Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash [Archive] - Page 3

Mister Geezer

17th May 2010, 00:36

Thank you PT6, you have hit the nail on the head! ICAO and IATA seem to turn a blind eye to African airports that dont meet standards. This is as much the international aviation organisations' fault as it is the Libyan CAA if someone is looking for a scapegoat. I think there needs to be a big shakeup in the inspection standards and enforcement by these agencies that leaves no space for ambiguity. No airport should be the weakest link in the transport chain.rt to

I am sorry but the LCAA know fine well what the standards are. It is just that they do not wish to adhere to them. Corruption is rife in the LCAA so it is little wonder that we see a wealthy country with such a crumbling aviation infrastructure.

I recently read that Libyan Airlines are going to equip their new A330s with onboard wireless internet for their pax. Yet the LCAA can't fix the DME and the NDB at Kufra which have been out for years? Both are Government organisations so like is being compared with like.

I know people have slated ATC but on the whole I feel sorry for them. ATCOs work with the risk of being escorted to the nearest Police Station by the Jamahiriya's finest, should an incident occur! I flew with one Libyan who used to be an ATCO and he said to me that he was frogmarched off his scope whilst still controlling one day, by two policeman after an incident took place which was not his fault. ATCOs in Libya are always guilty until proven innocent and that is often why they sound like a bag of nerves when there are more than a few aircraft on the frequency. There are only a few really switched on controllers in Libya. One chap in Tripoli Tower springs to mind and a couple of the senior guys in Benghazi Area that trained at Bournemouth are still around and they are always comforting to hear in the dark of night!!! However newer controllers are simply not given the training they need. Radar skills are poor with speed control or tactical vectoring never being used. One of my pet hates was being told to expedite my take off when the landing aircraft is no factor whatsoever. When asked if I am expecting any delay whilst sat on the runway I eventaully found that a 'Negative - Inshallah' normally made them keep quiet. If my checks take longer then press the PTT switch and have a word with Allah and not me... since he has decided that I need to complete the checklist in its entirety!!! :}

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 00:51

I said nothing of the sort Downwind. I said an ILS in THIS case would have saved the day. You cant argue with that no matter how hard you try. Few airline pilots these days fly manual approaches and an ILS on all runways should be made mandatory in all major international airports.

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 00:59

That is very true Mister Geezer, but ICAO should raise the bar and insist on precise safety standards or blacklist the country. Any leeway by ICAO is seen as a relaxation. ICAO should SET the standards. Anyway, I am sure you will now see a huge improvement in aviation safety standards by the LYCAA and the installation of latest hardware at HLLT and HLLB now that Mr Seif Gaddaffi is involved. This accident is probably a wakeup call for the Libyan embargo-dazed beureaucracy.

411A

17th May 2010, 01:00

Few airline pilots these days fly manual approaches and an ILS on all runways should be made mandatory in all major international airports.
Speak for yourself.
We complete manual and/or visual approaches all the time in our heavy jet...and, just for your information, so do many other pilots in other airlines, especially in the USA.

IF, on the other hand, you personally, RadAlt2010, cannot do so, I suspect you had better find a desk job.
Without a doubt, the new 'slaves to the magenta line' have a distinct disadvantage.:rolleyes:

Mister Geezer

17th May 2010, 01:06

What about digging up the ILS at Sebha that always worked when I used it and moving it to Tripoli. After all the ILS at Sebha is configured to a runway that is no longer in use and it is still a published procedure that is used by ATC!!!

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 01:08

fullforward

17th May 2010, 01:11

Fully agree with you!:ok:

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 01:23

OK 4PW, we blame the pilot and do NOTHING about the rest of the farce. Hello? What planet are you on? No one said the pilot is not to blame. Of course he should have not busted his minimas. But his fault should not be looked at in isolation. If you know anything about flight safety, you should know that accidents are a CHAIN of events. The only way to learn from this and prevent a recurrence is to make every link in the chain stronger.

My guess is that the pilot was flying an NDB/VOR appraoch with a faulty off-centreline signal due to nearby cranes that was Notamed . The sun obscured his sighting of the runway. He discovered too late visually that he was not aligned. Paniced and went below his MDA. Not very professional/excuable but also very possible in fatigue. Now wouldnt you agree that an ILS would have prevented all this? I would like to hear your argument

TowerDog

17th May 2010, 01:28

But his fault should not be looked at in isolation.

I think it should.

As pilots we fly into many airports with less than perfect WX, ATC, Nav aids and ground support, happens all the time, but that is not an excuse to fly a brand new jet into the ground like a student pilot on his first solo..:sad:

GarageYears

17th May 2010, 01:35

411A, I can fly manual approaches and, like you, have to pass my line checks. I have no intention of looking for a desk job. But pilots are human and they DO make mistakes. All I am saying is, anything that enhances safety cannot be unwelcome. Now if you dont agree with that, may I respectfully suggest that YOU look for a desk job.

It's a good job machines never go wrong isn't it? All this b/s rankles me - basic flying skills - if you can't hand-fly the aircraft, don't fly it at all. If you blindly trust the automation, don't fly. Automation is an aid, not a means to an end - 'nuff said.

RadAlt2010 - I'm not disagreeing with you w.r.t. the ICAO stepping in and insisting on improvements all round, and suspect we'll see an ILS at this airport p.d.q. but it's easy to bolt the door after the horse... in my opinion the ICAO should be there before the damn door opens.

- GY

Capn Bloggs

17th May 2010, 01:44

A probationary poster telling the world how to run a flight ops department.
His number of posts has absolutely nothing to do with the validity of his argument, Mr Thrust You Can't Trust. :=

RadAlt, you're talking sense. Keep it up. :ok:

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 01:48

Yes 'nuff said Garage. I never suggested stick it on auto, fold your arms and go to sleep. You are not talking to a PPL. I have been flying airliners for 30 years. An auto approach is always more comfortable for passengers, but must be supervised; every second of it. It doesnt mean I forgot how to fly an appraoch either.

I agree with you entirely that ICAO should wake up and smell the coffee.

lomapaseo

17th May 2010, 02:49

RadAlt2010

I agree with you entirely that ICAO should wake up and smell the coffee.

Please explain how ICAO is to blame and how they could fix their mistake.

Last I knew they provide recommendations only to governments, willing to listen and it's up to the governments to accept or reject.

Of course at this point we have no proof that there is a link between ICAOs recommendations, a failure to act, and this accident.

jcjeant

17th May 2010, 03:03

onetrack

17th May 2010, 05:59

RadAlt2010 - Now let me get this right. Around 100 pax trusted a PIC to be fully competent and conversant with his aeroplane, the principles of its operation, and all of the associated air control systems.
He was trusted to be tested and competent in his ability to handle virtually ANY problem that arose with his aircraft... or any problems associated with takeoffs and landings, or diversions, if need be.

It now appears, from evidence personally viewed by C-SAR, that this pilot was not competent. He flew a perfectly good, near-new plane into the ground, thus wiping out over 100 innocent people.

Now you are trying to say that unless the latest and up-to-date landing aids aren't installed, this event will continue to happen. I don't buy that.
There are any number of competent pilots who take off and land, handle serious problems, diversions, and less-than-totally satisfactory airport/runway conditions, EVERY DAY... without flying their plane into the ground, and wiping out large numbers of innocent people.

The bottom line, is this Afriqiyah PIC showed incompetence at worst, and a gung-ho attitude at best. There should be no place for pilots in passenger-carrying activities, that demonstrate these lack of skills, or who demonstrate risk-taking attitudes.

Yes, there were any number of factors in this event that made it a less-than-satisfactory landing event... but none that couldn't have been handled with a satisfactory outcome, by a PIC demonstrating competence in airmanship skills... that are demonstrated by P'sIC 100 times a day, worldwide.

Capn Bloggs

17th May 2010, 06:12

There should be no place for pilots in passenger-carrying activities, that demonstrate these lack of skills
So why are there?

PJ2

17th May 2010, 06:29

onetrack;

Good handle.

gtro

17th May 2010, 06:43

Sad to say but it looks like ONETRACK is right. For whatever reason this PIC has messed up real bad and has unfortunately taken with him the life of over 100 passengers.

a.carneiro

17th May 2010, 06:56

We seem to be working on a foregone conclusion that this was pilot error.

I have been following this thread with interest from the start but I think we need to step back, take a breath and remember once again that we're only working with speculation.

Granted, mostly well informed and well thought out speculation, but speculation nonetheless.

We have very little hard data and certainly none which is official so let's wait for that before making condemning statements.

And back I go to lurch in the shadows ;)

Wishing you all, every one of you, a happy and safe week

André

Walder

17th May 2010, 07:05

Dear all.

Most of you will probably ignore this comment….
I am very ”pleased” to see so many ”qualified” investigators in this forum.
Please only share facts – not guesses! Facts are what you have seen or heard on first hand!
When starting guessing, you may start an avalanche and might very well ending up with the wrong conclusions.
Please let the real investigators tell us what really happened.

Bare in mind, you were not there! You did not see what they saw! (I do not say it was not a pilot error. I was not there, I did not see anything and I have not heard the tapes: I do not know!:confused:)

But let me remind us all: (To prevent accidents caused by human errors)
Human errors occurs – normally started by a single event that makes you take some action or decision, and if you took a incorrect action or decision but believe you did right, you will continue on that path until you realise you were wrong – if you ever will find out. That is typically how to start a chain and it could well be combined with technical problems too.
It is rear that both pilots go in same the wrong direction with the feeling they did right. When it happens, it can be very dangers!:eek:
So if you ever fell something is not right – even it is a minor thing – share it – as soon as possible!
If you believe you do the right thing and someone asks questions about your decisions then listen carefully!
That is the most important in aviation!

And here we can have the benefit if the Flight Safety System is used correct:
When ever we make errors, remember to share it through the Air Safety Report (ASR). If we all do so, the Flight Safety Officer has a tool to find trends at a very early stage that can be announced as an eye-opener for all of us – or bring some of the events to the next SIM-pass.:ok:
(If you have a Flight Safety Culture there only blames you when you admit your errors, then you have no Flight Safety Culture, but an I’ll Blame You Culture!:oh:)

Walder – a human being.:p

ATC Watcher

17th May 2010, 07:19

RadAlt2010 :
Instead of spending $2M on an ILS facility, now the insurance has to pay out $500M in total. talk about false economies.
Right on the spot.
Same in many other places, Problem is that you do not increase poplularity with the ppopulace and the princes in power with an ILS, but building a new terminal or a new access road to the airport does.

Someone mentioned ICAO, remember ICAO is made of States, not individual supranational policemen...

HundredPercentPlease

17th May 2010, 07:20

Images from C-SAR:

Last pole standing:

http://i43.tinypic.com/rsdlxl.jpg

First pole down:

http://i40.tinypic.com/sopyfr.jpg

Second pole down:

http://i44.tinypic.com/2cqh5ya.jpg

Close up:

http://i42.tinypic.com/33bkfo8.jpg

Third pole down:

http://i43.tinypic.com/nv37du.jpg

Close up:

http://i41.tinypic.com/qpj9lu.jpg

Fourth pole down:

http://i39.tinypic.com/acz72c.jpg

Close up:

http://i41.tinypic.com/2dgnits.jpg

Reverse view:

http://i40.tinypic.com/t0n6th.jpg

Impact:

http://i41.tinypic.com/vcqruh.jpg

Close up:

http://i39.tinypic.com/260qyag.jpg

More to follow (mangled by email).

PENKO

17th May 2010, 07:25

Forgive me if this is stated or resolved already, but in an Airbus like the 320/330 you don't usually follow the actual VOR signal, but you follow a preprogrammed route from the database. This is base on GPS. So why focus on dodgy VOR's?

nugpot

17th May 2010, 07:25

I have been away for a few days so just caught up. We must be careful of the PPRuNe/Media spiral. The newspaper hacks read uninformed speculation here and publish it because it is attention-grabbing. Another poster quotes the newspaper and the next moment the idiotic fringe's ideas become facts, feeding the descent into chaos.

.............no other airframe has had such a run of bad " luck" in such short succession..........
paweas, not true old chap. Take forty lashes and go and do some homework.....

Some of you still don't get it pure and simple!!!!!

NOT a go around prang - but CFIT trying to find the runway........ Believe it or not but I would never have ever let my family or myself fly on an Afriqiyah or Libyan Arab Airlines aeroplane ever Even before this
White Knight, CFIT descending, CFIT descending during go-around is still CFIT. Your clairvoyance is noted though. Other than that, there is not much accident history to base your anti-Libyan sentiments on. Pinnacle Airlines in the states have done worse over the past two years..........

I said an ILS in THIS case would have saved the day. You cant argue with that no matter how hard you try. Few airline pilots these days fly manual approaches and an ILS on all runways should be made mandatory in all major international airports.
RadAlt2010, whether an ILS would have saved the day would surely depend on the final cause of the accident. If the cause is CFIT/pilot error, then a different crew would also have saved the day...

Non-precision approaches are only dangerous if you do not adhere to the procedure and related minima. Mandatory ILS's mean mandatory calibration, etc. How long would you trust ILS's in some places?

Many pilots fly manual approaches every day. If you don't, you are probably degrading the one skill that could save you and your pax one day.....

Asking for mandatory ILS's at every airport is just further evidence of legislating for mediocrity. A good captain would know when to abandon an NPA and when to go to the alternate. A/c prang off ILS's as well...........

An auto approach is always more comfortable for passengers

Uhm, why? I thought we could all fly at least as well and smoothly as the autopilot....

aterpster

17th May 2010, 08:22

PENKO:
Forgive me if this is stated or resolved already, but in an Airbus like the 320/330 you don't usually follow the actual VOR signal, but you follow a preprogrammed route from the database. This is base on GPS. So why focus on dodgy VOR's?

Libya is not a WGS84-compliant country, so the GPS is not supposed to be used as primary navigation on an instrument approach procedure. I can't speak to Airbus, but in a U.S. OEM vendor supplied database the approach mode should not activate in Libya.

WGS-84 Updates - Jeppesen (http://www.jeppesen.com/company/publications/wgs-84.jsp)

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 08:24

HPP, thanks for helping me overcome the internet access limitations I am experiencing here...
Once I get back home to Sunny Scotland :cool: I should be able to post more staff.

C-SAR

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 08:29

Quote:
The power line was hit before the impact point.
just checking but the photo on a previous page (15) seems to show a snapped telegraph pole near the tail cone (with wires attached) and aircraft debris either side of the snapped pole. Seems to indicate something happened before hitting this post.

Havana, you are correct. If you look at my pictures just posted ny HundredPercentPlease, the aircraft started to drag poles out of the ground before impact. The power line went to the house close to the mosque, therefore all the other poles after the impact point were entangled in the crash, hence the picture in page 15.
I could not enter the debris area, so my last standing was in front of the impact point... with some nice local guys all wearing the same dress around me asking polite questions...

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 08:33

Hi,

IF the tail scenario (tail separated first) is confirmed (and will be confirmed by the following) .. it will be lack of infos about the last second(s) of the crash as not recorded by the black boxes

Until impact the aircraft appears to have been intact, so FDR/CVR should have been recording at least until then. The tail section might have separated as part of the sequence of destruction after first impact.

C-SAR

ZEEBEE

17th May 2010, 08:36

Walder

Please only share facts – not guesses! Facts are what you have seen or heard on first hand!

Most have not seen anything, therefore the facts are almost non existent.

Perhaps you should look at the name of this forum again to re-acquaint yourself with its purpose.

Educated guesses by qualified individuals are of value and may help to shed some light to those of us who haven't peddled one of the big machines but still are interested in what might have led to the tragic outcome.

There is a place for this and the pious exhortations by some will do nothing to stop it.

Jetjock330

17th May 2010, 08:41

You can forget to tune the NDB feq and still do the approach in the Airbus. You can delete the NDB freq from RAD NAV and still do the approach on the FM. In fact, even if the ground sation is not working, you can still do the approach (not according to the reg's I know).

The aircraft will follow the green line from FM in a managed lateral navigation and will follow the vertical profile if indeed fully managed.

If this approach was done fully selected in both laterally and vertically, then the NDB would have to be tuned and the needle followed in Track/Flight path.
This is indeed very seldomly done, very seldomly!

Airbus has many ways to skin the cat and sometimes this cat bites back as Tiger if you screw up. This looks like one of those cases where procedures were not followed and systems not understood. Autopilot will disconnect at MDA minus 50ft, and then Airbus says you're on your own for what ever happens next.

JetThePilot

17th May 2010, 08:45

C-SAR:

I do not see the tracks left in the sand by the landing gear as shown in video taken from a jet posted in an earlier thread. Did you see evidence of landing gear making contact with ground? Where?
-------------------------
I happen to know a colleague of the deceased pilot (Capt. Yousif Saadi) and spoke to him on the phone yesterday. Pilot is experience, UK trained in 1970s, flew Boeing 727 for 2 decades then worked outside Libya for 6 years in 1990s. Joined Afriqiyah and converted to A330 with Air France. His colleague says he is a good pilot with excellent record (40 years flying), but the Tripoli-Johanesburg trip is a killer. Pilot gets less than 12 hours net resting time during daylight between two 9 hour flights (10 in the cockpit) - not enough to refresh. Having two FOs is no help because they are equally not fresh. He says that he himself begged to be removed from similar flights because on occasions he knew he was too fatigued to take quick important decisions if an emergency or bad visibility is encountered. He recalled an FO recently trying to persuade him to go low to identify runway in poor visibility in Benghazi. Under such circumstances ILS or an accurate system is a must. He said the late Capt Yousif knew the problems with Tripoli VOR system but can only explain what happened in two ways: either fatigue got the better of him and he did not check his decent soon enough to keep plane above minima or there was something wrong with the instruments that made him realise he was too close to the ground too late in poor visibility. Given VOR's performance for Tripoli 09, visual identification is needed for safe landing. In poor visibility, which is now confirmed for the time of the accident, pilots either abort early and request somewhere else (fuel considerations?) or push the limits towards a possible and predictable lethal outcome.

Commercial considerations and pressures would make the airways lethal without ILS and quality information and directions. Pilots are always pushed to the limit of their human capacity and can only survive by relying on automation, which is not always helpful in emergency. Recall the Hudson river pilot's testimony before congress? He spoke about the conditions pilots increasingly face.

By the way, in Libya, although the authority do not equip airports well at all, they apparently would bring a pilot before a committee if (minima) rules are breached or even if diversion is requested to expalin their decision. Effect on pax connections, fuel cost, etc. will all be discussed by such committee. Sounds familiar, anyone?

HundredPercentPlease

17th May 2010, 08:48

C-SAR's photos are quite large. The "impact" photo has lots of detail in, that may be of interest.

Here is a crop of the interesting stuff in that photo, with no reduction. Be sure to zoom in and see the sliced trees on the right, the direction of the debris compared to the impact and the impaled trees on the left.

Link to photo (http://www.filedropper.com/impactwide).

snowfalcon2

17th May 2010, 08:56

C-SAR, looking at the impact mark it looks fairly shallow. So the question is, was the first impact from the fuselage underside (where it starts to taper towards the tail) or from the actual tailcone?

I ask because if the first impact was from the fuselage underside, it suggests a lower angle of attack i.e. only a couple of degrees more than the tail strike angle of 15.5 degrees I referred to earlier. It also raises the possibility that the main landing gear hit the power line together with the fuselage.

Speculating further, a high angle of attack at impact may be one of the contributing factors to the high degree of destruction. If the AoA had been lower, the landing gear would have hit first and absorbed a lot of the energy that now caused the tail to break off and the airplane to do its final pitch down.

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 08:56

C-Star:

I do not see the tracks left in the sand by the landing gear as shown in video taken from a jet posted in an earlier thread. Did you see evidence of landing gear making contact with ground?

The marks are past the impact point/cactus line... the one I could not cross. So, for information on what was beyond, for the moment we need to relay only on the video clip. I might try another visit... but I can't garantee...

C-SAR

Nightrider

17th May 2010, 08:57

Looking at the pics above it appears that pole #2 has almost half it's length white colour stains and pole #3 the upper 25% white colour on the side. Zooming into the poles reveals also that there are scratch marks immediately below the stains.

The impact zone photo shows a prominent impression, judging by the size I assume most probably from the fuselage.

C-SAR, beside the excellent job you did here, just a clarification please, from your photo position, is the road behind you or between first impact and the mosque? I ask as there are no landing gear markings to see and the elevation before the mosque may actually show the higher level of the road where the landing gear impacted and broke. In this case, there was a very high AoA during the first impact.

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 09:02

C-SAR, looking at the impact mark it looks fairly shallow. So the question is, was the first impact from the fuselage underside (where it starts to taper towards the tail) or from the actual tailcone?

I base my speculation on the presence of power line wrapped around the end cone. Also, look at the cut in the cactus to the right. They most probably were cut by the right stabilizer. Calculating the hight of the cut we might establish the fuselage position at time of cut

C-SAR

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 09:09

C-SAR, - omissis - , just a clarification please, from your photo position, is the road behind you or between first impact and the mosque?

In relation to my position looking at the impact point, the road that runs west to east south of the mosque is to my right.
The road perpendicular to the approach path that goes north south is in front of me 200 metres further forward, well inside the debris area

C-SAR

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 09:12

Walder:
I agree with you entirely. The amateur sleuths and the hypocrites are ready with their damning speculation long before the professional investigators have spoken. I say to them, stop for a minute and think: if this had happened to you, how would you feel about being tried in a kangaroo court?
4PW:
I never attempted to absolve or accuse the pilot of blame. I merely suggested ONE scenario in what could have happened without prejudice. Wait for the findings then blame or otherwise show us how what a clever pilot you are however much you like. I don’t care if you can competently land on a short , wet runway built on a swamp every single time. The fact remains, it is still a SAFETY RISK to your passengers and other pilots less able than you. Remember what your first instructor told you: “There are old pilots and there are bold pilots but there are no…” etc etc. You may find that out the hard way.
Nugpot:
I don’t think I am wrong or naive in saying that ICAO should have more clout in standardising dangerous, ill equipped, badly run airports, nor that it cannot be effective. If an international body can impose sanctions in the name of politics, it can also impose sanctions in the name of safety. About the only thing for certain in this accident is that poorly equipped and maintained airports raise the stakes enormously.

takata

17th May 2010, 09:13

Hi,
I do not see the tracks left in the sand by the landing gear as shown in video taken from a jet posted in an earlier thread. Did you see evidence of landing gear making contact with ground?
Because they were possibly not landing gear tracks but rear under belly related (tail). Landing gear is more than 2 times wider than this track left (also it can not be related to engine's thrust as it would be larger than landing gear). It is a sandy area and from the initial impact, it is showing a fairly deep trench which, see from above, may look like parallel tracks while in fact it is sand edges.
S~
Olivier

Walder

17th May 2010, 09:15

By ZEEBEE
Quote:
Please only share facts – not guesses! Facts are what you have seen or heard on first hand!

Most have not seen anything, therefore the facts are almost non existent.

Perhaps you should look at the name of this forum again to re-acquaint yourself with its purpose.

Educated guesses by qualified individuals are of value and may help to shed some light to those of us who haven't peddled one of the big machines but still are interested in what might have led to the tragic outcome.

There is a place for this and the pious exhortations by some will do nothing to stop it

Well – facts in this case is:
Pictures, debris, eyewitness’, tapes and other recordings – all as fare as it exists.
That creates all together a very big and probably a complex puzzle which only can be assembled correctly by qualified investigators. I doubts most in this forum is qualified investigators.

The forum is called “Professional Pilots Rumour Network”
“Wild” guessing can easily be unprofessional and start incorrect rumours that in worst case can damage a specific airline or even the whole industry – so take care!

I am glad we have this forum where we can share things, but we should handle it carefully.

Walder:p

HundredPercentPlease

17th May 2010, 09:25

C-SAR,

When you saw this bit for real, did it look like the angle of cuts was steeply downhill?

http://i41.tinypic.com/r8z7zl.jpg

Fzz

17th May 2010, 09:26

Havana

17th May 2010, 09:30

Havana, you are correct. If you look at my pictures just posted ny HundredPercentPlease, the aircraft started to drag poles out of the ground before impact. The power line went to the house close to the mosque, therefore all the other poles after the impact point were entangled in the crash, hence the picture in page 15.
I could not enter the debris area, so my last standing was in front of the impact point... with some nice local guys all wearing the same dress around me asking polite questions...

Hi, thanks for that, now I see the photo all is clear. My mistake I thought the pole line ran 90 across the flight line where as in fact they run along the flight line.

Great photo's by the way.
H

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 09:32

C-SAR,

When you saw this bit for real, did it look like the angle of cuts was steeply downhill?

I can't say. I could not approach the cactus more than you can see in the pictures. The picture is squint because I had my camera just out of my pocket "shooting from the hip" for obvious reasons, so I could not be too precise. I know that this "distorsion" inserts optical errors... unfortunately this is the best I could do, given the circumstances. If anything, it looks as if the left cuts are a little lower than the right ones... but without close examination of the cuts and proper measurements it is hard to add any other factual information.

C-SAR

swedflyer

17th May 2010, 09:36

Engaging the autopilot at 200 feet and disengaging just before landing does not improve your flying skills, it doesn't even maintain them.

We all learned flying by hand. Keep up that skill! One day you might need it in minimum weather. Fly manual departures, ILS, VOR, NDB or visual, whatever it is. Twice a year in the sim is not enough! I bet that the day you need the autopilot the most, it's not there. Then it's nice to be confident. Especially for yourself.

Just another 10 cents.

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 09:37

C-SAR:

Did you see any evidence that the aircraft actually hit the poles? It looks from your photos that they're lying facing away from the crash site. Some of them look almost as if they have been lifted out of the ground.

So perhaps they were simply pulled over by the wires, then when the wires broke they rebounded and fell over away from the crash site. Or perhaps the aircraft snagged the wires and lifted the poles somewhat. But I'm not sure (at least from the photos) that we can say that the aircraft was low enough to hit the wires or poles 250m before the tailcone impacted.

As always, need to be careful to avoid drawing conclusions from only partial data.

I fully agree with you. Getting there my first thought was: these poles are pointing in the wrong direction. But then I saw that they looked like eradicated from the base, like in a pulling action, as you say. If you compare with the picture at page 15 where a pole is cut half way up, you can see the difference between being chopped "japanese sword like" and being pulled off the ground. That is why I agree with your hypothesis.

Your last comment finds me fully in agreement. I have been in too many accident sites for not to know how careful we need to be in looking at evidence and in formimg our own conclusions before corroboration and cross-check.

C-SAR

takata

17th May 2010, 09:57

C-SAR,
When you saw this bit for real, did it look like the angle of cuts was steeply downhill?
If it is not due to visual illusion (I don't think so), it is showing that cactus were cut by trailing edge of horizontal stab rather than leading edge, and will give the sinking angle in the opposite way. But of course, optical limitation would make it difficult to figure out without the shot being perfectly aligned with the ground and taken from another spot perpendicular to the path (which may be quite difficult to achieve discretly on the crashsite). C-SAR did quite well assuming the risk from local authorities!
S~
Olivier

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 10:08

JetThePilot:
Thank you for your last post. It explains the situation precisely in Libya and the difficulty faced by pilots and their governing bodies crippled by many years of UN embargo. The lifting of the sanctions and the new purchase of modern aircraft and increased commercial traffic has stressed the capability in dealing with it. In addition, Libyan pilots have been petitioning for ILS facilities for a long time now, but without success. There needs to be a big shakeup at the LYCAA, accountability supervised by ICAO ASAP.

Spadhampton

17th May 2010, 10:21

I refuse to accept any blame or excuse laid upon "UN Sanctions" as being in anyway related to this crash.

Incompetence in management may have played a significant role in this accident, but there is NO Political Blame or any blame or effect that can be placed outside of this company and government facility or oversight. Except in the rare occurrence of an engineering design flaw.

hoogvlieger

17th May 2010, 10:28

Compliments for C-SAR's 'on the spot'work and photography. A bold job ... One big remark however regarding all the presented material. As I recall in the first days after the accident the impact/crashsite has been heavily contaminated by flocks of (local) visitors, rescue-workers, journalists, heavy lifting machines and so on and son.
So how sure can we be that everyting in your snapshots is still in its original state or position?
Personally I have my doubts.

RIP

deSitter

17th May 2010, 10:37

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 10:40

Does that include "political" engineering Mr Spadhampton? No lets not get off topic here, but facts are facts. Its well know that sanctions punish the innocent more than the guilty, and you wouldnt be expected to know that unless you were at the receiving end.

17th May 2010, 11:40

I would like to repeat a question for AB pilots - it is more difficult to actually fly - in the seat of pants sense - a large, ponderous aircraft like the A330 with a sidestick controller, than say a 777 with its traditional yoke?

No. Without kicking off an Airbus v Boeing debate the Airbus FBW aircraft are easily as agile as a yoke controlled aircraft - perhaps more so because of the built in protections. However, if this aircraft was below 100' RA at initiation of the GA it would not have had the protection of AlphaFloor. Assuming it was at VAPP in a high drag config i.e. 10-15 knots above VAlphaProt then a very late go-around induced by a sudden realisation that you're too low (yank the stick back!) could have resulted in less than desired performance.

The infamous Habsheim A320 crash had exactly this - a sharp pull on the stick actually resulted in a nose down command to PREVENT a stall...... but if you fly too low towards trees no amount of computer wizardry will save you.

The DFDR's should soon yield the information to the point of impact.

A4

salimedj

17th May 2010, 11:58

Mr PTA-6
among all the expats working for AAW and posting about the crash you are far ahead the most virulent.

Shall I remind you that you applied for a job within AAW (certainly because you were jobless).

So I found your posts and comments about the crash and how Libyan Aviation is managed a bit displaced for 2 reasons

1 st

As I ve read it on the forum people who know what they are talking about do not discuss crash issues on a forum like this and wait for the investigation report to be released

2 nd

You are splitting in the soup by giving a negative picture of the airline who employs you and "insulting" Libyans pilots in public

even if a bit of what you said is true the airline has defaults like any other airlines not to mention local particularities

If it is really your thoughts than you shouldnt express them and keep them for you or discuss it with friends

You are free to stay on leave and not come back to Libya but I m sure you will since you know that at least with AAW you get a salary

Listen to my advice one more time NEVER SPLIT IN THE SOUP

SLFguy

17th May 2010, 12:01

'Split pea' soup?

BOAC

17th May 2010, 12:19

We owe a huge vote of thanks to C-SAR and 'helpers' - it is incredible that we have such pictures here.

On the question of the angle of cut on the bushes - if that was a real (and not distorted) angle it could not be FPA or we would be looking at a smoking hole in front of the mosque. I would suggest it may well be a rapidly down-pitching tail section?

A4 - a question from a non-AB pilot - you say 'no alpha floor' below 100RA but then you describe the Habsheim AB as reducing pitch to 'prevent a stall'. Is that a different mechanism? I thought I understood the idea of 'alpha-floor' was to give as close to alpha-max as allowed? What function ran in pitch at Habsheim?

JetThePilot

17th May 2010, 12:30

If gear is down, as the earlier Dutch video suggests, first impact must be either tail of nose of aircraft. If it was level, tracks would have been visible either side of the point of impact. The cactus is cut more horizontally than C-SAR red line on the image suggests. Look at the cactus to the right of the line and you see the cut is almost horizontal. The cut cannot be by the wings, as the engines would have left a great big mark on the sand either side of the point of impact. It seems that C-SAR's suggestion that the first impact was caused by tail is most plausible. Further, pilot must have applied full power to recover as the position of the detached wings suggests great force applied to them. The ~8 second lag before engines respond sealed the fate of the plane. The power came online as the body hit the ground or thereabout and made the impact much worse. In soft sand, without power applied, the aircraft would have slowed considerably and may have saved some lives as it came to the road at a much reduced speed. It hit the road at high speed and completely disintegrated next to the mosque.:sad:

thehighlander959

17th May 2010, 12:52

I have flown into TIP on Emirates Airlines over the last few years on a four week rotational basis, probably about 96 take-offs and landings.
In 2006 the flight was serviced by an A330-200 to Tripoli via Carthage, Emirates early in 2006 completed all their crew changes in Carthage due to problems they had in Libya ie. Tripoli Airport and Hotel problems for crew rest.
I have completed a cou[le of late afternoon dusk and rain landings on both runways. I always thought the better approach was for R 27, that meant when you landed the Terminal building was on your starboard side.

Two years ago 2008 Emirates changed the service to a Boeing 777.200/300.
This was done due to the length of flight time ie.0900am DXB departure with an arrival time in Tripoli of late afternoon as the stop in Carthage was still done for the Emirates crew change.

On both aircraft we have had imperfect landings but never scary landings.
I also flew in on an Alitalia Airbus 319 on Runway 09. in 2009 the poorest landing I have ever had in Tripoli and that was early morning from Rome, on the approach looking out of the window visibility was very poor. The touchdown and run out along the runway it was like being on a kangaroo.
I always wondered on that flight did the pilot see the air field at all prior to passing the threshold????
Sad to say but my thoughts go out to all the passengers and their families.

One Outsider

17th May 2010, 13:16

I thought I understood the idea of 'alpha-floor' was to give as close to alpha-max as allowed?

Alpha-floor is an auto thrust function that, when a certain AoA is exceeded, applies TOGA thrust. It is inhibited below 100' RA for good reason.

It is activated at a lower AoA than the stall protection modes that are part of the flight control laws.

aterpster

17th May 2010, 14:13

RadAlt2010:
I don’t think I am wrong or naive in saying that ICAO should have more clout in standardising dangerous, ill equipped, badly run airports, nor that it cannot be effective. If an international body can impose sanctions in the name of politics, it can also impose sanctions in the name of safety. About the only thing for certain in this accident is that poorly equipped and maintained airports raise the stakes enormously.

The first order of responsibility lies with the commercial carrier itself that intends to operate into any airport, especially an airport that is known to have safety and conformance issues.

The second order of responsibility lies with the sovereign state that holds that commercial operator's certificate of fitness.

The third order of resonsibility lies with the affected carrier's pilot's safety committee, if such exists (they do in cowboy-land. :rolleyes: )

ICAO falls way, way below all of the preceding.

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 15:34

I think what salmidj means to say to PT6A is: don’t bite the hand that feeds you! Which is understandable in a way esp. when no conclusions have been reached. Libya is trying to fast-track into the 21st century after years of neglect by the international community. This accident is a massive setback to morale and national pride which is deeply felt by the aviation institutions there. The accident findings will no doubt raise a lot of recommendations for change. Change will come, and it will come fast with a strong resolve for the highest standards, I have no doubt.

Roger Copy Charlie

17th May 2010, 16:21

Salimedj's post nicely sums up some of the cultural aspects at play:

- PT6A is not allowed to voice his opinion
- dirty laundry should be kept inside
- we pay you so shut up
- if you don't like it, then leave; we don't need your input
- other airlines make mistakes so we can hide behind that
- have "respect", i.e. wave the flag for us or shut up some more

All matters that point towards a rather steep cockpit gradient and not such a safety-orientated company culture. Consistent with my experience of 4 years of flying in Libya.

R09 is favoured by ATC in the morning for their convenience. Requests for a change to 27 are met by "not available due to traffic". 80% of ATC instructions are crude vectoring, "extend downwind", or "direct TW" (the locator for R09). Standard holds are almost never used, instead it becomes panicky "make a 360 to the right". Often you'd find yourself at 2000' above TW and cleared for a visual (650' too high on final). If half the navaids aournd HLLT work (even if it's on 'test' or without ident) it's a good day. The VOR approach for 09 brings you in at quite an offset angle. GPS/RNAV approaches do not exist (thus are not allowed) for HLLT. When executing a go-around once at HLLT and informing tower accordingly I was told "negative, continue" followed by "execute 360 to the right". We were at 300' at the time.

Low level aerobatics are the order of the day around TW for R09. "Incompetent at worst, gung-ho at best" is a very accurate description for much flying I've seen displayed at and around Tripoli.

Common denominator in much of this: a (lack of the right) cultural attitude towards safety and accountability.

sabenaboy

17th May 2010, 16:33

Fiero88

17th May 2010, 16:36

Why oh why do we always have to refer back to cultural differences.
I do not deny that there are any but at this stage we have no absolute knowledge of what happened.
I have been working in the region but disagree that the skill to fly is questionable.
There is a tendency from, in particular but not only, the other side of the ocean to form an opinion about everything that happens in other parts of the world, claiming that everybody else is an ar...
Just looking at the flying conditions, which are in many cases much worse that in the America's, I applaud the relative low number of accicdents/incidents happening there.( am talking about North Africa here)
My admiration goes out to, in particular, the circumstances in Indonesia, Philipinnes and other countries in the region, where pilot skill is really shown. Weather, poor navigation aids and lack of local information forms the profesionalism here which is not seen in other parts of the world.

I am sure that if similar circumstances would excist in the USA, newspapers would even not mention the number of accidents anymore because they were part of daily life there as are traffic accidents.

A disaster is always a chain of events and most of the time happening in an eye blink.:{

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 16:43

Very true Fiero. Bigotry should be kept out of aviation analysis. Accidents will happen anywhere and everywhere. The Libyans ought to be commended for working out of a base that is a pilot's worst nightmare! with relatively few scrapes.

RogerCopyCharlie, have you ever flown into Athens where ATC instructions are, at best, flying on a wing and a prayer? Again, the case of the Delta Airlines from Chicago to Stuttgart who landed in Brussels? I could go on and on.

Roger Copy Charlie

17th May 2010, 16:51

RadAlt2010

No, I haven't flown in ATH... are half the navaids u/s there also? And NPAs used whilst ILS and w/v favour the other runway?

I flew in Libya where I left because of safety concerns a/o related to the previously listed cultural aspects. Are you suggesting I should have disregarded my concerns because that would have been politically correct?

Please advise.

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 17:00

Political correctness is inappropriate too. I am suggesting that ICAO and IATA set minimum standards for airports and airline crew training, be it navaids, ATC or pilots training records. Go below those limits and you get outlawed/blacklisted till you improve and stay improved. Its not rocket science.

411A

17th May 2010, 17:14

Go below those limits and you get outlawed/blacklisted till you improve and stay improved.

Still living in never-never land, I see....not surprising, considering your previous comments.

TIP is used by some carriers as a technical stop for refueling...because of the fuel price.
Surprise, surprise.
'Blacklisting'...what utter nonsense.

I've never found landing on 09 a particular problem...and I've been flying to TIP well before there even was a runway 09....18/36 was the only runway then in use.
Is ATC rather poor at TIP?
Yes, without a doubt...and not much change since the early seventies, when I first started flying there.

Much complaining it seems, by those that simply cannot cope.
No surprise, certainly....:rolleyes:

CONF iture

17th May 2010, 17:28

However, if this aircraft was below 100' RA at initiation of the GA it would not have had the protection of AlphaFloor.
A4, what's the point to have Alpha Floor Protection if a GA is already initiated ... ?
Not sure you fully understand what you just wrote.

The infamous Habsheim A320 crash had exactly this - a sharp pull on the stick actually resulted in a nose down command to PREVENT a stall......
Once again, how to keep the Myth alive ...
But if you believe what you write, you should be able to quote it from the Official Report or at least publish some figures in that direction.

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 17:30

Oh God, not another macho bush pilot! I never found any problem landing in TIP 09 either 411A, in all weathers. But that doesnt mean safety standards there cannot be improved. Aviation is a LEARNING experience 411, not bravado. You learn from accidents so you dont repeat them. A very serious accident has occured here and you leave no stone unturned. the smallest details need to be explored to avoid repetition. I suggest you are the one who needs to review their coping strategy.

PJ2

17th May 2010, 17:37

RadAlt2010;
Political correctness is inappropriate too. I am suggesting that ICAO and IATA set minimum standards for airports and airline crew training, be it navaids, ATC or pilots training records. Go below those limits and you get outlawed/blacklisted till you improve and stay improved. Its not rocket science.
That's far too broad a brush to be a meaningful or effective comment.

Though their effectiveness will always be the subject of debate, many of the processes described are already in place.

The banning of certain carriers due to concerns over historical and/or current flight safety issues is already done in NA, Europe and Australia but such is not done on an ad hoc basis nor without significant cause.

Within the air carrier industry, IATA has its IOSA process. Such process may deserve debate but it is nevertheless in place and, to a degree, works as it is intended.

The ICAO Annexes (http://www.icao.int/icaonet/anx/info/annexes_booklet_en.pdf) already directly address your points. What is needed if you're going to argue this line of thought is detailed research and examples over time to be able to argue that standards are not effective. Most professional aircrew here know or are at least familiar with, for example, the FSF work on such matters, among other organizations.

It does nothing to merely state the obvious need for change; many are already quietly engaged in same and have been for decades, not just after one accident in an African country.

Insofar as accident investigation goes, much that is good has already been offered here and elsewhere on the process.

"What, not who" is a primary key as I'm sure you'll agree. There are no accidents in which there are not inappropriate "interests"; for the investigation, data is not a point of view, nor is a point of view, data.

As long as that is understood and the report(s) written as such, the report in question will likely come very close to what happened.

Under Annex 13, it is almost certain that at least France, (BEA), the UK, (AAIB) & the US, (NTSB), will be involved in the investigation though the Libyan authorities will lead. If the industry is not happy with such a process, ICAO and IATA both, incorporate the means of change.

PJ2

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 17:56

IOSA started out as just a concept, but it is now getting a grip and the airlines are sitting up and paying attention. Why is it a broad brush? If ICAO can enforce a similar inspection and enforcement process then we can have safer skies. Its all too easy to say it cant be done.

PJ2

17th May 2010, 18:18

RadAlt2010;

I will indulge you one more time. You're not reading the message being conveyed here: The processes you speak of are already in place and working.

Argue as you will, but that such processes are not working fast enough or effectively enough or broadly enough for you because you see one accident as cause for sweeping change, is wholly immaterial. You clearly do not comprehend how difficult it is for true advocates of this work to get even this far.

If you don't like the pace, make a difference and sign up for work where it counts, as there is plenty of it to go around.

PJ2

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 18:51

Just where did you see that I wanted changes done tomorrow PJ? Any accident, be it in Africa or Washington, should be a catalyst for change. Just get the BALL ROLLING. Setting minimum standards and enforcing them is not a Herculian task. Admittedly, some poor countries would not be able to comply, but then they will need to find the currency somehow or they loose out on the wealth that aviation traffic brings them.. ie cough up! I an sorry, but safety is non-negotiable. Thank you

foxcharliep2

17th May 2010, 18:58

RadAlt2010

I think what salmidj means to say to PT6A is: don’t bite the hand that feeds you! Which is understandable in a way esp. when no conclusions have been reached. Libya is trying to fast-track into the 21st century after years of neglect by the international community. This accident is a massive setback to morale and national pride which is deeply felt by the aviation institutions there. The accident findings will no doubt raise a lot of recommendations for change. Change will come, and it will come fast with a strong resolve for the highest standards, I have no doubt.

Years of neglect by the ...........

Change will come fast with higher standards ........

What do you smoke mornings ?? Sure is bad stuff. Change it.

I have my doubts - been to both TIP and BGZ

PJ2

17th May 2010, 19:50

BOAC;
What function ran in pitch at Habsheim?
There is no other "pitch mode" which will behave in the manner described. The only other mode is 'FLARE' which has nothing to do with the stated purpose below.
The Pilots deselected the autothrust via the FMGC prior to carrying out their low pass manoeuvre.
It is not possible to, ". . . [deselect] the autothrust via the FMGC . . . ".
The pitch down they experienced was due to the aircrafts normal law which will initiate a pitch down if it thinks the aircraft is about to stall and the autothrust is not available. It is separate to the alpha-floor protection.
Nonsense. See above.

golfyankeesierra

17th May 2010, 19:55

There were some reports about visibility but I have not seen the actual (metar). Anyone knows the QNH at the time?

edit: mea culpa, 'scuse me.. (used the search function and no hits, didn't look at the first page)

snowfalcon2

17th May 2010, 20:00

There were some reports about visibility but I have not seen the actual (metar). Anyone knows the QNH at the time?

See post #5 in this thread. :ugh:

lomapaseo

17th May 2010, 20:11

RadAlt2010

IOSA started out as just a concept, but it is now getting a grip and the airlines are sitting up and paying attention. Why is it a broad brush? If ICAO can enforce a similar inspection and enforcement process then we can have safer skies. Its all too easy to say it cant be done.

Can you provide an example of an enforcement that befits ICAO. I mean something other than words to the effect "stop it".

A regulatory agency within a country (Europe etc.) has the power to ban only the flights within its purview and not the flights into some other country.

ICAO like the UN can use words which are equally ineffective outside a specfic country unless an individual regulator decides to adopt them.

We've come a long way in having organizations, representing many, publish words of "best practices" when it comes to safety but we still don't have equality among national aviation entities.

PJ2

17th May 2010, 20:27

snowfalcon2;

Quote:
There were some reports about visibility but I have not seen the actual (metar). Anyone knows the QNH at the time?
See post #5 in this thread.
I get the sense that the vis in some local pockets was not that good. The investigation will of course include comments from or actions by other aircraft on approach to 09 (or 27) before and after the accident so we may know more about such conditions then. PJ2

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 20:29

I dont know why you are drowning in an inch of water Iomapaseo. Its dead simple. The country that falls below ICAO minimum standards in NAV, ATC, engineering maintenance, crewing etc loses its ICAO membership. Member airlines are then penalised for flying into the offending country so that it becomes uneconomical for them to even pick up cheap fuel. Thats how economic sanctions work right? I understand that some standards are hard to monitor and enforce, but at least the offending countries would not be given an easy ride of making a mockery of safety and there will be a need to even "be seen to improve safety". Who knows, it may even grow to be a genuine effort.

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 20:39

For those interested and with the patience to wait for a 7 Mbyte document to download follow this link:

7 Mbyte pdf file summarizing pictures and locations (http://home.comcast.net/~archae86//C-SAR/5A-ONG_Accident_12-5-2010.pdf)

to view a few pages presentation that correlates google earth overview with pictures from different media sources, in order to give a comprehensive view of the crash site layout.

My sincere thanks to archae86 for his help with the mysteries of linking files and for the use of holding space.

C-SAR

PS: This is a "home made" tentative production, made with what was available openly in the media. It is not, and never wanted to be, a precise representation of the crash site diagram.

Niner_Mike

17th May 2010, 20:44

According to Afriqiyah, the crash took place at 4:00 UTC
Afriqiyah Airways ,Announce that our flight 8U771 had an accident during landing at Tripoli International airport at 04:00 UTC. (06:00 AM Tripoli time) Today Wednesday 12 May.The active metar at that time was
Hllt 120350z Vrb01kt 6000 Nsc 19/17 Q1008or even
Hllt 120250z 35003kt 6000 Skc 19/17 Q1008So the crew was expecting with high probability a visual approach, unless warned otherwise by TAF, experience, approach, tower, previous landing traffic or haze visible from above and afar (in darkness).
Does anyone have the active TAF of that moment?
Under above active metar, the choice of runway 09 wasn't all that crazy (apart from sunrise to be expected) if ATC preferred that direction.

This further contributes to my speculation that this was an unexpected instrument approach gone sour.

Niner Mike.

jcjeant

17th May 2010, 20:44

Hi,

Sorry to derail a little but ... despite my eyes are less accurate than 40 years ago .. where I can seen a "pitch down" there ... (give me the time line when pitch down begin)
YouTube - Accidente aéreo de Habsheim (ángulo opuesto) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFv4ADUuwhw)
YouTube - Accidente aéreo de Habsheim (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SxXjj-45tw8)

PJ2

17th May 2010, 20:45

C-SAR;

With the help of the others who you have mentioned, your field work stands among others who have made contributions of exceptional quality and dedication to the art and science of flight safety work; I add my sincere thanks for your efforts and risking the "questions..."; it really helps to get a sense of the accident scene when discussing various notions of how this happened. Hopefully it will be determined from the recorders a bit more about why it occurred. PJ2

C-SAR

17th May 2010, 20:53

PJ2

Thanks for your words.
I feel privileged to have been accepted into this forum as a new comer and to be able to relate to so many wiser and more experienced professionals.
C-SAR

411A

17th May 2010, 20:56

Many replies to this particular forum/thread have been quite interesting and informative, keep 'em up.
As a long time pilot to TIP(circa 1971, onwards), I find these informative replies... most interesting.

However, those from RadAlt2010...much less so, sadly...:}

I suggest the 'ignore function', as an alternative.... I (and perhaps many others have noticed)...he /she is a troll...IE: totally detached from reality, vis-a-vis ICAO etc.

He/she? should know better.

We can only hope...:}

NB.
TIP is what it is, plan accordingly...or, go elsewhere.
Rocket science...it ain't.
And, never has been.
BEN...likewise.

17th May 2010, 21:42

Confiture said: A4, what's the point to have Alpha Floor Protection if a GA is already initiated ... ?
Not sure you fully understand what you just wrote.

Ok, I can understand where you're coming from but what I was alluding to is this. Imagine a scenario where you are below 100' RA and suddenly the ground looms out the mist. Instinctively you haul the sidestick back but leave the T/LVR's in CLB - what will happen? No AlphaFloor (<100' RA) but AoA protection will activate? (> half stick). Sure, A/THR will increase thrust to try to maintain VAPP but it won't be AlphaFloor. AoA protection may well lower the nose initially.......... Don't forget we're talking here about flying around just above min speeds not 250 knots - the tolerence for activation is minimal.

FCOM

HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

Under normal law, when the angle of attack becomes greater than αprot, the system switches elevator control from normal mode to a protection mode, in which the angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. That is, in the αprot range, from αprot to αmax, the sidestick commands directly. However, the angle of attack will not exceed αmax, even if the pilot gently pulls the sidestick all the way back. If the pilot releases the sidestick, the angle of attack returns to αprot and stays there.

This protection against stall and windshear has priority over all other protections. The autopilot disconnects at αprot + 1°.

V αprot, V αfloor, V αmax vary according to the weight and the configuration.

To deactivate the angle of attack protection, the pilot must push the sidestick :

- More than 8° forward, or

- More than 0.5° forward for at least 0.5 second, when < αmax.

In addition, below 200 feet, the angle of attack protection is also deactivated, when :

- Sidestick deflection is less than half nose-up, and
- Actual is less than αprot – 2°.

Rock and a hard place? Haul it back - no AlphaFloor and AoA protection active = negative flight path? Don't haul it back AoA protection not active - but if the levers aren't pushed a perhaps less than optimal spool up to try to maintain VAPP? In both cases the flight path is going to remain pretty similar which is not ideal close to the ground.

Once again, how to keep the Myth alive ...
But if you believe what you write, you should be able to quote it from the Official Report or at least publish some figures in that direction.

I don't wish to start a debate about Habsheim. I've tried to find the official report in English but can't. I do recall though on Air Crash Investigation that the claims of the Captain that when he pulled the stick back, the nose actually lowered were verified by the DFDR data. This was AoA protection. As he was below 200' RA (circa 30'-40' so no AlphaFloor) presumably he must have had more than half backstick otherwise it would have been deactivated.

Hope that clears up my thinking. I stand to be corrected and am only interested in sensible, technical debate - nothing else.

A4

PapaThreeCee

17th May 2010, 21:42

C-SAR,

There were reports in earlier threads about the aircraft hitting the roof of a house. Does that house appear to the far right in the third page of your overlay (titled "Impact") ?? If so, would that be the actual point of initial impact, even before the aircraft struck the utility poles / wires?

Thank you VERY much for your on-the-ground coverage of this accident.

Cheers!

overthewing

17th May 2010, 21:45

C-Sar, I'd like to thank you also for your excellent work, and all the information you've gathered and posted. Pprune is rarely so lucky.

But please don't get into trouble, taking photographs near an accident site, in Libya...

takata

17th May 2010, 21:50

Hi;
Another picture found by C-SAR in Libya showing the debris field and track left before tail separation. This view is from mosque's roof; initial impact is on the left but out of the pict. The perpendicular road, packed with ambulances, is clearly above previous ground elevation:
http://takata1940.free.fr/Reverseanglefrommosque.JPG
S~
Olivier

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 22:03

gums

17th May 2010, 22:26

Salute!

Adding to the others, C-SAR's inputs have been most useful to get an impression of what happened without the CVR/FDR. Outstanding on-the-scene info and pics. And PLZ try to stay outta trouble.

+++++++++++

I was puzzled by A4's description of the AoA limiter control laws.

How does the flight control computer know your altitude? AGL or baro?

Some of the angles A4 mentions seem very small. Actual stick angles or commanded elevator?

I flew FBW well before the Airbus, and tho our mission was vastly different, the basic rate and AoA limiters did not depend upon altitude. Control laws were different once gear was down, as AoA was more of a factor than "gee" command. Gains were different compared to clean configuration gains, but the thing felt like every other plane you had flown with gear and flaps down. The stick also used "pressure" and not degrees of movement. Hell, the sticks in the first 40 or 50 jets didn't move a mm. So I wonder about all the "normal" laws and the "other" laws and approach modes and ...

Gums sends ...

Viper pilot since 1979

ATC Watcher

17th May 2010, 22:31

RadAlt2010 you wrote , among other things , the following :

If ICAO can enforce a similar inspection and enforcement process then we can have safer skies. Its all too easy to say it cant be done.

and :
Its dead simple. The country that falls below ICAO minimum standards in NAV, ATC, engineering maintenance, crewing etc loses its ICAO membership.

and :
Setting minimum standards and enforcing them is not a Herculian task. Admittedly, some poor countries would not be able to comply, but then they will need to find the currency somehow or they loose out on the wealth that aviation traffic brings them..

Well either you are very young, in which case , you should listen to those here wo are a bit older and vey wise like PJ2 and , yes, 411A and learn. In case you are older, then you have not been paying much attention in the real world out there.For info, Nobody has the authority to withdraw membership of ICAO . ICAO is not a club, it is a part of the UN . ICAO set standards and recommended practices . ICAO cannot by its nature enforce regulations. The individual States have that responsibility.

CONF iture

17th May 2010, 22:41

A4, Gutter Airways,
Did I read you correctly : You actually base your comments on Air Crash Investigation TV Show ?

In addition, below 200 feet, the angle of attack protection is also deactivated, when :

- Sidestick deflection is less than half nose-up, and
- Actual is less than αprot – 2°.

A4, I am not familiar with this FCOM quote.
Would you have the precise reference, please ?

PJ2

17th May 2010, 22:48

Gutter Airways;

Believe as you wish or need. As far as aviation goes, the video has absolutely no redeeming qualities. It is a profoundly stupid piece of work and of no interest or value whatsoever.

If you prefer learning from such videos to discussing Airbus technologies with those who fly all these types and even trained other pilots on them then there is nothing further to discuss.

bugg smasher

17th May 2010, 22:49

411A thinks that since he was flying in Libya in 1971 (must be well past retirement now and only speaking as a clueless armchair pliot) he's an authority on the region, ICAO and even the psychological state of others. He hasnt produced a single valid argument for his animosity/objection towards my suggestions.. just personal attacks/ name calling which speaks volumes about his disposition.

That may be so, 411A certainly has highly personal opinions some find challenging, to say the least. In this case, though, he makes valid points, I respect his experience in that particular theater of operations. I’ve followed a somewhat similar career path, have even worked for one or two of the same airlines, although I have never met him.

In every, any, and all respects, Africa pretty much leaves you to your own wits. If you don’t have the requisite aviation chops, and they are very hard won, you’ve really no business strapping on any kind of flying machine there. North Africa is no different in this respect, the great sandy desert will kill you just as fast as the central jungles will.

Without remorse. It’s just the way it is. TIA.

RadAlt2010

17th May 2010, 23:28

Thank you for your response ATC watcher. I am well aware what ICAO is, what it can and cannot do, its history etc. I am not new to aviation, I am almost a decade younger than 411A who sadly has lost touch with current practices, if not his social skills. In the interest of safety, I was merely suggesting new roles and powers for ICAO. OK, if you cannot see ICAO fulfilling that, lets invent a NEW body and call it International Agency For Aviation Standards & Safety, fund it through the UN and give it international executive powers. I cannot understand why you, or 411 are so vehemently opposed to the idea of such an international lobby. Tripoli (or any other airport for that matter) may seem very safe to some, but very dangerous to others. Lets set up a body that sets standards that say this airport is bad, and that airport is good (to put it at its simplest), and actually attach some teeth to it, not just a name, so that the offending airfields or CAA's or countries get their act together through deadlines and penalties. It will need legislation that over-rides regional CAA's where safety is concerned, because what is safe and what is not can be clearly audited and ought to be internationally agreed. I would like to know why this is so hard to implement particularly at a time of declining safety standards all over the world. Aviation safety took a dive in the last two/three years.

RadAlt2010

18th May 2010, 00:09

I think you will find that all what I have been saying is vindicated here:
Google Answers: airline management (http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview/id/232819.html)

ICAO has no teeth and it needs to grow them or hand over control to another body.

I rest my case.

411A

18th May 2010, 01:38

I rest my case.

Good, we are thus spared any further of your...nonsense.

PS:
Opertating to TIP next month, just I have been doing for the last many years.
L1011 equipment...the gold standard of older types.:ok:

Machaca

18th May 2010, 02:19

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-007.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-015.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-012.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-008.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-014.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-011.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-009.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-010.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-006.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-013.jpg

lomapaseo

18th May 2010, 02:38

Machaca

I can always depend on you for better pictures.

That close up of the engine (BTW which looks like the same one posted earlier) does seem to show the last stages of the turbine rather than the booster stage of the compressor (Barit1?)

One can see the yellow containment blanket for the fan at the other end.

At first glance the damage points to a probable tail first impact with the ground crushing the aft end of the engine first.

Any pics of the other engine?

I'm a little leary of speculating based on a single picture so if I see some other more valid arguments I may edit this post :)

onetrack

18th May 2010, 04:13

JetThePilot - The ~8 second lag before engines respond sealed the fate of the plane

Where does this information come from? Obviously not from any Airbus advice.

QUOTE - FROM AIRBUS FLIGHT OPERATIONS BRIEFING NOTES - If the thrust is set at (approach) idle, approximately 5 seconds are necessary to obtain the engine thrust required to recover from a speed loss or to initiate a go-around...

deSitter

18th May 2010, 04:30

It's nothing short of astonishing that an airplane could tear itself to pieces like that without the help of explosive burning. One wonders how they are put together at some point.

-drl

nojwod

18th May 2010, 04:33

Is it just me or is anyone else having trouble reconciling the debris trail to the assumption that the aircraft was in descent profile and either flown into the ground or attempting go-around from a late realisation of a situation?

To me the shape of the impact point and the complete shredding of practically every square foot of the fuselage doesn't sit right with the theory that the plane was in a go-around or descent flight path. Also, if the tail breaking off caused the rest of the plane to climb briefly before nosing in, I would have expected to see another point of impact and a separate debris field futher on, whereas this appears to be a continuous shredding of the fuselage from around about where the impact mark appears.

One other thing that troubles me is the relatively compact nature of the impact mark. If the plane was nose high either in approach or go-around power-on attitude, and took out the wires for at least a couple of hundred metres before the impact mark, I would have expected to see a long draggy furrow, not the compact shape we see.

What the photos is suggesting to me is a high rate of descent but nose high, picking up the wires close to the impact mark which pulled the rest of the poles down, immediate disintegration of the fuselage on impact but somehow the tail being left relatively unscathed. If so, why the aircraft would be in a high rate of descent at that point is a complete mystery.

deSitter

18th May 2010, 04:45

I have to completely agree here - tumbling and mutual erosion does not reduce seats to small pieces. There's almost nothing left - this reminds me of accidents in which the plane went right in, such as PSA 182 - and the weird lack of fire makes it even more puzzling. Is it possible that a nearly empty fuel tank, or several of them, can explode like a bomb on impact? Where are the wing parts?? That would explain no burning, or rather no slow burning.

Also I agree about the wires - the reason the tangled wires could drag the poles from the ground without breaking is that the attach points on all the poles shared the load all at once - they were pulled up and out of their shallow holes in an instant.

-drl

Flying Bagel

18th May 2010, 05:30

I think you will find that all what I have been saying is vindicated here:
Google Answers: airline management

ICAO has no teeth and it needs to grow them or hand over control to another body.

I rest my case.

What's your obsession with governing bodies? Or you seem like you have a personal grudge of some sort. No one holds onto such an unreasonable argument for so long without having first explaining why from their personal experience they think this is the case.

I fly into airports with bad ATC and poorly maintained equipment all the time. That's part of why I get paid. The other part is to know when not to go into said airport for the fear of my own underpants.

From what I gather, TIP is not half as bad as some places I fly into. Third world countries are just that, third world. They don't have the money to maintain their equipment, the staff is generally poorly paid, and most of them have bigger problems than just inoperative DME's or poor speaking controllers. So what are you suggesting? ICAO dump them out because they're not up to snuff? Surely, that's going to improve the situation.

Really, you have to use your brain a bit more often to think about consequences of said actions.

V1... Ooops

18th May 2010, 05:44

I have been following this discussion with great fascination, and I would like to extend my thanks to all of you (especially C-SAR) for your very carefully considered and insightful posts.

I note that many of you have commented on "the debris field" and how "all the small pieces" may possibly suggest a high-energy impact that is not consistent with a typical shallow angle CFIT during the landing phase of flight.

I wonder if perhaps this kind of debris field (many small pieces) is just a characteristic of the construction methods (e.g. bonding) or construction materials (e.g. composites) used on this particular model of aircraft? For sure, we are all used to seeing a more conventional "broken sausage" type of wreckage when a plane lands short of the runway - for example, the recent BA 777 accident, or the more recent Turkish 737 accident.

Is it possible that A330 aircraft break up differently than what we are used to seeing - not due to any deficiency of the aircraft, but just due to their nature? Consider the frustration the French have had trying to find the debris field for the Air France A330 that was lost in the South Atlantic - if that debris field turned out to be anything like this one (and chances are that impact was a heck of a lot more violent than this one), then it is no wonder why they have had so much difficulty locating the remains of the AF aircraft.

Everything I have read so far in this discussion seems to point to a CFIT - most participants appear to agree on that. Perhaps it took place while the crew were still proceeding towards landing, or perhaps it took place in the very early stages of a go-around, but still, it doesn't appear to be anything more complex or sinister than a CFIT. I think we might need to re-evaluate any inferences we have been drawing from the wreckage pattern, because this might simply be a 'normal' wreckage pattern for this aircraft type, even though it is not the same as the wreckage pattern we would anticipate based on observing prior accidents of other types of aircraft.

SortieIII

18th May 2010, 05:46

lets invent a NEW body and call it International Agency For Aviation Standards & Safety, fund it through the UN and give it international executive powers.

ICAO is a UN body. The UN has been spectacularly ineffective when dealing with crises around the globe, despite being equipped with wide ranging 'powers', and a small army, why should aviation be any different?

Only bunch who have had any effect on Africa is Europe, who have managed to get a small amount of compliance by banning the worst of the bunch from European airspace. Those thus banned have spent a lot of energy bleating about how unfair it all is, etc. etc., instead of taking action to change the situation.

I agree with 411A when it comes to flying in Africa (40 years experience doing it on heavy jets, for the last 20 on 'glass'). Expect and prepare for the worst, then you won't be caught unawares.

I rest my case.

I live in hope.

mike-wsm

18th May 2010, 06:34

C-SAR, your pics are stunning and all your on-site information is much appreciated. But there is a question not being asked and there are pics that are simply not there. Have you looked at the area before impact, and is there any evidence of engine thrust? Blown sand, blown-over trees or whatever? In a previous post I hinted at this but the kindly old moderator noticed that I am only an avionice design guy and deleted my post. So, in prof-pilot-speak, were the engines "turnin and burnin"? And blowing half the environment away? Or had the power failed? Many thanks.

18th May 2010, 07:09

@CONF iture:

My reference to Air Crash Investigation was purely that - a reference. I don't regard ACI as serious but it is non the less interesting. Regarding Habsheim they did make a big issue surrounding the fact that the aircraft pitched down despite a nose up demand. Airbus even recreated it with another A320 at Toulouse confirming AoA protection. AB wanted to know whether the aircraft had gone into "LAND mode". This is a slight misnomer as there is no Normal Law-"LAND Mode". The FMA annuciation of "LAND" at approx 350' RA is only confirming valid LOC, GS and RA signals and will ensure "FLARE" mode will sequence (memorising pitch attitude at 50' RA and then applying nose down trim from 30' RA to induce the pilot to flare). This all happens in Normal Law - Flight Mode until switching to Normal Law-Flare Mode at 50' RA.

At Habsheim they were not following an ILS and I assume FD's were off so there would not have been any LAND annunciation. Likewise this was obvioulsy a "first release" Airbus so in the event of a GA there would not have been any automatic reinstatement of the FD's. IIRC it required manual pitch to 15 degrees, FD's on, the T/LVR's from TOGA to CLB to TOGA to engage SRS - quite a handful. This would not have been the case with this A330 accident.

I've found the official report but it's in French and I don't speak French so I cannot give any reference to the AoA protection. If any French speakers wish to search feel free - I would like to be either proved or disproved regarding the AoA issue and the report.

The FCOM Ref (Airbus A320 Series) regarding modes/protections is Volume : 1, Chapter : 27, Section : 20, Page : 4

A4

rottenray

18th May 2010, 07:30

That may be so, 411A certainly has highly personal opinions some find challenging, to say the least. Be very, very careful here, unless you want an L-10 in your back yard.:eek:

411 is very, very professional, and rarely misspeaks.

He is here to speak, unlike many other older or bolder pilots.

The thread has clearly gone to absolute hell, when we start seeing badck-biting comments like this.

C-SAR -

Thanks for your being on scene and able to cope with making a valuable contribution.

It has to have been extremely tough and stressful. Seeing the site, taking photos as you can without "coming to the attention of" various folks.

I think you have done more to keep this thread relevant and on-topic than most others.

There are a lot of others who have contributed theories, and I appreciate you as well.

Without all of you, this thread would have gone Jet Blast a long, long time ago.

Thanks all for the good discussion, hopefully the debate between some folks and others will taper off a bit so we can get back to pondering true causes.

But, damitt, Jim, we can't argue with 411 - the ship cannae take it, we'll break up!

RR

onetrack

18th May 2010, 07:32

The almost total fragmentation of the aircraft does raise many questions... and no doubt a lot of them will be answered in the full investigation. There are several factors that could be contributory. One is the obviously hard, dry ground, with the possibility of rock not far under the surface. A ploughed field in a wet climate offers a more compliant surface, with a degree of impact absorption. Second, is the relative absence of larger, foliage-laden trees, which also tend to soften impact. Third, is the likelihood that the impact was very hard... the hull and wings were effectively slammed into the ground with a very high RoD, and high G's. Add in speed of the aircraft at not less than say, 150 kts?... and you have a scenario for some major destruction of the airframe.

The question, of course, that is possibly on most minds, is... if this was a Boeing, with less composites in the construction... would the hull have stayed more intact... and would there have been more survivors?
IMO... perhaps, for the first question... and a big maybe, for the second.
There have been similar crashes with a lot of survivors (the A320 crash at Schiphol - TK1951)... but the Schiphol crash was into a ploughed field, and the AoA at impact was probably far less than this one. The TK1951 flight impacted hard with substantial hull rotation at impact, but the fuselage stayed relatively intact.

Re the powerline and poles. Yes, it is very easy to uproot/pull over poles just with wire pressure. The direction of pull on the poles on impact in this case is horizontal, not downwards, and poles are surprisingly easily dislodged, even if they are sizeable poles... and these ones aren't.
I have a farmer friend who has a two-wire powerline running through his farm, suspended on sizeable wooden poles. The wire clearance is a minimum of around 4.9M. He "bumped" one pole with a trailed implement (large scarifier) recently, and the pole he hit, fell over! He turned to see it fall... then to his great consternation, the falling pole took another 6 poles down with it!!... purely by drag, on the two wires!!

lexoncd

18th May 2010, 07:46

The TK crask was a 737 not an A320 and as for the composites in the aircraft making a difference to survival aspects this is a red herring and not worthy of this board.

In the fullness of time the report will be out. The Flight recorders were recovered immediately and were clearly intact. It should be hoped they can provide an insight as to what went wrong.

No doubt it will most likely be a combination or swiss cheese scenario....

silverstrata

18th May 2010, 07:54

Downwind:
Taking your approach RadAlt, you make it seem automation should be trusted and used more than the human brain. Why use pilots in the first place?

I suggest we put ILSes in all airports and provide RNAV-to-ILS automatic change and just man airplanes with computers.

Let me get this straight, Downwind - are you suggesting that we should take all the ILSs out of Heathrow and use an ADF instead, because ILSs are unnecessary?

ILSs were devised for a reason - THEY ARE EASIER AND SAFER. An international airport without an ILS is NOT an international airport, and heavy traffic should not be visiting (unless, of course, RNAV approaches become fully certificated).

.

silverstrata

18th May 2010, 08:10

Fiero:
Why oh why do we always have to refer back to cultural differences.

Because they are a factor. Not a reason, but a factor. Take this from a N African carrier's CRM course.

"...as a 1st officer you must understand that the captain is always right. you can only give advice..."

Phoebus

18th May 2010, 08:32

I think the questions here regarding break-up of manufacturer 'A's vs manufacturer 'B's products is fruitless. The A330 is mainly conventional alloy for wings and fuselage. Is it possible the speed at impact was a little higher? The FDR will provide the answers, and further speculation is just that - speculation.

Regarding approach aids, I think you can buy a few ILS installations for the price of an A330. They just don't look so impressive as a shiny new terminal... ...and I expect the accountants have problems finding a column for 'safety' in their spreadsheet until after the event.

JetThePilot

18th May 2010, 08:50

QUOTE - FROM AIRBUS FLIGHT OPERATIONS BRIEFING NOTES - If the thrust is set at (approach) idle, approximately 5 seconds are necessary to obtain the engine thrust required to recover from a speed loss or to initiate a go-around...Airbus state APPROXIMATELY 5 seconds because it is not exact. It will depend on AoA (because this affects airflow into engine as well as power required to recover), current speed (will determine additional power required), moisture (affects oxygen content per volume of air), tempretaure (also oxygen content), etc. Now if you want to play it safe, as many experienced pilots will tell you, do not operate right on the margin but give some slack. About 8 seconds is the least you can allow under real, not laboratory or simulated, conditions (and this is assuming Airbus computers will not tell the aircraft to do something else!). Just think about the rate of descent for a minute, on approach and near minima altitutde, relying on 5 seconds to GA will see a plane crushed and then draged on the ground. I will be very surprised if the disintegration of 8U771 was not caused by a late surge of power as the plane was about to make contact.

JetThePilot

18th May 2010, 09:03

There has been a debate about ILS, ATC, and safety issues in Tripoli and other airports in Libya and Africa. I tend to side with the critical side of the debate. Whilst a poor African nation will be excused for not spending on 'fancy' safety equipment, Libya has absolutely no excuse. A very rich country that has been free from sanctions for a decade that has been told by its own pilots of the need for ILS for at least a decade and chose to ignore them. Further, ATC would direct pilots to 09 when 27 (with ILS) is available! This is not a big issue in good weather when you can see the runway from miles away, but in poor visibility it is criminally irresponsible.

It is not that Libyans do not know the importance of NavAids in poor weather or that they are bad pilots, it is the corruption and carelessness of the poor poor system of administration. This problems exist in hospitals, schools, roads, electricity supply, water supply, courts of law, prisons, etc. To say sanctions have caused the problems may be true if said 10 years ago, but now it is a standard excuse for neglect, corruption, incompetence, and inept governance. Not only excellent pilots left Libya to escape the mindless decay, but also doctors, engineers, professors.

apdak

18th May 2010, 09:44

I crashed an Airbus once.:uhoh:
Here's my account on how i bought the farm.

The first time I did a go-around in an Airbus with the autopilot disengaged, I expected that natural tendancy for the nose to lift up on giving power as it had with every other aeroplane that i had flown before that.

Because the airbus fly-by-wire system demands a 1G loading with the autopilot out, the nose did not lift an inch. Now with very little back stick input from my side, it went hurtling with almost full power atraight ahead into the ground infront of me.

Luckily this was in a simulator.
I have no doubt though, that had this not been so dramatically demonstrated to me that day in the sim, I would never have been so aware of the danger that this particular trap represents. It takes a monumental pull on the stick (almost full tilt) to get the desired amount of rotation...

A go around, at, (or even below minima) especially having lost visibility, doing manual flying, in a high powered twin at low weight, has DISASTER written all over it, in an Airbus if you are not accutely aware of the trap.
Maybe this is what happened?

bia botal

18th May 2010, 09:58

Thanks to C-SAR for his great work, I wonder can someone please answer a boeing man some airbus questions.
With ref to the tail most likely striking the ground first,what is the AoA for a tail strike, versus the pitch attitude the FD would command in a go-around.
After watching the videos of the Habsheim accident is it possible that the crew just got it so low that it tried to land.
And a observation, with reference the photos on post 611, in particular the shot of the tire, score marks can be seen on opposing sides indicating that the wheel at the time was not rotating, surely this could indicate that the undercarriage was in a less than vertical position or indeed fully retracted.

C-SAR

18th May 2010, 10:11

There were reports in earlier threads about the aircraft hitting the roof of a house. Does that house appear to the far right in the third page of your overlay (titled "Impact") ?? If so, would that be the actual point of initial impact, even before the aircraft struck the utility poles / wires?

Few pages back I answered a similar question: in my opinion, the house being mentioned is the little shack next to the mosque, to the west of it along the east-west road. This house is already after the impact point, so no surprise that it was showered by debris, but it is not in the line of travel (it is to the right of the path) and as I said, AFTER the first impact point. The power line was hit before the impact point.

Sir Richard

18th May 2010, 10:13

JetThePilot

Initiating the go-around at minimums (about 250ft aal) still gives you 15 seconds before ground contact at 1000 fpm rate of descent....plenty of time for the engines to reach full power ! :ugh:

Nickdj

18th May 2010, 10:22

TK1951 flight impacted hard with substantial hull rotation at impact, but the fuselage stayed relatively intact.

TK1951 came down with a speed of approx 100kts in a moist dirt field. Seen by the length of the debris trail of this crash, you can easily make out that the velocity of the aircraft was a lot greater. What i also noted was the fact that the engine found had no engines blades left what so ever. I would presume this to be because the engine was giving a high amount of thrust (i.e. TO/GA).

C-SAR, thanks for the great time you have taken with the images!!! :ok:

C-SAR

18th May 2010, 10:23

Have you looked at the area before impact, and is there any evidence of engine thrust? Blown sand, blown-over trees or whatever?

I did and I didn't see anything that looked like relevant (but it does not mean that they are not there..). The tracks visible from the overflight video before the impact point are of a makeshift road. A car is also visible and the white marks further on are just left overs from previous buildings. The google map being old(er) shows buildings that are not there.

To All:
Thanks for your thanks but please stop doing it... no mention no attention...

On a more general point, all of you familiar with accident investigations will agree with me that I was lucky to have a peek at the site. In the large scheme of things, mine was just a blink of an eye. I know that I have missed 80% or more of the clues and information that is there. Of course a peek is better than nothing, but please do not loose the perspective that I could (and probably am) wrong in some of my assumpitons due to the limited time to properly analyze the information.

Thanks. C-SAR

valvanuz

18th May 2010, 10:33

Soooo:
1. Full power was added below minimums :eek:
2. At minimums, GA was not (properly) applied :eek:
3. ...:confused:

JetThePilot

18th May 2010, 10:40

Initiating the go-around at minimums (about 250ft aal) still gives you 15 seconds before ground contact at 1000 fpm rate of descent....plenty of time for the engines to reach full power ! :ugh:Agree under normal conditions with no buildings, tall trees, power pylons, etc., that may be under the flight path on approach. But by the time full power is on, you are well below 250ft, right? Factor in reaction time and I am sure we can agree on the rest.

The point I was trying to make is that in cases of loss of power the approx. 5 seconds AirBus manual at minimums may not be enough, more slack needs to be allowed to avoid breaching minimums.

andrasz

18th May 2010, 10:46

Having been away a few days, I cannot see much new aside [edited out, thanks anyway :)], most of what I summarised in #40 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-2.html#post5688723) still seems to stand, with the exception of the final moments that are not supported by the contact marks.

I still maintain however that the aircraft must have struck at a highly unusual attitude. It does appear that the complete disintegration was the result of a rapid pitch-down following tail separation (with a possible tumbling around the axis of the wing box, shredding the fuselage but keeping the wing structure relatively intact at the farthest point of the wreckage field). However for the tail to have completely separated, the aircraft must have been either in a very sharp nose up attitude, or the vertical speed must have been very high. With the latter being improbable even in a blotched approach/go around scenario, the first is the more likely.

There have been a number of speculations about the hardness of the ground. I am very familiar with desert surfaces (including Libya), from what I can see on the photos of the impact site the subsoil is a mix of gravel and clay covered by a thin layer of sand. Such surfaces are very firm, will easily support a car without any meaningful sinking of the wheels, and may be strong enough to actually support an aircraft on wheels. This layer of gravel and clay will extend to a depth of several metres before bedrock is reached. The firmness is indicated by the fact that the tail only dug a trench of less than half metres, in soft ground that rut would have been much deeper. Had the plane made a gentler contact with this type of terrain, it would have just slid along, probably the only major damage being the shearing-off of the undercarriage (more due to unevenness of terrain rather than the wheels sinking in)

RadAlt2010

18th May 2010, 10:57

Flying Bagel and 411A (how does this guy find the time to fly when he made 7000 posts I'll never know):
Both of you are the type of crop duster pilots that we are all glad to see the back of. I hate to break this to you, but aviation has changes since the 1950's Dakotas and Constellations. Accent is now on safety, regulation, CRM. Its not just about you and your airplane, its about the safety of your passengers foremost.

"From what I gather, TIP is not half as bad as some places I fly into. Third world countries are just that, third world."

If you have been reading my posts you’d know that I wasn’t referring to TIP singularly. I am saying ALL major international airports of the world have to be audited,rated, monitored. If you want to fly into some death trap do it on your own, don’t take passengers with you.

silverstrata

18th May 2010, 11:06

Andraz:
Had the plane made a softer contact with this type of terrain, it would have just slid along, probably the only major damage being the breaking-off of the undercarriage.

Indeed, rather like the Heathrow 777. Wet London clay is such a flattering surface to inadvertently land upon. (Note the 777 hit wheels first, not tail first. Tail first is a possible indicator of a failed go-around for the A330).

But the other factor is the energy involved, be that in airspeed or thrust. One would have thought that the speed would be low, and the extra energy was provided by thrust - but in this instance, anything could have happened.

http://img.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2008/01_03/planeskidNTI1701_800X466.jpg

Right Way Up

18th May 2010, 11:13

JetThePilot,

The minima will take into account obstacles in the approach zone and also of the height loss after go-around.

A possible scenario that I alluded to earlier in the thread that I have heard no evidence to disprove, is the scenario that occurred in Melbourne. On an approach a decision to go around is hampered by not selecting the TOGA detent, the aircraft will continue descending at the same rate possibly with MCT power & the gear retracting. The acceleration would be significant.

JetThePilot

18th May 2010, 11:28

What you say makes sense. Minima is not to be breached - initiating GA or recovering speed need to be initiated above minima in descent at or above minima. That is the point I am trying to make. You cannot give yourself 5 seconds to do that, few more seconds are needed.

From what C-SAR posted it seems that 8U771 did not have landing gear deployed at point of impact. This supports what you said about the Australia incident. However, with regard to disintegration, I agree with what has already been posted. Surface should have slowed the plane considerably if there was alot of drag, but it appears to have hit several tress and pylons and that would have resulted in loss of structure integrity. Hitting the RAISED road after that at high velocity (just see how far the wings are and you will realise massive thrust was applied to them) meant a weakened structure is totally destroyed.

andrasz

18th May 2010, 11:48

One would have thought that the speed would be low, and the extra energy was provided by thrust...

Concur, thrust by itself can wreak havoc - just think of the Etihad 346 in Toulouse. They had no more than 20-30m of roll at takeoff thrust (and even that not free, but slipping brakes), and the front of the aircraft was basically shredded. Fuselage is built for torsional strength, but has very little resistance to longitudinal compression. If the tail broke off as it appears, the engines running at full power would have driven the nose into the ground, disintegrating the front fuselage to the degree we see.

Right Way Up

18th May 2010, 11:48

JetThePilot,

If you go-around at minima, you pitch at a normal rate towards approx 15 degrees which will take roughly 4-5 secs. At the same time the engines will be spooling up towards TOGA and again that will take roughly 5 seconds. The engine thrust increase should be quick enough to maintain speed whilst carrying out the pitch manoeuvre. The altitude loss if the manoeuvre is carried out correctly will be roughly 20-30 feet. Even allowing for 3 secs pilot delay the total loss will only be 50-60 feet which is still safe if not advisable. If a pilot delays more than that then you cannot account for that behaviour or lack of ability. It is quite safe and proper to go-around at minima.

Boeingrestricted

18th May 2010, 13:03

800-1000m from treshold = 200 feet in alt. speed given the pax numbers will be around 135kt........ See the pics no skidding marks what so ever results in 1 conclusion a big bang. I would say a crusader attack from the western intelligence services..Or maybe from christianist extremists

wilyflier

18th May 2010, 13:16

Having hit , then lost its tail, we had the equivalent of a tailless aircraft not designed with sufficient pitch stability. I have seen this happen with hang gliders , at even at slow airspeed the change of attitude in a "tuck"is so sudden , 12 degrees nose up to 90 degrees nose down in a flash, that the pilot can continue forward to instantaneous bone breaking injury on the airframe. The negative angle of attack accelerates the rate of descent to a high figure at once.Im not surprised the A330 was so completely shattered.Not a cartwheel., maybe the pieces tumbled .
Wilyflier

ivarpenris

18th May 2010, 13:37

I'm a reporter of a big Dutch newspaper and had brief contact through email with the pilot of AlItalia who was an eyewitness of the crash in Tripoli. He posted a message on what he saw on the forum of anpac.it. The press-officer of ANPAC told me one brief passage of his post: the plain had far too much speed and was touching the ground with a backangle of more than 20 degrees. A Dutch flight-expert told me that this indicates that the pilot must have been disorientated and that he tried to pull up the plane in the last seconds.
My question: are there any Italian pilots here who can login to the (closed) forum on the website anpac.it? If so, can anyone send me the passage this Italian pilot wrote? As you might know the majority of the victims is Dutch and relatives of them are very interested in everey detail there is to tell. Please leave your message here or send it to: ivar.penris at ad.nl.

one post only!

18th May 2010, 13:53

Not sure if its already been discussed (probably) but what about the scenario that because they were flying a NPA, if they were flying it in approach mode and then performed the GA at just below minima (or the very unfortunate millisecond time window after minima) that the engines go to full power but you don't go into GA mode. The thing just spears on towards the ground until you take over. One of the holes lining up?

Someone mentioned a while back that this airline wasn't cleared to fly managed approaches though so I imagine they would have been in raw data so should not have had this problem?!?

Interflug

18th May 2010, 14:00

Where is the cockpit located in the picture sequence? Where did the (remains of) the cockpit end up, I have not read any information in that regard? Probably not in front of the wings, so the wings must have overtaken the cockpit in the breakup sequence...

SaturnV

18th May 2010, 14:01

RadAlt2010

18th May 2010, 14:04

If you don't see that I can only conclude you are trying to cover up incompetence.

Towerdog, so far you have spewed out nothing but invective and paranoia which adequately reflects your putrid state of mind. I assure you I have no allegiance to Afriqiya. I am saying to you, and morons who blame dead pilots like you before the reports are out: give it a break! You have mentioned "flying a perfect airplane into the gound" more than once in your posts, and that says a lot about you.. that YOU are the one who has no idea about aviation

takata

18th May 2010, 14:36

takata, in the first image, in the middle right of the frame, could that be the first pole knocked down in C-SARs set of pole images? If so, the last pole standing would then be at the right edge of the image.
Yes. Those are the same poles from C-SAR's images (That is why I included this first picture as the impact point is at its left limit). One seems still standing on the right (see the sun shadow), and several are down and roughly parallel to the crash path. One is down behind the bush in front of the white mark, but is clearly visible on the next image. The lines of cactus are also visible, in fact there is two lines, each bordering one track perpendicular to the road.
S~
Olivier

valvanuz

18th May 2010, 14:50

Nickdj

18th May 2010, 14:55

The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage?
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.

Those are both the wings.

And everyone lets not bash at each other, keep on subject please....

takata

18th May 2010, 15:03

The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage?
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
Yes, its quite puzzling but they might have been moved because of the fire and fumes for clearing the runway. I have seen a footage showing them burning amongst trees (and there is none where they are lying now), but I can't find it anymore.

One identifiable piece of the front fuselage seems to be lying there:
http://takata1940.free.fr/afri.jpg

Smilin_Ed

18th May 2010, 15:20

wings?
The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage? I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.

The wing boxes are the most robust portions of the airframe and the heaviest because they contained the fuel. Because of their robustness and mass, they continued forward while the more fragile portions of the airframe lagged behind due to less kinetic energy.

HundredPercentPlease

18th May 2010, 15:50

Altimetry.

Has anyone here had the interesting exercise in the sim where you are given a nasty NPA and passed an incorrect QNH?

Hllt 120420z 27007kt 5000 Br Nsc 19/17 Q1009

Temperature one nine, QNH one zero one nine. :ooh:

It has be puzzling me how you crash an Airbus at the lateral point that is roughly at MDA. Really, you should crash it on the runway, or at least abeam.

To crash 0.8 nm short, you need to start at the right point and have a high ROD, or start at the wrong point (too low) and have the correct ROD. Given that the Airbus uses FPA, going for the wrong ROD is tricky.

Now I realise I am creating a scenario to fit, and not looking at evidence to make a scenario - so this is just food for thought. But the 330 was 250' off-profile, and then bust minima. If the altimeters said they were on profile and at minima when the ground arrived, then you'd end up where they were. If your first warning was "50" then conceivably you could get your tail tangled in wires as you went around.

And yes, I know that the RA would be the clue, but fatigue can knock you so so easily. But how else do you end up on the ground so far short of the r/w?

andrasz

18th May 2010, 16:07

I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces around.

The following are all FACTUAL information, verifiable from information and linked photos over the previous 650 or so posts:

The ground contact marks indicate the aircraft hit the ground tail first in a nose-up attitude
The first major piece of wreckage is the tailplane with all three control surfaces attached and (relatively) intact, facing the opposite direction of travel, about 200 metres from initial impact.
The last piece of wreckage are the wings, both still attached to the central wing box, structurally largely intact except for destruction by the post-crash fire, located about 700 metres from the initial impact point
The fuselage is shattered to tiny bits, littering the area between the tailplane and the wings in a narrow 500m long wreckage path
At least one engine was producing thrust at time of impact (2nd stage compressor blades show clear FOD)Without speculating on the why's, I believe the last (rather disturbing) moments of the aircraft and the impact sequence can be DEDUCTED reasonably well from the above information:

Aircraft strikes the ground with the tail in a strong nose-up pitch attitude. The impact is strong enough to fracture the rear fuselage, and the tail breaks off.
The forward momentum (and possible impact rebound) carries the fuselage up and forward (probably aided by TOGA thrust, with the associated pitch-up moment countering the pitch-down moment caused by the loss of the tail for a few moments). While this is happening, the tail tumbles on the ground (attested by the damage on the tip of the V/S) one or more times, and comes to a rest facing rearwards
Loss of tail results in a rapid pitch down of the remaining fuselage, hitting the ground in a sharp nose-down attitude, probably pushed by the engines at full power.
Nose and front fuselage is crushed and fragmented, while the whole structure pivots around the ground contact point, propelling the still intact wings forward. The crushing of the forward fuselage cushions the impact sufficiently that the wing structure remains intact. The engines would still run at this point (for another few miliseconds) ingesting gravel and aircraft debris.
The wings tumble over, crushing the remaining fuselage over and aft of the wing and probably losing the engines at this point. This would be the point where fuel tank integrity would be lost, producing a fireball of vaporized fuel, moving forward together with the wing structure. (this explains the lack of major fire in the earlier part of the wreckage path)
The remaining momentum causes the wings to tumble over once more, coming to rest facing the original direction of travel, and are partially consumed by fire fed by fuel remaining in the wings and centre tank.This whole sequence would have lasted 8-9 seconds if initial impact happened close to the 135kt approach speed, less if applied go-around thrust already increased speed significantly.

TowerDog

18th May 2010, 16:25

Towerdog, so far you have spewed out nothing but invective and paranoia which adequately reflects your putrid state of mind.

All that becuase I suggested somebody screwed up by flying into the ground and killing people.

Must have hit the nail on the head. :sad:

I am saying to you, and morons who blame dead pilots like you

No, I am not dead yet...:=

Neptunus Rex

18th May 2010, 16:27

andrasz

A plausible theory. If I may add another thought - given that selecting TOGA did not prevent the initial impact, the engines would still be accelerating and achieved thrust would be less than maximum. The nose-down pitch following the loss of the tailplane would be massive, probably well in excess of the airframe negative g limit. With enough height, and it need not be much, some structural failure could have occurred before the major ground impact.

Neptunus Rex

18th May 2010, 16:30

TowerDog

I applaud your grasp of syntax - and indeed your patience.

Machaca

18th May 2010, 16:39

andrasz

Just a clarification -- the engine damage visible in the photos is the turbine section. As pointed out by Lomapaseo, this also supports a nose-high AoA wherein first contact with the ground would cause such initial damage to the aft part of the engines.

TowerDog

18th May 2010, 16:57

and indeed your patience.

The patience is only virtual...:p

rgbrock1

18th May 2010, 17:00

As a member of the SLF club I am awed by the depth of experience being shown here in describing all the different scenarios in which the accident aircraft may have been involved.

I am equally amazed that anyone at all escaped this accident with their life, as the little
boy(?) did. I cannot grasp how he survived the sheer destruction of this magnitude.
Would be interesting to note, for me anyway, where the 10 year old was sitting at the time. Not that it really matters but did his location have something to do with his survival? Or was it just a matter of plain ol' good luck?

PJ2

18th May 2010, 17:03

HundredPercentPlease;

A reasonable hypothesis I think. But I wonder if it perhaps assumes poor visibility or nobody watching out the windows? It seems, given the experience of the captain and possibly his F/O, that the latter is less material; - there have been reports of "pockets" of poor visibility.

We have the METARS which indicates VMC but we also have a few comments about "sun", "dust", poor visibility in certain areas, etc.

So one outstanding question among many therefore is, what comments if any were offered by incoming aircraft regarding the approach both before and after the accident? Did any aircraft, a) request a runway change or even specifically comment to others that 09 was questionable, b) go-around, or c) divert? Was the crew of the accident aircraft executing a full-blown NPA (selected-selected) on 09, were they partially visual or, as you observe, is there another reason the aircraft was so low 0.8nm back? Were they executing an approach on a runway others had avoided or gone-around from? - if so, what was the decision-making process?

It is likely, as indicated by many comments from those we would expect to know, that a fully-managed NPA was likely not being conducted but was either being hand-flown or on the autopilot using the selected-selected method. This method is straightforward enough and is perhaps even slightly easier than the managed-approach method; neither are a challenge, however.

To cover off the possibility of the VS/FPA mode confusion, although the issue is well understood by Airbus pilots, the Strasbourg A320 accident was (likely, but not established as) a setting of "3.0" for the FPA but the mode was in "V/S" and resulted in a descent rate of 3000fpm, (roughly).

I hasten to add that I doubt this scenario, but the question has to be asked. The display has been modified and these issues are well-known and trained for and hasn't been an issue.

Regarding impact, I have a slightly different sense of the go-around; I sense that the go-around was very nearly successful and that the only part of the aircraft that 'touched down' was the tail and even then only due to the slightly higher ground near the mosque just at the road.

The wires, in and of themselves, may not have done enough damage to render the aircraft unflyable. We don't know if/how they embedded in the very aft structure.

I agree that the collision between the empennage and the slightly higher ground was sufficient to fracture and separate that section of the aircraft and, with the loss of this structure, the aircraft became unflyable as has already been described, but I don't think anything else, (gear, engines, wingtips) touched the ground until after the tail left the structure, although they may have hit cacti/trees etc.

Especially with a slight rise in ground elevation, (4 to 6 feet is sufficient), the pitch attitude to hit the tail would not have to be beyond ordinary go-around pitch attitudes of, say, 15deg or slightly higher.

In direct response to your hypothesis HPP which I think is possible, hopefully the recorders will tell us what approach method was being used, what autoflight selections were being made, what the aircraft and engine performance was in the moments before impact and during what we may now reasonably conclude was a go-around attempt.

Hopefully too, the CVR will tell us what the discussions were regarding the approach, what their assessment of the visibility was and, through standard analysis techniques, what their state of mind and alertness was. Another primary question to ask/determine the answer to is, therefore, questions regarding this crew's schedule, their crew rest on the layover and their combined duty days; were there any delays and if so were rest periods compromised? These are all a matter of record and thus are easily answered questions but, except for positing the notion of fatigue, so far these details haven't been directly provided or even asked or answered here or in other sources.

aterpster

18th May 2010, 17:03

Right Way Up:
If you go-around at minima, you pitch at a normal rate towards approx 15 degrees which will take roughly 4-5 secs. At the same time the engines will be spooling up towards TOGA and again that will take roughly 5 seconds. The engine thrust increase should be quick enough to maintain speed whilst carrying out the pitch manoeuvre. The altitude loss if the manoeuvre is carried out correctly will be roughly 20-30 feet. Even allowing for 3 secs pilot delay the total loss will only be 50-60 feet which is still safe if not advisable. If a pilot delays more than that then you cannot account for that behaviour or lack of ability. It is quite safe and proper to go-around at minima.

Sounds like you're speaking of a missed approach from DA on a vertically-guided IAP. There should be no altitude loss on go-around from MDA on a non-precision IAP. Further, in either a DA or MDA missed approach the engines should already be sufficiently spooled up to provide a significant increase in power in far less than 4 to 5 seconds.

Also, in the case of an approach with a DA, the missed approach obstacle clearance criteria provides for a height loss below DA for a prescribed distance before the missed approach obstacle clearance starts its slope upwards.

In the accident at issue it would have been an MDA which should have resulted in no height loss unless the decision to miss was made subsequent to descent below MDA (always a dicey situation in poor visibility.)

Flying Bagel

18th May 2010, 17:16

Since we're into what if's, I do wonder the crew's experience on type is.

If the Italians are to be believed, they could have been coming in on an intercept from above, messed up their mode selections hoping for an automatic capture that probably never happened, and ended up with a high ROD (>1000'/min) below the planned approach path close to the threshold, possibly with the spoilers out. That's the only way I can explain the impact trajectory in my head.

Right Way Up

18th May 2010, 17:18

Aterpster,

That all depends what side of the fence you sit on. In Europe the majority of operators fly a constant descent approach, and will adjust an MDA to allow for height loss during the go-around. That is why I specifically mentioned "minima" rather than MDA. However EU-Ops is now calculating minima for non-precision approach (constant descent) as DAs allowing for the height loss. Whichever way it is flown the MDA should not be breached.
I have no idea whether this carrier fly constant descent or level non-precision approaches.

HundredPercentPlease

18th May 2010, 17:26

they could have been coming in on an intercept from above, messed up their mode selections hoping for an automatic capture

The approach type on 09 is either an NDB or a VOR - neither of which allow an "automatic capture" from above.

However, you allude to the only too common, most-modern-accidents-feature-it unstable approach. If you are a betting man, it is a good bet.

PJ2,

As I say, it was just a thought. In a calm, prepared environment, a selected-selected NPA is a complete doddle (though I prefer and love managed-managed!). There will be something amiss on this one, which only the boxes will reveal.

GarageYears

18th May 2010, 17:43

So one outstanding question among many therefore is, what comments if any were offered by incoming aircraft regarding the approach both before and after the accident? Did any aircraft, a) request a runway change or even specifically comment to others that 09 was questionable, b) go-around, or c) divert? Was the crew of the accident aircraft executing a full-blown NPA (selected-selected) on 09, were they partially visual or, as you observe, is there another reason the aircraft was so low 0.8nm back? Were they executing an approach on a runway others had avoided or gone-around from? - if so, what was the decision-making process?

I remember reading somewhere that the preceding aircraft had attempted to land and diverted, but I'll be damned if I can find that now. Can anyone with a better memory corroborate this? I re-read the first 15 pages of the thread but did not see it here, so I'm suspicious it was in one of the news reports.

If this is totally incorrect apologies all round.

- GY :confused:

safetypee

18th May 2010, 17:50

HundredPercentPlease, PJ2, et al,
NPAs, unstable approach, problems of procedure, poor vis/ night, mistook lights, something amiss, etc, etc; - in many previous incidents (www.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5CTAWS%20Saves%20plus%20add.pdf), but what about EGPWS?

despegue

18th May 2010, 17:52

A question for Airbus pilots:

If flown manually with autothrust ON, and you decide to go-around but forget to push the TOGA-buttons, merely pushing the throttles forward ( old habits by PF from former type?), what is the result?
Will the aircraft increase its AoA until alpha-floor is reached, still descending due to lack of thrust, after which the alpha-prot. is activated and go-around thrust is delivered? Alas, maybe in this case too close to the ground?
Result is a high decend rate with very high AoA, high-energy on the engines and a maybe very confused crew?

haven't touched a sidestick in 7 years now so please pardon me if talking complete rubbish.

HundredPercentPlease

18th May 2010, 18:15

despegue,

If flown manually, autothrust on or off, to go around you just slam the levers forwards. There is no "TOGA button". You get full thrust and some nice upwardly pointing flight directors (even if they were switched off before you commanded TOGA). You are given guidance to keep you going straight ahead (G/A track) and SRS (speed reference system - gets you going up, safely).

Nice and simple. :)

Right Way Up

18th May 2010, 18:18

If flown manually, autothrust on or off, to go around you just slam the levers forwards. There is no "TOGA button". You get full thrust and some nice upwardly pointing flight directors (even if they were switched off before you commanded TOGA). You are given guidance to keep you going straight ahead (G/A track) and SRS (speed reference system - gets you going up, safely).

As long as you reach the TOGA detent! :ouch:

despegue

18th May 2010, 18:23

Thank you, that clears my mind!

lomapaseo

18th May 2010, 18:30

I keep reading about the loss of the tail plane leading to a rapid pitch down and agree that the tail plaine is an important part of keeping a balanced pitch attitude.

However, not knowing all the balances at play in this flight regime, my question is to the relative significance of the engine rapidly rising thrust on pylons ahead of the wing causing a pitch up mode vs the tail plane being there or not. Now once the engines get creamed against the ground then the loss of the tail plane might be logical to result in a pitch down

comments?

PJ2

18th May 2010, 18:51

safetypee;

I think many would agree that early examining of the role, if any, of the EGPWS is important. First, we don't know if the airport is in the database which this a/c had, (411A?). We don't know the type of installation (Mk, Honeywell? etc). Differences in specifications may provide different (more enhanced) warnings.

In one schematic, (to use the term loosely - the entire description is poorly outlined), there is a 5nm circle which gradually descends from 400' AGL to ground level some distance from the runway. Because the diagram is so poor I can't tell what the distance is from the runway that the system "sort of gives up monitoring". In other words, the A330 FCOM section on EGPWS I am familiar with does not make it clear where EGPWS protections end. By the diagram I have, it ends some distance from the runway. It's strange I know but there it is - no information. Going to the Honeywell site offers a choice of Mk's but as mentioned, we don't know which it is.

So yes, absolutely the EGPWS needs to be examined for these limitations, if any, and then, if programmed to provide warnings of terrain right to the runway threshold, did it work as designed or was it or related systems on MEL, and if it did work what did the crew/PF do or say?, etc etc.

PJ2

JetLag50

18th May 2010, 18:54

Towerdog, dont judge dead pilots till you get the facts. It is common decency and a basic pilot fraternity thing.

GarageYears

18th May 2010, 19:06

However, not knowing all the balances at play in this flight regime, my question is to the relative significance of the engine rapidly rising thrust on pylons ahead of the wing causing a pitch up mode vs the tail plane being there or not.

If you refer to the picture in post #655 of this thread, you get a good idea of the overall structure of the A330. Now lop off the tail. Logically a significant change in the CofG occurs in the forward sense - where the CofG would originally have been somewhere centered perhaps slightly aft of the engine centerline, losing the large tail assemble and APU (located at the far extent of the tail cone) would result in a large change forward. Hence the result of engine thrust would logically be pitch down. And all this ignores the lift generated by the horizontal stabilizers.

- GY

despegue

18th May 2010, 19:09

Jetlag50,

Wise words, in this profession that used to be one of the closest tied communities, it is now "normal" to sling mud at eachother and behave like fish-sellers wives'. Another example of how our professional behaviour is going through the drains...

I've seen pilot error by all nationalities I flew with, not to mention own mistakes. But Pprune is notorious for its anal-retentive participants, some who pretend to be flightcrew, but are not. Luckily, there are also the very helpful, wise and knowledgeable contributors.

TowerDog

18th May 2010, 19:16

Towerdog, dont judge dead pilots till you get the facts. It is common decency and a basic pilot fraternity thing.

I agree.

Not sure I have judged dead pilots, just being fed up with all the rubbish about a lack of an ILS caused the accident, or that ICAO was responsible, or other off the wall theories when the obvious cause, CFIT should be examined closer.

If the airplane was in good order, and the flight was not hijacked, then incompetence in the cockpit is a real possibillity....:sad:

I wish it was not so, but reality is that 100+ folks are dead and I doubt we can blame the Bogeyman or Tinkerbell, yet certain folks are leaving no stone un-turned to shift the focus away from pilot error in any sort or form. :rolleyes:

Gringobr

18th May 2010, 19:34

I know I am going to get shot down for this, as I have seen it specifically stated otherwise, but is it possible the plane went into a sharp nose down attitude then flipped?
I cannot see any other reason for such total destruction
undercarriage, wings, basic structure would have otherwise absorbed much of the impact, but an upside down impact would certainly destroy the whole cabin, seats etc.

TowerDog

18th May 2010, 19:55

I've seen pilot error by all nationalities I flew with, not to mention own mistakes.

Yup, I agree and that goes without saying:

Aircraft from all nations have crashed and pilot error is not a local or national thing.

Training, attitude and lack of CRM may be instead.

snowfalcon2

18th May 2010, 20:06

Somebody asked about the TAF forecast. I found this:

TAF HLLT 120700Z 1206/1306 36005KT 2000 BR SCT003 BECMG 1207/1209 8000 FEW025 SCT100 PROB30 TEMPO1209/1215 7000 -RA BKN080 BECMG 1212/1214 03010KT NSC BECMG 1216/1218 22015KT BECMG1302/1304 34006KT NSC

TAF HLLT 111700Z 1118/1218 35005KT 8000 NSC PROB40 1200/1206 5000 BR PROB30 TEMPO1212/1216 -RA FEW050 BKN100 BECMG 1215/1217 09010KT

TAF HLLT 102300Z 1100/1124 13015G25KT 8000 TEMPO 1100/1105 5000 BLSA BECMG 1105/1107 22015KT 8000 NSC BECMG 1112/1114 29015KT CAVOK BECMG 1121/1123 35010KT 8000 NSC

So only one forecast from the previous evening, hinting at reduced visibility.
(The accident occurred around 120400Z)
(For Metars see post #5)

HundredPercentPlease

Temperature one nine, QNH one zero one nine.

Not bad at all at this stage :ok:
FDR/CVR will tell of course.

PJ2

18th May 2010, 20:11

TowerDog;
If the airplane was in good order, and the flight was not hijacked, then incompetence in the cockpit is a real possibillity....http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/puppy_dog_eyes.gif

I wish it was not so, but reality is that 100+ folks are dead and I doubt we can blame the Bogeyman or Tinkerbell, yet certain folks are leaving no stone un-turned to shift the focus away from pilot error in any sort or form
Some folks are, some aren't. Some are reserving judgement in favour of curiosity.

But if judgement deems "incompetence", then, what? It may seem a slight diversion to examine the word, "incompetence", but it means something.

The obvious meaning is, 'those in control weren't up to the task.'

But then, what? Were they not up to the task in that moment, or historically, or during that cycle or...?

Without discovering the many antecedents which, with hindsight may be reverse-engineered from the initial impact in the sand, the argument that "the pilots were incompetent" becomes both circular and meaningless.

In other words, examining the word isn't merely an irrelevant academic exercise in a philosophical decontructing of meaning from the text: These words convey real meaning to people, within the context of this accident and what we know about airplanes, people and people-in-airplanes.

If "what happened" is to be found out, then it is necessary to go beyond such notions as "competence", "pilot error", and even "human error". If the airplane was completely healthy, then, that the pilots were at the controls and made a mistake is plainly, bluntly obvious. What then? Where does that conclusion take us? What is fixed? What has changed?

The entire concept of a safety culture, a reporting culture, the sharing of incident data and collecting data to examine it for precursors to an accident is to take the discourse beyond but not away from, the crew. If the notion of blame, responsibility and even the notion of "forgiveness" is part of the discourse, the conversation, even among the experts and specialists if they permit such terms to enter their conversation, has changed from finding out what went wrong so it can be prevented from occurring again, to the human need to find fault to satisfy very real human needs and emotions.

When we or more commonly 'the system' whack(s) someone (with jail, fines, 'time off'), usually the pilot, (or ATC or....?), what really has been accomplished and what will occur the next time such circumstances arise?

I submit that we already know the answers to these questions; they are lurking here, occupying our time right now on this thread.

Blame only answers one question. Blame concludes the dialogue, it does not open it up nor does it benefit anyone. Blame also permits the excusing of others and allows those in charge and capable of responding, to ignore change in favour of quarterly reports.

I know this thinking seems black-and-white, but 'telescope' the notions and this is what we see. For some operations, these realities have been managed exceptionally well. For others, they just have to pee on the electric fence, sometimes more than once. A big, fatal accident for a major carrier these days is about a US$10b hit to the bottom line but, in my one blunt criticism about a characteristic which has common threads throughout this industry, the bean-counters scatter like rodents when the light is turned in their direction, preferring blaming pilots to honesty.

Just some thoughts, mainly at this moment for the passengers and pilots.

PJ2

C-SAR

18th May 2010, 20:28

ICAO Annex 13 Foreword or thereabouts:

The purpose of Aviation Safety is the prevention of accidents, not the apportion of blame

C-SAR

JetLag50

18th May 2010, 20:38

Thank you PJ2, a more eloquent and incisive comment as one will ever see to expose those that seek to blame. Others look for ways of preventing future repetitions of similar accidents by looking at the whole picture of Navaids, regulation and other details. Even those are hounded by them saying that they are seeking to exonerate the pilot! PJ2 my hat off to you for your excellent essay!

PJ2

18th May 2010, 20:53

JetLag50;

Lest one fine point be misunderstood, just as in a reporting culture, this approach to flight safety is not a 'get-out-of-jail' card, (for others, that means that just because the focus goes beyond just the pilot doesn't mean that the pilot didn't contribute to the accident or perhaps was the main cause of the accident. For example, (because the notion is under discussion here), if a pilot is historically marginal, does his/her continuance in the cockpit rest entirely with the judgement of the individual involved; are those who pass said pilot in checkrides involved; are training failures expensive?

Recognizing factors which lead to an accident does not equate with innocence of cause or vulnerability. It merely prevents blame from stopping further investigation; most formal reports now, do this very well and with great integrity. Others do not.

So to clarify myself for TowerDog and others who may at the moment think that such an approach means, "no one is responsible": - the difference in the approach here is subtle but a material difference nevertheless. When one seeks to find out, the one sure way to determine the difference between the two is to watch for the raised eyebrow, the held-up hand or the outright resistance to questions.

The former approach which intends to find out stuff, is in many countries, standard, but sadly in other countries, less so still. If RadAlt2010 wants change such that all areas are audited without compromise, this is an area to work hard in and make the changes he so vociferously pronounced upon here for a short little while.

This is one key area where help is badly needed from aviation professionals, especially pilots, who have a keen and abiding interest safety work and not just a passing fancy driven by current events, to contribute to their profession in the form of energy, drive, vision and a positive, collegial attitude.

Those who haven't done the work of changing regulatory environments cannot pronounce on either the work or the time it takes to accomplish change.

Believe it or not, not all official bodies, interested parties and corporate interests or even those organizations mentioned, are in accord with saving lives and preventing accidents and otherwise privileging flight safety principles over their respective bottom lines.

Sorry. Enough thread drift.

PJ2

aterpster

18th May 2010, 20:59

Right Way Up:

That all depends what side of the fence you sit on. In Europe the majority of operators fly a constant descent approach, and will adjust an MDA to allow for height loss during the go-around. That is why I specifically mentioned "minima" rather than MDA. However EU-Ops is now calculating minima for non-precision approach (constant descent) as DAs allowing for the height loss. Whichever way it is flown the MDA should not be breached.

I have no idea whether this carrier fly constant descent or level non-precision approaches.

We have that in the U.S. provided the visual segment is 34:1 clear, the IAP has a straight-in MDA, and Jeppesen is able to code a Baro VNAV path into the procedure. (of course, if it is an LNAV/VNAV or LPV IAP this is unnecessary.) The operator must have special approval and it is limited to commercial operators.

wilyflier

18th May 2010, 21:01

Garage years,
Once flaps are down Centre of Pressure moves aft, there is a requirement for a strong down force from tail trim and /or elevators. Loss of this down force is far more significant than pitch up from engines particularly if they are still winding up.

TowerDog

18th May 2010, 21:12

Some folks are, some aren't. Some are reserving judgement in favour of curiosity.

Indeed, I am also curious why this happen as well as how.

Where does that conclusion take us?

Hopefully to a system that will tighten up the standards in the cockpit.

Blame concludes the dialogue

If you say so, I am not blaming anybody, just pointing to where we should shine the light to find out what really happened.

Sorry I can't be more philosophical, been flying airplanes for too long I guess.
No time for touchy feely stuff when you are just about to hit the ground at great speed. :sad:

JetLag50

18th May 2010, 21:17

I agree entirely PJ. Of course the pilot is part of the whole picture, but he is not the entire picture in an accident. Even if he was to blame, we need to look at all the aspects of the accident if we are to prevent a repetition. To use one example: the Panam /KLM tragedy in Tenerife. If we said the pilots were incompetent and that’s why that crash happened and left it at that, then that would have been futile. However, since that accident we have learned to repeat and confirm take off clearances.. that is objectiveness. Blame is NOT objective. Blame is a nasty concept as you say. It equates with victimisation, bullying, bigotry and even narcissism in proving that you know better than the erring pilot . Anyone who expresses those sentiments against his fellow pilot (a dead one at tha) has not a clue in my opinion.

PJ2

18th May 2010, 21:41

TowerDog;
No time for touchy feely stuff when you are just about to hit the ground at great speed
Yes but of course that isn't the time to be doing flight safety work either!

In any case, it's not "touchy-feely new-age-nice-guy" stuff, this is the stuff that flight safety work is now made of and is the intent behind SMS. The words aren't familiar because of habit not because they're not relevant. I am absolutely certain you understand this and the approach taken...not trying to say anything but general stuff that may help some who are reading this kind of discussion for the first time to see where most of the industry is intent on heading.

Cheers! PJ2

TowerDog

18th May 2010, 22:16

Yes but of course that isn't the time to be doing flight safety work either!

Correct again, that should have been done a bit earlier.

The person you are addressing certainly doesnt sound like a pilot to me.

And who would that be?

Say it loud and clear if you are questioning my qualifications.

Couldn't care less...:rolleyes:

RetiredF4

18th May 2010, 22:19

In the first picture with the tail http://www.pprune.org/5699903-post611.html there is a bigger part, looking like a main gear strut, the lower part with the wheel sheared off?

Here a picture from the whole assembly http://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/static.panoramio.com/photos/original/7296126.jpg, note the three hollow connection bolts, which can also bee seen on the crash picture if you zoom into it.

Would that tell us something concerning the way of first impact?

franzl

A33Zab

18th May 2010, 23:28

You are right, it's a main gear.

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/A330/MainGearA330.jpg?t=1274225240

A33Zab

bugg smasher

18th May 2010, 23:45

Dont waste bandwidth PJ2. The person you are addressing certainly doesnt sound like a pilot to me. Honestly.

Know who Towerdog is, very experienced 747 skipper of NYC Tower Air fame, long years in hard conditions, planet-wide ops, survivor material, worth his weight in aviation gold.

Tiresome comments by young sprogs with reputations to forge on this forum really don't contribute to the collective intelligence and experience being brought to bear on this accident.

A33Zab

18th May 2010, 23:46

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/A330/5A_ONG_Pict2.jpg?t=1274226273

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/A330/5A_ONG_Pict.jpg?t=1274226310

A33Zab

jmmilner

19th May 2010, 00:12

I am equally amazed that anyone at all escaped this accident with their life, as the little boy(?) did. I cannot grasp how he survived the sheer destruction of this magnitude. Would be interesting to note, for me anyway, where the 10 year old was sitting at the time. Not that it really matters but did his location have something to do with his survival? Or was it just a matter of plain ol' good luck?The survival aspects will be addressed in the accident report. Given this was a long duration, overnight flight with a 40% passenger load, even knowing the assigned seating for the boy is likely meaningless due to possible reseating after takeoff. Only the survivor knows for sure where he was sitting and I'm not sure I'd expect a 10 year old to recall a seat number.

All that being said, in this accident the largest section of the cabin that remained was the tail. Once separated from the balance of the aircraft, this section had would have offered a high-drag, low-lift profile with no thrust from the engines to offset it. Contact with the ground would occur rapidly, if it were not already in contact at the point of breakup. The final resting position of the tail requires it to have rotated at least 180 degrees, during which aerodynamic drag would have further increased. Until we know where along the airframe the tail separated, it isn't possible to say how much of the forward end of the tail section was consumed by contact with the ground. However, all these factors, plus the lack of post-crash fire in this area, suggest that the tail provided best combination of protection and deceleration in this accident.

The smaller size of a child also reduces the moment arm as the upper body rotates forward and downward around the seatbelted waist, as well as reducing the potential impact of the head against the seat in front. The same factors might be of some value in the tumbling that may have also taken place. These factors are somewhat offset by the weaker bone structure, especially with respect to the skull. As I recall that the child suffered multiple leg fractures which required surgery.

Airbubba

19th May 2010, 02:22

Know who Towerdog is, very experienced 747 skipper of NYC Tower Air fame, long years in hard conditions, planet-wide ops, survivor material, worth his weight in aviation gold.

Yep, he's not just another troll from Trondheim.

Danny has had to take him to the woodshed a couple of times over the years for lack of political correctness though...:)

GarageYears

19th May 2010, 02:26

WilyFlier:

Once flaps are down Centre of Pressure moves aft, there is a requirement for a strong down force from tail trim and /or elevators. Loss of this down force is far more significant than pitch up from engines particularly if they are still winding up

The pitch moment due to the flaps will depend on the CofG relative to the Center of Pressure. If the CofG is aft of the CofP then the pitch movement will be up, however, (and as I continue to assert will be the case with the tail torn off), if the CofG is forward of the CofP, then this will produce a significant pitch down movement. That, combined with the complete elimination of any pitch authority due to the loss of the tail, would doom the aircraft more than certainly.

-GY

Pablo26

19th May 2010, 03:27

Here's a helpful view of the final approach to rwy 9 - skip to 3:45 or so, as the mosque appears at 4:00.

YouTube - Landing at Tripoli International Airport, Libya (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1srEE7qq9jw)

PBL

19th May 2010, 08:15

I have read most of the posts here since last week, and would like to express my appreciation for contributors who have kept the ratio of information to blather as high as PPRuNe used to be, and far higher than anything in recent memory (which extends back to July 2007).

People seem to think the tail hit first. There is a puzzle with that, which I raised with PJ2 privately.

Pitch angle for a tail strike first (bogies tilted, shock absorber extended) is 16° wings-level and 17.5° with 5° bank, and it doesn't go below 16° again until you are 13° AoB.

And the aircraft is descending. So add, say, 1°? That makes AoA at least 17°. High AoA protection is always active. I don't know what AlphaMax and AlphaProt are for that config or weight (I do have a query out). But how much higher than 17° can AlphaMax possibly be?

PJ2 suggests that you can pitch up to 15° on go-around. Sure, I would think, if the aircraft is ascending, which it usually is before the pitch-up gets to 15°. But this one wasn't, obviously. PJ2 also suggests the tail can hit first if there is say 2m of rising ground. I am not sure about that, since the bogies have gone over that same piece of ground a few fractions of a second before and apparently not left a trace (I note they are outside the line of the tail cone), so that still means the AC had a pitch angle of 16° or above, providing its AoB was 13° or less.

In short, I think there are some figures here that don't yet make sense for what is emerging here as a consensus CFIT scenario. And if it wasn't CFIT, there is nothing yet here to suggest how LOC may have occurred.

PBL

BOAC

19th May 2010, 08:21

PBL - reducing to basics, and ignoring the 'doubts' on the AB control laws, we have to accept that the tail broke off well before the rest of it came down and if the Alitalia is to be believed it was well nose-down at impact. As said many times, all pitch/power etc is recorded up to loss of tail section at least

SLFguy

19th May 2010, 08:27

"Humble yourself and you will get the respect that you crave in your dreams"

[x] Confucius in this thread

PBL

19th May 2010, 08:36

BOAC,

I am sure everything will be revealed in time through the boxes, but that's not why I'm here.

Can you solve the "puzzle"?

PBL

BOAC

19th May 2010, 08:53

No - I had a brief 'stab' earlier but it is really pointless when all will be revealed in matter of days. IF there is still a 'puzzle', as with AF447, then yes, it woud be worthwhile to pontificate..

snowfalcon2

19th May 2010, 09:03

Can you solve the "puzzle"?

Speculation #1: Perhaps the landing gear was not fully down anymore for the go-around? A few posters seem to think this is a possibility.

Speculation #2: A panic pull on the stick leading to a g-stall / high AoA and sink rate. Have no idea if control laws would allow this. Also the actual airspeed (margin to Vs) obviously plays a role here.

But FDR/CVR will obviously tell.

infrequentflyer789

19th May 2010, 09:22

BOAC,

I am sure everything will be revealed in time through the boxes, but that's not why I'm here.

Can you solve the "puzzle"?

PBL

Not convinced it is a "solve", but I think you are assuming the wheels were down. I am not sure we have any evidence if they were or not, but your argument may in fact suggest that they weren't.

I have no idea why they wouldn't be down, but then this wasn't a normal approach and landing, otherwise we wouldn't be here.

RetiredF4

19th May 2010, 09:36

BOAC:
PBL - reducing to basics, and ignoring the 'doubts' on the AB control laws, we have to accept that the tail broke off well before the rest of it came down and if the Alitalia is to be believed it was well nose-down at impact. As said many times, all pitch/power etc is recorded up to loss of tail section at least

How would that explain the maingear strut resting near the tail asembly mentioned in Posts 695 http://www.pprune.org/5701799-post695.html and 696?

Finding those two pieces together it could be possible, the gear broke off together with or shortly after the tailstrike?
franzl

PBL

19th May 2010, 10:50

To snowfalcon #1, and infrequentflyer: Maybe. But we would then have to reconcile this with the apparent fact that one main is lying close to the start of the debris trail, which suggests rather that they weren't stowed. Or at least not completely stowed. That might account for it.

To snowfalcon #2: no, the protection does not allow the AoA to exceed AlphaMax. (A stall would be LOC, wouldn't it, not CFIT.)

Another puzzle: If the aircraft were pointing 16+° in the air when the tail hit, where are the swathes from the blast of those engines, which I would expect to see before the "tail cone impact" point?

Suppose one says: they were idling. I don't think that would fit: if they were idling, how come the nose would have been pointing 16+° up?

PBL

snowfalcon2

19th May 2010, 11:27

(A stall would be LOC, wouldn't it, not CFIT.)

My admittedly not very likely scenario goes something close to that of HundredPercentPlease. The crew believe they are still above MDA and get hugely surprised when they see ground very close. An instinctive stick pull raises the nose and induces an accelerated stall causing high sink rate and the flight path to continue on a downward gradient. As the tail hits ground the thrust levers are TOGA'ed but thrust does not come on until the nose is pitching level or down.
But if the protection system precludes the above, then that's it.

Regarding CFIT and what is not. I have not seen any strict formal definition of "CFIT" but IMHO it means something like "CFIT is when the aircraft is flown into a position from where a terrain impact is inevitable". What happens thereafter, in control or not, is then irrelevant. Pls correct me if wrong.

ZeeDoktor

19th May 2010, 11:31

If the portion of the tail that's relatively intact is indicative of where the tail became separated, there's a good chance the DFDR/CVR were not affected and should contain data to the very end, for what it's worth. According to the training manual, the A332 has them located ahead of the left aft door which is a fair distance further forward than the tail section on the ground.

bia botal

19th May 2010, 12:17

As I say, it was just a thought. In a calm, prepared environment, a selected-selected NPA is a complete doddle (though I prefer and love managed-managed!). There will be something amiss on this one, which only the boxes will reveal.

Possible loss of situational awareness? (blinded by the light, there's no better camouflage) I recall many years ago landing into the setting sun in northern Australia, visual just below scattered cloud at min. but as approach continued the setting sun come into play and sight of the runway was completely lost, not only that but visibility inside the cockpit, that is to say of the instrument panel become very difficult, we went around, but if i was being totally honest at what height we had no idea, moments are lost in trying to shade ones face to improve the forward visibility to try to redeem the situation and as we all know time moves very quickly when things start going against you.
So it is quite possible that they did everything right and lost sight of the field and control of the aircraft after they had commited to land.

JetLag50

19th May 2010, 14:12

That is more than likely Bia, as any pilot of experience would admit. Landing into the sun and mist is never a doddle even for John wayne types! This was not a CATIII approach, and by its nature requires visual contact. In what circumstances the sighting was made, what actions were taken when it was made, we will never know till we see the report.

keitaidenwa

19th May 2010, 17:16

The picture linked from post #311 shows a maintainence road paralell to the runway starting right behind the mosque. What would be the chances the pilot was errenously aiming for that road? The road being much thinner than the runway, the optical illusion would be that one is still safely high and far away.

rgbrock1

19th May 2010, 17:34

I've been reading this thread with a lot of interest and have noted an occasional post alluding to blinding sunlight as a possible source of flight deck disorientation.

However, as SLF I don't quite understand that premise. Don't you guys and gals up front in the pointy end wear sunglasses? If you do, don't they help? I"m sure the sunglasses you wear are of the highest quality so I don't understand how sunlight can be of such a distraction.

I'm sure someone will be along shortly to correct my assumptions. I meant this not in the least bit disrespectful. Merely curious.

Thanks.

aterpster

19th May 2010, 19:44

rgbrock1:
However, as SLF I don't quite understand that premise. Don't you guys and gals up front in the pointy end wear sunglasses? If you do, don't they help? I"m sure the sunglasses you wear are of the highest quality so I don't understand how sunlight can be of such a distraction.

They don't help when the fireball is close to the runway.

mike-wsm

19th May 2010, 19:50

There must be dozens of differences between this incident and AF447, but there are two similarities, both planes were flying little more than stall speed and both planes simply fell out of the sky. Can the professional pilots who fly these types comment on the possiblity of unintended spoiler deployment, please? I read that the spoilers deploy when the spoiler lever is armed and the throttles are both reduced to idle.

Edit: This may be relevant - click here (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/dft_avsafety_pdf_507767.pdf)

TowerDog

19th May 2010, 20:02

I read that the spoilers deploy when the spoiler lever is armed and the throttles are both reduced to idle.

Not true, got to have wheel spin-up or other ground signal.

archae86

19th May 2010, 20:36

More pictures from a favored source, which I believe were taken today in three batches.

I'll post in the three batches. The original images I've posted on the same photo-hosting site I am using to host the ones down-sampled for inline posting here. If you wish to review or download any of the pictures (from these three batches and a previous batch) at full original resolution, you can find them here:

Full resolution photos from a favored source (http://tinyurl.com/28qt5q8)

All the pictures suffer serious blurring, whether from focus, camera motion, or imperfect transparencies. They still may help as to one point or another. With this in mind, I've chose to post all the pictures available, thinking the chance I might hide useful information by failing to post some outweighs the inconvenience and extra bandwidth of posting some which add nothing. On another topic of less interest or with better alternate information I would not be so profligate.

This first batch appear to have been taken at ground level, earlier in the day than the other two batches. The three are quite similar.

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00192.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00193.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00194.jpg

silverstrata

19th May 2010, 20:39

Mike:
Can the professional pilots who fly these types comment on the possiblity of unintended spoiler deployment, please? I read that the spoilers deploy when the spoiler lever is armed and the throttles are both reduced to idle.

Think before posting, Mike. If spoilers did that, we would have spoiler deployment every time we start a descent.

archae86

19th May 2010, 20:39

From the air, same source:

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/P5190057.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/P5190058.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/P5190058.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/P5190060.jpg

archae86

19th May 2010, 20:47

more from the air, different viewpoint and camera, same favored source:

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00209.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00211.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00212.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00213.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00214.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00215.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00221.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00222.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00223.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00225.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00226.jpg

http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Tripoli_A330/posting/DSC00227.jpg

The observer made these comments based on cumulative personal site viewing:

First: It looks like the parallel marks that originate from the impact point could actually have been left by the fuselage itself sliding on the sand, then upon hitting the slightly elevated perpendicular road, the tail shears, the rest "trampolines" up and the destruction sequence begins as already amply and expertly described.

Second: the field of debris, although thinning out, seems to extend all the way to the final resting place of the wings.

Third, short of the wings resting place it seems to be a part of some size and bulk. I leave to the experts on the A330 to try to identify it.

I, personally, am not a pilot, but am attempting to assist as an intermediary.

justawanab

19th May 2010, 21:37

However, as SLF I don't quite understand that premise. Don't you guys and gals up front in the pointy end wear sunglasses? If you do, don't they help? I"m sure the sunglasses you wear are of the highest quality so I don't understand how sunlight can be of such a distraction.

I'm SLF too, but I have one question for you: "Don't you drive a car?"
If you do, you will surely have been in the situation where you find it almost impossible to look directly out of your windscreen because the sun is directly in front of you. No sunglasses are good enough to protect you from that!

On another note, there is much use here of the rather unfortunate term "Pilot Error" and as non-pilots I think we need to look at it in relation to our own situation. The closest we come to being in the same situation as the pilots on an aircraft is when we're driving our car where everything happens at snails pace compared to the speed of an aircraft in flight and I know from my own history just how close I've been to having a serious accident on more than one occasion due to any number of factors where sheer luck seems to have been the only thing between us and disaster ... and we have the advantage of being able to stop if necessary without gravity having a significant negative effect.

In those situations there are an infinite number of possible scenarios and often a similar number of solutions more wrong than right and a very fine line between "Oh s**t!! You idiot!" and "Phew, that was close! Well done!".
In a car that might mean an expensive repair job and a week on the bus ... in an aircraft that usually means many dead and injured.

So, even if this comes back as "Pilot error" don't be too quick to condemn them. That "error" may simply have been one of any number of split second decisions that had to be made which on a flip of the coin could have gone either way.

We know pilots train endlessly in simulators to avoid this but in the heat of the moment the situation may not exactly match the carefully simulated rehearsal and they're effectively on their own at that point.

Like many kids, when I was young, I dreamed of learning to fly and seriously considered it, but don't consider I have "the right stuff" to be able to react correctly in all situations. I have nothing but great respect for those who do.

BigHitDH

19th May 2010, 22:03

Third, short of the wings resting place it seems to be a part of some size and bulk. I leave to the experts on the A330 to try to identify it.

Wingtip maybe?

andrasz

19th May 2010, 22:14

more from the air, different viewpoint and camera, same favored source

Many thanks, and to the source too!

On the very last photo an interesting detail not seen before: the wings came to rest upside down (flap mechanism cowlings clearly visible), yet pointing forward. That is clearly at odds with the break-up sequence I have speculated on earlier. I cannot envision how after a tail strike in wings level attitude the wings could have become inverted while maintaining a straight line of motion, and remain intact in the process. Anyone any ideas... ?

GarageYears

19th May 2010, 22:40

From looking at the recently posted pictures by archae86 (thanks for doing that) does anyone see what I think I see - in the third to last picture (sort of overview of the final resting place for the wings) does it seem that there is a break in the debris field to the right of what appears to be a significant impact gouge in the ground leading to the wings? I'm trying to figure how the debris field can be so long, and how the various pieces can to be where they are. What seems plausible from the pictures so far is something like:

- Initial contact with the ground in a pitch-up attitude causing tail strike and shortly after loss of the tail assembly entirely
- The remaining aft fuselage continues to contact the ground, breaking up as it travels
- Assuming TOGA thrust was demanded just before or coincident with ground contact, thrust is still available from the engines, however shortly after loss of the tail, at least one engine leaves the wing (probably both).
- However the immediate attitude is one of pitch-up, causing the remaining structure to leave the ground momentarily (accounting for the gap in the debris field/ground contact path, though I suppose some debris continues to leave the aircraft, just a lot smaller pieces)
- Obviously stricken, and primarily due to the loss of the tail the CofG, moves far forward, and combined with the center of pressure being far behind (due to flaps), the aircraft pitches violently nose down, resulting in destruction of the forward cabin, leaving the wings as effectively the only remaining part of the aircraft (which would explain the Alitalia report seeing the aircraft 20 degress pitch down)
- The wings and wing box continue as one structure and tumble (explaining the fact they are upside-down) until arrested by the perimeter fence, whereupon a short lived flash fire consumes whatever is left of the fuel (I can only really see evidence of fire at the wing site)

Comments?

- GY

JetLag50

19th May 2010, 23:34

Mike:
Can the professional pilots who fly these types comment on the possiblity of unintended spoiler deployment, please? I read that the spoilers deploy when the spoiler lever is armed and the throttles are both reduced to idle.
Spoilers+flaps=quickest route to making a big hole in the ground. You need groundswitch for spoliers to deploy in landing config.

JetLag50

20th May 2010, 06:03

Latest on FDR

Libyan Air Crash Black Boxes Go to Paris for Analysis (Update1) - BusinessWeek (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-19/libyan-air-crash-black-boxes-go-to-paris-for-analysis-update1-.html)

onetrack

20th May 2010, 06:29

After intensive re-examination, particulary of C-SAR's pics, I believe a different scenario happened to the tail strike/high AoA scenario.

If it was a tail strike/high AoA impact, there would be two major impact gouges. One, when the tail struck, and a second one, when the fuselage hit, perhaps 150-200 metres on. I can see only one... and it is a very much wider gouge, than a tail cone would make.

I suggest the following scenario. The aircraft flew into the ground at a low AoA, and the crew never knew a thing until they hit, virtually level. The fuselage impacted at a high rate of descent, and virtually exploded on impact. The wheels were possibly still up, thus the reason for no wheel drag marks. The crew were unaware of their true height (and position), due to patches of mist, sun in their eyes, and quite possibly an incorrect/faulty altimeter reading.

The fuselage promptly shattered into many pieces as a result of 135kts forward speed, and a high vertical descent speed... as witnessed by the LARGE AMOUNT of debris, SPREAD OUT, right after the initial impact crater. The tail separated, largely intact, when the main portion of the fuselage broke up, and tumbled along behind the main debris field, coming to rest, part way along the debris field.

The wings and wing root box, being the more substantial part of the aircraft structure, continued forward, relatively intact. However, the engines hitting the ground, contributed to a major forward rotation of the wings.
Thus, we then have the engines separating shortly after impacting the ground... and at the same time, giving enough impetus to completely rotate both wing structures, resulting in them coming to rest, upside down.

RetiredF4

20th May 2010, 07:15

Plausible except the part with the gear again.

With gear completely retracted, the main gear strut would probably stay with the wingsection or at least not separate that early with the tail section like it happened.

So either it was fully deployed or it was in transition. In the latter case however there should be distinct marks on the wheel rims, which i cant see.

Was anybody able to locate the nosegear?

franzl

snowfalcon2

20th May 2010, 07:55

Many thanks for the pictures.
Examination of the wings pictures leads me to suggest that
a) the right wing has flipped upside down and is the closer one in the pictures, the wingtip end towards the camera, with either the tip+aileron or part of the flaps separate a short distance away.
b) the left wing is right way up, likewise with the tip closer to the camera, and is farther away in the photographs.

Comments and corrections are welcome.

There is what looks like an airport service road going right under the wings, and it appears that there is free sight from the road visible farther away. So hopefully there will be other photos that can confirm if the above is true or false.

Volume

20th May 2010, 08:05

The debris field does not really support the nose up tail impact scenario.
What we see:
The tail is surprisingly intact, the VTP tip is undamaged, the rudder tip is broken, the HTP is still attached. It sits upright but against the flight direction.
The wings are also quite intact, even some of the fixed trailing edge structure (light composite parts) are still attached. The wings sit upside down in the direction of the impact.

If the tail broke of first at impact, it needs to rotate around the vertical axis to reach its position, this would require a HTP tip ground contact, which would not leave the HTP perfectly in place (The HTP attachment is not at all designed to take such loads).
If the wings would tumble over after loss of tail, it would rest upside down against the impact direction.

For me this looks like a fully inverted nose down impact. Fuselage completely disintegrates, wings (being the most heavy part) slide forward and come to rest at end of debris field (inverted in direction of flight). Due to fuselage desintegration, the tail section flips over 180° and lands VTP up agains flight direction destroying most of the lower forward part but keeping the HTP attached.

Would not be the first time that an airliner impacted inverted nose down after LOC... but for an Aircraft with that many protections ???

Interflug

20th May 2010, 08:07

if the wings are resting upside down, then they must have rotated in a barrel roll the way they are positioned now... But what looks a bit like flap fairings could also just be a big crack?

White Knight

20th May 2010, 08:30

For me this looks like a fully inverted nose down impact. Fuselage completely disintegrates, wings (being the most heavy part) slide forward and come to rest at end of debris field (inverted in direction of flight). Due to fuselage desintegration, the tail section flips over 180° and lands VTP up agains flight direction destroying most of the lower forward part but keeping the HTP attached.

Would not be the first time that an airliner impacted inverted nose down after LOC... but for an Aircraft with that many protections ???

You won't invert an Airbus in Normal Law... As I said before, CFIT pure and simple.. Besides - all this speculation that the wings are upside down is just that.. When I look at the latest photos posted the far wing appears to have quite a camber on the top surface, therefore it would 'appear' to me that the wings are in fact the right way up and facing forwards in the direction they were going when they hit the ground trying to find the runway!!

I'm not sure who made the comment about the crew 'not being aware they were below MDA':ugh: Well, unless there was a problem with the rad alts you are always aware of where you are in relation to MDA and the ground with the 2500,1000,100 above,MINIMUM,100,50,40,30,20,10 countdown etc - believe me, you can't miss these callouts on the 'Bus!!

takata

20th May 2010, 09:16

Hello,
All suppositions given above (inverted, no high AOA) are not taking into account the very first impact and following trail left on the sand. Some pictures taken from the ground won't give the real feeling of depth in the debris field (wrong horizontal distances are due to optical illusions). The best footage so far is the from Dutch video:

first pict with initial impact, trail and barely no debris:
http://takata1940.free.fr/75_05.jpg

second pict, still no debris until the mosque road, the first house fairly close to the trail is left intact, ruling out low level wings:
http://takata1940.free.fr/75_07.jpg
third pict, second impact clearly visible after the mosque road:
http://takata1940.free.fr/75_08.jpg
fourth pict, debris between the second and third impact are mostly cabin content due to tail separation; a third impact due to tail separation is clearly visible:
http://takata1940.free.fr/75_11.jpg
fith pict: third impact following the tail separation clearly visible, after that the debris of the main cabin appears:
http://takata1940.free.fr/75_13.jpg
sixth pict with fire traces visibles:
http://takata1940.free.fr/75_14.jpg
7th, and finally the wings:
http://takata1940.free.fr/75_16.jpg

mike-wsm

20th May 2010, 09:22

Um, as a humble avionics guy I have great respect for professional pilots and would never gainsay their highly informed opinions. But I have one small reservation, and that is the assumption that the clockwork was fully wound and functioning perfectly. There have been instances in the past of multiple electrical systems failure and an unplanned power-down can affect the systems in unpredictable ways. Some reports say the pilot asked for emergency assistance to be available on landing. This would indicate that he had some sort of problem with the airplane. We don't know what the problem was but it could have been another electrical failure and could have disabled instruments and annunciators. Or even caused unplanned deployment of the http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/censored.gif ? Now you can all rap my knuckles again and send me to bed without any supper.

takata

20th May 2010, 09:25

Hi,
Some reports say the pilot asked for emergency assistance to be available on landing.
You might bother to read the thread before speculating. This never happened, communications with ATC reports no problem until crash time.
S~
Olivier

SaturnV

20th May 2010, 10:17

takata, thanks again. ;)

The several images that exist of the terrain prior to the first image that you posted above, show the poles knocked over. This feature is consistent with C-SAR's ground level photographs of the poles many pages back.

Entirely from memory and very rough calculation, is it not about 100 meters from the first pole knocked down to the first impact point that you marked in the photos above?

RetiredF4

20th May 2010, 10:47

Volume
For me this looks like a fully inverted nose down impact. Fuselage completely disintegrates, wings (being the most heavy part) slide forward and come to rest at end of debris field (inverted in direction of flight). Due to fuselage desintegration, the tail section flips over 180° and lands VTP up agains flight direction destroying most of the lower forward part but keeping the HTP attached.

Again, and how would the main gear strut come off that early in the szenario above? It is designed to withstand heavy loads. The strut located in the vicinity of the tailsection http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-31.html#post5699903 is not only seperated from the structure, the lower crossbone supporting the four wheels is separated as well and shows in onother picture bent and brokenhttp://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-35.html#post5701898 . That kind of damage is most probably asociated with excessive loads on the whole wheel assembly while still attached to the aircraft. The inverted impact does not fit for this kind of damage.

franzl

JetLag50

20th May 2010, 11:11

Thanks guys,I hope this is worth your efforts in explaining how to embed photo!

A composite I have constructed from information about debris scatter using Google Maps

http://www.thesurreymart.com/composite2.jpg

Volume

20th May 2010, 11:35

Besides - all this speculation that the wings are upside down is just that.. Two of the pictures posted here earlier (don´t find them at the moment) show the rear spar of the right wing with the side stay still attached to its fitting, at the upper end of of the spar. At least the right wing for sure is upside down.
if the wings are resting upside down, then they must have rotated in a barrel rollIf they would have done a barrel roll after initial impact, they would look far more desintegrated.

Alison747

20th May 2010, 12:36

To help in the discussion about the orientation of the wings, may I be so bold as to note that Nickdj in post #350 has put together a montage from video still frames showing the wings in their final resting place.
The image is not directly visible - you need to click on the link.
As another of the mere SLF lurking around in the background of this forum, I would not attempt to make a judgment from these images, but one with more knowledge of the Airbus wing structure may be able to comment.

repariit

20th May 2010, 13:02

Once the wing separated from the fuselage, why would you not expect it to tumble about an axis from tip-to-tip? The leading edge of the center section could dig into the sand causing it to flip over or tumble forward.

GarageYears

20th May 2010, 13:16

Not sure if this has been discussed, but I just went back through all the pictures that have been posted and one thing I realized is that at least one engine separated before the tail of the aircraft broke off.

Look at the last pic in post #256 - you will see the tail facing the engine, and as we know the tail is reversed with respect to the direction of flight. So the engine is some distance West of the tail cone and tail itself. If you look at the pic in post #267 I would estimate that the engine must be about the same distance away from the tail cone, as the tail cone is from the tail itself.

So one of the first pieces off the aircraft was at least one of the engines. Where is the second one???

- GY

bearfoil

20th May 2010, 14:17

Taking SmilinEd and his post into account, I see the left wing closest to the viewer, the right wing on the "other side" of the road, both right side up and both carrying some portion of the wing box at their root, with a substantial part of the center section a bit short of the wings. What I thought was a canoe I think instead is a tear in the wing as it flopped onto the ground. I also make out the left engine pylon protruding through the top of the left wing. They did not slide much, if at all; I believe they were airborne and are as SmilinEd says, the last of the wreckage due to integrity and mass of their structure. One theory is that either the main gear or tail hit first, bringing the nose down heavily, "pitch-poling" the fuselage over the nose. Some other poster proposed the fuel (that which was left) atomized and disappeared in a fireball congruent with its mass.

Noticed in the photograph is a spanwise and virtually uninterrupted separation of the leading edges. Testimony to the amazing strength of the structure, but sadly, also to the amount of energy borne in so heavy a mass in a tragic collision with the ground.
The survivor is a young man with angels surrounding him, it stretches the reason to know that a living being survived that chaotic end.

bear

JetLag50

20th May 2010, 14:20

Two points of interest:

(a) I dont think the pilot had visual with the runway because he would have easily tucked into 09 after reaching his MDA at about 1 NM threshold (MAP is 0.6 NM threshold), even though he was slightly offset (4 degrees as reported). Plenty of time to select landing flaps and touch down had he seen the runway.
b) The impact point was approx. 500 metres from the threshold; he would have reached the impact point approx 20 secs seconds after his MAP of 0.6 NM , the position of the marker. ie, the photo above (post #748) tallies with a missed approach executed at the correct point (Delta locator, at 360 ft AGL MDA)) but something catastrophic happened.
Look at high ROD due to calm conditions and also possibly turbine blade stall if manual GA.

RetiredF4

20th May 2010, 14:37

Yoe have to be carefull in using the present position of the wingparts as being the final resting position after the crash.

As you can see at around 45 seconds in this clip, the parts have been moved by a crane shortly after the accident. AD Vliegramp Tripoli - 'Piloot meldde geen technische problemen' (483435) (http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/2461/Vliegramp-Tripoli/article/detail/483435/2010/05/14/Piloot-meldde-geen-technische-problemen.dhtml)

franzl

rgbrock1

20th May 2010, 15:14

RetiredF4:

My knowledge of the Dutch language is a bit rusty these days but
according to the link you supplied above does that link not say:
"Pilot reported technical problems"?

Never mind, it basically says the pilot reported no technical problems.
Geen being the negation of the object.

Es ist mir doch klar!!!

HundredPercentPlease

20th May 2010, 16:11

Two points of interest:

(a) I dont think the pilot had visual with the runway because he would have easily tucked into 09 after reaching his MDA at about 1 NM threshold (MAP is 0.6 NM threshold), even though he was slightly offset (4 degrees as reported).

The VOR approach is 4° offset, but at minimums you will be roughly on the centreline. That's why it's offset. And what on earth is "tucking in"?

Plenty of time to select landing flaps and touch down had he seen the runway.

Oh dear. Landing flaps are set (normally) by 1000' AAL.

b) The impact point was approx. 500 metres from the threshold;

The impact point is 1600m from the TDZ.

he would have reached the impact point approx 20 secs seconds after his MAP of 0.6 NM ,

See above,

the position of the marker. ie, the photo above (post #748) tallies with a missed approach executed at the correct point (Delta locator, at 360 ft AGL MDA))

MDA is 550' (288' AAL), not 360.

but something catastrophic happened.
Look at high ROD due to calm conditions

An Airbus flies a "flight path angle". It's constant (set by the pilots) and does not vary with wind or aircraft speed.

and also possibly turbine blade stall if manual GA.

:rolleyes:

I'm going to have a guess here: not a pilot.

JetLag50

20th May 2010, 16:29

Hello 100% (are you really 100%?)
tell me what airline you fly for (if you fly). You select landing flaps (ie full flaps to a pilot) before committing to land? Hellloooo?

The offset is notammed and due to signal interference. If the VOR is offset 4 degrees it would say it on the chart. The chart does not say that.

Impact point is reported at 500 meters. I dont know where you get your facts from.

The NDB approach, if he was on NDB is 360. 550 ft for a VOR app would have still placed the impact point at about the same crash position. Dont split hairs

The high ROD of descent I was referring to is in the case of the pilot flying manual in GA. There is a reason why we dont land with a tailwind.

Compressor stall is when you apply power suddenly and the blades do just what is described: stall!. A basic jet engine feature which I am sure even Airbus hasnt cured.

Tuck in: make a corrective final manuever to get on the runway, but I am sure you are just being cantankerous on this one.

Sitting Bull

20th May 2010, 16:48

my dear JetLag50

-the A330 (like all other wide-bodies) must be in full landing configuration before leaving the FAF when executing a Non-Precision Approach
-the NDB MDA is 620 ft
-the VOR MDA is 550 ft
-the VOR is always 4° offset (the Notam has nothing to do with it)
-the crew was cleared to fly the NDB 09 approach

now please: make only valid and informed remarks

M-rat

20th May 2010, 16:49

Jet Lag... :rolleyes:

Ahem.

Ladies and Gents, in addition to the myriad theories placed before us thus far, I would like to contribute a possibility.

If the possible consequences (some/all - there are many possibilities) of FCOM 3/QRH OEB 076/2A from March 2010 "ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER (RA) HEIGHT INDICATION were somehow to have played a part in the latter stages of this approach, then we may have some factors which may have contributed or exacerbated this accident. It may be worth incorporating that OEB in to the theorizing taking place. The OEB is too long for me too transcribe at the moment. I unfortunately don't have the time to paste it in. Perhaps some other intrepid soul may.

As I scan the photos placed on this forum so far, it occurs to me that the debris trail is in line with a perimeter fence, it must be the south fence. Is it possible that in the heat of the moment our departed brethren mistook this line for the approach lighting system (which may or may not have been operable?). This may explain the deviation from the centreline, perhaps.

In my personal experience, Airbus in Toulouse will most certainly have downloaded and sequenced the DFDR. It is very very quiet. This is in itself quite interesting.

HundredPercentPlease

20th May 2010, 16:55

Hello 100% (are you really 100%?)
tell me what airline you fly for (if you fly).

I am a Captain on the A320 series. Also have plenty of command time on the 737. It's not hard to work out who I fly for - there are plenty of us.

You select landing flaps (ie full flaps to a pilot) before committing to land? Hellloooo?

In our company, if landing flaps (not always full flaps - we are encouraged to land with less than full) are NOT SELECTED by the start of the final approach (assuming NPA) then it's tea and biccies. Even on an ILS, landing flaps must be set by 1000' AAL.

The offset is notammed and due to signal interference. If the VOR is offset 4 degrees it would say it on the chart. The chart does not say that.

Every time you do a VOR, you need to check the offset. You simply look at the inbound course (092) and compare it to the runway (088). By a simple process of mathematics, you can deduce the offset.

It is nothing to do with interference, it's because the VOR is not on the runway centreline.

Impact point is reported at 500 meters. I dont know where you get your facts from.

Clue: you don't land at the threshold.

http://i46.tinypic.com/30mwuna.jpg

The NDB approach, if he was on NDB is 360. 550 ft for a VOR app would have still placed the impact point at about the same crash position. Dont split hairs

Splitting hairs keeps me alive.

The high ROD of descent I was referring to is in the case of the pilot flying manual in GA.

I'm sorry - you lost me. When you GA (go around), you are climbing.

There is a reason why we dont land with a tailwind.

Don't we? Do it all the time. :eek: