Air India Express incident

[Ultralights]

experience?

Air India Express | Panicky pilot caused passenger jet plunge (http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travel-news/panicky-pilot-caused-passenger-jet-plunge-20101130-18edn.html)

[AnthonyGA]

Sounds more like a lack of experience.

[punkalouver]

http://dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/incident/VT-AXJ.pdf

[moggiee]

And there was me thinking that the ability to fly an aeroplane straight and level was a pre-requisite for any commercial pilot. If that panicked the guy then he should lose his licence because he is clearly unfit to be in control of an aeroplane.

[protectthehornet]

sounds like this copilot will soon be a CHIEF PILOT!




(due credit to my pal richard)

[directX]

Reported in the Sydney Morning Herald today:

A co-pilot sent an international passenger jet into a terrifying nosedive when he adjusted his seat and accidentally pushed the control column forward, an official report revealed yesterday.
The clumsy officer then panicked and was unable to let the captain, who had gone on a toilet break, back into the cockpit as the plane plunged 7000 feet (2000 metres).
The captain only saved the Boeing 737 aircraft after using an emergency code to get through the cockpit door and take the controls back from the co-pilot, the report by India's Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) said.
The 25-year-old Indian co-pilot told the inquiry he had "got in a panic situation couldn't control the aircraft, neither open the cockpit door and answer the cabin call."
When the captain, 39, got back into the cockpit, he shouted "What are you doing?" as cabin crew ordered the 113 terrified passengers to fasten their seatbelts.
The report said there was "complete commotion" in the cabin and that passengers were "very much scared and were shouting loudly" as the plane dived steeply and boxes and liquor bottles fell into the aisle.
The Air India Express flight was flying at 37,000 feet from Dubai to Pune airport, in western India, on May 26 when the near-disaster occurred. No one was injured.
According to the report, the nosedive was "due to the copilot adjusting his seat forward and inadvertently pressing the control column forward."
The plane fell 2000 feet before the captain got back into the cockpit -- and another 5000 feet as he struggled with the panicking co-pilot.
"There was application of opposite force by pilot and copilot on control column," the report said.
It added that the copilot "probably had no clue to tackle this kind of emergency."
"Appropriate action shall be taken against the involved crew," it concluded.
After the incident, the captain tried to calm passengers by telling them that the aircraft had hit an air pocket.

[Lonewolf_50]

The Air India Express flight was flying at 37,000 feet from Dubai to Pune airport, in western India, on May 26 when the near-disaster occurred. No one was injured.
It lost 7000 feet while at 37,000 feet, in cruise. No, not a near disaster, but very uncomfortable for the passengers/paying customers.

According to the report, the nosedive was "due to the copilot adjusting his seat forward and inadvertently pressing the control column forward."

Ok, here's the hard part. How did he not know how to regain his altitude? :confused:

The plane fell 2000 feet before the captain got back into the cockpit -- and another 5000 feet as he struggled with the panicking co-pilot.
The aircraft descends, and rather than fly it back to altitude, we are told that the co-pilot panicked. If this is true (mind you, this is a media report) then why is that person in a pilot's seat hauling people about?

"There was application of opposite force by pilot and copilot on control column," the report said. It added that the copilot "probably had no clue to tackle this kind of emergency."

Not an emergency. Maybe a malfunction, in a particular brain housing group.

"Appropriate action shall be taken against the involved crew," it concluded.
After the incident, the captain tried to calm passengers by telling them that the aircraft had hit an air pocket.

Well, one could complain that the captain lied to them, but I'll put myself in his shoes for a moment. Best not to shake the confidence of the pax any further by informing them that 50% of the cockpit crew is not up to scratch. :eek:

[Golf_Seirra]

Not wishing to jump the gun on the facts, but the chickens are coming home to roost if low timers cannot even get the basics right.

No worry India, get rid of your expierenced expats, promote your senior co-pilots to P1 and carry on with your short sighted approach to employing low timers.

[EatMyShorts!]

Quoting the first paragraph of the report at the Aviation Herald (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=433d30d2&opt=0) An Air India Express Boeing 737-800, registration VT-AXJ performing flight IX-212 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Pune (India) with 113 passengers, was enroute at FL370 at Mach 0.76 between waypoints PARAR and DOGET with autopilot A in CMD mode and autothrottle engaged. The captain decided to take a short break to visit the washroom and left the cockpit, however noticed the washroom was occupied and wanted to return to the cockpit, when he noticed the airplane was pitching down. He attempted to enter the cockpit, the cockpit door however did not open. He used the emergency access code to open the door and re-entered the cockpit about 40 seconds after he had left the cockpit. He observed the airplane's attitude was 26 degrees nose down and 5 degrees left bank, the speed in the red band, the mach overspeed clackers sounding. He disengaged the autopilot, arrested the descent, switched the engines to continous relight and resumed level flight before climbing back to FL370 and joining the assigned track again. The captain then engaged LNAV and VNAV modes and engaged the autopilot. The airplane continued to Pune for a safe landing, no injuries and no damage occurred. India's Directorate General of Civil Aviation DGCA released their final report concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was: The incident occurred due to inadvertent handling of the control column in fully automated mode by the copilot which got compounded as he was not trained to recover the aircraft in automated mode. Subsequent recovery actions by the PIC without coordination with copilot was the contributory factor.India...incredible India!

[Piltdown Man]

I do hope for the sake of the people who fly Air India Express that this article is total and utter pugwash. Maybe someone from that side of the planet could point us in the direction of the real facts.

PM

[stepwilk]

This is an account of a DGCA final report, so though the journalist might have gotten a specific wrong here and there--or not--I can't imagine it's "total and utter pugwash."

[TopTup]

I can assure you, it's not. And THAT is the worst part of all.

I did a contract at AI as a 777 TRE and NEVER in my professional career have I witnessed such utter corruption, nepotism and a training / safety department that employs bullying and victimizing tactics to humiliate as they see fit. Stone age.

I witnessed pilots (Capts and FO's) unable to fly an aircraft (no AP or FD's) straight and level on downwind and complete a safe landing from a stabilized approach. In the sim I failed a Capt unable to to land the 777 on raw data with a 15 kt x-wind. I was hauled into the safety / training dept and ORDERED to change my appraisal. I resigned. Said Capt flew to DXB and back 2 days later with a "batch-mate" and was checked to line. (All relevant and other authorities received reports from me. I guess they were lost? Yes: that includes you Mr FAA).

Read another article on how kids forge log books, almost completely and are given jobs on 737 NG's: Rajasthan: Fraud pilots busted: Nation : India Today (http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/119735/NATION/rajasthan-fraud-pilots-busted.html)

(At least these kids were caught, but how the hell did they ever get to occupy the seat? The trainers and examiners who passed them should be stripped of their licenses too, as and where needed).

Blame the pilots? The airlines? Or blame the despicably corrupt and [criminally] negligent SYSTEM that allows this to happen. And what about the utter xenophobic attitude of all too many hunting, driving, lobbying for the removal of the expat Capts with many, many thousands of hours so they can be replaced by "Commanders" with anything from 1500 hrs TT hours to 2 or 3000 hrs TT, and FO's to fill that void with 175-200 hrs!?

Mangalore? NOTHING was learnt nor will it be. In all too many eyes it was completely THE EXPAT'S fault, not the system that screened, hired, assessed and monitored the entire pilot body: national and expat alike. Too many pockets lined and whistles wet as a result of the siphoning off of part of the expats' salary, and so, and so on, and so on. Been said and documented all before......

Good news there are some good eggs in the bunch seeking to steer things in the right direction at AI. Hats off to them.

[Escape Path]

The Air India Express flight was flying at 37,000 feet from Dubai to Pune airport, in western India, on May 26 when the near-disaster occurred. No one was injured.

And we just hear about this "near-disaster" (pffft, yeah right!) now? How convenient :ugh:

Not wishing to jump the gun on the facts, but the chickens are coming home to roost if low timers cannot even get the basics right.

That doesn't even looks like a low-timer. That's just plain stupidity! Mind you, he could have been one of those kids with 20 real flight hours but with 200 on his logbook.

[subsonicsubic]

I trained with some of these "wonders" in the Philippines.

Of note was the hotshot who attempted to fly his 152 on a hot day direct to 11000 feet with no regard to oil temp warnings etc etc.

The aircraft he destroyed was the only one he would use as it was "lucky", despite there being 15 others available.

This is the same individual who proclaimed himself to be the Indian Motocross Champion....despite him being unable to produce a single wheelie after 10 minutes riding a bike my 8 year old could wheelie.

I pity the Philippine flight schools obliged to take these overpaid, over egotistic idiots.

Common sense = 0
Basic Aviation Knowledge = 0
Money = unlimited
Access to exam papers = 100 percent
Ability= 10 percent
Perceived Ability = 300 percent
Ego = Unlimited

:(

SSS

[Piltdown Man]

Well, I did a Googling and...

The DGCA's report, whilst being appearing to be thorough in determining what happened to the control column and auto-pilot modes, appears to be painfully lacking in analysis and recommendations to prevent similar occurrences and recovery from "upsets." I'm also not totally convinced that the F/O told the investigators really what happened.

Another thing which springs to mind is how does this company get insurance? Are they actually insured? Neither pilot had more than a 1,000 jet time and also the investigator's appear not to have looked into any of the Operator's training records and systems. I do hope for India's sake that the performance of the DGCA and Air India Express is not representative of the standard of her Aviation.

PM

[Machinbird]

I hope the DGCA got it right. There are a lot of events in that cockpit that paralleled the events of Egyptair flight 990.:suspect:

[captplaystation]

Having just read the report, I have to agree with Machinbird and feel we should be looking at this from a different, rather more sinister, angle.

If we read the co-pilots actions, it is way way beyond incompetent.

Not too well established why, if he was completing paperwork, he needed to put his seat forward ? au contraire, easier to sit further back from the column in a non Airbus FBW ship to complete papers.
Initial push force causing CWS was 20lb, okay, but when alt wng sounded he panicked and applied 50lb DOWN FORCE ? ? ' Yeah, that would help :*

Subsequently he put the column forward again and indeed when the Capt intervened he was doing so with 125lb pullback versus a 200ld push force from Cojo-Boy.

If this wasn't another Egypt Air/ Silk Air scenario what was it ?
I find it difficult to believe anyone could be quite this incompetent, and the aircraft was trying to help him by going into Alt Acq, while all he could do was pull the thrust back and apply even more push force.

The only thing he missed was pulling the CVR/FDR breakers, otherwise I think we can see what was intended here.

I sincerely hope he doesn't fly anymore, either for them or anyone else, as he is either too cr@p to be allowed to do so, or suicidal, neither being a very satisfactory scenario.

[rudderrudderrat]

3.2 Probable cause of the serious incident:
The incident occurred due to inadvertent handling of the control column in fully automated mode by the copilot which got compounded as he was not trained to recover the aircraft in automated mode.

The official accident report doesn't even acknowledge the fact that the red autopilot disconnect button would have put the copilot into the situation where he has been trained to recover.

I agree with captplaystation - I'll add AIE to my no fly list.

[Escape Path]

The DGCA's report, whilst being appearing to be thorough in determining what happened to the control column and auto-pilot modes, appears to be painfully lacking in analysis and recommendations to prevent similar occurrences and recovery from "upsets." I'm also not totally convinced that the F/O told the investigators really what happened.

If the Captain re-entered the cockpit around 40 seconds after the incident started and "only" 2000ft were lost, how the hell does one loses 5000ft more? What the copilot states in the report doesn't match the FDR recordings; how the hell does one, as a copilot, keeps pushing the column with a 200lb(!) force while the Captain is trying to recover the aircraft??? Panicking? Yeah, I bet you did! :mad:

I agree with captplaystation:
Having just read the report, I have to agree with Machinbird and feel we should be looking at this from a different, rather more sinister, angle.
If we read the co-pilots actions, it is way way beyond incompetent.

[p51guy]

Why would anybody need training to recover an aircraft in automated mode. Two clicks and you are a 727.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

Several years ago, in Delhi, I was responsable for training an airforce CAPTAIN, a 2 seater recon flight.

To cut the very long, 2 year, story short he failed his TR check ride, unable to actually command an aircraft. Lost in the visual circuit, and had no idea how to fly the NDB approach.

Eventually I found out part of the reason, was that as a 2 seater, he was not responsable for navigation, or "command", always given a PAR from the back seater.

Upon advising the company for the last time that this guy should never be permitted to actually be in command of anything other than a TUK TUK, I was remined that if I did not sign him off, as Captain would have my visa recinded, for actions detremental to the country, and thus be unwelcome.

The next morning, I was woken up by a smile face, handed a cup of fresh tea, with real milk, and asked to fasten my seat belt. Welcome home, top deck of the 747 was never a sweeter place to be as the sun rose over Heathrow.

Nothing changes, glf

ps asking to come back last week, to work there again...Hope CID refuse to let me enter.

[AlexanderH]

Hang on a minute...didn't I already post something on this earlier?
Where did my thread go?

[eckhard]

Did the Captain ever complete his visit to the washroom?

[Herod]

After this, I imagine it was too late! :)

[Old King Coal]

Throughout this debacle it's highly likely that the Flight Director System would have been commanding pitch guidance designed to a return the aircraft to its previously assigned (MCP) altitude, as well as providing roll guidance designed to return the aircraft to its (LNAV?) track.

The auto-throttle (assuming it was engaged) would have been managing thrust to maintain the airspeed (be that MCP or VNAV derived).

It's therefore truly staggering that these two pilots seemed unable to follow basic Flight Director System information, regardless of whether the aircraft was being flown via the autopilot in Control Wheel Steering mode, or not ?!!! :ugh:

[Sable Knight]

How easy is to "accidently" disengage the autopilot and do this sort of "manoever"?. I was under the understanding if the autopilot remained active until the disarm "button" was pressed to prevent accidents like Eastern Airlines 401

p.s. I am just curious. My flight experience is upto the level of a Grob 115 and Microsoft flight sim. I am just trying to educate myself

[Escape Path]

It's therefore truly staggering that these two pilots seemed unable to follow basic Flight Director System information, regardless of whether the aircraft was being flown via the autopilot in Control Wheel Steering mode, or not ?!!!

Well, staggering that the copilot did what he did. The Captain rushed in immediately to recover the aircraft (which he correctly did, apparently), not before fighting with the "panicked" copilot for the controls :eek: :eek: :eek:

How easy is to "accidently" disengage the autopilot and do this sort of "manoever"?. I was under the understanding if the autopilot remained active until the disarm "button" was pressed to prevent accidents like Eastern Airlines 401


It is kind of easy to disengage the autopilot by just moving the yoke with sufficient force. Every type has its own "trigger force", so to speak. The aircraft will, however, under normal circumstances announce you (via aural and/or visual warnings) that you disengaged the autopilot (or that it disengaged itself) in an usual way. That was one of the reasons learned from EAL401, even though the A310 failed to get the lesson and subsequently didn't help to prevent one of them making a big smoking hole in the Siberia region, only this time it was a kid who flew the plane!

And by the way, what really prevents accidents like EAL401 (and most of other kinds as well) is called CRM :ok:

[Morrisman1]

lets just hope that the -0.2g didnt come while he was mid-stream :}:}

[Tee Emm]

It's therefore truly staggering that these two pilots seemed unable to follow basic Flight Director System information, regardless of whether the aircraft was being flown via the autopilot in Control Wheel Steering mode, or not ?!!

On the contrary. The flight directors should never be used to recover from an unusual attitude. That is not their primary purpose. It may have been this blind reliance on FD indications that caused the first officer to lose the plot. All he had to do was to disengage the autopilot and autothrottles, get rid of the FD's and simply use his manual flying skills (presuming he had some in the first instance which seems doubtful ..) to return to controlled flight. Then, when he had the aircraft under control manually he could re-introduce the appropriate automatics at his leisure.

In fact under the heading of Automatic Flight, the 737 FCTM states in part: "Early intervention prevents unsatisfactory performance or a degraded flight path...reducing the level of automation as far as manual flight may be necessary to ensure proper control of the airplane is maintained".

[goldfish85]

The report is unbelievable. I would have thought a solo student in a Cessna 150 would have done better than that.

However, I do have one more concern. I notice that the F/O applied enough force to trip the autopilot into CWS. When are we going to train pilots in the use of CWS. CWS can be a useful tool (although I'm not a big fan), BUT, the crew must be properly trained to use it, to recognize when the autopilot goes into CWS, and above all, fly the bloody airplane.

The Goldfish:ugh:

[Check Airman]

captplaystation:

"I find it difficult to believe anyone could be quite this incompetent, and the aircraft was trying to help him by going into Alt Acq, while all he could do was pull the thrust back and apply even more push force."

They're out there all right. Reference Colgan 3407 in Buffalo, NY where the Captain pulled against the stick PUSHER. In the Colgan accident, fatigue was cited as a major player, whereas I didn't notice fatigue mentioned in this DGCA report (perhaps I missed it). Now I'm just a flight instructor, but it's sad when airline pilots cannot effect recoveries to upsets that a pre-solo student should be able to handle.

I also note the conspicuous absence of the CVR data after the Captain entered the cockpit. Did they sit in silence the whole time or did the Captain ask something along the lines of "what the :mad: just happened?" I'm sure he did. I wonder why that portion of the CVR wasn't published.

[punkalouver]

Meanwhile, after it appears that the captain saved everybody's lives after the F/O completely screwed up with total incmpetence, it seems the investigation board wants to focus as much blame on the captain as possible.

The captain did not take over control as per standard procedure. What is expected when beyond Mmo and 20° nosedown, a calm "I have control" and wait for the F/O to release the controls?

Then they state that the captain pulled too hard to recover by yanking the control column. What do they expect when the copilot is still pushing forward on the controls at mach 0.9(which was never explained how or why he was doing it).

The PIC, not the crew but the PIC did not do the RVSM contingency procedure done after the altitude deviation seems to be important in the report(good point to make but after an incident like this who would remember).

But they do take time to say in the conclusions that the F/O had no previous incidents.

So in the end the report recommends to "take the appropriate action against the involved crew" Let me guess, the F/O is local and the captain is an expat.

Having read many accident reports but this being my first Indian one, I suspect a low level of competence in their investigations. Seems to match the level of competence in other aviation areas I read about frequently on this board.

My suggested appropriate action is an award for the captain.

[Graybeard]

I fault the captain for leaving the cockpit with such an idiot at the controls.

GB

[Machinbird]

Having read many accident reports but this being my first Indian one, I suspect a low level of competence in their investigations. Seems to match the level of competence in other aviation areas I read about frequently on this board.The more I read the DGCA report, the more I am reminded of cats covering over something in the "Cat Box".:rolleyes:
My suggested appropriate action is an award for the captain.Heck yes. His only mistake was getting airborne with that turkey in the other seat. The captain did not cause excessive g levels. The aircraft was seconds away from exploring new airspeed territory. Why does DGCA seem to think they should be second guessing this captain? Now we are second guessing them!
Where is TopTup when we need him?

[Lonewolf_50]

Graybeard:

If the captain cannot step out to take a quick leak, and trust a co pilot to ensure the trimmed/autopilot on cruise setting is maintained, there are issues well above and beyond the aeronautic skill of the pilot in the other seat. We used to call such things "supervisory error" in the aircraft mishaps I investigated while in the service.

IF the captain cannot do the above, there is no sound reason for that particular copilot to be sitting in ANY cockpit, no less a passenger plane with numerous trusting souls on board.

[Abbeville]

Distinct odour of 'merde du vache' here....

No surprises there then.

[stuckgear]

Indeed. Perhaps yet another annual medical will be an effective DGCA solution to such an occurrence.

[goldfish85]

Just re-read the incident report. I missed the contributing factor of the "Subsequent recovery actions by the PIC without coordination with the copilot"

YGBSM!

Goldfish

[Graybeard]

If the captain cannot step out to take a quick leak, and trust a co pilot to ensure the trimmed/autopilot on cruise setting is maintained, there are issues well above and beyond the aeronautic skill of the pilot in the other seat.

Exactly, Lonewolf. It's highly unlikely this Capt chose or had any control of scheduling this FO for this trip, so he had to deal with it. Before leaving the fright deck, it was his job to be absolutely sure it was safe.

GB

[gh0strider]

punkalouver - both Capt and the FO are Indian, so lets leave the expat vs local debate out of this one

You are correct in assuming the worst about their accident investigating capabilities, I doubt there was a single pilot on the board. If you see previous accident reports you will see that the DGCA like to use "pilot error" as a general cause or contributing factor to any accident. Its easier to blame someone rather than the system.

[jumpy737]

Does anyone know what the Mach speed was on initiation of recovery. I could only find that it was "in the red".

[p7lot]

Speed was past mach 0.82(544 mph, 876 km/h, 473 kt)..... or should I say overspeed. according to the dfdr data
As has been said before .......easily recoverable situation from fl370.
I find it hard to accept this level of incompetence....in fact I would not accept this level of incompetence on my fight deck.period.

[Machinbird]

Jumpy, from the DFDR section of the DGCA report quoted earlier:
After this point, the column position and sensor force realigned as the airplane began to pitch nose-up and the Mach number reached a maximum of 0.888.
The report lists Vd as M 0.89. Beyond that, you are a test pilot.

[p7lot]

I stand corrected ....thank you Machinbird.
Overspeed was indeed 0.88 (way too fast lol)
And still totally unacceptable.

[SDFlyer]

punkalouver: that is the way the story strikes me as well. It's probably more a question of politics/corruption on the part of the so-called investigators than it is simple incompetence. But we'll never know I suppose.

Graybeard: I assumed you were being facetious. How could any Captain expect to discover incompetence on the part of the F/O, even at the level suggested by the facts here, in the short period of time prior to takeoff? Hardly a reasonable expectation. It is, after all, the job of the company, it's training staff and the regulators who set the rules, to try to ensure that incompetents like this don't darken the doors of a cockpit. I do not expect the Captain to do that except in very rare cases (e.g. gross intoxication).

There does seem to be something to the Buffalo analogy.

[Graybeard]

Not facetious at all. AIE captains should have enough judgement skills to see incompetence. After all, this is not likely the only under trained copilot on their roster.

I have a pic of a placard on a copilot's panel:

---------------------

Copilot Checklist:

1. Don't touch anything

2. Keep your mouth shut

-----------------

[Machinbird]

Graybeard
Doesn't help at all in an Egyptair 990 situation.
See this NTSB - Publication (http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201.htm) if you don't remember the circumstances.
That's why the DGCA report smells-no mention of that possible aspect to this event.

[Lonewolf_50]

Graybeard: as I understand you, "deal with it" means "if I don't know this copilot, I must assume my copilot is a suicidal oxygen thief."

If that is what you mean, that's a pretty nasty occupational culture to be working in. :(

[SDFlyer]

Graybeard: I still think you're being facetious to a degree. Precistly to what degree I wouldn't know.

[PERJ]

Could / can / will something alike this ever happen in a FAA / EU based cockpit?

Are our training standards really up to par?

I have for example personally dealt with several student pilots who come back from Spain based FTOs with fresh IRME ratings. Now they want their CPL, but they can't fly. They can't take a VOR bearing and they cant fly attitude based flying, but merely re-act rather than pro-act. Basic flying skills are generally not up to par in my opinion.

Yet, they still have a JAR IRME just as valid as mine.

My personal opinion is that the bar is set too low and that schools/examinors are letting through people that should have been stopped.
Some of these guys WILL slip through again into bigger planes and they WILL someday cause bigger incidences.

[AirRabbit]

http://dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/incident/VT-AXJ.pdf

I am hoping that this might enlighten some who think that a pilot who has a larger number of "flight hours" in his/her log book equates to a greater probability that he/she is, therefore, more competent.

[Mr.Bloggs]

Explain what you mean, Air Rabbit? Your comments make no sense to me.

[Jabiman]

I am hoping that this might enlighten some who think that a pilot who has a larger number of "flight hours" in his/her log book equates to a greater probability that he/she is, therefore, more competent.
I think what rabbit is referring to is the debate regarding cadet FO going directly into the RHS. Not sure what side of the debate rabbit is on but let us look at this particular FO’s hours:
Total flying experience 1310 hours
Experience on type: 968 hours

So he has less than 1500 hours and would definitely be classed as inexperienced. Further, his non-type hours are 342 which also indicates that he was a direct entry cadet and had little more than flight training experience. Certainly no GA type flying was done by this novice and he would have little or no real airmanship skill. If the PIC became incapacitated for any reason, it is probable that this plane would have become a wreck.
A strong case AGAINST direct entry cadets if I ever saw one.

And this is assuming that all his hours were real:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/434529-fake-pilots-helps-explain-lot-things.html (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/434529-fake-pilots-helps-explain-lot-things.html)

[picollo]

Is there any information on what now happens to the involved crew?

[despegue]

PERJ,

I have found most Spanish FTO trained young collegues good pilots who know how to feel the aircraft. So I have to disagree with your opinion of Spanish FTO's.
In the case of the AIE incident, the FO clearly was suicidal or had never learned how to feel an aircraft. Maybe he was Oxford trained?:oh:

[Morrisman1]

Sounds like the co-pilot knew how to operate the Auto-pilot and thats about it. Its a shame that pilots aren't forced to train in the most basic of planes so they learn the fundamentals. I cringe when I see g1000 in a training aircraft as they steal attention from actually flying the thing!! Out of the whole fleet Im flying I prefer the VFR only PA28-181 with half the stuff in it INOP because its good honest aviation and such a beautiful machine to fly. Autopilot, GPS430, fuel computers etc is not necessary if you are in touch with what your flying.

Its a shame a pilot in such a position has none of the necessary skills required when you take it back to basics. Its a motor action - trees getting bigger so pull stick back! I dont mean to rip on indians as im sure many are capable pilots but today we had one who couldn't find the right end of the runway, couldn't operate the self serve fuel pump and had no clue what he was doing while taxiing. Needless to say he was not given takeoff clearance and his instructor had to come pick him up.

[flydive1]

Its a motor action - trees getting bigger so pull stick back!

Did not work well in Buffalo

[Roger Greendeck]

Push forward trees get smaller, pull back trees get smaller, pull back more trees get bigger again ;)

[infrequentflyer789]

Could / can / will something alike this ever happen in a FAA / EU based cockpit?


"Could / can / will" - or has ?

Like, say, pulling back on the stick, presumably in some kind of panic, right through the stick shaker and against the full force of the stick pusher, and stalling into the ground as a result. Is that "alike" enough ?

[PA-28-180]

" I cringe when I see g1000 in a training aircraft as they steal attention from actually flying the thing!! "

I began flight training around 1990....I never saw so much as a DME until I was about to start my IR. Just basic panel - fully agree this is how it should be! :ok:

" couldn't find the right end of the runway, couldn't operate the self serve fuel pump and had no clue what he was doing while taxiing."
First question....why did his instructor sign him off for solo? Or..was this similar to what I saw with some Asian cadets who had really severe language problems?

[pilotmike]

@Roger Greendeck:
Push forward trees get smaller, pull back trees get smaller, pull back more trees get bigger again
Oh dear! Fatally flawed thinking like that was probably the root cause of this incident, if the FO similarly believed that 'pushing forward would make any trees get smaller'...:eek:

It seems to me that 2 distinctly possible causes have so far not been mentioned:

1 Misreading the pitch indication on the AI. Though this really should not happen, it might explain why the FO felt the need to persist with his incorrect control input. After all, AIs have been misread before, especially when there has been exposure to Russian style AIs displaying in a different way.

2 Attempted suicide? After all, the 'accidental' upset seemed to occur immediately the Captain was out of the flightdeck, door locked, combined with the FO's 'inability' to open the door. Then the FO used a further MASSIVE incorrect control force. The reported 200lb force is more than the weight of an average man! That was ONE HELL OF A PUSH! The FO involved was clearly on some kind of a mission... Determining exactly WHAT mission is crucial, with the FO not being allowed anywhere near an aircraft flightdeck ever again.

[AirRabbit]

I think what rabbit is referring to is the debate regarding cadet FO going directly into the RHS. Not sure what side of the debate rabbit is on but let us look at this particular FO’s hours:
Total flying experience 1310 hours
Experience on type: 968 hours

So he has less than 1500 hours and would definitely be classed as inexperienced. Further, his non-type hours are 342 which also indicates that he was a direct entry cadet and had little more than flight training experience. Certainly no GA type flying was done by this novice and he would have little or no real airmanship skill. If the PIC became incapacitated for any reason, it is probable that this plane would have become a wreck.
A strong case AGAINST direct entry cadets if I ever saw one.

And this is assuming that all his hours were real

I guess I’m not sure what it is you mean by “direct entry cadet.” I’m also not sure how many flight hours someone would have to have logged for you to believe he/she is “experienced.”

The dictionary defines experience as “direct observation of or participation in events as a basis of knowledge, or the fact or state of having been affected by or gained knowledge through direct observation or participation, practical knowledge, skill, or practice derived from direct observation of or participation in events or in a particular activity.” In fact, experience is a relative term, and, therefore, there simply isn’t a direct relationship to which anyone is able to reference. It is clearly evident that a pilot having flown for 1000 hours is less experienced than one who has flown 1200 hours and more experienced than one who has flown 800 hours – but there are very few who would recognize any significant difference in the competency levels of those three pilots. In my experience (note the use of the word), I have come across those with precious few hours with whom I would be most pleased to share my flight deck duties … and I have come across those with literally thousands of hours with whom I would prefer to NOT share my flight deck duties. It is also my experience that, when going strictly on the number of hours a pilot has flown (i.e., his/her flying “experience”), that experience becomes pertinent only when comparing “multiples” of 2 for approximately the first 500 hours and multiples of 5 thereafter. For example, a pilot with 75 hours of experience is likely to have approximately the same level of competency as a pilot with 80 - 90 hours, and that more experienced pilot probably wouldn’t be noticeably better until he/she had at least 150 hours (i.e., twice the 75 hours). After completing approximately 500 hours of experience, that pilot is likely not to be noticeably “more experienced” until he/she has logged something in the neighborhood of 2500 hours, or 5 times that amount.

What IS important, however, is HOW the pilot was screened initially; how he/she was trained; the competency of the instructor doing the training; the viability of the equipment used during the training; and the willingness of the pilot to assimilate what was being presented during the training program.

While we all recognize that in this particular case, apparently the FO screwed up … royally. But until we know more about what actually happened – speculating beyond that is fruitless. The fact that this FO had over 1300 hours of flight time, with almost 1000 hours on type, it should be clearly evident that this FO was not properly trained – regardless of what it was he did to initiate the problem. With the amount of time on type he reportedly had, one would think he would be able to recover from the dive that was apparently encountered. The point is, he very likely wasn’t trained properly – and even the almost 1000 hours of operating experience on type didn’t seem to make a lot of difference in his ability to avoid the mistake he made. There simply isn’t any logic in presuming that his having flown an additional 800 hours – perhaps in a Cessna 152 – prior to being hired and trained on this airplane would have made a significant difference. What WOULD have likely made a difference is the quality of the training he received prior to his being hired AND the quality of the training he received on this airplane type.

The Colgan accident statistics further demonstrate this issue. The captain of that flight had a total of almost 3500 hours, with 260 hours on type … 100 of which were as captain. Additionally, the FO on that Colgan flight had over 2000 hours of flight time with 750 on type. Both of them made mistakes. What would likely have made a difference there is exactly the same issue – the quality of the training they both received before being hired at Colgan, AND the quality of the training they received at Colgan.

I have tried to make the point on this forum that the military services, at least in the US, and probably around the world, have done a very satisfactory job of taking “no-nothing” persons and creating competent pilots out of them. How is this done? It is done through careful screening and even more carefully designed and conducted training … using competent instructors … using viable training equipment … and, ultimately, encouraging the individuals to assimilate what was being presented during that training. I believe that THIS is where the focus needs to be addressed – not on the total number of flight hours someone has logged prior to being hired … if, for no other reason than, as you correctly point out, “ assuming all his (logged) hours are real.”

[A37575]

What IS important, however, is HOW the pilot was screened initially; how he/she was trained;

Good point. In fact it may surprise you to know that in that part of the aviation world there are first officers that do not want to be pilots at all. They are coerced into the job by parents and relatives who see them as cash cows for the extended family. Astrologers are consulted. I well recall from some years ago talking to some Chinese students we trained in NZ. They had been in a Chinese university studying various subjects when the military walked into the class-room and said you are all to undergo aircrew medicals. Those that pass will be split into military pilots and others into airline pilots. One of my students was studying opthamology at the university when it all happened.

[Lonewolf_50]

In fact it may surprise you to know that in that part of the aviation world there are first officers that do not want to be pilots at all.
They are coerced into the job by parents and relatives who see them as cash cows for the extended family. Astrologers are consulted.
I well recall from some years ago talking to some Chinese students we trained in NZ. They had been in a Chinese university studying various subjects when the military walked into the class-room and said you are all to undergo aircrew medicals.
Those that pass will be split into military pilots and others into airline pilots. One of my students was studying opthamology at the university when it all happened

That blows my mind. :eek:

[AirRabbit]

Unfortunately, that does not surprise me – when I sincerely wish that it did.

In the US, we have seen an unfortunate increase in the numbers of college graduates who choose major areas of study based exclusively on what kind of salary structure they can achieve. What happens is that we wind up with an increasing number of persons who are performing job functions – some of which directly affect the health, livelihood, and even in some cases, the lives of other persons – when they, themselves, are hard-hearted, mean, and somewhere between relatively and completely disinterested in the outcome of their work effort as long as they can afford the big house, flashy car, and membership in the fashionably exclusive country club. While a position as an airline pilot may not be nearly as lucrative as it once was financially, there are still those who believe that the “romance” of the uniform and the imaginative travel opportunities are sufficient motivators to pursue this profession when they would more likely be suited to other, less critically knowledge-dependent and skill-dependent jobs.

However, this fact must not interfere with the responsible decision makers from ensuring that those who DO choose piloting as a career are properly trained and evaluated to ensure they possess the skill sets that are necessary … and, in case there may be some who are not aware … this goes well beyond observing that an individual is able to “slop” his or her way through a course of training and blindly meet (or mostly meet) the generalized meaning of the “standards” that have been set out as a “passing score.” This means that if the salary structure offered attracts only those who may be considered marginally acceptable, it MUST become the responsibility of those who develop, manage, and actually conduct the training and evaluation to make absolutely SURE that those who are deemed “satisfactory” to ANY degree are, INDEED, satisfactory for all areas – without question … OR … they must be turned down! Once it is understood by airline managers that substandard applicants and even applicants that may, with one eye closed, be considered minimally acceptable, are only going to increase the training costs and endanger the overall satisfactory operation of the business, perhaps it will be easier for them to understand that increasing the starting and eventual salary structure will do wonders for turning this aspect of the industry back to the levels that must exist! Of course, marketing and sales, frills and extras, infrastructures and equipment, salaries and benefits are always going to have an impact on the successful operation of any business … we have to recognize that the training department, i.e., those who develop, manage, and conduct the training and evaluation can, and should be, one of the most important, perhaps the most important, department of every company that does business in THIS industry!

[Mintheskies]

Autopilot, GPS430, fuel computers etc is not necessary if you are in touch with what your flying.

I don't mean to be impolite, but it sounds to me like young and proud talk.
Even as part of a CPL/ATPL training they are absolutely necessary in the way that you have to know how to use them and when not to use them since every modern aircraft is equipped with them.
Being familiar with your duty implies understanding and knowing the tools at your disposal, and how some of them could mislead you. Plus in emergency they can come in pretty handy (to be able to know the remaining fuel, the autonomy/distance available, nearest suitable airfields and associated freq. and facilities in one click while you can still fly the plane is no small deed).
Though VFR initial training should remain dead reckoning and look outside (can't agree more) modern commercial aviation is a bit more than that, thanks.

Its a motor action - trees getting bigger so pull stick back!

In this case maybe, but I hope for you you don't fly by motor actions...

[express315]

Spent a few years flying there. Never locked the cockpit door behind me while leaving for washroom. Survival instinct and common sense wouldn't let me do the opposite.

[stepwilk]

" couldn't find the right end of the runway, couldn't operate the self serve fuel pump and had no clue what he was doing while taxiing."
First question....why did his instructor sign him off for solo?

When my wife was doing her multiengine training some 35 years ago, at Vero Beach (FlightSafety), they had a Middle Eastern student who took off on a cross-country solo in a Seneca, or whatever they were using then, and stopped for lunch at his first waypoint. Left the airplane well-chocked but engines running, since he later admitted he had no idea how to restart them.

Unfortunately, he parked right outside the VEB FSS.

Somebody apparently signed -him- off for XC solo...

[arba]

after CDLS installed, company SOP to have one of the cabin staff in
the cockpit if one of the pilot needs to go. But if they are busy, I disarm the lock just before go out.