Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash

[RoyHudd]

Aterpster is correct. The navaids at TIP (and BEN) have not been improved since their shocking state when I first flew from these poorly-maintained airfields in 2000. 10 years ago. Even the damned windsocks were torn and u/s, so no accurate wind readings were given. (Anemometer? No chance). I had the rotten luck of flying as a contractor to the state airline.

As for investment in the infrastructure....standard third world. I still face it now in the Caribbean and it is hardly better in Greek and Turkish airspace, not forgetting Tunisia and Morocco. Or Syria and most of the Middle East. And India. Archaic support for the Western fliers, who breathe a big sigh of relief when entering civilized airspace.

The "Inshallah" culture predominates in the closed world of Libyan "Aviation". It is even said when estimates for waypoints/beacons are given by local carriers. Hence the apalling safety record. Many of the guys are incompetent, both in the aircraft and in the control towers and radar centres. You have to have experience there to be able to say so.

[Roger Copy Charlie]

Exactly. And anybody denying that these factors play a role in this accident is naive...

Apparently you have to have been there to appreciate how the attitude and infrastructure affects flight safety.

[C-SAR]

Right, now that we have discussed the merits of simulators with lots of opinions but little progress on the events conducting to the accident AND since we are returning to the fruitless arguments about cultural issues, let’s go back to our accident and its dynamics...
One of the arguments developed in previous posts was focusing on the nose first v/s tail first. I have to apologize because I am (probably) the unwilling cause of this argument. After all English is only my third language, so please bear with me a minute, or two... if you have nothing better to do and want to read the rest…!!
When I wondered casually around the fringes of the crash site I started walking from here (Blue star) and covered all the gray area. After about 160 meters I saw the poles down from here (Yellow star) and, after another 150 meters more or less, THE FIRST MARK here (Red star).
Area 1 (http://i750.photobucket.com/albums/xx147/Fotocesto82/A330%20Tripoli/Untitled1.png)
I should Therefore rephrase my statement to say that the first mark I saw was what appeared to be the perfect print of the tail cone, not that the tail hit first. More on this later.....

So, here we have our powerful A330 (powerful also because very light in payload and therefore with a noticeable power to weight ratio) conducting a go around. I hope that we can all safely agree on the assumption that our average trained crew realizing that the approach was not taking them to a safe landing decided to GA. (How they did it, how the aircraft AP and all the other wonders were set, WHO WAS AT THE CONTROLS, etc. I leave it to the FDR/CVR). The assumption to agree upon is that up until this moment (decision to GA) the flight was uneventful (except for the incorrect approach) but we all have been there at least... a healthy number of times (if you are honest with yourself) and as long as we recognized that we had effed...up the approach and decided to GA we were still doing our job as advertised.
Westernmost Mark (http://i750.photobucket.com/albums/xx147/Fotocesto82/A330%20Tripoli/Untitled2.png)
Now a number of things could happen. I am listing a couple, but by no means this is exhaustive of the possible scenarios. Please contribute..!!!

1. The lovers of the horizontal acceleration induced vertigo (sorry I do not call it with the fancy name, I am an old pilot and when I got it, I recognized it, stuck to my instruments and got over it, with or without knowledge of the fancy name) could say again all what has been already said, the pilot flying nosed it down and flew it to the ground. (On the Alitalia witness statement more later...)
2. The pilot flying went for the GA but too late and they hit the ground at the bottom of their trajectory.

Let’s see how we reconcile the marks on the ground with our scenarios and the witnesses.

I think that this photo here below is very important IF I am correct in saying that it shows a substantial nose up command. I said IF because I do not know the A330, so I couldn’t say if this position of the HS indicates a “pull up”. Inputs please from A330 flyers!!
HS (http://i750.photobucket.com/albums/xx147/Fotocesto82/A330%20Tripoli/Untitled3.png)
But, if it is an indication that the side stick was pulled all the way back, then two possibilities connected to the two options above. In the case of the nose down, the PF eventually saw the ground and jerked the stick back, or during the GA, realizing that he was too low applied full stick back hopping to avoid contact with the terrain.

Which brings me back to the markings on the ground.

Forget for a moment the witness statement and concentrate on the markings. Look at this picture from above. It looks as if the aircraft has hit flat, almost belly-flopping, and then skidding on the belly. Compare the picture above and below for position of little bushes (yellow arrows) and the two long markings in the direction of the crash.
Bird's eye (http://i750.photobucket.com/albums/xx147/Fotocesto82/A330%20Tripoli/Untitled4.png)
Now the concept of hitting the ground almost flat (belly-flopping) could be compatible with both options above (nose down – last minute attempt to avoid terrain) (normal GA hitting the ground at the bottom of the trajectory) However do not forget the position of HS, which might indicate a nose up command.

Now to the witness statement.

First of all let me qualify what I am about to say because in no way do I doubt the witness: he/she was there. I was not. I am only trying to recreate the situation in order to make the most of the information available.

AZ was at holding point runway 09. Which of the two I do not know, in matter of angle and distance are not very different, but the orientation of the AZ aircraft in relation to the direction from which the A330 was coming could be significant. Anyway, suppose they were in the most favorable position, the inside holding point, they had to look at about 60° to the right, in order to see the A330 coming, which they probably were. Now the distance from the holding point to the first mark on the ground is about 1.2 Km (full black line) and would have been masked by the clutch of trees in the yellow circle (many pictures of the site show those trees). If they had seen the aircraft coming out of the clouds before hitting the terrain, then we need to look further to the west, probably another 3 to 4 hundred meters. So, if they saw the A330 coming out of the clouds before impact, it should have been at a distance around 1.5 Km. Granted, they had the sun behind them, therefore their visibility was better than that of the pilots looking into the sun, but still, if the visibility was that much.....
Witness View (http://i750.photobucket.com/albums/xx147/Fotocesto82/A330%20Tripoli/Untitled5.png)
Anyway, another possibility could be that, as has already been described by numerous others posters much more observant than me, the A330 hit flat, bounced back up (in its entirety, I remember what the witnesses said) then nosed down, hit the ground and started to disintegrate.
I have not forgotten the picture of the forward fuselage piece of skin with the airline name in it, but, although it is before (meaning towards the beginning of the debris site) the final resting point of the Vertical Stabilator, it is after that famous slightly elevated road, which has been indicated by others as a possible springboard.

That is all folks, for now...

C-SAR

[RetiredF4]

C-SAR
imho a very good analysis of the possible scenarios.
It can be asumed that the AI crew reported exactly what they saw. Due to the distance both possibilities could lead to their observation. The marks on the ground after initial impact however does not support the version No. 2, the marks being uninterrupted from the beginning.
franzl

[RegDep]

C-SAR wrote
"The marks on the ground after initial impact however does not support the version No. 2, the marks being uninterrupted from the beginning."

Could it be that the marks are effected or affected by the blast of the still running engines at their TOGA setting?

[DownIn3Green]

Roy...

You ARE correct...however, my point is if one wants to Captain an A/C in that part of the world, be good, or be prepared for the consequences...

As I have said before, flying in Africa ot the Mid-East is not for the faint of heart or non-initaited...

A Type rating without practical experience is an accident waiting to happen...

And I'm not saying that's what happened in this case...I'm saying if you haven't been there, don't comment...

[aterpster]

ThreeGreen:
You ARE correct...however, my point is if one wants to Captain an A/C in that part of the world, be good, or be prepared for the consequences...

As I have said before, flying in Africa ot the Mid-East is not for the faint of heart or non-initaited...

A Type rating without practical experience is an accident waiting to happen...

And I'm not saying that's what happened in this case...I'm saying if you haven't been there, don't comment...

This latest post helps me understand where you are coming from.

Does this mean since I haven't flown in that part of the world I should have no expectation of a country in that part of the world to provide accident investigation information?

I certainly have not made any statements in this thread about what the ill-fated flight crew may have done or not done. That's what good accident investigation is supposed to be all about.

BTW, although I did not fly to Africa my airline did for many years. They seemed to do a pretty good job of it.

[CONF iture]

C-SAR,
I have read your analysis with interest.
To me, there would be a similitude to the Polish TU154 where after initial obstacle contact, a high level of thrust is applied which leads to high level of destruction.

I think that this photo here below is very important IF I am correct in saying that it shows a substantial nose up command. I said IF because I do not know the A330, so I couldn’t say if this position of the HS indicates a “pull up”.
It is not a nose up command but a horizontal stabilizer trimmed in a full up position. An airplane being flown in slow flight would have its HS in such setting. Now, as there is obviously none hydraulic power applied at this stage, I believe the HS could have ended up in any position with no relation to the real setting a few seconds earlier.

[Dakota719]

There has been no analysis that I can find about the engines - they are on top of the ground, stripped down to the heavy metal - no pylon, no cowling, no fan, fuel lines, cables, etc. They are not dug into the dirt. Does anyone have an expert analysis of the position and condition of the engines ? ?

[barit1]

Just conjecture - but one engine core (sans fan module) is lying almost intact in one photo. A shallow impact angle at high thrust might have jammed the fan blades to the case, and the LPT inertia sheared the "long tom" fan shaft. The fan case/stator assy was then knocked loose from impact forces and walked away on its own.

[lomapaseo]

There has been no analysis that I can find about the engines - they are on top of the ground, stripped down to the heavy metal - no pylon, no cowling, no fan, fuel lines, cables, etc. They are not dug into the dirt. Does anyone have an expert analysis of the position and condition of the engines ? ?

I've only seen a couple of pictures of what seems to be the same engine. No other pictures have turned up so if you have come across some please post.

Similarity between the engines would help and possibly confirm that the engines did not tumble before hitting the ground a well as confirm that the turbines hit tailpipe first (severe rotational damage). Probably not much of significance in whatever is found in the engines if it's a botched landing abort.



.

[DownIn3Green]

And here he is again...Paeso...apply to the NTSB...WHO??? cares want YOU want to see...get a life or post your PROFESSIONAL profile...

[Machaca]

Downin3 - Of all the contributors here on PPRUNE, I seriously doubt you want to challenge Lomapaseo on things engine related when it comes to accident investigation.

[bearfoil]

Agreed, he is most qualified in this area.

[C-SAR]

16 pictures in sequence showing the crash site from before the impact to the wings View from Above (http://s750.photobucket.com/albums/xx147/Fotocesto82/View%20from%20Above/)

C-SAR

[HendrikJan]

Some members refer to the OFFICIAL Alitalia crew witness report. Can someone lead me to that report. As far as I am aware the crew report was mentioned the same day of the crash but after that Alialia did not make anymore comments. Thanks in advance.

[C-SAR]

See Sitting Bull post 921 (or there about, numbers tend to change) for answer to your Alitalia question.

C-SAR

[barit1]

Sitting Bull's post is #894

[HendrikJan]

Thanks C-SAR. I checked but I can still find no link. The background of my question is the following:

The Alitalia flight AZ871, executed by I-BIKF did indeed take off from Tripoli at the same time window as the the unfortunate Afriqiyah plane. It was reported ARRIVATO in FCO at 07:42. Scheduled take off timeTripoli was 06:05 local time.

The questions I have as a non expert (I am not a pilot, I analyse flight punctuality) in this field are:

I find it hard to believe a pilot who is holding for take-off at 09 takes off after he witnessed a passenger plane disintegrate in front of his eyes just seconds before. Several pilots I interviewed shared my feeling.

If the pilot was holding at 09 than the passengers sitting at the window seats on the right must have seen the dissater scene, when he positioned for take of, as well. No mention of that in any paper. Other than the plane carried very few passengers this is hard to believe in todays world. Passengers will speak, as members do on this forum.

Why does Alitalia management refuse to comment when asked if AZ871 took of just before or just after the crash? (I have a firm confirmation of this) What is so difficult to answer such a factual question?

The I-BKF continued it's normal service after arrival in FCO and returned to Tripoli the next day.

I am sure all questions can be answered. Most of the members here are pilots: a simple question: would you have taken off after an Airbus crashes in front of you?

[Sitting Bull]

dear HendrikJan

did you really read my post?

I mentioned that "I have information others don´t have"

now please start to think about that and maybe you will come to a valid conclusion

and yes: they took off and flew all the way to FCO

[BOAC]

Hendrik - they are indeed valid questions you ask. I think I would have waited a while. In any case, I would expect the airfield to 'close' because all the rescue services would be off-field.

[METO power]

This is probably the reason why Alitalia refuses to give a statement. They probably have an internal investigation to find out why (if) they took off with the knowledge that emergency service is not available. There is room for an explanation.

[HendrikJan]

Thanks Sitting Bull. I did read your post carefully but remain with the question: if, as you post you know for a fact from your source, the Alitalia crew witnessed the crash how is it then possible that none of the passengers have spoken to the press?

That can be explained very simple: either there were very few passengers on board and nobody looked outside (it is very unusual passenger do NOT look outside at time of take-off), or the passengers actually did not see anything because the angle they looked to the outside was different to the viewing angle of the pilot. And that I do not understand.

AZ is fully entitled to keep the official report confidential. I absolutely understand that. But no company can order passengers not to speak out.

[RegDep]

Hendrik: My drift would be the following: The pilots had more information than the passengers. They knew there was a plane coming and had the collision warning system on - they knew what to look for. Then probably only some parts of the a/c were visible at times above the bushes and there was no major immediate fire. Pretty conceivable that the pax did not realize anything. What is not conceivable to me is how did the pilots have or considered that they had a take-off clearance. Good reason for a big silence, right?

[wozzo]

But no company can order passengers not to speak out.

How do you know they didn't talked or want to talk about it? If no journalist was quick enough to catch them at arrival, it will be hard if no one of the passengers called the media directly. Have you searched Facebook, *Twitter*, Italian fora etc. thoroughly?

Anyway, I guess they wouldn't have much information. If (if!) they looked outside a window, can one expect a non-professional to provide accurate information?

[HendrikJan]

Thanks wozzo. I am getting out of the discussion now. I will wait for the official report. I had hoped that more info on the official report was available. As long as it is not published I guess we have to let it rest as speculation rather than facts may dominate further discussions. I don't want to go that way.

[D Bru]

Dutch media (Afriqiyah-crash een groot raadsel - Binnenland - Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] [binnenland] (http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/6894966/__Afriqiyah-crash_een_groot_raadsel__.html?p=11,1)) quote Afriqiyah CEO Shadi saying in interviews in Berlin that, according to the CVR transcripts "as extracted this week in Paris", at least the conversations in the cockpit do not show any signs of the pilots "being aware of a sudden danger or of a pilot noticing that someting goes wrong." "Suddenly there is silence", Shadi is quoted, after he indicated that "until one second before the crash" there was radio-contact with the tower. Shadi continues to say that the accident cause is "therefore also for us a great mystery".

I have underlined "the conversations", because I cannot believe that there were no aural messages to be heard under the circumstances.

Dutch

[76-er]

A jet descending towards the ground in landing configuration at a normal rate will not trigger the GPWS and may nog trigger the EGPWS.

[GarageYears]

According the System Description document issued by Airbus for the Allied Signal CVR, the unit records 4 channels of audio:

Channel 1 - Capt - all audio transmitted by the capt (radio and i/c)
Channel 2 - F/O - all audio transmitted by the F/O (radio and i/c)
Channel 3 - 3rd occupant - all audio transmitted by the 3rd crew (radio and i/c)
Channel 4 - Cockpit ambient mic

Therefore any background noise, warnings and cautions, etc, along with non-transmitted audio (crew chat) would have been picked up on the 4th channel.

Doesn't the FWC issue normal rad alt height call outs during descent? Synthetic voice callouts are issued in increments of 100 feet starting at 300 feet down to 100, and then at 50 feet in 10 foot increments.

- GY

[76-er]

From what I know, the exact altitude callouts on approach can be pin-selected by the operator.

[GarageYears]

From what I know, the exact altitude callouts on approach can be pin-selected by the operator.

That may indeed be true - I don't have access to the FWC documentation to know whether you can pin-select all of the call outs to OFF... that would seem a rather foolish design if you can. :confused:

- GY

[76-er]

Yes it would be. On my airplane (747-4) the next autocallout after '500' is '50'. Dunno about the average 332...

[Green-dot]

This A330 FCOM example contains info about the automated voice callouts. See section 1.34.40 - Radio Altimeter.

http://www.smartcockpit.com/data/pdfs/plane/airbus/A330/systems/A330-Navigation.pdf

G-d

[RegDep]

Do you see a discrepancy in the postinng #1036 and the statement in your posting #894: "-they announced and initiated a go-around at low level (tower radar and Alitalia TCAS)"? If yes, would you be in a position to elaborate some?
Thanks RD

[D Bru]

I was indeed not only referring to rad alt callouts, but also to Premature Decent Alerting (PDA), or in Honeywell terms Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF) alerts.

You are right to say that EGWPS MAY not give an alert when the A/C is fully configured for landing and within an normal descent envelope.

Up to how close to the RWY PDA will provoke an alert in those circumstances depends on the advancement of the EGWPS/PDA hard- and software installed.

I presume this allmost brandnew A/C was mounted with the latest (incl. data on the A/C home-base), and therefore likely to provoke an alert relatively close to the RWY. A Honeywell TCF video speaks of 0,5 nm (link below).

General Information - Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System - Honeywell Aerospace (http://www51.honeywell.com/aero/Products-Services/Avionics-Electronics/Egpws-Home3/GeneralInformation.html?c=21)

Dutch

[Sitting Bull]

Dear RegDep

Just where do you see a discrepancy?

Do you suggest that the initiation of a go-around should cause confusion or even panic in the cockpit?

Dear HendrikJan

Alitalia was approaching the holding point for Rwy 09

[RegDep]

Sir, in my ill-thought-of question I was looking for confirmation that the newspaper article was correct in its reference to the CVR in not mentioning the go-around and/or the reason of it. I am not thinking, nor believing, that the crew could not handle a GA. As told by you earlier and repeatedly, I, as all of us, should have waited for the official information to be published.

[rcsa]

HendrikJan: If you are still monitoring this, I might propose a scenario.

A pilot is at holding point (or nearby) on a foreign airfield with no real facilities for a long ground stay, where the local authorities and facilities are, (shall we say), not exactly "first world" in all aspects; and where the pilot is in command of a lightly-loaded aircraft, working for an airline that is in deep financial trouble.

He sees, directly ahead of him, an inbound aircraft fly into the ground and disappear in a cloud of dust.

Perhaps he has two choices:

1: abort take off, return to stand, park up, shut down, offload pax, and prepare for himself, crew, aircraft, cargo and pax to be stuck there, in a grotty hotel, more or less indefinitely (or until local authorities decide to let them all go, which if the pilot is a material witness might not be for some time).

2: He pushes TL to TO power, and slips away in the confusion, flying directly over the wreckage trail of the crashed aircraft, (which his pax would not see as they are not looking directly ahead), and mutters "there but for the grace of God" or words to that effect.

I would suggest that Airline management, freight recipients, pax, and crew would all be intensely grateful for him to take the second option.

Not, of course, suggesting that this is what happened. But if I were aboard that aircraft, I would be grateful he made that call.

Whether the Alitalia internal investigation agrees is a different matter, of course.

[JW411]

Well, if I were in the situation of watching a large passenger aircraft spearing into the ground right in front of me just before my take-off, my first reaction (after "Oh Dear") would be "Where are the fire engines likely to be in the next few seconds"?

For a passenger flight that requires at least a Fire Category of 6 (or similar) for departure, then that is not going to happen in these circumstances is it?

Are you seriously going to tell me that, in the event of something very simple such as my having a rejected take-off leading to a brake fire etc and an evacution being needed, then the fire engines are going to leave the site of the original major disaster and come and assist me within two minutes? Of course not.

Even if they did, would the fire engines have anything left on board with which to fight a fire?

I'm sorry, but this is one of those occasions where the smart move is to taxi back to the ramp and let existing events take their course first. After all, you and your crew and all of your passengers are going to be safe.

[rcsa]

Of course, if the Alitalia aircraft was operating within SOPs, you are right JW411. I am just mulling around an answer to a puzzling question, and putting a hypothesis out. If, as it seems, the Alitalia flight was ready for TO (but not yet airborne) as the Afriqiya aircraft crashed, yet it arrived in FCO on schedule, there has to have been a decision process that was out of the ordinary. I'm proposing one possibility.

[JW411]

So why would the Alitalia flight NOT be operating within SOPs.

Please don't get me wrong. Had this happened to me during my military days and had there been any sign of aggressive activity from the great unwashed, then I would have gone within two miliseconds.

However, the Alitalia flight was under no such threat.

[ATC Watcher]

: He pushes TL to TO power, and slips away in the confusion
Without a take off clearance ? at the risk of having emergency vehicles taking or crossing the runway to get to the crash site ?
You are watching too much American movies !

[TBSC]

AIT released by Airbus. Initial facts based on readouts: no aircraft system malfunctions, no fuel starvation, no sign of fire or explosion.

[BOAC]

As long as the airport is officially open for departure - the problem is it isn't. No RFF - no ops except in emergency.

[Lonewolf_50]

What an educational thread. Wow, thanks gents. A few comments/points.

C-SAR: thanks for you over and above efforts with the pictures. You took a risk with the Federales being there ...

Highlander: thanks for the first person experience at TIP
RadAlt2010: Now wouldnt you agree that an ILS would have prevented all this? I would like to hear your argument
There is an ILS, RWY 27.

General question: does anyone do back course localizer approaches anymore, or have they fallen into disuse?
JetJock330: Airbus has many ways to skin the cat and sometimes this cat bites back as Tiger if you screw up. This looks like one of those cases where procedures were not followed and systems not understood.

Autopilot will disconnect at MDA minus 50ft, and then Airbus says you're on your own for what ever happens next.
I added that to spool up time in my brain, vis/glare/visual disorientation, and began to see a crew possibly behind an aircraft. Thanks for that trigger.
Jet the Pilot: By the way, in Libya, although the authority do not equip airports well at all, they apparently would bring a pilot before a committee if (minima) rules are breached or even if diversion is requested to expalin their decision. Effect on pax connections, fuel cost, etc. will all be discussed by such committee. Sounds familiar, anyone?
Command climate, corporate culture ... recall that being discussed in Air India Crash, Mangalore ...
TowerDog: Training, attitude and lack of CRM may be instead.
Cultural influences, and corporate cultural influences, are all imbedded in that trifecta you mention. Funny that some people get sensitive about that well demonstrated fact in air operations.

jshg: thanks for post 803, and places A330 can play gotcha on approach.
　

As to the running battle over pilot skills, please consider this, gents.

A bit over a decade ago, had working for me an Instructor from Test Pilot School, Patuxent River, as my director of Flight Operations. (After his Pax River tour).

He had to recommend a wash for two Seahawk pilots who made the cut and got into TPS (damned hard competetitive climate, that) for what he found disturbing: poor (for a test pilot) stick and rudder skills.

Having flown the Seahawk, I was not all that surprised. If you don't make it a point to work on Stick and Rudder skills, you can rack up over a thousand hours in a Seahawk, or could, and get precious little stick and rudder time.

So yes, us old timers are not wrong to raise that point, time and again, about what a pilot is for.

But I am not an airline guy, so take it with a grain of sea salt ...
　
　

[A321COBI]

So yes, us old timers are not wrong to raise that point, time and again, about what a pilot is for.

But I am not an airline guy, so take it with a grain of sea salt ...
　


A pilot is there to take a plane from one place to another or a ring to the same place safely
simple, no matter for an airline or anything

[mike-wsm]

Lonewolf_50,

He had to recommend a wash for two Seahawk pilots

Disambiguation for Olde Worlde oldies:
Hawker Sea Hawk (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawker_Sea_Hawk)
Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SH-60_Seahawk)

[Lonewolf_50]

Thanks, Mike. For a moment I thought you might be referring to Drake, Hawkins, or Flynn (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sea_Hawk_(1940_film)) ... Olde Worlde Indeed! :8

[thehighlander959]

Just a point her gentlemen. I worked in Libya for a few years offshore, we used to depart from the International Airport flying with a very professional French based Helicopter company.
On all the Dauphin flights from that airport we had no problems other than slight delays due to weather or minor technical problems, which were always repaired prior to the aircraft departing for the field which was about 45 minutes offshore and very close to the Tunisian border.

Over the last fifteen months when I was their this professional company was deemed to be to expensive by the Libyan Government Oil Company operator. They canceled the contract and brought in a Qatar operator (name on request) based helicopter operation who moved their flight operations to Metiga Airport which was the old American base in Tripoli. And was used for VIP flights, it was also used by the President of Libya and his family for their recreational use to fly elsewhere in the world.
The President or his family never used the international airport because of inadequate poor weather facilities when I was their.
I have had more scares taking off and landing from Metiga Airport due to laziness of Libyan ATC here is an example "we were lined up ready to take off.
An IL-76 from the Libyan national airline carrying out freight operations demanded clearance to land immediately.
We were ordered to taxi from the runway to allow him to touchdown. This was done and an argument ensued as to why an Oil Company helicopter was being allowed to use the main runway at Metiga Airport which was designated for Libyan and VIP Flights.

I have also had to face down a TU-134 that has clearance to take off from the opposite end of the runway. The Libyan pilots of the Bell 214 were absolutely aghast. Another mistake that could have had catastrophic consequences.

Life in the Oil and Gas business is not always easy.

[76-er]

@ Lonewolf:

I don't recall ever having flown a localizer back course approach outside the US or Canada. Although they do exist outside those coutries, they are rare.

[lomapaseo]

Latest update

Control Issues in Libya Crash
Pilots Were Disoriented; Jet Appeared to Be Working Properly, Officials Say

By ANDY PASZTOR And DANIEL MICHAELS

......................

A spokesman for Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co.,
said the company on Friday sent update notices about the investigation to all operators of A330s, but declined to give details.
A person familiar with the communication said it told airlines that investigators' analysis indicates the crashed plane, which was only nine months old, had no system malfunctions, still had sufficient fuel going to its engines, and didn't suffer a fire before impact.
When the jet was at roughly 1,000 feet in altitude and about a minute from touching down, according to people familiar with the details, the pilots reacted
to some type of ground-proximity warning. The co-pilot, who was flying, increased power quickly and pulled up the nose of the plane, typically the
correct steps to initiate a so-called go-around. But since there weren't many passengers aboard and the jet had relatively little fuel, it accelerated rapidly. The captain, according to people familiar with the sequence of events, may
have been looking at charts or was distracted by something else.

At that point, the co-pilot apparently believed the Airbus A330 was climbing at
a dangerously steep angle and pushed the nose down, quickly losing control of the plane. The captain subsequently tried to yank the nose up again when he heard more collision warnings, but the big plane was too close to the ground
for such maneuvers, these people said. That scenario is consistent with the widely scattered, small pieces of wreckage found at the site.

[Green-dot]

When the jet was at roughly 1,000 feet in altitude and about a minute from touching down, according to people familiar with the details, the pilots reacted to some type of ground-proximity warning. The co-pilot, who was flying, increased power quickly and pulled up the nose of the plane, typically the correct steps to initiate a so-called go-around. But since there weren't many passengers aboard and the jet had relatively little fuel, it accelerated rapidly. The captain, according to people familiar with the sequence of events, may have been looking at charts or was distracted by something else.

At that point, the co-pilot apparently believed the Airbus A330 was climbing at a dangerously steep angle and pushed the nose down, quickly losing control of the plane. The captain subsequently tried to yank the nose up again when he heard more collision warnings, but the big plane was too close to the ground for such maneuvers, these people said. That scenario is consistent with the widely scattered, small pieces of wreckage found at the site.

Here is a link to the full article:

Pilot Control Was Issue in Libya Crash - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703685404575307012892478800.html?mod=WSJEURO PE_hpp_sections_world)

[JetThePilot]

An article sheds more light on the investigation:

Pilot Control Was Issue in Libya Crash - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703685404575307012892478800.html?mod=WSJ_Air lines_leftHeadlines)

In the article disorientaion is mentioned. It may have made the co-pilot believe he was climbing too steep when he was not. Not so sure about the 'good weather' though, because in Tripoli the airfield would have been perfectly visible from several miles away. There are no natural or man made objects to obscure it. It sounded as if the pilot was looking at some charts to locate the strip.

I just wonder if too many chimes and bells in cockpit are unhelpful in stressful situations. Automation is great, but I cannot help thinking that too many loops in the automation systems require leisurely decision making. How about a big switch that disables all automatic control of plane and leaves the pilot to it?

[jcjeant]

Hi,

How about a big switch that disables all automatic control of plane and leaves the pilot to it?I already read this many time ... the big red push button :)

Label:
In case of emergency push here

[Lonewolf_50]

@76-er Thanks

The WSJ article, which I read in full, scares me. What it implies is that the manufacturer thinks that improving hardware, versus improving training, is the solution to low to the ground/CFIT problems.

Not a Luddite, but quite frankly, that attitude is what leads to what the Flight Safety source in the article referred to as the aircrew getting all caught up in the automated systems.

/rant mode on, fully aware that this board is full of airline professionals

I began a personal boycott of air travel after 9-11, unless I absolutely had to (business, and three family must take trips) due to how the industry (mostly management) and our silly government responded. I've spent more time and money in Texas as a consequence, during my off time, which suits me just fine. The attitude of Airbus, if accurately reflected, confirms my instincts.

If what is attributed to Airbus in that article (which may or may not be so) is in fact where air transport is headed, I shall continue that boycott into the future, with specific inclination to never fly an Airbus product. Ever. It has to do with attitude and operating philosophy.

The problem solution isn't in building a perfect machine, a perfect set of machine level codes, and a perfect rule set so that the robot takes over from the pilot and all perfection results. Reality don't work that way. Murphy rules.

The solution set is in pilot training. What the WSJ article implies is that Airbus doesn't believe that to be true.

/rant mode off

For any of the many airline professionals here who take offense at my boycott (or rather, almost boycott) of your bread and butter, please appreciate that many of my compadres from the service fly big iron for the major airlines, as does a brother in law. That doesn't change my utter disgust at what air travel has become, for me, an unhappy customer.

At the moment I can trust the pilots, if nothing else involving air travel.

If what Airbus is cited as suggesting is the future, that trust is intercepted.

No thanks.

[Sqwak7700]

The solution set is in pilot training. What the WSJ article implies is that Airbus doesn't believe that to be true.

I agree Lonewolf. The problem is, airlines these days are run by accountants. And accountants know that well trained, experienced professional cost money.

That is why they come up with all these creative solutions to destroy the profession, a side effect of which is more smoking holes. So they turn to technology to bail them out, but technology only goes so far.

Trying to fix these problems with technology is the equivalent of memorizing every mathematical calculation in anticipation of solving all math problems. You would be much better prepared to learn and truly understand math and it's equations so you can solve the problems you didn't anticipate.

But like I said, that takes time and money. :uhoh:

[mike-wsm]

Long, long ago when we were working on the world's first ever automatic landing system, for the De Havilland Trident, some wag drew a cartoon that showed a pilot inside a box with a sign saying 'In emergency break glass'. At the time it was supposed to be a joke. Now I'm not so sure.

[ELAC]

How is it that we are all still preoccupied with automation and all of its perils for modern aviation when it is becoming more and more likely that automation had nothing to do with the accident?

I haven't seen the AIT yet, but if the WSJ's account of it is correct the PF was hand flying either from prior to the G/A or from shortly after initiating it. The critical questions relate to the reasons for his manual input to dramatically reduce pitch attitude and the PF's (Capt. in this case) lack of timely intervention to over-ride the PF's incorrect reactions.

These questions are pretty much independent of the equipment or the automation. The same course of events is possible with a sufficiently high powered aircraft of any era or design.

Automation didn't cause this accident, but it's effective use could likely have prevented it.

ELAC

[Timothy Claypole]

Having read the WSJ article it seems to me Bill Voss is just another talking head. There's no 'automation' in an Airbus that makes responding to a GPWS difficult. If you overspeed the flaps you'll get a warning, just as you will in a Boeing, but the absence of pitch/power couple in the Airbus makes a hard GPWS pull-up a much easier proposition than in a Boeing. This isn't a computer error, this is failing to fly the correct vertical profile then stuffing up the GPWS escape manouvere.

[fc101]

How about a big switch that disables all automatic control of plane and leaves the pilot to it?
I already read this many time ... the big red push button http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif

Label:
In case of emergency push hereand as every engineer of a safety critical system knowns the last thing you ever want is a button that turns all the automation off in one big go. Hence why no "big red button" but rather a set of procedures for graceful degradation of the automation.

That way the human operator (be it a pilot in an Airbus or Boeing (or Embraer) or a vehicle/ship/hospital/nuclear power station etc) isn't left in the situation where they now have full control of everything but without a clear idea of what state the whole system is in.

IIRC, you can gracefully degrade the automation in an Airbus but selective turning off the compters so that the various protections are selectively disabled and control handed back to the pilot (normal->alternate->direct) in sensible chunks.

In particular we could refer to the US Air Airbus accident where one of the reasons why Sully was so succesful was because he could rely on the automation is assist - by reducing certain aspects of the work-load - in getting the aircraft down. Now if, a big red button" had been present then Sully and crew would have been in the situation where they workload would have suddenly increased damatically as they would have had to manage all the aircraft's systems as well as looking for a place to land. Worse could have been that with the automation completely relinquishing control could have meant that the aircraft would have been in some unknown state (define fail-safe state here!).

To me, this current A330 case is more about piloting rather than any technological issue. If as some of the posters here have stated the FO initiated a go-around and the captain countermanded resulting in the crash is correct then automation or not would have played no part in this at all.

The other incident that comes to mind here regarding automation in the S7 (?) A310 autopilot disengage accident (captain's children in cockpit) where that fact that the pilot took control only exasperated the accident rather than letting the automation in take control - IIRC, the A310 will return to level flight if the pilot releases the yoke.

Anyway, can we get away from all these misconceptions about automation*, be it Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, Tupolev etc etc etc - or is it just becoming a way of protecting our assumed infallibility?

fc101
E145 driver

*ok, I'm naive - given this particular forum

edited: typos

[JamesT73J]

I remember (I think it was in response to the TK Schipol accident) that one of the experienced folks here made a remark that stayed with me. Automation and interface improvements aren't necessarily the answer. The pilot already has the tools at his/her disposal that provide all the clues; it is a human matter rather than trying to build in more failsafes.

The pprune accident threads tend to involve into these discussions about systems / pilot interaction. They're pretty fascinating. Looks like much work still to be done in an area where pilots & aircraft have already come so far in 50 years.

[hencom71]

Automation and interface improvements aren't necessarily the answer,I think that the only way to have a safe system is to remove the human factor,that wont happen thats why its safe to say that having ppl in a system will always generate errors

How you detect and react to those (e.g TRAINING TRAINING) that the key

[Lonewolf_50]

Gentlemen, having an AFCS of one sort or another is a good thing. Try flying for three hours SAS off in a Blackhawk or Seahawk, and any of us will appreciate automated flight control systems and assistance even more. :cool: Also, the coupled SAR approach over open ocean in dodgy weather is a very, very nice feature.

As to fly by wire, which I still distrust in some forms (more than one death by auto stab programming in the Blackhawk ...) it has advanced the state of the art. Without fly by wire, the Hornet doesn't fly.

What disturbed me about the article isn't automation, it's the attitude that the robot can fix your problems.
How is it that we are all still preoccupied with automation and all of its perils for modern aviation when it is becoming more and more likely that automation had nothing to do with the accident?
Hence my point that the issue at hand is training. Whether you use auto waveoff or a hand flown waveoff (go around), executing a proper go around is what would have given the crew (it seems) and the pax a second chance at a safe landing.
Automation didn't cause this accident, but it's effective use could likely have prevented it.
Respectfully, training and proficiency is what leads to effective use of automation by any crew. :cool:
... the absence of pitch/power couple in the Airbus makes a hard GPWS pull-up a much easier proposition than in a Boeing. This isn't a computer error, this is failing to fly the correct vertical profile then stuffing up the GPWS escape manouvere
Indeed. Seems a matter of training and proficiency.
@ fc101 (great post, by the way, many thanks)
To me, this current A330 case is more about piloting rather than any technological issue. If as some of the posters here have stated the FO initiated a go-around and the captain countermanded resulting in the crash is correct then automation or not would have played no part in this at all.
Training and proficiency, perhaps in the matters of CRM or even company SOP ...

@James
Automation and interface improvements aren't necessarily the answer. The pilot already has the tools at his/her disposal that provide all the clues; it is a human matter rather than trying to build in more failsafes.
Training and proficiency ...

@ Hencom: agreed.

[CONF iture]

In particular we could refer to the US Air Airbus accident where one of the reasons why Sully was so succesful was because he could rely on the automation is assist - by reducing certain aspects of the work-load - in getting the aircraft down. Now if, a big red button" had been present then Sully and crew would have been in the situation where they workload would have suddenly increased damatically as they would have had to manage all the aircraft's systems as well as looking for a place to land. Worse could have been that with the automation completely relinquishing control could have meant that the aircraft would have been in some unknown state (define fail-safe state here!).

Sorry but absolutely no basis behind such statement fc101.

To the contrary, and most probably, Sully would have had a much better flare without that intervention of additional features built into the system which attenuate pilot sidestick pitch inputs, preventing the airplane from reaching the maximum AOA.
His speed was low, but as proved by AoA + attitude data, there was ample space for touchdown improvement as requested by the pilot.

But I guess we’ll have to go back to the thread in question to further discuss that issue.

[Sitting Bull]

Gentlemen:

the DFDR and the CVR have shown most of the contributors to this thread being quite far off, so please just sit back and wait for the results of the investigation being made public (and stop relying on newspaper articles)

[fc101]

Respectfully CONF_iture you miss the point; the US Air accident is a good example of how automation was used to assist the pilot in such a situation - we can argue whether Sully made a good landing or not, or the specifics of the A320 control logic or whatever. The point I'm making is that - you can read Sully's own statements - the availability of automation along with its *correct* usage meant that the pilot could concentrate more on the situation at hand by leaving certain aspects to the automation - in this case planning the ditching of the aircraft in the Hudson. Saying that Sully's AOA was wrong etc etc is at this stage really with the benefit of hindsight.

But that aside, which really isn't the main point but rather that in *any* safety critical system the "big red button" is a nonsence rather than a desirable feature. Ideally, and this really is what is built into the requirements for any safety critical system is the feature that the automation remains in place until explicitly disconnected. This also assumes that the user-interface to any such system also is designed with this in account.

fc101
E145 driver

[Kita]

Best statement so far Sitting Bull !
I was at the Crash site and still cannot believe the destruction.

[CONF iture]

But that aside, which really isn't the main point but rather that in *any* safety critical system the "big red button" is a nonsence rather than a desirable feature.
fc101,
I don't foresee Tripoli being a case for a "big red button".
Hudson was not either (I'll comment Hudson on the dedicated thread)
But QF72 clearly was : Protections are supposed to protect, not hurt !

Sitting Bull,
Haven't seen any data yet ... Have you ?

[Sitting Bull]

dear CONF iture

I have seen all the data and again: most of you are far off

[ATC Watcher]

most of you are far off

That would leave PIO ? ( a la Saab Grippen )

[CONF iture]

After violently hitting nose first it disintegrated with the tail separating and tumbling over
Sitting Bull,
If you confirm that, can we guess Clandestino was correct here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-45.html#post5712743) ?

[arc-en-ciel]

Guys , why don't you start from the begining ?
Before wondering if the aircraft touched nose or tail first (who cares , a/c is destroyed anyway), we could may be wonder why they had a GPWS warning at 1000ft ??!! Shouldn't we ? As far as I know, to get such a warning at that altitude, it need a rate of closure or inertial Vs of at least 2500ft/min :eek: Thats is quite a lot to start with...
If at 1000ft you have such a Vs of 2500ft/min, don't expect things and landing to be "standard":ugh:
Then after, on top of it, the mess devellops...

[mike-wsm]

http://gallery4collectors.com/images/DavidBehrens-SittingBull.jpg

[bearfoil]

d'o eesh ti no kand'e

N'a po tah weh

bear in ground

[SDFlyer]

Sqwak7700: "That is why they come up with all these creative solutions to destroy the profession, a side effect of which is more smoking holes. So they turn to technology to bail them out, but technology only goes so far."
---------------

If there had been no technical advances in aviation in the past (say) 20 years, would there have been fewer smoking holes ..... or more? [other things being equal]

I suspect the latter.

[Sitting Bull]

dear mike-wsm

HOKA-HEI

dear CONF iture

some got it right, most got it wrong.

Enough said. I remove myself now from this thread. :ok:

[aterpster]

SDFlyer:
If there had been no technical advances in aviation in the past (say) 20 years, would there have been fewer smoking holes ..... or more? [other things being equal]

I think the answer is, "It depends."

If the training is good, the line qualifications and checking are good (and honest) then for those operations technology has improved the safety margins (particularly EGPWS and TCAS).

But, if the training is bad, the line qualifications and checking are perfunctory, then it's all a wild card.

[CONF iture]

we could may be wonder why they had a GPWS warning at 1000ft ??!!
There could a possibility that the GPWS warnings came up only after a go around procedure was initiated when sensory illusions are at their best. During such maneuver, after an initial pitch up, we have seen already aircrafts with 10 degrees pitch down leading to all kind of GPWS warnings …

A go around with full thrust on all engines is rarely practiced during simulator training and the level of sensory illusions probably not representative of the reality.

[golfyankeesierra]

A go around with full thrust on all engines is rarely practiced during simulator training
There is a JAR (-OPS?) requirement for a g/a at least twice a year to maintain cat 2/3 qualification! Then again, no need for low vis ops over there in the desert.

[CONF iture]

GFS,

In the simulated world, plenty of go around procedures, but usually done only on half the max avilable thrust. Heavy weight low energy scenario which is quite a different challenge than for a low weight, high energy situation with all engines pushing hard.


In the real world, at best one go around per year, if you're lucky, or unlucky should I say, on long haul anyway.

[BOAC]

Not forgetting, of course, that in a sim, the disorientating illusion of being tilted back during a real g/a is created by - tilting you back....................

[arc-en-ciel]

CONF iture, I don't think the initial GPWS is a consequence of the Go Around, as we can read that the TOGA selection was a RESPONSE to the first GPWS warning at 1000ft.
So I would say first GPWS due to unstabilised approach and high (very) rate of descend (at least 2500 ft/min to get the Warning according to FCOM 1),
and then TOGA selection and mess up with the pitch and/or flaps/gear/crm...

[deSitter]

Scenario is - PF subjected to somatogravic illusion, caused by entering foggy/cloudy conditions at dawn, while attempting to relalign a bad approach and so under significant thrust. Pitched it foward, came out of the fog pointed down, tried to GA and couldn't get altitude in time. I'm still mystified that the fuselage was completely fragmented while the wings ended up intact and far away, but I guess if it hit just right the wings might actually bounce as a unit and keep flying.

-drl

[latetonite]

Think we said enough. Basic flying error. I see it daily in the sim. No need to look for special things. Been around the world. Not surprised. Hope I will be proven wrong..

[76-er]

Next question for Bus drivers: What kind of thrust does the A/T command after hitting the TOGA buttons on a go-around? My experience is limited to only the 76/74 (2000ft/m climb) and the MD11 (full thrust).

[CONF iture]

Max thrust 76-er, sky is the limit.

AEC,
We will see, but what we can write here is certainly as valid as what we can read from that big media corporation ...
All I can say is that GPWS warnings during go around phases are already documented facts with some very very scary situations.

[mike-wsm]

Not forgetting, of course, that in a sim, the disorientating illusion of being tilted back during a real g/a is created by - tilting you back....................
Nope, sorry, I don't buy that.

When my dentist tilts the chair back, I feel a zero-g sort of sensation as the force supporting my back drops to nil and I fall backwards. When I use full wellie in an auto transmission car the force on my back pushes me forward continuously for an extended period of time. Totally different sensation.

And once the sim seat is tilted back to say 45 degrees the total is still 1g, whereas in a real sitation it would be 1.4g. I think I would notice the difference.

But I do accept the traditional model of somographic illusion where all 1g blind manouevres seem like level flight.

[RetiredF4]

mike-wsm
When my dentist tilts the chair back, I feel a zero-g sort of sensation as the force supporting my back drops to nil and I fall backwards.


That´s why they tilt not only the seat in the sim, but the whole box.

franzl

[BOAC]

mike - start here (http://www.pilotfriend.com/aeromed/medical/false_climb.htm). It is all to do with the balance organs.

By the way, I would hope your 'full wellie' actually 'pushes you back', otherwise take your car back to the garage:)

[RegDep]

BOAC: when Mike's Bentley rushes forward obedient to Mike's full wellie, his seatback pushes him forward, methinks.
RD

[BOAC]

This is going well off topic, but do you see Mike being pushed out of the front of the car or sliding towards the back? Let's return to the effect of illusions on the body, not a Newtonian discussion.

We began by pointing out that pilots do not get full acceleration experience in a simulator and

the 'acceleration' felt in a simulator is false and

pilots do not normally do full power go-rounds.

[safetypee]

Simulators have tilt, but not acceleration*.
See slides 18-20 of the presentation 'Spatial Disorientation' at aviation.org / library .
The false climb illusion is predominantly triggered by acceleration.

* Except the really clever and expensive ones.

Alternative link ( www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/760.ppt)

[CONF iture]

76-er,
Some more information below to answer your question about the go around logic for the Airbus. This is from the FCTM, in blue :

The go-around phase is activated when the thrust levers are set to TOGA full fwd position, there is no other switch or button to press The FDs are displayed automatically and SRS Speed Ref Sys and GA TRK modes engage. The missed approach becomes the active F-PLN and the previously flown approach is strung back into the F-PLN.

The SRS mode guides the aircraft with a maximum speed of VLS, VAPP, or IAS
at time of TOGA selection (limited to maximum of VAPP + 25 with all engines
operative or VAPP + 15 with one engine inoperative) until the acceleration
altitude where the target speed increases to green dot. The pitch up can be phenomenal if the go around is initiated at higher speed like VAPP + 40

If TOGA thrust is not required during a go-around for any reason, e.g. an early
go-around ordered by ATC, it is essential that thrust levers are set to TOGA
momentarily to sequence the F-PLN and to trigger the SRS mode.
The recommended procedure is to set the thrust levers to the TOGA position for one second or two to activate the overall logic and to bring them back to the MCT detent or even the CLB detent before the output thrust is too significant.

[barit1]

Thanks, CONF iture, that's what I had visualized as a reasonable GA action, "If TOGA thrust is not required during a go-around ..."

[PBL]

Simulators have tilt, but not acceleration...[e]xcept the really clever and expensive ones.........
The false climb illusion is predominantly triggered by acceleration.


To amplify somewhat, Newtonian mechanics is important here to understand what is going on physically.

I realise that this egg-sucking missive will be read by certain grannies who know how to already, but I crave indulgence, for there are obviously those who don't and this note is addressed to them.

From a given starting point and velocity, the integration (integral calculus) of acceleration over time gives a unique path through space. Starting from, say, (velocity vector) 140 kts Vapp and 3° downward FPA wrt Earth coordinates, and point-in-space X some 200 ft above a runway, there is a unique path described by the accelerations experienced by the aircraft.

To reproduce those accelerations, the sim starts from 0 kts (and therefore no need for a reference direction). And it ends up ...... in the same place (somewhere within the small spatial box which bounds its movement limits).

To get the exact path followed by the simulator if it is tracking the aircraft exactly, take the unique path followed by the aircraft, and subtract the starting velocity velocity. from the velocity vector at each point. It does not require much imagination (I hope!) to see that such a path will very quickly pass outside the bounding box of the sim.

Conclusion: the sim cannot reproduce the accelerations experienced by a real aircraft performing a real accelerated manoeuvre except over a short period of time sufficient to retain that manouevre within the bounding box. That is a short period of time!

That all follows from basic first-semester calculus.

Now for the accelerations. Suppose you are sitting more or less upright in an aircraft with a shallow nose-up pitch angle and constant velocity. Let's use pilot-coordinates as our coordinate system (same as aircraft coordinates, but for pilot). Your state, with your weight vector tilted 3° in the negative-x direction, can be veridically reproduced in the sim by tilting you to the same nose-up pitch angle. Suppose you are in a lightly-loaded aircraft and put in TOGA thrust, and pitch up to, let's say 14° (which takes a second or two, we hope). First, your mass vector is being tilted relative to you (as origin of coordinates) from 3° back to 14° along negative-x. Second, you are being accelerated in the postive-x direction by many kNewtons generated by those large motors. The sim can give you a bit of a shove to start with, but it can't move you out of the bounding box, so after giving you the shove, it has got to let up. Whereas those motors go on shoving.

Newtonian mechanics and unique path. The sim can trick your body into thinking it is being momentarily accelerated by doing so, by reproducing the acceleration starting from a different velocity vector. But then your mind must do the rest, keeping you thinking your body is being accelerated when in fact it is not.

If the sim designers have done their job, then your mind is going to be thinking, yes we are still accelerating heavily after 20 seconds. But you ain't. And the real thing is going to feel different. There will be considerably more force on the body in the real thing. After that initial shove, the sim is working entirely on your body weight, whereas the real scenario is body weight plus all those kN from the motors.

Similarly, everybody has "simulated" what it is like to be in a Formula 1 car at the start of a race, by driving away from traffic lights in the Mini. But it ain't the same thing. And you can't reproduce the feeling by replacing the Mini windshields with plasma screens, and tilting the driver's seat back as the Mini accelerates off and the screen views with them. Body weight plus a bit of PS does not equal body weight plus an order of magnitude more PS.

What you can try to do is catalog a list of motion illusions. That is what some aviation psychologists do. And then investigate motions in the sim that appear able to trigger those illusions in most pilots. And then program your sim to generate those motions. You may be successful. You may find ways to make your Mini give the impression to its driver that heshe is really in an F1 car. But it can't be the same. More applied force is *always* felt, unless you're dead and gone.

[BTW, this point is a different one from the discussion about whether sims can mimic aerodynamic behavior, say up to and beyond a fully-stalled wing, which aren't known in detail. Of course you can't program a machine to mimic a behavior whose progress you don't actually know. This seems to be a perennial sticking point also.]

PBL

[RetiredF4]

PBL
If the sim designers have done their job, then your mind is going to be thinking, yes we are still accelerating heavily after 20 seconds. But you ain't. And the real thing is going to feel different. There will be considerably more force on the body in the real thing. After that initial shove, the sim is working entirely on your body weight, whereas the real scenario is body weight plus all those kN from the motors.



Thanks a lot for your explicit elaboration. You answered my question from my post http://www.pprune.org/5695535-post418.html long time ago:


It is not my intention to disqualify simulator flying at all. But assuming a situation with spatial disorientation during TOGA could have happened like in the Gulf-Air Accident, a training situation like that will probably not happen in the simulator, or are they meanwhile as good as real live concerning movement and enviromental reality?
(sorry for quoting myself)

So the simulator is very valuable for procedural training, in this case we are discussing here it might even be counterproductive. You might expect the artificially generated feeling known from sim missions (heavy weight go-around with less than TOGA power and simulated acceleration) and might be totally surprised by the real thing (light weight, TOGA power, real life acceleration). Combine that with sudden loss of outside visual clues and a bad instrument crosscheck.....

Now i know, why we did instrument training in the T-37 and T-38 in the rear cockpit and under the hood, depriving you from any kind of outside visual reference but subjecting you to the real feeling for a complete mission from departure till landing.
franzl

[mike-wsm]

The recommended procedure is to set the thrust levers to the TOGA position for one second or two to activate the overall logic and to bring them back to the MCT detent or even the CLB detent before the output thrust is too significant.
aka the 'Toga Tap' methinks. Mode Mixup (http://flightsafety.org/asw/may10/asw_may10_p57-64.pdf) and Melbourne spring to mind.

[henra]

When reading all these posts how bad modern technology and automation is, I have to seriously wonder how many here are really experts/ professionals. There are for sure many, you can take that from their posts. BUut there is also a number where I really have to wonder...

If you simply compare the statistics for the new fangled flying computers B777 + Airbus 340 with the really good old 707/727/DC8... whatever, you would notice that the two modern things have caused to date 0 fatalities, whereas you can count the fatalities in the good old iron in the 1000's (for each of them btw.).
And this after ~1200 of them being in service to date after almost two decades.
So much for the general statement: Áutomation is only meant to replace pilots and to kill people.
A more rational approach to this topic might be wise.

Indeed automation causes a new kind of problem. That is the communication problem between man and machine.
The criticism which I can fully understand is that airlines might be sometimes temtped to abuse the increased automation to decrease the qualification requirements for their pilots which is a BAD mistake !
Automation avoids a lot of unnecessary accidents but it also asks a lot of the pilots if something goes wrong. Then it's not as simple as pushing the yoke or pulling it anymore to save the day.

[A4]

Thanks PBL. You made a complex topic understandable. I strongly suspect that if the leaked info regarding this crash turns out to be true, we will be teaching this in the sims (with their associated limits) within a few months. After AF447 (A330 into Atlantic) Airbus issued training guidance for unreliable airspeed. It seems that somotogravic illusion is an insidious killer which can catch even the most experienced and of course it's usually close to the ground.

From memory I think that SRS is limited to 18.5 degrees or 22? In AlphaFloor. Of course if it's being manually flown then it would be possible to exceed these limits ..... But AlphaFloor/AoA protection will be activated VERY soon if huge pitch is demanded. AlphaFloor tends to be associated with "low speed" but it is an autothrust protection. When I demonstrate it in the sim I show guys that you can get alpha floor at 280knots IAS quite easily.

Good discussion.

A4

[RetiredF4]

henra
Indeed automation causes a new kind of problem. That is the communication problem between man and machine.
The criticism which I can fully understand is that airlines might be sometimes temtped to abuse the increased automation to decrease the qualification requirements for their pilots which is a BAD mistake !
Automation avoids a lot of unnecessary accidents but it also asks a lot of the pilots if something goes wrong. Then it's not as simple as pushing the yoke or pulling it anymore to save the day.


You hit the nail on the head with that one.
Is there anything in the pipeline to change that?

franzl

[BOAC]

It seems that somotogravic illusion is an insidious killer which can catch even the most experienced - I really cannot believe I am reading that. Whatever fancy name it gets, it has been around for decades (used to be called 'disorientation'). It is not 'complex' nor should it need to be 'taught in the sim' (nor, I suspect, can it be). It should be a basic keystone in every pilot's ACTUAL training, especially for those who go on to fly without external visual reference. That is what the 'instruments' are for and they are what pilots should be told to use.

Have we really only just discovered it?:ugh:

[RetiredF4]

Quote:
It seems that somotogravic illusion is an insidious killer which can catch even the most experienced
BOAC
- I really cannot believe I am reading that. Whatever fancy name it gets, it has been around for decades (used to be called 'disorientation'). It is not 'complex' nor should it need to be 'taught in the sim' (nor, I suspect, can it be). It should be a basic keystone in every pilot's ACTUAL training, especially for those who go on to fly without external visual reference. That is what the 'instruments' are for and they are what pilots should be told to use.


Have we really only just discovered it?:ugh:

How did such vital knowledge got lost in such a short time?
There might come the day, when we have to re-discover basic flying all over again.

franzl

[aterpster]

BOAC:
- I really cannot believe I am reading that. Whatever fancy name it gets, it has been around for decades (used to be called 'disorientation'). It is not 'complex' nor should it need to be 'taught in the sim' (nor, I suspect, can it be). It should be a basic keystone in every pilot's ACTUAL training, especially for those who go on to fly without external visual reference. That is what the 'instruments' are for and they are what pilots should be told to use.

I recall it was called Attitude Instrument Flying for many decades.

[Right Way Up]

That is what the 'instruments' are for and they are what pilots should be told to use.

BOAC,

You are quite right. This is basic stuff regarding instrument flying. The question is whether this problem is due to complacency or poor training.

[MurphyWasRight]

Quote: That is what the 'instruments' are for and they are what pilots should be told to use.
BOAC,

You are quite right. This is basic stuff regarding instrument flying. The question is whether this problem is due to complacency or poor training.


The other factor may be flying towards the sun and morning fog.

It is probably easier (much?) to ignore SI whien already flying on instruments than during an unexpected loss of external visual references.

While it is not possible to fully replicate the conditions to induce SI it training on sudden transitions from visual to instrument conditions could incorporate deliberatly exagerated pitch up cues to reinforce the need to trust instruments over "seat of pants" in those conditions.

[A4]

Hmmm. It seems my comments may have been misinterpretted. I'm not for one moment suggesting it's something new. What I am suggesting is that the amplified effects in modern high performance jet transports are perhaps NOT as understood as they should be - and this does indeed come down to training. During basic instrument flying training we are of course taught about disorientation and that we must trust our instruments - but never once did I hear the specific phrase "somatogravic illusion" and I would wage that there are a considerable number of pilots who have also never heard the phrase but are fully au fait with "disorientation".

As for not addressing the issue in the sim...... Gulf Air (BAH), Sochi (Black Sea), Flash Airlines ex Sharm (?) and now Afriqiyah (Libya) - it would seem that the basics are indeed being forgotton/lost when most needed. How do we address that? Training. Not only in the sim but by improving peoples (lack of) understanding that the sensation of a low gross weight, IMC, TOGA go-around can be MASSIVELY disorientating to the point that aircraft have subsequently been pointed straight back at and into the ground.

A4

[CONF iture]

The question is whether this problem is due to complacency or poor training.
Complacency by Regulators and poor training for money saving purposes.

After initial training on type, the first time a guy will see the real cockpit, it will be with a full pax load behind.

Before any revenue flight, there would be some powerful stuff to experiment in a couple of hours on the real aircraft as long as there is an experienced guy on the other seat, a powerful go around would be one of those items, something to remember, something to think about ...

[Tee Emm]

It seems that somotogravic illusion is an insidious killer which can catch even the most experienced and of course it's usually close to the ground. If that is true, then why don't we hear a lot more about crashes caused by this illusion that apparently must occur when jet fighters are catapulted from aircraft carriers. There are thousands of aircraft around the world that probably go around at night but we hear almost nothing of those that crash soon after lift off in IMC. That would suggest that somotographic illusion, although understandable medically. is not the deadly insidious killer we are brought up to believe.

[BOAC]

The 'secret' cure for all of this is in BASIC pilot training, not airline training, type rating, sim training or anywhere else.

It needs to be drummed into pilots' heads right from early days that the instruments are there to be followed. All the accidents quoted are caused because pilots are IGNORING their instruments. It is very rare for an instrument failure to cause a crash on its own, especially with back-up instruments. It is a big lesson and MUST be taught early.

Somatagravic refers to the effects of linear acceleration while somatogyral refers to rotational illusion. Both have been around since aircraft first flew. Both can be overcome by a strong inbuilt discipline to ignore the confusion and fly the instruments. The body is built to perform near sea-level, in air and at walking pace. The moment we try to go away from 'home' is when the trouble starts.

You will NOT crash during rapid acceleration or deceleration IF you fly the correct pitch attitude. You will not enter a 'graveyard spiral' if you fly the correct bank angle. The stimuli are so strong, (and complicated by the brain causing co-temporal eye 'disorientation') that the lesson MUST be given loud and clear at the beginning of life as a pilot. Now we generally have such obvious and compelling attitude displays I find it difficult to believe that they are being ignored. How we combat this apparent 'loss of memory' in aviation training I do not know. Maybe a poster campaign, videos (as the early USAF 'disorientation' film - 'Disoriented? Get on the Gauges' - corny but effective), talking to the 'kids' (and undoubtedly some of the adults too in that 'quiet moment':ugh:), awareness in training personnel of the sheer decades these phenomena has been with us - 100 years? Perhaps recognition that we are NOT 'sky-gods' as some appear to think?

EDIT for Tee-emm

A few answers
"If that is true, then why don't we hear a lot more about crashes caused by this illusion that apparently must occur when jet fighters are catapulted from aircraft carriers."
Partly TRAINING and partly not actually fiddling with the stick during the acceleration

"is not the deadly insidious killer we are brought up to believe"

How many possible events will you accept?

[mike-wsm]

There is another way of staying current on basic flying and that is for all big jet pilots to spend time flying sport planes. I can recall when the RAF pilots flying Hunters and Canberras would spend their leisure time in Chipmunks, just playing or providing cadet eperience flights. I speak as a one-time cadet who thoroughly enjoyed the aerobatics, low-level flying, and chasing one another through clouds. Oh, and being allowed to take over the controls while the pilot kindly cut the engine to see what I would do. He didn't fire the cartridge starter until we were a few feet off landing in a field. Anyway, my point is that small plane flying should be compulsory, preferably with blind flying arrangements in place. They used to have yellow windows and blue goggles so the intruments could be seen but outdoors was all black.

[aterpster]

mike-wsm:
They used to have yellow windows and blue goggles so the intruments could be seen but outdoors was all black.

That arrangement indeed was the most effective method of vision restriction in a small airplane, because it didn't create the illusory issues that the hood or foggles create. But, the yellow "glass" lost favor because it made it more difficult for the instructor or safety pilot to spot traffic.

[MurphyWasRight]

BOAC:
Maybe a poster campaign, videos (as the early USAF 'disorientation' film - 'Disoriented? Get on the Gauges' - corny but effective),


I think one point should be considered; unless I missed something in the thead, a likely theory is that this was a visual approach that encountered fog/mist while heading toward the sun.

I doubt that the PF had time to realize that he was disoriented and acted instinctivly.
Had he been on instruments througout the approach he would not have reacted as he did.
In other words there is a difference between basic instrument skills and recogniing SI, especially during an unexpected transition to instrument conditions.

[MurphyWasRight]

mike-wsm:
Quote:
They used to have yellow windows and blue goggles so the intruments could be seen but outdoors was all black.
That arrangement indeed was the most effective method of vision restriction in a small airplane, because it didn't create the illusory issues that the hood or foggles create. But, the yellow "glass" lost favor because it made it more difficult for the instructor or safety pilot to spot traffic.


Would it be possible to use polarzied plastic for the same effect, trainee has cross ploarized googles?
The trainee might be able to "cheat" be tilting his head enough though.

[RetiredF4]

MurphyWasRight
I doubt that the PF had time to realize that he was disoriented and acted instinctivly.
Had he been on instruments througout the approach he would not have reacted as he did.
In other words there is a difference between basic instrument skills and recogniing SI, especially during an unexpected transition to instrument conditions


You loose visual, you go to instruments. How much time do you need? If you are unable to do it in 2 seconds, you are in the wrong working place.
That is basic instrument skill. And if you stick to them, there is no need to recognize SI, because it will not happen or it will not affect you.

[BOAC]

F4 - excuse a correction? "it will happen but you do not let it affect you.". This I think is the key - that so many have either forgotten or never learned.

We are ALWAYS subject to disorientation - it is how we cope with it that matters. You cannot stop the illusion - it is built into our bodies - and it is often a good idea to 'recognise' it.

[RetiredF4]

BOAC
F4 - excuse a correction? "it will happen but you do not let it affect you.". This I think is the key - that so many have either forgotten or never learned.

We are ALWAYS subject to disorientation - it is how we cope with it that matters. You cannot stop the illusion - it is built into our bodies - and it is often a good idea to 'recognise' it.

Accepted, basically it was meant in exactly the same way, but written out of personal expierience as a military pilot.

Chances to encounter SI had been on every flight in a fast moving jet. We had to do a flight physiological course every three years, which included a big block concerning spatial disorientation and methods to avoid being affected by it. Due to the permanent exposure and training i think , that the recognition process is somewhat automatic or subconscious. Hence my statement.

franzl

[MurphyWasRight]

F4:
You loose visual, you go to instruments. How much time do you need? If you are unable to do it in 2 seconds, you are in the wrong working place.
That is basic instrument skill. And if you stick to them, there is no need to recognize SI, because it will not happen or it will not affect you.


Given the conditions is it possible the PF did not immediatly recognize that he had lost visual or expected to be out of the fog within seconds of commencing the go-around so was not fully on instruments?

[Neptunus Rex]

MurphyWasRight

The trainee might be able to "cheat" be tilting his head enough though.If a trainee does that under the hood, he will find out about "the leans" big time!

[RetiredF4]

MurphyWasRight

Given the conditions is it possible the PF did not immediatly recognize that he had lost visual or expected to be out of the fog within seconds of commencing the go-around so was not fully on instruments?



If it was that way, then it´s bad airmanship.

Hell, i had to do manual flying, looking, talking and dicisionmaking all by myself and in a fast aircraft down to minimums of 200 feet ceiling and a visibility of 800 meters. Then it should be manageable in modern aircraft with a functioning PF / PNF crew as well.

Loose visual, go instruments immidiately. Don´t wait on wonders. If you commence approach and dont´t see the Runway at the DH / MDA, go around on instruments. There is no time to loose and no additionals available. At least that kept me living for my pension.

franzl

[BOAC]

For murph's benefit - 95%+ of go-rounds in the simulator and for real will be flown in 'instrument' conditions. In any case, the pitch angle of a g/a in a modern jet g/a is such that judging pitch attitude 'on a horizon' is difficult and imprecise. Therefore it is the norm to transfer to instruments for a g/a.

[MurphyWasRight]

BOAC:
For murph's benefit - 95%+ of go-rounds in the simulator and for real will be flown in 'instrument' conditions. In any case, the pitch angle of a g/a in a modern jet g/a is such that judging pitch attitude 'on a horizon' is difficult and imprecise. Therefore it is the norm to transfer to instruments for a g/a.


Thanks, The 95% makes sense since in good conditions go-arounds are much less likely.

If the earlier speculation in this thread is correct then this was one of
the 5% of go arounds not in instrument conditions. at least untill just before the decision to go around.

This could mean the PF had little if any expereice (real or sim) transitioning to intrumetns during a go-around.

First hole in swiss cheese?

[misd-agin]

Nothing like the high climb rates that can be experienced on G/A's. A/c's typically fairly light(less than max landing weight) and the transition from a stable approach to a G/A is a busy event.

I'm a HUGE fan of turning the autothrottles off and reducing the power on G/A's once the initial transition to the G/A has been established. Reduces acceleration rate(vertigo issues), reduces climb rate(often low altitude level off on G/A), and reduces pitch attitude(less pitch transition), and reduced power reduces the threat of flap overspeed on the G/A. All of this adds time to the G/A, clean up, acceleration, time to level off, and the time compression is relaxed.

Of course this is often 'frowned' upon - "just let the automation(ie A/T's) due the work for you." Uh, they're increasing the workload, which is why I reduced the power in the first place.

[deSitter]

Would it be possible to project, as with holograms (think Laser Floyd), an artificial "green line" horizon as seen from the pilots' chairs? This would go some way toward combating this physical illusion.

Such an instrument could take its cue from a simplified onboard inertial navigation unit ("platform"), which could be aligned by the PF shortly before approach if needed. Thus it need not maintain strict alignment over a long time.

-drl

[Neptunus Rex]

BOAC,
I agree entirely. I have performed several G/As in visual conditions, and the G/A in a 737-200 needed the pitch attitude to be nailed, with a strong arm pushing the elevators against the nose-up pitch from TOGA, meanwhile trimming like mad!
In comparison, the G/A in an A330 is benign, with the auto trim being very efficient. Nailing the pitch attitude still applies. On to instruments as soon as a go-around is initiated.

[misd-agin]

Low altitude, low vis, G/A's are 'black and white' events. See the field. lose it, see the field, lose it, etc, etc. It can be a tricky time, especially when dealing with the 'yes, no, yes, uh, maybe, uh, G/A' cycle that can occur.

Buddy talked about doing G/A's, almost always VFR, in F-15's. Mil power, rapid acceleration. Great fun VFR. Could be, and was, deadly IMC. Experienced guys would just close the speedbrakes. That would be enough acceleration to reduce the risk of vertigo while allowing the a/c to climb.

Squadron deployment. IMC, fighter radar in trail department. Advised that last a/c RTB'd due to loss of radios. Turns out they were trying to protect the crews from the real event, which was a crash on departure. High speed acceleration, transition to IMC, resulted in vertigo and loss of life/a/c.

Sometimes power is your friend, sometimes it isn't.

[Smilin_Ed]

Doesn't anyone ever just add power gradually so as not to induce vertigo or precipitate an "unusual attitude"? It's called flying the airplane. The guys at Madrid didn't fly the airplane. They just hauled it up into a stall. With enough power available to make some folks concerned about overspeeding the flaps on a GA, it doesn't seem to me that you need a whole fist full to keep from busting minimums and climbing out smoothly.

Unions originally started out to preserve quality in the work of their members. What do pilots' unions have to say about training? Are they not concerned about the erosion of basic flying skills, especially under IMC? How about chief pilots? Do they have no interest in maintenance of flying skills.

[goldfish85]

Murphy was right --

Polarized plastic has a two major problems. First, the plastic sheet on the windshield/canopy usually has to be curved which makes the polarization vary from angle to angle and creates light spots where external cues can be seen. Also, many windscreens have stresses in the glass which can be seen with polzatized goggles. Blue-amber works just fine. The instructor/safety pilot can see with only a minor effect.

Well, maybe not just fine. I tried it once in an airplane with some LED frequency/DME displays (which were amber), With the blue goggles, you couldn't read them at all

I used blue-amber to block the external cues in early HUD flight testing. By putting the amber sheet behind the HUD, you could read the HUD but not see any external cues.

While any complementary color pair will work, one must be careful. In one HUD program, we used red plastic on the windshield and a green visor. I was flying with the green visor and the safety pilot (flying with a minor color vision waiver) commented that the red sheet on the windshield was no problem -- in fact he couldn't tell it was there --- UNTIL --- the sun went behind a cloud and his view went from transparent to opaque! It is very disconcerting to hear your safety pilot say "I can't see anything!"

I agree with the basic thread -- we seem to have lost basic instrument flying skills.


Goldfish

[Machinbird]

The memories I have of military instrument training while sitting under the bag in the rear cockpit of my jet trainer all involve the sensation of sitting in a trash can while flying the aircraft. Success required conquering this illusion and allowing the information from the instruments to flow directly to the fingertips and stripping away the illusory body position information from my control inputs.
The first mention of the somatogravic illusion that I can recall was in an accident report from the late 1960s. An F-4 had cleaned up and accelerated to climb schedule below a low overcast while in afterburner and then pulled up into the overcast for the departure. The aircraft was then seen diving out of the overcast still in burner!
FWIW, With reference to the somatogravic illusion, night catapult shots were not unduly disorienting to me. After a bit of eye blurring 4+ g acceleration and shaking, the catapult letting go felt like a deceleration and the key tasks were setting the rotation attitude (not always trivial due to the variables involved) and verifying that you had flying speed.
There were other visual/body position illusions:eek: encountered during my career as well that do not fall into the classic somatogravic illusion frame and will not be discussed here. If interested PM me.
The mental link that allows the mind to overpower one set of information with another will deteriorate with time. Simulators help reinforce the linkage, but perhaps we should not worry about perfect alignment of the calculated force direction applied by the simulator. Perhaps instead, the simulator should give a deliberate case of the “leans” or sitting in a bucket feeling so that the crews will reinforce their ability to override the somatogravic information they are bombarded with. Yes, it will make simulator sessions harder to do well, but I can about guarantee it will make you a better aviator.

[RetiredF4]

Machinbird
The memories I have of military instrument training while sitting under the bag in the rear cockpit of my jet trainer all involve the sensation of sitting in a trash can while flying the aircraft. Success required conquering this illusion and allowing the information from the instruments to flow directly to the fingertips and stripping away the illusory body position information from my control inputs.


You made my day.
Why did it get lost in the training of commercial pilots?
franzl

[stepwilk]

It bears no relevance to this thread, admittedly, but I supposes after 57 pages little does:

My late friend Dick Weeghman, with whom I worked at Flying Magazine in the 1960s and '70s, tells of the time he made his first fully-under-the-hood takeoff in a T-6, during his cadet days. (He survived to fly -86 Dogs.)

"I lined up on the centerline, carefully set the gyrocompass to runway heading and pulled down the hood. Gently brought the throttle up and we rolled faster and faster while I kicked away at the rudder, working my ass off to keep that gyro centered, and we finally lifted off, to my relief. Only then did I realize I'd never uncaged the gyro."

[TyroPicard]

Smilin-Ed
Doesn't anyone ever just add power gradually so as not to induce vertigo or precipitate an "unusual attitude"? It's called flying the airplane.If no visual reference at DA you need to make the a/c go up - in the A330 the AP will only do that if you select TOGA thrust. If you "nearly" select TOGA it keeps going down, while accelerating.
Manual flight - you still need to go up to avoid busting MDA - and the FD is switched to G/A mode by selection of TOGA.
So you cannot add power gradually in this instance.

[Payscale]

What was their experience?
Nationality?
Background?

[BOAC]

Doesn't anyone ever just add power gradually so as not to induce vertigo or precipitate an "unusual attitude"? It's called flying the airplane. - I see you are a 'retired US Navy pilot', Ed. I assume in your career you had to pass the odd instrument rating test? I'm afraid you would not now.:) Things have changed.

[aterpster]

BOAC:
- I see you are a 'retired US Navy pilot', Ed. I assume in your career you had to pass the odd instrument rating test? I'm afraid you would not now.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif Things have changed.

Is that cute sarcasm or is it simplistic?

The more things change, the more they remain the same, at least in fundamental aspects. I believe there is a consensus on this forum that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad (Turkish Air) and they have to (horrors) actually hand-fly the airplane and be able to accomplish a basic critical flight instrument scan on a continuing basis. Oh, and actually use the throttles to control airspeed? Wow, what a quaint concept.

Ed could be sent through transition training and line qualifications on, say, a 737-NG, and once qualified probably be a far better, safer pilot in that advanced aircraft than many of the folks flying it today who lack the fundamental skills of flying.

[RetiredF4]

@ aterpster :D:D

[FullWings]

I think BOAC is trying to point out that trying to be "gentle" on a GA at low level is a risky strategy and frowned on by most instructors (to the point of re-training being necessary).

If you're IMC, you're probably going around due no visual contact at DH/MDA... How far do you think it's wise to descend while being smooth? If you're visual, it's because something's gone wrong with the approach and it needs throwing away - again a need to get away from the ground rapidly.

If a pilot can't cope with the pitch change during a GA on TOGA power, they shouldn't be flying, IMHO.

[Smilin_Ed]

So you cannot add power gradually in this instance.

Maybe that needs to change.

[bearfoil]

What is more gradual than the powerplants on a 330? Slam or advance, tap your toes to five.

[aterpster]

FullWings:
I think BOAC is trying to point out that trying to be "gentle" on a GA at low level is a risky strategy and frowned on by most instructors (to the point of re-training being necessary).

I guess we need to define what is "gentle," what is "robust," and what is "excessive."

The most important action to minimize descent below DA or keep from going below MDA is proper control of attitude and sink rate, whether with automatics or flown by hand. Obviously, if power isn't applied at the same time, the speed is going to decay. (then, it short order flaps to what is appropriate for GA) But, assuming sufficient power to keep the speed from decaying, the first order of business is achieving target attitude.

If the power were applied a bit slowly but the other elements of configuration are done correctly, the airplane will climb, albeit at less than the maximum possible ROC. Since most missed approaches are predicated on a 40:1 OCS, ROC far less than maximum will easily keep you out of the weeds.

Application of GA thrust, of course, is the name of the game, but getting to that maximum thrust setting quickly is not as important as attitude and flap reconfiguration, assuming a "sufficient" application of thrust.

[Right Way Up]

Maybe that needs to change.

Or we could always bother to look at the instruments as we were taught.

[CONF iture]

If no visual reference at DA you need to make the a/c go up - in the A330 the AP will only do that if you select TOGA thrust. If you "nearly" select TOGA it keeps going down, while accelerating.
Manual flight - you still need to go up to avoid busting MDA - and the FD is switched to G/A mode by selection of TOGA.
So you cannot add power gradually in this instance.
But nothing prevents to slam the thrust lever fully fwd and to retard them immediately afterward to the desired setting, A/THR off. The addition of power could be as gradual as necessary.

[ELAC]

aterpster,

I believe there is a consensus on this forum that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad (Turkish Air) and they have to (horrors) actually hand-fly the airplane and be able to accomplish a basic critical flight instrument scan on a continuing basis. Oh, and actually use the throttles to control airspeed? Wow, what a quaint concept.


Unfortunately the data doesn't support either of your hypotheses.

The only "consensus" on the forum is a simplistic one that comes from a group of mostly retired types who seem to long for the good ole days of DC-8's and gooneybirds. Beyond that group there's a discussion about risk factors and how they change or recurr as the industry evolves.

Some here say that succumbing to a somatogravic illusion (if that is what happened) is simply indicative of poor scan or instrument flying abilities and then condemn both the individual and the entire generation of "button pushing bus drivers" for the failure. Frankly that's facile. SI has been an issue for a long time and has caused a significant number of accidents over the years, most particularly with higher performance military aircraft. It's probably less of a risk for commercial operations because power to weight ratios are generally lower and the frequency of exposure to the triggering conditions is also substantially less, but still we've seen instances of it at work here as well.

What this accident may be suggesting to us is that our training on how to recognize and combat perceptive illusions is lacking. This is a matter that is distinct from simple good instrument flying skills. You can be a real pro at reading the dials and fly on them like an ace, but if you havn't had exposure to convincing illusions and are unable to identify when you are experiencing one then it becomes much more difficult to make the cognitive choice to ignore the illusory perception. Manual skill in the absence of appropriate training won't save you from your instincts.

Since the trigger conditions for a SI are ones that a commercial instrument pilot is only very infrequently exposed to more practice at normal procedures is of only limited use when faced with a mentally abnormal experience. And just telling a pilot he needs to trust the dials isn't necessarily enough to arm him against what can be a powerful sensory illusion if he hasn't experienced it before first hand.

Points to consider for discussion would be when, for most of us, did we receive our last training or exposure to potential illusory conditions? When was it discussed in terms of where the high risk points during a flight would be? What training do we do relative to illusions in the sim? As others have pointed out the sim itself is an illusion and the means by which it functions may make it difficult to create a situation where a trainee experiences a deliberately induced illusion that he can identify as such. There's also the individuality of it in that, like hypoxia, not everyone experiences the same result in the same circumstances. How do we cater for this in respect to the changing background experience of those we are hiring into the right seat of our aircraft? In many countries there is neither a civil or military pipeline of experienced pilots for the airlines to draw from, so the baseline experience with such conditions is likely dropping significantly. Is it possible that this will be a factor in this accident? If so, where does the fault that needs correction lie, and what can be done about it?

These would be far more valuable discussions than a simplistic diatribe such as "far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad" which seems to ignore the fact that accident and incident rates for this generation of button pushing bus drivers are an order of magnitude lower than they were a generation ago.

They must be doing an awful lot of things right the vast majority of the time, including managing degradations in the automation when they occur, for that to be the case. How about giving them their due as professionals along with the wisdom of your experience, instead of just pontificating about what you consider their failings to be in the same fashion as a more distantly past generation did about you?

ELAC

[Machinbird]

I fully recognize the necessity of the TOGA tap to reset the Airbus aircraft logic on GA. My question relates to the sensing of the throttles in the TOGA position. How reliable of a mechanism is the sensing element? If a mechanical switch, those can get bound up by cockpit dirt and "cookie crumbs." If a hall effect switch, perhaps part of the switch could detach from the moving element (The Throttle levers).
Suppose the failure probability of TOGA position sensing is 1 failure in 10,000 attempts, or 1 in 100,000 attempts. The consequences could be ugly (accelerating down the glide slope) and at those probability levels, bad things will eventually happen. For that matter, what percentage of the time will an Airbus PF miss hitting the TOGA stop when doing a TOGA tap?
So as Smilin Ed said earlier,
[quote][Maybe that needs to change. /QUOTE] meaning (I believe) that perhaps there is a better, more positive way to select a go around.

I'm quite sure that on a waveoff at the boat, Ed got the power up smartly (but smoothly) and "retracted the boards" as he rotated the aircraft.

ELAC, Nice job! Bullseye.:ok:

[mike-wsm]

"cookie crumbs."

One for us design guys. There is a procedure called FMEA or Failure Mode Effects Analysis. Every possible failure is analysed and the consequences are documented. The whole lot, thousands of them for each assembly, are statistically summed and converted into failure rates.

In general the design is arranged in a way that assures that no one failure can be catastrophic. For example a mechanical switch is electrically sensed on two poles and each pole is sensed on the normally-open and the normally-closed side. This gives a four-way check on the switch position and there is a hardware (not software) diagnosis of which section has failed and is to be ignored.

In a failure-critical application like Toga Tap there would I am sure be more than one mechanical switch or other position transducer and the hardware would diagnose any malfunction so as to go on operating whilst at the same time logging the failure (in software to nvram) as a maintenance issue.

I have no direct experience of the Airbus engine control system but I would expect that there are rotational position transducers on both throttles and that the toga signal is deduced from these without the use of a separate mechanical switch.

Hope this is helpful.

[RetiredF4]

Let me say first, that i accept and apreciate your position. Being retired and not having flown the new gadgets does´t mean a position against automation. I would have been glad if our "George" would have 10% of the features available to a pilot today.

ELAC
The only "consensus" on the forum is a simplistic one that comes from a group of mostly retired types who seem to long for the good ole days of DC-8's and gooneybirds.

Your statement here is a simplistic one as well. This generation might have not that expierience with automation, but the expierience with flying was definitly more intense one. It´s not the fault of the pilots, it´s the fault of the management that the piloting skills rely only on automation and the handflying skills are deteriorating.

Some here say that succumbing to a somatogravic illusion (if that is what happened) is simply indicative of poor scan or instrument flying abilities

It is, it was before without automation and it still is. Because the ADI in our days or the Attitude information in the glass cockpit is not affected by SI. It shows the correct values. If you follow it, you will not crash.



and then condemn both the individual and the entire generation of "button pushing bus drivers" for the failure.


Nobody is condemning the pilots. How should they train, when it is not allowed? How should they know from flying in the box? The bloody who is the management.


SI has been an issue for a long time and has caused a significant number of accidents over the years, most particularly with higher performance military aircraft.


That is true. A lot higher percentage of the missiontime is flown under conditions and with maneuvers, which bear a high SI potential.



It's probably less of a risk for commercial operations because power to weight ratios are generally lower and the frequency of exposure to the triggering conditions is also substantially less, but still we've seen instances of it at work here as well.



Due to the fact, as you describe it very well, that only minimal exposure to SI is to be expected in cammercial flying, there are too much happenings and accidents documented.


What this accident may be suggesting to us is that our training on how to recognize and combat perceptive illusions is lacking. This is a matter that is distinct from simple good instrument flying skills. You can be a real pro at reading the dials and fly on them like an ace, but if you havn't had exposure to convincing illusions and are unable to identify when you are experiencing one then it becomes much more difficult to make the cognitive choice to ignore the illusory perception.


When the Instruments tell you that you are in a ten degree climb and you feel like being in a 45 degree climb, to what information do you follow? The autopilot will do it on its own, it doesn´t fall for SI, the human does. You only need to reed the instruments correct, that´s the only way to avoid mistakes by SI. There is no thinking "its SI, the instruments are correct" versus "its not SI, the intruments are wrong". That might have been a problem with our old ADI or with the standby ADI.
Trainng however is essential to know that it exists and be prepared to get that feeling, when you follow the instruments. It comforts. But it does not prevent it. Basic instrument flying with a sound instrument crosscheck does, as well as crew coordination.



Manual skill in the absence of appropriate training won't save you from your instincts.


Appropriate training without the manual skill will do it neither.

Points to consider for discussion would be when, for most of us, did we receive our last training or exposure to potential illusory conditions? When was it discussed in terms of where the high risk points during a flight would be? What training do we do relative to illusions in the sim? As others have pointed out the sim itself is an illusion and the means by which it functions may make it difficult to create a situation where a trainee experiences a deliberately induced illusion that he can identify as such. There's also the individuality of it in that, like hypoxia, not everyone experiences the same result in the same circumstances. How do we cater for this in respect to the changing background experience of those we are hiring into the right seat of our aircraft? In many countries there is neither a civil or military pipeline of experienced pilots for the airlines to draw from, so the baseline experience with such conditions is likely dropping significantly. Is it possible that this will be a factor in this accident? If so, where does the fault that needs correction lie, and what can be done about it?


Excellent. As i mentioned before, management failure.

These would be a far more valuable discussions than a simplistic diatribe such as "far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad"

Its stating a fact, you yourself confirm it with your posting. But again, its not the pilots fault, its a management problem.


which seems to ignore the fact that accident and incident rates for this generation of button pushing bus drivers are an order of magnitude lower than they were a generation ago.


The reason being not better pilots today, but better equipment, more failsafe, better tested, lot of lessons learned out of the accidents our generation had to suffer. The weather was 40 years ago as good or as bad as today, but the approach aids inside and outside of the cockpit made an immense progress as did flightcontrolsystems, ATC and procedures. Take the human out of the equation and weigh the improvement. If the generation you named would have been trained like some of the new generation, the accident rates would have been a lot higher. But again, it´s a management problem.

They must be doing an awful lot of things right the vast majority of the time, including managing degradations in the automation when they occur, for that to be the case. How about giving them their due as professionals along with the wisdom of your experience, instead of just pontificating about what you consider their failings to be in the same fashion as a more distantly past generation did about you?


Imho they do the job within their cababilities. Good friend of mine liked to keep proficient in his abilities of handflying as a captain A320 (aquired before his comercial career, ), it was not liked by his FO´s and he had to give it up due to company procedure. Its a difference wether you monitor the autopilot flying the aircraft or wether you have to fly it alone when the time comes. And the box might be of some help, but it´s not the real thing and it never will be. They could do the job a lot better, but management doesn´t allow it.

It would be wrong to judge the critique of the old grandpa´s on the present system as a personal pilots issue. Its´s the system which has to improve and we have the guts to name it. We are unemployed anyway.

There´s probably one thing the pilots themselves have to think about:
Do the new generation of young pilots really feel safe and proficient enough to take the jet from the autopilot in any kind of situation or wouldn´t they appreciate some more realistic training in that area? Would it be bad to have more training or would it improve self confidence and therfore also safety? What can they do to get more training out of their management?

Never mind, i know that it is not my sandbox anymore, however as long as my family members and myself fly as paying guests, i have an interest in the matter.

franzl

[Machinbird]

We need to realize that it is not sufficient to blame dirty rotten managers for today's problems. Hopefully some of those key managers were once stick and throttle guys who understand how important it is that their crews are fully competent. And to the ones who were only accountants and bean counters-we need to make arguments and show the way that they can have their cake and eat it too.
The problem is that our airline system is exploring new territory and needs to better manage the transition. I'm a great believer in education and communication as a problem solving technique. To villainize any particular group is to interfere with good communication.
Rather than agonize over what we are allowed to do, management needs to be told (diplomatically) what it would be smart for them to do to better manage the transition to lesser qualified pilot input in an environment of decreased hand flying. If we handle this as a partnership, all will benefit. If we handle the issues in a strictly adversarial manner-positions will harden and progress will slow to a halt. Just human nature.

[Smilin_Ed]

[quote][Maybe that needs to change. /QUOTE] meaning (I believe) that perhaps there is a better, more positive way to select a go around.
I'm quite sure that on a waveoff at the boat, Ed got the power up smartly (but smoothly) and "retracted the boards" as he rotated the aircraft.

The change I have in mind is to change the software (or whatever) so that you don't have to select TOGA to go around. You should only have to add as much power as necessary to expeditiously stop the descent, not bust minimums, and start climbing. Slamming on a fist full of power and then immediately pulling it off seems like a recipe for disorientation and confusion. As a graduate of the Navy's Test Pilot School and two subsequent testing assignments, if asked to evaluate such a system, I would have had to object strenuously. Two recent accidents, Buffalo and Amsterdam, have shown us that at least some line pilots have a hard time coping with the dramatic pitch-up brought about by a sudden application of a lot of power in some aircraft. Comments on this board also lead me to think that the typical line pilot is very uncomfortable with actually flying an airplane. Certainly improved training would help to counter this but I'm suggesting that a system modification is also in order. System design has to be aimed at, if not below, the typical pilot.

As far as a waveoff at the ship, you ALWAYS slam the power all the way forward, simultaneously bringing in the boards and hitting the burner (if you have one). Carrier based planes do not dramatically pitch up with power the way transports, especially lightly loaded transports, with under-slung engines do. The thrust line is very close to the center of gravity even for the A-3 and S-3.

[barit1]

I appreciate the FMEA discussion, and have participated in some of that work.

I'd like to point out, however, that if the FMEA is done by a separate working group, there is risk of the resulting analysis being "lightweight" and incomplete. One FMEA I "gigged" analyzed the failure of a speed sensor on a high-speed rotor; it correctly identified loss of a tachometer indication, but failed to recognize it was part of a servomechanism control loop, and that its failure would cause a rotor overspeed.

Another FMEA had to do with loss of prop blade position feedback in beta mode. The FMEA writer showed the blades slewing toward coarse pitch, a benign condition that the pilot could manage. In fact, the writer overlooked many decades of experience that showed blades slewing to fine pitch, creating much drag and possible overspeed. Several recoverable incidents had occurred before this fatal accident (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X16773).

[ELAC]

franzl,

Your statement here is a simplistic one as well. This generation might have not that expieience with automation, but the expierience with flying was definitly more intense one. It´s not the fault of the pilots, it´s the fault of the management that the piloting skills rely only on automation and the handflying skills are deteriorating.

Sorry franzl, while I can agree with many of your points I reject the "This [i.e. past] generation might have not that expieience with automation, but the expierience with flying was definitly more intense one.", theory of relative safety. They (the past generation) were experts at operating the equipment of their generation in the environment of their generation. Both the equipment and the environment have changed, and along with that there has been a necessary change in the expertise required to operate safely. Those doing the job today take it on with the same dedication as yourselves, but they do so with a skill set that is developing differently in order to meet different demands than those that presented themselves to you or to the industry 20 or 40 years ago.

We say that hand flying skill is decreasing with increased use of automation and there's a point in that, but the truth is that the overall safety gain from "expert" hand flying skill versus "adequate" hand flying skill becomes more marginal as the aircraft evolve. On the other hand, the potential losses to the net safety of the operation by allowing an overemphasis on correcting the perceived wrongs of diminshing hand flying skill to result in wholesale changes in our normal methods of operation could be significant.

What needs adaption is how we train the manual skills and prepare the pilot for the appropriate instances for their use, as opposed to how we fly the aircraft day-to-day, or as some would suggest applying an overall reduction in the use of automation in design in favour of a more manual flying oriented machine. I agree completely with you on the need to train proficiency in handling the aircraft in all situations, but this neither advocates an over reliance on automation to the exclusion of manual flying or the reverse. What is required is further development of training on the appropriate judgement of when to use either along with the skills to do so in those instances. And, we need to recognize that the evolutions in aircraft design will change what we decide is the acceptable skill level for some tasks.

In terms of who to "blame" for diminished hand flying skill I think it's too simple to just say "management" is to blame when there's still serious disagreement in the industry on what the nature of the problem really is or what the best process for creating a net increase in safety in the use of hand flying should be. For example, if improved hand flying training resulted in a net 1% improvement in safety, but a similar investment in another area could produce a 10% improvement, which would you opt for if your resources were limited as is the case for most commercial entities? If increasing the amount of hand flying on the line resulted in a 5% increase in net pilot errors due to decreased attention to other operational tasks is that a worthwhile trade for an improvement in a hand flying skill when the degree of improvement has a very low percentage probablility of being decisive in a critical event?

The reason being not better pilots today, but better equipment, more failsafe, better tested, lot of lessons learned out of the accidents our generation had to suffer. The weather was 40 years ago as good or as bad as today, but the approach aids inside and outside of the cockpit made an immense progress as did flightcontrolsystems, ATC and procedures. Take the human out of the equation and weigh the improvement. If the generation you named would have been trained like some of the new generation, the accident rates would have been a lot higher. But again, it´s a management problem.

Sorry again franzl, I disagree with you here as well. While pilots today may not get the same degree of "stick & rudder" exposure as in the past, there have been improvements over the previous generation in a number of areas due to advances we've made both in training processes and our understanding of human dynamics, as well as those hard lessons learned from each accident that occurs. You suggest that had the past generation trained like the current generation that accident rates would be a lot higher, but come on, what do you think of the likliehood that a repeat of Staines could happen to BA today, or Tenerife to KLM? Not impossible, but pretty unlikely to happen again now as opposed to then because we've learned from and adapted to our failings and improved our training in those areas and in doing so improved the pilot. It's an ongoing process, and not without its flaws, so not everything is always an immediate step forward. This is what we need to have in mind in assessing the nature of the problem and what resources and changes need to be put to it.

A fair statement would be that training in hand flying skills has to adapt to the changing nature of the aircraft and environment. An unfair statement would be the suggestion that pilots (or aircraft) of a past generation were inherently safer because hand flying was more frequent and pilots had a resulting higher base level in that skill. While they may have been more proficient at that it does not follow that they were thus overall more safe operators within their environment than the pilot of today is within his.

Cheers,

ELAC

[aterpster]

ELAC:
Unfortunately the data doesn't support either of your hypotheses.

The Turkish Air crash fits quite nicely.

I've worked my share of accidents. Some pilots have always done really careless or downright dumb things. That isn't the exclusive domain of today's younger pilots.

But, the majority before automation knew how to fly the airplane and how to stay ahead of it. And, I don't recall a jet transport accident with a U.S. carrier where visual illusions overtook trust and proper use of attitude instruments.

I was fortunate in that I flew both low-tech and high tech aircraft. We were trained to fly the high-tech airplanes with and without automation, and did a fair amount of both. That seems to not be the case any longer.

I currently deal extensively with all the nuances of RNP AR, which is a quantum advance in instrument approach procedures. At some locations there is virtually no margin for error, thus the proper use of the automatics is essential. But, equally essential is a plan to escape in the event the automatics and flight path guidance fail at the worst possible time. I have no doubt that pilots will handle terrain-critical RNP AR IAPs just fine so long as nothing critical fails.

[ELAC]

aterpster,

The Turkish Air crash fits quite nicely.

If you choose to form your conclusions and draw your hypotheses from single instances then I think we've discovered the source of the problem.

ELAC

[CONF iture]

Slamming on a fist full of power and then immediately pulling it off seems like a recipe for disorientation and confusion.
It is not an issue with that kind of engine as the all process takes one second, not long enough for the engine to rev up. The thrust levers are retarded well before the TOGA request is satisfied.

[TowerDog]

Comments on this board also lead me to think that the typical line pilot is very uncomfortable with actually flying an airplane.

Not so.

As a typical line pilot I am very comfortable flying (Hand flying) the airplane.
So is 95% of my co-workers.

The pilots you mentioned, the ones that are not comfortable flying an airplane, are probably the guys you see on the CNN evening news..Buffalo, Amsterdam, Tripoli..

You don't have to be a Navy test pilot to safely fly a Boeing or a Bus. :=

[Capn Bloggs]

ELAC,
A fair statement would be that training in hand flying skills has to adapt to the changing nature of the aircraft and environment.

An unfair statement would be the suggestion that pilots (or aircraft) of a past generation were inherently safer because hand flying was more frequent and pilots had a resulting higher base level in that skill.
I disagree with both of those statements. Handflying skills are exactly the same as they were years ago, and the hand-flyers of old are better at it on automated aircraft, if for no other reason than they appreciate the need to stay current doing it, regardless of what the Magenta-Line brigade think. And yes, years of more hand flying does make one better able to cope when forced into it.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Elac:
that a repeat of Staines could happen to BA today, or Tenerife to KLM? Not impossible, but pretty unlikely to happen again now as opposed to then because we've learned from and adapted to our failings and improved our training in those areas and in doing so improved the pilotSeem's it's space for more improvement as this crash seem's to be a very good aircraft (with no technical failures discovered so far) slam to the ground by the improved ? pilots
And methink it's not the first case it's happened .. so where are the "learn" and adaptation to the "failing" ?
Sure you can have again "Tenerife to KLM" .. it's just a matter of time

[ELAC]

jcjeant,

Seem's it's space for more improvement as this crash seem's to be a very good aircraft (with no technical failures discovered so far) slam to the ground by the improved ? pilots

There is always room for improvement. That should be a never ending process in aviation. And there will always be accidents that result from exceptions to the overall level of proficiency that is normal within the industry, but an accident is by nature an exceptional event, and one needs to be careful what conclusions one infers from exceptional events.

I think the problem here is that some are suffering from a very selective view (or review) of the data. Perfectly good aircraft slammed into the ground for exactly the same reason in past generations, and they slammed into the ground for all sorts of pilot related issues at an even greater rate than is the case today.

In the past, however, we didn't have these convenient little targets of "too much automation" or "too little hand flying" to pin cause on. Real thought had to be put into finding out the roots of error and the means of correcting and improving overall flight safety. Now however, on this forum at least, some seem content to fall into a form of reductionist logic where every accident is the result of either a failure of automation or a failure of the pilot operate effectively without automation.

After wading through nostalgia for the good old days, the curative prescriptions are always the same: Less automation and more hand flying. But, where is the data that supports the idea that these prescriptions will actually enhance overall safety?

I say it isn't there. Certainly there's nothing in historical statistics of accidents and incidents to suggest that greater hand flying of aircraft with lesser degrees of automation will result in lower rates of accidents/incidents. It's pretty much the reverse on that score. Aircraft that have lower levels of automation and/or that demand higher amounts of hand flying seem to have higher accident rates than those of the current generation.

Automation and hand flying are just tools to get a job done, and using these tools, as well as others, today's pilots a key component of a safety system that, while still imperfect, delivers a lower error rate than that of any past generation. So before we go about thrashing this generation as being "button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad" as aterpster so quaintly puts it, let's put these individual events into the bigger picture and see whether that analysis really stands up.

And when it comes to solutions intended to reduce the errors, I'm open to them all, but only once it can be demonstated that a proposed change in philosophy or process will actually deliver a net gain to the safety of the system. I see no profit in reducing automation and increasing hand flying only to generate a more skilled hand flyer who commits a greater number of errors with safety implications in other aspects of the operation.

Cheers,

ELAC

[Capn Bloggs]

ELAC,
After wading through nostalgia for the good old days, the curative prescriptions are always the same: Less automation and more hand flying. But, where is the data that supports the idea that these prescriptions will actually enhance overall safety?

I say it isn't there. Certainly there's nothing in historical statistics of accidents and incidents to suggest that greater hand flying of aircraft with lesser degrees of automation will result in lower rates of accidents/incidents. It's pretty much the reverse on that score. Aircraft that have lower levels of automation and/or that demand higher amounts of hand flying seem to have higher accident rates than those of the current generation.
Nobody is suggesting that handflying in the old days produced better safety outcomes. What is being said is that accidents are now occurring regularly in which the basic flying skills of the crew are a factor. There is only one way to keep up your basic flying skills - practice handflying. Good IF cross-reference is the key and in my experience the only way that skill can be maintained is by handflying.

[australiancalou]

The general level has been decreasing for years pushed by the global administration trying to solve the up and down pilot demand in the special market of aviation.
Once upon a time ATPL was a real licence hard to get and the reward of a happy few due to high knowledge and skill requirements but also long to get.
Administrations and manufacturers on Airlines demand worked on a new licencing system enableing the product of new pilots at a higher rate than previous in the double aim of avoiding pilot gap and of reducing payscale as a result of less offer than demand.
Financial results have allways been inversely proportional to the labor cost as good management is judged by investors on the ability of managers to reduce workforce cost and enhance productivity.
These two principles cannot apply to aviation as they do not deserve safety.
Eventhough manufacturers have work to make their airplanes easier to use the specificity of the pilot's job is to be minded in the special way enabling to react quickly but safely and in the correct way to a problem that happens.
The need of being an experienced handler and a well qualified high level knowledged pilot will always be necessary to comply with the minimum safety level required to transport passangers safely to their destination in all situations.
Fatigue due to enhancement of productivity and poor knowledge and handling due to new licencing system (not the fault of new joiners who also have to pay for their ratings) will undoubtedly lead to a decrease of safety records.
What's the best.
- Good maintenance (less failures)
- Adapted productivity and real fatigue management
-Not the least, good formation and high level required to work as a pilot and of course high management skills to work as a captain (This you can not learn even with CRM training and all these bull****s).

This is not a message to relate to the present subject but an experience return to answer to a few messages above and dedicated to all financials and administration manufacturers or airline's managers...:E

[ELAC]

Capn Bloggs,

Nobody is suggesting that handflying in the old days produced better safety outcomes. What is being said is that accidents are now occurring regularly in which the basic flying skills of the crew are a factor. There is only one way to keep up your basic flying skills - practice handflying. Good IF cross-reference is the key and in my experience the only way that skill can be maintained is by handflying.

"accidents are now occurring regularly in which the basic flying skills of the crew are a factor" To me that appears to be an exaggeration. We have had several accidents recently where basic flying skills/awareness have been a factor, but "regularly" is a leap too far. Additionally I'm sure I could point to any number of other periods in the last 20-40 years where a similar number of accidents of a similar sort occured during a similar time frame, and that would be against a background of significantly fewer total aircraft cycles.

What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.

I agree with you that continuous hand flying practice is the best way to keep basic stick and rudder skills at their highest. Where I would disagree with some is on whether changing our approach to the use of automation to enable more hand flying practice during line operations would actually produce a net positive for the overall safety of flight operations. As you may recall when sims were less capable we used to practice things like double engine failures in the real aircraft. Looking back, history shows us that we lost more jet transports practicing that skill than we did to actual double engine failures. While there's a scale difference between normal operation hand flying and abnormal operation double engine failures the point is that practicing a skill with the intention of improving handling ability doesn't always come for free, and before advocating more hand flying on the line we should give better consideration as to what other risk factors we might be letting into the operation. If the trade-off is not a net gain, then we'd be doing the wrong thing.

Along this line it's worth considering that modern aircraft have a good number of capabilities and crew tasks that older generation aircraft did not have, and in many cases fewer crew to accomplish/monitor those tasks than in the past. The entire "system", not just the pilot or the aircraft, are adapting to make use of these capabilities with attendant changes in what is required of the pilot. One of the basic purposes of automation is to free up more of the physical and mental capacity of the pilots to concentrate better on those tasks and how they relate to the big picture with less conscious effort being required for the manual task of keeping the aircraft on the straight and level. This is how these aircraft are designed to be used and this is why I suggest that some folks like aterpster are perhaps not giving due credit to today's pilots for understanding how their machine is meant to be operated and using its systems accordingly. Overall they do the job with a very high degree of safety, and while it is right to focus on anything that's a perceived weak link in the safety chain and look for means of improvement, doing so without acknowledging the greater context is disingenuous.

So by all means let's talk of how we can improve handling skills, but let's do it without hyperbole and with a clear eye on the fact that if we aren't improving the overall safety of the system in the process what we may end up with is pilots who hand fly better but who end up having accidents more frequently.

Cheers,

ELAC

[BOAC]

In my opinion ELAC is spot on here. As 'automation' becomes better and better, we finish up with crashes caused ONLY by the inability of a crew to 'salvage' a flight where something went wrong with the 'perfect' automatic system. We may well arrive at the point where the failure rate is so low that the loss of an airframe every now and then is acceptable statistically, so do then the crews NEED to be able to use 'stick and rudder'? Personally I hope I am into 'daisy pushing' before then.

I think now this thread has gone too far away form the topic. May I invite continued discussion on this particular topic on my year old thread here (http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/379780-computers-cockpit-safety-aviation.html) ? Somewhat spookily the topic of 'disorientation' came up there too...............................

[aterpster]

ELAC:
If you choose to form your conclusions and draw your hypotheses from single instances then I think we've discovered the source of the problem.

That's quite an assumption on your part.

[deSitter]

ELAC said

What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.I don't find this to be true at all. I've studied hundreds of accident reports and it has been very rare in the past to see gross flying errors leading to deaths. Of course one has any number of CFIT crashes, and while that does represent a gross error, it's not of the same sort as flying a perfectly good airplane straight into the ground on finals. I really do see a trend toward accidents resulting from basic flying mistakes that practically represent a new category.

I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.

-drl

[ManaAdaSystem]

Some (OK, quite a few) years ago I was flying with a high hours, ex military pilot in the left seat. He was in the habit of not flying with the auto throttle engaged, because he did not trust it.
It worked well until we got a level off in a very busy situation, and he simply forgot the throttles. We nearly ended up in a stall.
Yes, we need to be able to hand fly the aircraft, but it is equally important to understand how the auto systems work.
It doesn't really matter if you auto fly or hand fly the aircraft into the ground, the result will be the same.
Confusion on "what it is doing now" can be as deadly as lousy hand flying.
The worst will be a combination of both.

No, everything was not better before.

[MurphyWasRight]

ELAC said
Quote:
What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.
I don't find this to be true at all. I've studied hundreds of accident reports and it has been very rare in the past to see gross flying errors leading to deaths. Of course one has any number of CFIT crashes, and while that does represent a gross error, it's not of the same sort as flying a perfectly good airplane straight into the ground on finals. I really do see a trend toward accidents resulting from basic flying mistakes that practically represent a new category.

I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.

-drl


It may be more than lack of ex-military, another trend is "direct to Jet" training options that sidestep the other traditional path to ATPL, PPL > instrucotr - bank check runs etc.

One thing in common to either path is many hours in multiple aircraft types and conditions.

Monitoring and recovering from student errors is probably very relevant to flying modern automation, - many hours of boredom interupt by the occasional "what the F***"

[GarageYears]

It may be more than lack of ex-military, another trend is "direct to Jet" training options that sidestep the other traditional path to ATPL, PPL > instrucotr - bank check runs etc.

I presume the (relatively) recently introduced Multi-crew Pilot License (MPL) requirements are common knowledge on this board...? I'm sure you're all very capable of Googling "MPL", but the hard fact is that a MPL-trained pilot can be sitting in the right-hand set of a commercial flight (cabin full of passengers) with a minimum of 6 (yes, SIX) take-off and landings in a 'real' aircraft (with an additional 6 in a Level D full-flight sim). What could possibly go wrong...

Talk about direct-to-jet. :sad:

- GY

[ELAC]

aterpster,

ELAC:

Quote:
If you choose to form your conclusions and draw your hypotheses from single instances then I think we've discovered the source of the problem.

That's quite an assumption on your part.

All right.

Let's not forget that it is you who has made the claim: "that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad"

So, prove it. Provide a data set that proves your hypothesis.

And, please come up with something more than just one off anecdotals that don't provide any statistical significance or a basis for comparison.

ELAC

[RetiredF4]

I presume the (relatively) recently introduced Multi-crew Pilot License (MPL) requirements are common knowledge on this board...? I'm sure you're all very capable of Googling "MPL", but the hard fact is that a MPL-trained pilot can be sitting in the right-hand set of a commercial flight (cabin full of passengers) with a minimum of 6 (yes, SIX) take-off and landings in a 'real' aircraft (with an additional 6 in a Level D full-flight sim). What could possibly go wrong...

Talk about direct-to-jet. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/puppy_dog_eyes.gif

- GY


You are kidding, aren´t you?

If i go to the garage to have my car repaired, i can check on the expierience of the guy i hand the keys.
If your above statement is true, i hope i´m able to check the qualification of the crew who i hand over the live of the loved ones as well.

franzl

[ELAC]

deSitter,

I don't find this to be true at all. I've studied hundreds of accident reports and it has been very rare in the past to see gross flying errors leading to deaths. Of course one has any number of CFIT crashes, and while that does represent a gross error, it's not of the same sort as flying a perfectly good airplane straight into the ground on finals. I really do see a trend toward accidents resulting from basic flying mistakes that practically represent a new category.

I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.

Perhaps you should look again. There are plenty of past accidents that fit into the same categories. By example, the following very similar accidents are drawn from the NTSB database for the period of 1980-1990.

If you consider the growth in volume of flights over the past 20 years and the fact that these reports are drawn from the records of just one nation (where the current accidents we are considering are global), you may also want to review your conclusions of the relative rate of incidence of such accidents now vs. then.

Adjusted to remove terrorist events there were 36 fatal accidents for Part 121 carriers between 1980 and 1990. For the period 2000-2010 the number was 18, a 50% reduction. During similar periods the the number of system departures in the U.S. increased from 55,269,988 (1977-1987) to 100,302,134 (1997-2007, the last year available for annual statistics). So, as a rough measure, there were 3.63 (36/55,269,988) / (18/100,302,134) accidents then for every one we experience now.

If the quality of our pilot's handling skills (use of the entire aircraft system, manual or automatic) only remained constant, then with the pace of traffic growth we should be seeing 3-4 of each of these types of accidents now for each 1 that occurred during the 80's. If overall aircraft handling ability was getting worse due to badly designed automation or poor manual skills the number would be even higher. But, while we do see 1 or 2 of some of these accident types, and these are what's drawing our attention, overall we are experiencing a reduction in the number of accidents of this nature per X departures versus the past. Despite what some insist, the data suggests that this generation of pilots has a lower level of total accident causing handling errors than their predecessors. By no means perfect, and certainly with areas where improvement can take place, but better than the supposed "consensus" on this forum.

So, before we start talking about chucking out our philosophies and processes for pilot use of automation and hand flying, maybe we should look closer at what the nature of the problems really are and whether there really would be a net benefit to safety in making broad changes to operational processes that have so far proven effective in reducing accident rates. And maybe we could let up a bit on the "button pushing bus drivers who would be truly screwed if ..." characterizations while we're at it.

Cheers,

ELAC




Loss of Control During Mismanaged Approach (similar [but not SI] to what's assumed for Afriqiyah):

Accident occurred Wednesday, January 09, 1985 in KANSAS CITY, KS
Aircraft: LOCKHEED 188A, registration: N357Q
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
DURING ARRIVAL TO THE KANSAS CITY DOWNTOWN ARPT, THE FLT WAS VECTORED FOR A VOR RWY 3 APCH, THEN WAS CLEARED FOR THE APCH & TO CIRCLE & LAND ON RWY 36. ON FINAL APCH, THE ACFT WAS HI & WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO LAND, SO THE FLT WAS CLEARED TO CIRCLE LEFT FOR ANOTHER APCH TO LAND. THE AIRCREW ACKNOWLEDGED & BEGAN CIRCLING LEFT WHICH TOOK THEM IN THE VICINITY OF THE FAIRFAX ARPT. A SHORT TIME LATER, THE ATC CONTROLLER CAUTIONED THAT THE FLT MIGHT BE LINING UP FOR THE FAIRFAX ARPT. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CREW INITIATED A MISSED APCH & WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO 360 DEG & CLIMB TO 3000 FT. THE ACFT BEGAN A STEEP CLIMB TO 3100 FT, STALLED & ENTERED A STEEP DESCENT. BEFORE THE DESCENT WAS ARRESTED, THE ACFT IMPACTED IN A PUBLIC WATER TREATMENT PLANT. CVR RECORDINGS INDICATED THAT THE 1ST OFFICER WAS FLYING THE ACFT DURING THEEN ROUTE DESCENT, VOR APCH & CIRCLING APCH, THEN THE CAPTAIN TOOK CONTROL DURING THE MISSED APCH. AN EXAM OF THE WRECK- AGE REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF AN AIRFRAME OR POWERPLANT PROBLEM. ALSO, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CARGO HAD SHIFTED.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

AIRSPEED..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
STALL..INADVERTENT..PILOT IN COMMAND

Contributing Factors

WEATHER CONDITION..LOW CEILING
WEATHER CONDITION..FOG
LIGHT CONDITION..DAWN
IFR PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
SUPERVISION..INADEQUATE..PILOT IN COMMAND
BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED..INADVERTENT..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED..INADVERTENT..PILOT IN COMMAND

Overrun Accident Resulting From Inattention to Autothrust & Airspeed on Approach (similar to THY 737 but overspeed not under):

Accident occurred Tuesday, February 28, 1984 in JAMAICA, NY
Aircraft: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-30, registration: LNRKB
Injuries: 1 Serious, 11 Minor, 165 Uninjured.
DURING AN ILS APCH TO RWY 4R WITH A TAILWIND, THE ACFT (SCANDINAVIAN FLT 901) WAS BEING FLOWN BY THE COPLT. THE ACFT WAS FAST ON FINAL APCH & WAS LANDED APRX 4700 FT BEYOND THE APCH END OF THE RWY AT 36 KTS ABOVE THE PROGRAMMED TOUCHDOWN SPEED. THE AIRCREW MEMBERS WERE UNABLE TO STOP ON THE REMAINING 3700 FT OF RWY. THE CAPT STEERED THE ACFT TO THE RGT OF THE RWY CENTERLINE TO AVOID A HEAD-ON COLLISION WITH THE APCH LGT PIER AT THE DEPT END. THE LEFT WING HIT THE PIER & THE ACFT CAME TO REST IN A TIDAL WATERWAY. THE OCCUPANTS WERE EVACUATED WITH ONLY MINOR INJURIES TO SOME, BUT 1 PAX WITH A CARDIAC CONDITION WAS HOSPITALIZED FOR OVER 48 HRS. A SMALL FIRE WAS CONFINED TO SOME ELECTRIC WIRING & SELF EXTINGUISHED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE AUTOTHROTTLE HAD MALFUNCTIONED DURING THE OCCURRENCE. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THRUST HAD INCREASED ON FINAL APCH WHEN IT WAS NOT NEEDED. ALSO. THE CREW DID NOT USE THE AIRSPEED 'BUGS' & CALLOUTS DURING THE APCH. THE AUTOTHROTTLE HAD A HISTORY OF MALFUNCTIONS.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES..DISREGARDED
THROTTLE/POWER CONTROL..NOT CORRECTED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
OVERCONFIDENCE IN AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
SUPERVISION..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
IMPROPER USE OF PROCEDURE..PILOT IN COMMAND
GO-AROUND..NOT PERFORMED

Contributing Factors

WEATHER CONDITION..TAILWIND
OBJECT..APPROACH LIGHT/NAVAID
AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR,AUTO THROTTLE..ERRATIC
AIRSPEED..EXCESSIVE..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT

Loss of Control Due to Over Reliance on Automation (as some posit for AF447):

Accident occurred Tuesday, February 19, 1985 in SAN FRANCISCO, CA
Aircraft: BOEING 747 SP-09, registration: N4522V
Injuries: 2 Serious, 271 Uninjured.
WHILE ABV A CLOUD LAYER (TOP AT FL 370) NR THE JET STREAM, AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED & WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE MNGMNT SYS (PMS)MODE. THE PMS PROVIDED PITCH GUIDANCE TO HOLD FL 410, ROLL GUIDANCE TO AILERONS & SPOILERS FOR ROLL CTL & AUTOTHROTTLE TO MAINT .85 MACH (254 KIAS). ACFT ENCOUNTERED CLR AIR TURBC & AIRSPEED BGN TO VARY BTN .84 & .88 MACH. PMS BGN MOVING THROTTLES FORE & AFT TO HOLD .85 MACH. DRG AUTOTHROTTLE ADJUSTMENTS, #4 ENG THRUST DECREASED & 'HUNG' AT APRX 1.0 EPR & AIRSPEED BGN DECREASING. FLT ENGINEER ATMTD TO MANUALLY RCVR THE #4 ENG THRUST, BUT DID NOT CLOSE THE BLEED AIR VLV BFR ADJUSTING THE #4 THROTTLE. THE #4 ENG REMAINED AT APRX 1.0 EPR. AS THE ACFT SLOWED, AUTOPLT TRIMMED TO HOLD ALT & HDG TIL THE PLT DISENGAGED IT. AT THAT TIME, ACFT ROLLED/YAWED RGT & ENTERED AN UNCTLD DSCNT INTO THE CLOUDS. AS IT BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT 11,000', CREW RCVRD & LVLD AT 9500'. DRG DSCNT/RCVRY, ACFT WAS DMGD BY ACCELLERATION FORCES & HI SPEED. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THE PLT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH ENG PRBLM, DIDN'T MONITOR INSTRUMENTS & OVER-RELIED ON AUTOPLT.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

FLIGHT/NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT(S)..INATTENTIVE..PILOT IN COMMAND
DIVERTED ATTENTION..PILOT IN COMMAND
AIRSPEED..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
FLIGHT CONTROLS..IMPROPER USE OF..PILOT IN COMMAND
AIRCRAFT HANDLING..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
DESIGN STRESS LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT..EXCEEDED..PILOT IN COMMAND

Contributing Factors

WEATHER CONDITION..UNFAVORABLE WIND
WEATHER CONDITION..WINDSHEAR
WEATHER CONDITION..TURBULENCE,CLEAR AIR
OVERCONFIDENCE IN AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY..PILOT IN COMMAND

Terrain Impact Due to Poor Instrument Scan/Loss of Control (similar to Colgan Air Q400):

Accident occurred Thursday, January 12, 1989 in TIPP CITY, OH
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/10/1990
Aircraft: HAWKER SIDDELEY HS.748 SERIES 2A, registration: CGDOV
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
DRG NGT CARGO OPN, CHECK CAPT (RGT SEAT) WAS EVALUATING THE 1ST OFFICER (F/O, LEFT SEAT) FOR PSBL UPGRADE TO CAPT. BFR DEPG, FLT WAS CLRD FOR RGT TURN AFTER TKOF TO 020 DEG. TKOF BGN AT 0441:11. WTR/METHANOL INJECTION WAS USED (TO 1ST PWR RDCN). AT 0441:49, LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED; 8 SEC LTR 1ST PWR RDCN WAS MADE, THEN A FREQ CHG WAS APPROVED. CAPT NOTED THEY SHLD CLB TO 1500' MSL (APRX 500' AGL) BFR TURNING. AT ABT 300' AGL, ACFT ENTERED OVC & BGN A STEEP RGT TURN. CVR INDCD CAPT WAS PERFORMING COCKPIT DUTIES AT THIS TIME & GIVING INFO TO F/O ABT THE DEP. FDR SHOWED ACFT RCHD MAX ALT OF 423' AGL & BGN DSCNDG. AT 0442:22, CAPT REMARKED TO F/O, 'DON'T GO DOWN . . . GET UP . . . UP UP UP . . . UP, OH!' AT ABT THAT TIME, ACFT HIT IN AN OPEN FLD, BUT CONTD FLYING FOR APRX 3/4 MI. IT THEN HIT A TREE & CRASHED IN A WOODED AREA.INV REVEALED THAT DRG SVRL TRNG FLTS & 2 CHECK FLTS, THE F/O DEMONSTRATED DIFFICULTY IN PERFORMING INSTRUMENT FLT DUE TODISORIENTATION, NARROW FOCUS OF ATTENTION, OR LACK OF INSTRUMENT SCAN (INST FIXATION), ESPECIALLY DRG HI TASK WORK LOAD.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

IMPROPER IFR PROCEDURE BY THE FIRST OFFICER (COPILOT) DURING TAKEOFF, HIS LACK OF INSTRUMENT SCAN (IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT/NAVIGATION INSTRUMENTS), HIS FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A POSITIVE RATE OF CLIMB OR TO IDENTIFY THE RESULTANT DESCENT, AND THE CAPTAIN'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF THE FLIGHT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: DARK NIGHT, LOW CEILING, DRIZZLE, THE FIRST OFFICER'S LACK OF TOTAL EXPERIENCE IN THE TYPE OF OPERATION, AND POSSIBLE SPATIAL DISORIENTATION OF THE FIRST OFFICER.


Accident Due to Stall Resulting From Failure to Confirm flap Position (same as Spanair):

Accident occurred Sunday, August 16, 1987 in ROMULUS, MI
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/28/1989
Aircraft: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-82, registration: N312RC
Injuries: 156 Fatal, 2 Serious, 4 Minor.

NORTHWEST FLT 255 (NW255) CRASHED AFTER TAKEOFF FM RWY 3C AT DETROIT METRO AIRPORT. WITNESSES SAID NW255 ROTATED FOR TAKEOFF 1200-1500 FT FROM THE END AND LIFTED OFF NR THE END OF THE 8500 FT RWY. AFTER LIFTOFF, THE WINGS ROCKED LT AND RT AND THE ACFT FAILED TO CLIMB NORMALLY. 18 FEET OF THE LT WING SEPARATED WHEN THE WING CONTACTED A LIGHT POLE 2760 FT BEYOND THE RWY END. THE ACFT ROLLED STEEPLY TO THE LEFT AND STRUCK POLES, A BLDG, AND AUTOMOBILES BEFORE CRASHING INTO A RAILROAD EMBANKMENT. THE ACFT WAS DESTROYED. THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THE FLAPS AND SLATS WERE IN THE UP/RETRACT POSITION AND HAD NOT BEEN DEPLOYED FOR TKOF. NEITHER PLT RECITED THE ITEMS OF THE TAXI CKLIST. STALL WARNINGS WERE ANNUNCIATED BUT AN AURAL TKOF WARNING WAS NOT ANNUNCIATED BY THE CENTRAL AURAL WARNING SYSTEM (CAWS). IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT 28 VOLT DC PWR WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE CAWS PWR SUPPLY #2. THE REASON FOR THE LOSS OF ELECTRICAL PWR WAS TRACED TO A CIRCUIT BRKR BUT NO MALF OF THE CB WAS FND. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, SEE NTSB/AAR-88/05.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

CHECKLIST..NOT PERFORMED..PILOT IN COMMAND
LOWERING OF FLAPS..NOT PERFORMED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
LOWERING OF SLATS..NOT PERFORMED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT

Contributing Factors

WARNING SYSTEM(OTHER)..DISABLED


Terrain Impact Due to Poor IFR Procedure (similar in some respects to Yemenia A310):

Accident occurred Monday, April 13, 1987 in KANSAS CITY, MO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/6/1989
Aircraft: BOEING 707-351C, registration: N144SP
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
DRG ARR, BUFFALO AIRWAYS FLT 721 WAS VECTORED FOR AN ILS RWY 1 APCH. EXCEPT FOR DEVIATIONS TO AVOID TSTMS, DSCNT TO THE TERMINAL AREA WAS ROUTINE. AT 2151:01, THE FLT WAS ADZD IT WAS 5 MI FM THE OUTER MARKER (OM), WAS GIVEN A FINAL VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE ILS LOCALIZER (LOC) AT 2400' & WAS CLRD FOR THE APCH. AT 2153:07, THE FLT RPRTD OVR THE OM 'INBOUND.' AT THAT TIME, THE LCL CTLR (LC) WARNED THE FLT TO 'CHECK ALT IMMEDIATELY,' & THAT IT WAS SUPPOSE TO BE AT 2400'. SHORTLYTHEREAFTER, AN MSAW (MIN SAFE ALT WARNING) ALERT WAS ACTIVATED. THE LC WARNED FLT 721 THAT HE HAD RCVD AN MSAW ALERT & ADZD IT TO CLB TO 2400'. FLT 721 DID NOT RESPOND BY RADIO TO EITHER SAFETY ADZY. THE ACFT CRASHED APRX 3 MI SHORT OF RWY 1. THE OM ALT WAS 2400'; DECISION HGT (DH) FOR APCH WAS 1211'. FDR & RADAR DATA SHOWED THE ACFT PASSED THE OM AT 1700'. THE CVR REVEALED THE FO GAVE ALT INFO IN 100' INCREMENTS DWN TO THE DH, BUT DID NOT ADZ THE CAPT OF THE ALT ERRORAT THE OM OR RPRT THE RWY NOT IN SIGHT AT THE DH. THE GND PROXIMITY WARNING SYS (GPWS) DID NOT WARN THE CREW.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

IFR PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
DECISION HEIGHT..DISREGARDED..PILOT IN COMMAND
UNSAFE/HAZARDOUS CONDITION WARNING..DISREGARDED..PILOT IN COMMAND

Contributing Factors

GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM..FAILURE,TOTAL
CREW/GROUP COORDINATION..INADEQUATE

[safetypee]

Many people cite automation and the lack of stick and rudder skills as being a major contribution in ‘modern’ accidents.
If, in this case disorientation is a major factor, then it’s the interaction with instruments and displays which should be considered – an aspect seen in other accidents.
Flying a manual visual approach does little to enhance instrument flying skills and currency. Similarly, much of the current automation training overlooks the mechanism of monitoring the aircraft by scanning all of the flight instruments – how to check the output of automation; understand what the aircraft is actually doing, as opposed to what it might do.
Instead, there is focus on input selection and mode annunciation, and monitoring via the FD (probably the same source of computation as the autos).

Instrument flying is an interactive skill between a depiction of the real world and aircraft control, one of situation awareness, and a need to balance differing and occasionally erroneous sensory inputs – you have to believe the instruments.
The use of automation weakens the interaction as the pilot does not have to make the control inputs and also does not have this movement as a datum, although hands-on monitoring of those controls which do have feedback will provide some information.

Thus, inappropriate use of automation (poor monitoring) can erode instrument flying skills.
There are risks of reduced situation awareness due to lack of scanning, leading to unwanted maneuver (loss of control), and loss of the key defenses against disorientation.

[Dakota719]

There has been some very interesting discussion about hand flying versus automation, disorientation or “somatographic illusion”, and many other topics.
The experts on this thread are very good at describing , from a cockpit perspective, how a pilot can go wrong and crash an airplane on approach or go around. TOGA tap, how engine power can overcome the pilot’s ability/training/awareness/confidence/composure, and all that.

The elephant in the room is the physical evidence of the wreckage, and I would like to hear from the experts who can readily come up with a scenario of how to crash an airplane from the perspective of the cockpit and pilot, and connect those scenarios with the wreckage on the ground, because there is no way I visualize the scenarios discussed creating the results on the ground. The airplane is shredded and scattered over more than 800 meters. What is the explanation for where the wings ended up
?
Is there an expert out there who can connect the dots? ?? ??
　

[Capn Bloggs]

Safetypee, I agree, and I would go further and say that without hands-on manual flying, one's instrument scan WILL degrade and the chance of disorientation will increase, as will the inability to manually fly when the chips are down. The physical interaction between hand (and feet) movements and resulting changes in attitude as observed by the eyes/brain is critical in maintaining IF skills. One will never get any benefit from simply watching, even intently, what the aircraft does on the automatics, regardless of how long you do it.

[stepwilk]

Whatever happened to the "Sacred Six"?

Depending on how many readers have no idea what I'm talking about, there's your answer.

[Capn Bloggs]

Whatever happened to the "Sacred Six"?

I'll bite. Please explain? :)

[iceman50]

"Sacred Six"

Probably talking about SCAN!

Some call it "T" or "selective radial".

Common language separated by "colloquialisms".

[ELAC]

stepwilk,

Whatever happened to the "Sacred Six"?

Depending on how many readers have no idea what I'm talking about, there's your answer.


The six pack is more like a box lunch these days. The same stuff, but all on one or two plates now instead of sperate tins if you will. Overall better, but the eyes don't move quite the same way they used to.

ELAC

[MurphyWasRight]

Safetypee,
I agree, and I would go further and say that without hands-on manual flying, one's instrument scan WILL degrade and the chance of disorientation will increase, as will the inability to manually fly when the chips are down.
The physical interaction between hand (and feet) movements and resulting changes in attitude as observed by the eyes/brain is critical in maintaining IF skills. One will never get any benefit from simply watching, even intently, what the aircraft does on the automatics, regardless of how long you do it.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs : Yesterday at 22:30.


One thought would be to create a "skill honing" mode in the automation that would allow pilot input but still keep the plane within a safe box of altitude and heading etc.
Within that box the pilot would be in control of the aircraft, yet the overall safety gains (perceived or real :) )from automation would be preserved.

I have no idea if this is realistic from either a techical or regulatory view.

[aterpster]

ELAC:
So, prove it. Provide a data set that proves your hypothesis.

And, please come up with something more than just one off anecdotals that don't provide any statistical significance or a basis for comparison.

When I flew the line I was a ALPA technical safety representative for most of my line carrer. I am still quite active in that arena and have been so since I retired. So, I am not exactly sitting around fishing. I interface with those active in the industry on an almost daily basis. (I've even flow a flew RNP AR approaches in a 737-800 simulator with all the latest and greatest stuff.)

A whole lot came out of Colgan 3407. It was a very extensive investigation. I personally worked on the Comair 5191 "constant chatter" wrong runway crash.

This is a link to a relevant article in the current issue of the ALPA Magazine. Note in particular "Talking Points" on the second page:

http://www.terps.com/safety/alpa.pdf

[aterpster]

ELAC:
The six pack is more like a box lunch these days. The same stuff, but all on one or two plates now instead of sperate tins if you will. Overall better, but the eyes don't move quite the same way they used to.

All the same information is there as in a "steam guage" airplane. Only with electronics and optimal symbology it is presented far better in the current generation airplanes.

Any skilled attitude instrument pilot has an easier time hand-flying a state-of-the-art presentation than with the old "T."

[stepwilk]

"All the same information is there as in a "steam gauge" airplane. Only with electronics and optimal symbology it is presented far better in the current generation airplanes."

I've spent minimal time in glass-cockpit airplanes--a few business jets, Cirrus lightplanes--and of course I agree that the presentation is far better, but I wonder...there's -more- information presented than with the old analog AH/DG/airspeed/altimeter/RoC/T&B array, which for some might be challenging, particularly Cirrus-type pilots. I also wonder if there's more opportunity for fixation on one or another parameter than there was with the constant scan that used to be the basic Sacred Six technique.

Admittedly, I write as a 3,000-hour GA pilot with a Citation type rating, so any "opinion" I might have is pretty useless in this forum. Here to learn.

[safetypee]

- ELAC, the problem is not only the lack of ‘a six pack’ or using the two plates; these have been replaced by a ‘straw’ – the FD – everything being sucked up via a single cue.

- Murphy, I don’t think that it necessary to design something new to hone skills. Pilots have to be willing to improve existing skills; this requires commitment, discipline, professionalism, pride. Many of these attributes are seen as ‘old fashioned’, but they are still essential for airmanship.

- aterpster, I would not necessarily agree that modern EFIS formats are easier to use when flying raw instrument procedures.
Yes, all of the information is there – and more (consider why). The display formats can differ, which often requires a change in the mechanism of extracting information from an instrument, e.g. compare the awareness of airspeed with respect to high / low limits; a dial shows the limits with numeric and angular relationship to them, a strip display may not show any limit and has no angular quality.
Often modern instrument training overlooks the subtitles of using new displays, particularly as there are more varying and complex situations, some of which cannot be flown with raw instruments.

Pilots have to know when and how to use instruments in context, and then how to manage a situation.
During a GA, attitude (as ever) is paramount – a target, a datum for further adjustment, and a stability reference both for the maneuver and the mental picture.
Instrument flying is based on this latter feature – the mental model, and this also provides the basis of negating disorientating effects.
Instead of forming an mental model by mixing what is seen on the flight instruments with body sensed information, pilots have to be prepared (practiced) in downgrading the (often very compelling) body sensed information and concentrating almost entirely on the visual input.
Furthermore, both pilots have to be aware of this need, as disorientation is one of the few hazards which can affect both pilots at the same time, and not necessarily be obvious to either one.

[MurphyWasRight]

Safetypee:

- Murphy, I don’t think that it necessary to design something new to hone skills. Pilots have to be willing to improve existing skills; this requires commitment, discipline, professionalism, pride. Many of these attributes are seen as ‘old fashioned’, but they are still essential for airmanship.


My suggestion was a possible way around the reluctance on the part of mangement to encourage (or even allow) hand flying during normal operations.

By keeping automation in the loop as an (arguably by some on this forum not needed) backup practicing skills could be encouraged without the (percevied only?) safety downside.

While probably totally boring in good conditions playing " beat the autopilot" could be skilll building in more challenging conditions, as you mentioned there is no substitute for actually "being in the loop" to aquire and maintain IF skills.

The "video game" nature of this probably would appeal most to the younger generation, who are likely the ones who could benefit the most.

[safetypee]

- Murphy, I appreciate the intent of your suggestion. However, using technology to change management attitudes may not be a good idea; on the other hand, … a desk and chair on a spin table to introduce disorientation - no, that's already the problem.

Of interest, a possible role for video game playing is discussed in New Scientist (25 May) (www.newscientist.com/article/mg20627613.200-slaying-stereotypes-about-video-games.html) where ‘gamers’ (in opposition to the typical sterotype), know how to gather resources and information, and they can solve problems ... and that gamers carry these attributes beyond the confines of the game into the real world. more info here. (www.johnseelybrown.com/gamer_disposition.pdf)

[ELAC]

aterpster,

When I flew the line I was a ALPA technical safety representative for most of my line carrer. I am still quite active in that arena and have been so since I retired. So, I am not exactly sitting around fishing. I interface with those active in the industry on an almost daily basis. (I've even flow a flew RNP AR approaches in a 737-800 simulator with all the latest and greatest stuff.)

A whole lot came out of Colgan 3407. It was a very extensive investigation. I personally worked on the Comair 5191 "constant chatter" wrong runway crash.

This is a link to a relevant article in the current issue of the ALPA Magazine. Note in particular "Talking Points" on the second page:

http://www.terps.com/safety/alpa.pdf

I'm not asking for your background credentials, I'm asking for the data that supports your conclusions. Facts, not opinions. The Colgan 3407 investigation is undoubtedly a thorough one with many appropriate findings, but it doesn't constitute a data set that proves a global diminishment in ability among pilots of this generation.

Based on your profile I accept that your credentials are good ones, though given that you retired 20 years ago I'm not sure that your appreciation of the nature of automation in current generation aircraft is the same as mine. That might also be suggested by your reference to a 737-800 as possessing "all the latest and greatest stuff", where I would consider it more of hybrid that is a deliberate cross between past and current generation technology and cockpit philosophy designed specifically to permit type certification in accordance with an over 40 year old original type certificate. If it matters, aside from almost 20 years hands on with the types we're talking about and time before that on good old round dialed 72's, I can pull out letters from ALPA safety thanking me for my presentations and contributions as well.

You seem not to be getting the basic points here which are that; one, a reflexive blaming of automation as the source (one way or the other) for current accidents is not justified based on the data; two, that prescribing "more hand flying, less use of automation" as an automatic curative for this perceived problem is not necessarily going to provide a real safety benefit; and three, that this generation of pilots does not deserve the disresprect of their professionalism as a group that you bestow on them when you as a fellow professional come out with trite one liners like: "I believe there is a consensus on this forum that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad".

The data doesn't support this, and the only real "consensus" on the matter seems to come from those who have never operated these type of aircraft, or often have never operated large aircraft at all. If your own experience with the equipment we're talking about comes down to a few approaches in a 738 sim one day, you would be a perfect example. Have you ever even set foot in an Airbus, 777 or other current generation cockpit? How much time have you spent observing in which instances the automation helps and where it hinders? Have you noticed the changing nature of some of the other tasks that go on in flight now versus 20 years ago? If the answers are "not much" perhaps you aren't getting the full flavour of how the system works as a whole. Some of your comments seem to reflect that.

Now, if you want to talk about improvements in hiring, training and qualification standards intended to produce improvements in the safety of flight operations, I'm all on your side. We both have the same goal in mind. I don't agree with a lot of where the industry is headed in terms of reducing the amount or quality of training that pilots receive and I can agree that there is still adaption that is required in design, in procedures, and in training for this generation of aircraft if we are to get the highest overall result in terms of safe operation. To do that though, we can't let ourselves get sucked into simplistic, reductive prescriptions like "less auto, more manual". The problems and the solutions demand more nuanced thinking than that.

Cheers,

ELAC

[ELAC]

safetypee,

ELAC, the problem is not only the lack of ‘a six pack’ or using the two plates; these have been replaced by a ‘straw’ – the FD – everything being sucked up via a single cue.

Yes, I'd agree there, though the FD isn't really an innovation that's particular to the EFIS/auto generation of aircraft. Perhaps it can be seen as the original form of flight guidance/control automation. I'm sure that at it's introduction there were many who bemoaned what it would do to scan abilities, but how many now believe that its implementation has been detrimental to safe and precise aircraft operation?


Cheers,

ELAC

[BOAC]

......not forgetting of course the disastrous effect the introduction of the artificial horizon had on scan.

[ELAC]

BOAC,

......not forgetting of course the disastrous effect the introduction of the artificial horizon had on scan.

Well, really it was only when they decided to colour the sky side blue that things started to go downhill. When it was just a white line on a black ball, well then, of course, your scan need to be on top of things and life was great.:)

[aterpster]

ELAC:
You seem not to be getting the basic points here which are that; one, a reflexive blaming of automation as the source (one way or the other) for current accidents is not justified based on the data; two, that prescribing "more hand flying, less use of automation" as an automatic curative for this perceived problem is not necessarily going to provide a real safety benefit; and three, that this generation of pilots does not deserve the disresprect of their professionalism as a group that you bestow on them when you as a fellow professional come out with trite one liners like: "I believe there is a consensus on this forum that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad".

You seem to be fixated on my statement that "far too many..." means "most" or "all." You cannot hold me to that, no matter how hard you try. If only a few non-European/U.S. carriers such as Turkish Air have the serious problems demonstrated in the crash at Ansterdam, then that is far too many. Colgan Air certainly qualifies as did the various crew interviews by the NTSB at Comair reveal similar systemic problems.

The ALPA article I posted supports all of this.

My statement about the 737-800 and "the latest and greatest" is that it is certified to do RNP AR to RNP 0.11. There is a very large segment of today's air carrier fleet than can still only do the same "1950s" IAPs that I did throughout my career, and are still done by most carriers today.

As to whether I ever set foot on a 777 or Airbus, yes indeed. for my 10 years of consulting to ALPA after retirement I went back and forth from the west coast to IAD quite often. I had an ALPA/FAA jump seat authority and the EASC insisted I ride the jump seat as much as possible. I had several long legs on the 777 and a few on the old Airbus. Such jump seat passes were cancelled after "911."

I chatted a lot with all the 777 crews, some of which had previously flown the 767 as had I. We seemed to agree that the autoflight didn't really do much more than the 767, but lots of other things, such as FMS data, and electronic check lists were big improvements.

I had a connection at UAL that got me on a so-called VIP floor tour of the 777 assembly building in Everett. That was interesting and provided some additional insight into that airplane, especially since our tour guide was UAL's senior acceptance engineer on the 777 project.

The instrumentation on he 777 is certainly much more advanced than the 767. Then again, so is the Garmin G-1000, which I toy around with today to stay current with non-AR RNAV procedures.

I standby my premise: that in a 777, for example, the pilot who is proficient at hand-flying the airplance often enough to maintain proficiency without automatics, has a resource availble to him or her that could save the day on a bad day. OTOH, for routine operations, especially with low-IFR approach conditions, the automatics should be (and are) the normal mode of operation.

BTW, are you RNP AR qualified?

[bearfoil]

At one time, a/c were designed for and catered to, pilots. The flip side is that it is too easy to say that now, pilots cater to a/c. The yoke on the 777 weighs thirty pounds, (each) the side stick (s) on the 330 weigh ten ounces. An accountant knows which a/c is "better", and if it was that simple, the discussion would disappear.

[RetiredF4]

Automation has its great benefits, as mentioned before i would have been glad if i had more of it. (I did my ATPL training on a Caravelle simulator, and was not allowed to use the autopilot).
But again: Is it used in a manner, which ensures the greatest amount of improvement in safety? If it leads to lowering of standard for hiring and training of pilots, than it is used the wrong way. Now i dont let you from the hook on that one, dont come again with your song we are against automation. We are against the fallout, automation has brought with it. As i mentioned before, it is a management problem. Everything has to come cheap, and the pilots and their training has to be cheapest. And because the flying toys are better handling without any pilots interfering, there seems to be no need for a good pilot anymore, but great need for cheap pilots. And they are not only cheap, they are interchangeable as well.

See your statement below.


Now, if you want to talk about improvements in hiring, training and qualification standards intended to produce improvements in the safety of flight operations, I'm all on your side. We both have the same goal in mind. I don't agree with a lot of where the industry is headed in terms of reducing the amount or quality of training that pilots receive and I can agree that there is still adaption that is required in design, in procedures, and in training for this generation of aircraft if we are to get the highest overall result in terms of safe operation.

I´m 100% with you on that one, and i can´t imagine somebody would object.


To do that though, we can't let ourselves get sucked into simplistic, reductive prescriptions like "less auto, more manual". The problems and the solutions demand more nuanced thinking than that.



"less auto, more manual" is again your simpistic interpretation of the warning voices. As long as there is a manual capability in the aircraft and depending circumstances the need to use it, it has to be trained in a adequate way.
Come up with a better idea, how eroding handflying and instrument skills can be stopped. I dont think there is the money in the system to have special training aircraft available like NASA has for their astronauts. I´m looking forward to the nuanced thinking of the industry to solve this task, and more so how long it will take. And who will start with this thinking?
- The employers?
- The flying schools?
- The unions?
- The accident investigators?
- The old pilots?
- The bold pilots?
- The new generation pilots?

Big surprise who it will be.

franzl

[safetypee]

The change in current standards being debated has been a gradual one; automation came of age with the Trident (Cat 3 approach – the FD was only single channel and could not be used for monitoring). More recently, the advances in technology have enabled much wider use of FDs, and many applications such as in HUD are highly reliable.
All of this encourages ‘automation’ complacency (even dependency), but this attitude may only occur if the old standards are not defended.
The industry appears to have accepted the benefits of modern technology, and with a few exceptions, forgotten or overlooked the many pitfalls.

Recent accidents which may have involved disorientation / loss of control suggest that specific manoeuvres should be considered as requiring additional training, especially as the occurrence of these situations appears to be decreasing, e.g. GA.
Some parts of the industry has to accept the need for more skill-and-proficiency training in high technology aircraft in return for the benefits from increased capability and lower cost of ownership.

Solutions for this must come initially from the regulatory authorities, but the operators (operating policies) and individuals (SOP permitting) can make a significant difference to their own capabilities by hand flying in instrument conditions.

However as a sceptic, I doubt that the industry will see any significant change in the immediate future; attempts to regulate safety are slow and tortuous, and can be delayed by operators. Many operators see the use of automation as ‘safety’ without considering emerging opportunities for error. Some individuals do not see themselves as being threatened (‘it won’t happen to me’, or they believe that their skills are better than they actually are), thus professional standards will continue to be effected by the pressures of current changes and demands of economics.

A caveat; overall the industry is very safe, and the vast majority of pilots have the necessary skills and professionalism. The task is to weed out the less capable and improve the overall standard. This is a system / organisational issue, and not an issue of blaming individuals with the hindsight of an accident.

[ELAC]

aterpster,

You seem to be fixated on my statement that "far too many..." means "most" or "all." You cannot hold me to that, no matter how hard you try. If only a few non-European/U.S. carriers such as Turkish Air have the serious problems demonstrated in the crash at Ansterdam, then that is far too many. Colgan Air certainly qualifies as did the various crew interviews by the NTSB at Comair reveal similar systemic problems.
....

I standby my premise: that in a 777, for example, the pilot who is proficient at hand-flying the airplance often enough to maintain proficiency without automatics, has a resource availble to him or her that could save the day on a bad day. OTOH, for routine operations, especially with low-IFR approach conditions, the automatics should be (and are) the normal mode of operation.

BTW, are you RNP AR qualified?

Yes, to a degree perhaps I am fixating on your "far too many" statement. But, "If only a few ... is far too many", well there have always been "a few", so what exactly is new under the sun? What is the qualitative difference, aside from fatalities, between THY at AMS versus the SAS DC-10 accident at JFK in the 80's? In terms of accidents and their causes a few has always been too many. The import of your remark was that the mean pilot ability of this generation to safely operate their aircraft is declining due to a reduction in skill at hand flying and an over-reliance on automation. So far you haven't presented data that supports that conclusion.

The Colgan Air report contains many very salient observations about hiring, training and proficiency monitoring, especially as it relates to the U.S. regional carrier sector, but it does not provide the basis for a "global" conclusion that there is a broad change in the overall safety with which pilots are operating their aircraft. When you examine only the failures in a process without also considering the successes you can end up with skewed conclusions about what you should do to improve the success of the system as a whole. This is what I think has been happening with how the discussion related to automation/hand flying has evolved.

Regarding your premise as now stated, which to me is not the same one as you started out with, I would agree with you that a higher degree of hand flying proficiency is always better than the opposite, and in some instances it may save the day. The question is: What is the best method of encouraging and improving that proficiency without returning or introducing other risk factors to the system? It's not as simple as just saying "hand fly more often", or "reduce use of automation" which is the solution that a number of people in your "consensus here" seem intent on proposing.

About RNP AR qualification, the answer is no, the regulatory authority that has jurisdiction over my carrier has yet to implement that standard, and as a consequence it is not in use with my company. But then, what does that have to do with the price of tea in China?


Regards,

ELAC

[CONF iture]

the problem is not only the lack of ‘a six pack’ or using the two plates; these have been replaced by a ‘straw’ – the FD – everything being sucked up via a single cue.

This is a very correct statement.
Only flying manual without FD is telling the true story : Do you still have it or you definitly need to reevaluate yourself ?

[ELAC]

franzl,

Automation has its great benefits, as mentioned before i would have been glad if i had more of it. (I did my ATPL training on a Caravelle simulator, and was not allowed to use the autopilot).
But again: Is it used in a manner, which ensures the greatest amount of improvement in safety? If it leads to lowering of standard for hiring and training of pilots, than it is used the wrong way. Now i dont let you from the hook on that one, dont come again with your song we are against automation. We are against the fallout, automation has brought with it. As i mentioned before, it is a management problem. Everything has to come cheap, and the pilots and their training has to be cheapest. And because the flying toys are better handling without any pilots interfering, there seems to be no need for a good pilot anymore, but great need for cheap pilots. And they are not only cheap, they are interchangeable as well.

Is it used in a manner which ensures the greatest improvement in safety? Great question, I think we'd both agree the answer is not yet.

Is it leading to a lowering of standards for hiring and training, probably so, it's one factor. But, that is not the fault of automation or philosophies of its use, nor does it imply that we should change the way we use automation to create a higher minimum standard of competence. You say that you are against the fallout that automation has brought with it. I'd suggest that automation didn't bring the fallout and that the pressures would be very much the same regardless. Diminishment of available skilled resources, growth of carriers in nations without lower level industry and infrastructure and increased economic competion are all factors in this, and let's not kid ourselves cost has always been an issue. Part of our role in the industry is to defend training and proficiency standards and if there's a problem there it's our job to make a sufficiently compelling case for why they need to be set differently.

As long as there is a manual capability in the aircraft and depending circumstances the need to use it, it has to be trained in a adequate way. Come up with a better idea, how eroding handflying and instrument skills can be stopped.

I agree. But we do nothing if the better way involves adopting practices that result in an overall reduction in the safety of the system. Hand flying is only one part of the job, and the need for a better way has to be stated as: "Come up with a way of improving hand flying skill that does not erode the safety of the system as a whole." So far that distinction hasn't featured much in the discussion.

Cheers,

ELAC

PS - Making pilots "interchangeable" has always been objective whether they were cheap or expensive. In terms of standardizing procedures that's basically a good thing. Possibly you mean the process of replacing expensive pilots from one source with cheap ones from another, but that's a whole different kettle of fish.

[Capn Bloggs]

ELAC,
It's not as simple as just saying "hand fly more often"
It is that simple. Just do it at the appropriate time. This is not asking for a super-human effort on the part of your pilots. For goodness sake, their job is to fly the aeroplane when all else fails. If it is considered too risky to let them hand-fly in good conditions then they shouldn't be in the cockpit, and management and the regulator should not allow them to be there.

[ELAC]

Capn Bloggs,

It is that simple. Just do it at the appropriate time. This is not asking for a super-human effort on the part of your pilots. For goodness sake, their job is to fly the aeroplane when all else fails. If it is considered too risky to let them hand-fly in good conditions then they shouldn't be in the cockpit, and management and the regulator should not allow them to be there.

No, it's not quite that simple. First let's be clear that I'm not advocating against all manual flying, I definitely believe it has its place in normal operations. What I'm saying is that advocating a policy of encouraging more manual flying and reducing the use of automation may bring with it unintended increases in the total system risk versus present practice without producing an offsetting improvement that is of value. I also think it may be resulting from a misdiagnosis of the root causes of the errors being cited to support the idea.

Having spent some time watching such things in some diverse environments and cockpit cultures I've seen that this theory definitely brings with it its own risks. One is that "appropriate time" and "good conditions" are phrases that can be bent in very different directions by different individuals. There will always be a few who view them as licence to go manual just about anywhere at any time, or more importantly the wrong somewhere at the wrong time. That is going to happen n times out of a 1000. The result may be a ropey approach outside of stabilization criteria, a botched one with a g/a, an overtasked PM who misses something that he should have been doing because he's preoccupied with either FCU/MCP inputs being directed by the PF, or perhaps needing to call out exceedances and corrections to the PF, and etc. Those can be considered as extra risks introduced to the system as a result of the policy.

Another consideration might be that if we broke down the pilot group into skill levels we'd find that the results of more manual approaches would be something like: little change in skill for those already most proficient, marginal improvement for those with average ability but good judgment who consequently limit themselves to doing manual approaches at appropriate times in good conditions (which by definition are less challenging), reasonable improvement in ability by those of below average skill but good judgement, but offset by increase in risk from replacing auto with manual when they are weak in the skill, and quite possibly no improvement in skill but a significant increase in risk for the small group who fall into the below average ability and below average judgement category. This is the group least likely to be aware when they choose the wrong place to practice a skill which is not up to snuff and needs improvement. You might say, well they shouldn't be there at all, and this would show them up, but the truth is there will always be a small percentage in this category, and the means for finding and improving them should not be the readout of a FOQA event or worse. So the point is, will we gain enough from improving the pilots who already have average/good skills and judgement (and consequently are already operating pretty safely as operating statistics attest) to offset what we will lose from those few who are deficient in one, the other, or both who will increase risk if we implement a policy of encouraging a greater amount of hand flying.

It's not as simple a calculation as it might seem at first blush. Perhaps this seems contrarian compared to the accepted wisdom of some, but this sort of calculus is what you need to consider before you change a component in a safety system.

ELAC

[Plastic Bug]

Man ELAC,

That's a LOT of words. You working on a dissertation or something?

Oh, you just did.

One can debate the number of nuns who can dance on the head of a pin until the cows come home, but the bottom line is that if a Pilot cannot demonstrate an ability, proficiently, to hand fly an approach to minimums, by hand, on the needles, using raw data, that pilot should NOT be allowed to land the aircraft on automation.

Automation is great, makes things safe and all that, but SOMEBODY has to know how to actually fly the dang thing when the whiz bang stuff goes on walkabout.

And I'm just the guy who makes sure that the wings stay attached. And the auto pilot works. And the toilets work. And the IFE works. Yada Yada Yada

What do I know, just saying...

PB

[PBL]

ELAC is spending, yes, a lot of words making a point. He is also, as far as I can see, slowly winning across to his point various others who might have thought they disagreed with it.

It is a subtle point, and he and other discussants are raising the level of this discussion considerably by debating it. Thank you all!

Let me be parasitic on it by restating the main thesis I take him to be arguing. Given that raising the overall skill level of the professional pilot community is agreed to be a Good Thing; would that overall skill level, in terms strictly of reducing the frequency of accidents, be enhanced by a general policy of encouraging "hand-flying" highly-automated aircraft whenever "the opportunity arises"?

It is a hard question to answer. A risk analysis is appropriate, but this analysis suffers from considerable uncertainty in many of its parameters. ELAC performs the beginnings of one by (a) looking at some accident data in terms of general number of operational hours in the fleet, and (b) performing a qualitative, discrete analysis by considering different pilot classes and the various hazards, representing possibly increased risk, associated with a pilot in each class exercising a choice to hand-fly in line operations.

That is the way to start the debate. This forum is one of the few places in which people not constrained by the policies of their organisation can discuss it freely.

PBL

[BOAC]

All this discussion is indeed good, but on the wrong forum! We still do not know what caused the accident. Disorientation? A failed attempt at manual flight? Simple minima bust?

Safety and CRM is the place for this, indeed valuable discussion.

So, back at the the scene of THIS crash.

That well-known 'reliable' journal, the WSJ says:
"When the jet was at roughly 1,000 feet in altitude and about a minute from touching down, according to people familiar with the details, the pilots reacted to some type of ground-proximity warning."

If this is not just WSJ rubbish, anyone know:-
1) Where this 'info' came from?
2) Was the warning on the way down first time (as suggested)
way up
or
way down second time?

The other thing that I cannot compute is the horizontal distance travelled. If we take a typical approach groundspeed of, say 140kts, how far could the a/c travel to allow for a g/a at DH (presumably at or near MAP?) a pitch up and a subsequent nose-over and crash and the bits finish up where they are?

Does the cartology not favour the original initial impact and break up theory?

[ELAC]

PB,

Man ELAC,

That's a LOT of words. You working on a dissertation or something?

Oh, you just did.

One can debate the number of nuns who can dance on the head of a pin until the cows come home, but the bottom line is that if a Pilot cannot demonstrate an ability, proficiently, to hand fly an approach to minimums, by hand, on the needles, using raw data, that pilot should NOT be allowed to land the aircraft on automation.

Automation is great, makes things safe and all that, but SOMEBODY has to know how to actually fly the dang thing when the whiz bang stuff goes on walkabout.

And I'm just the guy who makes sure that the wings stay attached. And the auto pilot works. And the toilets work. And the IFE works. Yada Yada Yada

What do I know, just saying...

PB

Yeah, it is a lot of words. But then I'm trying to get some folks to go back and revisit a notion that they seem pretty fondly attached to. And for all those words, I think maybe you aren't taking in their meaning. I've never said that pilots who are not suitably proficient in hand flying should be permitted to simply go out there fly and rely on the automatics not failing.

All I'm saying is that; one, the evidence supporting that a lack of hand flying proficiency is a significant problem does not appear to exist; and two that increasing the frequency of manual flying as a cure for that supposed problem is not necessarily a solution that raises the overall safety of the operation.

Are those such difficult concepts to understand, or am just not doing a good job of communicating them? Neither point advocates that we tolerate a lack of proficiency, and if you wish to they could be read as suggesting that more costly means of maintaining proficiency than the "more manual flying" crowd seem to have considered might do a better job of upping the net safety of the system.

That's my opinion, but what do I know from 20 years of flying the beasts, you know, just saying ...

Looking forward to your dissertation,

ELAC

[ELAC]

PBL,

Thank you for boiling things down to their essence. This does get at what the discusion should be about.

BOAC,

You are indeed right about where the discussion belongs and I considered moving my remarks there after your first nudge. But, at the moment we seem to be in a bit of a lull in terms of the hard information regarding this accident, and the topic at hand has grown out of the discussion of the accident. So with nothing else being new it seemed worthwhile to keep the discussion where the audience already is for a bit longer.

I've said what I think needed saying so I'm willing to leave it at that unless there are other angles that some wish to discuss, in which case I'll be happy to follow your direction to the other thread.

I too wonder about what the supposed GPWS warning might really have been. As for an actual GPWS the only mode that they could have triggered if the aircraft was fully configure would be mode 1 vertical rate at ~3200 fpm. If their aircraft is equipped the same as the ones I fly they commenced the g/a before reaching the upper boundary of the mode 2b rate of closure warning. Another possibility might be a "Speed Speed" low energy warning that can get triggered if the crew is too aggressive in using drag to increase descent rate at lower airspeeds which could be consistent with an approach commenced from above the profile.

ELAC

[Teevee]

Just SLF here but becoming somewhat alarmed by this thread as I don't fly well at the best of times but I have a question for ELAC ...

That statement

"the evidence supporting that a lack of hand flying proficiency is a significant problem does not appear to exist;" begs the question as to what you would accept as examples of such evidence?

Obviously I note your use of the word 'significant' and I'm not offering this as evidence but I think I've read somewhere of a Thomson flight into Bournemouth in 2008 can't find the link right now which was forced to GA after a decay of speed on approach (when the AT dropped out unnoticed??) where hand flying skills certainly seem to have saved the day in a way in which they didn't at Buffalo ... but I do acknowledge I'm not a pilot and writing from a considerable degree of ignorance.

[Sir Richard]

You must be thinking of this......

Air Accidents Investigation: 3/2009 G-THOF (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/3_2009_g_thof.cfm)

[Phil Squares]

After sitting on the sidelines and watching this post grow and grow, I just wanted to add a couple of comments.

I have seen the data and I can assure you things went wrong prior to the missed approach. There are several issues that, hopefully, will appear in the accident report.

There was no spatial disorientation, at least, there is no evidence to suggest that in the CVR and I doubt if that will be mentioned in the final report at all.

What hopefully emerge is there are systemic problems that exist that led to the accident. I really don't want to go into any further detail right now. However, I think jaws will drop when the final report, data plot and CVR are released.

[CONF iture]

BOAC,
Something we can say is that usually 1000 feet AGL is about 3 miles final and one minute from touchdown is also somewhere between 2 and 3 miles final.
But these are criteria for a stabilized approach. Seeing how it all ended up, I have some doubt if that approach was a stabilized one ... What was the speed, what was the altitude, what was the ROD, 10 miles final, 3 miles final ... ?

Just publish the DFDR data, there is enough interest here (not to say knowledge) to think about all that.

The result may be a ropey approach outside of stabilization criteria, a botched one with a g/a, an overtasked PM who misses something that he should have been doing because he's preoccupied with either FCU/MCP inputs being directed by the PF, or perhaps needing to call out exceedances and corrections to the PF, and etc. Those can be considered as extra risks introduced to the system as a result of the policy.


You are correct in your assessment, but it could be about time to accept those temporary "extra risks" if you want to improve the overall situation in a near future.
If a crew is not comfortable with its manual flying during an approach, just press again the 2 or 3 buttons to give back the controls to the airplane.

[aterpster]

ELAC:

Yes, to a degree perhaps I am fixating on your "far too many" statement. But, "If only a few ... is far too many", well there have always been "a few", so what exactly is new under the sun?

What's new under the Sun is the total ineptness with the Turkish Air and Colgan crews; the obvious lack of basic attitude instrument flying skills.


About RNP AR qualification, the answer is no, the regulatory authority that has jurisdiction over my carrier has yet to implement that standard, and as a consequence it is not in use with my company. But then, what does that have to do with the price of tea in China?

It's pertinent because you come across as being a state-of-the-art pilot unlike those of us who have been "expelled from the club." Sounds like your operations today are much like what we did in the Dark Ages. :)

[GarageYears]

Phil Squares:

What hopefully emerge is there are systemic problems that exist that led to the accident. I really don't want to go into any further detail right now. However, I think jaws will drop when the final report, data plot and CVR are released.

If the problems referred to here are 'systematic' then it is of the utmost urgency to have the report released as soon as possible, because the implication is that these same 'issues' most likely still exist right now. So the ticking time bomb is still counting down? :(

- GY

[Neptunus Rex]

First it was Sitting Bull; now we have Phil Squares, both smugly telling us that they know what happened but are not prepared to divulge their secrets.
If, for some good reason, they cannot say what happened, why are they revealing that they have such knowledge?
I couldn't possibly comment!

[Phil Squares]

First it was Sitting Bull; now we have Phil Squares, both smugly telling us that they know what happened but are not prepared to divulge their secrets.
If, for some good reason, they cannot say what happened, why are they revealing that they have such knowledge?
I couldn't possibly comment!

First of all, the only reason I made any comments on this post was because of the direction it had taken. The thoughts on this subject are way off! I merely wanted to get this topic back where it needs to be.

I am not at liberty to say what the DFDR/CVR has revealed. However, I will say, there are fundamental issues that need to be addressed. The problems that resulted in the loss of the aircraft were the result of many issues, some within the airline, some external to the airline. But, the bottom line is going to be the majority of the fault will go to the crew. In reality, it's more a breakdown of the concept of a "crew".

If the problems referred to here are 'systematic' then it is of the utmost urgency to have the report released as soon as possible, because the implication is that these same 'issues' most likely still exist right now. So the ticking time bomb is still counting down?

I will say that measures are already in place and others are being implemented to ensure this does not happen again at 8U. There will be some very painful days ahead but in the end, the carrier should be a better place.

[PJ2]

PBL, ELAC;
. . . but a significant increase in risk for the small group who fall into the below average ability and below average judgement category. This is the group least likely to be aware when they choose the wrong place to practice a skill which is not up to snuff and needs improvement. You might say, well they shouldn't be there at all, and this would show them up, but the truth is there will always be a small percentage in this category, and the means for finding and improving them should not be the readout of a FOQA event or worse.
FOQA/FDA/FDM flight data analysis programs, where conceived and implemented as serious trending and risk tools where the concepts of "precursors to accidents" is understood by operations/training people, and providing there is appropriate, active, daily engagement with the tools between the safety and operations/training people which means FOQA results are routinely, regularly discussed between these groups and taken seriously as indications of the operation and not either disbelieved or denied and hidden, are capable of extending understanding of this aspect of the operation and can in fact pin-point such operational safety problems very accurately. I have seen this work in flight data analysis.

If SOP or skill-related, it would of course be the responsibility of the operations (standards and training) people to determine how best to resolve issues and certainly precursors highlighted by an active FOQA program would assist any such response. Where insituted, trusted and supported by formal agreement between management and the pilots' representative association, providing such circumstances warrant, the (non-management) pilot association gatekeeper can, by crew contact, almost always with the captain first, enquire as to what happened which provides context for the event. Such contact provides informal means by which change can occur through de-identified feedback to operations and training.

Sometimes, in more serious excursions, training is indicated, even up to a more robust intervention, (off roster pending successful training) depending upon circumstances.

I know that this process works successfully.

PBL states:It is a hard question to answer. A risk analysis is appropriate, but this analysis suffers from considerable uncertainty in many of its parameters. Precisely. Using any data, even FOQA data, to "plot" risk and "state" that precursors exist is indeed very difficult even if such analysis software has embedded risk analysis tools. While an event or events may be seen in the data, the decision to response, and how to respond, is complex; it can range from a change in SOP to individual training before a return to the roster. FOQA can provide the information upon which such decisions may be made but of course cannot point to the decision itself.

ELAC has highlighted the question of hand-flight very well. For those who always hand-flew, automation is a tool to the point where it can even get in the way of the best operation. For the marginally-skilled who's skill levels have not been sufficiently identified through normal checking processes or formal, (and informal) safety reporting processes, or even through poor or non-existent FOQA monitoring/engagement, automation can mask such a problem until, as ELAC has observed, a serious incident or accident highlights the original problem.

The unfortunate thing is, where implemented at all (beyond a box-tick) and beyond the phenomenon of institutional denial, carriers may view such programs and their necessary infrastructure either as too expensive to support and/or defend at corporate board meetings or too complicated to understand.

Indeed, in my experience, for these exact reasons it has been very difficult to convey such safety information to executives who speak only "market" or "quarterly results" but who control the life-blood of such safety programs.

PJ2

[lomapaseo]

Phil Squares

First of all, the only reason I made any comments on this post was because of the direction it had taken. The thoughts on this subject are way off! I merely wanted to get this topic back where it needs to be.


Your objective is great:ok:

The way to do this in a public internet, having privelged information, is to Lead by offering food for thought to the discussion. Else your methods become the subject rather than the message. :)

[ELAC]

Teevee,

What would you accept as evidence?

The best place to look would be in a broad sampling of FOQA data spread across carriers, aircraft types, nations and cultures. Look for exceedances that relate either to hand flying or where poor monitoring allowed the autoflight to create an exceedance. Then look at the relative rates of manual approaches. Do that and run a rolling 5 year trend over a period of say 10 years and you'd probably get a pretty good idea of whether you have an increasing problem. pj2 is the man who could tell you best how to do it.

If you didn't have the FOQA data the next step up would be to look at cumulative incident reports. Last, and least effective is to just look at accidents. It's the precursors that never show up on the 9 o'clock news that are the best indicators of whether there's a trend that needs correcting.

ELAC

[ELAC]

Phil,

After sitting on the sidelines and watching this post grow and grow, I just wanted to add a couple of comments.

I have seen the data and I can assure you things went wrong prior to the missed approach. There are several issues that, hopefully, will appear in the accident report.

There was no spatial disorientation, at least, there is no evidence to suggest that in the CVR and I doubt if that will be mentioned in the final report at all.

What hopefully emerge is there are systemic problems that exist that led to the accident. I really don't want to go into any further detail right now. However, I think jaws will drop when the final report, data plot and CVR are released.

Thanks for that.

Spatial disorientation has never been more than just a possible explanation for the facts so far reported. More facts would be welcome to help all of us understand the accident, particularly as you suggest systemic problems may underpin it. Let's hope more information is available soon.


ELAc

[ELAC]

CONF iture,


You are correct in your assessment, but it could be about time to accept those temporary "extra risks" if you want to improve the overall situation in a near future.
If a crew is not comfortable with its manual flying during an approach, just press again the 2 or 3 buttons to give back the controls to the airplane.


Re #1, yes that could be true, but before we do so we should make sure we know what the problem really is, what improvement we will achieve and what the quantum of the extra risk we choose to accept is.

Re #2, also true, but the risk lies in those who don't recognize the appropriate time to press said buttons.

ELAC

[Phil Squares]

The way to do this in a public internet, having privelged information, is to Lead by offering food for thought to the discussion. Else your methods become the subject rather than the message.

Systemic problems and food for thought....

1) Passing the FAF below the hard altitude.
2) Descending well below minimums (busted by 1XX Feet)
3) Improper Go Around procedures
4) Possible improper use of Priority Switch
5) Switching from Managed/Managed to Selected/Selected approach just prior to commencent of the approach.

Please note, these tidbits are in no order. Nor are they all inclusive. There are other issues that will certainly be looked as contributing factors.

I have no dog in this fight. I am not trying to point fingers at anyone one group or group of pilots in this matter. I am merely trying to have people look at this accident from a very simplistic view. When the final report is issued, hopefully, you will be able to see just how simplistic and utterly avoidable this accident was.

[ELAC]

aterpster,

What's new under the Sun is the total ineptness with the Turkish Air and Colgan crews; the obvious lack of basic attitude instrument flying skills.

No, that's not particularly new. Scroll back and look at some of the past accidents as I posted to deSitter. For similarities to Turkish in the 80's look at the SAS DC10 in JFK or the Buffalo 707 in Kansas City. For Colgan, the L188 at KC and the China Airlines 747SP bear great similarity. There have always been "a few" accidents of this nature.

As a side note, the initiation of both of these accidents occurred because of a failure of monitoring skill, not manual control skill. Greater practice at manual flying might have improved the quality of monitoring when the a/p is on, as it was in both these cases, but then again possibly not. That's an unproven hypothesis. In any event the failure to monitor was not the final nail in the coffin in either case. Inappropriate stall recovery actions take the blame in both instances, and that is not going to be improved by more hand flying.

Quote:
About RNP AR qualification, the answer is no, the regulatory authority that has jurisdiction over my carrier has yet to implement that standard, and as a consequence it is not in use with my company. But then, what does that have to do with the price of tea in China?

It's pertinent because you come across as being a state-of-the-art pilot unlike those of us who have been "expelled from the club." Sounds like your operations today are much like what we did in the Dark Ages.

It's not a "club" and you haven't been expelled from it aterpster, so how about canning the trucelence. Perhaps though, as a guy who last flew the line 20 years ago you might accept that some things have changed since then in ways you may not have a full appreciation of, and that the perspectives of someone who spends each day up close and personal with the equipment we're discussing bears being considered a bit less dismissively.

Hmm, yeah with RNP AR I suspected that's where you wanted to go. The environment I work in today does have some Dark Ages elements to it, but that would not be the case with some of the previous operations that I've spent time with. I'm thinking that having collected the qualifications to operate these types from 6 different authorities including TC, FAA and CAA and having been hands on with carriers and crews in a number of different countries and cultures might give me a wee bit more insight into how things work in practice than any particular approach qualification.

Regards,

ELAC

PS - We're now doing a disservice to the thread so if you wish to continue the discussion I'll be happy to do so on the thread BOAC has suggested, or by PM. You may yet be surpised on the number of areas where we would share full agreement.

[LJ du Toit]

(Newby posting)

I found this forum a few days after May 12, since a very good friend of mine (Anton Matthee, from Stellenbosch, South Africa) died on this flight, and I needed to support the widow with as many pertinent and (as far as possible) factual data bits related to her husband's untimely death.

I found enough here to be able to tell her it was an unexpected and very fast death, and want to thank you collectively for your dissemination and discussion of the few factoids that were available back then. My conclusion was of some comfort to her, and also to me and other close friends. I can also report that he has been identified, repatriated, and that there is (at least biological) closure on the matter.

The reason for my post is a question: Will this thread remain vigilant for (and ready to discuss) factual news being released on the accident, or has it definitively moved on to policy & procedure discussions? If the former, I'll remain an interested reader, if the latter, I'd like a heads-up to start probing elsewhere. Thanks.

Edit:
... you will be able to see just how simplistic and utterly avoidable this accident was ...

Heartbreaking.

[One Outsider]

Inappropriate stall recovery actions take the blame in both instances, and that is not going to be improved by more hand flying.

Whenever manipulation of a mechanism is required to achieve a certain outcome, the manipulation must be second nature so that the focus can be on achieving the desired outcome. If it is not, the focus will be on the manipulation and not on the outcome.

I believe you know this already.

[barit1]

LJ du Toit

I found this forum a few days after May 12, since a very good friend of mine (Anton Matthee, from Stellenbosch, South Africa) died on this flight, and I needed to support the widow with as many pertinent and (as far as possible) factual data bits related to her husband's untimely death.

Welcome aboard. None of us envy your position, and you certainly deserve our support.

As I'm sure you have recognized by now, this is not always the most gentlemanly (or ladylike) of forums, and at this stage of investigation many theories are propagated. Most have at least some smattering of respectability. But the real value here is the ability of most contributors to see through the haze of politics that can disguise the truth.

Hope you can stick around.

[LJ du Toit]

Thanks Barit1, but fear not- I'm thick-skinned and intend to stick around... if this thread remains true to topic.
:ok:

[ELAC]

One Outsider,

Whenever manipulation of a mechanism is required to achieve a certain outcome, the manipulation must be second nature so that the focus can be on achieving the desired outcome. If it is not, the focus will be on the manipulation and not on the outcome.

I believe you know this already.

Agreed, but where is the evidence that preoccupation with the "manipulation of the mechanism" played a role in these accidents? The initiator was a failure of monitoring, it was the autopilot that was doing the manipulation.

The incorrect stall warning recoveries were procedural errors. One was a very deliberate choice to hold a high pitch attitude exacerbating instead of resolving the condition. The other had a 7 second delay in application of TOGA power resultant from both a change of control and an erroneous autothrust mode that retarded power again after it had already been applied by the original PF.

There's nothing there to suggest that the way these stall warning recoveries were accomplished was the result of a "bucket full" situation with too much mental capacity being used for manual manipulation leading to a loss of focus on the desired outcome when the extra ball was tossed in.

ELAC

[aterpster]

ELAC:
Perhaps though, as a guy who last flew the line 20 years ago you might accept that some things have changed since then in ways you may not have a full appreciation of, and that the perspectives of someone who spends each day up close and personal with the equipment we're discussing bears being considered a bit less dismissively.

No doubt about it. But, knowledge of attitude instrument flying and maintaining minimum instrument altitudes and flying speed hasn't changed at all.

...over and out. :)

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Elac:
Hand flying is only one part of the job
I don't like the idea to slice the pilot job in parts when it's matter of piloting.
You can have a pilot Nobel prize of flight automation ... but bad handflying pilot .. and when automation will fail .. the outcome is know ..
The inverse is also true.
So .. the "good" pilot must proficient in mixing of automatic and manual flying (mixing Nobel prize)

[ELAC]

jcjeant,

I don't like the idea to slice the pilot job in parts when it's matter of piloting.
You can have a pilot Nobel prize of flight automation ... but bad handflying pilot .. and when automation will fail .. the outcome is know ..
The inverse is also true.
So .. the "good" pilot must proficient in mixing of automatic and manual flying (mixing Nobel prize)

I agree with you entirely. It's just a matter of whether there's a trend we need to correct right now, and if so what that correction should be.

Cheers,

ELAC

[CONF iture]

All I'm saying is that; one, the evidence supporting that a lack of hand flying proficiency is a significant problem does not appear to exist; and two that increasing the frequency of manual flying as a cure for that supposed problem is not necessarily a solution that raises the overall safety of the operation.
Lately, even Airbus seems to think differently ...
Did you get the chance to read the following thread ELAC :
Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/388573-pilot-handling-skills-under-threat-says-airbus.html?highlight=airbus)

[ELAC]

CONF iture,

Quote:
Originally Posted by ELAC
All I'm saying is that; one, the evidence supporting that a lack of hand flying proficiency is a significant problem does not appear to exist; and two that increasing the frequency of manual flying as a cure for that supposed problem is not necessarily a solution that raises the overall safety of the operation.

Lately, even Airbus seems to think differently ...
Did you get the chance to read the following thread ELAC :
Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus

Actually, not quite the same case at all CONF iture.

From the article:

Airbus is urging the aviation industry to confront the issue of how to ensure long-haul airline pilots maintain basic flying skills in the face of ever-increasing aircraft reliability and cockpit automation.

This relates to an issue specific to a subset of pilots who see a relatively low number of handling sectors per month/year. That's not the same as pilots as a whole, and the accidents we've been discussing haven't been the product of crews that fall into this category.

And as to recommendations, what Airbus suggested was:

"I think that at a certain point in time we need to bring back a little bit of handling," said Drappier, adding that he advocates more simulator time for pilots to hone their basic skills. Meanwhile, he says, there are some elements of training that could be moved from the simulator to the classroom.

So neither the same problem nor the same solution as is being advocated here.

Cheers,

ELAC

[Plastic Bug]

Elac,

I get what you are saying. I'm just saying (without dissertation, ain't going there) that there is a feeling out there that maybe, just maybe, that automation may be leading to a degradation of basic skills.

Look at hand writing. Since the PC took over the world, how many people are still proficient at writing legibly?

Could it be remotely possible, that aircraft having reached such a level of reliability, critical failures requiring full control of an aircraft by aircrew are almost non-existent and as such, poor skills are masked by the reliability of the aircraft?

That's a failure. What about having to fly an approach that's not "in the box"? Or doing ANYTHING that's not "in the box".

People today don't know their airplanes like they did in the past. The sorry question: "What's it doing now?" USED to be a joke.

I'm still a firm believer that the best computer out there is the one between your ears.

I'm no Luddite, just saying ya gotta be able to be flexible.

PB

[ELAC]

PB,

I get what you are saying. I'm just saying (without dissertation, ain't going there) that there is a feeling out there that maybe, just maybe, that automation may be leading to a degradation of basic skills.

I get what you are saying too. But, we have the data available at various levels to determine whether those "feelings" are correct. Shouldn't we be using that to drive our conclusions and corrections instead of just leaving it to our feelings and hunches?

Cheers,

ELAC

[Lonewolf_50]

ELAC, in your analytical approach to the matter of piloting skills, which are a combination of (among other things) systems knowledge, cognitive skills, eye hand coordination, and teamwork, are you counting the hits and overlooking, or blind to, the misses? I get leary of the dismissal of experiential input as "oh, that's just anecdotal ..." Such anecdotal input was often the red flag a CO needed to ground a pilot, or have him/her work with the Standardization board to correct a lack of proficiency or demonstrated shortcoming of one sort or another. Lack of, or dismissal of such anecdotal input was mentioned in far too many Class A mishap reports I read over a couple of decades.

From where you sit, I wish to ask: how do you intend to capture the level of a skill set, or capability, if you have no program to perform and measure the skill or performance set in a continuum? Day to day proficiency is the issue, be it hand flying, using the systems as designed, in full and degraded modes, and crew task achievement with few to no errors.

It is nice that one can measure (and even improve) the teamwork and systems knowledge skills in a simulator, given the quality of today's simulation. You can even use graduated task saturation to find the point of failure of a given crew. (One of my favorite parts about using sims was to see how far one can take a crew into a nightmare scanario, multiple systems failures, before an error, or stream of errors, was induced).

You have asked for evidence, but I don't see your arguments addressing the critical elements of daily proficiency and currency. Perhaps I am simply not understanding you. :( Why does this concern me? Besides being generally interested in pilot issues, when I travel as a customer for any airline, I wish to be confident that the crew are current and proficient. Makes for a more enjoyable flight. Does the system support my confidence, or undermine it?

My points of reference are predominantly military flying and the training/currency/proficiency issues. What I learned about currency and proficiency may be only partly applicable to the commercial flying arena. But I think some overlaps.

That said, they didn't start calling some pilots "HUD cripples" (a less than complimentary term) for no good reason. There were observed changes in behavior by people who knew the difference. Even in that arena, there was a catch. At both the military and political (where money comes from) levels, the typical response was:

OK, you see a difference, what are you doing to fix it, at the operator training end? We have bought this magical device, it has mission advantages. Complaining or criticsing it makes us look bad, puts a new system at risk (and jobs). (We could waste some space on a host of negative, non-flying considerations then raised).

In the FWIW department: a few years ago, there was some evidence pointing towards the improvement of a metric richly desired -- boarding rate improvement (CV landings successfully achieved in initial jet training) which looked to correlate with the change to the T-45C from the T-45A, complete with glass cockpit, HUD, and more. The initial analysis had to account for some disparity of flight hours, numbers of FCLPs in syllabus, and landings of all sorts, and much else. I would love to have remained on that topic, but was assigned other tasks. The weighting of factors we needed done may or may not have happened as that assessment continued, my last touch point was a few years ago.

The outcome of that study was going to drive a resource decision, or inform it, while meeting frequency, currency, and proficiency requirements.

Proficiency is what you need (it appears over the course of this discussion) during unforecast events.

I understand that cost is a non-trivial variable. It was so even in the military environment: for example, does the PMR need to be 25-30 hours per month, can we focus the training so that proficiency and currency can be achieved in, say, 17-23? In 12-18? In some cases, the answer was "yes" in others it wasn't so clear. Use of simulation, which is also expensive, was most helpful in a lot of cases.

Having read any number of your posts on this topic, I appreciate your analytical bent, but wonder how and if you are capturing metrics that show, with fidelity to reality, where the proficiency of aircrews stand on the day to day contimuum of operations. Any number of practicing professional pilots (in this dialogue) have observed something less than proficiency on some flight decks. I don't think that input ought to be underweighted.

As I read this dialogue, proficiency is what the hand flying advocates are on about.

[mike-wsm]

I get leary of the dismissal of experiential input as "oh, that's just anecdotal ..." Such anecdotal input was often the red flag a CO needed to ground a pilot, or have him/her work with the Standardization board to correct a lack of proficiency or demonstrated shortcoming of one sort or another. Lack of, or dismissal of such anecdotal input was mentioned in far too many Class A mishap reports I read over a couple of decades.

Perhaps in civil aviation any anecdotal evidence could be supplemented by routine analysis of DFDR/CVR information. I understand at present the recordings are discarded, but surely it would be possible to download the data and check for anomalies. Or at least store it for future comparison. Then we would know whether the events leading up to an accident were one-off or whether they were common practice. This applies equally in automation anomalies and in pilot disregard/disagree.

[GarageYears]

I get what you are saying. I'm just saying (without dissertation, ain't going there) that there is a feeling out there that maybe, just maybe, that automation may be leading to a degradation of basic skills.

Look at hand writing. Since the PC took over the world, how many people are still proficient at writing legibly?But couldn't you turn that equally 180 degrees and note that since the introduction of the PC everybody has the ability to produce publishable quality documents? (And no, I'm not suggesting everyone should or could produce something worth publishing).

Similarly has the introduction of in-car GPS systems led to a reduction in map reading skills - yes - but there are fewer people lost!

Just as the introduction of the firearm relegated the archer to history...

We humans have a great ability to invent. The problem we are struggling with here is our ability to (apparently) relinquish direct control (hands on control column) to a computer.

Unfortunately when an aircraft crashes the results are terrible. But putting that into perspective, risk is part of all human activity. I haven't looked recently, but I am confident that the accident rate per million miles traveled per person is quite different today compared to, say, 30 years ago. Many, many more flights in the air....

So would we be better or worse off with or without the automation that seems to be the focus of so many on this board? Anyone want to surrender their in-car navi system for a paper map?

FWIW - I can still read a map, but have a GPS. I insist my kids work on their hand-writing skills, but they use PCs to produce reports for school. I don't have a firearm or a bow... I'd rather like the pilot on my next flight to be fully proficient and be able to hand-fly the entire flight if necessary, but I'd expect him/her to use the automation available to the full extent.

But there's the dilemma - using the automation, precludes honing those hand-flying skills. So is this a question of SOP and training?

- GY

[Lonewolf_50]

Good point, Mike, CVR and FDR allow some data harvesting that I'd not have commonly seen in military experience. But there is a marked exception. Every CV approach and landing is debriefed, in detail, and also graded, by the LSO. I don't know if current software/hardware packages provide the LSO with a "last 5-10 minutes of the mission" read out of A/S, alt, power, etcetera, at CVR/FDR levels of granularity. I know some people were interested in such ...

Seems the last thirty (sixty?) minutes of any flight are in the approach and landing environment, which is a task area of interest, so crew performance trends could in fact be gathered over time.

Is that routinely done at most airlines?

[MurphyWasRight]

As a data point in the ability of computers to understand and react to novel situations I offer this "google ad" (automatically selected by web page context) that appeared under this thread:

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-----
Not sure what that is trying to tell us but....:)

[PJ2]

Lonewolf_50;
Good point, Mike, CVR and FDR allow some data harvesting that I'd not have commonly seen in military experience. But there is a marked exception. Every CV approach and landing is debriefed, in detail, and also graded, by the LSO. I don't know if current software/hardware packages provide the LSO with a "last 5-10 minutes of the mission" read out of A/S, alt, power, etcetera, at CVR/FDR levels of granularity. I know some people were interested in such ...

Seems the last thirty (sixty?) minutes of any flight are in the approach and landing environment, which is a task area of interest, so crew performance trends could in fact be gathered over time.

Is that routinely done at most airlines?
Yes, it is.

Please read recent contributions. Most of the thinking described in your post would not apply and would not be suitable to airline work. I posted on this topic yesterday in response to ELAC's contributions especially his response to "TeeVee", and may have addressed your questions/suggestions here: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/414936-afriqiyah-airbus-330-crash-61.html#post5770385 .

From what I have seen, you do not see routine "data harvesting" for safety purposes in military work. Along with many civilian safety formats, I have attended MFOQA (Military FOQA) conferences and learned that flight data is used primarily to assure mission readiness, not to assure flight safety. Commercial carriers are obviously driven by different priorities and is the basis for my comment.

Routine flight data analysis is done at most airlines to a greater or lesser degree, with greater or lesser effectiveness. The granularity of such data is usually very high, with thousands of parameters available, many at very high sample rates. Such programs are complex and expensive not because the equipment is expensive but ensuring appropriate staffing of such programs and justifying the costs for same, is always a problem within a profit-driven enterprise.

Airline pilots do not debrief after every landing. Normally there is no need because we fly well within "normal". If there is an event on the flight, normally the carrier requires a safety report and a formal crew debriefing. If for example an approach was a mess, we would normally talk about it informally.

In addressing your suggestion concerning information sharing, like flight data analysis, the concept has been around for decades in civilian work. The concept was recently formalized in the US as a "Distributed National ASAP Archive" and "Distributed National FOQA Archive". I do not know its present status. Canada has no such concept in place. I am unsure whether the Europeans do this.

For a number of reasons, sharing safety information even within one carrier let alone across the industry is not an easy thing to implement. What is shared is mainly done through a very high-level approach, (meaning, specifics are never openly discussed, just the broad trends) through industry safety publications, (Flight Safety Foundation, etc).

There are contributors here who know far more about distributed archives than I but for the purposes of understanding the notion, 'distributed' and 'archive' here mean that safety reporting information and FOQA information from individual member airlines are distributed on servers but accessible through a single point that prevents identification of individual carriers, flights or personnel. The intent is to provide a broad data and information base so that the industry can see "over the fence" what other carriers are experiencing in terms of safety issues and FOQA events and compare with their own operation.

Clearly, the basis for such sharing intends to foster the ability of all carriers to address common safety matters and events. One question which might be asked of the distributed archive is, "Are B737's or A320's landing beyond the touchdown zone and if so how far past, and at what airports?", or, "What is the number and nature of industry TCAS or EGPWS events and where are they occurring?"

You may imagine the thousands of questions which may be asked of such an archive the study of which can provide a solid, data-driven basis for change rather than a mere anecdotal/opinion-based foundation which those who do safety work within an airline must wrestle.

That observed, the setting up of such a system is extremely complex. While providing sufficient detail for all safety report or FOQA event categories, carrier anonymity must be guaranteed.

There is an FAA paper here (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA465642&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) that may be of use in furthering understanding.

PJ2

[Lonewolf_50]

PJ2: many thanks. Cleared up quite a bit. :) The informal debrief appears to translate very well. As to tailored proficiency metrics ... I'll do some more reading, appreciate the pointers.

You may be amused to note that I applied for a civil service MFOQA billet, but was not chosen, just under five years ago. The billet, I found out from my friend who had first alerted me, was suspended (for funding) for over a year. In the meantime, I found another job. When I found out the job was on again, I was late to the party with my package.

So it goes. :(

[PJ2]

Lonewolf_50;

You're welcome - This stuff should be used broadly but along with many understandable concerns, prosecution by the legal industry using safety information gathered purely for improving safety is at the top of the list of (I would say) all carriers. The data is protected in the US under the FAA's FOQA initiative, providing airlines can demonstrate that such data is being actively used. In Canada, once again, Transport Canada has no requirement for FOQA under their SMS initiative, does not protect in law the data that is gathered by airlines voluntarily doing FOQA and has otherwise not taken a leadership role in such safety work. Consequently, anecdotal information and opinion can carry as much weight as validated, hard data. Go figure.

Anyway, that's all I have to say here - thanks for the response. PJ2

[ELAC]

Lonewolf 50,

Thanks for your questions & contribution. As some others have already replied here, with the forebearance of the mods I'll do the same instead of switching this to another thread.

ELAC, in your analytical approach to the matter of piloting skills, which are a combination of (among other things) systems knowledge, cognitive skills, eye hand coordination, and teamwork, are you counting the hits and overlooking, or blind to, the misses? I get leary of the dismissal of experiential input as "oh, that's just anecdotal ..." Such anecdotal input was often the red flag a CO needed to ground a pilot, or have him/her work with the Standardization board to correct a lack of proficiency or demonstrated shortcoming of one sort or another. Lack of, or dismissal of such anecdotal input was mentioned in far too many Class A mishap reports I read over a couple of decades.

Actually, if you look back at where this discussion started it arose from what appeared to me an over willingness to count the misses, which are few, without considering the hits which are many. Regarding anecdotal evidence, I'm not suggesting that it be discounted in its entirety, but rather it be ascribed weight according to what it is intended to indicate or detect. Look at the examples you've provided. They involve specific performance of a single individual or small group or a specific task. There the anecdotal can be very relevant. But that approach loses a good deal of value as the population you are dealing with and the breadth of the task increases. Additionally, anecdotes, especially of aircraft accidents, suffer from a"vividness factor" which tends to skew the weight that's placed on that information. Some relevant thoughts on this can be found in the chapter on "Biases in the Evaluation of Evidence" from the work "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" by Richard Heuer. Particularly relevant is a section titled "The Vividness Criterion". Some excerpts that apply:

The Vividness Criterion

The impact of information on the human mind is only imperfectly related to its true value as evidence.

Specifically, information that is vivid, concrete, and personal has a greater impact on our thinking than pallid, abstract information that may actually have substantially greater value as evidence. For example:

Information that people perceive directly, that they hear with their own ears or see with their own eyes, is likely to have greater impact than information received secondhand that may have greater evidential value.
Case histories and anecdotes will have greater impact than moreinformative but abstract aggregate or statistical data.
A familiar form of this error is the single, vivid case that outweighs a much larger body of statistical evidence or conclusions reached by abstract reasoning.

The most serious implication of vividness as a criterion that determines the impact of evidence is that certain kinds of very valuable evidence will have little influence simply because they are abstract. Statistical data, in particular, lack the rich and concrete detail to evoke vivid images, and they are often overlooked, ignored, or minimized.

Personal anecdotes, actual accounts of people’s responsiveness or indifference to information sources, and controlled experiments can all be cited ad infinitum “to illustrate the proposition that data summaries, despite their logically compelling implications, have less impact than does inferior but more vivid evidence.” It seems likely that intelligence analysts, too, assign insuffcient weight to statistical information.

Analysts should give little weight to anecdotes and personal case histories unless they are known to be typical, and perhaps no weight at all if aggregate data based on a more valid sample can be obtained.

This is my point in counter to statements who cite the Turkish or Colgan accidents and then claim that as a result there is a consensus that "Far too many pilots are truly screwed when...", etc, etc. They are taking the atypical case and giving it great weight without any statistical underpinning.

From where you sit, I wish to ask: how do you intend to capture the level of a skill set, or capability, if you have no program to perform and measure the skill or performance set in a continuum? Day to day proficiency is the issue, be it hand flying, using the systems as designed, in full and degraded modes, and crew task achievement with few to no errors.

We have a growing body of data that is available to us for use (in varying degrees for varying populations) in the form of FOQA programs. pj2 is the expert here and I'll defer to his explanations of the capabilities and limitations, but suffice it to say that if the issue is a pressing one we have the means of determining to what degree it is and to make some estimations of what different changes in policy might yield. While the data probably isn't sufficient to cover a "generational" change there's likely enough there to capture a rolling 5 year trend run out over the past 10 years. A step back from that approach, but more easy to accomplish over a broad worldwide group, would be a similar analysis of incident reports. The data is there, so instead of just allowing the vividness criterion to rule I suggest accessing it if that hasn't already been done by those who are paid to think deep on the issue.

It is nice that one can measure (and even improve) the teamwork and systems knowledge skills in a simulator, given the quality of today's simulation. You can even use graduated task saturation to find the point of failure of a given crew. (One of my favorite parts about using sims was to see how far one can take a crew into a nightmare scanario, multiple systems failures, before an error, or stream of errors, was induced).

You have asked for evidence, but I don't see your arguments addressing the critical elements of daily proficiency and currency. Perhaps I am simply not understanding you. Why does this concern me? Besides being generally interested in pilot issues, when I travel as a customer for any airline, I wish to be confident that the crew are current and proficient. Makes for a more enjoyable flight. Does the system support my confidence, or undermine it?

Is something undermining your confidence regarding the critical elements of proficiency and currency today, versus the level of confidence you had in those elements 5 years ago, 10 years ago or 20 years ago? As already mentioned, at the coarsest level, accidents, the rate of occurrence has dropped by about 72.5% in the U.S. since the 1980s, so shouldn't whatever assured you then still be assuring you now? Is it a change in type of accidents occurring? Again as already discussed, we have had similar accidents in the past, and if we we're only just keeping even with traffic growth we'd be seeing more than double the number of them now as opposed to then. The accident data doesn't seem to support that suppositon except perhaps as relative to an even greater reduction in rates of accidents from other causes. Is it possible that any erosion in your confidence of the standards of critical elements in daily proficiency is a result of repetition of anecdotals such as "Accidents like that didn't happen back when ..."? I think that's in large part why I bothered to jump into this. Repeat something often enough and people start to believe it's true, whether or not it is founded in fact. Erroneous conclusions then lead to erroneous prescriptions to solve the assumed but not necessarily actual problem. The industry already addresses issues of currency and proficiency to a high degree, so before proposing a positive change I would need a better basis for the "why" and "too what net effect".

My points of reference are predominantly military flying and the training/currency/proficiency issues. What I learned about currency and proficiency may be only partly applicable to the commercial flying arena. But I think some overlaps.

That said, they didn't start calling some pilots "HUD cripples" (a less than complimentary term) for no good reason. There were observed changes in behavior by people who knew the difference. Even in that arena, there was a catch. At both the military and political (where money comes from) levels, the typical response was:

OK, you see a difference, what are you doing to fix it, at the operator training end? We have bought this magical device, it has mission advantages. Complaining or criticsing it makes us look bad, puts a new system at risk (and jobs). (We could waste some space on a host of negative, non-flying considerations then raised).

Yup, I agree that, that form of problem exists. Our job as an industry is to keep our focus on accurately measuring the results and then asking: Which modifications to equipment, process or philosophy will enhance the safety of the system and which ones won't? Some answers could include an increase in manual flying on the line, but again, quite possibly not. I think it's better to look carefully before leaping to that conclusion.

In the FWIW department: a few years ago, there was some evidence pointing towards the improvement of a metric richly desired -- boarding rate improvement (CV landings successfully achieved in initial jet training) which looked to correlate with the change to the T-45C from the T-45A, complete with glass cockpit, HUD, and more. The initial analysis had to account for some disparity of flight hours, numbers of FCLPs in syllabus, and landings of all sorts, and much else. I would love to have remained on that topic, but was assigned other tasks. The weighting of factors we needed done may or may not have happened as that assessment continued, my last touch point was a few years ago.

The outcome of that study was going to drive a resource decision, or inform it, while meeting frequency, currency, and proficiency requirements.

Proficiency is what you need (it appears over the course of this discussion) during unforecast events.

I understand that cost is a non-trivial variable. It was so even in the military environment: for example, does the PMR need to be 25-30 hours per month, can we focus the training so that proficiency and currency can be achieved in, say, 17-23? In 12-18? In some cases, the answer was "yes" in others it wasn't so clear. Use of simulation, which is also expensive, was most helpful in a lot of cases.

That sounds like the way I'm suggesting the issue should be broached. A shame you didn't get to stick with the project as I'm sure observations on how it evolved would be very relevant to this discussion.

Having read any number of your posts on this topic, I appreciate your analytical bent, but wonder how and if you are capturing metrics that show, with fidelity to reality, where the proficiency of aircrews stand on the day to day contimuum of operations. Any number of practicing professional pilots (in this dialogue) have observed something less than proficiency on some flight decks. I don't think that input ought to be underweighted.

As I read this dialogue, proficiency is what the hand flying advocates are on about.

No, I'm not capturing metrics with certain fidelity to reality, but at least I'm providing some that have relevance and give a starting point for a metrics driven discussion. Those advocating that there is a significant problem and that the solution to the problem is more hand flying, are not providing any metrics at all. As the ones proposing the theory I've asked what they can show that supports it. In return what is being provided is an amplification of the importance of the anecdotal, but without any analogous statistical support. That's a path to significant analytical error, as Heuer describes. Given that the problem, if it exists as proposed, and the solutions suggested are significant, I don't think the evidence being presented here is sufficient for the conclusions they state. And, the constant repetition of the position makes the perception of consensus illusory. By example, if you look back at the thread and remove all comments from those who do not have reasonably current, relevant experience, how many participants are you left with? Of those, how many make the claim that hand flying skill is a problem of the magnitude that it demands a significant reduction in the use of automation in response? I think the count on both parts would reduce well below the standard of "any number...", and yet that is the impression that many critical readers (in the sense of educated to the subject) like yourself, for example, may be forming from what they read. Eventually that can create a real consensus founded on the thinking "Well, eveyone else believes it, so it must be true that...". This isn't how I see us improving the safety of the system.

Cheers,

ELAC

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Just a tought about accidents rates (or types) and any statistics related
It's indeed a fact (solid like a rock) that the rate of accidents is lower than in the past .. in relation with a greatest traffic than in the past.
Anyways (less the pilots and the experts in accident investigations or in statistics of all kinds ) the last judge is the customer.
And for the customer .. it's not important to know (or he don't bother) of such very good statistics.
The fact is (if the accidents rate stay at it is today) .. the number of accidents will go growing with growing traffic ..
So it will be feel by the public that is more accidents so .. less safety in the air....
And the public (customers) have a greatest weight than the other side (experts and statisticians)
Can the public accept (exagerated on purpose!) 1 accident by week with a average of 200 victims .. even though statistics indicate that everything is perfect and that the accident rate is stable or declining ?
Methink the traffic problem (like births worldwide) will be solved by itself in a natural way .. auto regulation .. :)

[CONF iture]

This relates to an issue specific to a subset of pilots who see a relatively low number of handling sectors per month/year. That's not the same as pilots as a whole, and the accidents we've been discussing haven't been the product of crews that fall into this category.
South Africa to Tripoli qualifies for the long haul category, don't you think ?

There is more than a Flightglobal article, there is a all thread Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/388573-pilot-handling-skills-under-threat-says-airbus.html) with some very interesting stuff to read, maybe you would like to participate.

[barit1]

Guess the good ones know enough to know what they dont know and the bad ones simply dont know.


It's a 2x2 matrix:

#1 Those who know, and know that they know, are the true pros *

#2 Those who know, and know not that they know, are prodigies or savants.

#3 Those who do not know, and know that they don't know, are wise and trainable.

#4 Those who do not know, and know NOT that they don't know, are dangerous. :eek:


* This can only come about via an honest external evaluation. A good pilot would be (my guess)
98% #1 and
2% #3

In other words, he knows what NOT to attempt - it's beyond his or the aeroplane's proven experience.

Incidentally, this matrix applies to most skills. I learned it in a musical context, and find it works almost everywhere.

[Lonewolf_50]

In deference to what BOAC pointed out, we still await report from the investigators to confirm or render vacant the hypotheses under discussion here. :) Your matrix, barit, reminds me of how we used to identify plumbers in flight training ... :cool:

[ELAC]

CONF iture,

South Africa to Tripoli qualifies for the long haul category, don't you think ?

There is more than a Flightglobal article, there is a all thread Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus with some very interesting stuff to read, maybe you would like to participate.

The JNB-TIP sector for Afriqiyah is blocked at 8:50, which would fit most definitions of Long Haul (usually above 8 or 10 hrs), but that sector isn't typical of the company's route structure. Much of the flying is from TIP to European destinations where the block times are in the range of 3-5 hours. To know for sure you'd have to analyze Afriqiyah's flight program for the A330, but my guess is that their A330 pilots probably see, on average, more sectors than the pilot group Airbus was expressing concern about. The specific concern there is pilots who's average block time and working agreements result in a very low number of monthly sectors, say 8-10 or fewer, with only half of those being handling sectors.

Re, that thread, definitely interesting stuff, but your comment was specifically about what Airbus had stated, and hence my reply relates to that.

Cheers,

ELAC

[safetypee]

Phil Squares, or anyone else with ‘information’ (re #1222), would you care to comment on the document Celebrating TAWS ‘Saves’ (www.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5CTAWS%20Saves%20plus%20add.pdf) and perhaps indicate which incident or what factors might relate to this accident.

I note similarities in the procedure being a NPA. The approach chart has no table of altitude vs distance to assist with a continuous descent, and no advisory VS. There are two beacons shown for the approach, and a third for the missed approach; how are these depicted by the FMS/EFIS ND.
VOR not used for the approach?
There is no ground-based distance information, thus consider how the onboard position might be calculated. Does the FMS have GPS input in this aircraft? If only IRS/DME what position updating might be available on a trans-African flight?
Was this aircraft fitted with EGPWS or TAWS (T2CAS). If EGPWS did it require the FMS position or use an embedded GPS (not available for navigation).

Note that all of these features precede any GA event and subsequent handling issues which appear to have an unwarranted focus of attention.

[PA-28-180]

Barit1....."In other words, he knows what NOT to attempt - it's beyond his or the aeroplane's proven experience."....

This comment reminded me of what my primary flight instructor told me at the beginning - and often, all the way through my training. He, quoting from a Clint Eastwood movie ("Dirty Harry"..??):

"A Mans gotta know his limitations."

This is something that has always 'stuck' in my head when flying....and, whether simplistic or not, has always served me well as a good comment on risk management. (Thanks, Tim! :ok: )

[Mode7]

Guys,
Without loosing my sanity trying read the 60 odd pages of this thread on a Sat connection with dialup speeds:ugh:, has there been a report on the accident yet? Do they know what happened please?
Cheers

[411A]

The approach chart has no table of altitude vs distance to assist with a continuous descent...

It does not because...the NDB approach procedure in question was not designed to be flown via the continuous descent mode only.
IE: it is a perfect example of a dive/drive procedure, the missed approach being flown at the inner beacon.

It really is quite simple...fly the approach the way it was designed, or...if you can't and the vis is poor, divert.

NB.
And yes, I've flown to TIP many times over the last thirty years, and flown this procedure to runway 09 repeatedly.
Very straightforward and uncomplicated...don't try to reinvent the wheel.:rolleyes:

[safetypee]

Thanks 411A. You and your views on ‘Dive and Drive’ are well known. Old cultures take time to die out, or like dinosaurs come to a sudden end. ;)

A major theme of the Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) initiative was to encourage regulators/providers to revise procedures and charts to create ‘precision like’ approaches. NDB only approaches pose problems, but operators can prepare their own charts with advisory altitude / range data (where DME/GPS is available); crews can include similar calculations in thier briefings.

Major safety initiatives should not be seen as reinventing the wheel; there are better versions of the ‘stone age’ mentality associated with NPAs and Dive and Drive procedures.
Safety is about reducing unnecessary risk. NPAs statistically have higher risk, maybe not for everyone, but for those individuals who did not know or heed modern advice, this lack of knowledge or inappropriate application, could be fatal.

[411A]

....but for those individuals who did not know or heed modern advice, this lack of knowledge or inappropriate application, could be fatal.

I would suggest otherwise, safetypee, IE: those that do not have the skills to fly these NPA's in a reasonable manner, should stick to ILS approaches only, thereby ensuring their abilities match the results desired.

[noske]

Without loosing my sanity trying read the 60 odd pages of this thread on a Sat connection with dialup speeds:ugh:, has there been a report on the accident yet? Do they know what happened please?No report yet, but yes, the investigators apparently know what happened. Look for the posts by Phil Squares on pp. 61 and 62, and you will get a rough idea of what went wrong here.

[HP7]

How refreshing to see someone like Phil Squares who simply appears to stick to relevant facts and in a couple of posts succinctly states what may well have taken place. No axe to grind and no criticism of others - simply providing credible info.

So many others on here just want to waffle and have a go at other posters that much of the content is a complete waste of time but hey ho.

[aterpster]

411A:
I would suggest otherwise, safetypee, IE: those that do not have the skills to fly these NPA's in a reasonable manner, should stick to ILS approaches only, thereby ensuring their abilities match the results desired.

In an airplane without autoland capability flying an ILS to bare CAT I minimums, say 200 foot HaTH DA and RVR 1800 in obscuration, is very demanding, more so than an NPA to say, 400 and 1 by a presumably competent pilot (in both types of procedures).