Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash

[Machaca]

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-004.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-003.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-002.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-001.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-005.jpg

[brize]

I don't know about the rest of you, but I'M reading this forum because I am interested in the SPECULATION of pilots on this accident. So speculate away and I'll use my own brain and sift through what I think is useful. Eventually, as always, a full report will be released and speculation will no longer be of interest.

[aterpster]

brize:
I don't know about the rest of you, but I'M reading this forum because I am interested in the SPECULATION of pilots on this accident. So speculate away and I'll use my own brain and sift through what I think is useful. Eventually, as always, a full report will be released and speculation will no longer be of interest.

For anyone who knows:

As an ICAO member state, to what extent is Libia required to provide party status to Airbus, the engine manufacturer, etc?

Who will read the DFDR and DCVR? France or Germany? Or, can Libia refuse access to the recorders?

[wileydog3]

Sortie III Whose fault is that? Surely the manufacturer should make sure that their 'perfect' product is understood by all involved?

I would say a lot of that falls on the training program. I saw a lot of guys coming through a number of different programs and their understanding of what happens when you push the button was at times quite shallow. They knew what was supposed to happen but the logic or defaults, not so much. And this was on NON-Airbus aircraft.

[Flymecpt]

Re "How likely is an engine to blow on landing" - this aircraft lost four blades in the last month as a result of a bird strike, the blades were flown into Joburg - took 10 days to repair

[xcitation]

This AP article is a good summary of likely contributing factors.

Libyan Airbus may have been attempting go-around
By SLOBODAN LEKIC (AP) – 2 hours ago

BRUSSELS — The Afriqiyah Airways jet that crashed just before touchdown in Libya may have been attempting a go-around in poor visibility caused by sunlit haze, safety officials and pilots familiar with the airport said Thursday.

The Airbus 330-200 was carrying 103 people from South Africa to the Libyan capital, and a 9-year-old boy from the Netherlands appeared to be the lone survivor.

Both black boxes, the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder, were immediately recovered at the crash site in the capital, Tripoli. Investigators from the United States, France, South Africa, the Netherlands are reportedly helping Libya with the probe into the causes of the accident.

"I am assured that there will be a very thorough investigation, since (the French accident investigation authority) will be party to it and they are one of best accident investigators in the world," said William Voss, president of the U.S.-based Flight Safety Foundation.

He cautioned that "it's important to realize that early assumptions about an accident are often wrong."

Investigators will likely consider technical reasons for the crash, such as catastrophic engine or structural failure just before touchdown. They will also look into whether the pilots were fatigued after a long overnight flight.

Still, safety officials interviewed by The Associated Press say questions have already been raised about the crash because of the condition of the plane's wreckage.

Images and footage from the scene showed a wide debris field, with the aircraft having completely disintegrated, indicating a high-energy impact. But the images did not show any significant evidence of fire, which often accompanies accidents in which the plane's fuel tanks are destroyed.

"I would first look into this, the lack of fire, when searching for a cause. Could it indicate fuel starvation?" said an aviation official who could not be named due to the sensitivity of the matter.

A safety expert who declined to be identified because of possible involvement in the investigation also noted that the lack of a fire may indicate that the plane was low on fuel after the long flight from South Africa.

Pieces of the fuselage appeared to have ended up facing backward — away from the direction of flight — raising the possibility that the Airbus had cartwheeled on impact.

That, in turn, would mean that the plane likely slammed into the ground with one wing tip first, instead of coming down with its wings level — indicating that the pilot may have been banking during the flight's final moments, possibly attempting a go-around after problems on approach.

A frequent cause of aviation disasters during the approach and landing phase is known as "controlled flight into terrain," in which an otherwise airworthy plane is accidentally flown into the ground or water, usually because of the pilots' spatial disorientation.

Tripoli International Airport's navigational systems are considered austere by international standards. On Wednesday, pilots were notified that a key navigational aide was showing false readings due to interference from a construction project — though interference is not uncommon at airports.

The main runway is positioned in an east-west direction, with most arriving aircraft flying in from the east because navigational aides are at that end of the runway and the prevailing wind is from the west. Airliners normally land and take off against the wind because it makes the process easier.

Still, the Afriqiyah Airbus approached the runway from the west, although the airport weather report showed the wind was blowing in the same direction. The pilots were thus looking directly into the sunrise while searching for the runway and also had to contend with an early morning layer of haze that reduced visibility at lower altitude.

A European pilot who has flown to Tripoli numerous times said the standard approach was from the east. He described as "strange" the decision to come in from the opposite direction, particularly in light of the wind direction.

[PJ2]

Diversification;
Has it any merit?
Possibly, in the sense that there is no evidence to rule such a notion out. I suspect however, that the loss of almost the entire supporting structure below the horizontal stab motors and associated jacks and what was likely the tumbling of this section, (as evidenced by the rudder damage - the missing top section can be seen in another photograph and the flattened face of the forward-facing fuselage section) that probably left the horizontal stabs in this position - in other words, there is nothing to resist the final resting position, while the vertical stabilizer has fallen away, backwards from the stabilizer, on what remains of the tail structure.

In another photograph, one of the main gear wing-attachment trunions is visible, with the oleo broken off at the very top of the structure, (ie, it's entirely missing.) In the background of this same photo one can see one main-gear tire.

In another photograph of this same area this tire can be seen close-up, damaged with several deep cuts; I suspect the other tire on the left of the photo is one of two nosewheel tires. In yet another photograph, another tire can be seen, similarly deflated, though it is not possible to see damage due to the on-edge perspective of the photograph. There is a section of the wing with what may be a spar, (front or rear) but it looks a bit too small to be an inboard section of the wing where the gear is fastened. Difficult to tell with one photo.

It is difficult to tell too, what the flat section is in the photograph with the partially-seen Mercedes in it; I would say it was outboard wing but the quality, (low pixel count) is too poor to be sure.

Though almost everything remains to be known yet, it is yet to be confirmed:

- that the approach initially used was the ILS to 27, (left hand base leg flown from the south);
- that there was a go-around off 27, from which, a) the accident occurred during a go-around, or a tear-drop turn for an approach to 09, off which the accident occurred;
- that, alternatively, the approach initially used was onto 09 with a right-hand base leg from the south;
- that the attitude of the aircraft was (or was not) unusual at any time during the approach;
- what the actual weather/visibility was at the time of the accident. The winds were 2 - 4 knots with the temp/dew point within 2C.

Has anyone placed the crash site on Google yet? I've seen estimates but no placements and no confirmation of the location of the mosque seen in photographs of the tail section.

Machaca, I don't know how you do it, but thank you for the additional photographs you've posted.

PJ2

[jcjeant]

Hi,

http://www.pprune.org/5691838-post260.html
A safety expert who declined to be identified because of possible involvement in the investigation also noted that the lack of a fire may indicate that the plane was low on fuel after the long flight from South Africa.:confused:
I can't name "long flight" six hours journey for a A330-200 !
A safety expert ?

[RoyHudd]

1 Operating Airbus into TIP or BEN can be risky in low vis with standard poor/unserviceable navaids

2 ATC standard in Libya is poor, and often ATC have no access to current met info, esp anemometer

3 Operating Airbus with part-Libyan crew is often dangerous due to the incompetence and over-confidence of Libyan pilots. Many have little relevant recency, and often have previously flown out-dated primitive aircraft.

4 A330 is too complex an aircraft for the average Libyan crew.

Above comments based on extensive experience operating A320's with Libyans out of TIP and BEN. And current experience on A330.

[valvanuz]

The tail section is at about +/- 950 metres west from runway 09 Threshold and about 150m right (south) of axis.

[xcitation]

Obviously it should have plenty of contingency fuel. I interpreted that quote to mean another causes rather than flight duration e.g. erroneous fuel loading on departure and failed cross checks or unexpected/undetected fuel loss.
Consider that a "long flight" might require greater contingency fueling than a short flight which makes the absence of significant fuel burning even the more remarkable.

[takata]

PJ2
The tailfin's leading edge is definitely oriented to the West, but it looks like having rotated during the crash.
Note: the tail cone is on the right close to picture's border, and most of the wreckage is closer to the runaway.



http://takata1940.free.fr/tailfin3.jpg

http://takata1940.free.fr/crashsite.jpg
http://http://takata1940.free.fr/tailfin3.jpg

[noelbaba]

World Tourism and Aviation News (http://www.tourismandaviation.com)
Ünal Başusta

The Airbus A330 belonging to the state-owned Afriqiyah Airways was on a regular flight from South Africa when it came down on a plot of barren land just short of a runway at Tripoli airport, some 25km south of the city centre.

The aircraft was on its way from Johannesburg to London when it crashed while attempting to land for a stopover in the Libyan capital.

Theories about the disaster focused on a possible technical malfunction or pilot error, or both, just before the A330-200 Airbus was due to touch down. The Afriqiyah Airlines aircraft came down short of the Tripoli runway after a dawn approach in visibility of 2 Km. Mist had been reported.

Pilots who know the Tripoli approach have speculated that the airport’s old-fashioned landing aids may have played a role. It lacks an instrument landing system. Crews have to rely on a VOR radio beacon and Tripoli’s is subject to false readings, pilots said.

A navigational notice advises caution: the VOR is suffering “interference” from building work at the airport. Pilots make visual checks to ensure that they are lining up correctly. There was speculation that the rising sun would have been directly in the crew’s eyes, reducing visibility.

Airbus did not touchdown level but appeared to have slammed into the ground and broken up. The accident happened around sunrise with reported visibility of dust/haze coupled with strong sun rays behind it most likely blurring the vision of the pilots, causing temporary blindness at the last moment during the landing. Sunlit dust can produce whiteout conditions like snow and even though reported ground visibility may have been around 2000m, the sunlit part of the approach would have been flown virtually blind and at that time these conditions would have persisted almost until touchdown. If runway 09 was indeed in use, the approach would have been made straight towards the rising sun. There was no meaningful terrain on either end of the runway, with perfectly flat country within 5-10m of runway elevation in both directions for at least twice the runway length.

Nav aids at Tripoli airport were reported to be unsufficient and not in good operating order.

Afriqiyah Airways is not included on the European Union's list of banned airlines. The list has nearly 300 carriers deemed by the EU not to meet international safety standards.

The main runway at Tripoli Airport is 3,600 yards long. According to international airport guides, the airport does not have a precision approach system ILS that guides airplanes down to the runway's threshold, but has two other less sophisticated systems that are in wide use throughout the world. It is even possible to intercept a false localizer signal and is easy to get in trouble if one is not careful .
Since the airport does not have reliable nav aids most modern avionics has no help for the landing aircraft. Only manual flight and visual aproach is reliable.

Photos of the wreckage show it is is completely fragmented, indicating a high energy impact rather than the slow speed-low angle crash one would expect on an approach/go around accident. Accident photos indicate that the impact was at an unusual attitude involving high speed.

The Dutch Travel and Transport Association ANWB said at least 61 Dutch nationals died. Other reports listed Libyans as well as British and South African nationals among the victims.

The French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA) said two of its investigators and five Airbus specialists were on their way to Tripoli to join the investigation.

It was not immediately clear what caused the crash, but Libyan Transport Minister Mohammed Zidane ruled out a terrorist attack.

"We definitely exclude the theory that the crash would be the result of a terrorist act," he told a news conference, adding that a committee had been set up to investigate.

A witness reportedly saw flames coming out of an engine before the plane hit the ground. Officials declined to confirm reports that a technical fault was discovered shortly before the crash.

Plane-maker Airbus said it would provide full technical assistance to the authorities responsible for the investigation into the accident.

An airline representative in Johannesburg said the Airbus was a new plane that had been purchased in the summer of last year and had been properly checked before it left South Africa on Tuesday evening.

It was the first accident involving one of the airline's planes since it was founded in 2001.
The European Airline Safety Agency EASA said Afriqiyah Airways enjoyed a good safety record and had passed all inspections at European airports.The sole survivor of the crash, a 10-year-old Dutch boy, was described to be in good condition on Wednesday after the crash took the lives of 103 passengers and crew.
"The child is in good condition and is in hospital undergoing checks," Libyan Transport Minister Mohammed Ali Zaidan said. His injuries were not life-threatening, he added.

Libyan security official, speaking to AFP on condition of anonymity, said the plane had "exploded on landing and totally disintegrated."

Afriqiyah Airways operates an all-Airbus fleet. It was founded in April 2001 and is fully owned by the Libyan government.
The company's website says that the airline only flies modern Airbus 320–200, A319-111 & A330-200 planes. According to international conventions, Libya must lead the investigation, which should also involve the a representation of the aircraft’s country of manufacture, namely France, where the Airbus plane was built. The crashed plane is believed to have been constructed only last year. The A330-200 plane had been in service for eight months, according to Reuters and "had been inspected three times in Paris by France’s DGAC aviation agency."

There were two very serious incidents in the past might shed light to why this accident happened.

In the October 7 incident, on Qantas flight QF72 from Singapore to Perth, passengers were hurled around the cabin after the Airbus A330 aircraft dropped with two plunges of 20 and 16 seconds 200 and 650 metres in a matter of seconds while flying over the Indian Ocean. The pilot was forced to make an emergency landing at Learmonth, 1200 kilometres north of Perth on the Western Australian coast, and 44 passengers required hospital treatment.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau said it believed a faulty component, called the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU), caused the problem by feeding "erroneous and spike values'' about the angle at which the plane was flying to a flight control computer.
"This led to several consequences, including false stall and over speed warnings,'' and later generated very high and incorrect values for the aircraft's angle of attack. This led to the flight control computers commanding the aircraft to pitch down.

On this flight the plane acted of its own accord even after the pilot had taken manual control of the aircraft but minutes later, the plane made two downward plunges.
This was a situation which nobody had seen before.
During the incident the flight crew should get a message from ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) signalling to the pilots which system is faulty and what to do to fix it.
The thing to remember about Airbus is the flight control computer is always flying the plane whether autopilot is on or not; even in manual mode all the controlling is done through the flight control computer. After the initial problem that led to the autopilot disconnecting, they were hand-flying the plane and then the aircraft pitched down by itself. While they were trying to correct the situation it happened again, pitching down a second time.

After the incident they found one of the three Air Data Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU) was defective and it was sent to the US base of its manufacturer, Northrop Grumman, to find out what led to the fault and reduce the chance of it happening in the future.
As far as it is known, this appears to be a unique event and Airbus has admited that it is not aware of any similar events over the many years of operation of these type of airplanes.
Qantas’s initial review of the aircraft's maintenance history found no problems. A Qantas spokeswoman said 21 of the company's 217 aircraft were equipped with the component in question."This is now clearly a manufacturer's issue and we will comply with the manufacturer's advice," she said.

Airbus issued a bulletin to all operators of its planes containing the component, with advice on how to reduce the risk of a crash in the event of such a malfunction. The aim of the bulletin is to: update operators on the factors identified to date that led to the accident involving QF72, provide operational recommendations to mitigate risk in the event of a reoccurrence of the situation which occurred on QF72. In order to "minimize risk in the unlikely event of a similar occurrence" … an Operational Engineering Bulletin is on its way … Is it simply to emphasize the already published procedure or is it something new the QF72 crew could not have known before ?

The importance of reading the ECAM messages and manipulating the appropriate switches is shown once again in this incident. The A330 and A340 have identical systems, in the world there are 182 A-340 and 210 A-330 airplanes flying. During the second incident, Cathay Pacific flight 780 suffered a dual engine failure leading to a highspeed landing at Hong Kong on 13th April 2010.

The Accident Investigation Division of Hong Kong Civil Aviation Authority has released its preliminary report. The aircraft, reg B-HLL, an Airbus A330-300 powered by two Rolls Royce Trent 700 engines, had been built in 1998. The aircraft declared a Mayday when approaching Hong Kong Airport ( ICAO : VHHH ), on a flight from Surabaya, with a control problem on both engines. The aircraft landed on runway 07L at a groundspeed of 230 knots, with No. 1 engine stuck at about 70% N1 and No. 2 engine stuck at about 17 % N1. The five main tyres had been deflated when the aircraft came to a complete stop on the runway. All the passengers and crew were evacuated while one passenger suffered serious injuries. The Captain had 7756 flight hours experience of which 2601 were on the type.
At a press briefing Dennis Hui, Manager Maintenance Support at the airline’s Engineering Department, emphasised that after further investigation of the flight data from CX780 and having interviewed the crew, updated information had shown a clear picture of this aspect of the incident.

He said it had been determined that the number 2 (RH) engine was at idle power throughout the approach and landing at HKIA, and the Number 1(LH) engine was operating at 70 per cent of its maximum power, and was frozen at that level.

Mr. Hui said: “This is a higher power setting than is required for a normal approach with a single operating engine. Consequently, this higher than normal power setting led to a higher than normal approach speed and incorrect flap configuration.

“The aircraft therefore touched down at approx 230 knots, as against a normal 135 knots at this aircraft’s operating weight.

“ However, the aircraft touched down on the correct position on the runway, but due to its high speed had to brake hard and use reverse thrust from the operating engine to bring the aircraft to a halt.

“The high speed and high energy braking led to very hot brakes, tyre deflation and the report from the FSD outside the aircraft that it had observed flames and smoke on the landing gear,” he added.

Mr. Hui said details of what happened and what caused the engine malfunction are now the subject of CAD investigations. Cathay Pacific was co-operating closely with the investigation, along with Airbus and Rolls Royce, the engine supplier.

At the same briefing, Quince Chong Director Corporate Affairs emphasized that no decision could be taken before touchdown on evacuation, until the aircraft safely landed and the commander was in the best position to assess the situation.

Once the pilots were told by the Fire Services Department that they had seen flames and smoke in the undercarriage, they decided to deplane the passengers and immediately alerted the cabin crew to begin the evacuation procedure.

The investigation is being conducted by an investigation team consisting of investigators from the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department, the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) of France and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the United Kingdom. The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia and the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States of America also provide assistance in the investigation. Experts from Airbus, Rolls Royce and CPA also assist in the investigation.
The accident investigation team has conducted interviews with the commander, the co-pilot, the cabin crew, and some of the passengers on CPA 780. The information of the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR), Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), Quick Access Recorder (QAR) have been successfully downloaded for analysis. The aircraft flight documents, maintenance records, weather information, ATC radio and radar recordings, fuel samples from the subject aircraft and the departure airport have also been collected for investigation purposes. The engines, their control systems and the fuel system are under detailed examinations to determine the possible causes of the abnormal engines behaviours. Engine fuel components and the fuel samples collected have been sent to the United Kingdom and the United States of America for test and analysis.

Based on past experience, the investigation is expected to take more than one year to complete. However, during the course of the investigation, should any safety recommendation be necessary, it will be promulgated immediately.

[B-HKD]

Intersting bit of info in this article (in Dutch)
translation:

according to Afriqiyah employee who wishes to remain anonymous, Tripoli ATC always lets aircraft land on rwy 09 in the morning even if there is no wind. The reason for this is that aircraft landing on rwy 27 approach from the East, which obliges ATC to look into the sun, which they find unpleasant. [..]

Amongst Afriqiyah staff there has been discontent about this state of affairs for some time already. Not because it's now the pilots having to look into the sun, but since rwy 09 is fitted with the much older NDB (as opposed to ILS-equipped rwy 27). "rwy 09 is terrible, even compared to the rest of Africa", the Afriqiyah employee says.

[..] landing at 09 was made harder by low-hanging clouds. A pilot who landed on the same rwy a few minutes earlier was said to have warned his colleague on the ill-fated plane about this. Allegedly he even recommended him to request rwy 27 instead. The tower then merely answered "stand by". "They always do that. It means that you have to wait an eternity".

A KL pilot then is quoted as saying that he actually considers TIP ATC reliable and never had problems "well you can't fly a precision approach, but that in itself doesn't mean it is unsafe".

[...]

The captain of the plane, Yousif Al Ssady (1953), had an excellent reputation. "Everybody wanted to fly with him", an employee says. He had his training at the British Oxford Aviation Academy, who issued a press release yesterday in which it confirmed to have "a training relationship" with Afriqiyah.

[HazelNuts39]

RE: noelbaba #268;
a generally well-informed article but this phrase is not entirely correct:
After the incident they found one of the three Air Data Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU) was defectiveThe analysis has identified the unit that emitted the erroneous AoA signals, but no defect that would explain its behavior has been found in that unit.
HN39

[Arik]

As SLF but also involved in aviation and Libya I am stunned by some of the posts on here that 'bash' Libya, African aviation and the general racism.

Afriqiyah has some of the newest fleets worldwide. Everything in Libya is being upgraded, including the new airport which unfortunately might be a contributing factor to this accident.

Reading through the lines & knowing the bits that I know, there will be more to this but one thing that hasn't been pointed out is that the crew were Libyan, they knew the NOTAM, they were on their way home. They were not a kamikaze crew that a few on this thread have made out they are!

What I am at a loss to understand is the debris. It's fairly spread over a compact area but in small pieces, no real sign of burnt debris. They were obviously near to the ground at impact ie. they didn't fall from an altitude but no real fuselage remains bar the tail assembly. So can an aircraft such as the A330 disintegrate like this in these circumstances???

It would be good to focus on the real events, rather than bashing African aviation or Libyans (who are wonderful people!)

[galaxy flyer]

Arik

Wonderful people can be incompetent! Most of the posters here are world-wide airline pilots who are commenting on the realities and reputations of the African and Libyan aviation, not being racist. The accident/incident rates in Africa are horrendous and not improving much. Have you reviewed the thread "You know you are in Africa when...." on the Africa forum?

GF

[Max Angle]

Arik, if you really are involved with aviation in Africa then I am stunned that you are stunned.

According to IATA in 2008 the accident rate in the African continent which is obviously huge and has some very good and some very bad operators (both based there and flying in and out) was 6 times the global average. Lots of factors, many of which have been alluded to in previous posts, unfortunately the place just seems to offer many opportunities for the holes to line up.

[billteasdale]

No, I meant Afriqiyah... they have a bit of a bad reputation among the airlines in West Africa... and apparently, it is well deserved.

[lomapaseo]

Again Thanks for posting some decent resolution pictures.

So now one can see the intensity of the ground fire surrounded by the body recovery folks in the one pic.


In yet another pic we see an engine with a shattered fan pointing at both high energy of the crash as well as high energy in the engine.

In yet another pic we begin to see a linear crash debris field. So now some areas of postulation are less viable while others still are of keen interest.

[wasp9]

For obvious reasons you won't find professional pilots, safety specialists or accident investigators offering their thoughts on this thread. Not at the moment anyway.

With all due respect PJ2, despite you choosing to call yourself "Flight Safety Specialist & Consultant" you are doing just that.

Not that I have any problem with that. Some of your comments and thoughts are actually very good indeed. I would expect however that someone involved in Flight Safety does not automatically, or by "feeling", rule out cultural factors, cockpit gradient, training and other valid points brought up by a number of pilots that actually operate in Libya. (not talking about the KL pilot that flew there 12 times...).
Why is it that speculations on the hard factor are apparently allowed on this forum but information on the soft factor is considered finger pointing, politically incorrect or even racism...?
By the way, speculation (estimation part of assessment) is part of any normal accident investigation process. For all those here thinking that only the DFDR & CVR will provide the answers; Think outside the box (literally) and invest some time in, for instance, an SMS course or better, accident investigation (Tripod etc.)

As opposed to some complaints here I think that this forum is used for what the title says; "Rumours & News" no more, no less.

And sorry Heli-Mate, Libya is part of Maghreb.

[sumi]

No matter if it was CFIT, Fuel or WX, this type of accident should be avoidable today with all decision models and CRM skills we get as crews. Of course it was a new A330, but Afriqiah has a few years experience on the A320, which is not that much different (beside energy management and a few system differences).

I believe it was more a personal attitude problem than a training or flying skill problem (as we say: non-tech skill problem)...

[Vc10Tail]

Rather than speculate out of hard headedness why not follow the good example of XCITATION and not get too excited about specs but try and draw facts instead.Have you done any course on air accident investigation-do you know its rudiments even?If not...please don't attempt to act as one.If you wish to get carried away in speculating, better delve into the permutations of procedures in force and which could have been probably used by the crew in their posible desperate attempt-possibilities of fuel starvation after a long flight from SA as well asa long night flight, and perhaps several go around attempts and a low circling or attempts to straighten up...and we all know the illusive effects of haze in visbility terms all might have been the recipe for the disaster.Better we speculate on procedures rather than have a go at the crews behaviour...can you name even one of the crew members...let alone have records of their abilities, wont it make an ASS out of U and ME (to ASSUME they were all incompetent Libyans only to be discovered by the CVR that the PF might have ben Canadian or some other westerner with God given superior flying skills??Am sure the Human Factors group in the ensuing investigation re-quoted below from XCITATION shall elucidate some useful pointers.Meanwhile don't get too excited.I personally view this website with a pinch of salt...as there are things you can learn from seasoned aviators and there also...those who dress their salad up to sound as ones...i dare say- even PC pilots!

"I am assured that there will be a very thorough investigation, since (the French accident investigation authority) will be party to it and they are one of best accident investigators in the world," said William Voss, president of the U.S.-based Flight Safety Foundation.

He cautioned that "it's important to realize that early assumptions about an accident are often wrong."

Considering that the accident form was in the state depicted in the photos portrayed in various parts of this thread, it is a miracle that the mosque was spared in its etirerity...would it be useful if you wana speculate if this could have been an act of God?Then again we don't wish to turn this into a religious thread do we now...?

Patience...old boy...patience is the mark of a good investigator...so wait on for the facts...they may not all come forward mind you but at least you shall THEN have more concrete information to do your guess work:8

[A-3TWENTY]

Hi all,

Were the pilots locals or foreigners??

A-3TWENTY

[ClearSkys]

Guys ... after reading some pages .. just wondering is there not any Logic..
For those questioning competency of the pilot(s) ... and how the place there is a gong show ... wouldn't we be expecting regular crashes from there?

There are daily flights-local and international- and those pilots flew their planes safety for decades ... No one disagrees that Qaddafi is crazy; he himself would agree to that BUT lets try to talk about our colleagues as professionals ..... :ugh:

[takata]

Hi,
I tried to find some footages from the buildings on the right of the Mosquee but without success. This picture is clearly showing that the impact was before the Mosquee but it seems that nobody could film the whole scene at the right of this place (or it is masked by the vertical stab).
http://takata1940.free.fr/tailfin.jpg

The inverted position of the vertical stab is confirmed by the cuttings in the vegetation which are all oriented in direction of the Airport (which is also not filmed). So I wonder if those buildings are not some kind of military installations forbidden to be filmed. (see below in yellow). If the road was aimed in place of the runaway, it might be possible that wings/landing gear hit those buildings. There is also some kind of empenage piece visible at the right corner of the mosquée.

http://takata1940.free.fr/crash1.jpg

The arrows below are indicating the orientation of the crash in direction of the Airport. Note the tail cone in the first pict, clearly visible in large plan above.
http://takata1940.free.fr/crash0.jpg

[Sir Richard]

A-3TWENTY (and others)

Translation of the link in post #271 gives a clue to the nationalities of all the crew.

[Cytherea]

All,
See below from FlightGlobal:
By: John Croft
Date: 13/05/2010
Source: Air Transport Intelligence news

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has sent a team of investigators to help the government of Libya determine what caused an Afriqiyah Airways Airbus A330-200 to crash on approach to the Tripoli airport early on the morning of 12 May. There was one survivor of the 104 passengers and crew on board.

The aircraft, equipped with General Electric CF6-8E1 engines, was arriving from Johannesburg, South Africa.

The US team, set to arrive in Tripoli Friday afternoon, will include a lead investigator as well an engines specialist and technical advisors from the US Federal Aviation Administration and General Electric.

Hopefully that might quash some of the coverup and conspiricy theorists - even thoughthey are arrioving late and after considerable contamination of evidence.

Also can anyone who is in the know confirm Takata's positional assumptions, Is the mosque where the empenage ended up definitely that structure highlighted - there seem to be too many anomolies in my interpretation of the picture, Lack of minaret, lack of road to RHS of mosque, vegetation differences...I'm just not sure and perhaps someone who knows the lie of the land there could confirm.

Thanks

Cy

[ManaAdaSystem]

Did he do a NDB approach into the sun and does Tripoli suffer from the usual sand haze that is very common in desert areas? Weather can be CAVOK but visibility can be very limited in a situation like that.
Not a good combination, even if you have a good aircraft.

Just speculating.

[C-SAR]

Takata interpretation is correct.
The mosque is just south of the center line for 09.
To the west of the tail there is the cone end, a piece of APU and the vertical stabilizer piece missing at the top.
Mi guess is high angle of attack impact tail first during a tentative go around.
Debris field goes on just 10 or 15 degrees of to the south (right for the pilot) towards the airport fence, where there is a small building in the south-west corner, where a wheel was located. Also in line with this building there is a large piece of fuselage skin, and maybe an engine (immages are not too clear)

[HundredPercentPlease]

I am curious about this photo - so much doesn't make sense. It appears that the engine remains are a long way North (ie perpendicular) to the debris field.

And what event causes that kind of damage - certainly nothing like the THY event.

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/TIP-005.jpg



Debris field:

http://takata1940.free.fr/tailfin.jpg

[C-SAR]

This picture was taken by somebody on a plane landing on 09
So the runway is on the left of the picture
The debris bield starts a little to the right of the picture, where the end cone is, and goes on for more than 8 hundred meters to the left of the picture, towards the south west corner of the airport perimeter fence

[takata]

Translation of the link in post #271 gives a clue to the nationalities of all the crew.
Nationality is not a factor.
So far, all the reports are confirming that this Captain and crew was really experienced and totally qualified to fly this aircraft which was brand new. They have been intensively trained here in Toulouse not so long ago. Maybe this place is quite dangerous in regards to Western standards but they were used to it, it was their home, and certainly landed several hundreds times here without any problem.

How many excellent Westerners crew were killed in many stupid accidents before our actual safety level could be reached? It still happens nowaday.
The whole system can not be adapted everywhere in a fortnight. Moreover, it is way too early to blame anybody for what happened. Maybe this aircraft had really a problem, the ATC screwed them, or both.
Some guy from the French pilot union said that is what happens when you sell a Mercedes to a camel driver.
I feel really sorry to be French when some idiots behave like that. Maybe in less than 10 years, those who thought the same today would be very proud to be hired by an Indian Company (or to be able to work).

S~
Olivier

[RetiredF4]

There is another video from the crash-site.
NOVA - detail - Uitzendingen (http://www.novatv.nl/page/detail/uitzendingen/7818#)
franzl

[takata]

Also can anyone who is in the know confirm Takata's positional assumptions, Is the mosque where the empenage ended up definitely that structure highlighted - there seem to be too many anomolies in my interpretation of the picture, Lack of minaret, lack of road to RHS of mosque, vegetation differences...I'm just not sure and perhaps someone who knows the lie of the land there could confirm.
Did you see my previous post here:http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-14.html#post5691875?
The only difference is that the terrain from Google map is flat. But every detail corresponds, even the vegetation. The crossroad is here, the minaret doesn't lack, it is in the picture beside the two domes, but view from sattelite!
S~
Olivier

[StudentInDebt]

It appears that the engine remains are a long way North (ie perpendicular) to the debris field.Or maybe it's the APU.... :hmm:

[takata]

I am curious about this photo - so much doesn't make sense. It appears that the engine remains are a long way North (ie perpendicular) to the debris field.
It is not perpendicular but roughly in the direction pointed by the horizontal plan of the tailfin shown from the air. This is an illusion due to perspective change (same for tail cone and tailfin pictures which seems way closer on the ground). The tailfin is not straight up and its surface is curved, then you can see the letters from a very different angle but the engine is North-East, much closer to the Runaway and not so far away. If the air picture was larger, you could see it on the left low corner where people are standing.

[Arik]

Merci Olivier Nationality is not a factor.
So far, all the reports are confirming that this Captain and crew was really experienced and totally qualified to fly this aircraft which was brand new. They have been intensively trained here in Toulouse not so long ago. Maybe this place is quite dangerous in regards to Western standards but they were used to it, it was their home, and certainly landed several hundreds times here without any problem.

How many excellent Westerners crew were killed in many stupid accidents before our actual safety level could be reached? It still happens nowaday.Exactly my point, I'm all too well aware of the accident rate in Africa and the way aviation is managed across the continent, but 'generally' the accidents are with older aircraft & occasionally kamikaze crew. But I'm digressing from the topic; it brings me back to my question, the area of wreckage appears 'compact' Why would this be? Why are the obvious pieces of wreckage (tail fin particularly) in the position they are in?

Two other questions; can anyone now confirm that Alitalia (? I think) went around prior to this approach and did the Afriqiyah captain request ambulances to meet them? Two 'rumours' I've seen but not heard if they are just rumours or real facts??

Thanks

[obiwan78]

AuditReports3-CSA (http://www.icao.int/fsix/auditRep3_CSA.cfm?s=Libyan%20Arab%20Jamahiriya&i=100)

[henra]

This picture was taken by somebody on a plane landing on 09
So the runway is on the left of the picture
The debris bield starts a little to the right of the picture, where the end cone is, and goes on for more than 8 hundred meters to the left of the picture, towards the south west corner of the airport perimeter fence


That would mean that the Vertical Stab would be close to the beginning of the debris field :confused:
Strange.
That wouldn't really fit to the Cartwheeling theory:
In that case I would expect a wing Tip to initiate the trail. And the Tail should be found close to the end of the debris trail.

High AoA Tail hitting first:
Would have to be an EXTREMELY high AoA at first contact. Would require speed <100 kts. Doesn't really fit to a Debris Trail going on for another 1/2 mile.

[takata]

There is another video from the crash-site.
Too bad, I can't read it. It seems localized.

For those still doubting of the crash orientation, here is two poor quality screenshots from yesterday's video here: Video - Breaking News Videos from CNN.com (http://cnn.com/video/?/video/world/2010/05/12/libya.tripoli.plane.crash.cnn)

there is a short and dodgy right to left travelling from the airport fences, filled with smoking wrecks, to the trajectory of impact at 0.40-0.43 s. It is taken from where most of the big burned pieces of wreckage are lying (airport limits), then you can see the tailfin at frame 0.43 far in the background and in inverted position. (red arrow)
http://takata1940.free.fr/crash5.jpg

Previously, on this other plan, you can see also what remains of APU seen on picts posted above.(red arrow)
http://takata1940.free.fr/crash4.jpg

[Selfloader]

If, as most speculators here seem to agree, there was a controlled flight into ground, what about the ground proximity warning? Would this have been switched off or just ignored. The FDRs and CVR will surely throw more light on this if in fact the case.

[Right Way Up]

self loader
If the aircraft was fully configured the GPWS would not make a peep.

[henra]

In the Dutch video it also seems the bigger Parts which are charred (looks like Center Wingbox to me) are close to the Airport perimeter fence, i.e. towards the end of the trail.
At the moment I'm really struggeling to think of a crash sequence where the Tail is at the beginning of the trail and the Wingbox is close to its end !?
And all this with an extreme degree of fragmentation.

Edit:
after looking again at the debris and ground condition close to the Tail one remotely possible scenario could indeed be a high AoA contact with the Tail just scraping the ground, tearing off the Tail and the plane rising again (TOGA?) and then dropping again from a higher Altitude. Could explain the length of the trail despite high AoA and would also explain why no further fuselage fragments close to the tail are visible.
Moreover the ground around what I think might be the wingbox looks much more scarred.

[411A]

Apart from the fact that the cause of this accident is as yet unknown, to imply that it was caused because the pilots were Libyan is blatantly racist.

Quite possibly.
Just a couple of years ago, I flew two (Libyan national) Captains from BEN to AMM, so that they could obtain the required entry visa into Taiwan.
Both (as I recall) went to work for EVA, and I don't think that they would have been successful, if they had not been up to snuff.

[Spadhampton]

How many excellent Westerners crew were killed in many stupid accidents before our actual safety level could be reached? It still happens nowaday.
The whole system can not be adapted everywhere in a fortnight


Meanwhile we have to put our lives at perpetual risk while you catch up with the rest of the world. All you have to suffer is the occasional off handed remark, should you be African. Poor baby.

People died here. The lives of these people are worth more than your entire nation's aviation effort. When you kill people, expect criticism. Everybody else does.

[Max Angle]

If the aircraft was fully configured the GPWS would not make a peep.

Being brand new it was almost certainly equipped with Enhanced GPWS which would have detected the descent below the virtual terrain floor regardless of config.

[C-SAR]

Henra,

Look at my comment #301.
I agree with you high AOA, tail strikes first, lost end cone, which is to the west of the tail complex, and then all the rest for nearly 1 km.

[takata]

Two other questions; can anyone now confirm that Alitalia (? I think) went around prior to this approach and did the Afriqiyah captain request ambulances to meet them? Two 'rumours' I've seen but not heard if they are just rumours or real facts??

Rumors, like usual, stand unfounded until now. I don't think that the crash site is really "compact", at least 1 km long, without seeing exactly where is the point of impact (at least before the mosquée).
It seems possible that a collision with those buildings before the mosquée occured, or with the ground when trying to avoid those buildings. Aircraft was not level, it departed on its left (collision or avoidance). Impact was hard as tail was separated with a bad angle, then rotated or flipped. It was a missed final (for whatever reason) then certainly TOGA but too late.
http://takata1940.free.fr/crashsite1.jpg

[snowfalcon2]

No Technical Problems Reported Before Libya Crash - Inquiry
Friday, May 14, 2010

TRIPOLI (AFP)--The pilot of the Libyan airliner that crashed with the loss of 103 lives reported no technical problems before this week's accident, the head of the commission of inquiry said Friday.

(END) Dow Jones Newswires

14-05-10 1109GMT

-------
Crash in Libya: the pilot had not reported any technical problem
(AFP) – Il ya 30 minutes (AFP) - 30 minutes ago

TRIPOLI — The pilot of al-Afriqiyah that crashed Wednesday near Tripoli, which killed 103, had not reported a technical problem on the aircraft before the crash, told AFP Friday Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, Neji Dhaou.

"The pilot did not report any problems. Until last moment, things went quite normally between the pilot and control tower," said Dhaou.

"What I can confirm for now is that the aircraft struck the ground just before reaching the runway," he said, adding that investigators no "remove any hypothesis yet."

[BOAC]

Enhanced GPWS which would have detected the descent below the virtual terrain floor - not necessarily here. TCF begins (from memory) at 1Foot at the threshold and increases as you move away from the threshold. As to what height it would be triggered wherever this 'excursion' occurred is purely a guess - partly because we do not know 'where'. Of course, it would have triggered at some point.

[silverline001]

Although its not right to jump to conclusions and blame anyone,I think that most of the guys here agree that the system in Tripoli is pretty much f...d up.Most of the times,its good weather ,however when the weather is bad,like sandstorms and reduced visibility,pilots are put so easily ,in the so called chain of events,which normally leads to an accident.

Many of the times its the pilots to blame....of course after a long night flight,alertness at its lowest,then add to all this ...an unreliable airfield with unreliable approach nav aids and a sloppy ATC system...and I call it system.... because I don`t` know what equipment and hi tech the ATC is equipped with.Have you ever been in Tripoli with two or more aircarft approaching the airfield...guess what...all hell breaks loose,with ATC showing lack of trust in their equipment and eventually a couple of last minute go arounds and wierd holdings are not uncommon.

As someone already said,Tripoli is an accident awaiting to happen,and its not the first time.Even the ILS on 27 is not reliable,one day its working,the other day not,how can you trust such a system.Papis are hardly ever calibrated.Where is EASA and where is ICAO?Such a fuss was made on Lockerbie loss of lives...what about this one.....history repeating itself in Tripoli as i remember there was already a similair crash in crappy visibility in the past.

I `m pretty confident this accident could have been spared if one of the richest countries in the world ,could have invested in a good ILS system on both runways and likewise a good reliable ATC system,which is maintained...good.

And by the way,its a pity the runway is in such a disgrace.All this says alot about who is managing the Libyan Airport.Apparently safety is at the end of the priorities.

Enough said
Silverline

[Fuel Dump]

Non precision approaches are always tricky in marginal weather. Even if you do it perfectly right you have a longer visual segment in which you must have at least the approach lights in sight. Unfortunately that's not always enough to align with the runway at very low altitude and desorientation in the poor visibility is real factor in my opinion. And pilots usually work like this: runway in sight (or kind of) = LAND! Sometimes experience is needed to call a go around in such cases...
Please note that I'm not saying the crew wasn't experienced. Let's wait for the accident report.
RIP

[Sir Richard]

takata, I agree with your post #288, that is why I left it to the interested parties to find out for themselves.... not too difficult.

[STC-8]

Article in Dutch quality news outlet (similar to BBC, NYT etc).

Reposted here with version from their English site

It would appear the writer of the article has referenced this very thread here on pprune - indeed there is even mention of a certain online pilots forum on which a British employee of Afriqiyah Air posted..


nrc.nl - International - Obsolete equipment cited as factor in air crash (http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2544293.ece/Obsolete_equipment_cited_as_factor_in_air_crash)

Obsolete equipment cited as factor in air crash

Published: 14 May 2010 14:53 | Changed: 14 May 2010 17:21

The cause of the Afriqiyah Airways crash near Tripoli remains unknown. But why didn't the Airbus land on the runway outfitted with the most advanced navigation equipment?
By Joke Mat and Mark Schenkel

Much remains unknown about Wednesday’s crash of Afriqiyah Airways' Airbus A330, which killed 103 people including 70 Dutch nationals. But it has become clear that the crash took place near Tripoli International Airport's runway 09, which is not outfitted with modern navigation equipment. Weather conditions above the airport were very poor at the time of the crash, said an Afriqiyah staff member. Low-hanging clowds had reduced visibility.

Benno Baksteen, a former pilot who now chairs a Dutch aviation association, said he wondered why the plane had not landed instead on runway 27, which is equipped with more advanced navigation aids. "That would have made more sense," Baksteen said. "It would also have put them closer to the passenger terminal."

Afriqiyah Airways staff remain puzzled by the same question.
The most sophisticated navigation aid used for aircraft landings is the Instrument Landing System (ILS), used, for example, on all of the runways at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport. The most advanced version allows aircraft to land at a visibility of only 70 metres.

Air traffic control blamed
At Tripoli’s airport, runway 27 has also been equipped with ILS, albeit not its latest version. The Tripoli system guides aircrafts to an altitude of 60 metres, after which the pilot has to manually complete his landing.
An Afriqiyah Airways staff member, who asked to remain anonymous, said that Tripoli air traffic control always directed morning arrivals towards runway 09, regardless of wind conditions or the availability of the other runway. The reason, the source claimed, was that aircrafts descending towards runway 27 arrive from the east. As the air traffic controllers prefer to avoid staring directly into the morning sun, they direct the pilots to the outdated runway, which lies on the same tarmac, but runs in the opposite direction.
Many at Afriqiyah Airways have been unhappy with this situation for quite some time, the staff member said. Not because it leaves the approaching pilots staring directly into the rising sun, but because runway 09 has only been equipped with older navigational aids called Non Directional Beacons (NDB). "Runway 09 is terrible," the Afriqiyah employee said. "Even compared to the rest of Africa."
On Wednesday morning, an additional factor complicated matters. Low-hanging clouds had apparently reduced visibility immediately above the airport, making it even more difficult to land on runway 09. A pilot who landed on the same airstrip minutes before flight 8U771 is said to have warned his colleague about the situation before the plane crashed. Allegedly, he even recommended that the pilot request a different runway. The control tower's only response, it appears, was a request to stand by. "They always do that,"" the Afriqiyah employee said. "It means you can wait for all eternity." Libyan authorities were unavailable for comment on the issue on Thursday.
Weather reports: visibility sufficient
Official weather reports, however, do not confirm the reports of poor conditions. Official visibility at the time of the crash was 5,000 metres. The reports also fail to mention any cloud coverage. Another weather report, issued 25 minutes after the crash, does state that visibility had by then been reduced to 2,000 metres.
"The weather was getting worse," Baksteen said. "But visibility was still sufficient." To land on runway 09, a minimum visibility of 1,600 metres is required. Baksteen said it was possible very low-hanging clouds failed to register on meteorological services' sensors.
Dutch pilots said that an NDB-assisted landing wasn't necessarily dangerous, even at reduced visibility. A pilot who passed through Tripoli airport as recently as six months ago, said he did not have any negative experiences. "I feel that air traffic control there is reliable. Lufthansa and British Airways both frequent the airport. Precision landings, like the ones carried out at Schiphol airport, are impossible there, but that doesn't mean it is unsafe. Clouds or sandstorms could complicate matters, but I have never experienced either," the pilot said.
On Thursday, a British employee posted a message on an online aviation forum describing Afriqiyah Airways – a small airline – as a place where everybody knew each other personally and camaraderie was the norm. The crashed captain, Yousif Al Ssady (1953), had a very good reputation. "Everybody wanted to fly with him," an Afriqiyah staffer interviewed said. Al Ssady learned his trade at the British Oxford Aviation Academy.
Afriqiyah Airways is awash with speculation regarding the cause of the crash. An oft-cited rumour is that the pilot was in the midst of a go-around procedure to reattempt landing, and hit a tower supporting overhead power lines. Afriqiyah's legal affairs manager said he knew nothing of such an incident. He called the possibility that low-hanging clouds had caused the crash "remote".
Officially, more facts will only emerge after Libyan authorities have analysed the information stored on the aircraft's flight data recorder. The inquiry into the crash began on Thursday, but it could take weeks to complete. When a Turkish Airlines aircraft crashed near Amsterdam's Schiphol airport in February last year it took eight days before a first official report was issued. A definitive report wasn't published until last week.

[omaaa]

here is a picture of the approach into 09, u can see the mosque which is clearly visible in the pictures of the crash just on the right of short final


Photos: - Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo//1187180/L/&sid=2d5f23592799ab4981922ef8db7000a1)

[Right Way Up]

Max Angle,

Looking at the terrain clearance floor in the FCOMs the floor rises from 0 ft a short way from the runway to 400 ft at 5nm. If you flew a 3 degree slope to the ground at 1nm it looks unlikely you would get any warning and if you did it would be a very late one!

[C-SAR]

Can we all agree that:


Pilot elected to land on 09
Procedures for 09 ar VOR and Locator, not very precise, but standard procedures that any current pilot should be able to shoot
Wind, few knots from 270
Visibility 2000-5000 but worsening the lower they went
Sun dazzling effect
Nothing abnormal until last minuteFrom the crash site analysis

First impact point to the west of mosque
Probably tail first, high AOA
High energy impact, possibly go around already started
debris field almost 1 km long

[STC-8]

This principle is definitely known to some here - others maybe not, just adding this to the discussion in relation to trying to unravel events:





Occam's razor (or Ockham's razor[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-0)), is the meta-theoretical principle that "entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity" ( entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem) and the conclusion thereof, that the simplest solution is usually the correct one.

The principle is attributed to 14th-century English logician (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logician), theologian and Franciscan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franciscan) friar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friar), William of Ockham (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_of_Ockham). Occam's razor may be alternatively phrased as pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate ("plurality should not be posited without necessity")[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-1). The principle is often expressed in Latin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin) as the lex parsimoniae (translating to the law of parsimony (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsimony), law of economy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frugality) or law of succinctness). When competing hypotheses are equal in other respects, the principle recommends selection of the hypothesis that introduces the fewest assumptions and postulates the fewest entities while still sufficiently answering the question. It is in this sense that Occam's razor is usually understood. To quote Isaac Newton (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton), "We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Therefore, to the same natural effects we must, so far as possible, assign the same causes."[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-Hawking-2)
In science, Occam’s razor is used as a heuristic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristic) (rule of thumb) to guide scientists in the development of theoretical models rather than as an arbiter between published models.[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-fn_.28100.29-3)[5] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-fn_.28101.29-4) In the scientific method, Occam's razor is not considered an irrefutable principle of logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic), and certainly not a scientific result.[6] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-fn_.28109.29-5)[7] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-fn_.28110.29-6)[8] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-fn_.28111.29-7)[9] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-fn_.28112.29-8)


[edit (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Occam%27s_razor&action=edit&section=19)] Controversial aspects of the Razor

Occam's razor is not an embargo against the positing of any kind of entity, or a recommendation of the simplest theory come what may[33] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-32) (note that simplest theory is something like "only I exist (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism)" or "nothing exists").
The other things in question are the evidential support for the theory.[34] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-33) Therefore, according to the principle, a simpler but less correct theory should not be preferred over a more complex but more correct one. It is this fact which gives the lie to the common misinterpretation of Occam's Razor that "the simplest" one is usually the correct one.
For instance, classical physics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_physics) is simpler than more recent theories; nonetheless it should not be preferred over them, because it is demonstrably wrong in certain respects.
Occam's razor is used to adjudicate between theories that have already passed 'theoretical scrutiny' tests, and which are equally well-supported by the evidence.[35] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-34) Furthermore, it may be used to prioritize empirical testing between two equally plausible but unequally testable hypotheses; thereby minimizing costs and wastes while increasing chances of falsification of the simpler-to-test hypothesis.
Another contentious aspect of the Razor is that a theory can become more complex in terms of its structure (or syntax (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syntax)), while its ontology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology) (or semantics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics)) becomes simpler, or vice versa.[36] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-35) The theory of relativity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity) is often given as an example of the proliferation of complex words to describe a simple concept.


Variations

The principle is most often expressed as Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, or "Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity", but this sentence was written by later authors and is not found in Ockham's surviving writings. This also applies to non est ponenda pluritas sine necessitate, which translates literally into English (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_language) as "pluralities ought not be posited without necessity". It has inspired numerous expressions including "parsimony of postulates", the "principle of simplicity", the "KISS principle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_principle)" (Keep It Simple, Stupid).
Other common restatements are: Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity.
and The simplest answer is usually the correct answer.
A restatement of Occam's razor, in more formal terms, is provided by information theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory) in the form of minimum message length (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_message_length) (MML (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_message_length)). Tests of Occam's razor on decision tree (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_tree) models which initially appeared critical have been shown to actually work fine when re-visited using MML (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_message_length). Other criticisms of Occam's razor and MML (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_message_length) (e.g., a binary cut-point segmentation problem) have again been rectified when—crucially—an inefficient coding scheme is made more efficient.
"When deciding between two models which make equivalent predictions, choose the simpler one," makes the point that a simpler model that doesn't make equivalent predictions is not among the models that this criterion applies to in the first place.[32] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-31)
Leonardo da Vinci (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonardo_da_Vinci) (1452–1519) lived after Ockham's time and has a variant of Occam's razor. His variant short-circuits the need for sophistication by equating it to simplicity. Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication.
Another related quote is attributed to Albert Einstein (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein) Make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler.
Occam's razor is now usually stated as follows: Of two equivalent theories or explanations, all other things being equal, the simpler (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplicity) one is to be preferred.
As this is ambiguous, Isaac Newton (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton)'s version may be better: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
In the spirit of Occam's razor itself, the rule is sometimes stated as: The simplest explanation is usually the best.
Another common statement of it is: The simplest explanation that covers all the facts is usually the best.

[SimJock]

The crew did indicate a problem before landing. If as reported the aircraft 'exploded' in the air, a possibility is a catastrophic engine separation causing explosion.

How likely is an engine to blow during a landing?

How about upon selecting TOGA power for a go around, one engine says 'no' due perhaps to previous damage and goes bang violently, but the other engine says 'yes' and goes to full thrust.

Worst possible scenario at MDA, how often is this practiced, at V1, V2 EFATO yes but on GA ?

[4PW's]

This is as good as any of the half assed speculation here: look at the direction of the road to the right of the mosque. They may have been lined up on that. Same alignment as the runway. Very little in it by way of lateral displacement at minimums off a non precision approach.

Who hasn't got to minimums off a NPA, landing into the sun, early morning, called visual with the runway but not the PAPI as you can't see it for the bright assed light shining in your eyes, only to find in a few more seconds you are visual with what looked like the runway!

It's not the runway you're looking at but a road...Sharjah's runway 12 was a case in point. VOR, now an ILS. Early morning fog. Same deal. Happens. Happened. May have happened here.

If the Captain realised and tried banking left for the actual runway instead of going around, straight ahead, full power...it could happen very quickly. Bit of speculation, true, and I wasn't there. Somehow it went all wrong, that's for sure.

The crash site looks, the road, the alignment...it looks conspicuous. This is not dragging their asses through the mud. They didn't wake up and think "oh gee, today's the day for me to plough in." I know that. But that they did. Lot of people died as a result.

Speculation. Mine is just speculation. But it fits. The probability of a power failure on one engine at that stage is infitesimally small. This isn't.

Anyway, RIP.

[C-SAR]

STC-8

What about this scenario for an Occam's Razor:

Coming home, I know my base.
Lets' land on 09, I know my procedure.
Weather is not too bad (2000-5000 viz reported)
Shoot the procedure, all ok
Then at MDA look out and... the runway is not where it is supposed to be!! - Instead there is a white wall of mist and the sun blinding me...
A moment hesitation... decide to go around.... but too late....

[HazelNuts39]

SimJock;
How about upon selecting TOGA power for a go around, one engine says 'no' due perhaps to previous damage and goes bang violently, but the other engine says 'yes' and goes to full thrust.

VREF is not less than VMCL, and the 'other engine' requires several seconds to achieve full thrust.

[STC-8]

'Piloot meldde geen technische problemen' - Binnenland - Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] (http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/6714521/___Piloot_meldde_geen_technische_problemen___.html)


STC-8 translation:

Friday 14 May 2010, 13:39

No reports of technical problems by Pilot

The pilot of the Afriqiyah Airways jet which crashed on Wednesday made no reports of any technical problems, stated the head of the Libyan investigation team, Neji Dhaou, on Friday.

"The pilot did not report any type of problem whatsoever. Communication between the air traffic control tower and the pilot was routine up until the crash". "What I can confirm is that the aircraft made contact with the ground before reaching the runway." The investigators are not ruling out any possibilities.

The investigation team consists of Libyan and South African officials, two French experts, five experts from Airbus and two observers from The Netherlands. American investigators will join the team later on Friday as the engines and navigation system on the plane were manufactured in the USA.




+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++



vr 14 mei 2010, 13:39 [B] 'Piloot meldde geen technische problemen'

TRIPOLI - De piloot van het woensdag verongelukte vliegtuig van Afriqiyah Airways heeft voor de crash geen technische problemen gemeld. Dit heeft het hoofd van de Libische onderzoekscommissie, Neji Dhaou, vrijdag gezegd.

„De piloot heeft geen enkel probleem gemeld. Tot op het laatste moment waren de dingen normaal tussen de piloot en de verkeerstoren”, aldus Dhaou. „Wat ik kan bevestigen, is dat het vliegtuig de grond raakte voordat het de landingsbaan bereikte.” De onderzoekers willen voorlopig 'niets uitsluiten'.
De onderzoekscommissie bestaat uit Libische en Zuid-Afrikaanse functionarissen, twee Franse experts, vijf van vliegtuigbouwer Airbus en twee waarnemers uit Nederland. Amerikaanse onderzoekers sluiten zich later vrijdag aan bij de commissie, omdat de motoren en het navigatiesysteem van de Airbus van Amerikaanse makelij waren.

[wizele]

C-SAR you wrote:

''Can we all agree that:

Pilot elected to land on 09''Well according to post 269, it really doesn't look like it was their 'choice' (in a subsequent post you also say they pilots kind of went ''let's land on runway 09''). We could of course add 'if post 269 is proven to be correct', but then, as pointed out by others, it would be 'weird' for a pilot to choose the worst option, if not forced.

[shortfinals]

Was this what happened, then? (Flightglobal.com)

Afriquiyah crash: the circumstances - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2010/05/afriquiyah-crash-the-circumsta.html)

[wasp9]

Vc10Tail, I assume you were asking me;
Have you done any course on air accident investigation-do you know its rudiments even?
Answer; Yes I did and yes.
Why are you asking? If you are looking for a course yourself feel free to PM me.

can you name even one of the crew members
Answer; Yes, all 11 and the 2 state security members.

...only to be discovered by the CVR that the PF might have ben Canadian or some other westerner with God given superior flying skills??
Neither Captain Yusuf Bashir Saadi nor F/O's Tareq Mousa Abu Chaouachi or Nazim Altarhuni were any of those. This is usually found on flight documents rather than trying to figure out someone's identity by CVR. Hope you were not serious here.

Some posters here don't seem to realize that a possible pilot error does not automatically mean that the pilots are to blame. If well seasoned pilots here indicate training, CRM and safety culture as possible contributors then this is not to be seen as mud-slinging.
By no way am I saying anything about the performance of these colleagues who I don't personally know.

While awaiting evidence and following your advise on what we better speculate about and what to ignore I'm curious to hear from you where you've found the fuel slip and OFP.
Very plausible theory but lack of "concrete information" classifies this in your own wording as... "Guess work".

We are probably all biased in some way. Taking this as a fact which would you prefer;

-Biased by ignorance.
-Biased by political correctness.
-Biased by fear of repercussions.
-Biased by patriotism.
-Biased by experience.

note; Experience is simply the name we give our mistakes.

[Willie Everlearn]

Just a couple of points I'd like to address from earlier in this thread....

The Airbus Bulletin covering revised stall recovery procedures is the result of recent Airbus stall accidents.
An A320 accident in France and an A310 accident in the Indian Ocean.
As for the notion this bulletin followed this accident, it's rather this accident followed the bulletin. Coincidence? Yes. Face saving for Airbus? No.
This notice is also coincident with a CAA Safety Notice addressing the same issue of stall recovery.

Whilst it's fun to muck about in a sim, any attempt at looking into fully developed stalls and spins is a waste of time as simulator data packages have NO data beyond the g-break. Therefore, what you see isn't necessarily what you will get. Despite the fun.

Willie :ok:

[barit1]

StudentInDebt:
Or maybe it's the APU...

No, the image in msg#286 is readily recognizable as a CF6 core engine. The fan module is missing, and the fan rotor may have spun off some distance away.

[WeeWinkyWilly]

Notice the pronounced upslope in the first third of the runway (image of 09 appch at post 303 above). The effect of this (first third only) limited runway field of view in poor visibility is an illusion that will cause the pilot to tend to undershoot - as he descends in his attempt to maintain a normal visual approach angle (an illusion added to by having no VASIS or PAPI to assist him with a visual glideslope on 09).
.
Couple this (low altitude) with any requirement to bank to achieve a late line-up and you have the potential to dig in a wing and cartwheel...... which is my best guess as to what happened..... and it's supported by the impact location in the image above. Occam's Razor cuts deep.
.

At times of sunset and sunrise the pilot's prevailing visibility (as against omni-directional meteorological visibility) can be very directional. For instance, somebody landing into the west at around sunset can easily lose it in the flare (i.e. this phenomenon can be very height sensitive as well).
.
Been there, done that. Cloud isn't a factor and most likely wasn't in this case in Tripoli. My guess is that he just lost it in the glare during a dragged in low approach - and dug in a wing-tip.
Looking at the terrain clearance floor in the FCOMs, the floor rises from 0 ft a short way from the runway to 400 ft at 5nm. If you flew a 3 degree slope to the ground at 1nm it looks unlikely that you would get any warning and if you did, it would be a very late one!

[C-SAR]

Rumors about the "habits" of Tripoli ATC are just rumors. I am in Tripoli and I can tell you that one of the rumors I heard is that the pilot was going for 09, that the Tower told him to go for 27 due to visibility and that he replied that he was going to go for 09 because the visibility was ok.
BUT because it is a rumor I have not mentioned.
What I was trying to describe was a possible sequence of events accepting the fact that, for whatever reason, the approach was being flown to 09.

Another issue that I picked from the italian forum, it seems that the alitalia flight that departs at 0605 was at holding point for 09 and saw the crash. APPARENTLY they said they saw the aircraft impacting nose first 20 to 30 degrees nose down....

[UNCTUOUS]

The answer's pretty straightforward and Occam's coloured.

Most of us with 10K plus hours have fallen for (and nearly done) this one.

See Sensory illusions in aviation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://tinyurl.com/25944ow)
.
and upsloping runway illusion - Google Search (http://tinyurl.com/247v7ef)

Already low due to the upsloping runway approach illusion plus a banking late line-up - and it's easy to dig in a wingtip.

UNC

[Sqwak7700]

Already low due to the upsloping runway approach illusion plus a banking late line-up - and it's easy to dig in a wingtip.

Still doesn't explain the utter destruction of the fuselage. If it hit even remotely in approach attitude, the main gear would have softened the impact and the wreckage would be much more intact, with a possibility of many more survivors.

Just look at other approach CFIT accidents for comparison. Korean in Guam, Turkish in EHAM, Avianca in KJFK, China Airlines MD-11 in VHHH. These were all approach and landing accidents that struck the ground in somewhat of a landing attitude. All were much more intact and all were more survivable.

There is almost nothing left of this A330, haven't even seen pictures of the wings. Maybe it is the media coverage in gagged state like Libya, but I think this aircraft hit with a lot more energy than your usual approach CFIT.

Wether this energy come from the attitude, the speed, or both we will have to wait for the investigation findings (if they ever goes public).

[wingview]

No visibility, tail first, banking hard to the right (or left) and tumble (with maybe GA power) might give you this debris field.

[douwetjerk]

Nothing wrong with HLLT.

[Sqwak7700]

No visibility, tail first, banking hard to the right (or left) and tumble (with maybe GA power) might give you this debris field.


Yeah, maybe. But again, look at other tumbling accidents like the UAL DC10 in Iowa, it tumbled and flipped several times, and it still had some very distinct pieces of fuselage. Not to mention they hit the ground going well over 200kts!

It just seems that this aircraft must have hit with a considerable down angle to destroy the fuselage in such a complete manner.

Simply falling or settling onto the earth doesn't destroy aircraft parts as much as hitting with lots of energy.

[shortfinals]

See entry 320 for a plausible damage scenario

[takata]

@ C-SAR
I am in Tripoli and I can tell you that one of the rumors I heard is...
Before you may leave for elsewhere, any chance that you could take some pictures of contact point West of the Mosque?
I'll be very curious to see if it impacted the constructions here. There is obviously some recent traces of fire on this Mosque's roof and the airfield picture previously posted seems to indicate other buildings close to the minaret. I wonder if that explosion witnessed "before landing" could be the result of this aircraft contact with those infrastructures causing fire and possibly this tail separation. Then aircraft's forward section could end near airfield's fences.
S~
Olivier

[takata]

It just seems that this aircraft must have hit with a considerable down angle to destroy the fuselage in such a complete manner.
There were still some important sections of the aircraft remaining. Just they didn't end near the rear section wreckage but several hundreds meters farther. Have a look again at this CNN video I posted one or two pages ago. It was badly filmed but one can notice also wing parts and fuselage sections near those airfield fences.
S~
Olivier

[vanHorck]

If the Alitalia crew, holding for 09, indeed saw the plane 20 degrees nose down during the crash, it could well be that the plane had previously impacted some building and it could explain the damage especially if after hitting the building engines were spooling up for a go around...

Just speculating

[STC-8]

From the NRC English version - Dutch quality news outlet similar to BBC, New York Times etc:


nrc.nl - International - Features - Libyan authorities open up to Dutch investigators (http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2544428.ece/Libyan_authorities_open_up_to_Dutch_investigators)

Libyan authorities open up to Dutch investigators

Published: 14 May 2010 17:20 | Changed: 14 May 2010 17:35

The Libyan regime is trying hard to show its best side to Dutch investigators who have arrived on the scene of the air crash that killed 70 of their compatriots.

By Leonie van Nierop in Tripoli

The Tripoli air crash is remarkable for a number of reasons. Not because of the high toll in human lives it has taken, or because its cause still remains a mystery. These conditions tend to be the rule rather than the exception. What makes this crash special is the reverence curious visitors are treated to. In February of last year, Dutch authorities were quick to shield the site of a Turkish Airlines crash from prying eyes. But in Tripoli on Thursday, a Dutch delegation was allowed to wander amidst the debris unchecked for hours.

The backdrop was a barren plot of land in Libya. Dry brushwood dotted the peach coloured sand. In the distance, the runways of a cluttered airport could be made out. Birds chirped as the hot summer sun beat down on the desert. In the middle of it all were hundreds of thousands of pieces of debris, spread out in a ribbon stretching out over almost a kilometre. Amongst the parts of the destroyed aircraft lay crumpled jeans, an elegant pink shoe and a bikini, a language guide, a ragged stuffed animal and a wooden fork shaped like a giraffe.

Larger pieces of debris were easier to spot: the plane's tail, an engine, the cockpit and two charred wings. Other recognisable parts of the airplane included earplugs, chairs, a remote control, and a sheet with safety instructions. Add to that all the unrecognisable bits of twisted metal that, apparently, once made up an entire aircraft.

Cause remains a mystery
But to the naked eye the debris raises more questions than it answers. Who can explain why fire has raged in one part and not another? Or how two shoes of the same pair were thrown hundreds of metres apart? Nobody can. At least not yet. Why this plane disintegrated in mid-air shortly before landing remains a mystery. The question why one nine-year-old Dutch boy was the only one to survive can probably never be answered.

Libyan rescue workers had already carried the remains of the crash's 103 victims to two morgues on Wednesday. A day later, the crash site was still littered with latex gloves and mouth caps, but not a single drop of blood was anywhere to be found. Most personal items had been collected as well, to help identify the bodies.

On Thursday, not a single investigator was spotted anywhere near the wreckage. Only a few Libyan soldiers and police officers idly stood by in the shade. Perhaps the Libyan authorities hoped to cast themselves in a positive light by letting the press run free throughout the crash site. It was odd that Dutch journalists were eagerly granted access to Libya, a country generally reluctant to issue visa. A delegation of the Dutch foreign affairs department received a warm welcome upon arrival at a military airport, which looked as though it has only just been cleaned. The smell of air freshener was overwhelming. The floors were still wet.

Making nice with the Libyans
Daan Noort, in charge of the Dutch National Forensic Investigation Team, which hopes to identify victims of the crash, said his team was received "more warmly than anticipated" on Thursday night. He added the Libyans had also exceeded his expectations when it came to the manner in which they had recovered the victims' bodies. The Dutch safety board has also praised the openness of the Libyan team in charge of the investigation.

On Wednesday night, before leaving the Netherlands, the men in both delegations joked they were happy not to be Swiss. Ever since Geneva police arrested Hannibal Gaddafi, a son of the Libyan leader, on suspicion of assault in July of 2008, the Libyans have been livid at the alpine nation. Libya has taken a number of punitive measures against Switzerland since, including trade restrictions, and it has practically taken two Swiss bankers hostage. One Dutch forensic investigator recalled that the infamous Lockerbie trial against two Libyans, while tried in a Scottish court, took place on Dutch soil. Perhaps Tripoli had not yet forgotten about that.

According to top Dutch foreign affairs official Ed Kronenburg, Dutch relations with Tripoli are "currently normal". There is a Dutch embassy in Tripoli and Libya maintains a diplomatic post in The Hague, which was recently "upgraded" to an embassy. According to Kronenburg, Dutch representatives were welcomed into the country after the crash, but Libya was "not so keen" about the arrival of journalists. "It made the authorities a little nervous," he said. Kronenburg's advice: "Stick to the disaster. This is not the time to start a dialogue over human rights for the foreign affairs department either."

Still a dictatorship
Libya is, of course, still a dictatorship. The oil-rich nation has been ruled by colonel Muammar Gaddafi with an iron fist for 41 years. His portrait is everywhere. The Dutch delegation is also constantly surrounded by hordes of men sporting gilded framed glasses and black moustaches, who could be relaying all sorts of information to any secret service.

But the dictatorship is trying to show its good side now. On Thursday, school classes visited the Libyan hospital to drop off floral arrangements intended for the crash's sole survivor. In front of the entrance, a driver handed out cooled water to anyone interested. "How is that little boy doing?" he wondered out loud. At least, he was being treated in "the best hospital in northern Africa," the man said consolingly.

But the newsstands did not attest to a similar interest in the country. Of the 15 Arabic newspapers lining the stands, only one had a picture of the air disaster on its front page. The papers knew better than to discuss the failings of the airline company. But the boy saved in a Libyan hospital, the "Miracle of Tripoli," was splashed over many a front page in the Netherlands.

[RetiredF4]

Go to 5:50 minutes in the video i posted before. I know, its in native language (dutsch), i´m also not familiar with. But at the mentioned time there is a guy explaining big junks of aircraft parts as left and right wing. The place is the fence of the airfield.

NOVA - detail - Uitzendingen (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.novatv.nl%2Fpage%2Fdetail%2Fuitzendinge n%2F7818%23&sref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Frumours-news%2F414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-15.html)

The quality is fairly good, even in full screen
franzl

[GarageYears]

So far I have pieced together an understanding of the crash site from a number of disjoint photos and several news reports with video footage.

Here's what I think I know:

- Debris field length = 800m +/-?
- Starts just prior to Mosque and finishes at airfield perimeter fence
- Tail assemblage is first large identifiable piece and is facing opposite direction to direction of crash
- Wings appear to have stopped at far end of debris field just short of perimeter fence (Dutch TV News report)
- Larger pieces of debris are toward airport fence end of site
- TV reporter claimed that a number of trees to the West of the mosque were first indications of contact

It would be very useful to know what the first sign of ground contact is; does it infer tailstrike, wingtip, nose, or landing gear?

- GY

[C-SAR]

Olivier,

I will try, but access is still VERY restricted.

C-SAR

[JW411]

At the risk of teaching the professional pilots among you who are posting on this forum and for the interest of those of you who are not professional pilots, I would like to make a very fundamental point.

NPAs (Non Precision Approaches) such as NDB and VOR approaches are NOT landing aids. They are airfield approach aids. In other words, they allow a crew to find an airfield NOT a runway. After that, a visual approach has to be made to the landing runway (which might mean a circling approach).

Now, in the case where the inbound course is roughly in line with the runway
in use, we all try to emulate a 3 degree glide path so that a landing MIGHT be made from the approach if everything works out just fine.

Flying an NPA is part of the LPC (Licence Proficiency Test) which every pilot has to pass at least once per year. It was always important to remember as an examiner (which I was for many years) that the item being assessed was the NPA and not the subsequent landing attempt.

In other words, a perfectly flown VOR approach might result in a cloud break in a position whereby a split-arsed turn and an unstabilised rate of descent might be necessary for a straight in landing to be made.

Anyone who flew an accurate NPA but then assessed that making a landing from the approach would be just a bit challenging and consequently made a go-around at MDA got a good result (for it was the approach that was being assessed).

Those who decided to practice their low level aerobatics whilst ignoring the EGPWS shouting at them about their excessive descent rate and bank angle were, for sure, going to be invited to one of my famous debriefs followed by a re-sit!

[dreamflier]

Why this plane disintegrated in mid-air shortly before landing remains a mystery.

Where did this come from?

[Wide-O]

FWIW, I'm in no way an expert, but I do speak Dutch, so there goes.

It seems that both the wings have ended right at the fence of the airfield, the right wing crushing part of it.

From there, the journalist estimates one would need to walk back about 800 meters to the starting of the debris.

Judging by what he found (magazines, books), there are no indications of a big fire.

Edit: this was an answer to post 335.

[takata]

NOVA - detail - Uitzendingen (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.novatv.nl%2Fpage%2Fdetail%2Fuitzendinge n%2F7818%23&sref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Frumours-news%2F414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-15.html)
The quality is fairly good, even in full screen
I could watch it at least. Thank you for the link.
But curiously, again, when they were close to the tail section, they were only showing their feet and the ground around but not what I would like to see: the first traces of contact. I guess that they are not allowed to film this place.
:ugh:

[dec26]

To dreamflier:

Quote:
Originally Posted by STC-8 http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-post5693441.html#post5693441)
Why this plane disintegrated in mid-air shortly before landing remains a mystery.

Where did this come from? This was just a Dutch newspaper journalist's impressionistic report, can safely be ignored.

[PJ2]

wasp9;
With all due respect PJ2, despite you choosing to call yourself "Flight Safety Specialist & Consultant" you are doing just that.

Not that I have any problem with that. Some of your comments and thoughts are actually very good indeed. I would expect however that someone involved in Flight Safety does not automatically, or by "feeling", rule out cultural factors, cockpit gradient, training and other valid points brought up by a number of pilots that actually operate in Libya. (not talking about the KL pilot that flew there 12 times...).
Why is it that speculations on the hard factor are apparently allowed on this forum but information on the soft factor is considered finger pointing, politically incorrect or even racism...?
By the way, speculation (estimation part of assessment) is part of any normal accident investigation process. For all those here thinking that only the DFDR & CVR will provide the answers; Think outside the box (literally) and invest some time in, for instance, an SMS course or better, accident investigation (Tripod etc.)
My thanks for your comments.

I chose to join the conversation because the wild speculations and conspiracy theories began to dwindle and some serious discussion was becoming possible.

If the impression gained by any of my remarks is that I "rule out cultural factors, cockpit gradient, training", etc, then I have been mis-communicating in all previous posts on other threads; One cannot discount such factors at all. In this particular case I didn't think that there was sufficient information upon which to base a serious discussion; nor was there in the Turkish/AMS accident although some tried.

It is a known, statistical fact, (as you'll be well aware) that the aviation accident and fatality rate for Africa is the highest, compared against other areas of the world. My view, to clarify, is, what cannot be accepted as a universal, is an assessment of competency (or lack of) based purely upon nationality or race. Comments offered by "those who operate there, (Libya) are of an anecdotal nature and may or may not reflect relevant factors in this accident. I made the comment 144 posts into the dialogue (May 12th, perhaps the one you're referencing), that "I don't get the feeling that this outcome had anything to do with the airport, the navaids, ATC or the country the accident occurred in." I still think that, but it is clear from others' posts that this sense of things is not shared universally. The truth or falsity of such statements is, for an accident investigation, not particularly relevant. However, cultural elements are relevant, (though we don't know if that is so here), as evidenced in the extensive historical literature on same. The matter is subtle; the line between 'pc' and honest, frank commentary is not necessarily fixed.

I don't think it is possible to discuss things such as cockpit gradient, training or CRM at the moment because, without knowledge of those things as they relate directly to this accident, that IS mere speculation without foundation; such discussion is not, 'not allowed'...it is just not possible to have it because, (though some such as yourself may know), we don't know anything about these issues yet as they relate to Afriqiyah, the crew involved or the safety culture of the airline. By many accounts, the comments have been highly complementary of the crew, not critical.

Establishing the pathway to the accident, how the aircraft was flown in the minutes before the accident, assessing such from the many excellent photographic contributions, are the primary goals right now, and inform the present discussion. I never considered that comments regarding nationality, the country involved, the character observations were helpful in understanding what happened. I think it is reasonable to expect that at some point, when more is known about the 'softer' factors, that discussion will, and should, take place, likely in the report.

The question regarding the airport and the airport's navaids as well as ATC do not, (for me) seem key points in this accident. I say this only because the A330, as you may know, programmed correctly through the FMGEC and autoflight system, is quite capable of executing a non-precision approach without the use of external navaids. The question has arisen regarding the permitted use of such technology, apparently either by the Libyan regulator or the airline, (can't recall which it was). But I have mentioned that a "Selected-Selected" approach, (meanin the use of Heading/VS-Track FPA) is a standard non-precision technique for the A320/A330/A340 series aircraft.

I can see both fatigue and the often-mentioned sun-in-the-eyes being factors to consider but we know nothing else except that which has been offered, once again, anecdotally. Having flown such approaches many times in all these types, I am not convinced of the relevance of either factor but that is just an opinion.

One thing I might add (and ask of others here) is, what did the wreckage pattern look like of the A330 flight test stall accident at Toulouse? Are there aerial photos available? The Afriqiyah accident has all the earmarks of a high-energy impact, but it may not necessarily have been a high-speed event, so I think the question is an important one to ask in determining how the impact occurred.
Some posters here don't seem to realize that a possible pilot error does not automatically mean that the pilots are to blame. If well seasoned pilots here indicate training, CRM and safety culture as possible contributors then this is not to be seen as mud-slinging.
Absolutely the case; this is the essence of accident investigation when assessing human factors. Well stated.

kind regards,

PJ2

[rgbrock1]

PJ2:

Would the debris pattern exhibited by the A330 test flight accident in Toulouse in 1994 resemble the current one? The reason I ask is because the former accident happened shortly after take-off whereas the latter happened during finals.

[wingview]

I stopped reading this (about the article in the NRC):

Why this plane disintegrated in mid-air shortly before landing remains a mystery.

What I did see was a burnt left wing today on the Dutch TV. It looked pretty much intact. Can't find it anymore on theire site (which is a pitty because I can't recall the flap setting).

[Sober Lark]

Quite a bit of nasty politics from some posters.

If it was unsafe, if the pilots etc etc, Catlin brokered through AON would never have touched it let alone insure it for $130,000,000.

[nugpot]

One thing I might add (and ask of others here) is, what did the wreckage pattern look like of the A330 flight test stall accident at Toulouse? Are there aerial photos available?

PJ2,

We still have not seen a picture of the complete wreckage trail, so it does not really help to compare it with previous accidents, but here is a picture of the accident in which the Polish president died a short while ago. Also apparently CFIT during approach. http://bi.gazeta.pl/im/3/7765/m7765863.jpg

You will know that the length of the wreckage trail is dependent on the combined forward and downward vector. A high speed accident with a large vertical component can leave a shorter trail than a low speed accident with a small vertical component. It is also a factor of the ground composition, obstacles and obviously the behaviour of the a/c structure during the impact sequence..

[Nickdj]

From the NOVA video i put together some screenshots showing the left wing and right wing. Cant really make out the flap selection.

http://www.uploadgeek.com/thumb-EADC_4BED803A.jpg (http://www.uploadgeek.com/share-EADC_4BED803A.html)

[takata]

One thing I might add (and ask of others here) is, what did the wreckage pattern look like of the A330 flight test stall accident at Toulouse? Are there aerial photos available?.
I don't have pictures of it but I've got the report description of the wreck which is pretty short:

Impact was near Blagnac Airport's runway.
First contact was made with left wing.
Wreckage pattern was about 180 m divided in four main groups after impact point:
1. vertical stab, APU and rear cabin near impact;
2. left wing, left LG, middle cabin at the center of wreckage zone;
3. left engine, front cabin and cockpit;
4. right wing and right engine.

In French:
1.12 - Epave:
L'épave est dispersée au sol sur un terrain situé en bordure ouest de l'aéroport de Toulouse-Blagnac. L'altitude du lieu de l'accident est de 499 pieds, ses coordonnées géographiques sont 43°38,10 Nord, 01°21,50 Est.

Le premier impact avec le sol a été effectué par la voilure gauche. Des pièces et des débris de l'avion jonchent le sol sur une longueur de 180 mètres environ. L'épave est divisée en quatre parties principales au-delà du point d'impact:

- dérive verticale, APU et fuselage arrière à proximité du point de l'impact avec le sol,
- aile gauche et jambe de train gauche au centre de l'épave,
- moteur gauche, fuselage avant comportant le poste de pilotage,
- aile droite et moteur droit.S~
Olivier

[PJ2]

takata, thanks very much. I thought later of the Nagoya accident as well.

rgbrock1;
Would the debris pattern exhibited by the A330 test flight accident in Toulouse in 1994 resemble the current one?
Not sure; yes, one was at takeoff, this one on approach.

I ask because the wreckage pattern is so much at odds with an approach accident, (Learmont has observed this as have others) that resolving the question may lead further "upstream" in terms of causal factors. The example of the Turkish B737 has been used here.

The Toulouse accident was not a high-speed one but it would have been high-energy with very high fragmentation, just as the Nagoya A300 accident was.

The photo of the Nagoya accident site illustrates what I mean:


http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/Nagoya/032.jpg

Obviously it would be helpful to have aerial photographs of the entire scene, from first impact, to the runway fences.

I'm not speculating on or pointing to cause or even what happened yet as there is no information to do so, but I am trying to resolve the question of the nature of the accident site which looks like a high-speed impact but which doesn't square with the phase of flight.

PJ2

[jjeppson]

What are the minimums for the VOR approach to Rwy 09 ? Is the approach aligned with the runway or offset?

Does anyone know what procedures this airline uses for non-precision (non-ILS) approaches? Many operators are still using the "dive and drive" method while many have adopted the constant rate descent method with a go around at MDA.

I am curious how radar reports say the aircraft never descended below MDA yet it impacted the ground? Something doesn't add up.

I hope the DFDR data solves the mystery so others can learn from it.

jj

[James7]

C-SAR
Coming home, I know my base.
Lets' land on 09, I know my procedure.
Weather is not too bad (2000-5000 viz reported)
Shoot the procedure, all ok
Then at MDA look out and... the runway is not where it is supposed to be!! - Instead there is a white wall of mist and the sun blinding me...
A moment hesitation... decide to go around.... but too late

Yep, have to agree with this. TOGA selected but no transition to the Vertical hence the debris spread far and wide. Dirty windscreen would exacerbate the problem. Faced the same met conditions a few times going into Tripoli.

Aircraft following went around and landed on rwy 27 and only just got in at minimas.

[UNCTUOUS]

If they banged a wing-tip trying to line up on the centre-line,*they'd have instantly*known about it and cobbed the power to TOGA. However all that would have done was guarantee the cataclysmic extent of the cart-wheeling breakup..... as can be seen from the extent of the wreckage shattering. When the Alitalia crew first saw them looming out of the mist on finals they were banked and in a severely nose down attitude - about to hit in the underrun. That's about what you'd expect from a wing-tip contacting ground or an obstacle.... induced yaw. I had the dubious pleasure in 1973 of watching someone catch a wing spoiler on high tension lines and then a wingtip on the ground and cartwheel..... in my Phoebus C. The pilot's knees were driven past his ears as the nose concertina'd and the canopy was ejected. That sort of fore-aft crumple of nose and fuselage was exactly what happened to this A330-200.
*
It's vaguely similar to the 2001 Aspen Colorado bizjet crash. .... where the upslope on runway 15 was 2% and was the factor that would've induced the visual illusion and got them down low on late finals whilst maneuvering to line up (per what likely occurred at Tripoli). It's a deadly trap.


The Aspen Gulfstream Crash
ASN Aircraft accident Gulfstream Aerospace G-1159 Gulfstream III N303GA Aspen Airport, CO (ASE) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20010329-0)

On March 29, 2001, a Gulfstream III bizjet crashed on approach to the airport at Aspen, Colo., killing all 15 passengers and three crew members aboard. ...
The Aspen Gulfstream Crash (http://www.avweb.com/news/safety/182393-1.html)
*

2001 Avjet Aspen crash - Wikipedia
The 2001 Avjet Aspen crash occurred on March 29, 2001 when a chartered Avjet Corporation Gulfstream III business jet, registration N303GA, crashed into ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Avjet_Aspen_crash (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Avjet_Aspen_crash)

Runway 15's 2% upslope:
http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/1005/05889VDGC.PDF
*
Runway 15 (the Aspen accident runway) has a quite significant 2% UPSLOPE - i.e. leading to the same type of illusion (and low approach once visual off the VOR NPA) as in Tripoli.
*
Looks like the NTSB missed that vital element for the Aspen crash cause.

[takata]

The Toulouse accident was not a high-speed one but it would have been high-energy with very high fragmentation, just as the Nagoya A300 accident was.
High (horizontal) energy is the clue. That is why I'm suspecting that she wasn't actually landing (descelerating) but accelerating because of its failed approach, while being too low and hit some obstacles on its way (buildings, electric lignes/poles or trees). Another clue is about undercarriage, which seems fairly well cut clear on some pics. And last, the rotation and damages of the tailfin tip. To be noted also, there is some vegetation trapped on the leading edge of the vertical stab visible on some pics.
S~
Olivier

[lomapaseo]

I'm not speculating on or pointing to cause or even what happened yet as there is no information to do so, but I am trying to resolve the question of the nature of the accident site which looks like a high-speed impact but which doesn't square with the phase of flight.


One needs to parse these kinds of questions down between energy and speed to get a hint as to how the aircraft impacted the ground from a flight regime.

The best way to do this is to look at the vectors of the impact.

Considering a ground contact from a flight on approach or go-arround the questions are nose up or nose down? High velocity forward vs vertical velocity down and of course roll if any.

I haven't seen enough photos from the Libian accident to draw any conclusions in comparisons and probably by the time I see any, the on-scene investigators will already have those answers and be working towards the cause.

[RetiredF4]

Speculating:
Would it be thinkable, that the moment they applied TOGA (assuming from former posts that they did so), their eyes had been still outside the cockpit trying t o see some reference or other traffic conflicting with the missed approach? Could the increase in thrust and acceleration without instrument reference lead to spatial disorientation sensing a nose rising too high attitude and compensating with a stick forward movement, thus ending in an accelerating dive into ground?
I havent flown heavies, in a combat jet in an IMC goaround it is a common false feeling.
franzl

[johdi]

See the video in this article: they are hoisting the wings near the perimeter of the airfield

AD Vliegramp Tripoli - 'Piloot meldde geen technische problemen' (483435) (http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/2461/Vliegramp-Tripoli/article/detail/483435/2010/05/14/Piloot-meldde-geen-technische-problemen.dhtml)

[fredgrav]

Could the increase in thrust and acceleration without instrument reference lead to spatial disorientation sensing a nose rising too high attitude and compensating with a stick forward movement, thus ending in an accelerating dive in to ground?

This really makes me think to the Gulf Air A320 crashed in Bahrain 10 years ago at night. By applying TOGA Thrust on GA, the pilot had the somatogravic illusion induced by the aircraft acceleration that caused him to perceive as if the aircraft was pitching up, thus leading him to respond by making a pitch-down input on the stick: the aircraft had a negative attitude when hitting the water. According to what's been seen by some eyewitnesses, the Afriqiyah A330 stroke the ground with a negative attitude too.

Here's a plan view of Bahrain:

http://img291.imageshack.us/img291/1009/case1img.jpg

At that point it comes a doubt, was spatial disorientation at the bottom of the accident ? ...

§ fredgrav

[dreamflier]

Something which might be of interest:

The official said the boy was found at one end of the crash site about half a mile from the large tail section of the plane - something that could indicate he was sitting in the front of the plane.

IOL: Crash survivor not told about family's death (http://www.iol.co.za/general/news/newsprint.php?art_id=nw20100513192327773C887240&sf)=

[PJ2]

lomapaseo, yes, re parsing - precisely; the suggestions are absolutely tentative but I think growing more reasonable. The energy gained would be from the height, (vertical speed), not from forward speed. That said, takata expresses the notion of high forward speed; perhaps - it wouldn't take that high a speed to fragment the airplane as it has been - 200kts would likely do it.

fredgrav;

Yes, I thought of the Gulfair accident a few days ago but didn't feel as though enough was known about final attitudes of this aircraft. The comment that the airplane was pointed downwards, although unconfirmed still, does make one consider the possibility more seriously. I think knowing exactly what the weather conditions were like is now more important. I know what the METARS say but there are also comments about pockets of mist and the possibility of '2km visibility', (Dutch article previously quoted).

[barit1]

I haven't seen evidence of a significant crater in the ground, typical of a very steep impact. Could she have hit a rocky outcrop?

[ExSp33db1rd]

........a possible pilot error does not automatically mean that the pilots are to blame.......


Absolutely, tho' they usually are blamed as the easiest target, and sometimes unable to fight back.

IF there is pilot error - and I'm not referring specifically to this accident - let's not forget that it is usually the last error in the chain, and when the pilot is no longer around there is often no way to determine what blameworthy previous errors or omissions made by others led the pilot to make that last fateful decision based on erroneous information being presented, either mechanically, visually, electronically - or however.

[Old_Fokker]

Dutch TV program Nova contained an interesting clip (http://player.omroep.nl/?aflID=10953160) tonight of the whole crash site, filmed from another plane as it approached 09 (today or yesterday, time footage was shot is unclear).

Fast Forward to 20 min 43 seconds, approximately. Disregard dutch comment, it is not related to clip itself.

Visible is what could resemble a first impact area plus signs of the plane sliding straight forward. The tail section plus smaller debris appears to be located some 200 meters after this first impact area (in front of the mosque described by others). It appears the plane was more or less intact before that point.

A large debris field can be seen after the tail-section with relatively small pieces and stretches for some 240 meters. One large section (wings?) appears approx 200 meters further with relatively little (if any) debris in between those 2 points (though it appears the ground is scratched in between). There's approx 730 meters between what appears to be first impact area and this large piece (wings?).

After carefully watching this clip a few times, I believe it might be possible that the plane was intact and with its wings level when it hit the ground and slid for some 200 meters and eventually broke up (tail first) when it hit the road which runs North-West near the mosque. In clip, this road appears to be slightly higher then surrounding terrain.

Editted to clarify one point

[vovachan]

Dutch TV program Nova contained an interesting clip tonight of the whole crash site, filmed from another plane as it approached 09 (today or yesterday, time footage was shot is unclear).

What is clear from the footage is that the crash site is significantly to the right of the Rwy centerline. So until I am convinced otherwise I put my money on a last-ditch course correction which went badly wrong, or "low level aerobatics" as someone put it

[lomapaseo]

After carefully watching this clip a few times, I believe it might be possible that the plane was intact and with its wings level when it hit the ground and slid for some 200 meters and eventually broke up (tail first) when it hit the road which runs North-West near the mosque. In clip, this road appears to be slightly higher then surrounding terrain.


That description matches a lot of controlled Flight (wings level, approx flat pitch, high horriz speed) into terrain caused by any number of reasons. If confirmed it does not match IMO The A330 Test flight nor Nagoya. I still do not believe that the evidence suggests a flameout lack of fuel (too much engine damage and too intense a fire in some areas in the photos).

And maybe it's only me, but I have no clues at this time as to the causal factors.

[TowerDog]

I put my money on a last-ditch course correction which went badly wrong, or "low level aerobatics" as someone put it

The lack of basic instrument proficiency will do that every time.

Having worked in the Middle East, I have seen that in the simulator with locals now and then.
Have also seen job offers being tied to good family connections and not to flying skills or common sense in general.

(No relation to this accident of course)

[PJ2]

lomapaseo;
If confirmed it does not match IMO The A330 Test flight nor Nagoya. I still do not believe that the evidence suggests a flameout lack of fuel (too much engine damage and too intense a fire in some areas in the photos).
Yes, agree, seeing this new information. The ground path appears not to have a large initial impact mark, (for example, tail first, as at AMS), but a relatively smooth path.

[UNCTUOUS]

From another forum:

There are quite a lot of discussion on the TU154 accident : people talking about instrument approaches procedures in Russia, heirloom from the soviet era :
There are three possibilities on the procedure they were shooting (but the clue is in the ATC observation that "they lost altitude very quickly" close in):

1/- A GCA approach, which would confirm the initial Russian controller who said that " they stopped acknowledging my messages and they lost altitude very quickly..." required vis is 1000 m.

2/- A very unusual procedure - apparently quite common in the ex-soviet world - in which, the pilots would use two NDBs for the alignment on centerline, while being talked down by a ground operator. I have never heard of that method until to-day, and it seems to me quite dangerous as the pilot has to deal with two mental pictures - one from his instruments on a visual cue, another from the required "correlation" of some height orders from the ground (aural / visual cues ). Required min vis is 1200 m.

3/- A dual NDB approach. The problem with this letdown is the absence of any glide slope information ; everything is done by stopwatch, down to an MDH of some 200m / 600 ft.
Contrary to what some may think, the lateral precision of that approach is very good (the deviation of some 45 m at 1500 m from the threshold amount to a precision of less than 2° (and Yes, on that sort of approach, that's "smack on the centerline" ! )

Another image I would have liked to see is a cockpit view of that approach, especially at the point where they started that strange "dive"... i.e. was there a visual clue that made them think they were closer to the runway ( and too high, of course ) ?
Dutch TV program Nova contains an interesting clip of the whole Tripoli crash site, filmed from another plane as it approached Tripoli's runway 09.
Fast Forward to 20 min 43 seconds, approximately. Disregard Dutch comment, it's not related to the clip itself.

Visible is what could resemble a first impact area plus signs of the plane sliding straight forward. The tail section plus smaller debris appears to be located some 200 meters after this first impact area (in front of the mosque described by others). It appears the plane was more or less intact before that point.

A large debris field can be seen after the tail-section with relatively small pieces and stretches for some 240 meters. One large section (wings?) appears approx 200 meters further on, with relatively little (if any) debris in between those 2 points (though it appears the ground is scratched in between). There's approx 730 meters between what appears to be first impact area and this large*object (wings?).

After carefully watching this clip a few times, I believe it's probable that the plane was intact and with its wings almost level when it hit the ground and slid for some 200 meters and eventually broke up (tail first) when it hit the road which runs North-West near the mosque. In the clip, this road appears to be slightly higher then surrounding terrain (i.e. a "berm").
*
For comparison, at the link below is a picture of the TU154 accident debris trail in which the Polish president died a short while ago.
Also apparently a CFIT during approach. TU154 crash site debris distribution ( http://bi.gazeta.pl/im/3/7765/m7765863.jpg )

You will appreciate that the length of the wreckage trail is dependent on the combined forward and downward vector. A high-speed accident with a large vertical component can leave a shorter trail than a low speed accident with a lesser vertical component. Other varying factors are the ground composition, obstacles and obviously the behaviour of the a/c structure during the impact sequence.
*
But it's likely that the TU-154 accident and the Tripoli accident were very similar in their origins. See explanation below.
*
Picked up this photo (below): of the TU-154 crash
.....showing that the big piece first torn from the airplane was indeed the tip of the left wing.


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/101-196ab6.jpg
So thanks to this fact, we have confirmed that the reason the TU154 veered to the left and - apparently - ended up upside down, was a sharp low altitude left bank (and tree-top connection) which resulted in the airplane impacting the ground inverted.

Using that elevation/location data, here on Pprune some theorists have plotted the TU154's finals flightpath on a terrain profile and found out that, at the first tree impact, theTU154 was well below the airfield elevation and their subsequent trajectory was a 5% climb, insufficient to clear all obstacles.

That 5% value would be puzzling to anyone unfamiliar with approach illusions, being way below the height and gradient from which we would expect a go-around/missed approach to commence; and with that puzzling final approach geometry, it would tend to make any stabilized final approach a lot more difficult than normal...even if they were well above stall speed... However this puzzling low altitude close-in on final approach could easily be explained away by a visual illusion caused by a runway upslope.... in limited visibility.
*
Yet it's hard to establish whether or not runway 26 at Smolensk has any upslope - as the Russian military don't publish public charts/plates for their military airfields. I'll keep looking, but it's conceivably a common factor. The inordinately low altitude during the TU-154's approach would appear to support an upslope visual illusion theory. As with Aspen CO's 2001 Gulfstream III crash, superimpose a 2% upsloping runway upon a standard 3% approach profile and the pilot is inevitably being visually "conned" into descending into a subterranean approach - once he becomes visual with the first half of the runway. It's an illusion that's very difficult to perceive or even anticipate, so how can one avoid it - particularly in low visibility?
*
The TU154 Smolensk and Tripoli A330 accidents would appear to have much in common. That final "drive" and descent to the "now visible" runway, after an NPA approach, is totally dependent upon what the pilot perceives his approach angle to be....in limited visibility (i.e. with few cues). If he's unknowingly coping with (i.e. subject to) an upslope illusion, and consequently very low, any last minute line-up banking will put a wingtip perilously close to the ground..... but he won't realize that. It's a deadly combo.

[Vc10Tail]

Aircraft

Subscribe (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/12/04/220062/air-transport-intelligence.html?sfid=701200000002OhM&cp=FG_ATI_article_top_link)You are in: Home (http://www.flightglobal.com/home/default.aspx) › Aircraft (http://www.flightglobal.com/sectionhome/sectiondefault.aspx?NavigationID=179&CategoryID=10249&SlotID=2) › News Article

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DATE:12/05/10
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news

Crashed Libyan A330 had logged just 1,600 hours
By David Kaminski-Morrow ([email protected])
http://adtech.panthercustomer.com/apps/291/Ad2854179St3Sz277Sq3926445V0Id3/901639354

http://adserver.adtech.de/adserv|3.0|289|1061237|0|277|ADTECH;loc=300;key=key1+key2+ke y3+key4;grp=[group] (http://adserver.adtech.de/adlink|3.0|289|1061237|0|277|ADTECH;loc=300;key=key1+key2+ke y3+key4;grp=[group])

Airframer data for the crashed Afriqiyah Airways Airbus A330-200 (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/330-200.html) shows that it had accumulated just 1,600 flight hours before the accident.
Airbus (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/airbus.html) has confirmed the carrier's identification of the airframe as serial number 1024, adding that it had conducted some 420 flights since delivery in September.
"Preliminary reports indicate that the aircraft crashed short of the runway threshold during approach," it adds.
There is no information on the level of experience of the cockpit crew. Afriqiyah confirms that a child was the sole survivor from among the 93 passengers - mainly Dutch nationals - and 11 crew on board.
Video images from the scene suggest that both flight recorders have been recovered from the wreckage.

http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/getAsset.aspx?ItemID=34191 Source: Libyan TV

Sunrise time for Tripoli on 12 May is listed by astronomical charts as 06:10.
Weather information for Tripoli International Airport indicates visiblity had started varying around the time of the Afriqiyah Airbus A330 (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/airbus%20a330.html) crash, given as about 06:00.
While meteorological data at 05:50 indicated visibility of 6,000m, this had dropped back to 5,000m at 06:20 and an update timed at 06:25 puts the figure at 2,000m.
Tripoli's main runway is desginated 09/27. There is no confirmation of the runway in use, or the type of approach carried out, but the weather data suggests westerly winds prevailed.
Related content

PICTURES: AirSpace forum pictures and discussion (http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/forums/afriqiyah-airways-a330-crashes-in-libya-48764.aspx#56496)
Incident watch (http://www.flightglobal.com/staticpages/incidentwatch.html)
Afriqiyah Airways pictures (http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/default.aspx?mq=Afriqiyah+Airways)
Latest safety opinion from our Learmount blog (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/)
Global airline accident review 2009 (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/01/11/336920/global-airline-accident-review-of-2009.html)

[poison]

This approach ladies and gentlemen was more than likely unstable. One or more of the criteria for a stabilized approach was not met on that early morning approach into Tripoli. This aircraft was a perfectly good working aircraft up until the point of impact. To be stabilized you need to be on the correct flight path, laterally and vertically. Correct VAPP and in the landing config is a must and hopefully checklist read with just monitoring to be done with the autopilot on and track/FPA with flight path director on. I can only assume that Air Afiqiyah conduct CANPA approaches into Tripoli and this approach should not have posed a big problem for anyone who knows how to do a non precision approach in the A330, whether it be managed or selected.

Situational awareness in this cockpit was poor as well. However I have no doubt that the crew knew that something was going wrong but failed to take the appropriate action of going around in time. Perhaps a go around was conducted but they may have even failed to pitch up and drove the aircraft into the ground.

[PJ2]

Below is a very rough composite of the video taken on final and presented on NOVA at Player omroep.nl (http://player.omroep.nl/?aflID=10953160).

The image is intentionally not cleaned up; it is necessarily choppy due to the changing perspective which is not possible to represent on a flat surface; I tried it in pTgui (panorama building program) but it couldn't deal with the series of images. The 'S-turn's' at the beginning are a result of the composite work rather than the actual track of the aircraft.

As has been observed by others who have watched the video, the initial ground contact appears more flat and not at high descent rate as I first thought. Given the length of the path, the fragmentation of the fuselage and location of the wings, (far left in the composite) it may be reasonable to posit a high speed, low-rate of descent scenario.

PJ2

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/Groundpath2copy-1.jpg

[C-SAR]

My comments are on crew composition and rest and PLEASE all you who knew the crew, Africa, Afriqiyah etc. do not get fired up. I am just trying to establish facts and possible contributing factors.

The flight took off on Monday at 19:30 and Landed in Joburg at 04:20 on Tuesday Morning
After 17 hours departed Joburg at 21:30 and landed in Tripoli at 06:20
All times from Afriqiyah published schedule

So, we have two night sectors flown by the same crew with 15 or less hours rest.

First question to the long rangers:
Is this ok in relation to crew duty and rest time?

The crew was 1 Captain and 2 FO

Second question:

Is this composition acceptable? Will this mean that the Captain will always be at the controls or that in some instances the two FOs will be left alone in the cockpit if the Captain has a rest?

Third question:

Could it be that, being a landing at home etc. the two FOs were at the controls?

As I said, I am not having a go at the professionality etc. of Afriqiyah pilots.

BTW, Takata, I will try to go to the site this afternoon and all the latest discussions on the first impact will guide me to look well before the mosque... if I make it there.

[HundredPercentPlease]

PJ2,

That's an interesting composite. I have watched the video a few times and studied your composite, and reckon our view of the field would be something like this:

http://i43.tinypic.com/33b32fl.jpg

[Nickdj]

The first area where you can see the plane came down has no debris (seen from aerial video) but a definite path. Can this be due to the fact that high thrust from the engines could have created this? If the plane would have hit there it would leave some debris but it has not...debris start just before the mosque. Any ideas? Anyone also have a approx location of the cockpit?

[HundredPercentPlease]

This?

http://i44.tinypic.com/27y782f.jpg

[Nickdj]

Yes. I cant really make out a lot of debris, only the white object in the beginning.

[sleeper]

First question to the long rangers:
Is this ok in relation to crew duty and rest time?

yes


The crew was 1 Captain and 2 FO

Second question:

Is this composition acceptable? Will this mean that the Captain will always be at the controls or that in some instances the two FOs will be left alone in the cockpit if the Captain has a rest?


This composition is acceptable and done by numerous airlines. During cruise captain may/will be in crewrest leaving the two F/O's up front.

Could it be that, being a landing at home etc. the two FOs were at the controls?

NO!
I cannot imagine airlines or authorities approving this.

[Schubinho]

The markings of the slide path are not very clear on the printscreen from the video, but they could be interpretated as follows:

1) The markings are formed by sand which is pushed sideways through the pressure of the belly. In this case the landing gear was not yet deployed. Is that normal 1km before the runway?
2) The markings are formed by the landing gear. As only 2 traces are visible, the angle of attack was such that only the rear landing gear touched the ground, otherwise a third trace would have been visible in the middle. Are there pictures which show the location of the landing gear on the debris field?

The other interesting fact is that the wings are closely together at the end of the debris field, indicating that the aircraft made no rotational movement (around the yaw axis). The fact that the tail is rotated 180 degrees can be explained by the fact that the rudder had some output, leading to a rotational movement at such high speeds. Or it made (multiple) somersaults?

[Niner_Mike]

When checking the 13-1 VOR DME Rwy 09 approach plate (assuming that the aircraft was following this approach), I noticed that the Tripoli VOR (TPI) is located about 300 m south of the runway (also visible on the 10-9 airport chart). Extending the final approach course from the Ghararah (TW) locator to the Tripoli VOR (TPI) along 92° magnetic as per the approach, I noticed that it goes almost overhead the crash site. The crash site is indeed also located 300 m south of the extended centerline of runway 09. See my sketching below.

I speculate that the pilot was on a perfectly stable approach tracking towards the TPI VOR, descended below minima before D Locator (550' AMSL, only 288' above the threshold) while still in or suddenly engulfed in IMC (haze + direct sunlight). Pilots could not adjust course visually towards the runway as they were IMC and they continued as if on a ILS approach. Close to the ground the go-around was probably initiated, but came too late and its energy contributed to the disintegration. Wheels touched in the sand, pull-up, tail scraped and broke off, remainder fell hard back onto the sand.



Niner Mike.

http://i42.tinypic.com/x4k9vk.jpg


http://i42.tinypic.com/o74jk0.jpg

[silverstrata]

The first area where you can see the plane came down has no debris (seen from aerial video) but a definite path. Can this be due to the fact that high thrust from the engines could have created this? If the plane would have hit there it would leave some debris but it has not...debris start just before the mosque. Any ideas? Anyone also have a approx location of the cockpit?



Looks like it did a perfect touchdown in the dirt, instead of on the runway.

It would be interesting to see if the initial trail contains any tyre tracks, or whether it was just the aft fuselage dragging along the ground. The width and depth would suggest tyre contact, but I cannot see any obvious tracks on that video.

[Schubinho]

Not very scientific, but as far as I can make up from this picture, it looks like it slided on its belly, without landing gear deployed.

http://i40.tinypic.com/350m3nl.jpg

[HundredPercentPlease]

Not very scientific, but as far as I can make up from this picture, it looks like it slided on its belly, without landing gear deployed.

In the go-around phase.

[Plectron]

As far as crew rest is concerned, if the Captain is with two FOs who are not type rated s/he may not leave the cockpit except for "physiological" reasons and that does not include sleep. Some airlines make long haul (over 8 hours) at night with this crew configuration. Captain gets no rest. Don't know about the rule regarding this case.

[BOAC]

Two things do not fit here:

1) I would expect the VOR approach track to be further to the north than drawn above - it is a runway approach and the FAT would normally cross the centreline around about the MAP which is the 'D' NDB, so they were more than '300m south'

2) What do we do with the Alitalia 'eye-witness report' of a pitch attitude of '20 degrees nose down'? It seems to suggest that they in fact saw the dive AFTER the initial impact.

[Nickdj]

Schubinho, thanks for that. What i still cant comprehend is the fact that the wings are all the way to the front of the crash site with no debris what so ever in front of them. The wings also look to be perfectly next to each other. Where did the nose of the plane go?

[filejw]

Lots of good speculation here...I vote for saw R/W at last min and tried to make the approach fit by forcing the landing. Either hit the ground with left wing while maneuvering or belly on late missed approach.. :sad:

[takata]

Hello,

C-SAR, thank you, it would be very nice if you could look at the initial impact zone, and if those "white" traces are related or not to impact, and check roughly the width of the initial trail. If you can walk the zone, looking at what are the first debris would be helpful.

I think also that it is not wheels contact that left this track, seems too tiny.

Contact could be made nose up with full power applied for a go around; tail hit first and trailed on the ground. Mosque road caused a bump further weakening the airframe and caused tail separation which rotated, then cabin came down after the mosque and starting to desintegrate along the trail. From initial contact to where wings are lying, the distance is between 800-900 meters. Part of the landing gear is lying near the last road just before the airport's limit.

I don't think that "Alitalia rumor" is very relevant. Beside, thank you for posting this Dutch link as the full trail travelling is very interesting.

[takata]

. What i still cant comprehend is the fact that the wings are all the way to the front of the crash site with no debris what so ever in front of them. The wings also look to be perfectly next to each other. Where did the nose of the plane go?
I fear they might have been moved when still burning for clearing the runway of their fumes.

[HundredPercentPlease]

BOAC,

It has been mentioned that the SOP was selected/selected, due to lack of approval of anything better. Which would lead toward the VOR rather than the FAT.

I have a suspicion that this trench is deeper and more aggressive than it may appear:

http://i44.tinypic.com/27y782f.jpg

It is difficult to scale its depth from that photo.

If the aircraft started a go-around (ie application of ga thrust and gear up) but for some reason rapidly headed down, then it may well have hit hard and more nose down than initially imagined (as per the eye witness).

A nose down attitude would explain the lack of frontal remains - most identifiable bits seem to be from wing root backwards.

A hard vertical g on impact could cause the wing roots to snap (allowing the wing assemblies to travel further before stopping). The tail assembly would be hard to guess, but it clearly has done some acrobatics - given the broken fin tip and the final orientation - but the fact that it's intact adds weight to a nose down impact.

[justawanab]

For what it's worth, my theory (everyone else is assuming so I may as well) ...

Using Schubinho's calculations as a guide it hit the ground flat but slightly tail first, enough to loosen the tail but not to actually separate it, slid for a bit until the tail cone and subsequently the whole tail section came off (from here on there's lots of debris from stuff falling out the rear and from the fuselage breaking apart). The tail tumbles at least once, hence the damage on it, until it stops. The wings and centre section being the strongest part of the aircraft and still possible powered by at least one engine remain virtually intact until they hit the fence. In effect the rest of the fuselage has broken up around the wings and and wing box.

The only thing that argues against this in Schubinho's picture is that, if the track is of the belly of the aircraft there should be tracks from the engines sliding along the ground

(Looks like Takata beat me to it!)

[takata]

The only thing that argues against this in Schubinho's picture is that, if the track is of the belly of the aircraft there should be tracks from the engines sliding along the ground
Right. That's why I think a good angle was kept and engines hit the dirt much later after initial impact. One is lying about 200 m East of the mosque. It doesn't fit with nose down attitude at impact.

[Neptunus Rex]

In a conventional low-wing monoplane, the centre of pressure (lift) is aft of the centre of gravity. The aircraft is kept in balance by a downward force on the tailplane. If the tailplane fails, the result is an instantaneous and massive nose-down pitch, which could result in further structural failure.

[BOAC]

Which would lead toward the VOR rather than the FAT. - I have absolutely NO idea what 'selected/selected' is but the FAT (092) is always towards the VOR:confused:

[HundredPercentPlease]

Sorry - my mistake. Of course it is.

As the VOR procedure is 4�° offset from the runway, most of the approach should be with the a/c to the North of the c/l. My point I tried to make (badly) was that rather than the aircraft fly a perfect managed path, the pilot may have done something else with his track knob that took him ultimately towards the VOR (past the point where he should turn left and align with the runway). The FMC wouldn't do that.

Selected/selected is just an Airbus term, meaning lateral and vertical modes are controlled by the track knob and the FPA (flight path angle) knob. The alternative is managed for either plane (which is like LNAV/VNAV for Boeing pilots).

[takata]

In a conventional low-wing monoplane, the centre of pressure (lift) is aft of the centre of gravity. The aircraft is kept in balance by a downward force on the tailplane. If the tailplane fails, the result is an instantaneous and massive nose-down pitch, which could result in further structural failure.
This observation fit very well with what could happen once the tail is separated. Until then, first impact was not too hard and structure's bits going loose would be only from the rear under belly but once the Mosque road would be crossed, with bump, and the tail separated, here came the major catastrophic part for the fuselage. Nose and wings would still have some height and everything would be projected down at high speed (even remaining thrust could contribute further). A major impact would follow, tearing everything appart from this point.

This explain why the cabin was so fragmented and nearly no big part of the fuselage survived (cockpit was nearly flatened). Also the state of the engine, fragments of the landing gear around this place and further (it was possibly still down but never touched ground). The surviving boy could have been ejected when the tail fall appart. He certainly was seated on the rear rows.
S~
Olivier

[Old_Fokker]

UNCTUOUS

http://www.pprune.org/5694361-post365.html

I'd appreciate it you would not copy-and-paste my previous post (#360) and use it as your own, complete with my observations. You do know how to quote text so please, whenever you agree with what someone else has written and/or linked to, quote them properly and then add whatever you want outside the quote-box! :=

PJ2

Thanks for the composite. I wanted to do something similar when I found the video last night but time (I needed to go to bed) did not allow me to :-(

Schubinho

I do not believe the markings are caused by the (main) landing gear. It more looks like the belly of the plane (your possibility #1) which simply slided some 200 meters until it encountered the road running north-west near the mosque and which appears to be slightly higher. If the main gear would have been down at initial impact, they would have been ripped off almost instantly or, posibly when they hit the aforementioned road, and thus be located within the vicinity of the tail-section.

Unfortunately, we do not know (at least not from the aerial shot I linked to as video stops there) if there is any more debris after what appears to be the wingbox (and which would be closer to the runway).

--


As others have already questioned, would a scenario where the pilots initiated a go around applying TOGA (and gear up) perhaps explain the lack of gear-tracks on the ground and the fact that the wings (though still unconfirmed these are actually the wings) appear some 730 meters from initial impact area? Would engines still running at TOGA (or a similarly high setting) be able to move this alleged wingbox section alone after the rest of the aircraft broke up?

[BOAC]

Ah well, although we are probably only hours away from FDR results of procedure flown, pitch, roll, yaw,.RPM, RadAlt, CVR transcript etc, I might as well join the speculation.

Are we certain there are no gear marks before the start of the pictures? Why would the gear be up? I would deduce that the 'furrows' seen at the start are dug by engine exhaust. Once the tail separated (presumably survivor seated here and ejected?) the pitch of full power would rapidly raise the nose, followed by a rapid nose down following a stall and an extremely hard final impact collapsing the forward section. How's that? Fits with the Alitalia visual too.

[Niner_Mike]

288' height from missed approach point to threshold is not a lot to decide and alter course when on a 4° offset course, or perform a safe go-around. At that missed approach point you are 80 m to the right of the extended centerline and 4° of course. The Jeppchart does not make immediately clear that you are on an offset course. It draws the visual approach course along the centerline.

For sure this approach design is to be legal (I am no specialist), but you can wonder how safe it is. 288' height is not a lot on an offset non-precision approach.

[411A]

What's even more important, why was the aircraft off course, to the right?
Runway 09 at TIP is served by a very accurate NDB approach...two beacons as I recall.
A simple exercise...provided of course, the pilots were at a reasonable proficient level.
Could it be that pilots that are 'slaves to the magenta line' are so out of touch with everyday flying reality, that they lose track of just where they (and their aircraft) are?:}:rolleyes:

[Niner_Mike]

I estimate he was 2° off course to the right, provided he was following the 92° M course towards TPI on the VOR DME Rwy 09 approach.

Being 2° off course (which is not a lot on a VOR track so close to the VOR itself) can be explained by VOR deviation either at the VOR itself or in the aircraft, dialed in the wrong course, being off course due to wind, less precise flying, or flying 'visually' towards an imagined runway in less then optimal visibility.

Niner Mike.

[PJ2]

BOAC;

By the evidence of its destruction, the gear was likely down; the main gear oleos are fragmented, tires are broken off and have lost their pressure.

(For others, if the aircraft was indeed on the approach to 09, the gear would have been down at this point, (normally extended between 1500' and 2500' or about 5 to 8km from the runway to stay within stabilized approach criteria).

I think once touchdown/impact had occurred as evidenced in the sand, engine power and/or control position and forces would have been largely ineffective. The engines would have swallowed a lot of sand and other debris; - the structure would be responding to variations in the terrain and the obstacles such as trees. Where the structure was in contact with the terrain, the drag offered by such contact would far outweigh any ability of the control surfaces to overcome. Once ground contact was made, the engines would have been inoperative.

As seen in an early video before they were moved to the highway, (where they are seen in the composite), the wing on the left in that early video is almost certainly upside down as evidenced by the spoiler panels seen on the bottom of the structure. I can't tell with the other wing but to me it looks correctly oriented, (top of the wing, up).

FWIW, I don't think the slightly-south track of the approach, being interpreted here as "off-course", has much to do with this accident.

RetiredF4, thanks again for the link to this video.

411A;
What's even more important, why was the aircraft off course, to the right?
Runway 09 at TIP is served by a very accurate NDB approach...two beacons as I recall.
A simple exercise...provided of course, the pilots were at a reasonable proficient level.
The Jepps show the two NDBs; the approach would have been straightforward, I agree.

That said, it all depends upon how the approach was being conducted and what was both available to the crew and what was used. I get the sense that this was an experienced, veteran crew although we do not yet know what experience they had on the A330, (the airplane was new but perhaps they had a background...we don't know).

The range of choices for the approach is a full, looking-outside visual to a fully-managed non-precision approach using the FMGEC and autoflight system.

The former (a visual) can be done close in as you know, even with a large aircraft and the requisite 'hands'; the latter, computer-based, autoflight-conducted approach requires more airspace (distance) to stabilize and do its LNAV/VNAV work properly.

An "early" descent (below FAF altitude before the FAF) cannot be ruled out either on a visual or using "Selected-selected", (which just means using heading/VS or track/FPA on the autopilot), especially if visibility was locally reduced. An early descent likely wouldn't occur using fully managed as both track and crossing altitudes are flown by the autoflight system. Requirements or restrictions on its use, and training and experience will be the focus here.

PJ2

[BOAC]

I think once touchdown/impact had occurred as evidenced in the sand, - but where are the gear touchdown marks? I still reckon it was a 'narrow squeak' with gear down, TOGA and tail well down near the ground, possibly impacted. Then you have no gear marks, just a swathe of 'dragged' sand and two furrows - the motors may well have been in clear air?

As 411 says, in particular there is a 'threshold' NDB (assuming it was working) and that would have been pointing well off to the left. All very strange. Certainly in 2km into a dawn rising sun on an offset approach the threshold NDB would feature high in my scan.

Anyway as I said, we will know soon enough.

[Right Way Up]

If the aircraft hit tail first with gear up it might suggest an event similar to the Melbourne one where TOGA was not quite selected and the aircraft kept descending. Selected FPA -3.0 degrees with possibly MCT and gear retracting. Visual clues more difficult to pick up omission because of the sun/viz.

[PJ2]

BOAC;
but where are the gear touchdown marks?
Yes...

I don't know; the tracks in the video are not clear enough to determine; Schubinho's post #383 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-20.html#post5694791) shows a comparison between the length of the nearby vehicle and the two furrows. With flattening of perspective, they could either be tracks from the engines or the gear or even just mounds of 'disturbed sand' from a last-second application of TOGA thrust as some have suggested, until the aircraft's tail struck the slightly-rising ground. The MK B747 accident at Halifax exhibited this pattern - loss of the tail structure by striking a burm followed by severe nose-down contact, etc.

Yes, the recorders will tell us soon enough. PJ

[Bill G Kerr]

I drive east to work, and return home to the west.
Living in the west of Scotland, this is most days quite comfortable.
But when the sun shines, I'm going in the wrong direction both morning and
evening - very difficult to see what you are about to hit.
Would pilots ever consider landing 'out of the sun'?

[STC-8]

Pilot error - Dutch news report


'Piloot veroorzaakte crash' - Buitenland - Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] (http://www.telegraaf.nl/buitenland/6717319/___Piloot_veroorzaakte_crash___.html)

(translation babelfish)

Sat May 15

' Pilot caused crash' by Ronald Veerman AMSTERDAM - from several analyses by pilots and air-traffic controllers (pprune?) it seems more and more that the crash in Tripoli have been caused by the pilot, who incorrectly assessed his position to the runway. When he wanted to correct this at the last moment touched a wing the ground and made the plane somersault whereupon it disintegrated. That can be made up from new declarations from Libya. Although experts continue emphasise that it can last still long for the fact of the matter clear is and also an attack cannot be still excluded, the possibility of a technical defect becomes already smaller. That also becomes clear from the declaration of the Libyan research commission. " The pilot has communicated absolutely no problem. Up to at the last moment the things were normal between the pilot and the tower" , according to investigation head Dhaou. According to Rob Hoogvliet, flight instructor and 747-pilot,the landing shortly before sunrise may have contributed to the crash. Although the visibility was well, it was landed after a long night flight. " due to the rising sun and haze the position can be incorrectly judged and the speed of the aircraft being too high as a result" , according Hoogvliet

+++++++

za 15 mei 2010, 05:30 [B] 'Piloot veroorzaakte crash'

door Ronald Veerman
AMSTERDAM - Uit diverse analyses van piloten en luchtverkeersleiders lijkt het er steeds meer op dat de crash in Tripoli is veroorzaakt door de piloot, die de positie tot de landingsbaan verkeerd inschatte.
Toen hij dit op het laatste moment wilde corrigeren raakte een vleugel de grond en maakte het vliegtuig een koprol waarna het uiteenspatte. Dat kan worden opgemaakt uit nieuwe verklaringen uit Libië. Hoewel experts blijven benadrukken dat het nog lang kan duren voor de ware toedracht duidelijk is en ook een aanslag nog altijd niet mag worden uitgesloten, wordt de mogelijkheid van een technisch mankement al kleiner. Dat blijkt ook uit de verklaring van de Libische onderzoekscommissie. "De piloot heeft geen enkel probleem gemeld. Tot op het laatste moment waren de dingen normaal tussen de piloot en de verkeerstoren", aldus hoofdonderzoeker Dhaou.
Volgens Rob Hoogvliet, vlieginstructeur en 747-piloot, heeft de landing kort voor zonsopgang mogelijk bijgedragen aan de crash. Hoewel het zicht goed was, werd geland na een zware nachtvlucht. "Door de opkomende zon en heiigheid kan de positie verkeerd ingeschat zijn en de snelheid van het toestel nog te hoog zijn geweest", aldus Hoogvliet

[gravity enemy]

Would pilots ever consider landing 'out of the sun'?

Somebody, with experience of flying in Tripoli had mentioned far earlier here that ATC prefers Runway 09 in the mornings simply because they don't like looking into the sun. In fact with the current slight Westerly winds at the time of the accident, Runway 27 should have been used.

Here are my two cents of the event (not the cause!)

Aircraft is configured for landing hence no GPWS warnings.
Crew lose situational awareness, at least temporarily.
No attempt is made to go around until:
The wheels touch the ground perhaps at a slight nose up attitude as would be expected during that phase of flight (I don't think any other section of the aircraft touched down at that stage. The parallel marks on the ground as depicted earlier against the length of the car seem pretty much like tire marks to me, while the portion in between is level and with no debris, which leads me to believe no fuselage contact was made. Also damage to the tires and landing gear seem to support a wheels first touch down)
At the point of touchdown, the crew reacts with Go-Around power.
The aircraft seems unable to climb as the gear starts running into little trees and bushes.
The nose is raised significantly and the aircraft perhaps lifts off the ground entirely but stalls in a high nose up attitude and is brought back down, this time the tail hitting first and separating, as well as perhaps doing a few cartwheels.
Without the tail the rest of the aircraft rapidly pitches down and impacts with a lot of energy.
The engines, as they are designed separate quickly and end up as they are, a few hundred meters East of the tail. So does the undercarriage.
The wings somehow travel the furthest distance and end up at the far eastern side of the crash site.

Just my theory, I am glad I wasn't there. RIP

[SortieIII]

the pitch of full power would rapidly raise the nose,

If I understand the Airbus FBW system, when 'hand flying' the aircraft, selection of TOGA will simply cause the aircraft to accelerate at the current pitch attitude. Current pitch will be maintained by FBW, and there will be NO pitch up. Only intervention on the side-stick will cause the pitch attitude to change. If the autoflight system is engaged, selection of TOGA causes an automatic pitch-up.

Is this correct?

[Juliet-Echo]

No, selection of TOGA will cause the flight directors to become active (even if flying raw data), and will command SRS (speed reference system), which is essentally go-around-attitude. Of course you will not get the force feed back on the side stick due to FBW and auto trim, but if you fly Airbus, this should be fairly instinctive.

Who knows - looks like CFIT, no matter whether still on finals or attempting a go around.

[SortieIII]

OK thanks for that Juliet Echo. If you did not follow the F/D commands, (flying manually), what would the result be?

I am trying to relate this to the aircraft that I fly. Not FBW, but selection of TOGA causes a pitch-up due to underwing mounted engines when hand flying the aircraft.

[STC-8]

Latest from Dutch news. STC-8 translation.



Sat May 15 17:58

'Aircraft not on fire before crash'

The plane that crashed Wednesday at the airport in Tripoli was not on fire prior to colliding with the ground. This was stated by Neji Dhaou, the the head of the Libyan commission investigating the accident.

According to Dhaou, this was the conclusion from examination of the wreckage and other evidence. Fire broke out 400 meters from the point of impact.

The investigation head also stated that the two 'black boxes' from the aircraft will be sent to France, Great Britain or the USA for examination.

His team has begun interviews with witnesses and is awaiting a statement from a pilot from Alitalia who was awaiting departure at the time of the crash.




++++++++++++++++++


'Vliegtuig niet in brand voor crash' | nu.nl/vliegramp tripoli | Het laatste nieuws het eerst op nu.nl (http://www.nu.nl/vliegramp-tripoli/2247908/vliegtuig-niet-in-brand-crash.html)

'Vliegtuig niet in brand voor crash' http://www.nu.nl/images/video_small.gif

Uitgegeven: 15 mei 2010 15:53 Laatst gewijzigd: 15 mei 2010 17:58
TRIPOLI - Het vliegtuig dat woensdag verongelukte op de luchthaven van Tripoli stond niet in brand voordat het de grond raakte. Dit heeft het hoofd van de Libische commissie die onderzoek doet naar de crash, Neji Dhaou, zaterdag gezegd.

Volgens Dhaou blijkt uit bestudering van de wrakstukken en ander bewijsmateriaal niet dat toestel voor de landing in brand stond. Het vuur brak pas 400 meter van de plaats van het ongeluk uit.

De onderzoeksleider zei verder dat de twee zwarte dozen van het toestel naar Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië of de Verenigde Staten worden gestuurd voor bestudering.

Zijn team begint ook met het horen van getuigen en is in afwachting van een verslag van een piloot van Alitalia die op het punt stond met zijn vliegtuig te vertrekken op het moment van de crash.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Sortie 3, you are correct. When hand flown if you apply TOGA then the aircraft just keeps going in the same direction. There is (almost) no pitch/power couple.

However, BOAC said:

Once the tail separated (presumably survivor seated here and ejected?) the pitch of full power would rapidly raise the nose,

J-E is correct - when the levers are moved all the way forward then the flight directors go up (in SRS mode) IF you have some flap out (worth remembering if you try to do a coupled go-around when clean).

[Juliet-Echo]

Well, those engines still give you around 70000lbs of thrust (each engine) with TOGA so naturally there will be definite nose-up pitch, but as I mentioned you will not have any "out of trim" state physically pushing back on your hands. I find it hard to believe that anyone could apply TOGA and maintain a constant negative pitch attitude. Easier to do on the Airbus, but would still require some kind of mental and physical force.

[SortieIII]

Thanks 100%.

[Juliet Sierra Papa]

Juliet-Echo

Well, those engines still give you around 70000lbs of thrust (each engine) with TOGA so naturally there will be definite nose-up pitch

How much sand, and other debris would be consumed by these engine in TOGA mode with the belly of the aircraft on or that close to the ground. I would have assumed either a single or possibly twin catastrophic failure.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Well, those engines still give you around 70000lbs of thrust (each engine) with TOGA so naturally there will be definite nose-up pitch, but as I mentioned you will not have any "out of trim" state physically pushing back on your hands.

No, J-E. In an Airbus if you go from idle to TOGA the aircraft continues on the same path. If it's 3 degrees down before, it is 3 degrees down afterwards. To go upwards, you must pull the sidestick back (with just one hand!)

[RetiredF4]

Is there any information concerning the kind of ground at the point of first ground-contact?

I think it´s very important wether its deep sand or just rock covered with an inch of sand. In the latter case there would be no tiremarks recognizable from distance, however the belly could get enough sand out of the way and to the side, thus looking like we see it now.

In my humble oppinion the whole area looks like solid rock, covered with smaller rock and a bit of sand, also further down in the crash-zone there are not enough recognizable marks on the ground.

What is the reason for assuming the gear to be down by analyyzing the damage to the wheels? There is nothing of the aircraft left undamaged, so i assume that the gear would not look better when it had been retracted before.

During a goaround situation, at what time is the gear retraction initiated and how long will it travel?

Is it known, what type of aircraft the captain flew before his time on the bus? If he flew a mainly manhandeld aircraft before, would it be understandable that he would continue to land the bus in manual mode (forgive me if i dont use the correct phrase here) thus doing an manual flown visual approach?
Reason for that asumption, the weather-report was not that bad, he was familiar with the field, he for sure knew the problems with the VOR, and he would naturally rely less on ATC knowing their deficiencies. So do the old thing, fly in visual and look for the field, it may even be quicker, not bad after a long flight.
When recognizing the degrading visibility he was not setup for an quick jump to an Instrument-Approach to the same runway, therefore deciding early for a goaround with intention to circle to the other runway? And then the goaround went wrong. Not prepared for it, no navaids set, therfore a visual goaround...

How is the acceleration in an A330 with nearly all fuel gone and only a limited pax load? At what speed would it be flown? How often would the crew have done a goaround before (except in the sim, i dont value that for real life expirience )? Let me edit my last sentence in brackets here: It is not my intention to disqualify simulator flying at all. But assuming a situation with spatial disorientation during TOGA could have happened like in the Gulf-Air Accident, a training situation like that will probably not happen in the simulator, or are they meanwhile as good as real live concerning movemeent and enviromental reality?

Dont kill me for asking to many questions, just trying to get some thinking going.

I cant believe that a qualified crew is that much of course and that much too low on an automated approach in basically fairly well weather at their homebase. There must be reasons, and the mentioned points concerning quality of local airmanship are thin ice.
franzl

[Tiennetti]

The tyre seems to be very "clean" with almost no dust on them
Do you believe that is any clue of the landing gear to be retracted or at least that had no contact with that dusty ground?

[tubby linton]

A lightweight 330 getting can exceed 8000ft/min climb!

[johdi]

See clip from May, 14 at AD.nl:

AD Vliegramp Tripoli - 'Piloot meldde geen technische problemen' (483435) (http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/2461/Vliegramp-Tripoli/article/detail/483435/2010/05/14/Piloot-meldde-geen-technische-problemen.dhtml)

In the last seconds you can see the lifting of parts of the wing.

[C-SAR]

As I have been saying to Takata, this afternoon I managed to go to the site.
Took some pictures, not as many as I wanted because of security. Could not go past the first impact point, but my interest was in the 400 or so meters before. I entered the area on foot 550 meters from the mosque (my zero reference point) and walked towards the tail.
Until the first impact point some 270 meters from the mosque there are no marks whatsoever. Lots of rubbish and car prints etc. but nothing related. There are 4 electricity poles, the wooden type, that have been downed before impact. The Impact point is the almost perfect print of the end of the tail cone. From there onwards the debris starts. Lots of honeycomb pieces etc. I say again, I could not go past this point. On the composite photo made from the overfly Dutch film, the white mark is just lime powder or something like that mixed with sand. The Sand is very soft, desert like. I took pictures of the surrounding trees on the road edge which are not cut. Also some low cactus at the impact point are cut straight and level (most probably by the horizontal stabilizer. I will make a scale map with the photos at the appropriate points. I will also try to calculate the distance from the first pole standing to the impact point, so that some techies can calculate the glide angle. The two parallel marks that can be seen on the video were past my no go point, so I have nothing to say on those.

[SLFinAZ]

I keep coming back to the indications that the choice of runway was for the convenience of ATC so they wouldn't be looking into the sun???

If in fact that is the case and is proven to be a direct contributing factor in this then I hope a few folks are stood up against a wall. Why would a PIC accept that vs "requesting" the appropriate runway, what is the culture in Libya in that regard?

[C-SAR]

For those looking at the Google map, the terrain is a little different. The big rectangular green area to the west of the mosque perpendicular to the road is in fact all sand. The building to the west of the mosque is all flattened down minus a small shack

[Jim Croche]

hundredpercentplease

Almost correct. In fact it's the Flap LEVER position that triggers the G/A mode - regardless of whether you actually have flaps out or not. This is to ensure G/A Mode is available in the event of a G/A from a Flapless landing.

If the pilot doesn't go into TOGA thrust he doesn't get any G/A command, the Autoflight system remains in the appproach mode and if you raise the gear on a G/A in this situation you'll get a "Too Low Gear" warning from the GPWS as it still thinks you want to land. (Oh, in addition you'll lose the whole flight plan from the FMGS but all Airbus pilots know that - or do they?) See Australian report of a Jetstar close shave in MEL or PTH a few years ago when TOGA wasn't selected at minimums.

PJ2

Excellent analysis as usual - thanks.

However, you do need to make a positive rotation into the G/A attitude even though there is a pitch up couple with TOGA thrust.

[HundredPercentPlease]

hundredpercentplease

Almost correct. In fact it's the Flap LEVER position that triggers the G/A mode - regardless of whether you actually have flaps out or not. This is to ensure G/A Mode is available in the event of a G/A from a Flapless landing.

Jim,

Almost correct. I was explaining to someone who had no idea about the Airbus, so kept it loose and understandable. I am well aware of the conditions required to engage SRS in a go around, including the conditions you omitted. :rolleyes:

[STC-8]

For obvious reasons the accident currently has a high profile in the Dutch news media, talk of the day & politics.

On the Dutch national 10-o' clock news tonight - NOS Journal,

Their correspondent on location in Tripoli reported that after the initial media free for all, Libyan officials have clamped down on the foreign press in recent days who are now very restricted in their ability to interview locals (eg: no longer allowed apparently) & freely collect information. The only officially permitted press action today (Saturday) was the awful media scrum surrounding the medivac flight of the sole survivor being repatriated to Holland.

According to the NOS correspondent Menno Reemeijer (the Dutch 'Anderson Cooper'), there is now a team of 25 Dutch forensic specialists in Tripoli to assist in victim identification. Additionally he reported that the foreign members of the crash investigation team allegedly spent the day having some sort of 'internal discussion'.

Menno Reemeijer t w i t t e r feed: menno reemeijer (mennoreemeijer) on Twitter (http://twitter.com/mennoreemeijer)

NOS report from Tripoli Sat May 15
NOS Nieuws - Verslaggever Menno Reemeijer vanaf vliegveld Tripoli (17.11 u) (http://nos.nl/audio/157169-verslaggever-menno-reemeijer-vanaf-vliegveld-tripoli-1711-u.html.html)

[silverstrata]

Runway 09 at TIP is served by a very accurate NDB approach...two beacons as I recall.



Now there is an oxymoron, if I ever heard one !! :ok:


Anyway, surely one would be concentrating more on the GPS computed ND track, rather than relying on a twitching NDB. Gave up flying DC3s ages ago.


.

[Nick Thomas]

Am not a pilot but am an architect and the site of the mosque gives some indication of the type of ground in that area. It's unlikely that you would build anything on deep or shiffting sand. It's very costly to pile so it would not suprise me to find out that the sand in that area has a max depth of about one metre and could be a lot less. Underneath that there could be rock, clay etc. I would think that the water table will be way below the harder sub layer so even if this layer is clay it would have a good load bearing capacity.
Of course the level of sand to the level of the sub layer will vary over the whole of the crash site and may even get near the surface at some points.
All the above comments are just based on the photographs.
Nick

[filejw]

Silver..a properly executed non precision approach should not be an issue for professional pilot period...i will not get into all the what if but. If you have a glass cockpit it makes it like shooting ducks in a barrel. I have my own speculation and will wait till at least the preliminary report comes out. This blaming the ATC guy and airport is a bit much..there is only one captain in the cockpit...

[411A]

Anyway, surely one would be concentrating more on the GPS computed ND track, rather than relying on a twitching NDB.

Sadly, that is what the pilots of the American Airlines B757 at Cali Colombia did in 1995...and they (and their passengers) ended up quite dead.
Throw in a little map shift, or an incorrect waypoint, and it all goes in the poo.

By the way, I have operated to TIP since 1971, so know the area, and the airport, quite well.
The NDB's are very accurate...the TIP VOR, much less so.

[Juliet-Echo]

PJ2

Just to clarify - it is the thrust levers in TOGA which activate the go-around phase, however you have to have at least Flaps1 selected. If the flap handle is at zero, you will merely get GA thrust but no SRS or flight plan resequence.

Cheers

[PJ2]

The NDB's are very accurate...the TIP VOR, much less so.
Yes, understand. The key here is however, although these navaids are required to execute the published approach, neither the NDB's nor the VOR are required by the A330 for an accurate non-precision with a set 3deg electronic glideslope.

A non-precision approach, as has been suggested numerous times, is as easy as flying an ILS providing the system is GPS-updated and the nav accuracy is RNP 0.3 or better on the PROG page. Given the age of the aircraft these two requirements would not be an issue.

For these kinds of systems, an NDB/VOR/DME or LOC-only approach is no longer a dive-and-drive cloud-breaking procedure but a reliable electronic approach which should be as stable as an ILS. Except in name and legal requirments to use the appropriate approach plate, with the required RNP it is essentially an RNAV/GPS approach.

With minor variations (timing/groundspeeds/winds, knowledge/training of optical and somatogravic illusions, use of the map, adherence to minima), the visual approach however, hasn't changed since the beginning of aviation.

[I-van]

Tripoli tragedy highlights Africa's unenviable air safety record | World news | The Observer (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/16/africa-plane-crash-record)

[gwillie]

Source: Autopilot off before Libya crash | NEWS.GNOM.ES (http://news.gnom.es/news/source-autopilot-off-before-libya-crash)

[Jetjock330]

From CNN (http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/05/15/libyan.crash.survivor/index.html?hpt=T2).

CNN) -- Low visibility caused by mist and sand created poor flying conditions for the pilot of an Afriqiyah Airways flight that crashed just before landing in Tripoli, Libyan sources with knowledge of the investigation said Saturday. The plane, an Airbus A330-200, originated in Johannesburg, South Africa, and was at the end of its nearly nine-hour flight when it crashed Wednesday. All but one of the 104 passengers on board were killed.
The sources said that as the pilot approached Tripoli International Airport, he took the plane off auto-pilot hoping to manually land the aircraft. He realized he was in trouble and tried to pull the plane up and turn the auto-pilot back on to give it another try, the sources said.
But the effort was too late and the plane slammed violently into the ground, explaining the condition of the wreckage and damage to the plane's tail at the crash site, the sources said.
An investigation into the crash is under way, and authorities are reviewing the aircraft's flight data recorder.
Meanwhile Ruben van Assouw, the 9-year-old sole survivor of the plane crash, has returned home to the Netherlands.
He suffered multiple fractures to his legs and underwent surgery at Al Khadra Hospital, said a doctor at the hospital who declined to give her name.
Both of Ruben's parents and a brother were killed in the crash, a Dutch foreign ministry representative said.
Ruben's family issued a statement Friday expressing gratitude to people who have helped them, such as Libyan hospital professionals and Dutch envoys, as well as the outpourings of sympathy from citizens in both countries.
The family also thanked "the vast majority of the Dutch media for respecting our privacy."
The family, which will raise Ruben, said the boy knows that his parents and brother were killed.
"Considering the circumstances, Ruben is doing fine. He is sleeping a lot; now and then he wakes up and is then lucid," the family said in the statement. "He has drunk a little, and has seen the flowers and cuddly toys."
Ruben's family said it has to deal with "two kinds of grief" -- the sorrow the boy is enduring and the sadness over the loss of the other family members.
"The coming period will be very difficult for us," the family said. "We hope that all the media will respect our privacy."
More than two-thirds of the passengers killed in the plane crash were Dutch, the ministry said.
Passengers from Libya, South Africa, Belgium, Austria, Germany, France, Zimbabwe and Britain were also among the victims, the airline said on its Web site. The Dutch foreign ministry said Friday it is sending more experts to Tripoli to help Libyan authorities and Dutch colleagues identify the victims.

[Flymecpt]

Can anyone identify exactly what kind of damage this aircraft suffered earlier in the month that resulted in it being out of action for days and stuck in the SAA Technical Hanger in Joburg?

[411A]

The key here is however, although these navaids are required to execute the published approach, neither the NDB's nor the VOR are required by the A330 for an accurate non-precision with a set 3deg electronic glideslope.

Fully understand, PJ2, in fact we as well have used RNP 0.3 GPS units for this type of approach, with L1011 aircraft, since 1998.
Honeywell HT9100 units are indeed very accurate, as I expect the equipment is in the A330.
I fly to TIP on a regular basis, and find that the NDB approach to 09 equally as accurate...it really is dead simple, provided of course that the pilots are properly trained.
The 'dirty dive' toward the runway however, is to be avoided at all costs, with a heavy jet....and yes, I've flown these in command for well over thirty years.
Did this happen here?
I expect we will know in short order.

[C-SAR]

In one of the pictures from the Dutch media the tail cone appears to be wrapped in a wire. That wire looks like the ones I saw yesterday around the power line poles down before the impact point. 4 poles are down from 250 meters from impact.

[PJ2]

Juliet-Echo;
If the flap handle is at zero, you will merely get GA thrust but no SRS or flight plan resequence.
Yes, that's correct.

[Niner_Mike]

Jetjock330 quoted CNN:
The sources said that as the pilot approached Tripoli International Airport, he took the plane off auto-pilot hoping to manually land the aircraft. He realized he was in trouble and tried to pull the plane up and turn the auto-pilot back on to give it another try, the sources said.
But the effort was too late and the plane slammed violently into the ground, explaining the condition of the wreckage and damage to the plane's tail at the crash site, the sources said.I speculate that the city and runway environment might have been visible from very far, making the pilots think they were going to execute a visual approach. I believe that the pilot on a last-minute, manual, raw data, non-precision VOR approach in bad visibility, descended below the legal minimum of 550 foot to 'take a look because it didn't look so bad from above' and was too late with his go-around.

First rule of instrument flying: do not descend below minima how tempting it may be to get home after a long flight. No runway in sight at minimum: go-around - don't wait. I believe he did go below and waited, and we can see the terrible result. Remember: at minima he only had 288 feet height left to execute his go-around. As I argued before: this is not a lot.

Niner Mike.

[C-SAR]

Based on all the contributions so far and on my visit to the site yesterday, my opinion is that the tail cone hit the power line some 250 meters before impact, dragging 4 poles down, possibly with relative high AOA. At impact point a clear impression of the tail cone is the first visible mark. Left and right of this mark there are two lines of cactus perpendicular to the flight path which are cut parallel to the terrain by the horizontal stabilizers. From there on the field of debris begins. The tail section separated and summersaulted, as has been suggested before.

[Clandestino]

Methinks that statement about aeroplane being hand flown during final app did not come out of the thin air but rather that it implies that at least DFDR or QAR have been read out, that we'll know in a couple of weeks what was the speed, attitude, configuration and flight path of the aeroplane, what were the engines doing, what was the status of AP/FD/ATHR, what command inputs were made by whom, etc. I've got a hunch that IAW Sturgeon's law, preliminary report (or even more preliminary leaks) will make large part of this thread obsolete. Not all of it, mind you. Wheat to chaff ratio in this thread is unusually high for PPRuNe.

Those statistics worshipers, lumping the Libya together with the rest of the Africa, could do a lot worse then checking here before posting: ASN's list of aviation safety related occurrences in Libya. (http://aviation-safety.net/database/dblist.php?Country=5A) While we're at ASN, there's also similar list for A330. (http://aviation-safety.net/database/dblist.php?Type=023)

I have used term "statistics worshipers" advisedly; statistic is a wonderful tool, yet as any tool it has its uses and limitations. Those most loudly piping about the significance of statistics are often unaware of either.

[snowfalcon2]

Can somebody verify what happens to the aerodynamics when you lose the horizontal stabilizer in a go-around?

As far as I understand the plane is initially in approach trim with lots of nose-up trim to balance the negative (nose-down) pitching moment added by the flaps and slats. At a normal go-around the engine thrust causes a nose-up pitching moment which is cancelled out by the Airbus's automatic retrim, so the pilots just uses normal stick forces to establish a proper climbing attitude.

The question is when now the tail hits and the stabilizer separates: Will the now tailless wing's negative pitching moment overpower the nose-up pitching moment of the engine thrust? If so, the result would be a quick nosedive into the ground, consistent with the destruction we see. If not, we would get a stall and then a nosedive somewhat later. Which one happened here?

[A4]

If the tail seperates then the pitch down will be almost instantaneous and massively violent. The tail is providing the "downward lift" to pitch the aircraft up. Think of it like a childs see-saw - put 50kgs on one end and then put 150kgs on the other (elevator force during go-around) and it will pitch "up". Now quickly remove the 150Kgs...... the other end will pitch "down" rapidly and hit the ground. This could well explain the eyewitness report from the threshold which said they saw the aircraft hit the ground with a steep nose down attitude perhaps just aftert he tail was lost.

Looks like a case of sneaking below, realising fractionally too late, initiating a go-around, hitting the aft of the aircraft sheering the tail......... rest is inevitable.

A4

[PT6A]

I have not flown into TIP for a week as I am on leave...

However can anyone confirm which navaids were working on the day?

The VOR has been NOTAM'd for a few months now that it should be used with caution due to the building works.... I can say for sure it should not be used as it is going all over the place!

On one of my last flights into TIP before leave we were cleared for a locator app to 09 only to find none of the NDB stations working not a single one... TWR was informed.... roger was the response.

We were able to fly the APP via the FMGS however... If that has not been available or the weather was not good (as it was in our case) I wonder what the result would of been...

If this A330 did some kind of botch APP it went wrong and then looked for raw data help...

If they went to the VOR it could explain why the aircraft was to the right.. as the "needle was swinging slowly from where it should be out right the right" <--- I saw that on all of my flights into TIP over the last few months.

So if they were to follow the VOR raw data they would of ended up somewhere other than the runway.

As for being so low seems like a case of sneaking under.

TIP's winds also often change in the latter stages of approach by 180 degrees.. so tower often gives a runway which is less than optimal.

If anything other than very very very basic English is used they have no clue what you are talking about and a long Standby is issued!

Just to underline the point once again... many times NAVAIDs are not working at TIP - they are reported as not working by aircrew... but no notam is ever issued or a mention on the ATIS.

PT6A

[DutchSpotter]

In this article in Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad it says the plane hit the roof of a house. Seven people in the house where unhurt, another miracle. It also says powerlines where struck by the plane

translated article
Google Bericht (http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=nl&ie=UTF-8&sl=nl&tl=en&u=http://www.nrc.nl/binnenland/article2544745.ece/Nog_zeven_wonderen_in_Tripoli&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.nl&twu=1&usg=ALkJrhgCeY4MAVJOMz32BycFSCSDUswWvw)

original article

nrc.nl - Binnenland - Nóg zeven wonderen in Tripoli (http://www.nrc.nl/binnenland/article2544745.ece/Nog_zeven_wonderen_in_Tripoli)

[condorbaaz]

just a 332 driver.

This must be one of the few places a NPA is carried out.

Mostly on ILS, I have heard Pilots brief " Go Around will be with AP ON"

Very nice for ILS but not suited for NPA.

If I recall correctly, AP disconnects at MDA +_ some ht, maybe 50 feet.

Ergo, If on approach, if TOGA is delayed by 2-5 seconds at MDA,
say "MDA- Field not in Sight" Go Around Flaps"

You have TOGA and no AP and a downward vector

[A4]

PT6A, if what you say is true then Libya should be banned from ICAO until they get their act together. Knowing that Navaids are unservicable/unreliable and just issuing a "cautionary" NOTAM is totally unacceptable. As for the airport clearing you for the NDB when they are both off is ..... well words fail me.

I think the Aviaition authorities in Libya and the airport management are due a huge proportion of the blame (yes I used the B word) for this accident.

You said you flew and approach to 09 using the FMGS. Is this a GNSS approach or an RNAV overlay? If it's the latter how can you monitor raw data whilst the box works it's magic?

An issue that I find disturbing has been mentioned a few times. Talk of manual go-arounds being challenging - i.e. "you must pitch up", " "the sidestick must be pulled with one hand" :rolleyes: Come on!

If anyone sitting in either seat of any airliner is not capable of pushing the thrust levers forward and pulling back on a sidestick or control column then I respectfully suggest that they seek another career for the safety of the travelling public. IT'S NOT ROCKET SCIENCE!! It's a basic manouver for heavens sake. Brief it. Agree the MA Altitude. Confirm the PF & PNF actions prior to the approach - it should be second nature - you're very close to the ground no time for prevarication or error.

Additionally at Minimums there is NO DELAY in initiating the go-around. PF should be looking out prior to the Minimums call. At minimums the call is (typically) "Go-around Flaps" or "Continue/Landing" - it is NOT ".........hmm, nope, nothing seen, go-around flaps".

For your LPC the LATEST that a missed approach can be initiated is MDA/DA/DH. If you have not pushed the levers by then it's a FAIL. It's MINIMUMS for a reason! On an NPA this is even more critical due to the potential for lateral/vertical displacement which the ILS avoids.

This is potentially two CFIT accidents on NPA's in poor WX in the last two months with the similar results........... why? We know rules - just apply them.

A4

[henra]

The question is when now the tail hits and the stabilizer separates: Will the now tailless wing's negative pitching moment overpower the nose-up pitching moment of the engine thrust? If so, the result would be a quick nosedive into the ground, consistent with the destruction we see. If not, we would get a stall and then a nosedive somewhat later. Which one happened here?


In a normal flight attitude as A4 pointed out the Nose-Down would be massive and immediate.
In a very Nose- Up attitude, the Nose- Down pitching could be somewhat delayed and reduced at the beginning (due to shift of Center of Thrust + momentum vs. Center of Drag/Lift), then increasing while the Nose is lowering

[A4]

I agree henra...... however I suspect that this aircraft would not have reached a high nose attitude due to the tailstrike. Of course they could have been incredibly unlucky and hit the tail just as pitch hit GA attitude - about 18 degrees (?). Of course if you go-around AT MINIMA you won't hit the tail - not be pompous or smug just factual.

A4

[C-SAR]

A4

Would the wire rapped around the end cone corroborate the kind of AOA you are suggesting?

[takata]

Hello there,

Nobody commented C-SAR's last days postings.
This forum is having someone on the site (in Tripoli), and C-SAR could visit the impact zone and look around much better than any press reports, films and picture did so far.

Here is again what he found which is enlightning:

As I have been saying to Takata, this afternoon I managed to go to the site.

Took some pictures, not as many as I wanted because of security. Could not go past the first impact point, but my interest was in the 400 or so meters before. I entered the area on foot 550 meters from the mosque (my zero reference point) and walked towards the tail.

Until the first impact point some 270 meters from the mosque there are no marks whatsoever. Lots of rubbish and car prints etc. but nothing related. There are 4 electricity poles, the wooden type, that have been downed before impact. The Impact point is the almost perfect print of the end of the tail cone. From there onwards the debris starts. Lots of honeycomb pieces etc. I say again, I could not go past this point. On the composite photo made from the overfly Dutch film, the white mark is just lime powder or something like that mixed with sand. The Sand is very soft, desert like. I took pictures of the surrounding trees on the road edge which are not cut. Also some low cactus at the impact point are cut straight and level (most probably by the horizontal stabilizer. I will make a scale map with the photos at the appropriate points. I will also try to calculate the distance from the first pole standing to the impact point, so that some techies can calculate the glide angle. The two parallel marks that can be seen on the video were past my no go point, so I have nothing to say on those.

For those looking at the Google map, the terrain is a little different. The big rectangular green area to the west of the mosque perpendicular to the road is in fact all sand. The building to the west of the mosque is all flattened down minus a small shack


In one of the pictures from the Dutch media the tail cone appears to be wrapped in a wire. That wire looks like the ones I saw yesterday around the power line poles down before the impact point. 4 poles are down from 250 meters from impact.


Based on all the contributions so far and on my visit to the site yesterday, my opinion is that the tail cone hit the power line some 250 meters before impact, dragging 4 poles down, possibly with relative high AOA. At impact point a clear impression of the tail cone is the first visible mark. Left and right of this mark there are two lines of cactus perpendicular to the flight path which are cut parallel to the terrain by the horizontal stabilizers. From there on the field of debris begins. The tail section separated and summersaulted, as has been suggested before.

Thank you very much Giorgio, those are very good infos not seen in the press so far. I'm waiting to see your schematics and pictures.
:-)

S~
Olivier

[HundredPercentPlease]

just a 332 driver.

This must be one of the few places a NPA is carried out.

Mostly on ILS, I have heard Pilots brief " Go Around will be with AP ON"

Very nice for ILS but not suited for NPA.

If I recall correctly, AP disconnects at MDA +_ some ht, maybe 50 feet.

Ergo, If on approach, if TOGA is delayed by 2-5 seconds at MDA,
say "MDA- Field not in Sight" Go Around Flaps"

You have TOGA and no AP and a downward vector

You should decide at MDA + 50'
The autopilot disconnects at MDA - 50'

100' in hand. Or 8 seconds of reckless, crash-inducing rule breaking (on a 3° approach) if you want to put it that way.

Use of the autopilot for approach and GA on an NPA to minimums is an excellent strategy. Most GA errors are when the PF decides to hand fly.

Aside:

A320 has an OEB about disconnecting APP mode just before minimums on an NPA. Does the 330?

[henra]

Of course they could have been incredibly unlucky and hit the tail just as pitch hit GA attitude - about 18 degrees (?).


Looking at the debris trail, the location of tail cone and tail therein and the almost non existing ground scars at the beginning of the trail they may just exactly have been unlucky.

[C-SAR]

Thanks Olivier,

I cannot upload pictures from where I am now. I will try tonight from my accomodation. If I will be stil unable, I have no problems in emailing them to anybody willing to do the job of posting them.

Giorgio

[HundredPercentPlease]

C-SAR:

PM on it's way. :)

[White Knight]

just a 332 driver.

This must be one of the few places a NPA is carried out.

Mostly on ILS, I have heard Pilots brief " Go Around will be with AP ON"

Very nice for ILS but not suited for NPA.

If I recall correctly, AP disconnects at MDA +_ some ht, maybe 50 feet.

Ergo, If on approach, if TOGA is delayed by 2-5 seconds at MDA,
say "MDA- Field not in Sight" Go Around Flaps"

You have TOGA and no AP and a downward vector


Once the AP has disconnected below MDA you can still engage the AP in basic mode - this would be Track/FPA as the 'bird' would be on from the managed NPA. Then select TOGA and the FDs will pop up and you'll get SRS/GA TRK... Only take a moment..

In fact - my briefs include that if I'm handflying at any stage on the approach and need to go around then I'll put the AP in before selecting TOGA.. You'll also find that it helps to come back to THR CLB fairly quickly, especially if there's a low go around altitude.

[BOAC]

However can anyone confirm which navaids were working on the day? - a very good question, and I suspect the answer will be 'very few'.

A4 - I take it you have not flown into TIP. It is not untypical of other airfields around that part of the world. See post #36 also.

[A4]

C-SAR said:

Would the wire rapped around the end cone corroborate the kind of AOA you are suggesting?

Impossible to say. From the pictures I think the hanging cable may be part of the aircraft structure.... I don't know. If they are power cables they may have been collected by the tumbling tail section. Are the power lines/poles before or after the initial tailcone impact points?

I can't see how power cables would snag and stay attached to the aircraft during the possible initial drag of the tail (if that happened at all).

A4

[zlocko2002]

Talked to a friend, 320 busdriver, he told me that his company policu: aircraft is flown eather by autopilot, or pilot. no handflying with autothrotle and similar mixed combinations.

[C-SAR]

C-SAR said:


Quote:
Would the wire rapped around the end cone corroborate the kind of AOA you are suggesting?
Impossible to say. From the pictures I think the hanging cable may be part of the aircraft structure.... I don't know. If they are power cables they may have been collected by the tumbling tail section. Are the power lines/poles before or after the initial tailcone impact points?

I can't see how power cables would snag and stay attached to the aircraft during the possible initial drag of the tail (if that happened at all).



I saw the power line cut about 250 meters before impact. 4 poles are down. The cables on the ground look like the one around the cone. The initial impact point is a print very similar in shape to the end cone. Please refer to my previous podtings where I describe my yesterday visit to the crash site.

Another clue to the AOA could be the relative angle between the line of cut in the inferior part of the tail section and the main longitudinal axis

[snowfalcon2]

I found a website listing the tail strike angle of the A330-200 at 15.5 degrees with the main gear oleos extended.

If the airplane hit the ground tailcone first, as C-SAR's observation suggest, the angle of attack must have been even greater.

This would also be consistent with a natural pilot reaction to pull the stick fully back as Mother Earth comes too close in the go-around.

I'm a little skeptical whether it made any difference if the tailcone snagged a powerline. In my experience a power line hung from wooden poles is not of the strongest variety (although it may survive a tree falling on top). Also wooden poles tend to be fairly low, 5-7 metres or so. So I'd suggest the airplane was doomed anyway at that point. But I have obviously not seen this particular powerline up close.

[aguadalte]

A330 FCOM 4.05.70 Pag.25 specifically says: MDA/MDH - Disconnect AP and fly visual or Go-Around

IMHO it is not a safe procedure to engage the AP at such a low altitude in order to go-around. Pilots are expected to be able to hand-fly the aircraft in every situation. I know that there are some airline companies that encourage their Pilots to keep AP ON and use it, as much as practicable, but the general final result is lack of proficiency and loss of self-confidence.
It is an error to engage the AP (if not previously engaged) to perform a low level go-around (even if briefed) or to continue an approach. One has to be prepared to take-over and do it manually. If you feel uncomfortable (for what ever reason) just level your wings and execute a go-around. Fly your aircraft to at least 1500' or MSA and only then (after reading your FMA and having the PNF switched the FCU to the figures you want to read on your FMA) AP may be coupled. If one feels uncomfortable with the way the approach is being hand-flown do not switch the AP ON, cause the mode or the drift out of that particular mode may surprise you at very low altitude. Remember: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.

[paweas]

Without starting the age ole Airbus debate questions need to be answered real fast with the A330 there have been at least 4 incidents and two total losses in the last year alone can anyone really say it's all just bad luck ......................no other airframe has had such a run of bad " luck" in such short succession..........

[StuntPilot]

And among these 'incidents' we have passenger threats, terrorist attacks, possible CFIT :ugh:

[vanHorck]

C-Sar

Could you comment on the posting #450 where there is a link to an NRC article (reliable newspaper) regarding a house that was hit and partly caved in?
Have you seen this house?

Others,
Is it at al possible that hitting the roof would lead to a break off of the tail resulting in the 20 degrees pitch down the Alitalia crew reported?

Thx

BvH

[henra]

Without starting the age ole Airbus debate questions need to be answered real fast with the A330 there have been at least 4 incidents and two total losses in the last year alone can anyone really say it's all just bad luck


It might have been a good idea to read through this thread a little bit (and the ones for the other 'Incidents' as well for that matter) what likely scenarios transpire here before posting such blunt statements.
Comparing them closely reveals which pattern exactly ?
Oh yes: It's an Airbus
And it crashed.
That's about it.

[ATCO1962]

paweas

Ever bothered looking through a crash database? :ugh:

Education is a wonderful thing!

[paweas]

"And among these 'incidents' we have passenger threats, terrorist attacks, possible CFIT"
:ugh:
Regardless...why not the same with all other aircraft type ? so many in such a short space of time ? doesnt take a genius to see something is wrong somewhere indeed you cannot factor in foolishness and human error with many events seeming unrelated, still the fact remains this aircraft has been involved in way too many serious and indeed fatal events in such short succession not to warrant a good hard sobering look ......Perhaps training is not sufficient or some pilots are becomming lazy with all the so-called idiot proof systems in the A330 ,however the facts cannot be ignored. Murphys law ? maybe with one or two incidents personally i think we are way beyond even Murphy now :ugh:

[StuntPilot]

"Is it at al possible that hitting the roof would lead to a break off of the tail resulting in the 20 degrees pitch down the Alitalia crew reported?"

This, of course, depends on the roof but is easy to roughly estimate: if you approximate a collision with a roof as trying to accelerate that roof over the size of the tail to its speed (this is the case if the roof is weak) you get, for a speed of 70 m/s and a roof of 1 ton and a tail of 5 m a collision time of 5/70= ~0.07 sec. A very rough estimate for the force is then 1000*70/.07 = 1 million Newton = 100 tonnes. A roof can do serious damage.

[keitaidenwa]

paweas, In fact, there was a another (even widebody!) airframe with 2x hull losses last year. If you are intending to post a flame with statistics as background it would make sense to check that your claim (no other airframe..) is true. :ugh:

I shall leave figuring out which airframe as homework.. :}

[ChicoChico]

We routinely practice Go-Arounds from 50 feet above the runway both with A/P on or off. With A/P on it's a walk in the park as the rotation is managed by the auto-pilot and very little height is lost althought the airplane may touch down briefly.
With the A/P off its not much different except you manually rotate the aircraft to the G/A attitude. Once you have 100 AGL you can renengage the A/P.
I should say that this maneuver is usually accompanied by a loss in thrust of one engine just to make it as difficult as possible but even on one engine at heavy weight and high temperature the aircraft can go around from very low altitude safely.
Chico
PS I am not saying this is what this crew should or could have done since we really just speculating here.

[StuntPilot]

paweas, instead of loosely associating maybe you should read an elementary statistics book, Poisson distribution and such. Then you can make useful calculations such as: if plane X has an incident on average once a year, what is the chance that in a given year it has 2 incidents?

[DB64]

paweas...

So what do you put the 737-800 hull losses down to in the past year or so? Or is your prejudice only restricted to one manufacturer? :ugh:

[fireflybob]

Maybe I have missed same on this thread but I see little reference to the concept of an approach gate. Many operators use 1,000 ft IMC and 500 ft VMC.

If the approach is stable, configured, on centreline/glidepath etc, engines spooled up, on target speed +/- margins then the approach may be continued. If not a Go Around is mandatory.

[PT6A]

Can someone tell me if you can post audio to this forum?

If so I have some audio I would like to post of HLLT ATC just days before the crash instructing aircraft to conduct the locator 09 app, even though it had been reported to them to be U/S.

Also offering the VOR again NOTAM'd to be unusable... The audio has already been sent to EASA... before the crash as the locals were unwilling to do anything about this mess that is called Tripoli International!

PT6A

[silverstrata]

A4
Would the wire rapped around the end cone corroborate the kind of AOA you are suggesting?

Would wire wrapped around the tailcone corroborate the speculation that minimums had been breached??


.

[PJ2]

snowfalcon2;

Regarding loss of the tail-section, the report (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2004/a04h0004/a04h0004.pdf) on the MK Airlines B747 accident at Halifax may be relevant to your question. This was yet another accident in which an incorrect takeoff weight was used to calculate power and speeds. The aircraft struck (literally brushed) a cement burm at the button of 06, removing the entire tail section. The aircraft nosed in almost immediately.

Crew fatigue was discussed as one of the factors; design of the software of the EFB another, and so on. PJ2

[GarageYears]

Can someone tell me if you can post audio to this forum?

PT6A - re posting audio file

Is the audio a WAV file or a link to something on the web? If it is a file you could upload it to YouTube then it would be linkable. I don't think you can embed a raw file directly. Obviously if it is already on the web somewhere then it's linkable.

[C-SAR]

C-Sar

Could you comment on the posting #450 where there is a link to an NRC article (reliable newspaper) regarding a house that was hit and partly caved in?
Have you seen this house?

vanHorck, I read the article and, in my opinion, the house is the little shack next to the mosque, to the west of it along the road. This house is already after the impact point, so no surprise that it was showered by debris, but it is not in the line of travel (it is to the right of the path) and as I said AFTER the first impact point. The power line was hit before the impact point.

To all, just a bit more patience, I am working with some of the group to post the pictures.

Giorgio

[golfyankeesierra]

Another issue that I picked from the italian forum, it seems that the alitalia flight that departs at 0605 was at holding point for 09 and saw the crash. APPARENTLY they said they saw the aircraft impacting nose first 20 to 30 degrees nose down....
C-sar, you said that in post 326.
That would be easy to verify. And very relevant. Any more info?
(Maybe a link to the forum)

BTW, anyone know the QNH? Didn't hear that scenario yet!

[White Knight]

Some of you still don't get it pure and simple!!!!!

NOT a go around prang - but CFIT trying to find the runway........ Believe it or not but I would never have ever let my family or myself fly on an Afriqiyah or Libyan Arab Airlines aeroplane ever:ugh::ugh: Even before this:hmm::hmm:

[takata]

vanHorck, I read the article and, in my opinion, the house is the little shack next to the mosque, to the west of it along the road. This house is already after the impact point, so no surprise that it was showered by debris, but it is not in the line of travel (it is to the right of the path) and as I said AFTER the first impact point. The power line was hit before the impact point.
Exactly. This house is well after the first impact point. If hit, it would be with the right horizontal stabilizer which was pretty damaged and could have participated to the tail separation which occured right after this place. But tail was already trailing on the ground before this point.
What the electrical pole arrachment story is telling is that the aircraft was already below 30 ft a couple of hundreds meter before the first impact, which was still a very long way before reaching the runway.

[flyerstar]

If you read my posts on the initial pages of this thread, i stated it was CFIT.

The extra thing is that VS was used below minima.

[pkg.kit]

YouTube - Landing at Tripoli International Airport, Libya (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1srEE7qq9jw)
that's an interesting video, landing on rwy 09 at Tripoli airport. Between minute 4.01 and 4.05 is the crash site of Afriqiyah Airbus 330. You can see the Mosque near the crash site on the background (4.01). Maybe this will help you C-SAR with placing the photos on the crash site.

[vanHorck]

C-SAR

Thank you for your valuable work "on the ground"

BvH

[RadAlt2010]

White Knight; If you care to look at Afriqiya and Libyan Airlines safety record you will find that that they are some of the best in the world. This was accomplished in spite of punishing economic embargoes in the 80's, 90's and early 2000's, where maintenance was at its lowest and poor airport facilities made operations extremely difficult, yet the safety record is enviable. Libyan pilots are trained to the highest standards at Oxford and, formerly,Hamble, and have earned the admiration of their line trainers at Lufthansa and Air France. No doubt, after this accident, you will see state of the art ILS equipment installed at Tripoli.. but its locking the stable doors after the event.Please dont blame Libyan pilots... ask any professional who dealt with them.

[barit1]

So what do you put the 737-800 hull losses down to in the past year or so? Or is your prejudice only restricted to one manufacturer?

DB64, please compare:

738 (or any 73x) losses as % of total fleet size

vs

A330 losses as % of total fleet size

***************

OR:

Compare hull losses per total segments (operating cycles) flown.

Footnote: To be fair, the early years of A330 ops were quite safe.

[PT6A]

I have RADALT, I was far from happy with them... Neither were my co-workers from Airbus who had to train them... maybe more will come to light when they look at the training records of some of the pilots currently flying Airbus A/C in Libya.

For the record I'm not talking about the Brookfield pilots... but the local pilots.

Some are ok... the young ones... but the older guys for the most part do not have a clue.

PT6A

[TowerDog]

Please dont blame Libyan pilots... ask any professional who dealt with them.

So who flew this airplane into the ground then? Not Libyan pilots?
Were they Chinese or Mexican? Perhaps Swedish?:sad:

[Havana]

The power line was hit before the impact point.

just checking but the photo on a previous page (15) seems to show a snapped telegraph pole near the tail cone (with wires attached) and aircraft debris either side of the snapped pole. Seems to indicate something happened before hitting this post.

H

[RadAlt2010]

I have no idea about the young Libyan pilots, but I know that a lot of the "old" Libyan pilots of my generation (some 40 or 50 of them) are working with Qatar Airways on state-of-the-art equipment and they are doing very nicely thank you. The Qataris are very happy with them and they have been there for many years since the embargo. I have heard of a lot dumber accidents commited by American and European carriers. I think that ICAO should seriously penalise airports that dont come up to scratch, that is where the main blame lies. This was an accident WAITING to happen, and it could have happened to a Mexican, Chinese or a Swedish pilot, so lets keep prejudice out of this sad event.

[aterpster]

RadAlt2010:
This was an accident WAITING to happen...

Could you please justify that strong opinion?

[PT6A]

It is not prejudice, maybe part of the problem is that the "good" pilots left for other airlines..

Leaving behind a brain drain.. pilots who have been sat at home in some cases for 10 years (on full pay) then to be drafted in to the Airbus etc.

Some have only DH6 time before flying for Light Air Transport and are now in the L/H seat of Libyan and Afriqiyah Airbus jets.

Yes this was an accident waiting to happen and it is a Libyan problem for the reasons below: -

Airport is well below ICAO standards, ATC, NAVAIDS, runway, fod etc

LYCAA lacks any teeth and is just part of the airline basically

Airline lacks proper training CRM ETC

Some pilots are way below standards... but are passed for internal reasons.

Ex-pat input is not welcome with regard to training.

Crew rest is nothing more than a standing joke - airlines are operating without a roster... indeed many times forgeting a pilot is already flying... and wondering why he is not at the hotel for pick up!

I could go on and on and on... the whole thing is a mess so yes it was an accident waiting to happen.

I hope that this will really shine the spotlight on Libya and action will be taken against them.

They dont have the incident free record many people think... If only the SAFA reports were public documents it would be VERY telling.

PT6A

[RadAlt2010]

Thank you PT6, you have hit the nail on the head! ICAO and IATA seem to turn a blind eye to African airports that dont meet standards. This is as much the international aviation organisations' fault as it is the Libyan CAA if someone is looking for a scapegoat. I think there needs to be a big shakeup in the inspection standards and enforcement by these agencies that leaves no space for ambiguity. No airport should be the weakest link in the transport chain.

[PT6A]

Yes it is about time RADALT.... The worst thing is... Tripoli is about the best airport in Libya! That or HLLB.

Everything else is not even approved! Or on the other hand... maybe that is a good thing at least they are honest about it on the charts!

If you are flying for QR next time you bring the 330 just look at all the holes, rocks, and other crap all the way from the runway to the parking stand... there is stuff everywhere.

Not to mention every man and his dog driving at a stupid rate of knots on the ramp.... under no sort of control... you are neither safe in the air or on the ground at that airport.

PT6A

[RadAlt2010]

I am afraid so PT6. I hope IOSA is listening and all those lives would have not been snuffed in vain.

[TowerDog]

So we are blaming the airport now?

Lemme see if I get this straight:

A perfectly fine airplane flown into the ground in Day-VMC with flat terrain surrounding the air field.

It was not the pilot's fault, as it could have happened to anybody.....

If that about sums up what I was reading in a few previous posts, we are all in big trouble, or somebody has been smoking crack-cocaine before hitting the key board....:sad:

[PT6A]

TowerDog... Have you ever been to Tripoli?

It really is as BAD as made out in this thread.

PT6A

[TowerDog]

Yup, been in there a few times, stopping for cheap gas on the way from Jo'burg to Vatery.

It has been 4 years or so, but I don't remember the airport being bad enough to fly a perfectly good aircraft into the ground.

Have landed worse places in Siberia and Africa among others.
Libyan pilots should have the advantage of local knowledge over tourists like me who land there only occasionally.

[RadAlt2010]

Towerdog, when many people die as a result of an accident, you look at ALL the events/factors that brought it on. An accident is a CHAIN of events. To stop it from happening again, you have to eliminate or correct all of the factors objectively. Its not a question of blame.

[RadAlt2010]

A 9 hour flight fatigue, a cockeyed VOR/NDB signal, a visual approach into the sun, the rest was Murphy's law. If it could happen it WOULD happen. An ILS would have brought that plane safely right to the threshold automatically. Instead of spending $2M on an ILS facility, now the insurance has to pay out $500M in total. talk about false economies.

[mmciau]

Someone made a decision based on 'what is the risk assessment vs money needed to be outlaid ' and as a consequence the appropriate aids were not put in place.

Mike