EK407 Tailstrike @ ML [Archive]

Capt Claret

20th Mar 2009, 23:15

From the ABC's web site.

Vic plane emergency landing 'terrifying'

Posted 53 minutes ago

Passengers on board a flight which made an emergency landing at Melbourne airport last night say they were terrified.

The Emirates flight made the emergency landing after reports of smoke inside the cabin.

The tail of the jet scraped the tarmac when it took off and had to return to the airport when the crew noticed the smoke.

No-one was injured.

One of the 225 passengers on board, Catherine Edmunds, says she was terrified.

"We did land successfully, thankfully, and the plane was surrounded by paramedics and fire engines," she said.

"It was terrifying, it really was scary. I'd hate to go through it again. I'm not looking forward to getting on a plane tomorrow."

Another passenger, Andrea Law, says the plane had to dump fuel before landing.

"We were floating round there for about 45 minutes dumping fuel and it was very quiet on board, a bit scary," he said.

"I try not to worry because if you start worrying then it just gets really bad.

"I know there was one person that was quite sick on the plane because they were frightened, so not nice."

Air safety officials are investigating.

Christodoulidesd

20th Mar 2009, 23:22

from http://avherald.com/:

Accident: Emirates A345 at Melbourne on Mar 20th 2009, tail strike on takeoff

By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Mar 20th 2009 23:11Z, last updated Friday, Mar 20th 2009 23:11ZAn Emirates Airlines Airbus A340-500, registration A6-ERG performing flight EK-407 from Melbourne,VI (Australia) to Dubai (United Arab Emirates) with 225 people on board, experienced a tail strike on takeoff from Melbourne. The airplane climbed out safely, went to dump fuel but returned for an immediate emergency landing when smoke started to fill the cabin. The airplane landed heavily on Melbourne's runway 16, no injuries occured.

Severe abrazions occured to the tail skin and several access panels were ripped off during the tailstrike, the landing reportedly caused additional damage to the gear.

The Melbourne Airport confirmed, that several runway end lights were damaged in the accident, too, and needed to be replaced.

Metars:
YMML 201400Z 35006KT CAVOK 15/13 Q1014 NOSIG
YMML 201330Z 35005KT CAVOK 15/13 Q1014 NOSIG
YMML 201300Z 01006KT CAVOK 15/13 Q1014 NOSIG
YMML 201230Z 31004KT CAVOK 16/14 Q1014 NOSIG
YMML 201200Z 30004KT CAVOK 16/14 Q1014 NOSIG
YMML 201130Z 26003KT CAVOK 17/14 Q1015 NOSIG
YMML 201100Z 24004KT CAVOK 16/14 Q1014 NOSIG
YMML 201030Z 23003KT CAVOK 17/14 Q1015 NOSIG

fogap

20th Mar 2009, 23:31

I was at the lookout point watching the whole thing including the emergency services racing around...

The old man happen to be on the other side at the airport and drove home one of the passengers who told him the whole story.

Tail struck the tarmac on take off, luggage underneath 'moved' causing concern to the pilots, dumped fuel over port phillip bay/ocean, smoke started filling the cabin, returned to YMML.

Landing was certainly very long. Touchdown was well down 34 and far from the threshold, though it did appear to be a soft landing (not hard as previously commented). Reverse thrust was engaged quickly, which was needed to stop the aircraft on the tarmac instead of the Bulla carpark.

There were about 8 emergency vehicles on the tarmac and once the flight came to a complete stop at the end of 34, flood lights lit up the aircraft checking for any catastrophic failures preventing it from taxing back to the gate.

Aircraft was escorted to the terminal and passengers disembarked normally. A couple of domestic Qantas flights inbound were slightly delayed on 27 for a couple of minutes.

mcgrath50

21st Mar 2009, 00:02

Slightly off topic question, where do they dump fuel in places that are land-locked and surrounded by large cities, surely this happens in the US or Europe? Australia seems pretty lucky to have all that water near our capital cities.

mocoman

21st Mar 2009, 00:10

where do they dump fuel in places that are land-locked and surrounded by large cities, surely this happens in the US or Europe?

Fuel dump would normally occur above FL100 unless other circumstances preclude it.

John Lush

21st Mar 2009, 00:42

The landing was on Runway 34, not 16 as stated elsewhere in this thread.

mauswara

21st Mar 2009, 01:10

From memory Min. altitude to 'dump fuel' is 6,000ft.Possibly to ensure it vapourises prior to ground contact.

Skybus_319

21st Mar 2009, 01:38

Dont forget you can see it occur on Webtrak..

Robbovic

21st Mar 2009, 01:53

Folks,
Without trying to over dramitise this, when the full story emerges about this accident, it will become clear how close we came to having a major incident in Melbourne last night.

The aircraft in fact took out the R16 localiser main and monitoring antenae.

Anyone who knows Melbourne will realise how low this dude had to be to do this. Don't know how he missed the strobes. Don't know how he cleared the boundary fence.

As someone else has said, wait for the ATSB report - i guarantee it will be chilling.

Led Zeppelin

21st Mar 2009, 02:21

Jo'burg all over again ? :confused:

Capt Kremin

21st Mar 2009, 02:26

C0372/09 REVIEW C0371/09
ILS RWY16 'IMS' FREQ 109.7 NOT AVBL
FROM 03 201610 TO 03 230700 EST

If he took out the localiser antennae then that would have to happen on the subsequent approach wouldn't it? You are right.... how low was he?:ooh:

Robbovic

21st Mar 2009, 02:33

CK
No, he took out the antennae on departure - there were tracks (probably jet blast) in the grass off the end of 16.

Like I said, chilling.

Noone on that flight should bother with lottery tickets from now on - they have used up all their luck!!

Old Fella

21st Mar 2009, 02:36

Any bets on this being another case of incorrect info being used to determine V Speeds and thrust settings, just like the SQ B747 out of Auckland which used figures 100000Kgs less than actual resulting in a 500 metre tail scrape and getting airborne just above the stall at reduced thrust!!!!

Doug the Head

21st Mar 2009, 02:43

The 2 support pilots will probably be ok as there is stuff all they could have done to prevent it in such a dynamic situation. Plus may not have been able to see the maltese cross etc etc.EK still using the Maltese Cross for rotation?

18-Wheeler

21st Mar 2009, 03:06

As long as you're above 6,000', no detectable vapour will hit the ground.

blueloo

21st Mar 2009, 03:17

Isnt le'bus and its flight laws meant to prevent over rotation on t/o to prevent tailstrike.? Or is it in direct law (or whatever they call it) and anything goes at that point?

Obviously more to this than just that, if he took out the localiser...... which seems somewhat incredible.... how long is the runway?

buggaluggs

21st Mar 2009, 03:22

It doe's have tones of the SQ "incident" at AKL a little while back, as well as the one in JNB. It makes the hair stand up on the back of my neck to think of the cockpit atmosphere in last few hundred meters of the rwy! :ooh:

T/O performance data errors have been a recurring theme in mishaps for the last couple of years, perhaps it's time for a closer look at more double checking/belts and braces systems for performance data, before one of these 'incidents' produces a less happy ending?

I do feel for the Crew though, very much a case of " there but for the grace of god... "

Buggs Out

P.S. Ymml rwy 34 is just under 12000ft, assuming they used the full length.

blueloo

21st Mar 2009, 03:26

So to take out the localiser during takeoff - takeoff must have been on RWY16.... last time I checked LOC antenna at far end of runway isnt it? ..So scraping bum of airplane... from Juliet to Kilo......only just airborne at threshold of 34...and collected antenna shortly after?

Is this right or do I have it arse about?

White Knight

21st Mar 2009, 03:28

No Doug - we've never used that stupid cross for the rotation (although for a while when we first got the 340s that's what the training dept was bandying at us - I ignored it because one should be looking out of the window)

Back Seat Driver

21st Mar 2009, 03:32

CK, (as pointed out by blueloo, (beat me to it))The 16LLZ aerial is at the far end of its namesake runway. ie. 34 T/Hold end. I'm sure you knew that, just a slip of the "old fella" memory probably.

BlueLoo, The flight control law on take-off is 'DIRECT LAW' and pitch transitions to 'NORMAL LAW' 10 seconds after liftoff. (Roll transitions from direct to normal 5 secs. after lift-off) :ok:

ps. When you find yourself that far down the runway and still using your drivers licence and not your pilots licence, heaving the bloody thing off the runway is exactly the right and only thing to do.

Tassie Devil

21st Mar 2009, 03:50

How else can this happen? You got using the cross incorrectly, maybe using incorrect T/O wt / Thrust. System failure or pilot incapacitated. No blame game but genuine interest in probable/possible causes.

Robbovic

21st Mar 2009, 04:22

Yes folks, you have it correct.
Departed off R16 - took out Loc antennae off end of runway/threshold of 34.

By the way. the near beam antenna ( the one that is the monitor for the status of the ILS) is only about 5 feet high I'm told by the techs. And he hit it!!

Back Seat Driver

21st Mar 2009, 04:26

Pushing the noise levers to the TOGA detent will give immediate FULL THRUST no matter what's in 'the box'.
I would be very hesitant to be critical of the crew until the facts are known. Another consideration for this type of take-off profile would be to check the actual loading of the freight and passengers as opposed to the load sheet theoretical loading.
I have no knowledge of the event, but if it was me, I'd hope to be given a fair suck of the sav.

Going Boeing

21st Mar 2009, 04:38

So if I am interpreting the "facts" presented so far, it appears that they took off on Rwy 16 with approx 5kts tailwind. Can any EK drivers let us know if this service was planned direct to Dubai & how the take-off performance should have been using Rwy 16 with 5 kts downwind at such a heavy weight?

Jetjock330

21st Mar 2009, 04:48

Anyone possibly know the departure runway and the flap configuration used for take-off? (Flap 1+F, Flap 2 or Flap 3????)

amberale

21st Mar 2009, 05:05

I heard reports today that there were 3 seperate tail strikes observed on the take off roll.
Some speculation that freight may have shifted rearward on rotate causing the stikes.

AA

inandout

21st Mar 2009, 05:11

Min ht for fuel jet is 4000feetAGL

third_time _lucky

21st Mar 2009, 05:58

Min ht for fuel jet is 4000feetAGLDon't know what country you're from but in Oz min height is 6000ft AGL. ATC have to keep other traffic clear of 1000ft above, 2000ft below and 1/2 mile laterally around the dump zone. Also no racetrack patterns for obvious reasons so if they were dumping for 45 mins, a big no go zone would have been used.

helen-damnation

21st Mar 2009, 06:14

Can any EK drivers let us know if this service was planned direct to Dubai & how the take-off performance should have been using Rwy 16 with 5 kts downwind at such a heavy weight?

Yes, it's a direct service.
Performance should have been fine, although I don't have figures to hand. 5 Kt tailwind would have given a lower "flex" thrust (more thrust) and a lower V1 but that's it. Certainly not limiting.

You got using the cross incorrectly
EK still using the Maltese Cross for rotation?
I believe the software has been modified so that the cross disappears when the nosewheel strut extends. If so, you CAN NOT fly the rotation with it 'cos it's not there.

boree3

21st Mar 2009, 06:43

Just a quick question from an onlookers point-of-view.

Why would you use 16 with 5 knots of downwind and not 34 with 5 knots of headwind? Noise abatement? I guess 16 was the nominated runway but it is still up to the PIC to decide if he requires 34.

Politicians, performance figures etc. etc. etc. Whatever happened to the oldie "the 2 most useless things in avaition, runway behind the aircraft and fuel in the bowser"?

Well done to all as everybody walked away.

ColB

21st Mar 2009, 06:44

I'm certainly no expert, just an unfortunate FF, but having just come back from YMML, I can tell you that it hit the antenna that is about 300m south of 34. The big orange array that is about 6 -7 ft tall.

I'm sure the experts here can substitute in the correct terminology.......

tmpffisch

21st Mar 2009, 06:49

To what I can tell, the event has been censored from WebTrak.....

At 2233 the Braybrook and Keilor noise meters register with no aircraft shown, and the incoming DJ294 on RW16 switches to RW27.

SB4200

21st Mar 2009, 07:09

12000' and some... Whoa!

Google Maps (http://maps.google.com.au/maps?hl=en&ie=UTF8&ll=-37.687183,144.841347&spn=0.004525,0.009613&t=h&z=17)

[not a very clever google mapper linking person... might need to scroll a bit :confused:]

Ken Borough

21st Mar 2009, 07:40

Mr Brokenshire said a number of factors could cause a "tail hit", among them weather conditions, loading issues and handling.

"It is a hazard, particularly on the longer aircraft," he said.Brokenshire is a spin-doctor for the ATSB. Was he confusing the -600 with its shorter brother the -500? He needs an education as the -500 is shorter that a B747 so what he means by 'the longer aircraft' is anyone's guess.

Is he also trying to introduce new terminology to the industry by referring to the incident as a 'tail hit'? In these parts we use (or maybe used to use) 'tail-strike' ot 'tail-scrape'.

Of course, one can always rely on spin doctors for accurate information that is then peddled by the media as gospel.:ugh::ugh:

fogap

21st Mar 2009, 07:40

The information regarding possible shifting of container during the roll corresponds with information I received from a passenger who stated that crew believed there was movement in the lower cabin (noticable noice, not from the strike).

In reply to a possible "video of the incident"....yes, I 'thought' I was recording it until I later found I wasn't. :ugh: (the perils of getting a new phone only two days previous!).

gruntyfen

21st Mar 2009, 07:57

How about this in the Herald Sun and reportedly a quote from an Emirates spokesperson.

An Emirates spokesperson confirmed the incident in a statement at 11.20am: "Last night, EK 407 from Melbourne to Dubai had to return to Melbourne shortly after take-off when a flight deck indication alerted the Captain to the possibility of the tail contacting the runway on departure.

7378FE

21st Mar 2009, 07:57

How come Qantas hasn't been blamed for it?

Because they don't codeshare on the flight, wait until Etihad has one, then QANTAS will be in the crosshairs, as they will be codesharing.

7378FE

leewan

21st Mar 2009, 08:29

This could be due to:
1. Incorrect TOW calculation
2.Cargo not properly latched and secured.
3.Cargo themselves not properly calculated
AFAIK, the 345 doesn't have tail strike protection. And as for the smoke, my guess is that it could have punctured the pressurised area of the fuselage causing the burning smoke of the fuselage to be circulated in the cabin. Whatever it is, it is gonna cost alot of $$$ to be repair that.

Take a look at this for full r/way usage for t/o:
YouTube - China Airlines 737-800 nearly overshoots runway at takeoff (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XbINavHtiA)

canadair

21st Mar 2009, 09:02

bottom line, it happened,
spare a moment and think of the crew,
right now they all wish they were not rostered for the flight.
Analyze all you want, pontificate away, but the incident is what it is.

It will undoubtedly come out, and they will stand or fall on the results, but either way the crew is currently reliving every minute, every action, and every decision made.

It is so easy to discuss an incident, and more times than not assess instant blame, but between these guys there is hundreds or thousands of ops normal departures, this one is not, so lets remember that a trained professional proven crew is involved.

It hits home that, regardless of experience, and ability, we are always only as good as our last flight.

I don't work for EK, but in the end we all do the same job. Those of us that do, ask yourselves how you might feel sitting in the hotel right now.

Goffee

21st Mar 2009, 09:14

... must be the weekend crew, but that is pretty slow.

kingpost

21st Mar 2009, 09:27

I wonder if any authority will look at the flight schedule the pilots have been working prior to the event. They're still human and being scheduled very high duty times eventually catches even the sharpest of operators.

411A

21st Mar 2009, 10:50

Not knowing much about long-bodied Airboos aeroplanes (or, short-bodied ones for that matter)...does this particular model have any type of tailskid...and if not, why not?:ooh:

baires1

21st Mar 2009, 11:34

once I was on a a342 heavy T.O from LEMD . ATIS reported wind calm. In our company we do our own calculation for T.O. speeds. As we where number 2 on sequence the tower reported to the number 1, wind 5 kts tail . when we roll into position wind calm. where using TOGA. 36L Its a long runway, but also long T.O. roll and wind might have changed or not being accurately reported along the runway. As we saw the end of the runway aproaching pretty fast and we didn't have V1 yet, the PF (FO) initated rotation. Had we waited for V1, today I would be driving a cab.
Got airborne normally but none of us where happy about the situation the say the least.
after T.O. we found out that the T.O. performance charts for 10 kts tail wind indicated V1,Vr,V2 much lower than the one we have used (example: V1 140 instead of 154, that's 14 knots less!) and that our T.O. rotation was perfectly safe. The reason: T.O. charts normaly uses improved climb speeds. I found usefull to take a look at the 10kts tail wind speeds on heavy T.O.'s . Just in case.

Blockla

21st Mar 2009, 12:03

The Melbourne Airport confirmed, that several runway end lights were damaged in the accident, too, and needed to be replaced. Heavily scrapped the tail and took out some lights (presumably on departure).

Was there a power issue associated with the event or an event simply because of weight? Long flight from YMML to OMDB, some 6300NM.

Is it unlikely that the scrapping kept them on the ground longer than expected, ie past the end of the movement area. Any damage to the Runway?

Was the scrapping a desperate result of needing to get in the air; ie they were past the point of no return with not enough tar left in front of them?

Jofm5

21st Mar 2009, 12:16

Was the scrapping a desperate result of needing to get in the air; ie they were past the point of no return with not enough tar left in front of them?

According to The Aviation Herald (http://avherald.com/h?article=416c9997&opt=0)

In daylight Saturday morning it was established, that the airplane was still on the ground when it passed the runway end during takeoff, according gear tracks were found in the soft ground past the runway end.

DeltaRed

21st Mar 2009, 13:14

Australian Transport Safety Bureau spokesman Ian Brokenshire said its officers were headed to Melbourne.

"We have started the investigation and we will be sending a team of four to Melbourne later this afternoon to start the investigation tomorrow," he said.

"We will be looking at the flight data records, getting data off that, interviewing the crew, interviewing the company representatives, inspecting the runway and aircraft."

That will be an neat trick since all four of the crew were reportedly on the next flight out of the country - less than two hours later and now in Dubai.

The ground staff claim they dead-headed on the next direct service to Dubai which left "immediately".

Maybe I'm wrong but I would've thought they'd hang around for a de-brief with the ATSB. Getting them out in such a hurry was most certainly NOT out of fear the pilots might have been arrested or otherwise interfered with.

While I don't think for a second these fellows have anything untoward to answer for, I can't help but feel somewhat disturbed by the unseemly haste in which the crew were removed from the scene of a pretty significant incident. Obviously before the ATSB were probably even woken up.

Emirates pulls off yet another sleazy safety-related move. It'll be interesting to see how EK expansion into Australia might just be put under the microscope as a result of this action - not the event but the rapid extraction of the crew before they could be interviewed.

I bet the police were pissed off they never got their hands on them at "the crime scene." I suppose that's a good thing, at least.

It's always so inconvenient when these things happen away from Dubai...

advisory

21st Mar 2009, 13:30

:yuk:
SO the Emirates crew fled to DXB - can you blame them after the OZ authorites reaction to the QLD oil spill accident by the Pacific Adventurer? They have the Captain under "house arrest" on his ship and have confiscated his passport and he is threatened with a $250K fine. As if he meant those 31 containers to go overboard.

A sure way to get people to be open an co-operative with the investigation and prevent it happening again - not.:ugh:

OZ now lies with countries like Japan - if there is an incident, regardless, you are under arrest. Better hope you you have a good lawyer - presumaby paid for by IFALPA.

Dysag

21st Mar 2009, 13:45

... and Taiwan, which detained the crew of the crashed SIA 747 for two months.

forget

21st Mar 2009, 14:57

... and Taiwan, which detained the crew of the crashed SIA 747 for two months.

Huge difference. SIA - Take-off attempt on the wrong runway - and fatalities.

Inspector Clueless

21st Mar 2009, 15:27

There is no pilot union at EK as many know and therefore IFALPA will have limited effect if any.

This event will join various others under the EK carpet in AARs office with JNB,AKL ,A345 in flight smoke in 2002 etc etc.

The fact that there thankfully were no fatalities will allow little A and his cronies to limit the publicity and damage.

It was in the UK press then immediately removed from BBC.

Funny old world.

IC:ok:

Ron & Edna Johns

21st Mar 2009, 15:43

You're kidding - these guys were loaded onto another jet and got the hell out of Aus before speaking with safety authorities?? I hope that's incorrect.....

At fault or not at fault, you DON'T do that! Whether you like it or not, you actually do have this little thing called "responsibility": to present some basic information on what happened. I'm not saying you should be locked up or detained, or have passports confiscated. But some basic questions have to be answered. Goodness me, can you imagine a truck driver fleeing the scene of a road accident or a ship's Captain hightailing after a marine collision? Totally unacceptable - so why should we, as professional airmen, be any different? All it does is make your actions look more suspicious.

It's evidence of a very immature airline, I'm afraid - one that doesn't really know how to handle the situation, one that doesn't know how to support the crew whilst abroad while at the same time respecting the laws and authorities of the applicable country.

firstchoice7e7

21st Mar 2009, 16:18

incident is still being reported on bbc

BBC NEWS | World | Asia-Pacific | Plane makes emergency landing (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7956594.stm)

Dairyground

21st Mar 2009, 16:18

From the photographs in post #2, the worst of the damage seems to be well forward of the back door and gets progressively less towards the tail.

Judging from such photographs of the type as I have been able to find quickly, it looks to me as though the only way to scrape that far forward without removing most of the lower part of the rear fuselage is to have the main wheels up.

Could this be a case of wheels up early, flaps in far too early?

captjns

21st Mar 2009, 16:33

Possible wrong weight or CG.

To the Airbus flyers... does Airbus have over-rotation protection to prevent tail strikes?

Jetjock330

21st Mar 2009, 16:39

Possible wrong weight or CG.

To the Airbus flyers... does Airbus have over-rotation protection to prevent tail strikes? It has a pitch limiter indication on the PFD, an orange "V" indication the approaching angle of pitch that would incur a tail strike if over rotated beyond the bottom point of the "V".

But there is no flight control law preventing the tail from striking the ground. There is a very small tail skid, but more of a tell tale sign if touched or scrapped.

PJ2

21st Mar 2009, 17:32

Some information from an Airbus A340 - 500 FCOM may assist in providing some sober second thoughts and perhaps a pause before contributing some of the inexperienced, uninformed and wilder notions we are seeing.

The following is in no way intended as speculation but only as information.

Tailstrikes on any transport category aircraft have a fairly narrow range of causes. In tailstrike incidents and takeoff accidents, the following have occurred:

- incorrect rotation technique, (early, fast, two-stage)
- incorrect takeoff data calculation, (wrong weights, wrong runway)
- incorrect takeoff data entry, (correct calculation, wrong FMGC entry)
- wrong runway used for takeoff, (taxiway used in some cases)
- incorrect weight and balance numbers, (includes incorrect stabilizer setting)
- incorrect stabilizer setting by the crew (correctly calculated, wrong setting)
- cargo shift, (extremely rare today, but it has happened in the past)
- strong tailwinds/windshear (rare)

Operational Bulletins (not cautionary in nature but expanding upon operations), for the Airbus 340-500 state that, with respect to the A340-300, the flight control laws have been adapted to take into account the longer fuselage length and that the tail clearance is monitored and if marginal, the rotation rate is reduced until lift-off. The information also states, (and this ought to be obvious to anyone), the airplane has a large inertia and the rotation takes time to build up. For rotation, one "sets" the sidestick about 2/3rds back and waits - one does not pull further.

For information, the aircraft does not have a tailskid, but nor do most transports including the B747. The DC8-61 and 63 series did and the B720 had a ventral fin which may have acted as a bit of protection but that aircraft had a very short fuselage compared to the 707.

The Airbus A340-500 rotation technique requires some care. Even though the technique is (or certainly should be) well known/understood by those trained on the airplane, there is specific guidance in the FCOM regarding the maneuver, there remains an aspect to rotation of the Airbus A340-500 that can be a bit of a surprise if one is not prepared for it or knowledgeable about it.

I stress here that this information is for those new on the airplane. This is a non-issue for someone who has been flying the -500 for more than a couple of legs. The FCOM has very specific cautions on rotation technique:

AT VR SPEED
PNF..."ROTATE"
PNF observes the speed and completes the call by VR. When V1 and VR are the same, the calls must be completed by VR.

At VR , the PF initiates the rotation with a positive sidestick input and maintains the positive sidestick input to achieve a continuous rotation rate of about 3°/sec towards a pitch attitude of 12½°
[A343] /15° [A345, A330]. Changes to the sidestick position should not be made until airborne. After lift off, follow SRS pitch command bar. In the event of no FD after liftoff select 12½° [A343] /15° [A345, A330] pitch with all engines (maintain minimum V2 plus 10 kt) or 12½° in the event of an engine failure (maintain minimum V2).

As the rotation maneuver is flown in Direct Law with full authority, pitch control is very sensitive to sidestick inputs. Altering sidestick backpressure can produce pilot induced oscillations and/or may produce a two-stage rotation which significantly increases the chance of tail strike.

Minimize lateral inputs on ground and during the rotation, to avoid spoiler extension. In strong crosswind conditions, small lateral stick inputs may be used, if necessary, to maintain wings level.

If some lateral control has been applied on the ground, the Sidestick should be centralised during rotation so that the aircraft becomes airborne with a zero roll rate demand.

Info
Airbus Training advises that once the rotation has begun, increasing side stick back pressure will increase chance of a tail strike.

CAUTION

In the unlikely event that a tail strike should occur, flight at altitude requiring a pressurized cabin must be avoided and a return to the nearest suitable airport should be performed for damage assessment.

woodja51

21st Mar 2009, 17:33

So far the best post on this link is that of CANADAIR - who doesnt even work for EK. He seems to have a big picture approach to this case.

We are all only as good as out last flight .. I have 5000 hours on the 330/345 and can understand why errors can be made from a pilots perspective that might lead to this event/similar

The jet is not fool proof as AB would have us believe.

Neither is the 777 that I fly now and there have been several cases of 'almost's' with that jet too.

I know at least one of the guys on the incident jet, and cannot be lead to believe that any errors would have been made without mitigating factors - as there always are.

What ever the events that occurred the other night, be it incorrect FM inputs, overzealous side stick input, environmental or load shift. All are possible causes. Lets wait and see what the prelim gives.

I do find it odd that the crew were evac'd before making a statement to CASA/ BASI or who ever else is responsible. However, I guess the fact is that no other party was involved or injured therefore - like in a car crash if no injuries , death or other issues , this is not a crime scene and merely an incident.

However it does reflect badly on EK to 'spirit' the crew away, However , after an incident letting them be interviewed might not be in anyones interest and prejudicial to fair play given the legal vultures that inhabit the universe.

The folks were very lucky if the aircraft managed to cut up the overrun/LLZ etc as with the better part of 100 000 kg of Jet A on board any tank rupture may have been a different outcome.

As always pilots are their own worse critics ( unlike the medical profession!)

Regardless of what the cause is determined to be , the guys flying that day are probably wishing that this event didnt cause almost '600' to be viewing the post as we speak.

Good on them for a glass half full not half empty - regardless of the initial cause.
Probably wont make the transition back to the roster any easier!!

EK' s 'find him and kill him approach' used to work at 33 SQN but not in the real world I suspect!
woodj

xkoote

21st Mar 2009, 18:07

Just like to make a quick comment regarding one of the possible factors, namely the cargo shift theory.

In my opinion on a plane that is this full, it will be quite difficult for the cargo to shift with only acceleration. Especially one full of pax and fuel for a 10+ hour trip. Now one might say that on these planes, the containers are placed on rollers and can move quite freely. May well be as I don't fly them, only MD-80's. But even IF that was the case, they move to the rear of the plane allowing for early rotation and or difficulty controlling the aircraft. Kind of like the poor chaps taking off of runway 27R back in the day in Miami.
And if so they would have rotated much earlier and become airborne earlier. It does not account for why the plane refused to become airborne after 13,000 feet on a 12,000 foot long runway.
Really interested in the initial results form ATSB.

CONF iture

21st Mar 2009, 18:11

If they were not already in the air after a 12000 feet long runway not that far from sea level and desperately still scratching the tail ... the speed was just not there for liftoff ...
My guess would go a very underestimate GW and therefore just not enough applied thrust.

If no extra cargo, any estimate for the GW ?

TDK mk2

21st Mar 2009, 18:27

expanding on the cargo shift theory, if the load did shift rearward after V1 (which may have been low due to high GW and tailwind) which caused the aircraft to rotate early the crew would not abort the take off but drag would increase massively, induced drag from the wings and friction. Could that have prevented the aircraft from reaching Vr?

Joetom

21st Mar 2009, 19:11

Very lucky people indeed.

I will be very surprised if cargo shift played a role.

Just appears, the aircraft was not producing enough lift at a suitable point on the runway and even suitable lift at runway end.

I hope we learn all the lessons from this event.

My thoughts with all involved, Cheers.....

PJ2

21st Mar 2009, 19:30

xkoote;

FWIW, I agree - I doubt very much whether this is "cargo-shift" related. According to the METAR there was a slight headwind. A ten-hour flight is not a long flight for this aircraft so it will not have been near the MTOW which, depending upon the MTOW "purchased" by the airline, is around 372k kg's.

Unless the PF was new on the airplane and perhaps mis-handled the rotation, while I think the primary cause may be simple, the factors leading to the incident will be more complicated than they appear.

Thrust levels would not likely be an issue. There are two thrust lever positions for such a takeoff - TOGA and FLX/MCT. They would likely be well within the ability to use Flex takeoff thrust. The crew is warned if a Flex temperature isn't set or if the thrust levers are not in either the TOGA or FLX/MCT position.

I would be looking at first at FMC entries, then at the speed calculation process. FMC entries are usually captured by the DFDR and sometimes by the QAR if the airline has a FOQA Program. The takeoff data calculation process is fully automated in many operations but initial data entries are made by hand when requesting such data, usually from the aircraft and sent to company via the AOC (Airline Operational Control) functions in the ATSU using the flight plan weights and ATIS weather. The final load numbers may or may not require a change in the takeoff data. My first inclination is to believe that the weight & balance data was correct as those processes are normally highly automated and highly accurate.

I certainly feel for the crew. I know crews who have had this happen to them and the processes now unfolding are not pleasant. Hopefully the aforementioned Just Culture is the way this will be approached. If they whack the crew they risk losing the opportunity to learn.

Hempy

21st Mar 2009, 19:41

Blocky,

From our end thats how it looked; the end of the black stuff was coming up too fast, so hes yanked back on the stick to get it up. I'm assuming he's taken an intersection departure. DOK was on the boundary road near the golf course when he went over the top, apparently about 10" clear of the boundary fence and trailing a lot of sparks. I'm tipping the 34 strobes got a bit of a scare as well...

PJ2

21st Mar 2009, 20:25

hempy;
I'm assuming he's taken an intersection departure.
Just curious, do you have info that supports this? Not challenging the statement, just interested. I would have thought that intersection takeoffs were simply not done unless runway construction etc mandates such a departure.

The operation I am familiar with is capable of calculating takeoff data, (speeds for WAT data and flap position), for intersection takeoffs as well as displaced runway thresholds but it is policy that intersection takeoffs are not done, period. The fact that the runway is about 12,000ft long would have no bearing on the policy. So I would be interested in learning if the takeoff was done from an intersection. Obviously the takeoff data would be different vice the data for the entire length.

alexmcfire

21st Mar 2009, 20:33

Any pics of the runway availble?

CONF iture

21st Mar 2009, 20:55

My first inclination is to believe that the weight & balance data was correct as those processes are normally highly automated and highly accurate
... as long as the correct data are entered ...

According to the METAR there was a slight headwind. A ten-hour flight is not a long flight for this aircraft so it will not have been near the MTOW which, depending upon the MTOW "purchased" by the airline, is around 372k kg's
Headwind ?
Also 6300 NM would be more around 14 hours flight ...

My estimate would be around 310 tonnes (no cargo) ... (?)

Emersome

21st Mar 2009, 20:58

This could be filed under speculation, but it happened to me years ago. Cargo was much heavier than what was shown on manifest and Aircraft (DC-10-30) was not performing to the book. Taking out the runway lights after long takeoff roll? Landing and using all the runway? Could it be someone was getting under table pay for loading cargo not on the manifest?

dooner

21st Mar 2009, 20:59

With 14 hours of fuel in the tanks, and bearing in mind that it is not unusual to be commencing rotation approaching the alternating red and whites at the far end of 16, I would very seriously doubt that an intersection take off was utilized

All will be revealed in due time

Dooner:ok:

Captain Peacock

21st Mar 2009, 21:21

...........since all four of the crew were reportedly on the next flight out of the country - less than two hours later and now in Dubai.If that happened to me, I would want to be on the first flight out of the country too.

Australia is going the way of Japan, Greece, New Zealand and Taiwan to name a few. All these countries arrest pilots that have had incidents. In New Zealand, they use FDR recordings in criminal proceedings. (Dash 8)

In Australia, we prosecute pilots based on confidential reports.:eek: (QF 737 in Launceston)

Good luck to the crew for getting out so quick. I would have too if I could. But I live here.:sad:

mrs nomer

21st Mar 2009, 21:22

Take off weight would have been in the range 340 - 360 tonnes, probably landing DXB a few tonnes under max landing weight.

Emirates system of cross checking entered performance data versus loadsheet data should have picked up any data entry errors. (ie ZFW as TOW etc etc) I always had a mental gross error check in my own mind as well.

I can't believe they would have used anything but the full length and 5 knots of tailwind would not have been a problem. Temperature was no issue.

If the above are eliminated as causes, it leaves rotation technique and shifting cargo . I've never had shifting cargo on an A345.

I can't imagine how, but if there was some very odd situation that involved incorrect performance data actually getting past the cross check, and then being used as the reference data for the take off ( ie low Vspeeds, low FLEX etc) it would be very interesting to see how the cross check system failed.

Jetjock330

21st Mar 2009, 21:27

Based on an example of SYD to the middle-east that we fly, 6650 nm, Melbourne to the middle-east is similar.

The flight time can be in excess of 14 hours: 30 minutes (136 tons departure fuel versus max fuel of 171 tons), this aircraft has in the region of almost 16 hours endurance with this fuel 136 tons, and average fuel flow of (plus minus) 8700kg per hour. Take-off weight for the A345 could be in the region of 358 tons, still under max TOW of around 368-372 tons.(depending whom the operator is).

Surely full length would be the only consideration!

Typical A345 speeds from the FOVE would be:

YMML RWY 34
Length 3657m
Elevation 330ft
15’c 1014 QNH
010/6 kts
358 tons

Optimum is Flap 3 from FOVE:

Flap 3 ,153 163 172 Flex 41 c of g AFT
Flap3 ,152 161 171 Flex 42 c of g FWD

Flap 2 ,152 165 175 Flex 38 c of g AFT
Flap 2 ,152 166 176 Flex 37 c of g FWD

Note: These speeds are just an example of the speeds calculated using Airbus Fove for a similar scenario and not the actual of the incident of the day

PJ2

21st Mar 2009, 21:33

CONF iture;

:
My first inclination is to believe that the weight & balance data was correct as those processes are normally highly automated and highly accurate
... as long as the correct data are entered ...
Clearly.

My point was, in observing this over a 34+ year career, I saw amost no errors in the process. It is trivially obvious that any process is open to error but I suspect not, here.

Your estimate of 310k kgs seems reasonable for 10hrs - I see there are higher estimates - it'll come out soon enough. As I say, not likely near the MTOW, if the MTOW is like other - 500's, around 372k kgs. Reduced thrust would likely have been possible.

Emersome:
Cargo was much heavier than what was shown on manifest
Yes, possible - seen it, and on a 340.

That said, unlike the A340-300 with hair-dryers for engines and, like the DC8-61, always made you wonder, the -500 is a very powerful aircraft and a) given that it is a serious error in calculations, would still hardly notice an extra 20k kgs and b) would not, even at all-up gross, take all of a 12,000ft runway. If the type is rotating in the reds, somethings's seriously wrong.

Ex Cargo Clown

21st Mar 2009, 21:45

Cargo was much heavier than what was shown on manifest

Can't happen.

The Loadsheet is done from weights off a Pallet Statement, ie every container is weighed.

Manifest is just a nice simple crosscheck for any SNAFUs, and will give you a net weight of freight, add the containers on and you should be very close to your total Pallet Statement weight.

As for shifting units, I cannot see it, having dealt with the loaders at MEL, they are professional and even an oversight such as leaving a pallet lock down wouldn't cause a weight shift enough to cause this. Worse case scenario would be a shift in an all but empty Cpt 3 and 4 all the way aft. Very unlikely.

Capt Kremin

21st Mar 2009, 22:46

A cargo shift would only explain the tailscrape, not the rotation in the weeds.
It sounds to me that it may be related to the Sing Air 747 incident in Auckland. Incorrectly entered V speeds and thrust.. too low for the weight which caused an early rotation and tailscrape.
Reports of three separate strikes on the runway would tend to confirm that.
Ironically one of the contributing factors in AKL was that the Captain had just converted from the Airbus, so the lower settings didn't set off any alarm bells.

grusome

21st Mar 2009, 23:13

woodja51

"EK' s 'find him and kill him approach' used to work at 33 SQN but not in the real world I suspect!"

OK, I'll bite! Please explain.

Gru

chainsaw

21st Mar 2009, 23:17

Captain Peacock,

Australia is going the way of Japan, Greece, New Zealand and Taiwan to name a few. All these countries arrest pilots that have had incidents. In New Zealand, they use FDR recordings in criminal proceedings. (Dash 8)

Wrong, particularly in your reference to New Zealand. The NZ Police issued a warrant to search and obtain the CVR and FDR from TAIC after TAIC had completed its investigation in 1997. TAIC appealed, but lost, because even though New Zealand was a Contracting State to the Chicago Convention, it had not ratified the provisions of Annex 13 to protect the CVR and FDR into New Zealand law.

It was also discovered that there was no provision for the carriage of CVRs at that time of the Dash 8 accident. TAIC, NZ Department of Transport, and the NZ airline industry lobbied the government to change the law, and that was achieved in 1999.

New Zealand now has protection for CV and FD recordings and they can't be used in criminal investigations without aspects of public interest being considered.

In Australia, we prosecute pilots based on confidential reports.

Yes, and that seems reasonable, particularly if the matter involves 'the public interest and safety' (as was noted by the Tasmanian Supreme Court Judge when granting a permanent stay on the proceedings to which you are referring).

But the same Supreme Court Judge also noted that public interest and safety was not being served in the QF737 Launceston matter, because it involved a prosecution some six years after the event was alleged to have occurred.

listentome

21st Mar 2009, 23:30

le bus team down from le France to fix le plane...got towed to the hangar in the dead of night.....damage to rear pressure bulkhead:sad:

PJ2

21st Mar 2009, 23:45

Capt Kremin;

Reports of three separate strikes on the runway would tend to confirm that.

Are three individual strikes confirmed or are we still seeing information come in? Were there any reports of "porpoising" of the aircraft at all? I ask for a specific reason related to my post on what the A340-500 FCOM has to say about rotation technique.

7378FE

22nd Mar 2009, 00:12

Route for this flight was to have been :
MEL-ADL-PHE-CMB-DXB with an estimated flight time of 13:36

7378FE

PJ2

22nd Mar 2009, 00:19

EK Snorkel;
average TOW between 360- 370 t, indeed very close to MTOW of 372t.
We'll see if the data bears this out but I have no reason to doubt your info, thanks.

Having done these flights in the -500, you will know with greater certainty than I then, about on average, how much runway is used for such a takeoff, (are you into the reds and whites, generally?), whether intersection takeoffs are generally not done and whether there are any rotation issues for the 345 the technique for which, as you will know if you have also flown the 340-300, is slightly different. I ask in a collegial spirit and not in any accusatory or pointed way. I have flown the same types under the similar circumstances so am curious.

CONF iture

22nd Mar 2009, 00:48

Wrong! I have flown that flight with the A345 many times; Average flight time on that sector 14 1/2 hrs, average TOW between 360- 370 t, indeed very close to MTOW of 372t.
Obviously you are at the right spot to know about it, but still, it looks VERY heavy ... would you detail a bit your numbers ?

chase888

22nd Mar 2009, 01:16

Just a PP so dont shoot me!
Is at all possible they had a problem with brakes not fully releasing?
Alloys dont normally emit too many sparks, but brakes certainly can.
Are there any brake temperature indicators on the flight deck?
My first thoughts were that it had to be weight related, but after many learned observations, perhaps not, although theft is of course an art form, and I am sure a determined team could find away around the checks and balances(no pun intended).

Old Fella

22nd Mar 2009, 01:31

Woodja51 Like grusome I too would be interested in some further detail.

MyNameIsIs

22nd Mar 2009, 01:41

Just curious, do you have info that supports this? Not challenging the statement, just interested. I would have thought that intersection takeoffs were simply not done unless runway construction etc mandates such a departure.
"PJ2"

Not sure about other countries or foreign carriers operating in Aus etc (my experience doesn't stretch that far), but from the Australian documents:

"A pilot wishing to use less than the full length of the runway available should nominate the intention when requesting the taxi clearance" AIP ENR 1.1-4.3.11
"ATC may offer an intersection departure and will advise the remaining runway length of the runway if required" AIP ENR 1.1-4.3.12

And one must not forget
"The pilot in command must ensure that the runway is suitable for the operation. If not suitable for an operational reason, ATC must be advised before taxiing or when requesting an airways clearance by using the phrase: "REQUIRE RUNWAY (number)" ............. The decision to take off rests solely with the pilot in command" AIP ENR 1.1-4.6

Led Zeppelin

22nd Mar 2009, 02:13

With an air distance of 6500 nm, approx fuel burn is 114 tonnes and flight time around 13:55 at M 0.83.

Approx. numbers

ZFW 225.0
FOB 125.0
TOW 350.0
FBO 114.0
LDW 236.0

HotDog

22nd Mar 2009, 03:43

Smart move by Emirates but not a precedent. Personal knowledge of a heavy L1011 landing due to a microburst at Narita. Common practice in Japan to detain the operating crew for the duration of the official investigation which took about two years to complete preventing the captain of that flight to be rostered on any flights to Japan.

Getzo

22nd Mar 2009, 03:51

:ugh:CONF

"Obviously you are at the right spot to know about it, but still, it looks VERY heavy ... would you detail a bit your numbers ?"

Detail a bit following::rolleyes:

Gnd Dist 6420nm
Ramp Fuel 137t
Trip Fuel 126t
ETOW 363t
ELWT 237t
EZFW 227t

G;)

Visual Procedures

22nd Mar 2009, 04:24

about on average, how much runway is used for such a takeoff, (are you into the reds and whites, generally?)

Derate/flex is calculated specifically for every takeoff, using TORA to calculate the minimum take-off thrust required. With derates of up to 73 deg on the 777, and similar flex on the bus, almost every longhaul takeoff (and indeed a lot of midhaul takeoffs) end up in the 'reds and whites'.

Adverseyawn

22nd Mar 2009, 04:33

The overload issue should be easy to settle by a QAR/DFDR download. The Airbus' three flight control computers weigh the aircraft after liftoff -- too bad that can't be done while taxiing -- and these values can be displayed on the MCDU. Usually the variance between the three are only a few hundred kgs, which on a +300 ton aicraft speaks to their accuracy.

Let's just hope that the cause of this incident was not flap mis-selection, i.e. 2 instead of 3.

wirgin blew

22nd Mar 2009, 04:34

Latest from the local paper in MEL.

Passengers "terrified" | Herald Sun (http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25221954-2862,00.html)

In particular Welsh passenger Geoff Passmore said he saw the engine blow and flames shoot out. "Then we heard a dreadful bang," he said.

Something else to consider.

chainsaw

22nd Mar 2009, 04:41

Smart move by Emirates [whisking the accident crew out of Australia]but not a precedent.

It's actually been a pretty DUMB move by Emirates, particularly if its actions are regarded as having hindered the investigation. :ugh:

halas

22nd Mar 2009, 04:52

Don't the ATSB have a telephone?

halas

PJ2

22nd Mar 2009, 05:46

Hempy;
the only other explanation for not reaching flying speed by the end of the runway I can come up is a gross (almost fatal) miscalculation of power settings.
In post #81, I stated, "Thrust levels would not likely be an issue. There are two thrust lever positions for such a takeoff - TOGA and FLX/MCT. They would likely be well within the ability to use Flex takeoff thrust. The crew is warned if a Flex temperature isn't set or if the thrust levers are not in either the TOGA or FLX/MCT position."

By that I mean, it is not possible nor likely, that this is a power setting incident. If the runway and, if available, the Flex temperature, have been entered into the MCDU, (FMGC interface), providing the thrust levers were in the TOGA or FLX/MCT detent, the takeoff thrust will have been correctly set by the FADECs for the runway entered. These are not easy mistakes to make. I doubt if they were made.

An incorrect flap setting is also possible but unlikely. Also, an incorrect flap setting does not, under most but not all conditions, have that great a variance on V speeds and available lift right after takeoff.

What I can see, outside a mishandled rotation, is a possible error in the V speeds. I say this because these speeds are usually manually entered into the MCDU from data received over the ACARS. We know this is possible because, as we know, it has happened.

I understand and know that a heavy takeoff can rotate in the reds and whites. It's the last thousand feet I'd be concerned about.

Hot Dog;
Personal knowledge of a heavy L1011 landing due to a microburst at Narita. Common practice in Japan to detain the operating crew for the duration of the official investigation
Yes, agree - seen it. They don't mess around. Given the country I don't think it was wise to ferret the crew out of the country so there is an underlying story here that will emerge as to why, which will ultimately reveal who was right.

mrdeux

22nd Mar 2009, 05:58

Hopefully Emirates rights to operate to Australia are cancelled until this is sorted out.

16 is slightly downhill (about .5° from memory), and after the perimeter road falls away into a valley. If the comment earlier about it cleaing the perimeter fence by about 10' is even close to true, then it would seem that the aircraft was at best level, and perhaps slightly descending.

Intersection departures on 16/34....with a strong southerly, the domestics will often use E (just south of the intersection). I've never seen anyone use C.

Instant Hooligan

22nd Mar 2009, 06:03

"Hopefully Emirates rights to operate to Australia are cancelled until this is sorted out".
Why?

woodja51

22nd Mar 2009, 06:16

If my memory serves me correctly the 345 is geometry limited - usually this means that if rotated too early the tail prevents the AOA increasing to a level that makes acceleration and liftoff impossible ( unlike say, an A4 or something like that) , however , that assumes things like the thrust being at the correct value etc.

If not enough thrust then anything is possible, but that is why the pilot has his hands on the go faster levers.

I could be wrong but even if really badly loaded the elevator and stab power
should be enough to get the thing airborne.

Of course the 345 autotrims the stab when a couple of the engines are started but it is based on the input data to the FM if I remember correctly.

so s%^t in =s$%t out = possible mis-trimmed stab- and that could certainly mess the rotate up and reduce elevator control.

just speculation of course which I agree is not always helpful - just my 2 cents. w

woodja51

22nd Mar 2009, 06:29

Probably an in joke - sorry guys - it was just that we had a rubber stamp at 33SQN when I was there that someone made up that had 'find him and kill him' AUTH CO 33SQN that was bandied around on various unofficial publications and manuals etc.

trying - poorly- to allude to the usual witch hunt process that seems to come out of things like this.

Apologies if it sounded contentious. Should have left it out.

Ta

Fromagio

22nd Mar 2009, 06:41

I'm glad to hear that Emirates didn't abandon their flight crew and leave them at the mercy of a foreign state. Fortunately, it was an incident and not an accident with no-one hurt. The investigators will have access to all flight data and CVR recordings + they do have telephones in Oz. (00971 is the international dialing code if they're wondering) :}

three eighty

22nd Mar 2009, 06:42

mrdeux -
Hopefully Emirates rights to operate to Australia are cancelled until this is sorted out.

That has to be the most naive response yet on this thread.
Should they cancell all Qantas flights untill they get there recent spate of technical issues sorted out?

mensaboy

22nd Mar 2009, 06:56

Unfortunately it will be termed an accident, not an incident.

Accident
''(a) a person is fatally or seriously injured.....''
''(b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which,
-adversely affects the structural strength, perf. or flight characteristics of the aircraft or
-would normally require major repair or replacement.......
etc.

No doubt EK will report it as an incident for publicity reasons, and I would do the same. They did it with the JNB accident for example.

mrdeux

22nd Mar 2009, 07:02

mrdeux -
Hopefully Emirates rights to operate to Australia are cancelled until this is sorted out.

That has to be the most naive response yet on this thread.
Should they cancel all Qantas flights until they get there recent spate of technical issues sorted out?

I wasn't referring to the incident itself, but rather the very quick removal of the pilots. Australia isn't Japan. Nobody was hurt, but it's still a pretty major event. At least having approval from the ATSB before heading home would seem prudent, and it makes it look much less like they are 'running away'. Now that they are 'home' I presume that the Australian ATSB will be well down the list of people that they will speak too...rather than being the first, as they probably should have been.

SIUYA

22nd Mar 2009, 07:09

Fromagio......

Fortunately, it was an incident and not an accident with no-one hurt.

You probably need to revise your ideas about the difference between accident and incident, because if the photos and description of the damage sustained are correct, then this was very much an accident and not just an incident.

ICAO Annex 13:-

Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which ... the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which ...would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin.

I may be wrong, but the way that I'm seeing it, those holes in the underside of the fuselage certainly appear to be more than just puncture holes! :eek:

PJ2

22nd Mar 2009, 07:11

I truly wonder if anyone contributing their thoughts actually reads the posts that have come before their own.

It is certainly frustrating to see the same points and the same questions arise so early in the thread, when they have been dealt with in one form or another in earlier posts.

While it may be that someone believes that what has been thus far contributed by experienced people on the airplane may be questioned, at least have the courtesy to pose the question and standby for an informed response so that the conversation can be developed.

Questions about how the Airbus and standard operating procedures handle takeoff weights, takeoff data and takeoff thrust have all been responded to by experienced, knowledgeable contributors. Questions about fuel loads, enroute times, takeoff V speeds and calculations of same have similarly been dealt with by experienced people on the equipment. I posted a lengthy description of the rotation technique, including cautions, concerning the A340-500. These are relevant points to a tailstrike incident. They are necessary aspects of the discussion yet continue to be ignored in favour of the wildest theories. Most theories regarding early gear or flap retraction, cargo shifting, wrong trim setting on takeoff range from much less likely to not-a-chance.

Of interest are reports that the aircraft was still on the ground at the end of the runway. Can anyone confirm this or is this just another media story? Thanks.

SB4200

22nd Mar 2009, 07:14

I had a look at the LOC this morning, the antennae are sheared off about 50cm up, i.e half a meter lower and the aircraft was hitting a brick building and not some hollow tube aluminium.

Hempy...

Can't see enough detail in that pic there, but the LLZ antenna has to be aligned with the runway centreline. The transmitter building is the one abeam.

So which one is it? Antenna i'm guessin...

FullWings

22nd Mar 2009, 07:31

If they were still on the ground after leaving the end of the runway and in a tailstrike attitude, it does somewhat follow that they weren't going fast enough to fly at that point (less than Vmu). What *could* cause this on 12,000' of tarmac?

- Lack of thrust
- Not enough flap
- Too little runway (intersection departure)
- Windshear
- Gross overload

Something (or things) must have gone badly wrong... After all, the aircraft should have been able to clear the runway end by at least 35' after losing an engine at V1. I doubt this accident has a type-specific cause as it is so far removed from normality.

radial090

22nd Mar 2009, 07:32

sb4200

Early in the morning and still groggy but the llz antenna are off to the side of the runway

Super VC-10

22nd Mar 2009, 07:35

Do we have another Sullenberger in the making ???

I don't think we do, Captain Sullenberger cannot be said to have caused the problems that his flight encountered. In this accident, we cannot be sure that this is the case, and won't be sure until the investigators release a preliminary report at the earliest.

neville_nobody

22nd Mar 2009, 07:36

Removing the flight crew from the country actually stops them being subpoenaed by the authorities. If they were thrown on a plane straight back to Dubai the ATSB would have a hard time actually talking to them if Emirates wanted to play hard ball. If they were in Australia then they would have a legal obligation to talk to the ATSB I would imagine.

This whole thing could become a political minefield as the airline is not a private company as such. So the owners may not be to appreciative of another government authority investigating their company.

As for LLZ it is aligned with the centreline. How else would you transmit a beam that tracks you down the centreline?

A-3TWENTY

22nd Mar 2009, 07:39

Hi Guys ,

Do you know what are the countries which use to prosecute/arrest pilots in case of an incident/accident?

a-3twenty

sandseeker

22nd Mar 2009, 07:41

some real muppets on this thread..... v biased un-professional comments.

Lets wait to hear from the real experts eh?

PJ2

22nd Mar 2009, 07:46

neville_nobody;
Removing the flight crew from the country actually stops them being subpoenaed by the authorities. If they were thrown on a plane straight back to Dubai the ATSB would have a hard time actually talking to them if Emirates wanted to play hard ball. If they were in Australia then they would have a legal obligation to talk to the ATSB I would imagine.

This whole thing could become a political minefield as the airline is not a private company as such. So the owners may not be to appreciative of another government authority investigating their company.
Understand and from a political point of view this may make some kind of crude sense but from a flight safety pov, preventing a country's investigative authorities from talking to those involved in an incident or accident within that country is certainly contrary to ICAO Annex 13. Unlike some countries that we have come to know, Australia does not prosecute first and ask questions about flight safety later - at least not the last time I was there, (Dec 08) discussing such issues.

B772

22nd Mar 2009, 07:50

Hempy. I was at MEL at 1300LT today. Your photo of R/W34 depicts strobes 350M south of the threshold. This is incorrect. This is the R/W 16 LLZ antenna array (Orange in colour). It appears to me from the damage to the antenna array it may have been caused by vortices. There were 10 officials inspecting the antenna array area at 1300Lt today.

The a/c is in the John Holland hangar and word at the airport is that the 'incident' is the most serious to have occured in Australia without loss of life. As the pilots left on the next flight approx. 2 hrs later there will be some huge ramifications for EK. (There is a 'rumour' DXB did not know the full storey when the crew were repatriated)

Dysag

22nd Mar 2009, 07:55

I guess the crew did not leave their bags in MEL.

Even on an electric bird like the A340, there could be some paper airfield charts, take-off calcs, loadsheet etc that are best taken home.

PJ2

22nd Mar 2009, 08:04

Although I don't know how EK does it, the paperwork, ie, the takeoff data, will likely be in the form of ACARS paper. We do all load and t/o data by ACARS and there is an electronic message logging within the ATSU so retrieving the data is not a problem. The QAR/DFDR may or may not record the actual V-speed entries in the FMC but the MCDU chips might. Anyway, that's all downstream stuff for later.

akerosid

22nd Mar 2009, 08:08

Are the nationalities of the crews involved known; I'd be surprised if at least were not Australian? Could they not still be subject to a sub-peona, notwithstanding the fact that they are working abroad?

Given the efforts EK (and the UAE govt) has put into getting extra access and rights into Oz, the airline would be very strongly advised to co-operate and to permit the crews involved to return. Given the seriousness of the incident, the Australian authorities could possibly impose sanctions, either temporarily and permanently.

Good memories

22nd Mar 2009, 08:10

In all the postings there is only one person writing about a possible engine failure. Probably I missed some factual information, but a engine failure after V1 in combination with a wind indication mismatch could be a possible cause. The collision with the offset localiser antenna would also be clearer.

Let's hope the crew did well i.s.o.making a mistake.

Good Flying!

John

Bus429

22nd Mar 2009, 08:16

Other than the obviously informed comments here, the rest follows the usual pattern of nonsense we can all expect when reading of incidents and accidents.

My - uninformed - input (but I did work for EK in the 90s):

Incident occurred - nobody hurt
Pilots returned to DXB within hours - a little strange
The FDR and CVR will provide the facts
Let the investigators do their job

neville_nobody

22nd Mar 2009, 08:34

PJ2

My point is that if push came to shove, would Emirates be willing to allow a foreign country's government (which is what ATSB ultimately is) come and investigate them and potentially embarrass the company to the world. While all the touchy feely human factors stuff is great, I am a bit cynical as to whether foreign carriers would actually see it this way.

Visual Procedures

22nd Mar 2009, 08:35

Hmmm.. I've been out of oz for a few years now so need a little help with my memory..

Can someone point out to me in the CAR's please where it says the flight crew must remain at the scene of the 'accident'?

B772

22nd Mar 2009, 08:40

Akerosid. One poster has suggested the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has sent a team to DXB to interview the crew and have a 'close look' at EK behind the scenes.

Good memories. The only offset antenna array I know of is for the MLS. The R/W 16 localiser antenna is 350M from the end of the R/W threshold.

New News:

It appears the a/c will be patched up in MEL and issued with a permit to fly to a MRO. This could be early next month.

The producers of the TV program "This Day Tonight" have been "sniffing around".

Capt Kremin

22nd Mar 2009, 08:42

A straight engine failure with properly calculated thrust and V speeds should still have seen them comfortably airborne by the time they crossed the threshold. None of the engineers posting here have mentioned any engine problems. I wouldn't rely on any pax reports either.

triton140

22nd Mar 2009, 08:54

Can someone point out to me in the CAR's please where it says the flight crew must remain at the scene of the 'accident'?

Not the CAR's that's relevant - it's the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 -and that gives the ATSB pretty wide powers - creating amongst other things an offence of hindering an investigation. s43 of the Act would also allow the ATSB to impound the aircraft.

SIUYA

22nd Mar 2009, 09:02

neville......

You perhaps may like rethink your approach to Emirate's supposed 'strengths' in this matter? Because it's looking as though it doesn't have too many from a number of points of view!

Apart from potentially stuffing-up big time with respect to S.24 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act (2003), it looks as though Emirates has also 'exposed' itself to adverse 'response' under S.30 DB and DC of the (Australian) Civil Aviation Act.

It really doesn't matter that Emirates is a UAE-controlled company and can do, as you seem to suggest, as it wants to do. The fact is Neville, if Emirates want's to 'play' in Australia (or beyond in accordance with 'freedoms'), then it has to so in accordance with Australian requirements AND legislation!

And if it doesn't want to play by those rules, then the Australian government has the final choice of telling Emirates to piss-off if it thinks Emirates isn't playing nicely.

It's as simple as that!

SOPS

22nd Mar 2009, 09:07

SIUYA.....would you mind posting what the relevent regulations say?

triton140

22nd Mar 2009, 09:09

Early in the morning and still groggy but the llz antenna are off to the side of the runway

ERSA gives localiser IMS (the one which was NOTAM'd) at 37 41.3S 144 50.5E which is on the runway centreline about 350m out from the threshold.

SIUYA

22nd Mar 2009, 09:13

SOPS....

See:-

ComLaw Management - Series- Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/management.nsf/lookupindexpagesbyid/IP200401884?OpenDocument)

for the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

and http://www.casa.gov.au/download/act_regs/CAA.pdf

for the Civil Aviation Act 1988.

triton140

22nd Mar 2009, 09:14

SIUYA.....would you mind posting what the relevent regulations say?

Basically, the Act says that a person is guilty of an offence if:

(a) the person engages in conduct; and

(b) the person is reckless as to whether the conduct will adversely affect an investigation that is being conducted at that time or that could be conducted at a later time into an immediately reportable matter; and

(c) the conduct has the result of adversely affecting such an investigation (whether or not the investigation had commenced at the time of the conduct); and

(d) the conduct is not authorised by the Executive Director.

Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 6 months.

My guess would be both Emirates and the flight crew individually (unfortunately) might get caught by this provision.

SIUYA

22nd Mar 2009, 09:20

Thanks triton140...........

In other words, if Emirates and the UAE want to play 'hardball' on this one and not play nicely, then they might get hurt.

Dysag

22nd Mar 2009, 09:25

We need a lawyer's opinion.

I am not one, but would suggest that in order to get a conviction, it would have to be proved that they went back to DXB intending not to return to be interviewed.

I also presume that the crew has the right to be accompanied by a representative of their employer and their union (if any). In the meantime, where would they be expected to remain? In the hangar, in MEL, in Victoria, in Australia....?

I guess the important thing is whether they are prepared to cooperate if requested. That has not been disproved.

Compare with this: "The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has confirmed that QANTAS removed a flight recorder from the 747 involved in the accident in Bangkok in September 1999. A Senate Committee heard that the quick access recorder, one of the three black boxes, was removed from QF1 and brought back to Australia"

paulg

22nd Mar 2009, 09:30

On a quick reading of the legislation, I doubt that the action of the aircrew departing for Dubai would in itself be construed as hindering the investigation under s. 24. It would of course be expected they would be avalable for interview when required by ATSB. Of course there is a requirement to file an accident report, and to allow access to the aircraft and flight data. No doubt this will be done by the company on the ground in Melbourne. There may also be obligations under the treaty. BTW I am a senior Australian lawyer but with no particular expertise in aviation law.

man on the ground

22nd Mar 2009, 09:31

n all the postings there is only one person writing about a possible engine failure. Probably I missed some factual information, but a engine failure after V1 in combination with a wind indication mismatch could be a possible cause. The collision with the offset localiser antenna would also be clearer.

Three tail strikes were observed.
I have never seen one of these flights use an intersection departure - that was just a guess by a poster here.
At no stage during the flight did the crew mention an engine malfunction.
There is no off-set localiser antenna. The antenna is on the centre line and was significantly damaged by the passage of the acft.
The building 'arrowed' in Hempy's photo is the LLZ power-house.

Regardless of "how' the situation came to be, the crew subsequently handled the situation well, and got the wounded aircraft back on the ground such that everyone could walk away from it. Doesn't get better than that. Nice flying!

triton140

22nd Mar 2009, 09:33

I am not one, but would suggest that in order to get a conviction, it would have to be proved that they went back to DXB intending not to return to be interviewed.

Equally IANAL either! But as far as Emirates itself is concerned, if they impeded the investigation (recklessly?) by repatriating the crew, then they're in the frame.

For the crew, probably not an issue unless they declined to be interviewed by ATSB.

But at the end of the day, as others have suggested, probably less of a legal issue and more about not getting up the nose of ATSB or CASA - because that ain't a good thing :=.

paulg

22nd Mar 2009, 09:50

Yes, Triton140, that is the real risk for the airline. I hope for their sake they can manage the media though. Wait for it.

Gretchenfrage

22nd Mar 2009, 09:54

maybe one ADIRU screwed up again and wanted to climb this time .....

triton140

22nd Mar 2009, 09:58

I hope for their sake they can manage the media though.

Doing an absolutely impeccable job so far! If it was QF we'd have had "Keilor Park kindergarten in narrow escape from runaway Qantas flight - seconds from disaster - offshore maintenance policy nearly claims yet more innocent victims."

paulg

22nd Mar 2009, 10:14

Yes I know. BTW you put it so well.

Jofm5

22nd Mar 2009, 11:07

Lets start looking at reality - rather than quoting verbatim this and that regulations.

Yes I am not a person that sits in the pointy end and yes you can pick apart my credentials to comment - I give that as an accepted.

But to have a go at said crew for following instructions to vacate is just wrong. They are instructions they followed, however strange and whatever rules have been broken they have followed instruction from the company. Neither you or I know if they contested those instructions stating blah blah legislation so lets drop that now.

PJ2: You might as well give up now - you are giving good information which seems to be ignored by those that want to focus on the small print of law.

Here is the reality check.

Regardless of who is to blame we need to learn what has happened and why. If it is a screw up then let us prevent it happening again. Over running a runway is not a trivial matter and I would bet what little I have in those in the pointy end not doing so intentionly, as a passenger I like to think those in control have the same value of life as I do.

So taking that into account, lets look at the aircraft performance, it seemed to underpeform for a reason. Let us understand this reason and learn from it,

Lets get rid of the culture of "the guys screwed up" before the facts are known and try thinking about what if it was you in the same situation with the circumstances prevailing.

It could very well be they screwed up - but I dont like to think anyone in that position of responsibilty has a death wish - so how they managed the situation is what we need to learn about along with how the situation arose.

triton140

22nd Mar 2009, 11:27

Lets start looking at reality - rather than quoting verbatim this and that regulations.

Fair enough I guess .....

But I make no comment whatsoever re the crew (I am certain they did their absolute professional best to avoid a disaster, and they succeeded, so well done to them) - what does puzzle me is why the airline concerned chose to potentially upset the Australian regulatory agencies, the same agencies who could presumably hold the aircraft as evidence for a long time, the same agencies who ultimately determine the right of Emirates to fly to Oz, etc.

Not surprisingly, that does puzzle me (as does the lack of media attention) - but as you correctly point out, it is a side issue. The main question is why and how. And we do not yet have any concrete information to help us with that, so we are all guessing at this point.

Meantime, the knowledgeable contributions of professionals like PJ2 help us to understand the possible contributing factors.

FFRATS

22nd Mar 2009, 11:31

A long landing on 34 would be difficult, hard landing though easy ;) as up slope.
FFRATS

7x7

22nd Mar 2009, 11:48

Why are so many of us so damned willing - (indeed, almost tripping over ourselves in our eagerness to make our very own accusation)- to "eat our young" in situations such as these?

Have any one of the (too **ing many!) Monday Morning Quarterbacks who've written in on this thread stopped for one moment to ask himself how HE would like to be treated by his peers in the period before a proper, considered investigation finds him guilty or innocent should he be unfortunate enough to find himself in a similar position one day?

airbusa330

22nd Mar 2009, 11:52

Maybe time to re-visit/revise FTL's. A manger's/beancounter's nightmare as it affects ''oh no my bonus''! Safety?what's that?We work nine to five why cant you?
Pushing crew to the limit will only catch up eventually.
Expensive employing crew?Try an accident.It is only a matter of time.

Gulf News

22nd Mar 2009, 12:26

Everyone here seems to be getting their knickers in a twist about an uncorroborated allegation from one single poster that the crew were dead headed back to DXB two hours after the incident. Does anyone know this for sure? Perhaps it was only the cabin crew or even the relief crew who were returned. Perhaps if the crew were dead headed home they did so with the blessing of the Authorities. None of us really know the facts.

Too much conjecture and very little fact. By the way the official communication on the incident from the EK VP Fleet states that passengers and crew were provided hotel accommodation. Although I am no great believer in EK managements honesty why would they state this if it were not true.What would they have to gain. If it turns out to be true that the crew were whisked out of the country thus contravening some law, regulation or directive then that is a matter for the relevant parties to resolve.

The last time EK had a major incident the relevant Post Holder, our beloved TCK was shown the door. If there has indeed been a transgression in that area then it will be revealed in time as with all things and someone will cop it.

Tassie Devil

22nd Mar 2009, 12:27

Get the crew home ASAP (if you can) , fairly standard practice. What ever has happened they have walked away.:D

HarryMann

22nd Mar 2009, 12:31

Get the crew home ASAP (if you can) , fairly standard practice. What ever has happened they have walked away.

.. even in fairly benign cases, so when it really matters, the authorities are on the crew like a rash? Right :rolleyes::rolleyes:

White Knight

22nd Mar 2009, 12:36

THE FACTS about the crew...... They are still here in MELBOURNE (this very minute, late on sunday evening).... EK has not whisked the crew away, and they were dealing with CASA TODAY..

I will not say anything else out of respect for my colleagues - two of whom I have flown with in the past and know to be competent pilots..

CONF iture

22nd Mar 2009, 13:44

Getzo, I don't know how you end up with an impressive 227.0 EZFW ?
Is 225 pax a reliable number for that EK407 ?
I thought the "strong" guys were in North America only ... ?

What I can see, outside a mishandled rotation, is a possible error in the V speeds. I say this because these speeds are usually manually entered into the MCDU from data received over the ACARS. We know this is possible because, as we know, it has happened.
A FRA type error in the Vr speed would explain a tailstrike half down the runway, but not an airplane still on the ground after 12000 feet.

Recall the 330 out of JNB with the ZFW in the box instead of the TOW?
I don't know that event, but I would see an error at least of that amplitude possible here ...

Dysag

22nd Mar 2009, 13:54

If the Aussies still have a spare ball-and-chain, I'd like to attach it to DeltaRed who in his first ever post wrote:

"The ground staff claim they dead-headed on the next direct service to Dubai which left "immediately".

Bird On

22nd Mar 2009, 15:05

PJ2

just to clarify for you, at EK the final loadsheet is mostly recieved by ACARS but all T/O performance calculations are calculated by the flight crew using the onboard Laptop computer and then inserted into the MCDU.

Getzo

22nd Mar 2009, 16:12

:rolleyes:Conf,

I get those numbers because they are the actual ones, move on!:ugh:

PJ2

22nd Mar 2009, 16:37

CONF iture;
A FRA type error in the Vr speed would explain a tailstrike half down the runway, but not an airplane still on the ground after 12000 feet.
No, I agree it doesn't, so perhaps V speed calculation and entry seem less plausible as one explanation. The other notion (not established fact, yet) that has been expressed, twice now, is the indication of 3 separate strikes on the runway. We might expand on this, given the cautions expressed in the FCOM which I offered on page 1. The airplane is in Direct Law in the rotation phase. I know for a fact that if the rotation of this airplane is mishandled, (ie, PF senses a high rotation rate (cautioned against) and does not strictly adhere to the FCOM procedures and instead checks forward on the sidestick), the airplane will respond very sharply to a reduced up-elevator command. I asked the question about "porpoising" because that it what the airplane may do if control of the rotation maneuver is lost through PIO, [pilot-induced oscillation]. This has happened on this type but not to those with experience on type. The key is a steady pull of 2/3rds back-stick. Check forward and the airplane will respond very sharply.

Now, this is absolutely in the realm of speculation but it is informed through knowledge and experience and not just guesswork. The cautions in the FCOM are there for a reason.

This may or may not explain the long takeoff run.

Unless thrust setting procedures were badly abused (warnings ignored and I can't see that happening), I can't see a "low power" issue on this airplane - that's not the way the airplane works.

If the thrust levers are not in either the TOGA or FLX/MCT detents a warnings, ECAM message, "THR LEVERS NOT SET" + chime + Master Caution, occur. If the Flex temperature entered in the MCDU (FMC interface) is too high (ie., higher than the OAT), the A/T - FADEC system will reference and the engines will produce, MCT - Max Continuous which would be at least equal to the maximum Flex thrust available anyway.

A weight entry error here as you describe, (ZFW into the GTOW) will not, I believe (not certain here), reduce the thrust setting dramatically, but that remains an open question for me, obviously, for the moment.

Bird On:

just to clarify for you, at EK the final loadsheet is mostly recieved by ACARS but all T/O performance calculations are calculated by the flight crew using the onboard Laptop computer and then inserted into the MCDU.
Thank you very much - very helpful info. The procedure I am familiar with is different, as described. Both methods work well.

misd-agin

22nd Mar 2009, 16:54

White Knight - THE FACTS about the crew...... They are still here in MELBOURNE (this very minute, late on sunday evening).... EK has not whisked the crew away, and they were dealing with CASA TODAY..
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Of course you realize, with this simple post, that you've ruined the chances for pages and pages of posts. :ok:

Getzo

22nd Mar 2009, 17:01

:ugh:Quoting PJ 2:rolleyes:

"A weight entry error here as you describe, (ZFW into the GTOW) will not, I believe (not certain here), reduce the thrust setting dramatically, but that remains an open question for me, obviously, for the moment.":=

Yes it will and is possible.:sad:

G

Wiley

22nd Mar 2009, 17:07

If the Flex temperature entered in the MCDU (FMC interface) is too high (ie., higher than the OAT),PJ2, slip of the finger there? The flex temp is, by definition, always higher than the IOAT. Isn't it?

Wouldn't it be nice if everyone would take the advice of one poster above and desist from speculation and wait until the official report comes out? The only fact we have to date is that the aeroplane suffered substantial damage on takeoff for reason or reasons unknown and that the pilots managed to get the damaged aircraft back on the ground in one piece without injuring one of their passengers or other crew.

I don't know it for a fact, but judging by the hearsay evidence of wheel tracks off the end of the runway and clipped LLZR aerials, they appear to have managed with some skill to avert what could well have been a catastrophic accident.

PJ2

22nd Mar 2009, 17:14

Wiley;
PJ2, slip of the finger there? The flex temp is, by definition, always higher than the IOAT. Isn't it?
Thanks, yes I thought so too. Now I'm trying to make sense of the following from the FCOM:

When the thrust lever is in the FLX-MCT detent :

–
On the ground :
The engine runs at the flex takeoff thrust rating if the MCDU has selected a flex takeoff temperature that is higher than the current total air temperature (TAT). Otherwise the engine produces maximum continuous thrust (MCT).

9v-SKA

22nd Mar 2009, 17:39

For those still confused about Localizer antennas, check this out:
Localizer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Localizer)

For me, I wouldn't want to say anything about the accident until the official report comes out. Let us not argue about what happen shall we and wait for the report?

One painful accident. I went "outch!" when I saw the damage.

ekwhistleblower

22nd Mar 2009, 17:42

I have read the posts and get the drift from many (particularly perhaps aussies/Q crew) that EK have handled it completely unprofessionally.

Yet, they have supported the crew and kept them in Mel. Sent a team down to support CASA's investigation and offered complete cooperation to all parties involved bar (I suspect) the press. So a nasty incident, lots of unfounded speculation and an on-going investigation. Are the comments maybe nationalistic in foundation? Bloody ***** have had a problem bet they did this, that and the other to avoid meeting their responsibilities. Its amazing how people join the dots based upon the registry of the airline rather than facts. Wait a week and you'll find out what happened in Flight and then see whether it was a crew issue, HF issue or technical issue.

James7

22nd Mar 2009, 18:15

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 747-244B (SF) 9G-MKJ Halifax International Airport, NS (YHZ) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20041014-0)

I hope history has not repeated itself.

MK Airlines Flight 1602, suffered 2 tailstrikes due to incorrect V speeds, eventually got airborne but crashed into the earthen berm 100m from the runway.

V speeds entered (incorrectly) from the BLT (Boeing Laptop Computer).

The full safety report is well worth reading.

CONF iture

22nd Mar 2009, 18:58

Now, this is absolutely in the realm of speculation but it is informed through knowledge and experience and not just guesswork. The cautions in the FCOM are there for a reason.

So obviously it is quite important to have some specific information on the way the 500 serie behaves during rotation.
The way I understand it, that behavior is almost an involuntary invitation for a dual input when the guy on the left/right side don't know what is done on the other side ...
IF the triple strikes is confirmed, it could be an indication of CIO (Crew Induced Oscillation) ... Only a thought of course.

just to clarify for you, at EK the final loadsheet is mostly recieved by ACARS but all T/O performance calculations are calculated by the flight crew using the onboard Laptop computer and then inserted into the MCDU
So there is here a real possibility for the crew to receive wrong data especially regarding cargo weight, so the crew determines a FLEX that does not match the real GW in case of substantial cargo was loaded without notice to the crew.

I get those numbers because they are the actual ones, move on!:ugh:
Getzo, as you do have facts, how much cargo was on board that airplane ?
225 pax cannot justify a 50 tonnes PAYLOAD matching your EZFW of 227 tonnes ... Did you try the average pax + baggage weight ?

Midland63

22nd Mar 2009, 19:23

Not a pilot, just a SLF. I have read the whole thread but with so many posts, it’s hard to remember all of them and some of the very techie ones are beyond my comprehension. So I’m not trying to promote any theories, second guess investigations, impugn anyone’s reputation or tell them how to do their jobs – just trying to understand.

To my untutored mind, the more serious aspect of this event is not the tailstrike(s) but why the plane used up nearly the whole runway (a very long one, as I understand it, well capable of allowing an A340 loaded for a non-stop flight to DXB to get off safely) and then was still so low that it took out antennae (or whatever) beyond the end of the r/w. The tailstrike(s) were a symptom of the bigger problem of the delayed t/o

Posters who sound like they know what they're talking about seem to be suggesting it's very hard to cock up take-off computations (speeds, powers settings) and that weight or flap setting miscalculations/errors should not have had that much of an effect on such a long runway.

I'm guessing that professional airline pilots don't just sit there going "Computer says no" while they gobble up 7/8ths of the r/w length without having reached take off speed and then yank the stick fully back and scrape the tail along the ground in a last gasp attempt to get the thing off the ground.

So, as I understand it, a more plausible theory is that (and, as I say, I'm not having a go at anyone) the pilot misjudged the rotation, put the nose back down leading to "porpoising" with one or tail strikes (and loss of speed?) and by the time this situation had stabilised, they were nearly at the end of the runway - is that right?

Thanks.

helen-damnation

22nd Mar 2009, 19:41

how much cargo was on board that airplane ?

The figures will come out in the report but at this stage that is not something you need to know. In the good old days is was called "commercial in confidence". I've seen the figures and they are correct. You can do the maths if you need to.

almost an involuntary invitation for a dual input

Like all Airbus FBW, there is an audio/visual warning of dual input. If either pilot takes control with or without saying so (take over PB), there is also an audio/visual warning for that as well. They won't stop PIO/CIO but should reduce the chances/time. Having said that, if you're running out of runway, everyone pull together!

Midland 63

All bets are open at this time and your theory is certainly one of many that the investigators will look at.

Whatever happened on the take off, well done to the crew for getting her safely back onto the ground :ok:

plt330

22nd Mar 2009, 20:10

Sorry you might've talked about it earlier,

Does anybody know if they actually used TOGA ??

emiratesson

22nd Mar 2009, 20:41

:-) please, dont mention whatever mosques or forgiveness, i am an emirates staff and i assure, all are treated the same, whoever does a "careless mistake" gets the punishment... dont involve brothers or whatever else.. it has nothing to do with it anywhere..

helen-damnation

22nd Mar 2009, 21:08

whoever does a "careless mistake" gets the punishment...

This should get some thread creep :ugh::ugh::ugh:

40&80

22nd Mar 2009, 21:12

A Boeing and an Airbus have trouble getting airborne....one hits an obstruction there are fatalities...one misses obstructions by a few feet and everyone lives...Fate is still the hunter.
B7x7 how is your recall?...If similar is happening at....you can bet the mortage on the same results...somtimes it appears there is nothying new
under the sun.

FarQEK

22nd Mar 2009, 21:45

I urge every pilot who has had dealings with ek flight operations management recently to lodge a report with the ATSB about flight ops culture at Emirates, particularly the man at the top AaR. His 'i'll just sack em' approach to anyone below him who raises health and safety concerns about his uninformed dictates creates a culture where safety is very seriously compromised - there is no safe haven at ek to express safety/sleep/rest/family-impact concerns without seriously jepordising your career. Any subordination will be met with disciplinary. AaR is a serious danger to the future viability of the company, almost like your worst captain who knows everything before crm was even dreamt of. I am aware his closest managers are only following his line to keep there jobs but I know one has lodged a report about the unsafe flight operations culture thats driven from the top. AaR must be stood down immediately - for the sake of peoples lives. The positive out of this incident is that it didn't happen in the UAE where it would have been covered up. A full a thorough investigation is heading emirates way for the whole world to see. To the previous, TOGA was used at V1 when observed that they were running out of tar, that only JUST saved their lives

GPRS

22nd Mar 2009, 22:33

Triton140
" what does puzzle me is why the airline concerned chose to potentially upset the Australian regulatory agencies, the same agencies who could presumably hold the aircraft as evidence for a long time, the same agencies who ultimately determine the right of Emirates to fly to Oz, etc."

You are extreamely :ok: wrong to think that the ATSB is not aware about the action plan !! otherwise, since the incident ,a dozen of flights touched down and departed from YMML,YPPH,YSSY,YBBN...where were the ATSB ??? probably waiting for you to wake them up :D

Not surprisingly, that does puzzle me (as does the lack of media attention)

Now, you are absoluately naive in seeking media's help :ugh:

ankh

22nd Mar 2009, 23:35

That was a huge contact area along the bottom rear of the aircraft.
Does anyone model the braking effect of that sort of drag, if the aircraft is
trying to nose up so actually pressing down on the tarmac at the rear?

Kamelchaser

23rd Mar 2009, 00:36

I'm not for a minute pre-judging the cause of this incident, however for a llong time now I've held a view that very few pilots have any way of judging whether acceleration is correct for the runway in use.

In my former life, we used to have a speed we expected to achieve by a point on the runway (it was a fighter jet, and we expected to achieve a minimum speed by 2,000ft down the runway..otherwise you'd abort the take-off).

I've always been surprised there is nothing similar on bigger acft (despite the complexities involved).

I ask many of my FOs (and other Capts) what they use to assess correct acceleration. Most people reply "just a feeling" That doesn't work for me! I've watched the trend vector on the 777 speed tape on just about every takeoff I've done in the last few years. At 100kts or so, it's a minimum of 30kts..sometimes more if you're using higher than normal thrust on a shorter runway.

But given a normal 3500m+ runway, heavy jet, normal derate (or indeed full thrust if needed...it takes about the same acceleration rate to get to rotate speed on the appropriate distance, in particular if you're using balanced field figures). So, if you're taught awareness of what you expect to see on the speed tape for acceleration, you may be better placed to pick up abnormal (reduced) acceleration. To me, its far more likely to pick that up than "sensing" that the aircraft is not accelerating fast enough..especially in the myriad conditions we operate in (the Potomac river incident comes to mind...slow acceleration in low vis ops)

Curious to see what others think of my theory? (again..not saying this is necessarily relevant to this incident, but it brings up the subject I've been passionate about for some time.)

Smilin_Ed

23rd Mar 2009, 00:45

In my former life, we used to have a speed we expected to achieve by a point on the runway (it was a fighter jet, and we expected to achieve a minimum speed by 2,000ft down the runway..otherwise you'd abort the take-off).

I brought this up in another thread and got the same response. I, too, have a military background and don't understand why airlines don't do this. I'd consider it essential to have at least one such check. More when you expect to have a very long roll.

DA50driver

23rd Mar 2009, 00:56

I used to fly Falcon 50's and 900's. We had an accelerometer on the PFD that read out in real time, as well as a time to 90 knots that we could figure out. Upon brake release you would look for a certain value. If you did not have at least that number something was wrong.(Not enough thrust, brake dragging, heavier than calculated, not enough tire pressure, etc).

We could literally abort takeoff at 5 knots based on the G number displayed. Or we could wait until we hit 90 knots. If it was at or less than computed time, go. If more, abort. Shouldn't be to hard to calculate and display on these airplanes as well.

easyduzzit

23rd Mar 2009, 01:01

PJ2 & Wiley
refreshing to see there's a couple of sensible/intelligent contributors to this thread!
Keep up the good effort.
w.r.t. the FCOM, explanation:
whatever flex temp one enters can only be higher than the actual OAT. This is the adjustment/pilot input, to fool the Fadec into thinking it is a much hotter day/conditions than actual, therefore causing it to calculate reduced thrust settings primarily to protect against expected EGT limits or exceedances, & Secondly preserving unneccessary fuelburn & extending the engine life, & noise abatement etc. In short, Big Savings for the company, compared to the 'old days'!
If no flex temp is inserted into the MCDU, then the fadec will by default use the sensed OAT(actual) to determine the T.O. parameters for the given ambient conditions, which will be higher thrust than any Flex take off roll, same as TOGA, if you were to select that detent during the roll for any required reason.
Difference between Flex to Toga, is nowadays ones reserve thrust, available at the push of the thrust lever from one detent to the next, if one gets into trouble & needs it, otherwise the engines on almost all big jets these days very seldom ever use/need use, max take off power that they are capable of delivering, for normal conditions! Wet runways & unusual circumstances excluded, naturally.
I expect you know all this, I am elaborating for the benefit of all.

easyduzzit

23rd Mar 2009, 01:19

B.T.W my statement there excludes the A340-300, which for any lucrative load in any warm environment only knows TOGA!

PJ2

23rd Mar 2009, 01:45

A380-800 driver, easyduzzit;
Your above statement is incorrect. You won't get any warnings if you stuck a higher flex temp in when the actual performance require a lower Flex temp (or none at all).
No, I know you won't get a warning if you stick a higher temperature than the proper flex temp - my comment was in reference to the position of the thrust levers - if they're not in either the TOGA or FLX/MCT detent, the warning I described will sound. Thanks to both of you for sorting out the higher flex temp item; yes, the engines will run "at the flex temp entered".

preset

23rd Mar 2009, 02:40

Having ploughed through the 10 odd pages of this post I'm surprised nobody has mentioned the CX A340 tailstrike at Auckland some time back. After a lot of speculation about the flight crew's ability (or lack of it), incorrect aircraft handling etc it was found the tail strike was due to underinflated main gear struts which had been brought to the attention of the ground engineer, by the crew, who had dismissed it. It was found the flight crew handled the rotation absolutely correctly & the tail strike could not have been avoided given the underinflated main gear struts.
I just mention this for those "armchair" investigators who may be suggesting it's the fault of the crew. It may well be, however I don't know & neither does anyone else so maybe waiting for the investigator's report could minimise "egg on face" & give the crew the benefit of the doubt they deserve.
Just a thought :rolleyes:

NIGELINOZ

23rd Mar 2009, 03:37

As a mere SLF can I ask what may seem a very stupid question? And that is what was so different in this case to the Ryanair tail strike at Dublin last year? I seem to recall the captain of the Ryanair flight declaring a mayday after that and
even discussion about leaking hydraulic fluid,what is so different between the two aircraft types that the amount of damage sustained in this event doesn't seem to have involved that sort of issue and was the Ryanair incident and the reaction of the captain an over reaction?
BTW I'm not saying the Ryanair captain did anything wrong-just asking.
I also seem to recall that in the Ryanair case there was even questions about pressurising the airframe after the event,why was that not an issue here?

yokebearer

23rd Mar 2009, 03:40

Nobody dragged the tail of the plane through some aerials 300 metres off the end of the runway in Auckland or Dublin - I don't think these incidents are comparable......

I feel for these guys and never want to be in this situation - These things are always more complicated than you think - but the only way I can think you don't get off the runway is if you are overloaded / have too little thrust or if you under-rotate initially - time will tell.

CONF iture

23rd Mar 2009, 03:42

Like all Airbus FBW, there is an audio/visual warning of dual input. If either pilot takes control with or without saying so (take over PB), there is also an audio/visual warning for that as well. They won't stop PIO/CIO but should reduce the chances/time. Having said that, if you're running out of runway, everyone pull together!

That’s what I call the nice theory behind Flight Crew Operation or Flight Crew Training Manuals but when time runs out and stress level sharply increases there are 2 independent humans trying their best on 2 independent sidesticks and the final mixed output can be very undesirable and therefore counterproductive …

The figures will come out in the report but at this stage that is not something you need to know. In the good old days is was called "commercial in confidence". I've seen the figures and they are correct. You can do the maths if you need to.
A gross error on the TOW could explain what happened by selecting inappropriate high FLEX temp …
To me 225 pax add up for a payload of 25 tonnes but not the double as you indirectly mention. But as you seem to be pretty sure of your figures, is it possible the crew was not made aware of an extra 25 tonnes of cargo … ?
Just one of the possible scenarios …

On Guard

23rd Mar 2009, 05:13

I'm not for a minute pre-judging the cause of this incident, however for a llong time now I've held a view that very few pilots have any way of judging whether acceleration is correct for the runway in use.

Our rule of thumb is 80kts by 1000" markers or you are heavier than estimated. This would also work for selecting wrong power as the power setting is not sufficient for a/c weight. Works pretty well.

Any others use this?

Look For The Rainbow

23rd Mar 2009, 05:41

just like the a320 landing on the hudson in the US, any cctv footage of the EK tail strike?

helen-damnation

23rd Mar 2009, 06:06

CONF iture

Those figures were the original ones given to the crew on the flight plan. They are used for initial input into the MCDU and are then updated when the flight closes and a final ZFW is given. The fuel requirements are then finalised, inserted in the MCDU & then the performance figures are computed. Any significant change after that should be advised to the crew who would then get new performance figures. You would also check the loadsheet to confirm the ZFW, T/O wt & Ldg wt.
I don't know the cargo set up to catch errors but as I said before, until details emerge, all bets are open: human and/or technical.

To err is human, to really :mad::mad: it up just add a computer/stress/more humans/time change/management etc etc

RetiredBA/BY

23rd Mar 2009, 07:56

I don't normally get involved on these theads, just a watcher being long retired, but I can't let this on go. When I flew Valiants we had a check time to 100 knots to make sure accel. was OK. If speed was down we aborted, did once, we went off the end, slowly. That check might well have saved Emirates at MEL.

When I converted to civil jets, BOAC VC10s I was surprised that no such check existed, however, it was BOAC so surely they knew best. Some years later as a B737 Capt. I got involved in designing a TOPIS, Take Off Performance Indicator System, it got shelved, not needed, too hard box. The electronics then were not as they are now.

I see no reason why when the performance of a sophisticated electric jet such as an A340, say, is calculated the FMC cannot calculate exactly what the accleration rate should be, considering all parameters such as thrust, temp. flap setting, weight and runway characteristics, and assign THAT rate to one pointer on a scale, on , say, the HSI or ADI The exact acceleration could then be extracted from the IRSs and another pointer driven alongside the other (rather like Concorde's speed/C of G pointers) so a direct comparison could be made between planned accel. and achieved accel. to say, 100k. Should be easy to do AND interpret.

On too many aircraft, certainly those that I have flown, we ASSUME, but do not know, that the tyres (and therefore brakes) are all intact and that the brakes are all cool, and able to accept the energy of a rejected take off at V1.

How many flight manuals contain data on tyre limitations, (although speeds such as TSOC62, 225 mph. if I rememenber correctly are indicated on the tyre mouldings) such as the maximum taxi distance at given weights before the tyres overheat to the risk of possible failure ?

Many years ago I wrote a paper for the International Journal of Flight Safety (only one edition published before the publisher died).

In that I questioned why it was not an airworthiness requirement for ALL jet transports to be fitted with brake temp. guages (sure indicator of a dragging brake as I experienced once on a VC10, ) and tyre failure indicators (like Concorde and even on my BMW) which tells me I have lost one tyre and TWO brakes assuming I want to brake in a straight line. (which I did once in a 737, fortunately during push back when a brand new wheel casting failed).

Does the A340 have brake temp. guages and tyre failure indicators, and what else could cause it to fail to become airborne on a 12,000 feet runway, even at max. gross, except too little thrust or a totally wrong flap setting, assuming the crew (of 4) would have immediately spotted gross overloading or an unexpected large tailwind ?

I believe the lack of information about take off acceleration is one of the last missing pieces in the aviation safety jigsaw, and SO easy to correct with modern electronics. Any constructive comment ?

PS Sorry if I have not used correct AB terminolgy, spent a long time on Boeings, 73, 75, 76, never flown a 'bus.

White Knight

23rd Mar 2009, 08:01

Retired BA/BY - yes the whole EK Airbus flight has TPIS and wheel temp indications..

fourgolds

23rd Mar 2009, 08:22

As for judging the acceleration rate by " feel" , lets not forget that EK MFF policy has the bus drivers flying 3 variants 332/343/345. Each with very unique acceleration qualities. Add a wide variety of weight regimes ( anything from a light 332 going to DOH) to a heavy 345 out of MEL. Also anything from max flex to Toga. Artificial rotation feeling that is different on the 345 to the other two. I recall a ' dead space' at about 2/3 back stick as a result of different rotation logic on the A345.

MFF does have its dangers.

7x7

23rd Mar 2009, 08:33

The Boeing product has a very obvious trend arrow that indicates acceleration during the takeoff roll. Anything under a 15kt acceleration trend and the alarm bells should ring that something is not going according to Hoyle. It is partiularly used for noticing the early onset of windshear. I seem to recall that the Airbus has a similar trend arrow. Someone will correct me if I am wrong.

John Miller

23rd Mar 2009, 08:51

B772

23rd Mar 2009, 08:57

At 1600Lt MEL today the a/c was in front of the John Holland hangar and being guarded by people sitting on chairs. The damage to the rear 'belly' is covered by tape. A BP tanker was in close proximity. I do not know if the a/c was to be de-fuelled.

deltayankee

23rd Mar 2009, 11:10

I guess Emirates has a big advertising budget, how else can you explain the lack of any media interest.
Throws into relief what was happening not so long ago to QF, when even a technical delay was enough to generate a "troubled airline" headline.
Doesn't ring true. Newspapers massacre pretty much everyone, advertisers or not (glossy magazines are different). How many Emirates ads were there in your paper today? Much more likely explanation for the low media interest was the fact that nobody was hurt.

Capt Kremin

23rd Mar 2009, 11:14

To a point, yes. However a few months ago during the latest QF feeding frenzy, technical delays somehow became major stories. A lot of it was due to the last vestiges of the engineers dispute... but it really got ridiculous.

limelight

23rd Mar 2009, 11:16

For those in the northern parts, anything concerning QF gets headlines in the Media here. The very interesting thing abount this accident is that bugga all has been said about the potential outcomes in the mainstream media, both press and TV.Not one report in the monday Melbourne press. The EK spindoctors either have worked very hard, or been very very lucky. When the report comes out we will watch with interest. In the meantime, lets wait for the report. Should not be long.

OverRun

23rd Mar 2009, 12:38

And it is not just the well-oiled Australian Emirates PR team. The Emirates PPRUNE spin team are smoothly working away. I'm embarrassed to say that White Knight got me fooledTHE FACTS about the crew...... They are still here in MELBOURNE (this very minute, late on sunday evening).... EK has not whisked the crew away, and they were dealing with CASA TODAY..

I will not say anything else out of respect for my colleagues - two of whom I have flown with in the past and know to be competent pilots..

HarryMann

23rd Mar 2009, 12:56

When I flew Valiants we had a check time to 100 knots to make sure accel. was OK. If speed was down we aborted, did once, we went off the end, slowly. That check might well have saved Emirates at MEL.

This topic came up in the Madrid Barajas t/o accident too, when it was intially stated an engine failure occurred... rule of thumb checks or stopwatch checks to a nominal 80 or 100kts have been proposed after many 'fail to accelerate properly' accidents/incidents

CONF iture

23rd Mar 2009, 13:04

To err is human, to really :mad: it up just add a computer/stress/more humans/time change/management etc etc
The procedure for the performances as you describe it looks pretty standard in the industry and effectively, it doesn’t take much for an error to enter the equation.
As earlier reminded by James7 MK Airlines flight 1602 tried to take off from Halifax with the figures for a 240 tonnes GW when actually the 747 was almost 50% FIFTY heavier !

So a mistake as Getzo put it is always possible :
“Could ZFW instead of TOW been used in LPC for the T/O performance calculations?”

Especially when, as reminded by fourgolds crews fly airplanes as different as the 332 and the 345 in weight perspective.

deSitter

23rd Mar 2009, 14:01

Could be we're looking at spectacular piloting, dealing with cargo shift that prevented proper rotation and landing configuration.

-drl

Dysag

23rd Mar 2009, 14:09

I don't believe cargo shift. The hold is short anyway so not much effect.

Sounds like clutching at straws to defend a human crew.

Dapeewee

23rd Mar 2009, 14:27

I was on that plane on my way back to holland. Pretty scary experience I must say (allmost crapped myself). The pilot announced there was a "small technical problem". :suspect: Was glad to be back on the ground.:bored:

glob99

23rd Mar 2009, 17:52

How far off would the weight have to be to only hit Vr at 12000' ?

James7

23rd Mar 2009, 18:20

This is an extract taken from the MK Airline flight 1602.

Quote:-
Also of interest was an incident that occurred on 18 July 2002, when an MK Airlines Limited B747-200 had a take-off performance incident in Sapporo, Japan. The first officer completed the take-off data card using the runway analysis charts for the applicable runway. The captain checked the card and found it to be correct. The take-off weight, as indicated on the card, was written as 258 000 kg, rather than the correct weight of 358 000 kg. Gross error check speeds had also been set using 258 000 kg. The loadmaster presented the load sheet to the captain for checking and he signed it. The load sheet indicated 358 000 kg, but the difference in weight was not detected. The airspeeds and EPRs were set for 258 000 kg. During the early stages of the take-off roll, the flight crew noted that the aircraft was not accelerating normally, and the take off was rejected at approximately 30 to 40 knots. On review of the take-off data card, the error was detected and a new take-off data card was completed using the correct weight. The subsequent take-off was uneventful." - end quote.

The report also believed that the crew of 1602 were sufficiently fatigued not to realise the lack of acceleration.

I am not suggesting in anyway that something similar happened here. I am a firm believer that the study of historical incidents and accidents enhances Flight Safety.

This is a link to the:- Boeing 747-412 9V-SMT, flight SQ286, tail strike during take-off, Auckland International Airport, 12 March 2003.

Tail strike due to fact that Vr was calculated 33 knots less than the required 163 kts.

Aviation Reports (http://www.taic.org.nz/AviationReports/tabid/78/ctl/Detail/mid/482/InvNumber/2003-003/Default.aspx?SkinSrc=)[G]skins%2ftaicAviation%2fskin_aviation

I would hope that some initial report would be out soon. Someone knows for sure.

Smilin_Ed

23rd Mar 2009, 20:20

Tail strike due to fact that Vr was calculated 33 knots less than the required 163 kts.

It seems to me that someone should have noticed a 30 knot difference. After all, that's 20 percent of the correct number. Had they never flown that type of aircraft before that day? :=

denabol

23rd Mar 2009, 21:55

Captn Kremin,

I was surprised Crikey didn't have a go, but I see their usual aviation writer Ben Sandilands went for it in his Crikey blog. Interesting comment about the ATSB. Surely they know what really happened by now.

Emirates flight EK 407 was the most dangerous non fatal accident to a jet airliner in Australia - Plane Talking (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2009/03/23/emirates-accident-tapes-should-clarify-its-dangerous-departure-from-melbourne/)

fox niner

23rd Mar 2009, 22:13

Hmm...
Maybe one of the engines ingested a part of the ILS antenna structure, when it plowed through the grass beyond the runway.

CONF iture

23rd Mar 2009, 22:30

Boeing 747-412 9V-SMT, flight SQ286, tail strike during take-off, Auckland International Airport, 12 March 2003.
Tail strike due to fact that Vr was calculated 33 knots less than the required 163 kts.
Interesting to note :

The tail scrape marks along the runway surface from 9V-SMT started at about 55% of the runway length and ended about 68% of its length (12000 feet)

In the EK407 case, we may assume the tail scrape marks are on the very last portion of the runway as the airplane was still rolling at this time, so probably no attempt here to rotate at a too low calculated Vr, but almost an obvious indication of some kind of thrust deficit.

Could it be justified by simply inverting 2 numbers and entering 72 when the appropriate calculated FLEX was in fact 27 ?

Again ... just a possible scenario ...

ExSp33db1rd

23rd Mar 2009, 22:45

After all, that's 20 percent of the correct number. Had they never flown that type of aircraft before that day?

Not exactly NO, but ........ the Captain was recently off the A 340, so the incorrect numbers sounded familiar to him.

Not an excuse, but just one of the holes in the cheese.

ptr120

23rd Mar 2009, 23:41

putting asside the debate on the cause of this for a moment, how and where will the aircraft be repaired? Slow & low ferry back to DXB or fly in the specialist equipment and parts required to do this in MEL?

SMOC

24th Mar 2009, 00:24

It seems to me that someone should have noticed a 30 knot difference. After all, that's 20 percent of the correct number. Had they never flown that type of aircraft before that day?

In the SIA event a take-off weight transcription error, which remained undetected, led to the miscalculation of the take-off data, which in turn resulted in a low thrust setting and excessively slow take-off reference speeds. The system defences did not ensure the errors were detected, and the aeroplane flight management system itself did not provide a final defence against mismatched information being programmed into it.

CX changed their ACARS RTOW input page after several reports of entering ZFW instead of TOW into the available field. I believe one A330 even got airborne, however the difference in ZFW and TOW was less than 20T and the resulting RTOW had the same max flex temp for both weights.

Because the FMS performance entry used ZFW crew became accustomed to using the ZFW figure when using the "box".

Also blasting around in light weight A330s all day and occasionally flying A340s and even less flying on A346s meant a typical A330 TOW was often similar to a 340 ZFW.

The ACARS RTOW now requires crew to enter both ZFW and TOW, the RTOW does a cross check, if the figures aren't reasonable you get a check data message.

Simply human factors, rubbish in the box you get rubbish out, you need well written SOPs to prevent the swiss cheese event.

chainsaw

24th Mar 2009, 03:03

....how and where will the aircraft be repaired? Slow & low ferry back to DXB or fly in the specialist equipment and parts required to do this in MEL?

How? Probably with a bit of difficulty by the looks of things, if the reports of the damage are correct. Getting a place to put it into to do the repairs will probably also be a fairly 'challenging' I'd imagine.

Where? Melbourne - the only way that aircraft will fly out of Melbourne is: a) after it's been repaired and signed-off as airworthy, or b) as cargo, once it's been disassembled.

The questions are good ones though. :ok:

phoenix62

24th Mar 2009, 05:22

I was a passenger on this flight,

I'm not a pilot but I have made moer than 100 flights in several types of aircraft as a passenger.

I was in the rear of the cabin at seat 34C and I watched the takeoff from the seat monitor via the forward camera. The aircraft seemed to rotate a very late and run out of runway. We did strike the end of the runway and there were visible sparks from the window near me. I did not see any engine issues from my side of the cabin.

The rate of climb once free flight was achieved seemed very low. There were some very distressed passengers and the crew didn't seem to be much better! I still have the fingernail marks in my arm from the lady sat next to me!

The captain admitted a technical fault after being in the air for 10 minutes and the flight over water to dump fuel seemed to take forever. I must admit I was more worried about landing as I thought the landing gear might have been damaged.

The landing happened without incident and the flight deck should be commended for that.

I must say it felt to me like there wasn't enough thrust to get the aircraft into the air. It took too long to get up to speed and then by the time we had got up to speed there was no runway left! The tail scrape as you call it did happened three times to my memory.

I must say I'm glad things happened they way they did and no injuries occurred. I am very interested in the investigation report. I don't think it was pilot error and more likely misinformation given or a technical fault with the aircraft. I wish the pilot could have slammed the brakes on before the point of no return but thats wishful thinking.

kingoftheslipstream

24th Mar 2009, 06:10

Overrun

I will back up White Knight unequivocally. He is correct. The crew remained in Melbourne, pending arrival of EK Flight Safety personnel, and the EK the A340 Tech Pilot who will overlap with the Aussies to investigate.

Anti Skid On

24th Mar 2009, 06:15

The SQ 744 that scraped in Auckland had an extended stay at NZAA till its bum was tidied up. I believe they had to ship in special gear and erect a temporary hangar for the job to be done.

gruntyfen

24th Mar 2009, 06:42

Link to FAA site on the structural repair of a China Airlines 747, as a result of a tail strike, that failed 22 years later.

Lessons Learned From Transport Airplane Accidents (http://accidents-ll.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=5&LLID=6)

Bus429

24th Mar 2009, 07:29

Grunty,

The accident report you refer to also mentioned - at the risk of thread drift -that China Airlines maintenance planning/MRO had failed to address re-inspections of the repaired area and CPCP (inspections for corrosion) requirements. Typical chain.

Old Fella

24th Mar 2009, 09:34

I am sure the lessons learnt following the loss of the JAL B747, as a result of an improper repair to the rear pressure bulkhead following a tailscrape, will be uppermost in the minds of those charged with repairing the Airbus.

Jet II

24th Mar 2009, 09:48

Where? Melbourne - the only way that aircraft will fly out of Melbourne is: a) after it's been repaired and signed-off as airworthy, or b) as cargo, once it's been disassembled.

Nah - I've seen a lot worse damage than that flying around. Bolt a big external patch over the damage and ferry it unpressurized to the heavy maintenance base.

An AA 767 in London landed on the nose gear and did a massive amount of damage to the fuselage - a few big plates bolted on externally and then ferried back to Mr Boeing in Seattle.

Algy

24th Mar 2009, 11:02

Thanks for that Phoenix62 - nice contribution.

I've been curious about the sparks reported by other pax - seems clear that there were sparks of some sort. That was leading me to think about the engines, but you seem to suggest that what you saw was very late on in the take-off run - perhaps at the point of impact with whatever structure was hit? And perhaps due to that impact in fact?

IFixPlanes

24th Mar 2009, 11:27

I was a passenger on this flight ...
... I was in the rear of the cabin at seat 34C ...
... there were visible sparks from the window near me.

34C?
Do you sit in the aisle?

Visible sparks seen through the window?
It is impossible to see the sparks of a tail strike through the window.

parabellum

24th Mar 2009, 11:34

On the subject of sparks etc. At night any source of light will probably be visible from the passenger windows as a reflection from the aircraft, (White) and the ground, as with an engine surge, everything around the aircraft lights up at night but, from the cockpit, you don't actually see the flames. I suspect that what the pax saw was the reflected light caused by the sparks, not the sparks themselves?

forget

24th Mar 2009, 11:35

IFP, Well spotted on 34C, which doesn't exist. However, tail strike sparks would probably reflect off the all white engine pods ........ so......

flyonthewall

24th Mar 2009, 11:40

Its not that hard to get distracted during flight prep by pursers, redcaps, refuellers, engineers etc all sticking their heads into the cockpit, although MEL is probably not as manic as DXB. This was highlighted during the recent LOSA audit, but it seems nothing was done about it.

I have fallen prey to the "ZFW as TOW" gotcha and had it picked up by the FO or relief crew. Not only embarrassing but quite shocking when you consider the implications.

Now I estimate my Vref30 (Boeing) at preflight briefing based on the planned TOW. It's quieter and there are no distractions to mess with my already poor mathematical skills. I used to check my green dot speed (Airbus) as I recall we had a procedure to cross check it prior to entering the speeds in the FMGC. If my calculated speed is more than a few knots off the FMC/FMGC speed, I want to know why.

For A330 it was something like, Green dot = (TOWx0.6)+107 (This figure has to be increased one knot per thousand feet above FL200, but for takeoff this is obviously not necessary). It's quoted in Vol 3 from memory so you can check the reference.

e.g. TOW of 230t, green dot should be (230x.6)+107 = 245

For Boeing, Vref30 = (GW/3)+66 (this is accurate for the 777-300ER but will vary a few knots for other models).

e.g. TOW of 300t, Vref 30 should be (300/3)+66 = 166

Capn Bloggs

24th Mar 2009, 11:44

It is impossible to see the sparks of a tail strike through the window.
Maybe not the sparks themselves, but...beacon flashes are quite easy to see against the ground during takeoff, and if the sparks off my grinder are anything to go by, dragging the bottom of the aeroplane along the runway would light up the surrounding area like (yellow) daylight. Maybe not see the sparks themselves, but the glow from them, you bet you'd see it.

Comoman

24th Mar 2009, 11:46

I assume that Phoenix62 means 34B and not C as C doesn't exist!

34 is towards the back though.....

SMOC

24th Mar 2009, 13:42

Emirates must use the same seating system as CX, the seats are all based on 3 - 4 - 3 seating system so ABC - DEFG - HJK however if you're on an Airbus where the layout is 2 - 4 - 2 in EY the seats go AC - DEFG - HK that way window and aisle seats are always the same, in all CX A/C A & K are window seats, CDGH are aisle seats, so 34C is the left widow group aisle seat, one seat from the window.

Edit: EK is not like CX though.

hutchss

24th Mar 2009, 13:55

Not so.

See :

SeatGuru Seat Map Emirates Airbus A340-500 (345) (http://www.seatguru.com/airlines/Emirates_Airlines/Emirates_Airlines_Airbus_A340-500.php)

FWIW

swedflyer

24th Mar 2009, 13:58

I might have missed it, but does EK use TODC or books for take-off calculations?

IFixPlanes

24th Mar 2009, 14:28

I don't know about Emirates but all CX seats are all based on 3 - 4 - 3 seating so ABC - DEFG - HJK however if your on an CX airbus where the layout is 2 - 4 - 2 in EY the seats go AC - DEFG - HK that way window and isle seats are always the same, in all CX A/C A & K are windows CDGH are isle seats, so 34C is the left widow group isle seat.
The Seating Chart of Emitates Airbus A340-500 tells another story:
Emirates | Flying with Emirates | Our Fleet | Seating Chart (http://www.emirates.com/de/english/flying/our_fleet/seating_chart.aspx?id=345UFJY&from=193748)

Smilin_Ed

24th Mar 2009, 14:56

I have fallen prey to the "ZFW as TOW" gotcha and had it picked up by the FO or relief crew. Not only embarrassing but quite shocking when you consider the implications.

That's why I brought up earlier that whoever is doing the calculations should have a gut feeling as to what the correct answer should be. Maybe these guys are flying too many types and can't remember what a reasonable answer should be. Did this crew fly this type plane to MEL? If so, they should have gotten something close to the same Vr that they got on that outbound leg. That in itself is a safety finding which should prompt a change in airline policy. Also, as previously discussed, some sort of acceleration check is certainly in order.

AutoAbort

24th Mar 2009, 17:00

Did this crew fly this type plane to MEL? If so, they should have gotten something close to the same Vr that they got on that outbound leg

Not necessarily. Probably 2 of the crewmembers omboard had been on a "short" hop over to New Zealand between the outbound leg and the leg to DXB with a comparably light aircraft.

AA

Smilin_Ed

24th Mar 2009, 17:42

Not necessarily. Probably 2 of the crewmembers omboard had been on a "short" hop over to New Zealand between the outbound leg and the leg to DXB with a comparably light aircraft.

So, pulling numbers out of a warm spot, if they got a Vr=X for a lightly loaded aircraft for a short leg, then they should have expect to have X+15 for a heavy takeoff. Again, they should have a gut feeling about their results, and if it isn't in the ballpark, they should look at their input and try to figure out where the error lies. Just basic airmanship.

Uncle Fred

24th Mar 2009, 22:10

I have always used 120 knots by around or just past the last set of Captain's bars (3000 feet). Yes, I realize that it is the high-speed regime but by that point but you could still get the airplane stopped if something were seriously wrong with the acceleration and it seems to work whether one is at max power (thus heavy) or reduced. Obviously power plays the leading role but it comes pretty close all the time +/-.

Granted that this personal rule of thumb was not the subject of thousands of man-hours of post doctoral research, four years of commentary period, and endless committee meetings, but I have found it has been pretty close in everything I have flown post military wide or narrow body including the -400 and the 777.

Would be interested if anyone else has the same experience with this.

mensaboy

24th Mar 2009, 22:23

To Midland63,
I enjoyed reading your post and for a self-proclaimed 'non-pilot', you seemed to hit the nail on the head. The big question is, why did the aircraft get airborne so late? I have no idea, and the theories put forth are just speculation at this point.

As for 'cocking-up' the takeoff figures, it is not as uncommon as you might think. This is the reason EK has instituted back-up procedures such as gross error checks. The final check, which should eliminate a large error in weight inputted into the computer, is the crosscheck of Green Dot speed. Unfortunately, if the weight entered into the laptop, is the same as the weight showing on the MCDU, then these speeds will still match (even if this weight is not an accurate reflection of the aircrafts true weight) This gross error check only shows a difference when the MCDU and laptop weights do not match.

The method I use to avoid this trap, is to cross reference the MCDU weight with the preplanned CFP (computerized flight plan) weight. The moment I see a difference, I investigate further and it should be explainable by a change in ZFW plus a change in Ramp Fuel. I go so far, as doing the math and make sure even a change as small as 500kgs, adds up.

The added benefit of cross-checking the CFP takeoff weight, is that it precludes 'forgetting' to input the Final ZFW into the MCDU after we receive it. (initially the ZFW is entered as the estimated ZFW)

The trap here, is that we have several things to do after we receive the FZFW.
1-We have to determine the final fuel load based on this new number, which again will change the takeoff weight
2-We have to send this info via ACARS to CLC (centralized load control in Dubai)
3-We have to give the final fuel load to the engineer, who could be ANYWHERE around the plane doing other duties.
4-We usually have to give this info to the ramp agent as well (who could be ANYWHERE as well)
5-Most importantly, we have to enter the new weight in the MCDU or all our figures will be in error. (perhaps I should have made this duty #1)

Someone mentioned it earlier... many, many people with their own priorities are popping into the cockpit during this time frame, so sometimes we get distracted. We are human beings.

I am not suggesting this was the cause of the problem because there are not enough facts. I just wanted to point out that it is VERY possible to make errors because the procedures in place are not good enough. I hope EK adds this final check that I use, even if it had nothing to do with that takeoff out of MEL.

GoGirl

24th Mar 2009, 23:52

Tyre marks on the grass at end of 16
A/c returned with an antenna lodged....Localiser antenna that sits (usually) about 6ft off the ground!
A/c took out some of the rabbits (strobes)
A/c missed roof of small building by 4 inches
A/c 100 feet approx before end of runway - struck 3 times before rotation with NO runway left to spare.

The words of someone investigating....

"The worst incident without loss of life in this country to date"

Disclaimer;
These are not my personal views or opinions rather 2nd hand info from reliable sources - this is a Rumour network after all :ok:

Cheers
GG

Golf Charlie Charlie

25th Mar 2009, 00:02

How would they possibly know it was 4 inches ?

GoGirl

25th Mar 2009, 00:05

NFI!!!

:confused:

What-ho Squiffy!

25th Mar 2009, 00:08

Just on the almost ZERO media coverage for this incident: I think posters are right by saying that if this was QF, the media would be all over it like seagulls on a chip.

But I think the reason EK have escaped (relatively) unscathed by the media is that they are not an Australian airline. It's the good old Aussie "I don't give a rats...they're from Arabia or somewhere..." attitude.

And go easy on "sparky-boy" from 34C. He might have mixed his seat number up, and he may have seen reflected sparks from the tail-strike, or even from the electrical damage to the ground equipment. Just sayin'!

ACMS

25th Mar 2009, 03:55

I think if a big aircraft like the 345 flew 4" above a small building it would "blow the roof off"

Don't you?

Even so they are very lucky it didn't turn out much worse.

derab

25th Mar 2009, 05:24

The first hand accounts of this event that I have heard tell me that the sparks from the tail were VERY bright. one account I have been given was that they "lit the place up like it was day", poor guy was shaken, he thought that he was witnessing a plane crash.
another account I have heard was that the light from the sparks was very bright on the video footage they saw (what was that question about CCTV footage? http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/wink2.gif)
so phoenix's account is quite reasonable from the reports I have heard.

Please bear in mind that this is hearsay from work colleagues, but they back up the 3 tailstrikes and the extremely bright sparks already mentioned.

CaptainMidnight

25th Mar 2009, 06:18

A/c missed roof of small building by 4 inchesI thought someone discounted that early in the piece - said the only building down there is the localiser powerhouse which is well away from the RWY off to the west?

The localiser antenna which is on RWY CL is cleary missing pieces.

bluewater

25th Mar 2009, 06:45

Does anybody have comparable views that an AIRLINE would have a “strategy” in place, such as a BOMB HOAX by one of its own staff (as happened the day after) to take the UK MEDIA ATTENTION off the Australian tail strike incident? Lessons learnt from previous incidents i.e. JNB. That is, have a pre approved plan to take the media/public attention off a far more serious incident & photographed incident.
Just curious or maybe being way too sceptical & clandestine?
"The worst incident without loss of life in this country to date" is a well written article to view – for those that have not! (previously posted by denabol)
Emirates flight EK 407 was the most dangerous non fatal accident to a jet airliner in Australia - Plane Talking (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2009/03/23/emirates-accident-tapes-should-clarify-its-dangerous-departure-from-melbourne/)
BW