American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming

[bearfoil]

Now we're getting somewhere. I was unaware that AA actually did some downloading, I thought they just took off with the FR.

A beautiful Touchdown.

[411A]

An undetected maintenance error, compounded by pilot mistakes,

An AA known trouble-prone area, especially in the maintenance area.
AA...the largest FAA maintenance fines of any US air carrier...ever.:*

[sevenstrokeroll]

as a carpenter has different grades of sandpaper for different jobs, so too an airline pilot must have different grades of landings.

this runway required a hard landing/firm landing and if by shear luck you get a soft landing this should alert the PRUDENT airline pilot of possible air / ground shift/tilt shift problems and manual stopping in all forms should be initiated.

[Hotel Tango]

I see that the video (taken by one of the pax) has been removed. Perhaps some of you later posters have not had a chance to watch it. My recollection was that it indicated a positive rather than a soft landing.

[bubbers44]

HT, I agree it was a firm landing from the video. AA haters will continue to find fault with the pilots and AA maintenance but what I have seen shows an onspeed touchdown at 900 ft past the threshold with an immediate attempt to reverse shown by the reverser trying to deploy but only deploying slightly. The rest of the data hasn't been released yet so we will have to wait for the rollout details. The approach and touchdown looked like it was textbook. The rest will come later.

[bearfoil]

The reverser jacket was cracked before T/D. IMO. Never did see the Spoilers. How long to stow/deploy after defeated by air logic in the initial "deploy"?? I count five seconds. Then there is ten seconds for "Spool up". Fifteen seconds for T/R and no spoilers. Oops there's the end. An extremely well choreographed AllAces Landing.

[bubbers44]

A charter operation flying corporate jets into Jacksonhole suspends all flights when snow removal operations are required because Jacksonhole is not allowed to use any sand or chemicals on the runway because of the environmental impact. Also the truck with the MU meter is not accurate on testing braking action. They ran a few jets off the end so even though airlines are operating, they don't. This is straight from one of their pilots that flies into Jacksonhole.

[bearfoil]

And your point is.......

[bubbers44]

I thought it was obvious why I posted it but if Jacksonhole doesn't use normal procedures to clear their runway and won't use normal procedures to improve braking action and test it maybe the FAA should look into the safety of flying into Jacksonhole. If a charter operation gives up a lot of revenue to ban operations because of snow removal and runway conditioning maybe someone needs to look into it. All the airlines are still operating so maybe they should just look at if they are following approved procedures that other airports are required to follow.

[bearfoil]

I most heartily agree.

[kappa]

Hotel Tango wrote:
I see that the video (taken by one of the pax) has been removed. Perhaps some of you later posters have not had a chance to watch it. My recollection was that it indicated a positive rather than a soft landing.For the video, see the link at Post 174 above. It is has commentary from AVWeb.com

[bearfoil]

Notes: 1:33, Touch. 1:34, TR gate opens, but not fully. 1:48, gate stows. 1:54, gate opens, TR deployed. 1:02, High Thrust is heard. 1:11, in the snow.

"Jesus Christ"......"Amen"......."No more the Problem, No more the problem!!"..

The 1:33-1:34 are more like 1:32.7- 1:33.5

If TR were selected prior to Untilt, (The time log would say that) There is a logic regroup, and a delay. Thrust was rejected (a/c origin) and the TR did not deploy until the gate shut, and waited for Untilt to initiate a new sequence. then up comes the thrust. I think the Boeing did what it was supposed to do. Spoilers? Tough call.

The a/c is confused. Premature action??

[bubbers44]

The video definately shows touchdown before attempted reverser deployment. The half second skip might have caused a problem with TR deployment but manually braking and manually deploying the spoilers shouldn't have been a problem. If braking action was good as reported, if it was accurate, then reversers would not have been a big factor. Notice I'm paying more attention to my commas?

[bearfoil]

The video does not show Touchdown prior to "attempting" to deploy TRs. What it shows is the Jacket migrated aft an inch, then stopped. The attempt was prior to the open/jam, by how much is on the DFDR. If the untilt had not completed, or the switch was operating in normal sequence, the manual application could well have been prior to T/D. IMO. Without spoilers, and good braking, it was a dice roll anyway. T/Rs are not crucial, as explained, but the lack of T/R deployment in timely fashion does suggest some thing was amiss with the plan. It is not accurate to state conclusively, but if the TR system was this late, and occupied our crew elsewhere........not a good runway to get behind the a/c.

[bubbers44]

I have never seen a pilot deploy thrust reversers before touchdown. Has anybody else? They won't deploy in modern aircraft if you did so what difference does it make? Why manual brakes and spoilers didn't stop the airplane is what puzzles me. Maybe the braking action wasn't as advertised. Maybe they fudged their braking action a bit? We will see.

[bearfoil]

From the video, did brakes and Spoilers have an effect?? Perhaps, but obviously not enough. Why pay attention to TR when it only acted for 9 seconds before the excursion?? It is guesswork, and two football fields through packed snow shows a good deal of energy left.

[bubbers44]

As I stated earlier in another post I landed as a first flight into Reno and having an empty airplane didn't worry about runway length but after a snow storm being the first flight in with no braking action reports found the braking was nil and only reverse kept me from going off the end with a 737. We came slowly out of reverse at 80 knots and into idle at 60 knots. That is when with 3,000 feet left realized we could only stop with reverse thrust. We stopped fine but braking action reports should be available and accurate.

[SKS777FLYER]

The south end of JAC is notoriously slippery at times during winter months. The passenger shot video out the left side of the AC never caught sight of a spoiler during the landing roll. On AA's RB211 engined fleet, if all systems are functioning as designed, the reverser sleeve will not translate aft in flight which would allow blocker doors to swivel into position to block fan air. Throttles must be at idle and separate levers mounted low on the front of the throttles must be grasped and raised by a pilot. The copilot was said by the NTSB to have been the PF. He would have been wrestling with the reverse levers. The captain would/should have a ready hand to deploy the ground spoilers if they not auto-deploy simultaneously with touchdown.

[Bealzebub]

During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.

The immediate priority at touchdown would be for the speedbrake lever to be moved to the up position manually, if it did not do so automatically. It would also be essential for the first pilot to notice it to call it. Without spoiler application, you are going be using a lot more runway than planned. For example if dispatch was planned with only 1 pair of flight spoiler panels unserviceable (there are 5 pairs of flight spoiler panels and 1 pair of ground spoilers) the additional required landing field length required, would be around 1270ft more. Obviously with no spoilers at all, life is going to get interesting.

From a performance standpoint, this is really where the problem lies. Reverse thrust is not normally a calculated factor in landing performance. Braking is of course, but without those spoiler panels up (automatically or manually) braking effectiveness is going to be significantly reduced.

If the above quoted preliminary finding, is correct or to be believed, then it will beg the question why the speedbrakes were not operated manually, when the lever didn't supposedly move to the up position on touchdown?

It is entirely possible, that there was a mechanical failure (alluded to here) that prevented such movement. It is possible that the movement of the lever between the down and armed position, and the sound of the drive motor may have provided some level of positive sensory re-inforcement if the crew were otherwise distracted.

All the information should be available to the investigators in this particular incident, so answers should be forthcoming in a reasonably short timescale.

[Oakape]

It might be just me, but there seem to have been an awful lot of runway over-runs lately! :hmm:

[cwatters]

A comment found elsewhere implies that speedbrakes are auto stowed if high thrust is applied on the ground. Sounds reasonable but...

If you have just landed and a reverser auto stow occurs.. does trying to apply full reverse thrust fool it into auto stowing the speed brakes as well?

[Bealzebub]

No it doesn't.

Application of reverse thrust should result in speedbrake deployment even if the speedbrake lever is down (not armed,) however cancelling reverse thrust will not cause the spoiler panels to retract or consequently the speedbrake lever to move.

According to the report given above, the speedbrake lever briefly moved from the armed to the down to the armed position, during the A/G transition phase at touchdown. It then apparantly remained in the armed position for the duration of the event.

In the ordinary course of events the speedbrakes should be deployed manually at touchdown if they do not deploy automatically. Failing that, they should deploy if and when the thrust reversers activate. However you would not rely on the latter feature to satisfy this requirement.

[flyingchanges]

The lever will never move from armed to disarmed, or disarmed to armed on its own. They must be talking about the status of the auto speedbrake function, not the physical handle itself.

[bubbers44]

The video is outside the spoiler panels so may or may not have been deployed. AA procedures is to manually deploy them if they didn't deploy. Also using reversers will deploy them if they are not armed. Braking is the question. Why couldn't they stop? Manual brakes should have worked fine. Auto brakes are not required to stop.

[Airbubba]

During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.

The lever will never move from armed to disarmed, or disarmed to armed on its own. They must be talking about the status of the auto speedbrake function, not the physical handle itself.

I wonder if the confusion is over nomenclature.

The speedbrake lever has three labeled positions, Down, Armed and Up. When the lever is fully up on the quadrant, it is in the Down position. When it it fully down, it is in the Up postion. I wonder if the NTSB brief meant the handle briefly moved down to the Up position, then returned to Armed.

Kinda sounds like some of those possibly ersatz non-flying handling pilot procedures that were going around ops bulletin boards a few years ago.

If you lightly bounce on landing with a little extra power or gusty winds, sometimes the speedbrake lever will cycle as the tilt sensors load and unload before weight is fully on the wheels. Or, so I'm told...:)

Some carriers use manual speedbrakes (and throttles) for gusty landings, others do not. Looks like the speedbrake lever was indeed armed on this approach.

I have never seen a pilot deploy thrust reversers before touchdown. Has anybody else? They won't deploy in modern aircraft if you did so what difference does it make?

Years ago those country boys at Piedmont had a homemade short field procedure on the 737-200 where they would pull the throttles to idle and pull back on the T/R levers in the flare. As soon as the gear touched down and the squat switches closed, the buckets would open without delay for a quick stop. Later when the 737-300's came along, the T/R levers were released by ten (or was it five?) feet radar altitude causing a spectacular fall from grace when the short field 'technique' was used.

[Machinbird]

bubbers44
The video is outside the spoiler panels so may or may not have been deployed.I went to the effort of locating where the 757 outboard spoiler panels were supposed to be relative to the passenger video. A piece of the outboard spoiler should have been visible when the camera scanned aft. It is my opinion that the spoilers never deployed. Approximately 1 second before hitting the snow at the end, the camera angled back for an an instant and there was no spoiler visible then either.

[tribo]

Airbubba


Years ago those country boys at Piedmont had a homemade short field procedure on the 737-200 where they would pull the throttles to idle and pull back on the T/R levers in the flare. As soon as the gear touched down and the squat switches closed, the buckets would open without delay for a quick stop. Later when the 737-300's came along, the T/R levers were released by ten (or was it five?) feet radar altitude causing a spectacular fall from grace when the short field 'technique' was used.

What was the efficiency of "bucket" T/R compared to todays T/R?

[misd-agin]

tribo - someone might have the technical numbers but 'buckets' divert 100% of the air.

With fan engines only the fan(N1) airflow gets diverted. The core thrust is not part of the reverser thrust system.

Accelerating a fan(high bypass) engine in reverse actually increases the forward thrust from the core but it is offset by the increased stopping power of the fan(N1) thrust being diverted.

And different engines have different effectiveness. The PW engines on the 757 have better reverse thrust than the RR powered 757's.

[misd-agin]

airbubba - "I wonder if the confusion is over nomenclature.

The speedbrake lever has three labeled positions, Down, Armed and Up. When the lever is fully up on the quadrant, it is in the Down position. When it it fully down, it is in the Up postion. I wonder if the NTSB brief meant the handle briefly moved down to the Up position, then returned to Armed."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Huh? Down is up, and up is down? 9,000+ hrs on the airplane and "up on the quadrant", along with your other explainations, confuses the heck out of me so I wonder how an ESL(english as a second language) person, or a non pilot, could understand your statements.

The handle fully forward is down(also 'stowed').

There's a slight detent that can be felt when the handle is first moved aft. That is the 'armed' detent and a light is activated that indicates the speedbrakes are 'armed'.

If the speedbrakes are 'armed' they should deploy with WOW(weight on wheels). Armed, or not armed, they should deploy when the thrust reversers are used.

Moving the handle aft(back/rearwards/deployed/out) deploys the speedbrakes in flight. With WOW it also deploys the inboard ground spoilers.

The autobrakes, if armed, should always work. If the braking action by the spoilers and reverse thrust is greater than the selected autobrake setting(1,2,3,4, max) the brakes don't engage until the total deacceleration rate is below the selected autobrake setting.

For example, thrust reverser and spoilers is about a deacceleration rate of just under 3. So if brakes 2 are selected the brakes won't be applied until thrust reverse effectiveness drops below '2' as the a/c slows.

If brakes 3 are selected the brakes are used slightly at high speed(w/thrust reverser and spoilers) and increase brake pressure as the a/c slows and thrust reverse effectivness decreases.

Brakes 4/MAX apply brakes harder throughout the landing.

From a pilot's perspective on a dry runway brakes 2 aren't felt until the thrust reversers are stowed. Brakes 3 are felt slightly during the landing roll. The application of brakes 4, or more, are obvious on a dry runway even when thrust reversers are being used.

Obviously runways less than dry have different reactions. The difference between what the pilots expect and what they actually experience is how 'reported braking action' reports are generated.

[sevenstrokeroll]

we do need to use words properly. I prefer "Illuminate" to light up

I prefer deploy or extended

I prefer stowed or retracted

and abbreviations are surrounding us...TR? when I first learned TR it stood for transformer rectifier...and now everyone seems to say thrust reverser.


do you remember the old nursery rhyme: sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never harm me...unless I misunderstand and am flying a plane

[bubbers44]

Remember when the call takeoff power was replaced with max power after the go around accident when the captain called for takeoff power and the FE did take it off? I agree for speed brakes, stowed and extended, rather than up and down would make it crystal clear for everybody.

[viking767]

There's a slight detent that can be felt when the handle is first moved aft. That is the 'armed' detent and a light is activated that indicates the speedbrakes are 'armed'.



Where is that light?

[Echo_Kilo]

@Bubbers

Compare the video to this picture....Pretty much the same point of view. To ease it, use the vortex gen as a reference.

Photos: Boeing 757-223 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/American-Airlines/Boeing-757-223/1003162/L/&sid=0b4a1f56b366d65cb0bf67e0c0efa44e)

In my opinion definitely no spoiler deflection...



Cheers,

[sevenstrokeroll]

yes bubbers 44...

I remember when one captain just said: Fifteen

I looked at HER and said, what do you mean, FIFTEEN.

she lectured me on situational awareness and that FIFTEEN could only mean flaps FIFTEEN during an approach.

I then told her that FIFTEEN could also mean she was adding FIFTEEN Knots to her Vref

Or that we were crabbing FIFTEEN degrees for wind

and that if SHE wanted flaps fifteen, she could say: FLAPS FIFTEEN or ONE FIVE or ONE FIFE

[bubbers44]

EK, thanks for that picture. I have been trying to find one from that angle and haven't been sucessful. It looks like this pic was taken a row or two behind the video shot. I couldn't see the vortex gen's well enough to count 5 1/2 in on the video but noticed that point was a few inches inboard of the second LED so replayed the video again and cannot be sure if the spoilers made the left side of the video or not. It looks like the edge of the video came within a foot of the outboard spoiler looking at it using your picture. If the spoilers weren't deployed it had nothing to do with the pilots at that point in the video as the reversers cause spoiler operation even if the spoilers are not armed on the 757. If you have a better video than post 174 please post it.

The 757 has never let me down landing at critical airports. I trust it's systems and want to defend the airplane and crew until the NTSB comes out with their report.

[JammedStab]

Years ago those country boys at Piedmont had a homemade short field procedure on the 737-200 where they would pull the throttles to idle and pull back on the T/R levers in the flare. As soon as the gear touched down and the squat switches closed, the buckets would open without delay for a quick stop. Later when the 737-300's came along, the T/R levers were released by ten (or was it five?) feet radar altitude causing a spectacular fall from grace when the short field 'technique' was used.

I would think that would create a significant increase in a thrust reverser ground strike depending on the touchdown attitude. Seem to remember no thrust reverser selection on the -200 until derotating.

[sevenstrokeroll]

maybe we should have retrorocket/jatos for planes...I recall the navy experiment with landing a C130Hercules on a CArrier. Pilot got a DFC...airplane had: ''look ma, no hook'' painted on the side ...also had reverse rockets

pretty cool

[galaxy flyer]

sevenstrokeroll

No "retro rockets" used.

C-130 Hercules Lands on U.S.S. Forrestal (http://www.theaviationzone.com/factsheets/c130_forrestal.asp)

They might have considered using RATO-assisted take-off, if ever they used the Herk on board the ship, but it was cancelled. The Super STOL Herk developed by Lockheed used rockets for arrival and departure. It was reported to be developed for a second rescue attempt in Tehran. Crashed at Dobbins AFB.

GF

[Airbubba]

Huh? Down is up, and up is down? 9,000+ hrs on the airplane and "up on the quadrant", along with your other explainations, confuses the heck out of me so I wonder how an ESL(english as a second language) person, or a non pilot, could understand your statements.

You're right, I guess it is more fore and aft but it confuses me too. I realize from your post that English may not be your first language, my apologies.:ok:

There's a slight detent that can be felt when the handle is first moved aft. That is the 'armed' detent and a light is activated that indicates the speedbrakes are 'armed'.

I certainly don't have 9000+ hours on the 75 but I'm not familiar with the light that indicates that the speedbrakes are armed, is it on the pedestal somewhere?

[misd-agin]

Viking767 - "where is that light?"

:eek:

Touche. 737 has it. 757/767 doesn't.

Thanks for keeping the facts accurate.

[Airbubba]

I would think that would create a significant increase in a thrust reverser ground strike depending on the touchdown attitude. Seem to remember no thrust reverser selection on the -200 until derotating.

Yep, seems like you needed nose gear compression on the -200 to pop the reversers. The 737-300 and later uses RA or weight on wheels if RA is not available I believe.

You can use reverse on the 75 when the bogie tilt sensors are actuated, you don't have to wait for the nosewheel to come down.

[Checkerboard 13]

I couldn't see the vortex gen's well enough to count 5 1/2 in on the video but noticed that point was a few inches inboard of the second LED so replayed the video again and cannot be sure if the spoilers made the left side of the video or not.The frames of the video ~ :55 - :57 show a view of the wing very similar to that in Echo Kilo's linked photo.
Viewing the video directly on youtube allows a full screen view.
With it paused in the :55 - :57 range, full-screen, on an HD monitor, I can clearly see enough of the wing to be able to see where deployed spoilers ought to be. (Counting the gaps between the slats gives a good reference between photo and video.)
I do not see any spoilers.

[sevenstrokeroll]

the -200 had the RA bit too.

thanks for the info on the ''retro rockets''. I saw a picture of it somewhere on line.

I still favor a ground contact timer...hit a button or triggered by the middle marker and a timer starts a countdown for ''ground features enabled"...disabled only on TOGA selection

[Airbubba]

the -200 had the RA bit too.

Izzat so?:E

[411A]

Short review...
Proper touchdown point, maybe.
Delayed reverse.
No spoilers (possibly, even likely).
Poor braking.
Into the snowbank.
And, to top it all off, AA ran off with the DFDR, before the NTSB had a look-see.

Yup, sounds like an AA screw-up to me.
No surprise.:}

Then..is it possible that the B757 is just too large an airplane for the available runway at JAC, considering the winter conditions?

[sevenstrokeroll]

ours did, the later ones that is...the earlier ones were called bubbajets by those in the know.

[protectthehornet]

I don't think the 757 is too big for jackson hole airport...I do think that follow through on automatic features (spoilers) wasn't as good as it should have been.

I also think that there is an inherent weakness in selection of reverse.

[Airbubba]

ours did, the later ones that is...the earlier ones were called bubbajets by those in the know.

Thanks, I have learned to never think I knew what was on a particular model of Boeing after flying 17 variants of the 727-200 at a now defunct Once Great Airline. There might indeed be 75's somewhere with a speedbrake Armed light because the customer spec'ed it for standardization with the 737. Didn't Southwest still get round dials for a while in the new 73's while everybody else was using glass displays?

A lot of the stuff we are discussing about WOW, tilt sensors, and RA has been removed from newer manuals, replaced by phrases such as "reverse thrust is available only when the aircraft is on the ground".

[BobM2]

I would think that would create a significant increase in a thrust reverser ground strike depending on the touchdown attitude. Seem to remember no thrust reverser selection on the -200 until derotating.

When 737-200 was introduced in 1968 it had short nacelles with clamshell reverser doors much like 727. With this arrangement, reverse was very ineffective as reversers were under trailing edge flaps & tended to take weight off wheels when operated. The hydraulic "target" type reversers with extended nacelles were retrofitted by 1970 along with a nosewheel squat switch which prevented reverser operation until nosewheel touchdown. This was the configuration for about 10 years until it was decided that ground strike was not a concern & the nosewheel switch was removed. After that, reverse was available simultaneous with main gear touchdown & I don't recall any problems with ground strikes.

[Cough]

Bob,

Agree, but it used to be a 737-200 limitation that pitch attitude had to be reducing prior to selecting reverse.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I think the very first Boeing 737's were later called the -100 (only after the 200 came about).

I saw one in Continental colors at KDCA and when they went in reverse, the plane ligtened on the gear/oleo struts.

I also think the later 200's canted/angled the thrust reversers to avoid the strike.

The DC9 I flew could easily deploy thrust reversers while nose up (or illegally inflight) but it was always encouraged to have the nosewheel firmly on the ground.

[krohmie]

Tu 154 and Il 62 can do that (reverser inflight)

Photo Album: "The Best Of... [Reverse in flight]" | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/search/photo.search?album=7289)

[BandAide]

DC-8s had certificated in-flight reversers.

The B-757 is better on short fields than B737/A320 because it has greater stopping capability with double the braking wheels. ATA and others operated 75s into Midway for many years without going off the end. Southwest? Not so many.

In any case, no one lands on any field without the data to support it. When you're landing at high altitude, high terrain, short field, marginal weather airports - no matter what you're flying - bring your A game.

[galaxy flyer]

The DC-8, C-5, C-17 all have/had in-flight reverse thrust. The C-17 can, as I understand it, with spoilers and reverse, go from FL 250 to the runway in one 360 descending turn.

Totally, unrelated, as is any in-flight T/R, to the landing problem in B757 at KJAC

[sevenstrokeroll]

bandaide is quite right about the 757 vs 737 and stopping.

[bubbers44]

I still think if you look at the video and any post here you will find the spoilers not deploying can not be verified because of the angle of the camera. The video came to the edge of the spoilers but didn't show the spoilers. The NTSB report will hopefully clarify this. It isn't that important because when reverse was finally sucessful spoilers would have automatically deployed. The video didn't show it. I think the left side of the video was within inches of the spoilers but they were not displayed.

[Checkerboard 13]

Frame grab from the video:
http://i51.tinypic.com/2j4wkuw.jpg

Link (originally posted by Echo Kilo) to photo for comparison:
Photos: Boeing 757-223 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/American-Airlines/Boeing-757-223/1003162/L/)

Comparing the two, it appears to me that the spoilers should be visible in the video frame, if they were deployed.
(Also note that the reverser is almost fully deployed by this frame.)

[bubbers44]

It is a swept wing and if you look forward just inboard of the second slat you will notice that the spoiler isn't in the video. I think the video is no help but the NTSB report will tell the story.

[Machaca]

Video frame grab of an AA 757 landing at Cancun:

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA757landing1.jpg

[Checkerboard 13]

It is a swept wing and if you look forward just inboard of the second slat you will notice that the spoiler isn't in the video.Not sure I follow what you're saying.
It can't be "forward" as in fore/aft on the plane, as that would be ahead of the wing....

I'm comparing this frame to the photo (which clearly shows the spoilers.)
There are 4 slats between the engine pylon and the wingtip. In the photo, the outboard end of the outboard spoiler is almost dead even with the outboard end of the second slat (outboard of the pylon.)
That end of the slat is difficult to discern on the video frame, but I can see it on an HD monitor... and looking directly aft of that point, there is still a large section of the trailing edge of the wing visible where the spoilers should be. I don't see them.
I also see that the wing in the video is pitched farther forward than that in the photo (note the angle of the engine pylon for comparison.) That should make the spoilers even more evident.

As you say, the report will tell the story... but then why discuss the incident at all, if we're just going to wait for the report?!

[Checkerboard 13]

Frame grabs side by side:http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA757landing1.jpg http://i54.tinypic.com/2poa82q.jpg

[bubbers44]

With the new picture of the left wing I think possibly the video should have shown spoiler deployment. I don't think with reversers the spoilers couldn't be out. They are automatic even if not armed. I guess we will have to wait.

[SKS777FLYER]

There is no maybe at all about the frame grab from the landing video; and several other frames during the video. If the ground spoilers were deployed on the left wing in the frame grab, they would be visible.
At the point shown, near the north end of the terminal, there is about 2,000 or less feet to the end of the runway.

[Checkerboard 13]

Frame grab @ 1:07. Reverser fully deployed, engines fully spooled up, less than :05 before airplane departs paved runway. Still no spoilers visible.
http://i51.tinypic.com/2n7mf07.jpg

[LandIT]

Surely it is very clear spoilers are not observed at any point on the video and it should be possible to see them if they were deployed. Ergo they didn't deploy - not automatically, not manually and not with the eventual application of reverse thrust. There, I've said it (now ducking for incoming). Hence braking not as effective as it should have been. Now waiting for investigation to find out why spoilers did not deploy and why reverse thrust, which would have also helped, both seem to have malfunctioned.

[sevenstrokeroll]

At our airline, we had a mishap with the 737 spoiler system. The spoilers deployed on landing normally, and the handle was placed in the stowed/retracted/down position after turning off the runway.

Trouble was, the spoilers did not retract. The plane was going out again and even though the copilot did a walk around, he could not see the spoilers deployed. There was no indication in the cockpit that the spoilers were still deployed.

Fortunately, there was a deadheading crew which observed the spoilers from the cabin and communicated it to the cockpit in time.


The cable from the spoiler handle had broken just before attempted stowing after landing.

the handle was in the correct place, but didn't do anything.

is it possible the pilots attempted to deploy spoilers on this plane and moved the handle to no avail, or warning of failure?

[oldrnU-2]

Holy Smokes. Your observation drives home the point of engineer and pilot perceptions.

The aircraft engineer believes that the pilot is really trying to screw up his beautiful creation.

All the while, the pilot truly believes that the engineer's beautiful creation is, in reality, trying to kill him...:bored:

[Airbubba]

The plane was going out again and even though the copilot did a walk around, he could not see the spoilers deployed.

Wow, that would be a little hard to miss unless he used one of those 'banked' walk arounds. Maybe it was raining or something...:)

You can easily see the upper surface of the wing from under the tail of the '75 as I recall.

[sevenstrokeroll]

yes, but the plane in question was a 737

[Airbubba]

yes, but the plane in question was a 737

Thanks, seems like those would be pretty visible as well with the lower wing. But, on the ground, I don't think you get any light indication that the brakes are up on the modern Boeings.

I've certainly forgotten to stow the 'brakes after landing, coasted into rock star parking near the high speed turnoff overseas and had the mechanic gently remind me when he plugged in to tell me I was chocked.

[BobM2]

Wow, that would be a little hard to miss unless he used one of those 'banked' walk arounds. Maybe it was raining or something...http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif

The version of this story that I heard was the F/O saw the spoilers were up on the walkaround but returned to the cockpit to find the Capt in his seat & speedbrake handle down. He thought the Capt had stowed the handle & spoilers were down. Hard to believe he didn't look out the window to verify. It was said that Boeing claimed the airplane would fly in this configuration....

[newsandguide]

I'm a reporter in Jackson, Wyoming. I'm looking for an expert to decipher and comment on the latest NTSB report on the AA overrun. The Wall Street Journal quotes unnamed sources as saying this report indicates errors on the part of the crew. Please contact me at [email protected].

NTSB ISSUES SECOND UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT

In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:

At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.

Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) weather conditions prevailed around the time of the incident with a ceiling of 400 feet, light snow and visibility of 1 mile. Winds were 10 knots from 240 degrees. Runway friction measurement data obtained before and after the event have been provided by the Jackson Hole Airport Authority for further evaluation by the NTSB.

In the continuing investigation, work groups have been formed to examine the subject areas of air traffic control, airports, meteorology, flight crew operations, airworthiness, maintenance records, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight data recorder (FDR), and airplane performance.

The NTSB systems investigator conducted testing on the incident airplane from December 31, 2010, through January 6, 2011. Operational testing and examination was accomplished on the spoiler/auto speed brake, air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. No discrepancies were found in the air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated.

The maintenance group convened at the American Airlines facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to review airplane logbooks. The group focused primarily on the spoiler/speed brake, air/ground, and thrust reverser systems. No significant issues with any of these systems were recorded prior to the incident, and there were no open minimum equipment list (MEL) items at the time of the incident. The airplane was manufactured in June 1992 and, at the time of the incident, had accumulated 58,879 hours and 20,518 cycles. No discrepancies were noted during the last periodic service maintenance check conducted on December 26, 2010. The last heavy maintenance was accomplished in October 2005. The auto speed brake actuator was replaced in January 2008.

The CVR group convened on January 4, 2011, at the NTSB recorder laboratory. The group completed a transcript of the last 30 minutes of the recording and a summary of the previous 90 minutes. The transcript will be released when the public docket is opened.

The FDR group has begun the process of determining which of the documented parameters are installed and should be functional, and is checking the recorded data for validity. The group has verified the following factual information:

The FDR download contains the last 43.9 hours of data, more than the required 25 hours, and includes all of the incident flight.
The recorded speed brake handle position indicates that the speed brakes were manually extended by the flight crew during the approach after which the handle was left in the armed position until landing. The FDR records only the speed brake handle position and not the individual speed brake (spoiler) panel positions.
The FDR data indicate that the aircraft touched down at approximately 132 knots.
At touchdown, the air/ground parameter changes to "ground" for approximately one second and then switches to "air" for approximately ½ second before changing back to "ground" for the remainder of the recording.
During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.
Thrust Reverser (T/R) discrete parameters indicate that the T/Rs moved into the in-transit position during the ½ second that the air/ground logic parameter indicated "air."
The T/Rs remained in the in-transit position for approximately 10 seconds before transitioning to the stowed position for one second. The T/Rs then moved back to the in-transit position for an additional 6 seconds before becoming deployed.
The T/R discrete parameters indicate that approximately 18 seconds elapsed from the time the T/Rs began moving until they were fully deployed.
Additionally, the team has examined security camera videos provided by the airport as well as a video of the landing taken by one of the passengers.

The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the NTSB website

[sevenstrokeroll]

surprised that a journo is here

but, and off the record:

"System operation with this condition present is being investigated."


is very interesting to me

[Old Ag]

Hmmmm... This ought to be interesting.....

I'm not sure how you could possible glean a crew issue from this investigation update. It is far from complete and only addresses systems and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data.

The FDR points to a normal approach and landing with the speed brake lever momentarily moving toward the down position during the touchdown sequence before returning to the armed position for the duration of the event (Normally, the speed brake lever would be set to armed and and automatically move to the Up or extended position upon landing. This should be automatic so long as certain parameters are met). They also note an error in the way the speed brake handle was installed, but did not definitively state that it was a contributing factor. They also discuss the operation of the thrust reversers and ground logic circuits and relate the timing of the thrust reverser deployment and speedbrake handle movement to the ground logic. Thus far they have not found any system performance issues or maintainence issues but have not ruled them out.

They also do not discuss aircraft performance, which will undoubtedly become a major area of the investigation.

While one could speculate about crew actions that could have caused this scenario, the NTSB has made no comment regarding the crew's performance. To report a crew issue at this point would be speculation based upon rumor and opinion, which does not make good journalism.

[411A]

To report a crew issue at this point would be speculation based upon rumor and opinion, which does not make good journalism.


But...does however question why both pilots never (apparently) noticed that no ground spoilers ever deployed.
I would speculate...more AA pilot complete nonsense.
IE: can't determine the forest for the trees.:ugh:

[L337]

no ground spoilers never deployed

? So they deployed....

[bubbers44]

411A, it sounds like you are feeding the journo N&G guy with BS info. Please STFU. He is trying to write a story to put in the press so just STFU. You are speculating on what happened. Let the NTSB figure it out. He will probably put in the press anything interesting you say but you will look like an idiot if it is not true.

By the way, I know the 757, flying it for years, and pilot inputs without mechanical failure, in my opinion, would not allow this to happen. Obviously the pilots tried to deploy the reversers by the reverser moving an inch. 18 seconds later they finally came out but do you see the auto spoilers come out as required with deployment in the video? Are they visible in the video?

[BandAide]

I fly into Jackson Hole routinely in an A319. On the A319/320, at my airline, the procedure and required callout by the PNF immediately after touchdown is, "Spoilers up" or "Spoilers not up". It's the same at Jackson Hole as it is anywhere with a long dry runway. Given the quality of my landings, that's usually the first indication we have touched down, not having felt anything.

Is the 757 similar? Does a display pop up showing the position of the flight controls at touchdown?

If spoilers did not deploy, the pilot must immediately use manual braking aggressively to assure stopping the airplane on the available remaining runway.

[Spooky 2]

You can twist this deal anyway you want but if the spoilers did not deploy for any reason, it becomes the responsibility of the PM to call them out and the PF to deploy them. It would appear at this point, that this did not happen. Boeing FCTM spells this out very clearly and I'm sure AA trains this procedure as the FAA has made a fairly big issue of it in the past.

Hey, **** happens! :mad:

[justanotheraviator]

Not B757 but as it is a common endorsement with the B767 the Boeing 767 FCOM Landing Roll Procedure has as its first item -

Pilot Flying
Verify that the thrust levers are closed.
Verify that the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is UP

Pilot Not Flying
Verify that the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is UP
Call "SPEEDBRAKES UP"

If the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is not UP, call "SPEEDBRAKES NOT UP"

Now after 16 years on type I don't remember exactly when this procedure was added and I believe it wasn't there when I came on type but it certainly wasn't added recently.

BandAide it is the lever which gives the indication. As I indicated above it is a standard Boeing call the same as the standard Airbus "Ground Spoilers" call.

[alf5071h]

From a human factors view, the call "SPEEDBRAKES UP" is very similar to "SPEEDBRAKES NOT UP". This could result in ‘wish think’ – hearing what is expected, particularly as the emotive ‘speedbrake’ is called in all normal operations – expectation error.
Some aircraft changed the crew calls and indications to remove this kind of anomaly; the resulting predominance is to only call the failed case - NO SPEEDBRAKE / SPOILER !

[aa73]

The correct callout at AA is either: "Deployed" or "No Spoilers."

And yes it is very emphasized at our recurrent training every 9 months, so much so that on many occasions the instructor will fail the spoilers on a landing/abort, just to make sure we are up to speed on the procedure.

I would withhold judgment on the JAC incident until all the facts come out.

[SKS777FLYER]

For probably the umpteenth time. AA 757/767 procedure after touchdown, regarding the spoilers.... PNF, if spoiler handle does not move aft to the deployed position immediately after TD, announce "NO SPOILERS"....the Captain then immediately grabs the spoiler handle and manually deploys them
The PNF is simultaneously monitoring engine display for REVERSE indication, and if amber followed by green REVERSE does not occur, announces "NO REVERSE Left" or "No REVERSE Right" or, if both not indicating, calls out "NO REVERSE". The PNF is also monitoring speed, runway position (center, left or right) runway remaining and speed relative to the end of runway. If speed is greater than 80 knots and 3,000 feet of runway remaining, the callout is "MAX BRAKES"

Whether or not the spoilers were armed, they should have deployed when the reverser (s) deployed, of course it was too late by then. If the spoilers are used in flight (NTSB said they were used in flight) the handle must first be returned to the full down stop, then moved into the "armed" detent prior to landing for the spoilers to actually arm for auto-deployment.

Flew the 757 for AA as a line CKA in and out of KJAC numerous times checking out pilots from the mid 90's when it was a unicom field, thru it's getting a Tower and part time tower operators sometime around the beginning of the Bush administration (V.P. Cheney lived/s in JAC and often had his 2 Air Force C-32 jets parked on the tarmac. (C32 = B757-200)

[sevenstrokeroll]

you american pilots and former american pilots, I applaud the terminology you use:

deployed or no spoilers...it is much clearer than using the word spoilers in both scenarios.

I do hope we find out what happened soon. Sadly, and I do mean sadly, I am concerned that the problem lies within the human element on this landing.

we, as the human component, must be alert to mechanical failure and be prepared to act.

I think that the 757 is just fine for this airport...the more wheels on the runway, the better for stopping.

american is one of the oldest lines in the country...if they screwed up, anyone could screw up.

we must all be ready to act until we have turned the ship over to the ground mx crew or another flight crew.

I do think that the Southwest over run at Chicago Midway should have taught us all a lesson on what to do if the reversers don't come out very soon after touchdown.

[411A]

...I am concerned that the problem lies within the human element on this landing.


Are you really surprised, considering the airline involved?:rolleyes:

[bubbers44]

411A, before you make any more remarks about how much you hate AA and think their pilots are idiots could you wait for the NTSB report? Thanks.

[Spooky 2]

Care to enlighten us on what SWA should have done at MDY?

[aa73]

Care to enlighten us on what SWA should have done at MDY?

Negative, you won't hear a peep out of 411A no matter how many crashes an airline has if it's not AA. :}

[sevenstrokeroll]

spooky 2, are you talking to me? do you mean KMDW?

if so...the difficulty in getting into reverse on the SW flight is pretty important...18 seconds after touchdown to getting into reverse. Should the copilot have taken over? Did the captain blank out for a second or two too much? Was their problems in the mechanics of the thrust reverser throttle?

Certainly landing into wind would have helped a bit. When you DO GET TO USE Reverse thrust in your landing calculations, getting into reverse better be part of the equation of stopping the plane and the pilots need to get into reverse PRONTO.

As most of the forum readers know, reverse thrust is not used in landing calculations in the great majority of planes and situations. SW and Boeing managed to get reverse thrust ''counted'' in their plane and situation.

[bubbers44]

My situation on a short runway and one reverser not working was not known until touchdown and reverser deployment was not possible on that engine. Using reverse thrust on landing for stopping only works if the reversers deploy. Reverse thrust is not guaranteed so should not be used for landing criteria.

[sevenstrokeroll]

bubbers...how the FAA ever got conned into allowing boeing and southwest to get away with that I will never know.

[411A]

Care to enlighten us on what SWA should have done at MDY?
Divert seems entirely reasonable to me.
IE: why stick your neck out if you don't have to?

Southwest did at Midway, and paid the price, no doubt about it.

[lomapaseo]

I do suppose that there is a presumption on landing, that the brakes will work, that the spoilers will work and that the reversers will work (all as typical). But should anyone of them not work, that suffcient margin coupled with pilot skill can compensate.

It appears that two or more of these didn't fit the presumptions. I will await the findings to see which ones

[safetypee]

For normal landing performance, credit for reverse can be claimed (normally by the manufacturer) if reverse can be shown by certification to be sufficiently reliable. AFAIK very few manufacturers have achieved this, probably because of the many interlocks to ensure that reverse will not come out in flight, thus increasing the probability of system unavailability or relatively ‘inconsistent’ response on the ground (details in FAR/CS25.125 ‘… means other than wheel brakes').

For contaminated runway operations, the European approach is that reverse thrust can be used, but the increased risk is mitigated by the assumption of low exposure – rare occurrences, as it is strongly recommended that contaminated runways are avoided, and also that the landing performance is calculated by standard certification methods.

Some US operators appear to have a FAA dispensation similar to the EU approach, but I am uncertain as how the risks are mitigated, particularly as contaminated operations are often taken to be normal. Thus a reverse ‘failure’ on a contaminated runway contains an element of increased risk, which if encountered on a limiting runway (considered to be always for a contaminated runway), then an overrun is most likely, particularly as there little or no safety margin in the distance calculations, as there has to be with non-contaminated operations.

[cwatters]

It appears the reversers were a long time in the "in-transit mode" when for all practical purposes they were stowed. So if you glance at the indicators at the right time the fact that they are amber might lead you to believe the reversers are behaving normally and will be available in a second or two. Obviously you don't wait forever but if your attention was drawn to the speedbrake problem at just the wrong moment would that delay the point at which your realise the reversers aren't working either. Cycle the reversers and are you at 12 seconds yet?

[alph2z]

FTR,

Here is a reanalysis of the gnd-speed and deceleration of the plane in question using a more advanced method for cases where few data points are available.

The deceleration data point at the 6000 ft runway mark is probably -1.8 m/s/s (the most problematic due to the limited view in the video).

Also included, the average decelerations, to 40 knots, for SWA1248 and 2 prior flights to SWA1248 at Chicago.

[Admiral346]

Alph2Z, it seems to me your graph is off.

As the green line (speed) is a function of the red line (deceleration), it should become less steep after 5000' as deceleration becomes less.
The blue and purple dots at 0' for other aircraft are completely meaningless on a graph like this.

And the deceleration at 6000' shows -1.5 obviously, not -1.8 as you write. That would be at 5000'.

[alph2z]

Nic, see my replies after the alph2z >>

Alph2Z, it seems to me your graph is off. alph2z >> as I noted in my post, possibly the 6000 ft deceleration; the most difficult pt to determine from the video.

As the green line (speed) is a function of the red line (deceleration), it should become less steep after 5000' as deceleration becomes less. alph2z >> I quickly learned that it is extremely difficult to obtain acceleration from a plot of speed ! :( On the other hand numbers speak for themselves.

The blue and purple dots at 0' for other aircraft are completely meaningless on a graph like this. alph2z >> Nope, they tell us what average deceleration is achievable in fair to poor braking conditions.

And the deceleration at 6000' shows -1.5 obviously, not -1.8 as you write. That would be at 5000'. alph2z >> As I find typing-text to be extremely boring I kept it, maybe, too sparse. The numbers say -1.5 but if you believe braking action increased monotonically then I would suspect -1.8 is more probable :}
.

[airman1900]

The NTSB has released to the public, on Oct. 21 , 2011, a docket, NTSB accident id no DCA11IA015, which can be found at:

Accident ID DCA11IA015 Mode Aviation occurred on December 29, 2010 in Jackson Hole, WY United States Last Modified on October 14, 2011 16:10 Public Released on October 21, 2011 09:10 Total 33 document items (http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=50468&CFID=37804&CFTOKEN=47515771)

on this accident including a CVR transcript, an "Interview Summary" and a "Group Chairman's Factual Report" which includes the following:


The FO said he planned to touchdown at 1,000 feet or less from the approach end of the runway, that he saw the runway about 300 to 400 feet above the ground, and that it looked like it was contaminated with snow. Once he transitioned to visual conditions he attempted to use the 1,000 foot marker as an aim point, and he believed he touched down firmly at about 800 feet past the threshold. He said when he tried to go into reverse, the levers moved slightly but he could not get the thrust reversers (TRs) out. On his second attempt to deploy the reversers, he told the captain that he could not get them into reverse. He said the captain took control of the TRs and told the FO to steer. The FO said he did not feel deceleration from the auto braking. He heard the captain say something about braking and he hit the brake pedals and went to max manual braking, but "the airplane felt like a sled." The captain confirmed that the flight landed as planned on "the first part of the runway," and that he told the first officer to recycle the thrust levers after they failed to deploy. The captain said he took control of the reversers and recycled the thrust levers 2 to 3 times and that both of them went to maximum manual braking but did not feel deceleration.

The FO said the TRs finally came out at about 2,000 feet or less remaining of the runway, and he could hear them operating but the deceleration was not normal. He saw the runway lights at the end and chose to go to the right because it looked smoother and he wanted to avoid hitting the lighting. He said there was about 3 feet of snow at the end of the runway where it had been plowed, and they impacted the snow, which stopped the airplane

Both pilots said the speed brake lever was armed during the flight, and it was still in the armed position after the aircraft stopped. Max autobrakes were set but were still in "max auto" after stopping. The captain said he did not check the "autobrakes" light during or after landing, and he did not look at the EICAS (engine indicating and crew alerting system) because he was looking out at the runway. The captain said he did not call out that the speedbrake was not deployed during landing, although the callout was part of the procedure. Both pilots confirmed that AAL policy was that speedbrakes should be deployed manually if they do not deploy automatically. The FO said that he noted the "left reverse isolation valve" and "auto spoiler"6 messages were on the EICAS after the incident.

[aterpster]

Question for those of you current on the 757: does this appear to be a crew screw up or a mechanical failure?

[pattern_is_full]

Could be both:

mechanical jam (as crew describes) preventing the throttle levers from moving into reverse detent (which is apparently required for automatic braking/spoiler operation) -

- and focusing on the TR jam distracted the crew (as they themselves note) from noticing that the spoilers were not up and the autobrakes did not go into operation, so they lost seconds before going to manual braking, and didn't note the spoiler condition at all.

Seems to boil down to the (still open, IMHO, from previous discussion) question of whether the plane could have been stopped had the crew immediately gone to manual braking and spoiler deployment (without TR) - on this slippery runway.

[Spooky 2]

I do not know the casue of this accident but your assumption is wrong.

"mechanical jam (as crew describes) preventing the throttle levers from moving into reverse detent (which is apparently required for automatic braking/spoiler operation)"

Autobrakes and auto spoilers are in no way dependent on reversers operating although deployment of the reversers will trigger spoiler deployment whether they are armed or not.

[pattern_is_full]

Thanks for clarifying...

[fdr]

I do not know the cause of this accident but your assumption is wrong.

"mechanical jam (as crew describes) preventing the throttle levers from moving into reverse detent (which is apparently required for automatic braking/spoiler operation)"

Autobrakes and auto spoilers are in no way dependent on reversers operating although deployment of the reversers will trigger spoiler deployment whether they are armed or not.

Statement is true in itself, however other single source failures can result in these events being concurrent. A simple trip/failure of the G/A sensing relays will result in reverser interlocks being inop, brake pressure being limited to IFB, and autospoilers not functioning, or combinations dependent on the aircraft type. On some aircraft, the manual spoiler will be limited to flight values, not ground operation values.

Does this occur? occasionally, even on an A340 having a hard landing event :)

[bubbers44]

As a new captain I landed at Reno as the first flight at 0530 and found coming out of reverse I had no braking action at all so used full reverse to stop. Otherwise I would have gone off the end of the runway. The pilots always get blamed but sometimes it is the luck of the draw. Our reversers got us stopped, the brakes didn't. Thank God the reversers worked to stop us. If one had failed we would have been in the news.

[Spooky 2]

Thanks for the reply but I'm not sure if you are generalizing here or speaking directly to the B757-200? No question about it there are always exceptions to the rules or logic in this case. Is that what happened though?

[Rollingthunder]

Jet's skid off runway highlights pilot complacency on automation


June 6, 2012 - 1:20PM
.


Brake system failures combined with human error led to an American Airlines jetliner skidding off a runway in Wyoming, the US National Transportation Safety Board said.

The flight from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport to Jackson Hole Airport on December 29, 2010, overshot the end of the 1.9km runway into a snowy field after landing. None of the 179 passengers and 6 crew members aboard the Boeing 757 were injured.

The incident highlights an issue that has arisen in recent accidents around the world: today's automated, reliable aircraft can breed complacency in pilots, the NTSB concluded.

A simultaneous series of events aboard the jetliner prevented its braking systems from functioning, the investigation found. The pilots, distracted by the initial failures, could have stopped the plane had they manually deployed some of those systems, the agency concluded.

"This incident demonstrates that experienced pilots can become distracted during unusual events," Katherine Wilson, an NTSB investigator who specializes in human performance, said.

The pilots attempted to switch on thrust reversers, devices that use engines to help a plane stop, after touchdown. The plane's computers prevented them from working, the investigation found. Pilots interviewed after the accident didn't know about the issue, the investigation found.

Panels on top of the wings known as speedbrakes, which flip up upon touchdown, also didn't work, the safety board found. Brakes are ineffective without those panels, which force a plane's wheels to the ground.

The captain on the flight erroneously called out that the speedbrakes were working, according to the NTSB. The plane could have stopped safely if the pilots had manually switched on the speedbrakes, the investigation found.

As jets have become more computer-driven, pilots spend more time monitoring autopilots and other systems, NTSB Chairman Debbie Hersman said in an interview after the hearing.

"That monitoring is no less important than the hand flying they once did, and failing to be attentive to the monitoring can be just as catastrophic," Hersman said.

The pilots landing in Jackson Hole, distracted by the thrust-reverser failure, didn't follow American's direction to check whether things such as speedbrakes are working, the NTSB concluded.

The NTSB voted to recommend that all airlines develop new training on the importance of monitoring speedbrakes. A review of incident reports by the safety board found 11 cases in which the speedbrakes activated and then deactivated on their own.

The board also recommended that a warning horn be installed on jets to alert pilots if the speedbrakes are not working. The board doesn't have authority to implement changes on its own.

Bloomberg/SMH

[thepotato232]

Is the failure of speed brakes and thrust reversers (independent of associated failures such as hydraulics) part of the sim ride for anyone around here? Because it's not for me - every time I've landed a simulator in training without those devices, it was predictable, it was briefed, and it was all pretty much part of the usual checkride script. I would hope a few lesson plans will be getting an amendment after this.

It seems the body of the NTSB report does a commendable job of pointing out the technical gremlins at play, but the headline of Rollingthunder's quoted story is a predictable example of how the findings will be interpreted by the peanut gallery.

[Rollingthunder]

Allergic to peanuts

[Check Airman]

8. The captain's erroneous speedbrakes "deployed" callout was likely made in anticipation (not in confirmation) of speedbrake deployment after he observed the speedbrake handle's initial movement; after the "deployed" callout was made, both pilots likely presumed that the reliable automatic speedbrakes were functioning normally and focused on the thrust reverser problem.




One of those things where habit takes over. Incidentally, I've seen this exact situation before. FO is PF, auto spoilers inop, and Captain calls out "deployed" after touchdown.


I've observed AA crews. Their SOP seems for the PM to keep his hand at the base of the thrust levers (just above the fuel control switches) during landing. I still can't figure why they do that. I wonder if it would be better for the CA to have his hand near the spoiler lever during landing while he is PM instead. That way, there's a tactile confirmation that the lever has moved. What do you guys think?

[sevenstrokeroll]

check:

the DC9 series makes an interesting sort of screechy sound when the handle moves to activate the ground spoilers automatically...the absence of the sound calls your attention to the problem of no speed brakes/spoilers.

I would suggest a sound indicating the speedbrakes are deployed. a unique sound to be sure.

having the hand at the base of the throttles isn't a bad idea, especially for a go around.

we are too dependent upon automatic stuff. its that simple.

[Check Airman]

Thanks.

I can easily see why this CA called deployed. He's landed the plane a thousand times, and every time it's been deployed. Force of habit.

I'm not sure I agree with automation dependency on this particular issue. I'd rather have the auto system reliably and consistently deploying the speedbrakes than a distracted PM.

re. hand on the thrust levers- I'm not following how it helps to have the PM's hand at the base of the thrust levers. Assuming the PF remains the same for the APP and the GA, what's the benefit? The PM's hand will be busy with the flaps, gear radio, and MCP. The PF will already have his hand on the thrust levers. What am I missing here? My airline doesn't do that.

[sevenstrokeroll]

hand at base of throttles:

not that our airline does that in normal conditions, but during catagory 2 approaches, we would put our hand below the other pilots hand in case of a go around, we would back up throttle movement to takeoff thrust/go around thrust.

And of course the captain can ''take it' any time he wants

I understand of course tht this wasn't a cat 2.

[Check Airman]

They do it on all landings:rolleyes:. Different strokes I suppose.

[Shell Management]

Again American training is shown to be weak by NTSB.:sad:

[aa73]

As far as I know, below 1000ft, AA mandates the PM's hand to be below the fuel switches and the other hand near the flight controls so that he can take over with minimal hand movements/coordination should the PF go incapacitated. Overkill? Maybe. Remember, AA is big into ancestral worship.

Also - as far as I know - every airline out there has some kind of call out for spoiler deployment upon touchdown - either "Spoilers", "Deployed", or "No Spoilers." Isn't that how everyone does it? How is AA different in that regard?

[aa73]

Again American training is shown to be weak by NTSB.

I guarantee you that ANY airline's training would be deemed "weak" by the NTSB following any kind of incident/accident. They always find holes in the training. This has been true for every airline incident/accident in which pilots have been found at fault.

[sevenstrokeroll]

Pilots...good bad and the ugly

Some pilots are really good...on their toes for everything and ready, thinking ahead all the time (except for losing their pensions).

Some pilots are ''too cool for school'' and just go along for the ride.

jackson hole, at night in a big jet...you better be ready

same with DCA, LGA, MDW, SNA and many others.

A beautiful day, no traffic at IAD? well, its not too bad...but watch out for traffic.

I remember a C130 at jackson hole takeoff or go around...I've forgotten and they had a CFIT.

I like the idea of having the NFP with his hands at base of throttle and ''ready" just in case.

Anyone know if the 757 has a radar alt ''on ground' feature(like some 737), or is it weight on wheels?

Southwest at midway...pilot didn't get into reverse for 18 seconds after landing

AA at little rock, plane didn't know it was on the ground...wet runway

YOU , the PILOT have always to be ready.

[TowerDog]

Again American training is shown to be weak by NTSB.


AA's training is not weak, but every airline has certain indivuals, who for whatever reason do their own thing....:confused:

AA's procedure calls for verifcation of spoiler deployment upon touch down, serious enough on a regular dry runway, much more so at high elevation and contaminated with snow. Can't blame the training department for a pilot having a brain-fart..:sad:

[pattern_is_full]

Talk about the holes in the Swiss Cheese lining up - rapidly:

(Hole) However, the precise timing of the unloading of the main landing gear just after touchdown

(Hole) that coincided with the deployment of the thrust reversers

(Hole) resulted in a rare mechanical/hydraulic interaction in the thrust reverser system,

(Hole) and the thrust reversers were locked in transit instead of continuing to deploy.

(Hole) Further, an unrelated defect in the automatic speedbrake mechanism

(Hole) prevented the speedbrakes from automatically deploying.

[drive73]

Ntsb and FAA investigations seem to never take into account time constraints. They seem to forget these guys have little time to register and understand and react to a multiple failure event. They don't have the liberty to read, ponder, kick it around with other colleagues for six months. This kind of accident is over in seconds, unfortunately human brains have limited ability to deal with multiple issues at once, as we see every day while passing people talking on cell phones while driving. Had this just been a single issue, it most likely wouldn't have been an accident.

[Check Airman]

Agreed.

That's the "you weren't there" factor. When you're going down the runway at 130kt and your main stopping force (reversers on a snow covered runway) is inoperative, you don't have time to run through AOM vol 2 in your head to diagnose and treat the problem.

[nomorecatering]

This has been an interesting thread, certainly gets one thinking about landing performance.

But there is one thing that has not been touched, especially in todays climate of Human factors/TEM training. Runway length. Unfortunately it seems that the TEM syllabus assumes that its only flight crews that can make a cockup. But what about airport planners.

Take Jackson Hole. A 1900m/6800ft runway at an eleveation of 6,800ft msl. Add snow, ice, poor braking conditions etc etc, and big jets. I think the industry as a whole can take some of the blame, a machoistic drive to shoehorn the biggiest equipment into the smallest bit of realestate possible.....for what reason, cause it can be done.

Looking at Jackson Hole, this accident typifies whats wrong with the industry. You have a wide, flat expanse of realestate surrounding the airport, unencoubered by terrain or urban development unlike Miday. Why not simply extend the runway by 1000m. That extra distance would mean a small cockup would not havecdire consequences.

As i see it TEM applies just as much to airport planners as it does to pilots.

[aterpster]

Nomorecatering:

Looking at Jackson Hole, thisaccident typifies whats wrong with the industry. You have a wide, flat expanseof real estate surrounding the airport, unencoubered by terrain or urbandevelopment unlike Miday. Why not simply extend the runway by 1000m. That extradistance would mean a small cockup would not have dire consequences.

Good thoughts but just plain wrong at this particular location. When the airport was built it was on county land. Later on the National Park Service wanted to extend the boundaries of Teton National Park further south to prevent private development from encroaching on an area that represents a very nice view from the highway.

This resulted in the park boundaries encompassing the airport, unlike when it was built. The National Park Service (NPS) agreed at the time they would in no way interfere with the operation of the airport. Then, some years went by and both the airlines and Jackson County drew up plans to add an additional 1,000 feet to the runway. By this time the greenies had become shrill to the point they didn’t want so much as a leaf disturbed in any national park, but especially Teton. And, the NPS had grown more reactionary along the same lines.

So, the Greenies screamed about the runway extension, lawsuits were threatened, and the NPS just plain said “No way” to the Jackson County Airport Authority. Jackson County accused the federal government of a double-cross and the NPS said, “Tough Sh*t.”

[Shell Management]

AA73 - thats why airlines need to prepare safety cases: http://www.caa.lv/upload/userfiles/files/SMS/Read%20first%20quick%20overview/SHELL%20Safety%20Cases%20C%20J%20Edwards.pdf
Certainly there should be one for operating in and out of Jackson Hole.

Safety Cases Save Lives!

[aa73]

Hi Shell,

AA, like all other airlines, incorporates safety cases during our recurrent training every 9 months. We have a dedicated 4 hour session titled "Human Factors" in which many actual real-life scenarios are presented to us.

[Shell Management]

:ugh::ugh:
I take it from that answer that AA do not have a strctured assessment (for example in the excellent bow tie methodology BowTieXP (http://www.governors.nl/bowtiexp.html)) of the associated hazardous events and the associated controls, recovery measures and remedial actions.

Instead they are just showing a few powerpoinbts.:mad:

[Matari]

"Shell Management" : (note the qualifier quotations)

Bow Tie is just one of many tools used (https://www2.hf.faa.gov/Workbenchtools/default.aspx?rPage=Tooldetails&subCatId=43&toolID=21) for risk assessment. It has pluses and minuses like any other.

Just because Shell may use it, doesn't make it fit every other operator. Why do you assume that AA simply uses powerpoints in risk assessments?

Does Shell use Bow Tie for oil spill risk assessments? Given Shell's horrendous environmental record in Nigeria, one could argue that Bow Tie is a very poor tool indeed.

[Chu Chu]

Maybe "Shell" is a verb.

[TrakBall]

nomorecatering said...

"I think the industry as a whole can take some of the blame, a machoistic drive to shoehorn the biggiest equipment into the smallest bit of realestate possible.....for what reason, cause it can be done."

I was at American Airlines when they started service to Jackson Hole and I questioned the choice of the 757 to a friend in the Flight Department and his answer was illuminating. The reason they chose the 757 for that route was because it was considered the safest plane in the fleet to fly it.

I agree that another 1000' of runway would be great for that airport and would substantially increase the margin of safety. However, remember the airport is essentially in a bowl surrounded by much higer terrain at a fairly high altitude. When all factors are considered, the 757 had the best takeoff and climb performance - even with an engine out - for this airport.

I agree that airlines are always looking to maximize revenue...every company is...but in this case, I know that airpcraft performance was the driving factor in the selection of the 757 for this route.

[fireflybob]

If the speedbrake deploys normally there should, in my opinion, be no callout as this is normal operation.

If the speedbrake does not deploy then there should be a call "No Speedbrake" but more importantly manual selection.

Years ago we managed well without all these what I call "Master Green" (as opposed to "Master Caution") calls.

There seems to be an idea around that just because you say something it's happening - the human brain does not operate that way.

Not sure whether this has been mentioned in the thread so far but failure of auto speedbrake in regular sim checks are also a way of highlighting the importance of this verification.

As regards the TEM aspect of building a longer runway you could argue that the certification standards and landing distance regs are also part of the TEM debate.

[BOAC]

May I bring this particular 'planning'/'greenies' issue to an end to save pages more discussion?

Longer runway = increased landing weights. Little gained. Bigger crash sometimes.

[aa73]

I take it from that answer that AA do not have a strctured assessment (for example in the excellent bow tie methodology BowTieXP) of the associated hazardous events and the associated controls, recovery measures and remedial actions.

Instead they are just showing a few powerpoinbts

No, Shell, with all due respect, you don't work here so you are only assuming.

AA's Human Factors course is anything BUT some simple powerpoints. It is right along the lines of any major airline's CRM courses and actually highly instructional. Maybe they don't use your particluar version of "Cases" but I gain a lot of insight when I walk away from our course every 9 months.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

May I bring this particular 'planning'/'greenies' issue to an end to save pages more discussion?

It is very pertinent to the discussion.

Longer runway = increased landing weights. Little gained. Bigger crash sometimes.

The subject airplane was about full of pax. Sometimes they are full. The additional 1,000 feet could have prevented this over-run.

[sevenstrokeroll]

So, there we are in the simulator, constantly doing V1 cuts to perfection.

But truly, how many times have you done a landing in the sim with compromised stopping power? Spoilers not working, thrust reverser difficulties and the like? I' haven't done it and I learned to fly 37 years ago.

My airline operated a piece of junk called the F100 (fokker, not north american sabre) for awhile (its gone now). One of our guys landed at KORD and couldn't get into reverse, no spoilers, and couldn't get wheel brakes to work...of course the plane ''thought'' it was in the air.

He went to the end, managed a turn onto a taxiway and the copilot wisely thought to turn OFF the anti skid. BAM...he got wheel brakes and skidded to a stop.

STUFF happens out there and a good pilot should be ready for anything.

[WhatsaLizad?]

This thread is the perfect example why that for every incident/accident, PPrune should have two threads. one thread would be for aircrew, cabin crew, mechanics(engineers?), airline management staff, airline operations employees, aircraft manufacturer/engineer types and maybe a couple of related types I've overlooked.

The other thread should be reserved for everyone else, enthusiasts, plane spotters, sim pilots, private pilots with an interest, ect.

I'm not denigrating anyone's interest, it is truly refreshing in today's world, but seriously, when something happens in the world with an aircraft, even one that I fly, I end up skipping the 23 pages of posts and probably 1/2 a page of great posts to avoid the inane questions and comments. It simply is an impediment to what PPRune was starting out.

This thread is no exception , and I fly B757's into Jackson Hole WY.

[con-pilot]

He went to the end, managed a turn onto a taxiway and the copilot wisely thought to turn OFF the anti skid. BAM...he got wheel brakes and skidded to a stop

Wow, the F 100 (non-Super Sabre) had the Jet Commander anti-skid system. :p

[BOAC]

It is very pertinent to the discussion.

Quote:
Longer runway = increased landing weights. Little gained. Bigger crash sometimes.
The subject airplane was about full of pax. Sometimes they are full. The additional 1,000 feet could have prevented this over-run. - no it isn't! Of course with 1000' more and THAT flight it would probably have worked. However, the 1000' is not just something you can roll out with the flick of a switch in the cockpit.. With 1000' more hard stuff in the performance manuals, airlines will almost certainly increase ldg wts by either tankering or more payload or bigger a/c.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

- no it isn't! Of course with 1000' more and THAT flight it would probably have worked. However, the 1000' is not just something you can roll out with the flick of a switch in the cockpit.. With 1000' more hard stuff in the performance manuals, airlines will almost certainly increase ldg wts by either tankering or more payload or bigger a/c.

Well, you seem to agree that it could have been pertinent for this flight.

As to tankering, they tanker now because the price of fuel is out of sight at KJAC.

[misd-agin]

Actual landing weight was 194,000 lbs, or 4,000 lbs under max landing weight.

If the runway was 1000' longer and the company increased the amount of payload or tankered fuel up to max landing weight the increase in landing distance would have been about 100'(dry). Even with POOR braking action the required runway length only increases by 250'.

1000' of pavement would have made the difference.

[BOAC]

misd - no-one is suggesting that runway in front of you is wasted. Re-read what I said
- no it isn't! Of course with 1000' more and THAT flight it would probably have worked.. The problem will come as airlines/bean-counters realise they can squeeze those extra few tons onto those extra 1000ft.

There obviously comes a point where you have such along runway that ANYTHING at any weight can use it., snow, ice, flood etc.

[PEI_3721]

BOAC, #372, :ok:

Why doesn’t the industry increase the overrun area, or if unavailable / unsuitable, deduct the equivalent distance from that available for landing … … … :confused:
Silly question; economics before safety. :oh:

Some airports have a restriction on the landing conditions due to the runway / overrun length, e.g. LCY, which does not allow contaminated operations at all.
Such a restriction at JAC might not involve a significant economic penalty for operators – except for the airport, but the safety / image benefits could be high.

[fireflybob]

As to tankering, they tanker now because the price of fuel is out of sight at KJAC.

So there is a question then - should you be tankering fuel to land on a runway which puts you close to the regulated landing weight?

[BOAC]

Did someone mention bean-counters.........? It always remains the Captain's decision whether to accept the tankering figure.

[fireflybob]

Did someone mention bean-counters.........? It always remains the Captain's decision whether to accept the tankering figure.

BOAC, agree 100%

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Did someone mention bean-counters.........? It always remains the Captain's decision whether to accept the tankering figure.

Of course it does. But, in the competitive degregulated environment that has existed in the past 20, or so, years, the captain that rejects the tankered fuel on the dispatch release may very well "get" to explain his decision on the telephone and then in writing to flight operations management who, in turn, report to the bean counters. Nothing more will come of it except the implied threat that "we have a way of keeping records."

It's called management by intimidation. Hopefully, you never had to go through that experience.

[bubbers44]

Just put on the fuel you need with your conditions. Add or subtract because the PIC has the final say. Sometimes the dispatchers are not familiar with your airport and make poor decisions. I flew to TGU Honduras and with a new dispatcher had to explain a few times we had to take off with a tailwind but have been doing it for years so give me this amount of fuel because we will need to hold with weather in MIA. They always gave it to me, we normally holded, and never once had to divert because of dispatched fuel.

[bubbers44]

Sometimes you just have to do what you have to do. Going to Barranquilla Columbia with Cartahena (sp) as an alternate both were closed on arrival due to a huge thunderstorm. 100 miles out I called our ops in Barranquilla and said since you and alternate are below minimums and I am low on fuel I am going to Panama City so tell dispatch because they don't answer. We did not descend so landed with normal fuel and called dispatch because they didn't think we had enough fuel. I said we didn't descend because of the weather so had adequate fuel. Some days it is fun to make them nervous instead of the reverse.

[bubbers44]

I know it is held not holded.

[aterpster]

bubbers44:

Just put on the fuel you need with your conditions. Add or subtract because the PIC has the final say. Sometimes the dispatchers are not familiar with your airport and make poor decisions. I flew to TGU Honduras and with a new dispatcher had to explain a few times we had to take off with a tailwind but have been doing it for years so give me this amount of fuel because we will need to hold with weather in MIA. They always gave it to me, we normally holded, and never once had to divert because of dispatched fuel.

AAL dispatchers are very familar with KJAC airport.

[averow]

I find pprune to be a valuable resource in discussing and dissecting accident and "near-accident" events. It might be prudent as you suggest in splitting off various threads to decide "what we have learned" after the fact for pilots, cabin crew, engineers, designers, etc.

I find it very instructive in my own career as a physician and a PPL to dissect and learn from "near-misses".

There has been much constructive discussion re AF447, it would be useful to boil these down to a salient review.