt move squarely...so you have to restow..and try again.

A quick scan on youtube...and look at how much more quickly the reverser deploys here 757 reverser (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwJvz2jDNko) 3 to 4 seconds by my count
Or here 757 reverser 2 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9mu_QoBiFI&NR=1) only a couple of seconds

[Oakape]

There is also a 7 to 8 second delay from reverser deployment until you hear thrust applied. Technical fault or not holding lightly against the stops, for immediate application of thrust after deployment?

I've seen guys simply forget to apply reverse for significant time after a difficult approach & landing. It will be interesting to see what transpired in the flight deck.

Hopefully the CVR is fine so, in time, perhaps we can all learn something.

[411A]

Hmmm, select, cancel, select (reverse)....wasn't that the same slight problem with the Southwest 737 that overran at Midway?
Common technical fault, perhaps?

[Abbey Road]

Touchdown seems to occur at about 0:25 (jolt and noise) and almost simultaneously the thrust reverser sleeve appears to move but only by a very small amount (look carefully - the join gap noticeably widens). Unable to get the thrust reverser to deploy fully?

At about 0:36 that small gap closes again (re-selecting forward idle?) until 0:41 where the reverser begins to deploy fully. Visually, I get the distinct impression there was a jam in the reverser sleeve and the crew may have been struggling with it? As already mentioned, there does seem to be a delay between full visual deployment and audible spool-up.

Merely my opinion though!

[aterpster]

safetypee:

Aterpster, I think that if you reconsider your inference at # 7, that overruns can be avoided by having longer runways, the logic of the argument is flawed.

Re-read the last sentence of my post #7; i.e., the word "many." :)

[SKS777FLYER]

Looks to me he touched down very near the PAPI's which are, I think about 1400' from the threshold there at JAC, about 25 second mark and then sailing on down the runway past taxiway A3 and not until the north end of the terminal, (maybe 2500 feet of runway remaining) and near the crossing of taxiway A2 ..... not until there (about 15 seconds later) does the left engine reverser sleeve translate aft. At least half of the terminal has gone by and looks to me like about 1500 - 2000 ft remaining, the engine spools way up.
There are quite a few shots during the rollout that the camera angle is far enough aft to catch sight of at least some of the outer 4 spoiler panels ..... however none are ever visible to my eyes.
Spoiler issue, either armed or not, the PNF calls out "NO SPOILERS"on touchdown if they do not deploy and the Captain is to deploy them manually.
PNF also immediately calls out any engine not in reverse. The spoilers will not deploy automatically on touchdown unless the throttles are at idle, and if deployed will auto retract if the throttles are advanced even slightly.

I recall occasionally having to wrestle with the reverser interlocks on the 757 to get them to deploy, but never suffered an inability with all hydraulic and aircraft systems functioning properly to deploy the spoilers manually.
For the Captains sake, I hope the auto brake and spoiler systems, if operating,were armed but did not function. I hope for his sake, that the spoilers were deployed either automatically or manually and if not, they failed to deploy to pilot command.
Three items clear from Youtube video.
1. Touchdown reasonably close to PAPI's.
2. No outer wing spoilers.
3. No left engine reverse thrust deployment for at least 15 seconds after TD.
Another detail, JAC runway 19 has a slight downslope, maybe a 40 foot elevation change along the runway from end to end.

[protectthehornet]

777flyer...thanks for setting a good example on critical airport ops.

thanks also for info on downsloping runway...I always briefed that as it is very critical and there is a visual illusion that can make for a long landing...it also allows all the junk on the runway to head towards the end making it slippery (than snot)...one must get it right on the runway and get the stopping drill in place.

I did just read that the CAPTAIN reported that the brakes didn't work. We shall see.

The MIDWAY Southwest over run , a number of problems there...but it took 18 seconds from touchdown to reverser deployment.

I would add to the excellent advice from 777flyer, that before departure to a critical airport that you check the reversers prior to takeoff...is there any delay or physical difficulty with the throttles?

This is an interesting incident and I hope we find out what happened....I wish I could see the video, but as a true airline pilot, I am TOO DAMN CHEAP to buy a computer new enough to make things like this work!

[Edgington]

here are quite a few shots during the rollout that the camera angle is far enough aft to catch sight of at least some of the outer 4 spoiler panels ..... however none are ever visible to my eyes.

That's what I was thinking as well, especially when watching the clip just after 40 seconds. The camera moves just far enough back to where you should see the outboard spoilers, but they are not deployed.

[Smoketrails]

SKS777FLYER,

Are you sure touchdown is after the papi's?

[SKS777FLYER]

After watching the video over and over, yes, I think he landed just past the PAPI. JAC RWY 19 has a four light PAPI on the left side about 1400' down the runway. The windsock also on the left is/ used to be within a few hundred feet of the PAPI just south of the PAPI. From the camera perspective, it is hard to tell if the objects just prior to TD are the parallel (side by side) lights of the PAPI, but it looks like perhaps the windsock is dimly visible at second 24, just prior to touchdown.

[Pilot DAR]

I know very little about flying 757's, or the use of reverse in a jet. However, my question is: If there were a mechanical failure of the left engine reversing system, would it not be appropriate to at least get the right engine developing some reverse thrust right away, to the extent that the directional control could be maintained with rudder, and steering if effective? Some reverse thrust, even assymetric, would be better than none?

I have first hand experience with the use of reverse on one engine only, on a PT6 powered twin, and was quite impressed as to how much decelleration could be safely achived that way. Would the same apply for the 757?

[Wino]

Failure of the air/ground sensor will cause an exact duplicate of the video...

Without the airplane determining its on the ground, No GROUND spoilers, no reverse, and locked wheel protection in effect, and weeeeeeeeeee off the end of the runway you go, even if its miles long....



Cheers
Andrew

[BOAC]

Just one small item to tidy up in your investigation results, Wino - how did the A/G sensor fix itself later?

[protectthehornet]

WINO makes a fine point. I wonder if the landing touchdown was ultra smooth? and didn't compress the gear struts.

something simliar with a different type at little rock...on all landings the spoilers should be checked as deployed...not that this deserves reading the CVR, but it would be an interesting listen

[Smoketrails]

I still reckon he touches down at 0.24(1st thump) and you see the papi's flash by at 0.27(2nd thump as nosewheel touches down!?)?

[Checkboard]

Failure of the air/ground sensor will cause an exact duplicate of the video...

In the 737, the reversers can be deployed from 10' radio altitude and below - no ground sensor input required.

Is the 757 (both Boeing products) that different?

[con-pilot]

In the 727 you can deploy the TRs anytime you want. I was under the impression it was the same for the 757.

[Spooky 2]

You need to be on the ground or at least the MLG needs to be on the ground.

[SKS777FLYER]

On 757, main landing gear needs to be compressed for thrust reverse to actuate with throttles against the idle stop, same for ground spoilers to deploy. Reverse thrust is modulated manually, but there occurs every now and then the refusal of the engine to actually go into reverse thrust, causing the pilot to try to coax the reverse levers out of their lock detents. In the event the ground spoilers don't deploy automatically (AA SOP is spoilers armed for every landing) the PNF calls out "NO SPOILERS" and if the Captain is flying, he moves his hands from the throttles and quickly manually deploys the ground spoilers. If the FO is flying, the Captain announces "No Spoilers" and the Captain manually actuates them. If auto-brakes are armed and come on at wheel spin-up, at settings of 4 or MAX, the nose will come down rapidly. I did not detect in the video, the near instant settling/compressing, (maybe 18-24" ?) of struts that occur on touchdown with weight transferred to wheels that spoiler deployment causes. Also did not detect the quick almost nose-slam to the runway that hi level auto-brake causes.
I don't think the pilots would fail to arm spoilers or auto brakes particularly at JAC with it's high elevation, short pavement, frequently slippery far end and maybe a jet near max landing weight (ferry fuel?) as well as usually a full load of pax and equipment for the slopes.

[con-pilot]

Okay, I was under the wrong impression, thanks to both of you.

Now, any chance of contamination (ice) of the WOW/squat switches being iced up from inclement weather at the departure airport, then giving a false reading? That has happened to me in the past a few times in different types of aircraft.

[SKS777FLYER]

Smoketrails;
I think you are probably right about the touchdown prior to the PAPI. At just shy of 28 seconds, I got the video to stop, and there is a clear frame of the orange windsock.

[protectthehornet]

I guess about 17 years ago or so, an F100 landed at ORD. It couldn't stop...they went off the last turnoff at highspeed skidding around the turn onto the taxiway...finally the copilot reached up and turned OFF the anti skid and they got normal (without anti skid) braking and stopped.

the plane didn't recognize it was on the ground, so no reverse, no spoilers, no anti skid brake.

ALL planes should have a nice big button that says: AIRPLANE YOU ARE ON THE GROUND< ACT LIKE IT.

I so respect planes like the 727 and the DC9...granted, you had to have enough sense to not deploy reversers in flight or ground spoilers in flight...but if you had to, you could!

[repulo]

SKS,

I think you are close to what might have happened, just one minor comment:
The nose won´t slam down if braking action is between medium and poor, regardless of AB setting. And those are the friction co. they probably have encountered. If there is hardly any braking action, then there is no force opposite to flight direction below the CG that will cause an acc. along the lateral axis.
Regards

repulo

[BOAC]

Still puzzled by the early small opening of the sleeve as spotted by Cough - what particular function/malfunction could cause that? Also are the 757 techies saying that unlike the 737, the 757 must have WoW set?

[Cough]

BOAC -

QRH for the 757 says in the landing gear section, WOW failure in air mode will cause-

1.No rev thrust on 1 or 2 engines.
2.Auto speedbrake inop
3.Autobrake inop.

However, we have no evidence of items 2 or 3 as yet.

** Just for reference, the above items came from a 757 QRH with a different engine fit than the AA aircraft**

The NTSB (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20101229X22154&key=1) prelim report seems to indicate that there was a reasonable payload on board.

[BOAC]

Thanks Cough- I've just located the 'tech' info too. A possible lead, but still I cannot understand the initial movement of the sleeve.

[misd-agin]

The video link has been removed.

[411A]

but still I cannot understand the initial movement of the sleeve.
In the end, I believe it will be called...an American Airlines crew ****-up.

[Out Of Trim]

Did a search for the link on YouTube and found another version with Commentary from AvWeb..

YouTube - 757 Jackson Hole Runway Overrun Wednesday December 29, 2010 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=blFw4Y1dtps)

[bearfoil]

On the plus side, excellent maintenance of Directional Control, nobody hurt, and someone remembered their catechism, as evidenced by the prayer when the tuff old bird started bouncing along the toboggan trail.

Thought I heard some German, and let's remember that this was a destination resort with excellent skiing and amenities, the a/c was full of tourists, skis, snowboards, and luggage. 181 SOB, no spoilers, late thrustR, early touch, etc. Good outcome. 6500 feet? 757?? Any 1011 pilots have some input??

[kappa]

We have already had input from 1011 pilot 411A, i.e., the usual AA bashing - nothing of value.

[Pilot DAR]

I believe it will be called...an American Airlines crew ****-up

We obviously have a variety of posters here, whose opinions span the full range of attitude, and skill/experience. I have no role whatever in assigning or speculating upon responsibiliy here, so I will not. In the absence of other authoritative information, I will maintain my confidence that the crew were applying their skill and training to the best of their ability, under the circumstances.

By the way, while I think of it at the moment, a hearty thanks, and well done for all those pilots recently who have accomplished a safe landing, regardless of the circumstances!

There was a problem, our industry gets better because we fix problems, not blame...

[Bealzebub]

The A/G sensing system on the 757 comprises tilt sensors on the main landing gear trucks, and strut compression sensors on the nose landing gear only. The later is only used for stall warning and portions of the warning/caution system.

Thrust reversers utilize the main gear tilt sensors, and can be deployed once the gear is untilted irrespective of the nose gear being on the ground.

Provided the speedbrake lever is in the armed position and the thrust levers are at idle, all 12 spoiler panels should extend as soon as the main gear untilts on the ground. Nomally, a failure in the automatic speedbrake system would result in both an Eicas advisory message and a caution light. In those circumstances the speedbrakes would (normally) be deployed manually after landing. If the speedbrake lever was not armed (in the down position,) there would be no caution or advisory message. If this were to be done intentionally or unintentionally, the spoilers would have to be activated manually on the ground.

Irrespective of the position of the speedbrake lever, as soon as the first thrust lever is moved to the reverse idle detent, the spoiler panels will fully extend and the lever will move to the up position.

This isn't to add any speculation to what might or might not have happened in this incident, but to clarify the system on the 757, that may well differ from some other aircraft types.

[411A]

There was a problem, our industry gets better because we fix problems, not blame...

One would hope so, however it does not help to 'fix the problem' by allowing tankering fuel into a limiting airfield, especially when it's icy.
It is that type of BS that causes incidents/accidents, not prevent them.
AA has a definite history of overruns (more so than any other US air carrier), perhaps it's time for the FAA to have a really close look at their line operations.

[protectthehornet]

411A has made some good points and I don't think anyone should ''bash'' him.

Tankering fuel into a critical airport may save money, but it adds to the approach speed and landing run...try as you might, that's the way it is.

American has had quite a few over runs...at least that made the newspapers. I don't have the numbers, I really don't care. But Little Rock, Jamaica, Jackson Hole should be waking someone up.

We seem to have forgotten the ''spot'' landing. Whether you know it or not, a simple commercial license requires the demonstration of landing within 200 feet of a designated spot. How many pilots on the line work on this on every landing? Or do they go for the passenger pleasing grease job.?

Think about it...Maybe this was a two or three hour flight from ORD...Takeoff, flip on autopilot...descend...click autopilot off...you have actually hand flown about 7 minutes or so. On a critical landing airport...get the feel for the machine by clicking AP off early on.

And always know if the runway slopes up or downhill. if you level off/flare on a runway that is descending beneath your gear, you will land long.

Good Luck and happy new year.

[Gulfcapt]

How are the thrust-reversers locked out on the 757 when the jet is in the air mode? Are the reverse levers locked in the fully stowed position or will they move to the deploy position? Just trying to explain why the reverser failed to fully deploy the first time...

Thanks in advance.
Best,
GC

[zalt]

I hear NTSB have removed party status from AA because they took the FDR to Tulsa and downloaded data themselves.

[protectthehornet]

Zalt is correct...quite suspicious. I guess the lawyers want to get ready early.

[411A]

I hear NTSB have removed party status from AA because they took the FDR to Tulsa and downloaded data themselves.
If true, expect severe repercussions, perhaps at the Federal Court level.
AA, up to their old tricks...nothing new.:*

[mm43]

Excerpt from NTSB email:-
During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where American Airlines technicians downloaded information from the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.

"Although a thorough examination by our investigators determined that no information from the DFDR was missing or altered in any way, the breach of protocol by American Airlines personnel violates the Safety Board's standards of conduct for any organization granted party status in an NTSB investigation," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.

"Because maintaining and enforcing strict investigative protocols and procedures is vital to the integrity of our investigative processes, we have revoked the party status of American Airlines and excused them from further participation in this incident investigation."

American Airlines has assured the Safety Board that a full review of proper procedures and internal controls would be undertaken to ensure that such an occurrence is not repeated.

Despite their removal from party standing, the NTSB will provide American Airlines with any and all information needed to ensure a timely response to operational safety deficiencies identified in the course of the investigation.

[misd-agin]

411A - "One would hope so, however it does not help to 'fix the problem' by allowing tankering fuel into a limiting airfield, especially when it's icy.
It is that type of BS that causes incidents/accidents, not prevent them.
AA has a definite history of overruns (more so than any other US air carrier), perhaps it's time for the FAA to have a really close look at their line operations."

Put up or shut up time -

how much ferry gas was on the flight?

how about posting the data about the overrun allegations you're making?

[Ercos]

"How are the thrust-reversers locked out on the 757 when the jet is in the air mode? Are the reverse levers locked in the fully stowed position or will they move to the deploy position? Just trying to explain why the reverser failed to fully deploy the first time..."

Most likely an electrical relay that is closed through the WOW switches. I don't have any 757 experience but the progressions sounds very similar to Gulfstreams. In the G-II/G-III the TRs are not inhibited ever, while the G-IV requires WOW for TRs to deploy.

On the G-IV the TR levers will be locked and no electrical signal will make it to the hydraulic actuators in order to allow them to receive pressure, which is required for TR unlock and deployment. The only way a TR will deploy inadvertently is if the solenoids that prevent the actuators from pressurizing fail or a series of electrical relays fail.

The only way I could think that the reverser would fail in that way would be if the TR unlocked but didn't deploy fully. This would be a mechanical failure on the aircraft for which I have technical knowledge. In other words the TR mechanical linkage failed or jammed.

[411A]

how much ferry gas was on the flight?
Review previous posts, standard tankering fuel into JAC for this airline, due to high fuel costs.
Beancounters should never dictate flight ops procedures, yet they continue to do so at many airlines.

how about posting the data about the overrun allegations you're making?

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 737-823 (WL) N977AN Kingston-Norman Manley International Airport (KIN) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20091222-0)
Note how far down the runway the touchdown point as reported.
This also was a tankering sector, as I recall.
ASN Aircraft accident McDonnell Douglas MD-82 N215AA Little Rock National Airport, AR (LIT) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19990601-0)
The Captain was an ORD-based Chief Pilot.

Big time problems at American Airlines, make no mistake.

[Telstar]

During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where American Airlines technicians downloaded information from the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.

I'm sorry!? Can we go back to this, did I read that correctly!? AA employees removed the DFDR themselves without running it by the FAA or NTSB, flew it elsewhere and downloaded the data first, by themselves, without supervision!?

I'm actually more interested in this development then the rest of the thread about the runway excursion.

Can we expect criminal charges over this behaviour?

[411A]

Can we expect criminal charges over this behaviour?
Most likely not, however...I expect the FAA/NTSB will have their say and a few heads might roll at AA.
Some folks think I bash AA unnecessarily, however, this DFDR incident aptly demonstrtates the arrogance that is AA, all the way through to the head shed.

[aterpster]

I'm sorry!? Can we go back to this, did I read that correctly!? AA employees removed the DFDR themselves without running it by the FAA or NTSB, flew it elsewhere and downloaded the data first, by themselves, without supervision!?

I'm actually more interested in this development then the rest of the thread about the runway excursion.

Can we expect criminal charges over this behaviour?

If there are criminal sanctions available to the federal government, they most certainly should be applied. Here is the full release with highlighting:

　
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
　
December 31, 2010
　
************************************************************
　
NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN
INCIDENT
　
************************************************************
　
In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a
jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyo., the National Transportation
Safety Board has developed the following factual
information:
　
At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American
Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from
Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of
runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole
Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers
and crew on board.
　
The aircraft came to rest in hard packed snow about 350 feet
beyond the runway overrun area. An initial inspection did
not reveal any structural damage to the aircraft. Shortly
after the aircraft came to a stop, in accordance with
American Airlines’ procedures, the pilots pulled the circuit
breaker to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) to preserve all
of the recorded information for investigators.
　
The CVR and DFDR (digital flight data recorder) arrived at
the Safety Board’s recorder laboratory on Thursday evening,
Dec. 30, where investigators were standing by to download
the contents of both recorders.　 The CVR provided a two-hour
recording of excellent quality audio; the voices of each of
the pilots on the flight deck were clearly audible. The DFDR
provided 1200 recorded parameters of flight data and
captured the entire incident.
　
The crew, who were interviewed on Thursday evening,
indicated that they saw the runway prior to reaching the
minimum descent altitude before touchdown. Both crewmembers
characterized the flight and approach to landing as
uneventful prior to the runway overrun. The first officer
was the flying pilot.　
　
The accident docket, which will contain additional factual
information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will
be available on the docket section of the NTSB website at
http://go.usa.gov/rjR (http://go.usa.gov/rjR)
　
PROTOCALS FOR TRANSPORTING AIRCRAFT RECORDERS IN INCIDENT
INVESTIGATIONS
　
The Safety Board has long-established protocols for the
handling and transportation of CVRs and DFDRs that contain
recorded information from a commercial aviation incident,
which by definition is one where no serious injuries or
substantial damage to the aircraft or other property has
occurred.
　
In such incident investigations, the Safety Board frequently
asks the airline involved to transport the recorders on
their own aircraft as such an arrangement often provides the
most expeditious means of conveying the devices to Safety
Board labs in Washington. The airline is instructed to
transport the recorders without delay and without accessing
the information contained within them by any means. This
practice has worked efficiently and without complication for
more than 40 years.
　
During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned
that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where
American Airlines technicians downloaded information from
the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.　
　
"Although a thorough examination by our investigators
determined that no information from the DFDR was missing or
altered in any way, the breach of protocol by American
Airlines personnel violates the Safety Board’s standards of
conduct for any organization granted party status in an NTSB
investigation," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.
"Because maintaining and enforcing strict investigative
protocols and procedures is vital to the integrity of our
investigative processes, we have revoked the party status of
American Airlines and excused them from further
participation in this incident investigation."
　
American Airlines has assured the Safety Board that a full
review of proper procedures and internal controls would be
undertaken to ensure that such an occurrence is not
repeated.
　
Despite their removal from party standing, the NTSB will
provide American Airlines with any and all information
needed to ensure a timely response to operational safety
deficiencies identified in the course of the investigation.
　

[aterpster]

411A:

Most likely not, however...I expect the FAA/NTSB will have their say and a few heads might roll at AA.

Some folks think I bash AA unnecessarily, however, this DFDR incident aptly demonstrtates the arrogance that is AA, all the way through to the head shed.

Someone apparently learned well from the School of Bob Crandall.

[alf5071h]

‘Removed party status…’
Seems rather pedantic particularly where the organization is central to the investigation. So much for encouraging open and honest reporting / investigation.
Does the NTSB action contravene ICAO Annex 13 ?

[Gulfcapt]

Most likely an electrical relay that is closed through the WOW switches. I don't have any 757 experience but the progressions sounds very similar to Gulfstreams. In the G-II/G-III the TRs are not inhibited ever, while the G-IV requires WOW for TRs to deploy.

On the G-IV the TR levers will be locked and no electrical signal will make it to the hydraulic actuators in order to allow them to receive pressure, which is required for TR unlock and deployment. The only way a TR will deploy inadvertently is if the solenoids that prevent the actuators from pressurizing fail or a series of electrical relays fail.

The only way I could think that the reverser would fail in that way would be if the TR unlocked but didn't deploy fully. This would be a mechanical failure on the aircraft for which I have technical knowledge. In other words the TR mechanical linkage failed or jammed


Thanks for the reply Ercos. When I posted my question, I was wondering whether the 757 reverser levers moved to the deploy position without deployment in the air mode; I don't think that would meet the KISS principle so it probably doesn't work that way.

How about if the thrust levers were not in the idle position after touchdown? Would the levers move to the deploy position but no further? That would not explain the apparent lack of ground spoiler deployment but it could explain why the reversers didn't deploy on the first attempt.

Best,
GC

[aterpster]

alf5071h:
‘Removed party status…’
Seems rather pedantic particularly where the organization is central to the investigation. So much for encouraging open and honest reporting / investigation.
Does the NTSB action contravene ICAO Annex 13 ?

The integrity of the ethics of party status far outweigh having AAL continue as a party in these circumstances. Boeing and the engine manufacturer will still be parties, as well as the AAL pilot's union and the FAA. It can reasonably be argued that continuing AAL's party status under these circumstances would actually impede the investigation.

Plus, AAL will still be required to cooperate by producing facilities and evidence to the extent demanded by the Board. To compare it to a criminal investigation, AAL is now the suspect, thus subject to all that entails. Suspects don't participate in the investigation of their crime, yet they are convicted much of the time.

[aterpster]

Pertinent NTSB regulation:

§ 831.11 Parties to the investigation.

(a) All Investigations, regardless of mode.

(1) The investigator-in-charge designates parties to participate in the investigation. Parties shall be limited to those persons, government agencies, companies, and associations whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in the accident or incident and who can provide suitable qualified technical personnel actively to assist in the investigation. Other than the FAA in aviation cases, no other entity is afforded the right to participate in Board investigations.

(2) Participants in the investigation (i.e., party representatives, party coordinators, and/or the larger party organization) shall be responsive to the direction of Board representatives and may lose party status if they do not comply with their assigned duties and activity proscriptions or instructions, or if they conduct themselves in a manner prejudicial to the investigation.

(3) No party to the investigation shall be represented in any aspect of the NTSB investigation by any person who also represents claimants or insurers. No party representative may occupy a legal position (see § 845.13 of this chapter). Failure to comply with these provisions may result in sanctions, including loss of status as a party.

(4) Title 49, United States Code § 1132 provides for the appropriate participation of the FAA in Board investigations, and § 1131(a)(2) provides for such participation by other departments, agencies, or instrumentalities. The FAA and those other entities that meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be parties to the investigation with the same rights and privileges and subject to the same limitations as other parties, provided however that representatives of the FAA need not sign the "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" (see paragraph (b) of this section).

(b) Aviation investigations. In addition to compliance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, and to assist in ensuring complete understanding of the requirements and limitations of party status, all party representatives in aviation investigations shall sign "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" immediately upon attaining party representative status. Failure timely to sign that statement may result in sanctions, including loss of status as a party.

[misd-agin]

411A- so a comment is made about ferry gas and you assume(word chosen for a reason) that they'd have ferry gas on an IFR day with snow falling at the airport? So you have no facts, do you?

As far as mentioning the 3 incidents that you did? There were probably more during that timeframe. With over 9 million flights during that period of time, and no one having a 100% success rate for millions of events, incidents are bound to happen.

Is the rate higher, lower, or the expected rate due to the amount of exposure? You said you had the facts, how about producing them? Who's better? Who's worse?

Here are some data bases to help you. In some AA does OK, it some it doesn't. Feel free to twist them anyway you want. Keep in mind none of them discuss runway overruns, which is what you posted about -

Airline accident ratings (http://www.planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm)

Plane Crashes and Other Significant Airline Safety Events by Airline (http://www.airsafe.com/airline.htm)

Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Selected Airlines in Europe Since 1970 (http://www.airsafe.com/events/regions/europe.htm)

Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Airlines in Latin America and the Caribbean Since 1970 (http://www.airsafe.com/events/regions/latcar.htm)

Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Airlines in Africa and the Middle East Since 1970 (http://www.airsafe.com/events/regions/afmid.htm)

Plane Crashes for Airlines in Asia, Australia and the Pacific Region (http://www.airsafe.com/events/regions/asia.htm)

[lomapaseo]

I wouldn't be too quick to label AAL as arrogant or criminal.

They are a very large entity and have checks and balances against procedures, one of which is comply with the norms (as stated above) of NTSB procedures.

CVRs and DFDRs are downloaded by airlines quite often after an incident. It's what's known as being proactive in an investigation of a low level incident before repeating it enough times to result in an accident. The issue here is the subjective judgement of a few within AAL that this was a minor incident and to get the downloading down ASAP and make furtur assessments afterwards. At the same time others within AAL would be communicating with the FAA and posibly the NTSB (according to reporting standards) and at this time as soon as the NTSB says they will take over the investigation, then all TSB protocols must be followed.

I suspect that somebody misunderstood or failed to coordinate the timing of the actions (folks out of office for holidays etc.) and that's what is going to now get corrected. BTDT

[VFD]

The airline is instructed to
transport the recorders without delay and without accessing
the information contained within them by any means. This
practice has worked efficiently and without complication for
more than 40 years.

Pretty cut and dried. Not like protocall changed last week.

So one would wonder what AA's motive really was.
Previous Mx issues?, after a flight crew?, blowing off the NTSB?
Why risk all this bad publicity over an incident?
Somehow this is not passing the smell test.

[WhatsaLizad?]

I wouldn't be too quick to label AAL as arrogant or criminal.

They are a very large entity and have checks and balances against procedures, one of which is comply with the norms (as stated above) of NTSB procedures.

CVRs and DFDRs are downloaded by airlines quite often after an incident. It's what's known as being proactive in an investigation of a low level incident before repeating it enough times to result in an accident.

lomapaseo,

Read the NTSB statement again. They didn't just throw in the "40 years" statement for decoration, they are pi##ed. The AA Pilots union (APA) is also pi##ed. Their contract specifically says that any data will not be download without notification and an opportunity to be present.

The NTSB specifically addresses handling of the data:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/Manuals/FDR_Handbook.pdf

"3.7. The FDR shall not be read out or downloaded on scene. The IIC shall caution the parties
to the investigation that unauthorized readout or download of an FDR, following a
reportable NTSB accident or incident, may result in loss of party status (refer to section
4 – FDR Data: Non-Safety Board FDR Download).:"


This wasn't some "we forgot to water the office plants over the holidays" mistake.

[411A]

This wasn't some "we forgot to water the office plants over the holidays" mistake.
Indeed it was not...for once WhatsaLizad? and I are in total agreement.:}
AA management...arrogance personified.

Is the rate higher, lower, or the expected rate due to the amount of exposure? You said you had the facts, how about producing them? Who's better? Who's worse?


The data I provided is all-telling.
AA, amongst US trunk air carriers, has had more incidents/accidents with regard to runway overruns than any other US truck airline.
The facts speak for themselves.
Hull loses?
American leads there, too.
Make all the excuses you like, misd-agin, AA management is rotten to the core.
The latest 'episode' demonstrates this conclusively.
IF I were the FAA administrator, I would suspend the AA air carrier certificate for at least thirty days.
This would get their attention, big time.
The EU might also like to have a close look at AA ops, as some of AA's actions border on deliberate malfeasance.

[Spooky 2]

I wonder at what management level the decison was made to deviate from the norm in this incident. The higher up, the more egregious this conduct is.

[misd-agin]

Quote:
Is the rate higher, lower, or the expected rate due to the amount of exposure? You said you had the facts, how about producing them? Who's better? Who's worse?

The data I provided is all-telling.

What data? That's the point, you provide NO data but BELIEVE something without providing facts to support your allegation.

AA, amongst US trunk air carriers, has had more incidents/accidents with regard to runway overruns than any other US truck airline.

How about the link to the source?

The facts speak for themselves.

Exactly. If you'd provide some facts we'd be getting somewhere.

Hull loses?
American leads there, too.

Source? www.airdisaster.com (http://www.airdisaster.com) doesn't have AA in first place. If you add in the total number of flights AA falls even farther.

Make all the excuses you like, misd-agin, AA management is rotten to the core.

I havn't been making excuses for AA management. I've been asking you to provide facts as opposed to garbage.

The latest 'episode' demonstrates this conclusively.

:ugh:

IF I were the FAA administrator, I would suspend the AA air carrier certificate for at least thirty days.
This would get their attention, big time.

You'll never be FAA administrator. That's a given.

The EU might also like to have a close look at AA ops, as some of AA's actions border on deliberate malfeasance.

Reread this thread. First post by you - maybe a low drag/idle power screwup...uh, no.

Next - dumb airline company, and pilots ferrying gas. Uh, no. No ferry gas.

Next - worst for runway overruns. Facts/links provided to show data? Uh, no.

[aa73]

411A: As an AA pilot, I am no fan of AA management, not by a long shot. They must be held accountable for their screwup in releasing the CVR/DFDR.

That said - your track record of bashing AA *PILOTS* and safety record is extremely biased and based on opinion only - not fact. While AA has had its share of hull losses/overruns/incidents, they are IN NO WAY leading the industry. In fact, a check of the NTSB files over the past two decades shows AA right in the middle of the statistics along with other US airline mishaps.

If you'd care to check the history of runway overruns at JAC, for example, you'll see that UAL and Skywest are the leading carriers of overruns there.

Again - I'm not saying AA's record is perfect, far from it. However, for you to sit here and claim that our record is the worst in the industry is not only misleading, it denotes a certain level of arrogance on your part and an unwillingness to back up your opinion with facts. Go back to the beginning of NTSB records and prove that AA has the highest level of overruns/incidents/accidents for all of us, please.

The fact that we have had a string of incidents is nothing more than the inevitable odds catching up with us. ALL major airlines except SWA have had a string of them - and even SWA is not immune.

Our training is top notch and comparable to all US airline training programs. Our pilots are amongst the most experienced in the industry. I am prout to share the cockpit with them. That said - our management needs to go, on that I agree with you 100%, and this latest screwup proves it. But please place blame where blame is due, without reverting to your opinion and presenting it as a "fact." The truth is, AA's accident record is quite comparable with all major US airlines its size, if you go back to the beginning of NTSB records.

73

[bearfoil]

The overrun? ess happens... The download of the DFDR?? Appalling, and for the very first time, I tend to agree with 411A re: certificate suspension. Unbelievable.

[Halfnut]

USA aviation system load factor running in the high 80% and a "certificate suspension" of AA. Way to funny. You guys are like a bunch of little old ladies at a quilting bee.

What you should be focusing on is jet operations into a snow country airport that is 6,451' MSL with a 6,300' runway. Over twenty excursions into the weeds and no one seems concerned that there is no margin for error when operating swept wings jets on a snowy runway. It should be nothing but turboprop aircraft going in there with the capability of stopping well short of the end of the runway vs. the current SOP of an idling bulldozer with a long chain parked in the firehouse.

[bearfoil]

Look, FAA has the ultimate Hammer, and the starting point is the DFDR. There is no doubt that palms have been crossed at the agency relative to ops at this airfield. 757 duty into this place is absurd, as you point out.

One thing at a time, Eh?

[zalt]

Would downloading the QAR (under normal FOQA rules) been OK??

[411A]

Our training is top notch and comparable to all US airline training programs.
Top notch, you say?
A First Officer bike-pedaling the rudder on an A300-600R, directly causing the vertical fin to depart the airframe...top notch?

AA management is not only negligent, it is grossly so.
Some of their pilots included.
Just look at the Kingston accident I provided a reference to...to actually view the results.
The photos speak for themselves.
Only the blind refuse to see.:rolleyes:

[aa73]

So a tail gets ripped off due to substandard composite construction in one of the most massive aircraft manufacturer cover-ups ever and you're dumb enough to blame the pilot that was reacting to a wake turbulence encounter by putting in NORMAL rudder inputs without realizing the TRAP that Airbus had set up... OK, you've just proven that either you're the biggest moron in the aviation industry or you're really that naive. I'll give you the benefit of the doubt that you're just inexperienced in this industry and like to shoot your mouth off.

Regarding Kingston, wow, great example. Would you like me to provide a list of airlines that have run off the end of runways from 1982 through today? Because I'll be glad to. AA was not the first, nor will it be the last.

In fact, the ONLY accurate part of your post is labeling AA management "negligent." You're giving me just a little ray of hope there, 411. But as for your comments regarding our experienced pilots and instructors here, you are way off base.

I guess Continental pilots are also terribly negligent with their Denver runway excursion.... and USAir pilots as well, after their LGA incidents... and Delta pilots, after their DFW deals... and Northwest pilots, after their landing at how many wrong airports...

In fact, 411, the only one who is apparently perfect is you... You must be a real joy to fly with, Chuck Yeager.

[W9SQD]

Be thankful that you don't have to share a cockpit with some (make that one) of the people who bloviate here. ;)

[411A]

Regarding Kingston, wow, great example.
It certainly is....of how not to perform a reasonable landing.
Photo of Boeing 737-823 (WL) N977AN - Aviation Safety Network (http://aviation-safety.net/photos/displayphoto.php?id=20091222-0&vnr=7&kind=C)

...blame the pilot that was reacting to a wake turbulence encounter by putting in NORMAL rudder inputs
Normal, you say?
Somehow 'normal' for AA, entirely not normal considering past history and experience with swept-wing jet transport airplanes.

aa73 must be a new guy to airline flying...either that or he is totally off the clock.:rolleyes:
Wait...he is an AA guy...that explains all.

[Spooky 2]

I suspect that 411A was turned down during the AA hiring period of the sixties and has has had a hard on for AA ever since.:}

[PJ2]

Zalt;

Would downloading the QAR (under normal FOQA rules) been OK??
No, not in my view and not at my former airline, but that is a matter that would (or should) be foreseen and agreed upon in any Airline-Association FOQA Agreement.

The reason is simple: - once a reportable incident occurs, any and all data belongs (in this case) to the NTSB, not the airline or the pilots and must be made available to the IIC and investigating board.

If we think about it, this protection is necessary. Otherwise an airline might be tempted to use the QAR data for their (as in "Flight Operations', not Flight Safety's) own investigation instead of permitting the in-house safety invesigation process to do it's job.

Good question...

PJ2

[misd-agin]

aa73's one of the most inexperienced pilots at AA. Over 10,000 hrs as a pilot, years to go before reaching age 40 and experienced in at least 5 airline jets. Why doesn't he have experience in 6? Too junior.

Yup, that's the standard to be called 'inexperienced' at AA.

It's a treat to fly with guys that, relatively speaking :ok:, are 'inexperienced'. :D

[411A]

Yup, that's the standard to be called 'inexperienced' at AA.



Goes nicely with this little problem...Photo of McDonnell Douglas MD-82 N215AA - Aviation Safety Network (http://aviation-safety.net/photos/displayphoto.php?id=19990601-0&vnr=5&kind=C)

[Bobbsy]

If you'll tolerate a question from a non-pilot:

Would there be any way AA could have changed or deleted parts of the DFDR data while downloading it?

If so, then their actions are very suspicious. If not, then it should likely be filed under "stupid but pointless".

Bob

[PA-28-180]

" Would there be any way AA could have changed or deleted parts of the DFDR data while downloading it? "

Actually....more than 'stupid'. They broke protocol AND 'chain of custody', with even the HINT of contaminating the data......NOT good! I believe there was a big fur ball about an Air France crash and tampering with the flight recorders....? :=

[airman1900]

SKSFLYER777 said:

"In recent years, don't know if they still are, but suspect it is so...... AA trains pilots to "hit" cities with computer based video flight checkouts. I think Tegucigalpa might be the only city they still actually physically check out a pilot to fly to and perhaps the V-Nav approach to Eagle."

I had occasion to speak with one of the AA 757 pilots who was involved in developing AA's JAC 757 IOC, including the computer stuff, about 1990. As you said, American treated their mountain airports, JAC, EGE with physical checkouts and special simulator training. This incident at JAC with the 757 is the first in 20 years, after thousands of flights. I believe an AA MD80 went off the JAC runway in the late 80’s.

In speaking with UA pilots on the other hand, they did not/do not receive a physical checkout. I don't know about DL, Skywest or in the past CO, NW, Mesa, Western, Rocky Mountain, Frontier(old/new), or the USAF.

In my opinion, JAC can be as tough as any AK airport including Juneau, Ketchikan, and Sitka. I believe Alaska Airlines has separate requirements for pilots flying southeast Alaska. At least one MD80, 737, A320, CRJ700, and now the first 757 have gone off the runway at JAC.

JAC has had way too many airline, business, military and, not to mention private incidents/accidents compared to southeast Alaska Airline's airports.

In my opinion, insufficient training, respect for mountain flying by the airlines, bureaucrats, business jet owners and last but not least pilots are the culprits here.

[protectthehornet]

LOOK, whether you like it or not...both sides have points. American has had a few memorable (I'm not saying they are out of the statistical norm) over runs.

I also think Southwest has at least two that make me shudder...but they seem to have a better PR department...though American is famous for painting out the name ASAP.

Jackson Hole is a tough airport on a nice day for a large plane, or a small plane.

So, pilots should be really ''up'' for any operation there. Just like DCA, or Midway, or LGA, or SNA.

AA breaking the chain of custody is a big mistake and just makes them look bad.

But, I don't think for a minute that the airbus crash out of JFK should be dismissed as a copilot bicycling on the rudder pedals...

American has screwed up...I know 3 pilots there , two have been fired, and one lied on his log book about flying time. the joint is not perfect.

But there are good pilots there too.

Let's wait and see what happened to this plane...we've already put out some good thoughts...shouldn't take too long to find out.

I do hope someone will post the FACTS asap.

[PJ2]

Bobbsy;
Would there be any way AA could have changed or deleted parts of the DFDR data while downloading it?
Essentially, no. The data creation, transmission, conversion, recording, reading/validation and correction process has its own characteristics and marks which are, in the original file, difficult to near impossible to change. Substitution is not a real possibility again because the data is so closely associated with both the histories of all the recorded flights and the aircraft itself. It would take long experience and deep knowledge of flight data systems to make such changes and even more craft to make them "invisible" to other experienced data people. Like all flight safety processes however, spending years and years learning how to do this work tends to weed out dishonesty and politics by one method or another.

A quick read-through of the CAA document "Approval, Operational Serviceability and Readout of Flight Data Recorder Systems (http://www.ihst.org/portals/54/Attachment%20L_CAP731.pdf)" may help understand why changing the data with sufficient interventions to make others believe they were reading the original aircraft data would be extremely difficult. If a quick read-through is tough sledding, at least read Appendix B.

[misd-agin]

airman1900 - "In my opinion, insufficient training, respect for mountain flying by the airlines, bureaucrats, business jet owners and last but not least pilots are the culprits here."

Do you know what the training standards are? You seem to indicate that AA had, or has, the highest standards for the mountian flying.

How do you know the pilots don't take it seriously? I've been LPB, TGU, EGE, JAC, GUC qualified at various times. I've yet to fly with ANYONE that didn't take the challenge of flying into those cities extremely serious. Some would avoid the airports while others are attracted to the challenge.

[Ercos]

American is second worst when it comes to overall accidents/incidents per capita for major airlines. However it seems more so than other airlines with more accidents or incidents (like United) American has far many accidents caused by unstable approaches or improperly executed landings. I won't speak to their training as I've never received it, but from an outsider looking in there appears to be a problem.

Whether it's pressure to never go around or simply inexperienced pilots (and no, 10,000 hours is not AA average pilot experience) something is wrong. From where I'm sitting it looks to be either a failure of training or a failure of the pilots themselves.

[rubik101]

Is it just me being very stupid or is this table a crock of shyte?

Airline accident ratings (http://www.planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm)

The last column refers to; Above/below average accident rate. Well, to me, if your average accident record is high, e.g. Delta at +538% then you need to have a very serious rethink about owning and running an airline and we should all avoid flying with them, whereas China Airlines and Turkish Airlines have an unbelievably good record at -469% and -106% respectively. I'm afraid the compiler needs to do some basic study of stats analysis and compilation.

AA Rudder departure has been done to death, sorry for the inappropriate pun, in another, very long and somewhat tedious thread. Suffice to say, if I am in my skidding car on an icy road if I swing the steering wheel from full lock left to full lock right and repeat the exersise (how many times was it, 4, 5?) until I lose complete control of the car then I will be very lucky to walk away from it unscathed. Bad practice, plain and almost simple.

And as for the invite to call me stupid for not understanding the stats table or the ability and wisdom of the FO in question, feel free; I've been called worse on here.

[bearfoil]

Had 587 lost only its Rudder, there would be no inappropriate references to worn out threads. It lost the Vertical Stabilizer, and for reasons that you seem to have missed in the "done to death" thread. Leave it alone.

[Mahatma Kote]

misd-agin refers to Airline accident ratings (http://www.planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm)

Now I've looked at that and the stats are calculated by


The Accident Rate is calculated as follows:

Accident Rate = ((A *(B/C))-D)

Where:

A = number of million flights completed by the airline

B = adjusted fatal events for all airlines on list

C = number of million flights for all airlines on list

D = adjusted fatal events of the airline

So by this formula, having zero accidents (D) impairs your score. Having lots of takeoffs (A) worsens your score

It has no relation whatsoever to accident rates

[Bobbsy]

Thanks for the very useful link, PJ12. It rather confirms my suspicion (and what you said) that the possibility of AA doing much beyond embarrassing themselves (and, obviously, committing an illegal act) is next to non-existent. With the dataframe structure as specified, the chances of any undetectable alterations would be pretty much impossible.

However, as said, the chain of evidence is well and truly broken.

Thanks again,

Bob

[airman1900]

Misd-agin:

<<How do you know the pilots don't take it seriously?>>

How about departing JAC in a part 121 operation VFR without an IFR clearance and flying into clouds before receiving an IFR clearance. Numerous warnings by SLC center to aircraft landing at JAC about being off course and too low. Part 121 and 135 aircraft landing JAC with significant tail winds and coming to a screeching halt at the end of the runway.

<<Do you know what the training standards are?>>

I hope I find out in the NTSB report.

If I may ask you, how many times you have actually landed or departed JAC at or near minimums with a contaminated runway and significant winds?

[Mansfield]

What we may be looking at is the result of a very tall “stovepipe” culture, which is not unique to American (although they may have perfected it). The deeper you are in the stovepipe, the more hands a body of knowledge must pass through before it gets to you. It becomes a giant game of telephone, wherein core concepts, extracted from documents that are already tortuously written by regulators and manufacturers, etc., are re-written, “simplified”, (generally a no-no in high reliability theory), interpreted, etc. By the time it gets to you, you have no real understanding of the original intent or the original context, and are only expected to trust your company's administrative rigor.

This is partially intentional as operators attempt to control the interpretation of various procedures and policies; consider those operators who do not issue the full Parts A, B and C Op Specs to their pilots, or who only provide access to the MEL while on the ground. But it can eventually lead to a wide divergence from the original meaning.

A cross-section of experienced pilots from legacy backgrounds will have a wide range of interpretations of how something is done, based on their formative training at an established carrier. In some cases, they will not realize that their carrier's methodology was but one “means of compliance” among many.

Perhaps the same problem has migrated into the training of those who manage the company's participation in the accident investigation.

[Doors to Automatic]

Just out of interest what would (roughly) the equivalent length of Jackson Hole's runway be if the airport was located at sea level rather than at 6,000ft elevation?

[captjns]

Is it really the airline... or is the pilot... or perhaps the instructor or check airman?

At every airline, there are a few, who make it through is/her PC/LPC that does not merit the pass. But alas for whatever reason, there is always a friend or colleague out there willing to sign off an inadequate pilot.

I've had the opportunity to work in many airlines' training departments. Some had state of the art computerized googoophonic training equipment, and some had a black board with chalk, if you could find a nub of chalk that is.

Still, there are instructors and check airmen who take pride in their work and will not permit an unsafe airman to endanger the lives of the innocent... and well you can guess about the other category of instructors and check airmen.

To say that AA has the worst training department is just ignorant and arrogant.

Every airline has their John Wayne type that will follow SOPs three times a year... two simulator periods and one line check a year... and the rest of the year??? up for grabs. For fear of their job, few F/Os come foward to comment on blatant disregard for SOPs and or poor performance of their skipper.

You'll have zealot with a hard on just waiting for an incident to occur at his or her favorite airline. Then they can pounce on that carrier's training and lack of proffessionalsim within their ranks. Oh well that's what happens when one does not have a life. Remind you of any posters of this thread:rolleyes:?

[aterpster]

airman 1900:

In my opinion, JAC can be as tough as any AK airport including Juneau, Ketchikan, and Sitka. I believe Alaska Airlines has separate requirements for pilots flying southeast Alaska. At least one MD80, 737, A320, CRJ700, and now the first 757 have gone off the runway at JAC.

I am very familiar with KJAC, and I fail to see the comparsion, especially for the well-equipped air carrier aircraft with RNP AR capability.

ILS with minimums of 200 3/4 to Runway 19 (could be 200 1/2 if the airport and the park service would agree to FAA-compliant ALS). RNP AR 380 and 1 to Runway 01 (could be 380 and 3/4 if the airport authority would make the ALS FAA-compliant.) Those minimums are about as good as many big-city airports.

The airport is a no-brainer for the competent, qualified jet crew when the runway is clean and dry. Runway length comes into play when the runway is contaminated but still not high-risk when the runway is contaminated but sanded and plowed. It is problematic with conditions that existed when AAL overrun, but some (much?) of that can be attributed to the failure of the park service to be concerned about making the airport safer by blocking a runway extension. The topography will permit a longer runway, so the issue is politics, not topography, unlike Eagle, Aspen, and many Alaska locations.

[SKS777FLYER]

Arpster, perhaps 1900's thoughts were of the terrain implications of engine out missed approach procedures or engine out departure procedures of Jackson Hole, compared to such in Alaska. I don't think (don't know for sure) that there are any airports at all in Alaska over 3300 feet elevation. Additionally, I think perhaps the approach/departure briefings and the detailed procedures add up in work load.



Doors to Automatic : ust out of interest what would (roughly) the equivalent length of Jackson Hole's runway be if the airport was located at sea level rather than at 6,000ft elevation?
I will SWAG (scientific wild-ass guess) of converting JAC's 6,300' runway length to a sea level equivalent. I would equate it to a 7,300' sea level airport. (Note that is significantly longer than the 5701 feet at KSNA. I don't recall any AA overuns at KSNA in the decades AA has flown there.)

Some of the many variables:
1. about a 10% difference in TAS versus IAS. Their approach speed was probably somewhere close to 130 knots indicated, which would be about 143 knots true or groundspeed + or - wind component.
2. The density altitude with the RH and temp was probably around 6800 feet.
3. Downslope of JAC runway 19 ( my equivalent runway has no slope)

For a standard day at sea level, there will be no difference between TAS and IAS, the denser air will offer more drag to aerodynamic braking. The engines will perform better in the denser air, providing quicker spool-up and more reverse thrust.

[misd-agin]

Ercos - post 95

What database are you using to compare the rate of runway/landing incidents?

As far as 10,000 hrs guy being the typical AA pilot? I stated aa73's one of the most inexperienced guys, and not the average. It was a reply to 411a and not a comment on this incident.

[airman1900]

aterpster:

Respectfully, I beg to differ.

<<I am very familiar with KJAC, and I fail to see the comparsion, especially for the well-equipped air carrier aircraft with RNP AR capability.>>

Hitting rocks in the totally boxed in by mountains JAC airport, with a blown engine is definitely an issue. In my opinion, the terrain at JAC is as challenging when compared to air carrier served airports in AK. Lack of nearby alternates, other than IDA, must be considered.

The valley floor is wide enough for an ILS with low minimums. I’m not a TERPS expert. In my opinion, legally designed approaches aren’t all equally safe.

<<The airport is a no-brainer for the competent, qualified jet crew when the runway is clean and dry.>>

In winter(roughly Nov-Mar), the runway at JAC is very often not clean and dry.

JAC is unattended at night. The observer, other than moose and coyote is often only the AWOS-3. ANC, FAI, JNU, or SIT are all attended 24 hrs.

In my opinion, especially at night, with a crosswind/gusty component, drifting snow, low visibility, JAC is a challenge.

[misd-agin]

airman1900 - "How about departing JAC in a part 121 operation VFR without an IFR clearance and flying into clouds before receiving an IFR clearance. Numerous warnings by SLC center to aircraft landing at JAC about being off course and too low. Part 121 and 135 aircraft landing JAC with significant tail winds and coming to a screeching halt at the end of the runway.

If I may ask you, how many times you have actually landed or departed JAC at or near minimums with a contaminated runway and significant winds

You can depart VFR under certain circumstances. Flying into clouds is another issue if they did not have an IFR clearance.

As far as SLC center giving altitude warnings? It depends if the a/c were IMC or VMC/VFR/visual. I've heard enough comments from passengers, and sometimes pilots, that thought we were doing 'crazy' stuff that didn't understand that it was absolutely normal.

]I'm not sure what you're calling 'significant' tailwinds. It wasn't an issue in this event. I'm not sure if you're complaining about AA specifically or others.

As far as my personal experience w/JAC with winds and weather? My JAC experience is at least 3 yrs old so the most common memory is of good weather(as it is anywhere in the U.S.). Did I fly there in the middle of the winter. Yes. Have I landed there in the snow? Yes. Winds? Yes. Winds and snow? I don't remember that ever happening. And this event is more typical of my bad weather experience there, snow with light winds.

[misd-agin]

SKS777FLYER -
"I will SWAG (scientific wild-ass guess) of converting JAC's 6,300' runway length to a sea level equivalent. I would equate it to a 7,300' sea level airport. (Note that is significantly longer than the 5701 feet at KSNA. I don't recall any AA overuns at KSNA in the decades AA has flown there.)"

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

I think you have your math backwards. It's not the same as a 7,300' runway, it would be the same as a 5,500' S.L. airport.

Isn't TAS affected 2% per thousand feet? If correct, and you could apply the same percentage to the field length, JAC at S.L. would be approx. 5500', or nearly the same as SNA.

SNA has rain for degraded braking action vs. JAC's snow impact.

[barit1]

SKS777FLYER:
I will SWAG (scientific wild-ass guess) of converting JAC's 6,300' runway length to a sea level equivalent. I would equate it to a 7,300' sea level airport.

wild-ass guess? yeah, sure.

Scientific? Don't think so.
Higher elevation => more runway required;
thus lower elevation => LESS runway required.

So 5300' would be a closer SWAG. :uhoh:

[bearfoil]

Looking out the side port, the approach seems shallow, fast and stable. Snowy runway and a greaser don't reckon with operations given the conditions? There weren 't a single 'gasp' or "Jesus" on touchdown, so maybe the landing was "Too Good".........

[misd-agin]

Passengers were told that the landing was going to be a little firm(news clip of interview w/passenger). IMO it seemed slightly firm, so the opinion battle is tied 1-1.

"Fast"? Huh? How do you reach that conclusion? How fast was it? Five knots? Ten knots?

"Shallow"? Again, I'm not sure how you reach that conclusion. Hopefully we can agree that the aircraft appeared to touchdown at, or before, the PAPI's.

[Doors to Automatic]

Thanks for the runway length responses. Looking at the video the touchdown looked fine. Not to hard or soft and nice and early given the runway length and conditions. It was the subsequent stopping that was the problem.

[aterpster]

airman 1900:

Hitting rocks in the totally boxed in by mountains JAC airport, with a blown engine is definitely an issue. In my opinion, the terrain at JAC is as challenging when compared to air carrier served airports in AK. Lack of nearby alternates, other than IDA, must be considered.

It is not really boxed in by rocks, at least not for high-performance jet transport or biz jet. It just looks that way because of the terrain to the west and east. But, to the north it is wide open, and will RNAV procedures, even a OEI procedure to the south is not terrain-limited for high-performance airplanes

The valley floor is wide enough for an ILS with low minimums. I’m not a TERPS expert. In my opinion, legally designed approaches aren’t all equally safe.
You don't have to be a TERPs expert to know some legally designed approaches are not particularly safe. High minimums is the big clue.

[SKS777FLYER]

Doors, no matter the wrong way number write up for funway/runway length.
In the same general conditions there is gonna be about a 12-13 knot slower true airspeed at a sea level airport, the aerodynamic braking will be more effective and the engines will spool quicker and provide more energy.

[WhatsaLizad?]

Looking out the side port, the approach seems shallow, fast and stable. Snowy runway and a greaser don't reckon with operations given the conditions? There weren 't a single 'gasp' or "Jesus" on touchdown, so maybe the landing was "Too Good".........

bear

bear,

One of the more ridiculous posts I have ever read on PPrune.


Your post reminds me of a story relayed to me by one of our First Officers.

He was standing in the cockpit door with the standard 'Buh-byes' to the deplaning passengers when a snotty passenger sarcastically remarked, "you were a little fast on that landing weren't you?"

The Captain who was standing behind the FO leans forward and says, "excuse me sir, what seat were you in?".

"18A" replies the passenger.

Without missing a beat, the Captain looks to the First officer and says, "Call maintenance and notify them that the airspeed indicator at 18A is reading a little high".

Stunned passenger walks off. :ok:

[Marty33]

Does the 57-2 require wheel spin up for ground spoiler deployment? If the runway was iced the wheels may have just been skating without rotating enough to activate the boards. That, coupled with a late/botched reverser activation may explain what happened. Was there a slight tailwind also?

Probably a series events, failures, etc just like every other incident.

[Gulfcapt]

Ok, you have three components at work here. I can speak with authority on the 777, but from those I have talked to that should know, the 757/767 systems are similar.

First are the thrust reversers. For the reversers to deploy, the airplane must be on the ground, throttles must be at idle, and the respective engines must be running. Clue #1, the airplane didn't think it was on the ground OR the throttles weren't fully closed.

Second are the spoilers. When the spoilers are armed, they extend on the ground when the landing gear is fully on the ground, and both throttles are at idle. If they are NOT armed, they will extend when the throttles are put into reverse thrust. Clue #2, in addition to the above, the throttles may not have been at idle for some reason.

Third is the auto brake system. Auto brakes are applied when the wheels have spun up and both throttles are at idle. Clue #3, the throttles may not have been at idle. Or at least the plane didn't think the throttles were at idle.

The common denominator here appears to be the throttle position. IF the throttles were not fully closed, all three of those systems would not have operated properly. Given the design of the reverser levers, I can't see how it is possible that the throttles were NOT at idle. Stranger things have happened, I guess.

Having said all that, there is one other system that may have come in to play here. It is called an Air/Ground Sensing System. There are sensors on each main landing gear (Can you say "Squat Switches"?) that sense when the airplane is on the ground. Signals from those sensors configure various airplane systems to the appropriate air or ground status. If for some reason those sensors did not sense that the airplane was on the ground, I can see how the above three systems would have not operated properly.


From my post #67 in this thread:

How about if the thrust levers were not in the idle position after touchdown? Would the levers move to the deploy position but no further? That would not explain the apparent lack of ground spoiler deployment but it could explain why the reversers didn't deploy on the first attempt


Apparently, thrust levers not fully closed could explain a lot. So could a mechanical failure of the Air/Ground Sensing System. Time will tell...

An eyewitness reported it had snowed a lot the day before and the snow off the end of the runway was pretty deep. Lucky - Mother Nature's EMAS :ok:

Best,
GC

[Airbubba]

At every airline, there are a few, who make it through is/her PC/LPC that does not merit the pass. But alas for whatever reason, there is always a friend or colleague out there willing to sign off an inadequate pilot.

It's a dirty little secret of the industry but most large U.S. airlines have a small number of folks who always need extra training and fail many checkrides but seem to have job security. Once a precedent of continuing to employ and train someone despite repeated failures is made, the bar is lowered to the ground and it is very difficult to fire someone else for lack of competence.

A publically documented example is the FO in one of the FedEx MEM crashes (the one with the Christmas presents being tossed out the window). She had failed checkrides and been given a 609 ride by the FAA before she was hired at FedEx. She continued to have training issues at FedEx and was late for three out of ten reports in the weeks preceeding the accident. Among other things, the NTSB recommended improved remedial training programs in the wake of this accident:

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operators to establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the training environment that would require a review of their whole performance history at the company and administer additional oversight and training to ensure that performance deficiencies are addressed and corrected.

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2005/AAR0501.pdf

Anybody know if she got her job back (or got one of those occasional settlements where she is paid not to come to work for the rest of her career)?

I do seem to note that in the past couple of years the FAA has fought back somewhat on the 'everybody eventually passes' philosophy and some folks who have been carried for years suddenly are facing a 709 (new name for 609) ride.

Every airline has their John Wayne type that will follow SOPs three times a year... two simulator periods and one line check a year... and the rest of the year??? up for grabs. For fear of their job, few F/Os come foward to comment on blatant disregard for SOPs and or poor performance of their skipper.

These cowboys with their own procedures, personal fuel policy and Sky God CRM fortunately seem to be scrolling off the seniority lists. There will always be a small handfull of people who cause most of the problems for the union and the company but they are under much tighter rein than in years past from what I can see.

FO's aren't too afraid to speak up in the U.S., in fact they perhaps have the other problem.:) Actually, of course, I really do want them to speak up if they think something is wrong.:ok:

[PJ2]

Airbubba;
These cowboys with their own procedures, personal fuel policy and Sky God CRM fortunately seem to be scrolling off the seniority lists. There will always be a small handfull of people who cause most of the problems for the union and the company but they are under much tighter rein than in years past from what I can see.
In other industries it seems the percent breakdown of those who are forever off the radar, retiring with "Who was so-and-so?", and those who continually cause problems for management and union alike is about 80/20, but in airline work I'd say it was closer to 95/5, in Flight Ops anyway. At least it was for us when I was doing union representation work.

Concerning standards, training and SOPs:

The purpose of operational FOQA programs is to indicate when SOPs aren't being followed and convey that information to management and the line pilots alike, (always deidentified of course).

No one here has yet mentioned that while these programs are not intended to monitor individual pilots, if a serious event is re-occurring and the association gatekeepers who do the daily analysis of data and make the crew calls determine its the same person, then that matter has to be addressed. Such processes are (or should be) part of any management - association FOQA Agreement.

[BOAC]

Now the thread appears to have quietened down a bit - has anyone ever seen a rev sleeve behave like that?

[PEI_3721]

Select reverse just enough to activate contacts, but not moving the thrust levers fully back / not checking indications; thrust levers inadvertently move forward / slip / vibrate back to idle.
Hazard of using reverse idle / hands not on thrust levers - habit?

[Spooky 2]

Yes I have seen this. It could be a rigging probem and when the airplane touched down the slight jolt will cause this small movement. It's more of a mechanical issue than an operational issue. NOT saying that's what happened in this video, but only maybe.

[notadog]

U.S. NTSB Excludes American Air From Overshoot Probe, WSJ Says - Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-03/u-s-ntsb-excludes-american-air-from-overshoot-probe-wsj-says.html)

[PJ2]

BOAC;

It appeared in the video as though the reverser 'tried' to open but could not. It then "re-stowed", (hydraulically or pneumatically depending upon the engine mfr). Therefore we could ask, what are the interlocks that prevent reverser deployment/use and when are they released to enable the reverser translating sleeve to move aft and when is the thrust reverse lever released to command max reverse?

I flew the 76' for a number of years. To answer your question, I did not see nor experience any difficulty with reverse deployment. I don't know how common the engines/reverser systems are between the 75/ and the 76' and of course, not having any difficulty doesn't mean a thing.

[misd-agin]

Have I seen it? No, at the pointy end we don't get to see it.

Have I experienced it, especially on the 757? Yes.

One evented ended with 4 tires being replaced. Chief Pilot said - "I've been on the airplane for 10 years and never had that happen."

My reply - "I've been on the airplane for 6 months and had it happen."

That fact that it never happened to him didn't prevent it from happening to me.

[protectthehornet]

In all the planes I've flown with reversers or reverse pitch, I've always found it difficult once in awhile to get into reverse.

rigging, my hand being off...trying to get into reverse too quickly after touchdown...all could have prevented or slowed my selection of reverse.

with so many automatic things, I think reverser auto deploy might be a consideration one day.

but we must remember that reversers are not counted in landing data/performance (except swa 737-700)...and the reasoning at the dawn of the jet age was that they don't always come out when you need them most.

comments???

[PJ2]

misd-agin;

Interesting...I've experienced it on the '9 (where the interlocks were, for lack of a better description, "held in place with lots of pressure on the reverse levers and released when the pressure was reduced" kind of thing - is that what you meant? Sorry, just trying to get a clearer picture - in our case I don't think it was an air-ground thing. No prob if you'd rather not speculate.

[lomapaseo]

Think of it this way.

The interlocks are a failsafe feature that release at a given set of conditions.

Other safety features are no pressure to deploy unless critical (on-ground) conditions are satisfied.

Yet another safety feature is an auto-stow command if an interlock was released and the other conditions are not satisfied.

So to continue the "what-ifs' one needs to know the timing of conditions that trigger each of these features (the reverser logic vs pilot commands). I have forgotten these myself, but that's why we have manuals and of course DFDR data.

[alph2z]

Here is plot of the flights speed and deceleration obtained from the video.

I also included the decelerations of SWA1248 Chicago runway overrun and landing flights just prior to SWA1248 (see the dots in the lower left of the graph).

The 2 lines are for the Jackson Hole incident. I estimate that they went off the overruns at 70 knots.

[protectthehornet]

perceptions of deceleration

I wonder how much the pilot perception of deceleration might play in this...if the runway is snow covered, one can't see the markings (I've always felt that runways should have the white markings outlined in red or yellow or orange).

I am also a fan of airspeed callouts during rollout...and indeed our company has 100 knot calls and 60 knot callouts during rollout.

[Shore Guy]

Much has been made of the reversers not deploying until very late in the landing roll.

Because they are not required and their performance is not included in any normal performance data, I have never seen a chart of the effectiveness of a reverse thrust installation.

I believe all AA 757's have RR engines. Their reversers are relatively ineffective compared to other installations. And the idle thrust setting produces very little thrust (air or ground flight idle).

By comparison, the Pratt powered 757's have extremely powerful reversers. They also produce a substantial amount of idle thrust.

My point.....I think at the end of the day, the lack of spoilers and either a low or no autobrake setting may be the culprit. Yes, non-deploying reversers may have occupied the crew from verifying spoiler deployment. But I do not believe the lack of reversers until late on the rollout on this aircraft will be a major factor due to their relative lack of effectiveness.

[BOAC]

Well, I hope we all managed to interpret my 'has anyone ever seen' in its intended sense! It is indeed a bonus that we have been able to 'see' this event.

Misd - it would be useful if you could tell us what the finding was, and since you could not 'see' what happened to the sleeve, what the symptoms were? EG any REV malfunction lights in the cockpit, restricted levers, other 'symptoms' etc etc?

[411A]

Misd - it would be useful if you could tell us what the finding was
Waisting your time, he/she would have no clue.
AA, in the dark...except for their transport of the DFDR to Tulsa.
One wonders...what do AA have to hide:?:}

[misd-agin]

Recall of what the details were? 25+ yrs, maybe 5000 flights so I have no recall on the details. The 4 tire replacement was not on the 757. I do remember that becaues of the tire replacement. Similar event, no thrust reversers, no auto spoilers, don't recall if auto brakes worked. Manual brakes did. :ok: Four tires later we left.

I've had reversers not deploy on several different a/c types. It happens. Not often, but it happens. Recollection on Airbus and 757 were no reverse lever movement.

Shoreguy-there are performance charts that show the value of reversers during landing. Roughly 1500' reduction in landing roll for 'Fair' and almost 5000' for 'Poor' was quoted on another MB. Varies by a/c.

757 w/P&W has awesome reverse thrust. No data on if the RR 757 reverser thrust is "poor". It seems to be similar to 727/737/767 reverser thrust. So maybe the RR's reverse thrust is 'poor', instead maybe they seem poor because the P&W 757 engines are outstanding.

411A - Thanks for underlining your personal issues.

[oldrnU-2]

Yep, what he said. The MDW airport is one slippery rascal this time of year.

SWA usually makes the high speed on 31C, and most A/C call the BRAG. I'd always call for BRA for the full length. ATC would reply..."uh, I'll check.

The last 1000 feet of 31C were usually BRAP. Sooo...I'd come out of reverse (737-800NG) expecting to keep on slowing down. I only did that once. When the -800s were new on the property, we noted the rather high ref speeds as compared to the 72'. Only, the 72' didn't have winglets.

SWA used to make fun of us for using the full length during landings during winter ops.

MDW isn't "The Hole", but it was a good trainer for "Hole" ops.:ugh:

[ASRAAM]

Some ballpark figures to give perspective. Not all of the corrections have been applied.

RR 757 Breaking Action Good @86T. Basic 1240m, add 30m/1000' altitude, add 80m for No T/R.

Breaking Action Poor @86T Basic 2040m, add 70m/1000 altitude, add 1245m for No T/R.

So under normal conditions lack of immediate T/R is no big deal, on a snowy runway its an underpant changing situation altogether!

[alph2z]

The reversers finally begin deploying at 4000 ft and are fully open by 5000 ft but begin to achieve thrust at 5500 ft, but by then the speed is near 80 knots.

Wow, from the long SWA1248 report (mods mine) :

o- ... using SWA routine/planned deceleration procedures to decelerate, showed that the airplane would likely have stopped about 1,351 feet beyond the end of the runway....

o- Under the same conditions and if the pilots had used Boeing’s reverse thrust procedures (...), simulations showed that the airplane would likely have stopped about 531 feet beyond the end of the runway.

o- However, simulations in which maximum reverse thrust was selected 2 seconds after touchdown and maintained until the airplane came to a complete stop (...) showed that the airplane could have stopped about 271 feet before the departure end of the runway.
.

[sevenstrokeroll]

The art and science of stopping a plane is often overlooked during routine flight operations. Sadly, routine can quickly become non routine.

Most of my flying has been at critical length airports and every landing/takeoff was a max effort.

It is a discipline that is mandatory...and the first time you ''get away with something'' better teach you a lesson!

I wonder if American has a 100 knot callout on landing roll followed by a 60 knot call?

anyone out there know?

7

[SKS777FLYER]

Sevenstroke..... Yes they have (when last I flew the 75) a 100 knot call, also an 80 knot call. Additionally, if nearing the last 3000 feet of runway and speed is over 80 knots, mandatory callout AND ACTION is/was "MAX BRAKES !!"


Recollections of inability to deploy reversers on two different occasions on AA 757's in about 10,000 hours between the 75/76 fleet. Both times just wrestled against the reverser interlocks and the reversers would not deploy. Each time, manually deployed the boards and used manual brakes, neither time a big deal.... but neither on slippery runways either. Immediately after touchdown, the PNF watches for amber REV indicating reverse sleeve translating aft, quickly followed by green REV
annunciation on EICAS display. PNF is also watching for spoiler deployment and auto-brake function.
As mentioned in thread, P&W engines have better reverse thrust steam that the Rolls engine on the AA 757. Whatever; the Rolls engine is plenty capable of significant reversing, of course the earlier and higher speed the better.

Thread drift.... AMR bought TWA, and their PW powered 757's came with the deal. They were great to taxi and initial TO roll.... you could release the brakes on the Pratts at idle and the jet would start moving...the Rolls needed an inch or so of throttle to get taxiing. The Pratts would also spool up quicker off idle. That was it then for the Pratt engined birds, 'cause they were about 37,000 lbs thrust. The Rolls engines, tho less quick to spool and less idle thrust.... well they cranked right up to just over 43,000 lbs thrust and it was buh-bye Pratt powered 75's. (all former TWA 757s are gone as far as I know)

Back to the story, I believe/hope the CVR/DFDR is gonna reveal the crew diligently briefed and configured the 757 IAW AA procedures. For sure, what happened on the runway is gonna be interesting. Bottom line, nobody as much as scratched and apparently no metal bent.:)

The RB211 has had it's share of thrust reverser AD's over the years; the first ones I recall dealt with routing of cockpit cables and pulleys/ interference with window heat wire bundles, replacing Boeing's early production phenolic pulleys with, I think, aluminum ones. Early production 757's had no thrust reverse sync-lock and caused some teething problems as well.

[sevenstrokeroll]

thanks sks777

I read somewhere that when any captain is the non flying pilot (monitoring pilot) he often doesn't comply with all the callouts as well as when the copilot is the nfp.

Now , I sure don't know what happened in that cockpit, but I wonder if there was a recognition of braking problems/stopping problems.

I also wonder if runway markings were difficult to see with snow on them.

[bubbers44]

My 757 landing incident at AA's most critical aiport, Tegucigalpa, Honduras was a non event. One reverser didn't deploy but it didn't matter. We taxied in and got it fixed. You don't need thrust reversers for 99% of your landings to be legal. They probably didn't need reverse thrust on this landing either to be legal. Why the left reverser didn't deploy is not that important, it wasn't required. That 20 seconds skating down the runway off the end is the question. 757's have manual brakes so unless they had a total brake failure they should have stopped with no reverse. Something is missing here.We will know with the CVR.

[sevenstrokeroll]

thanks B44

we have lots of ways of stopping...I wish we could hear the CVR, but I am sure we won't.

Oh well, I'm sure American won't be the next airline to go off the end...they lucked out on this one.

[bubbers44]

The winter is just beginning. Much more snow plowing to be done by airplanes. Hopefully they are as harmless as this.

[411A]

We will know with the CVR.


Unless it was erased by the FD crew.:}

[SKS777FLYER]

Bubbers44...
I no longer have my KJAC airport pages, but I recall that flying into JAC for wet or icy conditions, that functioning thrust reversers were required for dispatch.
I don't recall tho, if they were required at JAC for known dry conditions, but suspect they were/are required there.

[Spooky 2]

I believe the Capt was quoted as having said that he pulled the CVR CB right after they got the airpane stopped and shut down so as to preserve the voice data.

On another subject. I have flown both PW and RR powered B757's and I'm not aware of any reuction in reverse power on the RR aircraft, nor is Boeing, so you might want to call the performance engineers up in Renton and let them know about this issue. :}

[alph2z]

To use the full runway, at a constant deceleration, they would have had to
decelerate at 1.66 m/s/s, which they never achieved at any instant.

This resembles the SWA1248 accident more and more; but luckily without any dead.
.

[SKS777FLYER]

alpha2Z they would have had to
decelerate at 1.66 m/s/s, which they never achieved at any instant.

I think they did achieve a better decel rate than that ..... in about 600 some feet of deep snow.:)

[sevenstrokeroll]

isn't it funny how the copilot uses his left hand (usually the weaker) to operate the throttles and reverse levers

there are some differences between this and the southwest...worse visibility for southwest, a quartering tailwind

but both had mountains...those in chicago of course were man made ;0

we really don't practice stopping airplanes enough and what to do if stopping devices don't work properly.

memory items:

reverser failure checklist

brake failure checklist

spoiler failure checklist

how many of you have practiced those? (none of course)

[misd-agin]

reverser failure checklist? Uh, the rest of the landing items -

spoilers

brakes.


Same items that you do for the most common "reverser failure checklist" reason, the MEL. :ok:

[sevenstrokeroll]

I was trying to make a point in a humorous way. of course pulling out the MEL as you are sliding off the runway is funny too

[411A]

how many of you have practiced those? (none of course)
Do not for one minute presume that the American Airlines ineptitude permeates the rest of the airline operations world.:}

[SKS777FLYER]

411
I should think AA would pay you vast sums for your expertise. Probably take you on as a walk on for VP Flight or Director, Flight Ops.

[aterpster]

411A:

Do not for one minute presume that the American Airlines ineptitude permeates the rest of the airline operations world.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/badteeth.gif

As I have stated, I agree with some of your barbs at AAL management. But, you really do sound like a sour grapes guy who was rejected by AAL during the pilot interview process.

Tell us that is not the case.

[PEI_3721]

An interesting comparison with the Midway accident (alph2z, #146).
What has happened since then … the industry objected to proposed regulatory action – the FAA only recommends a 15% distance margin above the unfactored landing distance.
If the FAA had aligned US contaminated ops with EU requirements, then many of the assumptions and risks in calculating performance would be highlighted – see CS-25; AMC 1591.

There could be significant risk if the contaminated performance is based on the use of reverse.
Reverse is not normally considered for dry / wet landings due to reliability issues – the need to minimise risk (maximising the distance margin) for all landings. However, for contaminated ops where reverse is used, the EU contains the risk by assuming (and warning) that these operations should be infrequent and at best avoided. The risk with small safety-factors is that if reverse fails then an overrun is most likely; there are similar pitfalls with reverse and the use of lower autobrake settings.
Whilst many US operators have suitable performance data, the difference appears to be that contaminated ops are not ‘infrequent’ as in EU, they are accepted as the norm as an economic operation depends on them. This is also the background to the objections against regulation / higher factoring on contaminated runways. Thus if reverse fails on a limiting runway you will most likely overrun the end.
The ‘nay sayers’ might be encouraged by the ‘safe outcome’ arguing that more runway or safety areas will ensure lives saved. This is very short sighted as it can only be a matter of time before a US operator suffers a ‘big one’ – Jamaica was very close, who will be next.

[SKS777FLYER]

Also what AA found out in "discovery" (legal teams) is that the particular accident aircraft A300 had been involved in an inflight upset some time before, and that the flight data recordings from that upset were given to Airbus. In internal memos between Airbus engineers who communicated internally with themselves that OMG, that very A300 vertical stabilizer had experienced ultimate design load factor in it's inflight upset. That revelation was never passed on to AMR. There was also damage to the empennage attach fittings on the A300 that occured before the tail was attached to the plane.
Also, 411 you may want to check the NTSB recommendations (never complied with BTW) of A300 oversensitive rudderpedal design "logic".

A day or two later, when walking in the debris field at the crash site, our chief accident investigator was along side his opposite from Airbus when the two of them came upon the smoldering vertical stabilizer attachment fitting from which the tail ripped. Our investigator asked the Airbus guy. "In flight test, do you guys perform rudder doublets?" The incredulous response was, "No, the tail would come off." The test is full deflection, right or left then relaxed to center. Brief pause, then rudder deflection the other way.

I don't think there were many transport jet pilots around prior to 2002 who gave much thought to how easy it would be to take a rudder, no make that the ENTIRE FIN off a modern jet, well, at least an Airbus fin with a few rudder control inputs and at relatively low speed. I know, I never gave a thought about it on other than smooth use of the rudder in the Boeings and Mickey D's I flew. After all, we were told all about rudder limiters, yaw dampers; and the new fangled Airbi, who would take care of dumb pilots and not allow any over the limit control inputs. Not funny, but I've seen lots of detached Airbus tails floating in water, just one of them from an AA aircraft.

[411A]

Tell us that is not the case.

You are correct, never interested in AA, never applied.

I should think AA would pay you vast sums for your expertise. Probably take you on as a walk on for VP Flight or Director, Flight Ops.



I expect the AA management wouldn't like my thoughts....IE: AA is right and truly stuck in their misinformed ways.
Their so-called 'aircraft advanced maneuvering' training program was poorly thought out, and would never have passed muster with the older guys that were in AA training positions, long ago...especially the aggressive use of the rudder at higher speeds.
AA found out about this the hard way, with an A300-600.
Regarding their past overruns, Jamaica was a classic...landing long, with a slight tailwind, tankering fuel...AA was very lucky, there.
AA was not so lucky with Little Rock, and that was a classic as well...landing during a thunderstorm, with a management pilot, no less, at the helm.
Very basic mistakes that an airline the size of AA, with very many varied destinations, should not make.
JAC?
We shall have to wait and see what the investigation shows, however...AA running off with the DFDR is hardly something that a reasonable airline would do...unless they had something to hide.

I don't think there were many transport jet pilots around prior to 2002 who gave much thought to how easy it would be to take a rudder, no make that the ENTIRE FIN off a modern jet,
Certainly not many in AA, that's for sure.
It was well known with more experienced guys, especially from the 707 days.
Retaining adequate knowledge is certainly not AA's strong suit.

[bubbers44]

Certainly no bias in those statements. You just don't like AA much, do you?

[411A]

You just don't like AA much, do you?



Oh, I can think of a few dozen more...ex-Braniff guys, for example.:}

[sevenstrokeroll]

passing information has not been aviation's strong suit. and I will admit that I didn't know you could rip the vertical fin off the plane while using the rudder. Mind you I've taken at least 9 FAA written exams and the subject didn't come up.

My airline was lucky in that we didn't have the Airbus 300 series.

But a crash in Canada and its causes on a different type was not transmitted to our airline in time to prevent a similiar crash.

that is one reason why forums like this are important, you just might learn something.

cheers

[aterpster]

sevenstrokeroll:

passing information has not been aviation's strong suit. and I will admit that I didn't know you could rip the vertical fin off the plane while using the rudder. Mind you I've taken at least 9 FAA written exams and the subject didn't come up.

More specifically, it's never been the FAA's strong suit, especially when it might dampen a cozy relationship with a giant aircraft company.

[aterpster]

411A:

It was well known with more experienced guys, especially from the 707 days.

I went through school twice on that airplane in the mid 1960s. As I recall all they taught us is to be careful with the rudder above 250 kias if the pressure didn't reduce. (3,000 to 700 or 750 p.s.i. I think).

So, presumably that could leave the impression that agressive use of the 707 rudder would be okay below 250 kias or even above 250 if the pressured reduced.

It was somewhat academic at my airline since we were never taught to use the rudder for anything other than takeoff or landing or engine failures.

[grimmrad]

@SKS 777... "Not funny, but I've seen lots of detached Airbus tails floating in water, just one of them from an AA aircraft." (BTW, how can I get the quote function to work...)

Unrelated and from a person not involved professionally into aviation- but could that have been a cause in the AF accident. They found the tail vertical stabilizer. Heavy winds, speed not known, heavy rudder action - bam?

[SKS777FLYER]

grimmrad,
I could not hazard a guess about what happened to the tail of the A330 over the Atlantic other than it came off, not unheard of in big Airbus accidents.
The AF A330 would probably have been cruising at around 280 knots indicated B4 running into any trouble (turbulence or frozen pitots or whatever).
The AA A300 was flying I think somewhat less than 200 knots.

Of all the jet transport commercial line pilots flying back before 2002, there were probably only one or two who knew anything was probably dangerous about rudder reversals. (Rudder reversals were not taught at AMR, neither were there any cautions about rudder reversals mentioned in Boeing, Airbus or McD flight manuals, AMR flight manuals anyhow). Anyway 411's airline is fortunate to have him as he was probably one of those one or two knowledgeable pilots concerning rudder reversals and fin strength of modern jet transports.

[AirRabbit]

With regard to what was and what was not taught regarding flight control application ... we'll probably not know for sure whether or not a specific comment was made or a specific reference was included regarding "control reversals" ... specifically "rudder reversals," for any specific airline training program. But I can say, rather confidently, that the AA "Advanced Airplane Maneuver Training" materials talked specifically about rudder application using the reference of maintaining "coordinated flight." The last time I looked, that meant keeping the inclinometer index centered ("the ball in the middle"). To my knowledge and throughout my career, there never was any instruction to "rapidly reverse" ANY control application ... and, again, to my knowledge, the only thing that even approached this condition was the recovery from the infamous "Dutch roll." As anyone who ever was required to see and recover from this infamous condition in the airplane can confirm, the procedure was to first "center the rudder pedals and maintain that position," then apply up to full aileron control opposite to the direction of roll as the wings passed through the level flight position and then immediately return the aileron control to the neutral position and freeze it there. If the roll reversed and exceed wings level, the aileron control was again to be used, up to full input opposite the roll direction, and, again, immediately return the aileron control to the neutral position and freeze it there. This procedure was to continue until the Dutch roll was arrested. Why? This was deemed to be the appropriate control application to recover from the condition. And, as anyone familiar with flight test techniques can confirm, full control application at speeds below design maneuvering speed is allowed provided the controls are immediately returned to the neutral position. Sound familiar? And, one would be well-reminded about the surfaces involved and the differences between the aileron surface and maximum deflection versus the rudder surface and maximum deflection.

[SKS777FLYER]

AAMPS, as it was taught at AMR dealt mainly with low altitude, low energy, high angle of attack recovery from a wing down in an effort to minimize the extension of huge spoiler panels to level wings in slow flight, with ground contact imminent, if on the back side of the power curve.

[40&80]

What tells us at what time this aircraft finally accepted it was on the ground and released all its airborne lockouts.?
It appears to have reacted for a considerable period of time as though weight was "not" on the main gear and the landing gear bogie's had not passed their tilt on touch down signals....is this a case of a ("the aircraft still thought it was airborne") lack of communication signals due a soft touch contaminated landing aircraft?

[AirRabbit]

AAMPS, as it was taught at AMR dealt mainly with low altitude, low energy, high angle of attack recovery from a wing down in an effort to minimize the extension of huge spoiler panels to level wings in slow flight, with ground contact imminent, if on the back side of the power curve.
I agree … and, as I recall, the FO on the AA587 accident flight very successfully transitioned the first vortex experienced with minimum aileron application and almost zero rudder application, resulting in almost zero yawing moment. For all intents and purposes, it was a text-book response. However, scant seconds later, upon encountering the 2nd vortex, the response was completely different with dramatic control applications in virtually all axes, including control reversals from maximum deflection points and no attempt to freeze any control in the neutral position … and it went “down-hill” from that point.

[Roadtrip]

The "know-it-all" dolts on this BB ought to STFU and wait for a premliminary report. Any of you genius' seen the logbook history of the airplane?? Talked to the pilots involved??

[BOAC]

Indeed, RT - and how we got to 'rudder application in the air' on this thread heaven only knows!

[DozyWannabe]

Indeed, RT - and how we got to 'rudder application in the air' on this thread heaven only knows!

To try and squish that discussion, I'm pretty sure I read a report that said the vertical stabiliser found from AF447 showed a fracture pattern consistent with it having detached at sea level (i.e on or near impact) as opposed to coming off in mid-air.

The discussion went this way because a well-known poster on here decided to have a bash at AAL over the training programme which emphasised rudder use in upsets, predictably raking over some well-trodden coals in the process - as I'm sure they intended.

[Pugilistic Animus]

So, presumably that could leave the impression that agressive use of the 707 rudder would be okay below 250 kias or even above 250 if the pressured reduced.

It was somewhat academic at my airline since we were never taught to use the rudder for anything other than takeoff or landing or engine failures.
Aterpster,

no airplane is designed to take rapid aggressive oscillating inputs on the rudder [or other flight controls...even below Va...it's a structural issue..in fact from a maximum sideslip condition just centering the rudder imparts massive loads:eek:

this conversation is too hot for me so I'll go back to lurking and enjoying...:E:}:ouch:

[Gulfcapt]

What tells us at what time this aircraft finally accepted it was on the ground and released all its airborne lockouts.?
It appears to have reacted for a considerable period of time as though weight was "not" on the main gear and the landing gear bogie's had not passed their tilt on touch down signals....is this a case of a ("the aircraft still thought it was airborne") lack of communication signals due a soft touch contaminated landing aircraft?


As I posted in #118, it appears there are two possible causes to the aircraft responding the way it did: Throttles not in the idle position or a failure of the Air/Ground sensing system.


this conversation is too hot for me so I'll go back to lurking and enjoying...http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/evil.gifhttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/badteeth.gifhttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/shiner.gif


:ok: Think I'll stick with the thread topic myself...

[bearfoil]

Gulf Capt

from watching the video, I think the landing was indeed "soft". I said it before, and was flamed, I still think the F/O was looking for a greaser when he should have been wanting a plant.

[Zeffy]

bearfoil

I still think the F/O was looking for a greaser when he should have been wanting a plant.


blFw4Y1dtps

The touchdown was slightly prior to the PAPI lights -- how much shorter would you recommend?

And how would a "plant" vice "greaser" affect truck tilt sensors (http://biggles-software.com/software/757_tech/landing_gear/landing_gear.htm#truck_tilt_sensors)?

[bearfoil]

Touchdown. Touch Down Point. Two separate though related aspects of flight.


:ugh:

Tilt sensors. Squat switch. Two separate though related devices.

:ugh:

Plant. Float. Two variations of an aircraft's arrival

:ugh:

Thrust Reverser. Braking. Two separate but related aspects of slowing

:ugh:

[Zeffy]

So by all means, enlighten us as to how "touchdown" would have affected the truck tilt...

[Bealzebub]

Yes I agree with Zeffy, how would the touchdown have affected the truck tilt? These are not squat (compression) sensors, they are tilt sensors as I pointed out in post #53.

Provided the speedbrakes are armed, they will deploy as soon as the truck untilts, and this will happen once the gear touches the ground. If the speedbrake is not armed, or if it fails to deploy, then manual speedbrake would be necessary.

For a planned landing with automatic speedbrake inoperative and that is on on a dry runway at ISA, you would be looking at another 850 feet landing distance or a performance degradation equivalent to a mass increment of around 16,000kg. That still assumes that speedbrakes will be deployed manually after touchdown.

The reversers on the 757 can occaisionally be awkward to get through the lever interlock position, and the reverse levers may well be re-cycled in order to achieve the desired result. If one or both reversers are selected through to reverse idle, the speedbrakes (all 12 spoiler panels) will drive up irrespective of the lever position being armed or down.

In the normal course of events, the only time you wouldn't get spoilers after touchdown assuming no indication of "spoilers" or "auto speedbrake" on the EICAS / Discreet warning system prior to touchdown, would be if you selected or left the speedbrake lever in the "Down" position, didn't then deploy them manually after touchdown, and couldn't achieve reverse thrust.

That is not to imply that any of that happened in this incident, but simply to provide some information.

[bearfoil]

A mystery then.

[sevenstrokeroll]

mystery?

well, maybe it has something to do with a cup of coffee?

;-)

[bubbers44]

After the Little Rock crash all 757 crews verifiy spoiler deployment on touchdown or manually deployed them. The video showed a solid touchdown before the thousand ft. point. Landing long was not the problem on the overrun. Something didn't allow the reversers to work. Also braking action should have worked by itself if the reversers were inop. Something happened to the brakes or braking action was nil.

[Gulfcapt]

Beazlebub, I take it that you've got some experience with the 757; I do not. Can you confirm or deny that reversers, groundspoilers and brakes need the throttles in the idle position to operate correctly? I read it was so on another forum but haven't confirmed it here. Thanks in advance.

Best,
GC

[Bealzebub]

Physically the thrust levers must be in idle for the reverser levers to be moved through the interlock position. This is in addition to the aircraft being on the ground with the main trucks untilted.

The spoilers will operate once the main gear trucks untilt. This assumes they are armed. If the thrust levers are advanced on the ground the lever and spoiler panels will move to the down position (retract.) Of course they can be manually activated at any time, and irrespective of any other condition. In other words "you want them, you've got them!" Thrust levers idle or full, they can be manually deployed.

The brakes will operate whenever you press them. Autobrake will disarm if the throttles are advanced on the ground.

As has been mentioned above, the two main items for the PNF (NHP) to monitor on the ground are: That the spoilers deploy (speedbrake lever moves to the up position,) and that the the Autobrakes (if used) don't disarm. In either case manual input would be required from the PF (HP.)

[sevenstrokeroll]

unexpected nil braking action would of course explain quite a bit...if so, if there was no warning, then we should credit the crew with keeping the plane on centerline through the adventure..

I recall one landing at KBUF where the runway was fine, but the captain ( I was f/o at the time...many years ago) took the highspeed and we were skating on ice...max reverse on the taxiway got us under control again...but PHYSICS IS PHYSICS.

[Bealzebub]

unexpected nil braking action would of course explain quite a bit

It wouldn't explain of itself the failure of spoiler deployment, or the failure of reverser deployment.

[Gulfcapt]

Roger that Beazlebub, thanks! :ok:

Best,
GC

[cwatters]

The spoilers will operate once the main gear trucks untilt. This assumes they are armed.

Forgive me if this is wrong (I'm not a jet pilot) but I recalled reading the following the other day..

Boeing 757 Flight Controls :: Spoilers & Speedbrakes (http://biggles-software.com/software/757_tech/flight_controls/spoilers.htm)



Speedbrakes AUTO Operation

On the ground, the speedbrake lever is driven aft to the UP position and the spoiler panels are fully extended, when either:

•there is hydraulic pressure to both Landing Gear truck tilt actuators and
•the landing gear is fully on the ground (both Truck Tilt Sensors not tilted) and
•both Thrust Levers are at idle or
•either reverse thrust lever is moved to the reverse idle detent.

The speedbrake lever does not need to be in the ARMED position for automatic operation to occur.

[Bealzebub]

The speedbrake lever does not need to be in the ARMED position for automatic operation to occur. Yes it does. That is the raison d'etre for the armed position. The activation of Reverse thrust in conjunction with the conditions you describe will cause speedbrake activation irrespective of the speedbrakes being armed, but the other conditions, of themselves, will not.

For training purposes etc. touch and go landings are normally performed with the speedbrake lever down (disarmed) so that the speedbrakes do not deploy on touchdown.

[pattern_is_full]

"It (nil braking action) wouldn't explain of itself the failure of spoiler deployment,..."

However, failure of spoiler deployment might explain nil (or reduced) braking action: No spoilers = more residual wing lift = less weight/force holding the wheels tight to the ground for friction.

Seems to me that thus far, what we may know, from the "proxy FDR" (the video), is that the supplementary deceleration devices - TR and maybe spoilers - did not function as expected, at least in terms of timeliness.

What we don't know is: whether that abnormal function was due to mechanical problems, including perhaps a sticky TR lever. Or crew errors in the operation of the devices. Or anything at all about the actual braking (auto? armed?, setting?, surface condition?)

Or both - I can imagine a scenario (out of many) where in the midst of a challenging approach to a challenging runway, the spoilers didn't get armed. Which might have been easily noted and corrected during the roll-out except for the distraction of recalcitrant thrust levers at the same time.

I find the bashing and defense of American to both be premature at this point - except for the fustercluck surrounding the handling of the FDR data. :O

[Bealzebub]

However, failure of spoiler deployment might explain nil (or reduced) braking action: No spoilers = more residual wing lift = less weight/force holding the wheels tight to the ground for friction.

Yes, and even on a dry runway, significantly so.

From the limited scope provided by the video recording, it appears that the spoilers did not deploy on the outboard port wing. The spoilers are symetrically paired. Without the lift dump from normally operating spoilers, the extra required runway length would be significant.

Where it being planned to use manual speedbrake deployment after touchdown, it would be at least 850 feet. Even though reverse thrust may not be included in the performance planning figures, a combination of no spoiler deployment, late or no reverse application, and a limiting runway with any contamination at all, is never going to be a good combination.

If the perspective of the video confirms there was no or limited spoiler deployment at touchdown, (automatically or manually) whatever the reason established for that, undoubtably from a runway performance standpoint, that is where the problem started.

[BOAC]

Leaving spoiler deployment out of it for the moment, I still cannot fathom the odd movement of the reverser sleeve. Does selection of reverse on the 757 crack open the case while waiting for the interlock to open?

[Bealzebub]

I have never witnessed it from the cabin perspective, but as it utilizes a hydro mechanical system that would auto-stow the reverser, if the activation conditions were not satisfied, then I think it is quite likely this is what you would witness.

Perhaps a qualified engineer, or somebody who has witnessed it from this perspective, could give a better response?

[bearfoil]

Hating to sign on as a detractor, to join the nemesis himself of AA, but the pilot possibilities should be looked at. The Human factor bears a peek too. I think there is a 'chance at least' that this landing going wrong may have started before the "loss" of Spoilers. It may have started rolling from the point of the PA announcement to the back re: a "hard" touch. The conditions were dicey on the natch, did the PF challenge himself further to show his pilotage to good effect? Was the Captain joined in? I personally doubt it, but since the pilots will eat their lunch on this anyway, it bears a look, if only to gauge 'a priori' the upshot.

[aterpster]

beazlebub:

Physically the thrust levers must be in idle for the reverser levers to be moved through the interlock position. This is in addition to the aircraft being on the ground with the main trucks untilted.

If the thrust levers aren't at idle, won't moving the reverser levers force the thrust levers to idle, followed very shortly by the ability to move through the interlock position?

[misd-agin]

pattern is full - I find the bashing and defense of American to both be premature at this point - except for the fustercluck surrounding the handling of the FDR data.


Exactly. The video shows some know events - touchdown point, reverser operation, spoilers. The whole 'what and why' is completely unknown.

[alph2z]

This is from the SWA1248 accident public-docket on the NTSB site.

From the final report:
"FDR data indicated that the thrust reversers were eventually fully deployed about 18 seconds after touchdown, and the pilots held maximum reverse thrust until the airplane came to a stop off the end of the runway." (edit: added)

I'm extremely surprised that the pilot's notes were made public ! In no way can we judge pilots' actions without looking at the final and full report !!

From SWA1248 copilot's PNF notes. Bruce is captain PF.

"I looked at TR's. Bruce's hands were on them in the down position. I pulled his hands off and went to max reverse" (the remaining text is about after stopping)

[411A]

...except for the fustercluck surrounding the handling of the FDR data.


And, regarding this very strange action on the part of AA, we may never truly know what difficulties the specific flight experienced.

American Airlines, apparently trying to sweep any(every)thing under the rug.:uhoh:

[odericko2000]

@Beazlebub,
Correct me if im wrong but with the first three conditions that Cwatter mentioned above having been met, when the reverse thrust is deployed the speedbrake should move to the up position even if the lever was not initially armed

[Bealzebub]

Yes, that is correct. As I mentioned in post # 177:
The reversers on the 757 can occaisionally be awkward to get through the lever interlock position, and the reverse levers may well be re-cycled in order to achieve the desired result. If one or both reversers are selected through to reverse idle, the speedbrakes (all 12 spoiler panels) will drive up irrespective of the lever position being armed or down.
That is the normally the only condition where auto speedbrake occurs on landing, without the speedbrake lever being armed.

If the thrust levers aren't at idle, won't moving the reverser levers force the thrust levers to idle, followed very shortly by the ability to move through the interlock position? Well, not in itself as such, however the act of pulling up the levers should result in the thrust levers being moved aft. The problem then is that you are applying force that will likely prevent succesfull movement through the interlock position. The best way I can describe it, being like trying to unlock a door that you are pulling against.

[bubbers44]

Google Image Result for http://cdn-www.airliners.net/aviation-photos/photos/9/9/7/0967799.jpg (http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://cdn-www.airliners.net/aviation-photos/photos/9/9/7/0967799.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.airliners.net/photo/Continental-Airlines/Boeing-757-224/0967799/L/&h=812&w=1200&sz=317&tbnid=ZO_eEQhNwm9x3M:&tbnh=102&tbnw=150&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dboeing%2B757%2Bspoiler%2Bpicture&zoom=1&q=boeing+757+spoiler+picture&hl=en&usg=__Q3VIH3u6qjQD-ZJ9BDAKUrwCLwM=&sa=X&ei=918oTdWdLcXflgf71bTZAQ&ved=0CBkQ9QEwAQ)

Does anyone else agree that from the video posted earlier it is impossible to see if spoilers were deployed or not since they are on the rear portion of the wing? The video only shows the front of the wing.

[RegDep]

Bubbers can you please walk back to the cabin and verify. From the not-so-good 3D I have I would believe the camera goes down enough to show the portion of the wing where the spoilers should show at 55 seconds down the video. I stand to be corrected.

Reg

[SKS777FLYER]

Much of the left the wing is visible several times during the landing rollout and at least the outermost panel of the 4 outboard spoilers would be easily visible from the vantage point in the video. The outermost panel ends about 2/3 of the distance to the wingtip and, when fully extended, is easily visible from cabin window seats anywhere along the left side of the aircraft, probably even from a viewpoint near the lower edge of a window frame.

[bubbers44]

Unless you can see inboard of the left aileron on the trailing edge of the left wing in the video spoilers are not in the video. They could be up or down. If it was a WOW squat switch problem How did the reversers come out and if the reversers come out the spoilers automatically deploy even if spoilers are not armed. Brakes are always available. Spoilers can be deployed in the air. The 757 lets you do most anything you want manually. This time it is not pilot error. Reports of prior WOW switch failures might be a clue on this aircraft. Maybe it was an intermittent WOW problem and eventually it sensed being on the ground and allowed TR actuation. How can a TR come out less than an inch ? Is that what it would do if you were in the air and selected TR? These questions will be answered eventually. I don't want to be patient. Tell me now.

[bearfoil]

Pilot Error. Poor Planning. Brain Lock. I think the 757 is not weight on wheels, but "Untilt". Oh, and what happens when the trucks bounce, oscillating twixt tilt/untilt?? Especially when the a/c is not put firmly on the ground??

[RegDep]

bubbers44: FWIIW, I'd say that in the video at 30 seconds you see the left aileron move and can localize where its inboard end is. Later, after the landing, you can see clearly further the inboard part of the wing but no spoilers. You can compare this with the video in #24 YouTube - northwest airlines 757 landing in seattle (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwJvz2jDNko) where the view is from front but you can estimate how far outboard the last spoiler seen from the cabin in fact is.

[bubbers44]

Untilt or WOW this was a text book landing before the thousand foot point. The crew did a great job. We will see what happened to make it go off the end. It wasn't because of the pilots. They did everything right.

[sevenstrokeroll]

we do have to at least acknowledge the idea that one can do everything right and still end up off the end of the runway.

braking action and its reporting and measuring has been a topic for years.

I did read once that in some types, british airways has the non flying pilot operate the reversers.

[misd-agin]

The pilots did everything right.

The pilots made mistakes.



The reality is you can't PROVE either of those statements. Geez, how about waiting for the facts to be known? :ugh:

[skidoodog]

OK chaps,

Imagine the following,

Big aeroplane, short snowy / icy runway, runway reports that are hit and miss in terms of reliability and quality, little or no traffic to give actual braking reports or track changing conditions.

This would be an approach that I can assure you both pilots would be rolled "fully forward".

I haven't met an airline pilot yet who doesnt pay very close attension in mountainous approaches. Those who havent learned to pay attension don't fly in mountains, are very lucky, or are dead.

Yes you might get away with large aircraft, short runway ops most of the time but there are flaws in every system. American found one. A bunch of stuff lined up and they got bit. Thats what happens when you try to run a winter sched. operation into a po-dunk (small, understafed, underequiped) mountain airport.

some basics after 28 winter seasons of flying.

Go elsewhere if it does not feel right and have the gas to do it. (you sould always have that option if your planing was up to snuff, check the notams and runway condition reports) Check friction tables and cross wind limits. Plan your landing accordingly but expect worse.

If it's clear blue or good wx . No special action required.

Anything else pay close attension.

If the wx is ****e or changing quickly, you must be a step ahead and anticipate..... We are all weather pilots after all.


Go easy on American, any one of us could be in their shoes tomorow.

Let's wait for the final report.

The Dog.

[Plectron]

The reason folks are not waiting until the facts are known is because a few have an ax to grind.

[thehighlander959]

SLF here!!
So let me get this straight an internationally renowned professional airline which carries more than 10 million passengers around the world, can freely make a decision to look at Flight Data concerning their own aircraft after an accident before this information is relayed to the NTSB/AAIB.

I don,t know about most of you guys but this development seriously disturbs me. This development alone should cost this arrogant airline a few days in the courts for an explanation and a heavy fine to boot for completely ignoring and undermining the authority of the US Governments NTSB. This was not down to ignorance on American Airlines part its smacks more like arrogance and we can do what and when we want...

[Locked door]

Hi Sevenstrokeroll,

In BA on all types the NHP operates the reversers on touchdown and manually deploys the spoilers if the auto deployment fails. It's part of the 'monitored approach' technique. On some types there is also a NHP SOP call of 'spoilers deployed, reverse green' to aid both pilots' awareness of a/c configuration after touchdown.

Works for me.

LD

ps ref your comment you can do everything right and still go off the end, a major British airline in a widebody jet had an interesting landing last year after the airports groundstaff accidentally deiced the runway with weedkiller instead of deicing fluid. The airport was shut for a few hours after the first arrival of the day slithered to a halt with not much tarmac remaining!

[DA50driver]

Running off the end of the runway is not an accident according to NTSB 830. Unless they damaged more than 25k worth of stuff off the end it is not even an incident. Why should they get the FDR data? AA paid for the FDR, they own it, not the NTSB. Time to read up on the rules boys.

I am only looking at this from a legal point of view. I am not saying I agree with it.

[RegDep]

DA50driver the question then is did AA report it as an accident or incident, or not at all......

[sevenstrokeroll]

has any hard data been released yet? has the NTSB said, for example: air speed at touchdown, etc?

DS50 makes a good point

[Mansfield]

From CFR 49, Part 830:

Aircraft accident means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. For purposes of this part, the definition of “aircraft accident” includes “unmanned aircraft accident,” as defined herein.

Substantial damage means damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component. Engine failure or damage limited to an engine if only one engine fails or is damaged, bent fairings or cowling, dented skin, small punctured holes in the skin or fabric, ground damage to rotor or propeller blades, and damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or wingtips are not considered “substantial damage” for the purpose of this part.

Incident means an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations.

The $25,000 damage to property reference is part of a list of "serious incidents" which require immediate notification. The definition of an "incident" as stated above gives the Board the necessary reach to investigate an incident that does not require immediate notification. Nevertheless, once they're on it, you play by their rules, even if your company is too big to fail. Board investigators are actually deputized, carry a badge and have the power of subpoena. In my experience, they also have pretty thin skins with respect to interfering with an investigation. This is not a recent development; AA had to have been truly asleep at the switch to let this happen.

As far as the DFDR goes, the operator owns the tape, not the data on it. That's why the Board gives the operator a replacement tape in cases where the aircraft is still operating, and why, eventually, the entire recorder and tape is returned to the operator or designated salvage agent following a hull loss.

Some have suggested that AA was trying to hide something. They may be administratively inept, but I seriously doubt that their technical grasp of a DFDR is so poor as to think that it can be altered without leaving a trail. The data might be corrupted, but not "cleaned up". Trying to hide something in this way is so far down the stupid list as to not merit consideration, in my opinion.

No, they're just so used to downloading DFDR data for their own purposes that they failed to internally read the fine print...which is still inexcusable under the circumstances and given the potential effect it can have on the corporate interest, but not surprising in a large corporation.

[SKS777FLYER]

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 : CFR49 831.13
All information concerning the accident or incident obtained by
any person or organization participating in the investigation shall be
passed to the IIC (Investigator In Charge)through appropriate channels before being provided to
any individual outside the investigation. Parties to the investigation
may relay to their respective organizations information necessary for
purposes of prevention or remedial action.

Pertaining to the NTSB; from the NTSB's "Flight Data Recorder Handbook for Aviation Accident Investigations"
"This handbook has not been adopted by the NTSB Board
Members, is not regulatory in nature, is not a binding statement of policy, and is not all-inclusive. The recommended procedures are not intended to become obligations of the NTSB
or to create any rights in any of the parties to an NTSB investigation."



Violating protocol (I don't condone it) caused AA to be removed from party status in the investigation, but I sincerely doubt AA violated Federal law. I'm guessing the torches and pitchforks can be put away.

[PJ2]

I'm guessing the torches and pitchforks can be put away.

Interesting metaphor given what it may bring to mind.

Notwithstanding one contributor whose credibility has plummeted and is on permanent auto-ignore, the dialogue has been quite civil given that protocol was broken by those who should know better.

In response to a poster's question, I commented, with reasons, early in the thread that changing data was almost impossible and that wouldn't have been a motive anyway because, as a number of posters have (in my view, correctly) stated that AA people involved in this would know how difficult such a process was and why, if even possible, any alteration of data would cause far more trouble and attention than the original "non"-event.

[bubbers44]

I agree with DA50. This didn't even qualify as an incident since no damage was done to the aircraft or no injuries to passengers. AA therefore was not required to forward the black boxes before reading them. I think by now the investigators know why this happened. We will have to wait to hear the results. I don't think the pilots have to worry.

[411A]

ANY time a 121 certificated air carrier runs an airplane off the end of the runway, is cause for an NTSB report and investigation.
AA management...unbelieveably stupid in withholding the DFDR data...even for one minute.
This would be called...AA arrogance, personified.

IE: nothing has changed at the AA head shed.

[aterpster]

bubbers44:

I agree with DA50. This didn't even qualify as an incident since no damage was done to the aircraft or no injuries to passengers. AA therefore was not required to forward the black boxes before reading them. I think by now the investigators know why this happened. We will have to wait to hear the results.

The NTSB had decreed it an incident worthy of a go-team and party status to the participants. Party status requires signing a very specific agreement.

[lederhosen]

If you fail to arm the speedbrakes on the 737 they will come out automatically if you have the thrust levers in idle and select reverse. If you cannot for some reason select reverse, say the thrust levers are not quite closed, then the speedbrakes will not deploy and you will sail down the runway as demontrated here. Anyone know if this is similar on the 757?

The speedbrakes are critical to the stopping distance required. As far as planning is concerned the reversers are nice to have rather than need to have as already pointed out. Of course if you are focussed on why the reversers will not deploy you might overlook the speedbrakes and misinterpret why the end of the runway is fast approaching.

Some esoteric systems failure is always possible and indeed to be hoped for from the pilot's perspective. Hopefully the report should not take too long and then we will all know for sure.

[Mansfield]

Lederhosen: hold that thought for a few weeks... :ok:

[BOAC]

.and in the meantime read posts #177,182,189 and 198?

[sevenstrokeroll]

I think it will all boil down to this...sometimes getting into reverse is difficult. sometimes if you are too fast in selecting reverse something sort of jams up and it takes longer to get into reverse then if you had tried the whole thing a bit on the slower side..

so much is done to avoid reverse in flight that little is done to make ground selection of reverse perfect. not getting reverse might also distract the crew from other things in the stopping process.

[safetypee]

So much is being said about reverse; are we complacent, now having a dependency on reverse to stop.
The certification requirements for landing distance on a dry/wet runway do not require reverse to stop in the distance available.

In EU land, full reverse may be required on a contaminated runway if the landing performance is calculated with this assumption. The additional risk in these operations should be mitigated by infrequent exposure – by decision to maintain a safety margin, not frequency of weather.

The US does not have a requirement (rule) for operating on a contaminated runway. Neither, when operating according to advisory guidelines, is there any mitigation for the increased risk. The responsibility is entirely with the operator …<$> The crew …<$> The Captain.
Thus even when using calculated contaminated runway landing distances, if operators continue as normal they will be exposed to a higher risk of an overrun if they experience any minor technical failure or variability in human performance.

The risk of operating on a contaminated runway appears to be significantly increased by the poor standard of the reporting of runway braking action. Braking action is difficult to measure, quantify, or provide a meaningful relationship with aircraft performance; this alone justifies a overly cautious attitude to these operations.
There is overwhelming evidence for the need of a significant landing distance safety margin - higher factors than for a wet runway. Operators / crews must be aware of the risks due to inadequate runway state information, the dependence on reverse and other retarding devices, and less than timely/skilled execution of procedures.

[Airbubba]

The US does not have a requirement (rule) for operating on a contaminated runway. Neither, when operating according to advisory guidelines, is there any mitigation for the increased risk. The responsibility is entirely with the operator …<$> The crew …<$> The Captain.
Thus even when using calculated contaminated runway landing distances, if operators continue as normal they will be exposed to a higher risk of an overrun if they experience any minor technical failure or variability in human performance.

Not sure what you're trying to say but the FAA does require through OPS SPECS at most carriers that an inflight assessment be made of actual landing conditions at the time of arrival. Consideration is given to braking systems including spoilers and reverse and any malfunctions. A 15% margin is added and a multiplier for braking action is used to figure minimum required field length. I'm sure AA has this in their procedures, how it is implemented seems to depend on the views of the POI (FAA Principal Operations Inspector specific to each airline) from what I can see.

[411A]

The US does not have a requirement (rule) for operating on a contaminated runway.
You might like to review 14CFR121 and relavant ops specs for the specific airline/type.
Much mis-information for those on the eastern side of the great Atlantic divide.
No surprise.:=

[safetypee]

Airbubba, I presume that an Ops Spec is part of the licence to operate, thus in that sense it is a rule.
However, the requirement for an assessment does not help with a distance safety margin, nor with risk management on the frequency of exposure.

My understanding of SAFO 06012 is that “the landing distance available on the runway to be used for landing must allow a full stop landing, in the actual conditions and airplane configuration at the time of landing, and at least an additional 15% safety margin,”, but the full text is far from clear. This implies that the runway conditions have been accurately established and that the crew has baseline landing performance for those conditions.
The 15% margin is a minimum, which may not provide any realistic margin over what an average crew might achieve depending on how the performance is calculated (e.g. air distance / flare time).
Furthermore, unless specified, the method of calculating the performance and any dependency on reverse appears not to be to an agreed standard. Note the Midway accident, some aircraft performance was using reverse, others were not.
As you state “ … how it is implemented seems to depend on the views of the POI … ” My (dated) experience of some POI’s knowledge did not provide me with any basis of confidence.

411A, for info, quote from Federal Aviation Administration – Regulations and Policies Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee “FAR 121.195(d) and FAR 135.385(d) do not specifically address contaminated runways, but rather slippery runways, and do not require any additional landing distance over that for wet runways.”

[Mansfield]

Safetypee, the Operations Specifications are regulatory requirements tailored to each operator. They are generated from a standard, generic template, and are how the FAA adjusts the regulatory corpus, so-to-speak, to cover a wide variation in operator mission profiles, equipment, geography, etc.

AA does have the data on board for an inflight evaluation, and it includes the 15% margin. What is interesting is the way this data is presented, which I suspect is typical of many operators. There are four columns. The left two cover dry and good/wet braking actions, do not require reverse thrust, and include the 67% and 92% margins required by 121.195. The right two contain the data for medium/fair and poor braking action, DO require reverse thrust, and includes only the 15% margin.

What doesn't jump out of the page and grab you by the throat is the increasing workload requirement in parallel with the rapidly diminishing margin. Instead, it just looks like good is a bit worse than dry, fair is somewhat worse than good, and poor is quite a bit worse than fair.

This data should be presented on two pages: the 121.195 data on a green page, and the advisory data with the 15% margins on a red page, at the top of which is bold type stating "If you need this page, SERIOUSLY consider diverting..."

[411A]

Quote:
Safetypee, the Operations Specifications are regulatory requirements tailored to each operator. They are generated from a standard, generic template, and are how the FAA adjusts the regulatory corpus, so-to-speak, to cover a wide variation in operator mission profiles, equipment, geography, etc.


Precisely.
safetypee is totally misinformed.

[Mansfield]

At the risk of drifting this thread, I didn't have the impression that Safetypee was misinformed at all; just that the obscurities of the FAA, and particularly Op Specs, might not be something he was familiar with, any more than I am completely familiar with JAR-OPS or the descendants thereof...

I mean, after all, if we all knew everything, there wouldn't be much need for this dialog... :rolleyes:

[safetypee]

Mansfield thanks for the additional information which helps to improve my understanding of the US approach.
I agree with your views on the need for improved data presentation. In the example, for the two left columns it appears that they are only differentiated by the description of runway braking action and not as recommended in EU regulatory guidance by contaminant type, depth, etc; a much fuller description.
This suggests that US performance calculations have to cover a much wider range of situations, requiring the operator/crew to obtain additional information about the runway conditions (e.g. type/depth of contaminant) and skilled judgement in matching the reports with the performance data.

Thus my concern is that the industry (particularly the US) is exposed to additional, unmitigated risk in the event of a reverser ‘hiccup’ by using marginal performance on contaminated runways.
This concern is enhanced in that regulators and the industry are now actively discussing Operational Landing Distances - “the maximum landing performance realistically achievable by a line pilot adhering to standard techniques”. All indications are that this will be longer than the certification unfactored actual landing distance or the manufacturers current QRH unfactored distances for the conditions.
Thus, there is tacit recognition that current methods of calculating the baseline wet/contaminated landing performance are inadequate, but at this time operators have not been alerted to this risk.

IMHO, the current 15% margin above actual landing distance (contaminated) may only represent the proposed Operational Landing Distance which leaves operators without any distance safety margin. Thus adding a further 15% factor to existing requirements might provide a more realistic minimum landing distance on top of which operators could then judge any other risk, i.e. ‘reverser hiccup’.

TALPA Matrix. (http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/november-2010/unveiling-the-matrix)

Boeing view. (www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2010_q4/2/) Airplane Performance.

Operational Landing Distances – Airbus view. (www.ukfsc.co.uk/files/Safety%20Briefings%20_%20Presentations/Airbus%20Safety%20First%20Mag%20-%20August%202010.pdf) Page 8.

Boeing and Airbus views – EU conference. (http://easa.europa.eu/ws_prod/g/doc/Events/2010/mar/RuFAB%20Workshop%20Presentations.zip) – Zip file for download.

[Zeffy]

************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************

National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, DC 20594


January 12, 2011

************************************************************

NTSB ISSUES SECOND UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT

************************************************************

In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:


At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.


Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) weather conditions prevailed around the time of the incident with a ceiling of 400 feet, light snow and visibility of 1 mile. Winds were 10 knots from 240 degrees. Runway friction measurement data obtained before and after the event have been provided by the Jackson Hole Airport Authority for further evaluation by the NTSB.

In the continuing investigation, work groups have been formed to examine the subject areas of air traffic control, airports, meteorology, flight crew operations, airworthiness, maintenance records, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight data recorder (FDR), and airplane performance.

The NTSB systems investigator conducted testing on the incident airplane from December 31, 2010, through January 6, 2011. Operational testing and examination was accomplished on the spoiler/auto speed brake, air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. No discrepancies were found in the air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems.

Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated.


The maintenance group convened at the American Airlines facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to review airplane logbooks.

The group focused primarily on the spoiler/speed brake, air/ground, and thrust reverser systems. No significant issues with any of these systems were recorded prior to the incident, and there were no open minimum equipment list (MEL) items at the time of the incident. The airplane was manufactured in June 1992 and, at the time of the incident, had accumulated 58,879 hours and 20,518 cycles. No discrepancies were noted during the last periodic service maintenance check conducted on December 26, 2010. The last heavy maintenance was accomplished in October 2005. The auto speed brake actuator was replaced in January 2008.


The CVR group convened on January 4, 2011, at the NTSB recorder laboratory. The group completed a transcript of the last 30 minutes of the recording and a summary of the previous 90 minutes. The transcript will be released when the public docket is opened.


The FDR group has begun the process of determining which of the documented parameters are installed and should be functional, and is checking the recorded data for validity.

The group has verified the following factual information:

* The FDR download contains the last 43.9 hours of data, more than the required 25 hours, and includes all of the incident flight.

* The recorded speed brake handle position indicates that the speed brakes were manually extended by the flight crew during the approach after which the handle was left in the armed position until landing. The FDR records only the speed brake handle position and not the individual speed brake (spoiler) panel positions.

* The FDR data indicate that the aircraft touched down at approximately 132 knots.

* At touchdown, the air/ground parameter changes to "ground" for approximately one second and then switches to "air" for approximately ½ second before changing back to "ground" for the remainder of the recording.

* During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.

* Thrust Reverser (T/R) discrete parameters indicate that the T/Rs moved into the in-transit position during the ½ second that the air/ground logic parameter indicated "air."

* The T/Rs remained in the in-transit position for approximately 10 seconds before transitioning to the stowed position for one second. The T/Rs then moved back to the in-transit position for an additional 6 seconds before becoming deployed.

* The T/R discrete parameters indicate that approximately 18 seconds elapsed from the time the T/Rs began moving until they were fully deployed.


Additionally, the team has examined security camera videos provided by the airport as well as a video of the landing taken by one of the passengers.


The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the NTSB website at NTSB - FOIA requests (http://go.usa.gov/rjR)

[SKS777FLYER]

Sounds like perhaps a very soft T/D as written earlier here by others, as evidenced by the air/ground logic flip-flopping which could be caused by gear tilt sensor angle cycling. I am guessing the power levers were not at idle at touchdown. If the auto S/B's were functioning properly, they would have deployed simultaneously(NTSB says they were armed), with the A/G logic when it first changed to ground.....IF the throttles were both on the idle stop.
On dry and long runways, if stabilized approach, on glide path; a soft touchdown in the first 1500 feet of runway to me was a fine accomplishment. On wet, slippery runways AA has taught (drilled it in) for decades for pilots to plan for and fly a firm touchdown within the runway touchdown zone and quickly and efficiently apply up to maximum aerodynamic braking, wheel braking and thrust reverse. AA has for years now required thrust reverse on all landings.
NTSB interim report....
"Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated."

[bubbers44]

1/2 second of the mg tilt switch sensing air mode shouldn't have caused all the manual braking problems, spoilers not returning to extended and no reverse after returning to ground mode. Maybe the reversers were being pulled back the whole time during the 1/2 second air mode and were binding not allowing them to reverse properly. At least we know now that they touched down on speed short of the thousand foot mark.

[cwatters]

Could this be the system thinking this was a case of the reversers opening in the air so it auto stowed them? How long should an auto stow take?

[sevenstrokeroll]

funny how the southwest airlines/midway deal took 18 seconds for thrust reverser deployment too.

I flew one plane (piece of shirt, metroliner) about 25 years ago...it had an air ground over ride switch/button. whatever the plane ''thought'' the over ride would tell it differently.

I do think all planes should have the over ride, I also think that a timer should be selected at the middle marker that would signal on ground after an appropriate time to runway. (over ridden with GA switch)

[jjeppson]

An undetected maintenance error, compounded by pilot mistakes, likely caused an American Airlines Boeing 757 to roll off the end of a Wyoming runway in snowy conditions last month, according to people familiar with the details.

Federal safety officials, these people said, are now examining whether the same maintenance lapse discovered after the Dec. 29 incidentwhich didn't injure any of the 181 people aboardmay affect some of the carrier's other planes.

Arriving at Jackson Hole, Wyo., amid light snow and low visibility, the twin-engine Boeing 757 slid more than 600 feet off the end of the strip into hard-packed snow.

Investigators are examining why the pilots didn't promptly recognize certain automation failures that allowed the jetliner to keep barreling down the runway. The probe is examining whether the maintenance lapse caused those failures. Investigators are also examining why the pilots didn't manually deploy certain panels on the wings designed to help slow the aircraft.

A spokeswoman for the AMR Corp. unit and officials at the Federal Aviation Administration declined to comment.

The incident has attracted widespread attention because earlier this month, the National Transportation Safety Board determined that American violated long-established "standards of conduct" by improperly downloading information, for its own use, from the plane's flight-data recorder before turning the device over to the government. As a result, the board took the unusual step of barring American from further participation in the federal probe.

In an update of its preliminary findings released Wednesday, the safety board disclosed that the runway incident followed problems experienced by two separate systems designed to help decelerate the jetliner.

Panels on top of the wings, known as spoilers, failed to automatically pop up and help slow the aircraft, according to investigators. The safety board said that a portion of the linkage to an electrical switch needed to automatically activate the spoilers on the ground "was improperly installed" during earlier maintenance procedures. Investigators didn't indicate when mechanics made the alleged mistake.

Contrary to American's checklists and safety procedures, the cockpit crew apparently failed to try to manually deploy the spoilers in Jackson Hole, according to people familiar with the details.

In addition, the safety board said separate devices at the rear of the engines also designed to help the plane come to stopcalled thrust reverserstook too long to deploy. "Approximately 18 seconds elapsed" from the time the plane's landing gears touched the runway "until [reversers] were fully deployed," according to the update. Typically, the devices should kick in and start redirecting engine thrust in a matter of seconds. They are controlled by the crew.

The plane's cockpit-voice recorder, however, indicates that the pilots commanded the reversers to deploy as soon as the plane touched down, according to people familiar with the details. One angle the safety board is pursuing is whether the earlier maintenance errorpotentially binding or restricting the operation of various controls in the cockpitcould have caused the delayed response from the reversers.

To help answer that question, these people said, the FAA has told American to inspect a portion of its Boeing 757 fleet for similar maintenance lapses.

According to the board's latest findings, the 18-year old jetliner experienced "no significant issues with any of these systems" prior to the incident, and all required maintenance items were up to date prior to last month's flight from Chicago to Jackson Hole.

Almost precisely a year earlier, An American Airlines Boeing 737 ran off the end of a wet runway at Kingston, Jamaica, after touching far down the strip. Unable to stop with almost half the 8,900-foot runway behind it, the plane barreled off the strip at more than 60 miles per hour and broke apart. There were no fatalities.

In that event, Jamaican and U.S. investigators have concluded that the plane's brakes, reversers and other systems basically operated as designed, but standing water on portions of the runway likely made it difficult for the pilots to stop in time.