EK407 Tailstrike @ ML

[White Knight]

Mensaboy - If I don't learn something from at least every flight I do then I shall hang up the flying gear and go farming... I don't think MFF is contributory if YOU OPERATE TO SOP..

If you're going 89 days between types then I suggest you try bidding slightly differently.. In nearly 6 years of MFF here I've never gone anywhere near 89 days:ugh::ugh:

"Bad gen" from a TRE, TRI or LTC was what I wrote regarding JNB - not from the training department... Try reading that again!!!

[rascott3888]

Airline beefs up safety checks - contains quotes from EK management on resignations, diaries, fatigue tests, etc.

Two stories and an editorial in the Herald-Sun today (3 May). Will sell newspapers but wont get bums on EK seats.

Airline beefs up its safety checks | Herald Sun (http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25419688-2862,00.html)

RAS

[Al Fakhem]

TWT, Dropp the Pilot:

Obviously, just because something is technically possible, it does not mean that it gets adopted immediately. There is always resistance to change. But the monetary argument has been shown as been without merit in road transport already.

Stationary automatic vehicle weighing is widely implemented in road transport, no reason it cannot be done so in aviation. Price of implementation is no real hindrance. If we can employ and pay for thousands of d1ckheads as security staff at airports to supposedly ward off the 1-in-10million chance of a terrorist attack on any given aircraft, there is obviously enough money around to fund minimizing crashes due to wrongly calculated a/c weight.

[mensaboy]

Whitenight,
The ATSB is looking into MFF as a causal factor now! This news came out, after I commented that they should delve into that area. I'm not saying it was definitely a factor in this instance, but it certainly was in Joburg.

The whole of EK is not represented by your personal experiences. In other words, sometimes people reach levels of currency that are not conducive to their proficiency, even if they follow SOP's. You stated that a person should change his bidding if he finds himself 89 days between types, so therefore you agree that the 90 day policy is not a good one, yet you contradict yourself by stating that the MFF policy can in no way affect a pilot's proficiency if he follows SOP's. If the policy is sound and there is no decrease in proficiency, then why should a pilot alter his bidding practice to reduce that limit??

Bad 'gen' coming from certain individuals in the training department means there is, or was, an issue regarding teaching the proper technique. You are quick to deny contributing factors to an accident, if these factors have not affected YOU. It is astounding how you are quick to blame the pilots and you have no desire to delve further into the matter to look at the underlying causes.
You might want to read the post about management styles/personalities X or Y in the EK forum.

[Obie]

Now look!... I think mensaboy and white knight ( how about that for a couple of stupid monikers? ) oughta go off and indulge themselves in a personal ego fest via PMs, and let the rest of us get on with sensible discussions! :ok:

[Dani]

It has been mentioned some pages before about technological solutions to avoid accident like these, mainly selfweighting aircraft on gear strut or treshold markers on the runway.

Much more easier would be an acceleration meter on board. I learned recently that some business jets are already equipped with it.

The sensors are already on board, the IRS's. Some warning computer would compare actual acceleration vs. requested. You basically don't need any indication in the cockpit. Just give them an amber or red Acceleration Warning on the ECAM/Eicas. The warning would appear relatively early, depending on the size of the power setting error, at low speed, and standard policy would be to reject the take-off.

I guess that some bright engineer have already thought about it (otherwise it wouldn't be available), but manufactors of big airliners have decided against it, most probably not enough damage avoidance per unit's cost. This might change after this accident...

Dani

[pool]

acceleration meter on board

Well, the speed trend arrow should basically suffice for that, shouldn't it? Warnings about acceleration are very arbitrary anyway. Especially on four engined aircraft. On a twin, it might give up to 40kts trend, on a sluggish 340-300 out of ABB a meager 10 might be all it gives. How to program that??

I truly dread another of these possible nuisance warnings during crucial moments as the take off. Like "approaching runway xx" with RAAS when you are above 80kts and cross a intersecting runway!


Give it a break with all your well intended new devices and procedures. Just train the people adequately and give them decent rosters. The SOPs were not that bad up to now and new ones will only fix the mismanagements accountability, but not the real issue.

[White Knight]

Mensaboy - you really don't read too well do you? MFF is fine if YOU FOLLOW SOPS whatever type you're in on a particular day... The SOPS are so rigid!!

My comments about the 90 day rule pertain only to having to avoid doing circuits in the sim when you hit 90 days.. You want to go sim - just don't fly 330 for 90 days.. Doesn't mean you're not proficient in it!

Indeed there are underlying problems leading to this incident - many which I think are far more causal than MFF.. Try morale for starters!! Lots of unhappy conversations on the flightdecks these days regarding our wonderful managers - how's that for distraction? However the discussion was about MFF if you can cast your mind back a few posts.. Indeed for those who have a problem with it maybe it would be a good idea to fly just 330 or 340 - have you put that to the office wallahs??

Obie - back into your hole;)

[Dani]

Warnings about acceleration are very arbitrary anyway. Especially on four engined aircraft. On a twin, it might give up to 40kts trend, on a sluggish 340-300 out of ABB a meager 10 might be all it gives. How to program that??


Every aircraft type has to have it's own performance database of course!

But I agree that SOPs and human performance considerations do have a priority here. Easiest way to avoid such a procedural break down would be to x-check actual TO speeds vs load sheet vs a speed booklet. But where are they in modern airplanes...

Dani

[helen-damnation]

I'm not saying it was definitely a factor in this instance, but it certainly was in Joburg.

NO IT WASN'T :ugh::ugh:

J'oburg was bad technique, as taught or learnt. The rotation technique is basically the same on all 3 EK aircraft, as it is in all Airbus. 2.5-3 degrees/second towards your target pitch.

There were other factors included stupid rostering etc, but it wasn't the fact that the crew were MFF.

[galdian]

ENOUGH!

I have no doubt this has been raised in past 38 (39??) pages BUT:

- IF loadsheat to crew was acurate;
- IF pax numbers were about right;
- IF fuel was unaltered from briefed flight plan

then for the PIC at least to not have IDEA of what the T/O figure should be, let alone the F/O to have some idea should be just...unacceptable.

I say this only as I presently operate as a foreign PIC where if anything screws up I, yes, I (me, me,me) will go to gaol (jail) - not the F/O, dispatcher, manager, owner or any other prick.
Me - and me alone!

The heroics and ability from the crew to "rescue" the disaster is admirable.

The fact that the same crew actually PLACED the aircraft in the disaster situation?????

(And before the obvious comments... yes I screw up every day in small ways, I would hope that reveals constant, ongoing weaknesses in human nature - and so I don't make the sort of massive, stupid f**kup these guys made.)

Just a thought.
Cheers galdian

[helen-damnation]

so I don't make the sort of massive, stupid f**kup these guys made

The mistake was a single digit wrongly entered so yes I screw up every day in small ways could leave you rather worse off than you think.

Everything that happened after that IS open to conjecture at this time, which is why the ATSB will take 9 months plus to do their report.

If you don't like the conversation, don't take part :*

:mad:

[PositiveRate876]

The funny thing is, everytime an accident happens, and the facts come to light, everybody's response is "It couldn't be me!"

Yet seemingly preventable accidents continue to happen. I'm sure the MEL guys, the AMS guys, and countless pilots before them, when told about their future accident, would deny that it could happen to them.

Instead of judging others aeronautical abilities based on limited information, we should look at ourselves, see what we can learn from this, and think about what personal safeguards we each have in place to keep us from being next.

[Inspector Clueless]

Helen,

I think you are overly harsh on Galdian-because he/she does not agree with your viewpoint does not mean he/she is an ar$e.

I have significant 340 experience at EK and elsewhere and the facts raised by Galdian are valid as indeed are yours.

We are given the authority and responsibility as commanders to mitigate errors,we all make them it just depends on how you grade the error and this was a major one.

Career limiting infact-but it could have been far far worse and as any commander will acknowledge we are there to prevent these events in between 90% airways boredom.

Blue skies,IC

[helen-damnation]

IC

Fair enough, I was reacting to the ENOUGH, so his ar$e is removed :ooh:

I disagree on your statement that his point about awareness is valid.
I didn't know the crew so I don't know how recent their experience was on the 345. It's already been said that being 340 current doesn't mean 345 current. Like many here, I'm wondering how some things happened but I'm not going to say that items should have been noticed because none of us know why they weren't.

According to the initial report, the F/O had 425 hours on the A345. About 70 of that would have been CCQ and the rest could have been doing augment and operating the short NZ sectors. So, worst case, at about 35 hours for the DXB-Oz-NZ-Oz-DXB, that's a whole 10 trips with 20 operating sectors at light weights. Even if half were operating at heavy weights, that's not much to fall back on. Then add 190 hours of A343 ops and the waters get muddier.

Fair winds, H-D

[herkman]

It looks like in this case, history part at least repeated itself, which traditionally in many cases allow the accident to take place.

For the sake of a few dollars, someone decided that they knew better and there were not, as would be the norm two laptops used as a cross check. Compiling figures on two units, appears to be more diligent that using one, than having the calculations checked on one. Then there was the problem of stress caused by the pre flight flight deck conferances, and then it slipped past the crew that the AUW was far too low.

It is very apparent that the calculations were wrong and it was not picked by checking. However there must have been other factors that should have been revealed.

Most pilots, engineers and Loadmasters, and at least when I served, the loadmaster and engineer would calculate what the AUW would be, at the least the co pilot but usually the person doing the take off would do the card too, if they all when compared by the engineer, did not agree then the start up was not commenced until there was agreement.

In any case the figures produced did not get challenged, but I fail to see how with the load sheet, included the fuel, cargo a SLF did not come up to the gross weight, then again something was wrong. After all you know the pax, you know the cargo, you know the fuel that is required, and you know the empty weight of the airlane, in other words an experienced crew should have a very good idea what the AUW would be.

I fail to understand with an airplane about to conduct a very long flight, that they could accept that the airplane was lighter than it was. 100 tons is a lot to loose and bells should have been ringing.

Maybe the answer partly is not allow people into the flight deck, until such time as the important take off factors have been checked. I mean we are not talking about big time here, but never the less it is proberly the most important check before flight.

The other thing is if there had been two laptops used, the error would have been revealed, sounds like some penny pinching there.

In conclusion I feel that even though they made a mistake, the crew did an amazing airman ship show in recovering the situation. Looks to me that the mangement were looking for someone to take the wrap, and not have the finger pointed at them. Now their actions show that they too have responsibilty.

Instead of hanging the pilots out to dry, management should have immediately looked at all the facts, and then decided what action they should take. by them not waiting until the investigation to reveal the total situation.

The crew cocked up, but did a great recovery job, management cocked up too, but just pointed the finger, the safety officer he condoned the use of cheap and non recogmended proceedures, so really it is the comapny who was partly to blaim.

In the pilots being made to take the blame, is the easy way out, and if the incident became so bad that it was an accident, and they and many others had died, I am sure the company at least would have said pilot error.

The company needs to stand up and accept that they too played a major part, the pilots could have had action taken against them. But to dismiss them with all the associated problems that will cause, clearly indicates that management is remote from the real world. A bit choping off a finger because it has a scratch.

I for one believe that both pilots today, are and would be better pilots because of this matter. I for one would travel with them, and I suspect that if some the factors had not existed, this incident would not have occurred.

Regards

Col

[Wiley]

Re post #776:everybody's response is "It couldn't be me!"I think you'll find quite early in the thread that quite a few people, (myself included), made comments exactly the opposite to that.

[megan]

One wonders why pilots are doing performance calculations on laptops and then having to manually input the data coughed up into the FMS. As we have seen on a number of occasions (MEL, AKL, MK and there must be others) the routine is ripe for errors. Yet the technology has been available for years to overcome the problem IMHO (not being a jet driver).

From the Honeywell website (my bolding)- The Honeywell Weight and Balance System measures aircraft gross weight and center of gravity using sensors mounted on the aircraft landing gear. A dual system is capable of being certified as an alternate means of providing dispatch weight and balance information. The system is designed so that any individual component can be changed out without re-weighing the system. The system is standard equipment on the Freighter version of 747-400 aircraft. The system interfaces directly with the Flight Management Computer system on the aircraft and the output is displayed on the Multifunction Control Display Unit (MCDU). An optional Remote Dedicated Display Unit can be utilized in the cargo bay.

FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 1 July 1989
747 auto-balance system certificated
The US Federal Aviation Administration has certificated an electronic weight and balance measuring system (WBS) on the Boeing 747-400. The Honeywell Air Transport Systems division WBSs were installed ready for operation in the 747-400s recently delivered to KLM and Lufthansa. Certification does not yet clear it as a primary system, but as a means of checking the standard weight and balance calculations.

The system gives real-time readouts of aircraft weight and centre of gravity. KLM selected an optional cargo bay remote display for monitoring by loaders.
Because actual (not estimated) aircraft weight is measured automatically, departure delays caused by late passenger or cargo arrival can be minimised because cockpit paperwork and calculations are eliminated. The system automatically alerts the crew if loading limits are exceeded.

Certification has cleared the WBS to an accuracy of ±1 percent, and the dual system is designed ultimately to be certificated as a primary means of dispatch to FAR Part 121 standards. Lufthansa hopes for European certification of its dual WBS as a primary dispatch system. In the meantime it is useful as a means of checking the accuracy of conventional loadsheets, and particularly for giving an accurate final readout on the CG position.
The Honeywell WBS consists of landing-gear-mounted load sensors, a calibration module containing all gear parameter information, a digital computer unit, a pitch attitude sensor, a cockpit display, and an optional remote dedicated display unit.

A dual system such as Lufthansa's includes two variable reluctance sensors per wheel, or a total of 36 sensors. Air France, China Airlines, and French independent airline UTA have ordered the WBS for their 747-400s, and Alitalia and China Airlines for their McDonnell Douglas MD-l1s.

As I understand it Airbus has such a system available as an option and has been certified on the A300-600, A310, A320, A330, A342 and A343.

What is holding back the fitting of such tools? Short term monetary considerations, forgetting the old maxim "If you think this is expensive try having an accident". Perhaps the industry may have been better served in the long term (and I hate to say it - its the old railway crossing argument) if there had been loss of life. Thats when political pressure is brought to bear, the airlines themselves are rarely proactive on such matters and it requires mandating from some authority before they stir (kicking and screaming).

David Beaty
Firstly, there should be an acknowledgment that if and when the pilot makes a mistake, his will probably be the final enabling one at the apex of a whole pyramid of errors down below. This will, in turn, take the heat off investigations – the ‘we intend to find and punish the culprit’ syndrome. Only then can the pilots come forward and admit to mistakes they made or nearly made, and the reasons why can be coolly analysed and lessons learned.

Stanley Roscoe wrote that:
The tenacious retention of ‘pilot error’ as an accident ‘cause factor’ by governmental agencies, equipment manufacturers and airline management, and even by pilot unions indirectly, is a subtle manifestation of the apparently natural human inclination to narrow the responsibility for tragic events that receive wide public attention. If the responsibility can be isolated to the momentary defection of a single individual, the captain in command, then other members of the aviation community remain untarnished. The unions briefly acknowledge the inescapable conclusion that pilots can make errors and thereby gain a few bargaining points with management for the future.
Everyone else, including other crew members, remains clean. The airline accepts the inevitable financial liability for losses but escapes blame for inadequate training programmes or procedural indoctrination. Equipment manufacturers avoid product liability for faulty design. Regulatory agencies are not criticised for approving an unsafe operation, failing to invoke obviously needed precautionary restrictions, or, worse yet, contributing directly by injudicious control or unsafe clearance authorisations. Only the pilot who made the ‘error’ and his family suffer, and their suffering may be assuaged by a liberal pension in exchange for his quiet early retirement – in the event that he was fortunate enough to survive the accident

Thus far it seems EK has ticked every box in the Beaty and Roscoe statements.

The technology is available, what is lacking is the will.

[Busbert]

It would be great except the weight and balance system on A330/A340 never worked properly, and I understand that nobody is flying it.

A GA pilot will know all the critical speeds to the nearest knot, it surprises me that an experienced crew would not 'intuitively' recognise the difference in V1, Vr, V2 speeds resulting from a 100 TONNE typo error when calculating the TO performance.

The speeds would have been out by double figures, and a good airman should have noticed.

That said a certain A330 operator had the mother of all tailstrikes when the PNF (a captain) scribbled down the VR, as 136 instead of 156, and the PF (another captain) dutifully rotated. They flew on and then managed to do a hard landing at the other end...

[pia pium]

With widebody aircraft at such high TOWt's it is often the case EVEN WITH THE CORRECT CALCULATION ENTERED INTO THE FMGC to rotate in the last 1000m of a large international runway. The crew were expecting of course to rotate well down the runway as all previous flights would have done. To put to bed the issue of the rotate speed awareness, it is more a factor of how long it took them to get the intial acceleration going, that would be more of a tell tale that things were not going as planned as the slow Vr speed would only be picked up too late as happened on EK407 when TOGA was THEN applied. Having said that, in 25yrs of flying, I cannot say my personal accelerometers are that good to assume the intial acceleration is always as it should normally be.

[Lookleft]

A good airman probably would have picked up the error but most of us are average airman and this is not the first time a tailstrike has occurred because of incorrect weights being used. What has to happen is the development of a system that is 100% reliable. Did this type of occurrence exist when takeoff performance was calculated manually? Its no good saying that the systems are robust enough as clearly they are not.

[White Knight]

I'm sure mistakes of one type or the other are as likely to be made with manual calculations.. In fact, delving into the orange take-off charts for the big 'Buses is fraught with potential mistakes - more so actually at light weight because of the requirements regarding min control speed..
For example on the 330 if Vr was below Vmca then I recall we just had to add equal speeds to the V1 and Vr (I say recall - may be slightly mistaken) and make no change to the flex temp. However on 340 if speeds were too slow you'd have to reenter the charts at a lower flex temp that gave higher speeds associated with it... I saw plenty of mistakes made there:\

[HotDog]

A good airman probably would have picked up the error
No experience with the A340 but a 747 Classic with RB211-524 D4 engines at SL +15deg. 330kgs, non de rated thrust takeoff speeds, Flaps 10:
V1-150, VR-161, V2-173.
230kgs V1(VMCG)-142, VR-142, V2-159.

One does'nt have to be real sharp to notice the difference, me thinks.

[tuskegee airman]

Did you intend to type those weights above? Just wondering if they were:
typos
your reading what you expected to see or
intentional.

[jungle drums]

For your 747 example, perhaps more to the point, what was TOGA EPR and what was the reduced EPR?

EPR of 1.14.

Isn't zero thrust 1.00 by definition?

[Obie]

...you know, this whole thing is becoming quite stupid because of stupid people who haven't got a clue what they're talking about!! :(:(

[Brian Abraham]

It would be great except the weight and balance system on A330/A340 never worked properly, and I understand that nobody is flying it.
The Honeywell WBS is standard fit on the 747-400F. What is their experience?

[pool]

HotDog:

a 747 Classic with RB211-524 D4 engines at SL +15deg. 330kgs, non de rated thrust takeoff speeds, Flaps 10:
V1-150, VR-161, V2-173.
230kgs V1(VMCG)-142, VR-142, V2-159

Are you talking a Revell 747?? -> 330kgs or 230kgs??

I know, I know, everyone knows you meant 330tons. I just wanted to show to all the posting astronauts how easy it is to make a little typo ........

[HotDog]

OK, the weights quoted from the performance manual pages are Tons. The presentation is as printed in the manual. Sorry I didn't clarify that in my post, I guess some people understood what I was talking about.:ok:

[Obie]

I would have thought that any one with half a brain would know 1000kgs is a tonne! But, then again, most current airline pilots seem to have less than half a brain! This thread is rapidly becoming an embarrassment to our profession!

[NigelOnDraft]

The speeds would have been out by double figures, and a good airman should have noticed.You clearly have never dealt in Airbus' system of Perf Calcs :{

There is no logic to the Speeds / Flap setting used... Even on 1 type, you cannot get a "feel" for what the figures should be. Try flying 3 or 4 variants, and much as I would like to be able to "gross error check" the figures, all you can do is type whatever the printer/computer spits out. Your control of the situation is checking the data input(s).

Not safe or satisfactory IMHO, but we are just the employees at the end of the chain :oh:

NoD

[HotDog]

Obie, I presume you are refering to my input on this thread? Anyone with half a brain and familiar with performance graphs would not be in any doubt about the weights quoted. Yes, some professionals are a bit of an embarrassment.:rolleyes:

[Desperate]

Quote:

"I would have thought that any one with half a brain would know 1000kgs is a tonne!"

Agreed, but Hot Dog's missing 'k', or zeros (330kgs, 230kgs) shows how significant a typo can be.

Sort of makes the point of this thread, I suppose...

[FlexibleResponse]

tuskegee airman made a very pertinent comment pertaining to the essence of this accident.

We are all human, and humans make mistakes.

Aviation is about managing those mistakes so they don't become significant threats to flight safety.

[Daedong]

This tailstrike is remarkably similar to the SQ tailstike at AKL. The SQ pilots entered the ZFW in the TOW line of the FMC.As the fuel load was aprox 100 tonnes the end result was the same.First digit in the the TOW line was entered as 2 instead of 3.

[Obie]

I wasn't actually referring to you Hotdog!
However, now that you mention it...
why don't you stick to engineering and leave the flying up to us? :ok:

[pool]

Dear Obie

Desperate got the drift, you didn't.

Embarrassing, isn't it, as you pointed out.

[positivegee]

Desperate
"I would have thought that any one with half a brain would know 1000kgs is a tonne!"

Agreed, but Hot Dog's missing 'k', or zeros (330kgs, 230kgs) shows how significant a typo can be.

Sort of makes the point of this thread, I suppose...

Desperate; this is a desperate statement considering the fact that HotDog was merely following the previous posts and the fact that the 000's were missing took nothing away from HotDogs argument. Anyone who has been following this thread would have understood exactly the point that was being made.

What next? Do we have to use the full word kilogram insted of kg or nautical miles per hour instead of knots, instead of kts...this could go on forever.:ugh::ugh:

Please don't turn thread into pedantic ramblings and trivia...let those with something constructive to offer make their point without being picky on trivial points.:ok:

+G

[pool]

It is not about picking on trivial points, far from it.
It is about all those self appointed astronauts who just can't/won't understand how a experienced crew could put in a 2 for a 3 and not detect it. In their contribution they then make similar typos, like nuatical .... or assumptions. To me it was clear that 330kgs meant 330'000kgs, but I would never generously round down even a widebody by 999kgs, so it is basically a error.

Picking-up such typos is just what some discussions are about. I simply hate the kind of contribution like ".. they should really have picked it up. I fly 20 different types of boeingbusses, but I can smell a wrong Vspeed just by my professionalism .." - implementing this could never happen to them and the MEL crew was just a screw-up.

That was my sarcastic drift, now back to serious theories ....

[positivegee]

Pool, I agree that these little typo's can lead to big mistakes...In an aircraft...on these threads can't we allow a few?
+G

[RatherBeFlying]

Earlier I proposed having the laptop software provide required braking distance from V1 and using that as a signpost, but Oakape ably pointed that a bad weight invalidates the braking distance.

An alternative is having the software show time to 80 kt.

Assuming the software integrates thrust, acceleration and speed over time (as opposed to simply looking up static tables), time and distance to V1 are numbers the software must derive for a particular runway, weight, altitude, temperature, gradient, thrust setting, wind component etc. since the required runway length is the sum of distance to V1 plus the greater of braking distance for a V1 reject or distance to screen height without an engine plus required margins. On the way to V1, the software also derives the time and distance to 80 kt.

If you don't have 80 kt. by the expected time, you are either over stated weight, under thrust, have a brake dragging etc.

[MrMachfivepointfive]

The problem is that certification standards won't allow full integration.
The FMS is driven by a 1970's 8086 processor that CAN'T do single point takeoff calculations.
The class 1,2,3 on board that can are not allowed to push weights and V speeds into the FMS.
Alltogether they are not allowed to talk to and synchronize with the weight and balance system on the ground . So it is the pilot's mark1 mod0 eyeball and brain to make sense of the lot and transpose takeoff data from one to the other.

Its all about safety they say.

But if banks (who are even more paranoid about safety) would think the same about a carbon based lifeform and safety in the loop, there wouldn't be any ATMs. Cash would still be delivered by the postman.

The legislator must perform a 180 and allow the push of data into the FMS and if it is just for a plausibility check.

(Okay pool... I am sure you ll find a reason to have a go at me again. Secretly I believe you are my ex-wife)

[42psi]

RatherBeFlying...

Would that not require all airfields to install "distance markers" of some sort .... paint/post/signs ..


Otherwise how do you know when you've reached this "critical acceleration point".


More to the point what do you actually do ..... stop,go, more power and how do you arrive at the decision?

To be truly effective surely it needs to be an "always stop" choice which then creates multiple stop decision points?

[CONF iture]

I fail to understand with an airplane about to conduct a very long flight, that they could accept that the airplane was lighter than it was. 100 tons is a lot to loose and bells should have been ringing.

herkman, I'm afraid you're beside the point.
From what I understand, every weights in MCDU and System Display were according to the load sheet and a TOW of 363 tonnes.
All weight information presented to the crew by the airplane screens were correct and in total accordance with the W&B.

The only mistake was to type in the Performance laptop a 2 instead of a 3, 263 instead of 363.
Actually, VERY easy to do that kind of mistake.

In my eyes, the best chance to catch that mistake was to question that extreme 74 degrees Celsius as a FLEX when you go for 14 hours with a full load ...

I HOPE ??? I would have caught it ...
By now, learning from their experience, I HOPE I would get it.

[jungle drums]

Obie your comment was too cryptic for me. Were you talking about my remark re EPR 1.14?

If so, please explain?

In return, my take; was once they had dealt with all the crap before start (tiredness, company procs, distractions etc) and were taxying, that there was only one chance for them (and in future any of us all) to recognise the bullsh1t, and that was to ask the simple question - "doesn't an EPR of 1.14 a look little low tonight, given that we are departing for 15 hours at 10t below MTOW??"

Even if they had recognised this at the point of setting thrust on takeoff and gone TOGA, yes - it may have still been a tailscrape, but that would have been on the runway, and as an incident would have died a natural death many pages ago.

[helen-damnation]

Just a suggestion :O

When the fuel figures are sent back by acars, additional info of Rwy in use/OAT/Surface wind could easily allow some gross error check figures to be added to the loadsheet.

In fact, they could relatively easily add the whole set of figures which would be even better.

However, in the interests of time/money etc, a flex and green dot would suffice.

It shouldn't be difficult to do, they have the software already.

If some rocket surgeon posted this weeks ago, my apologies, too much to read now. :)

[M609]

Would that not require all airfields to install "distance markers" of some sort .... paint/post/signs ..

Proven concept at all NATO bases since....well forever! :)

[RatherBeFlying]

MM5.5, I agree with having the FMS do these calculations -- if only we can get the certification authorities to get their heads around it.

In fact, it seems that laptops with manufacturer sanctioned software is an end run about the certification bureaucratic hoops involved with putting these capabilities into FMS.

Introduction of laptops into cockpit performance calculations seems to have increased the proliferation of information sources already populated with FMS, performance charts and ACARs -- and has introduced more ways to get things wrong as we have also seen with MK in Halifax.

If the crew is expected to dash off a quick critical calculation in a compressed timeframe, they need a straightforward SOP that perhaps excludes unneeded bodies / distractions in the cockpit while this is being done.

42psi, both time and distance to 80 kt. (or other speed if necessary) are equally valid for performance monitoring, but I don't think we will see distance boards put up anytime soon and stopwatches are readily available.

[Abacus]

The latest 'Flight International' which has just dropped in to my 'inbox' has a half page article on the incident, most interestingly citing Emirates now introducing a second laptop on the flight deck, to perform independent performance calculations. Obviously their SOP was not to have two laptops.

My point exactly, as per my previous post!

[Ex Cargo Clown]

The latest 'Flight International' has a half page article on the incident, most interestingly citing Emirates now introducing a second laptop on the flight deck to perform independent performance calculations.

My point exactly, as per my previous post!

Surely it is better to get the dispatcher who prepared the loadsheet to do the perf calcs ?

Then you have two completely separate, independent data sources for v figures.

[Desperate]

positivegee
....Do we have to use ........ nautical miles per minute instead of knots, instead of kts...this could go on forever

Again you make the point, and so succinctly :)

When under pressure (and maybe feeling a little bit flushed, eh Positivegee?) it is so easy to type something that looks ok into a keyboard, only for it to come back and bite you later. And the more common the task the greater the difficulty in spotting the error.

Consider for example the effect of 'pattern interrupt' (google it) upon your pre-flight programming. You've got the preliminary via datalink, you're reading out the numbers and the other chap/ess is punching in the figures, you cross check but during those vital moments yet another person comes in with a query. Missing pax/bags/tug/odd question etc etc. It's actually the 'odd question' that might be your undoing - the rest you're used to fielding on a daily basis. Both your minds do a subtle 'eh?' and the interrupt is complete. Not saying that's what happened, just that it can.

Whatever the mistake, to err is human. You're right that on these forums (fora if you'd prefer the Latin) it doesn't matter very much. But it does help to illustrate the point.

Oh, I think if you use your preferred 'nautical miles per minute.. instead of knots' it will be over quicker than you think ;)

[HotDog]

why don't you stick to engineering and leave the flying up to us?

Dear Obie, in my entire career of 33 years as a flight engineer, one of my duties was to calculate and fill in the data cards for all phases of the flight. Cross checked before setting the bugs, we never had an incident or accident due to incorrect data input. Have you ever flown with a flight engineer? Maybe it's time they re-instated them.:ok:

[Old Fella]

HotDog. I'm on your team mate. I have made the same point on previous posts. Quite apart from the other contributions made by us, the distribution of pre-flight work load including the F/E extracting the performance data for independent checking by the non-handling pilot is very beneficial. The responsibility for the correct fuel uplift into the appropriate tanks resting with the F/E, who is/was going flying, was another benefit as was the thorough check on the walk-around pre-flight inspection and such niceties as initialising INS's and cockpit checks etc etc. They won't put us back mate, our in-flight rations and the return to a heavier, more comprehensive, MEL is too big a weight penalty. Besides that, the jargon used these days is too much like text messaging for us old buggers to familiarise ourselves with. Maybe we should just let comments like those from Obie "slip through to the 'keeper"

[Abacus]

'Ex Cargo Clown'. That would certainly help, but I'm not sure I would leave it just up to the dispatchers to provide the performance calc's. Besides, our SOP requires independent computation/calculation.

But as another line of defence, sure, I'm all in favour.

Can never see it happening though!

[Busbert]

Two near death experiences on takeoff, both 'human factors' related.
Their luck will run out.

[Woof etc]

Can anyone explain to me why it is not feasible for Airbus to build some sort of gross error check for take-off acceleration into the FMS?

The FMC already has all the required data: Temperature, air pressure, N1, entered or calculated wind component etc. Knowing all this surely it would be a simple matter for the FMC to calculate the expected acceleration for the entered TOW. This could be compared to the INS / ADIRU (or whatever its called on the bus) acceleration, and the pilots alerted to any gross discrepancy.

Or am I missing something?

[PJ2]

Woof etc;
Can anyone explain to me why it is not feasible for Airbus to build some sort of gross error check for take-off acceleration into the FMS?

You answered the question yourself, with:
for the entered TOW.
GIGO. If the weight(s) are out by a digit, ('2' instead of a '3' in a 375,000kg GTOW), the FMC will rationalize incorrect data as correct. It's already occurred as you know.

Some suggest that the aircraft have a weight/balance system installed using oleo deflection etc - such a system is available (from Airbus, I recall) and, we have read here, was "not reliable".

Also, airlines may not be too keen to have such a system which would be independant of their own load control departments and programs. Keep in mind that most airlines do not weigh baggage and they never weight passengers, just to avoid the inevitable harrassment/embarrassment lawsuits from passengers if nothing else.

So on any one takeoff, an installed aircraft w/b system would rarely agree with the "official" numbers as transmitted to the aircraft by the airline's load control department.

The question would be, how does one rationalize the discrepancies and which figures "trump" the other figures? In an accident investigation, which data is correct? Why?

Also, for those companies that choose to overload their aircraft, such a system would not be installed or, if mandated, would at least be heavily lobbied against. The business of aviation is about "max lift-min cost", first.

As has been pointed out earlier (Radio altimeter thread), how do you resolve differences between only two systems' data? Would a third data calculation provide a sufficiently robust voting system?

[GlueBall]

The phrase "TOW... ---.-Kgs" could be included as a final item in the "Before Takeoff check list." It would be a last chance gross error check with FMS input and computer flight plan weight. :ooh:

[CONF iture]

Glueball, what you mention is already part of the Airbus Standard Operation Procedure. It is part of what is called the MINI BRIEFING taking place sometime during the taxi out phase.
In the case of EK407, it did not change anything, for the simple reason, as already mentioned earlier, that FMS and paper flight plan (as provided by dispatch) weights were matching.
Please read here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/366754-ek407-tailstrike-ml-41.html#post4904721)

[framer]

In this particular case, with the crew being aware that they were at 360T, but the speeds being for a lesser weight, would a placard have helped?

Picture this;
Tower "Emirates 123 hold at holding position x for runway 34"
F/O " Holding short 34 Emirates 123"
F/O to Cpt " This is intersection x, the data was done for intersection x, gross weight 360T Vr checks"
Cpt to F/O " Well done son...before take-off checks please"

When the F/O confirms the intersection he looks at a $15 plaque attached to the a/c by his right knee.

Vr Table

Weight Flap 1 Flap2 Flap 3
360 161 153 148
350 159 150 144
340 157 148 142
330 etc etc etc
320 etc etc etc
etc

The figures would be for 15 degrees no slope but they would be a gross error check and thats all. It could be that as long as they made sense everyone is happy. ie if the Vr in the box is a couple knots faster the crew can put that down to the fact that it is 31 degrees outside.

I would be most receptive to posters telling me why this wouldn't work as I know there are people vastly more experienced than myself on these boards.
If this had been SOP in YMML would they have picked it up?
Regards, Framer
PS I have no idea of flap settings and speeds on this type of a/c so I made them up and just called them flap 1 2 and 3.

[Woof etc]

PJ2: That's the whole point: If the entered TOW is incorrect then the FMC would be expecting a different acceleration from the ACTUAL acceleration.

ie. For the given parameters (temp, pressure, N1 etc.) from which the thrust may be calculated, the predicted acceleration could be calculated for the entered mass. If the actual acceleration is significantly different then this would be an indication that the input mass is incorrect.

Of course additional factor affect the acceleration: Wind, runway contamination, variations between actual weights and std weights etc. But as a gross error check (in this case a 100 ton discrepancy) the difference between actual acceleration and predicted acceleration based on the weight entered into the FMS would have been significant.

[White Knight]

Not quite so simple Framer - the speeds for a particular weight and flap setting may change depending on the segment performance requirements, temp, pressure, wet/dry etc.... It's an Airbus:ok:, not a Cessna...

The whole key is to making sure that the CORRECT DATA IS ENTERED INTO THE LAPTOP.. Cr@p in = cr@p out..

[Jabawocky]

All these great ideas :rolleyes:................. be far simpler to have load cells fitted to the undercarriage, and feed that data in with an allowable tolerance. Then the crew could be alerted if they entered a big porky in by mistake!

J

[Brian Abraham]

Something along these lines Jaba.
http://i101.photobucket.com/albums/m56/babraham227/w-2.jpg
I mentioned onboard weight & balance systems in an earlier post, it seems the Airbus certified system is complex and consuming of maintenance hours so the latter (dollars) would seem why it hasn't gained favour. The 744F has it as a standard fit and I've asked a question on freight dogs if anyone can proffer their experience. Earlier in this thread one gentleman mentions the system they had on the Merchantman as being robust and reliable, surely its not beyond the ken of us all these years later to come up with something to do the job. The Honeywell system advertises +-1% accuracy and certified as a primary or advisory dispatch system on those aircraft for which it is certified (747 & MD-11 thus far). And no transposing of data from laptop to FMS which seems to be where this accident stems from.

[PJ2]

CONF iture, Brian Abraham;

Not sure it's been asked - wouldn't the error in entered weights also create an incorrect trip fuel burn and final fuel figure? One would at least notice the larger extra fuel opposite LSK 6L.

[White Knight]

Gents - the weights entered into the INIT B page of the FMS were correct. The problem was with the laptop and the speeds are then loaded into the PERF page..

You can upload screenshots of INIT pages all you like but it won't change the fact that the error was the original input into the laptop...

[PJ2]

White Knight;

Thanks...I knew there was something I'd missed in this.

[DonLeslie]

Gents - the weights entered into the INIT B page of the FMS were correct. The problem was with the laptop and the speeds are then loaded into the PERF page..Which is why we compare the "green dot" speeds (minimum clean) calculated by the laptop and the FMC on the PERF Page. If they match, laptop and FMC have the same weights. To enter the right weight into the FMC, but 2XX tons instead of 3XX tons into the laptop is by far the most common error. This is recognized by comparing green dot speeds.

Cheers,
DL

[framer]

.... It's an Airbushttp://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif, not a Cessna...

Dam! ....Oh well, I had a gut feeling I was gunna end up lookin silly on that post but thought it was worth a shot :)

Would the Vr really change that much though? Like more than 5kts? I understand V1 changing due wet/dry rwy etc etc but I thought Vr would be only effected by slope and temp/pressure. Does the Vr change due to 2nd and 4th climb segment requirements?
Cheers

[Obie]

Didn't they take off on R/W16?...
Do you lot know what you are talking about, or not?
I strongly suspect, not!! :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

[White Knight]

Obie - do YOU have anything useful to add? Mmm - Boring Point seems about right:ugh:

Indeed DL - which is where the mistake should have been nailed..

[ExSp33db1rd]

Not quite so simple Framer........


I'm with Framer, he talked of a GROSS error check, not a nit-picking knot or two here and there, think of the big picture.

Slightly off thread I know, but when learning to navigate I was told to stop trying to do a maths exam in a rattling steel cabinet and pretend I was sat on the tail driving the thing over a map of the World, but it is the same thing with take off performance, if you are going a long way you will be heavy, EPR numbers and V1/V2 numbers will be BIGGER. If they're not, stop and ask why. Might be a perfectly good reason, but might not, also.

I believe the SQ incident out of AKL was being flown by a guy recently off the A 340, so the lower numbers that they had mistakenly derived, seemed OK to him, had he been more familiar with the 747 he wouldn't have accepted them. The Big Picture. Head out of the computer. ( I also vowed I'd never fly without a Flight Engineer, too - but that's another story !! )

[Fat Dog]

Regarding flex/derate/assumed take off:
You cite best industry practice. Well, it's not completely true. With the EK software, you can only go for full thrust or max reduction. Any in-between, which is used a lot elsewhere for a little more safety margin but not full thrust, is not recommedable here, because the gross error trapping procedure a la EK will no longer be possible. It's not in the SOP, so either full or full reduction, which I believe is not best practice.


EK SOP = max or no derate? :confused: Why?

[White Knight]

Exsp33dbird - The whole point is that there isn't such a simple 'ballpark' figure on this aeroplane.. With the 'coming' of the laptop optimiser the tables with the 'about right' figures went out of the window:ouch:

One day you can put in the figures and get a flap 3 take-off, the next day same sector and a couple of minor variables and you've got a 1+F setting - and all with differing flex and speed settings. The performance is OPTIMISED - unlike my last type which had set speeds for set flaps at set weights..

There is no planned EPR setting as such either with the RR Trents on this aircraft. You put the calculated flex into the PERF page and let the FADEC work out how much EPR to set... Again - no ballpark as such..

[White Knight]

And just to further clarify - the Green Dot check is the check that should save your bacon. The Green Dot speed on the PERF page is calculated by the FMS from the ZFW and fuel load inserted into the INIT B.
When the laptop calc is complete the Green Dot speed shown on the 'perf' screen should be within a couple of knots.. If its not then ask questions..

Clear??

[framer]

Forgive me White Knight but can you confirm for me how much Vr would change for say 360T and Flap 3 for zero degrees celcius through to 35 degrees celcius ambiant. So really what I am asking is what is the range of rotate speeds possible for this a/c at Flap 3 and 360T?
I expect there will be a large range from what you have said, and that will confirm that my idea is not practical as a gross error check.
Thanks for taking the time,
framer

[CONF iture]

Also White Knight, as you seem to be current on this Airbus type, would you provide us with some more data ?
The report didn't elaborate much except that at a TOW of 263 tonnes as wrongly inserted into the laptop :

Vr was 147 kt
FLEX was 74C
CONF was 1+F


Please, what should have been these figures if the correct TOW of 363 tonnes had been inserted ?

[White Knight]

I'd need access to a laptop and as I'm off work for a few days I'll have to get back to you.......
All I can say is that at 360 tonnes you will NOT get a flex of 74 degrees. However you MAY get 1+F.. I also think that the V2 is a BETTER gross error check than Vr.

[CONF iture]

Thanks, I appreciate.

I agree for the V2, but I haven't seen any reference on that one in the report ?
V1 is positively given : 143
Vr is indirectly mentioned : 147 ?
Vr is also of interest regarding the tailstrike aspect.
And of course the FLEX ...

Anyway, no rush, fully enjoy your days off first !

[ExSp33db1rd]

White Knight - thank you, I guess one retires for a good reason ! But does 'progress' always improve things ? The tried and true KISS method ( Keep It Simple Stupid ) saved a lot of disasters.

I recall one of my Nav. instructors telling me that I'd never make a navigator until I'd been over Berlin with the shells coming through the cockpit whilst I was trying to get a 3-wind drift reading through a drift-sight ! Of course I never had to, similarly my future students never had to cope with trying to get a Sun, Moon, Venus sextant fix on a daylight Atlantic crossing when the Loran reception was down, and I despaired as they struggled with it for practice - INS was their Brave New World, now of course superceded by GPS.

But ...... the Big Picture is still important, I once had a co-pilot try to steer me NorthWest to Australia from Singapore - he had cocked up his maths / INS / FMS inputs and come up with a heading of 315 deg. The Big Picture again.

Whilst instructing for an Asian airline our students were very able instrument pilots, brought up on a diet of Space Invader and Microsoft games, but initially had difficulty connecting a real aeroplane to the real Earth. One of my colleagues remarked how the World had turned full circle, when we were flying with the old (?) WW II bomber pilots, many had difficulty following an instrument approach, but pop out of cloud, too high, too fast, not in line, not configured etc. etc. and point out the runway through the side window even, and they would immediately settle down and perform an immaculate visual approach and landing.

Horses for Courses, I guess. I hope you enjoy your aviation career as much as I enjoyed mine - and still do, albeit single seat microlights ( I still miss the Flt.Eng tho' !!! )

Cheers, ExSp33db1rd

[Wiley]

I have to plead guilty not to having read in full all of the last few pages of posts, as many of them seem at first glance to be attempting to come up with plans of varying usefullness to avoid a repetition of exactly the same situation that the crew of EK407 encountered that fateful evening.

Shoot me down in flames if what follows deserves it, but I believe the ATSB report will come out with recommendations that look beyond this 'shut the stable door behind the bolted horse' approach. It's been said before, but I believe it's worth repeating: no one out there - at least no one who holds an ATPL (I hope that's not too cryptic for most Sandpit readers) - believes for one moment that the crew set out that night not to follow SOPS.

(Again, as someone has said before me), one of the more likely findings will be that they were interrupted during some stage of their crosschecking and (perhaps, in some readers' opinion, unforgivably) neglected to go back and re-do the procedure from the beginning.

With that (as yet unconfirmed) scenario in mind, perhaps we should be looking at 'a fix' that covers more pitfalls than just the one this particular crew encountered. Maybe a sterile cockpit (i.e., a locked cockpit door) during the three or four minutes that the initial briefing and preparation of takeoff figures are done?

Anyone with five sectors of line experience will know it's highly impractical to suggest this sterile cockpit could be imposed later in the pre-departure sequence (i.e., the twenty-five minutes leading up to pushback). However, it, or something along similar lines, might be worth considering earlier in the pre-departure sequence, immediately after the crew have set themselves up and the tech log review and the walkaround have been completed.

I know the final ZFW will not have arrived at that stage, and therefore the crew will not be able to come up with accurate RTOW figures, and I know a late runway change will throw such preparations even further out. However, using the expected takeoff figures would give the crew a ballpark figure arrived at in a relatively non threatening situation that could be compared with the final figures for a gross error check - and, perhaps even more importantly, it would allow a proper takeoff briefing to be conducted without interruption.

People far smarter than I am will come up with something, probably far more clever than what I've suggested above. I just hope it's something a little more all-encompassing than the knee-jerk procedure we've come up after EK407 that covers only the particular pitfall that caught out that crew.

I believe there'd be few line pilots who would not say that there are many more pitfalls out there waiting to catch out some other crew in the future, and many such pitfalls could be 'trapped' far earlier than they are by crews today if we reduced the interruptions and distractions crews endure as they do their takeoff preparations under the present set up.

[pool]

A lot of good ideas, technical goodies etc., but I'd go with Wileys arguments. However, I proposed another approach as to how to proceed, and I still stick to my arguments.

1. Any action done alone needs to be confirmed by the fellow crew member(s). So why do it in the first place? To eliminate error? To crosscheck? I do not believe that such procedures are superior in trapping errors, as BOTH individualists might make errors, eventually doubling the risk. We are a team after all, aren't we?

2. Anything done in advance is by definition imprecise, as not all values are yet known. So why do it then? To give us a preliminary picture? To raise awareness? I do not believe that this helps trapping errors. I believe it might even set a trap, as it preconceives our thinking. It might lead to the feeling " ... it has already been covered".

As a consequence to these two arguments, I prefer working as follows:
Do all the math on the flightplan, as usual. We can crosscheck that, to raise awareness, big picture. Wait for the TO calculations until receipt of the loadsheet. Then go through it TOGETHER. Note the values on the flpl. Go into the laptop/EFB/charts, with the ACTUAL VALUES. Once the result shows, insert the necessary values into the FMC, set the MCP/FCP. All this done TOGETHER, do a quick CROSSCHECK a): loadsheet vs. FMC (grossweight), and a second crosscheck b): FMC vs. laptop/EFB/chart (greendot/Vref30).
This should take no more than three minutes, during which the crew may throw everybody out of the cockpit. Additionally such a procedure can be applied with anything from two to one laptops/EFBs, any kind of charts and even a precalculated ACARS from dispatch.

KISS

[145qrh]

The LPC user interface is riddled with ways in which to screw up.

Even more so when it comes to non-standard inputs; modified runway lengths or failures.

Whenever I fire up the LPC I always enter the airfield data as soon as I start it and run the perf for MTOW, for 2 reasons. Firstly it gives me situational awareness, it gives me an idea of the speeds, flex and what weight we can lift of the runway in question, and secondly if for some reason I then forget to re-enter correct weight when we get the final then we are covered as we have the most conservative figures possible.

The way I do is not SOP, just a technique, and I know that there is no foolproof way but it works for me.

[Obie]

Why not just apply your applicable companies SOPs? :ok:

[White Knight]

Indeed obie - just as the lads in MEL were doing... Maybe it's sensible to use a little 'airmanship' heh????

[Schnowzer]

Confiture,

170 kts, 30 Flex, Flap3 should about do it for 363.

A heavy A340 pretty much always takes off in Flap 3, flag number 1.
Flex 74 is max flex i.e. light weight data, flag number 2.
Rotate and Green Dot way out of the gross error range, flag number 3.

I guess a problem the industry faces is that operations have come so routine. When I am sitting on a 340 with the other guy flying at heavy weight and call rotate nothing much happens initially because the jet is so heavy, going so quick and has so much inertia. I still find that startling, many of our colleagues do not and we have to shake the complacency that comes with our routine operations and look for trouble.

[Chronic Snoozer]

Just curious.

If you knew the number of pax on board and how much fuel you'd planned - would you be able to estimate the MTOW to within 100T? 50T?

[Obie]

...try 100k!

[iflytb20]

In the 737s, we use an "unofficial" thumb rule to check the figures.

The 1st 2 digits of your ATOW [from trim sheet] - 20 gives the V2 +- 3 knots.

For eg, if ATOW = 70,000 Kgs, then V2 would be [70-20] = 150 +- 2 knots. This can be used as a fairly accurate cross-check on whether you entered the figures in the FMC correctly or not. Maybe the 340 also has a thumb rule like this
Cheers

[Capt Kremin]

Put an expected green dot value on the final loadsheet. Simple.

[vino]

that just won't happen for all sorts of circular 'legalistic' reasons that relate to the 'chain of command' ='chain of culpubility'
In short- the buck stops in the LHS!
But Wiley is 'on to it'-he/she is taking a more global approach to a systemic pre-flight problem.
And he's/she's absolutely correct!
We've allowed ourselves to be progressively compromised over the years to accepting
-interuppted briefings
-dispatchers with '2 ways' on max volume bursting onto the flight deck
etc etc
now some need to be there-
engineers have no-where else to go to sign off the tech log
FA's need to get tea/coffee orders
But it's typically mayhem....
We've all seen it-tried to manage it amongst revised slots, de-ice etc etc
but in the midst of that don't go finger wagging 'cos someone cocks-up a data entry on a single day.
It really deserves some attention-given we spend so much time and money on CRM
Vino over and out.....:E

[Obie]

...he's a he actually! :ok:

[Denti]

Interesting rule of thumb iflytb20, havent heard of it yet :) I would think however it only works if you use standard speeds and not improved climb speeds which can easily lead to 160kt+ Vr for 50t weights (-3/-7 obviously).

[CONF iture]

170 kts, 30 Flex, Flap3 should about do it for 363.

A heavy A340 pretty much always takes off in Flap 3, flag number 1.
Flex 74 is max flex i.e. light weight data, flag number 2.
Rotate and Green Dot way out of the gross error range, flag number 3.
Thanks Schnowzer, that's interesting.

I would have another question :
Using the laptop for the performances, can you force an input value such as CONF 1+F ?
... and again what would have been the Vr and FLEX values ?

[Joetom]

All good stuff,

Must be some lessons to be learnt.

When I go shopping, a small basket=$10, big basket=$20, small trolly=$40, big trolly=$60+, I don't always check the bill detail, but I check the bill zone.

Brings to mind an old story of an Air Florida 737 departing IAD I think, poss 1982 may be, they got reqd EPR IND but less N1 and thrust than needed, result was bad.

I liked the previous post of a wide guage plate just like the ones for other systems likes Flaps nd Gear on some aircrafts.

I've said it before, well done to the crew involved, great end result, only hope we learn the lessons and make flying even more safe.

Edit. Thinking on, I wonder how many similar type events have been saved from the press by crew Stopping or TOGA being applied when crew aware things are not what they might be, may be !!!

[framer]

what is the range of rotate speeds possible for this a/c at Flap 3 and 360T?
I expect there will be a large range from what you have said, and that will confirm that my idea is not practical as a gross error check.

Does anyone have this info?
I'm like an old dog with a bone and am still keen to see if a cheap as chips plaque could have made a difference on this particular flight when they knew their weight but the speeds were wrong.
Why not just apply your applicable companies SOPs? http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif
I think that is a bit too simplistic (with all due respect Obie) because of the vast range of attitudes towards SOP's and also the range of ability between different crews. Some people I fly with are naturally masters of maintaining SA and recognising when a distraction has occurred, others bumble along letting the distraction push in on the situation and constantly saying "where were we?". Both of these types are trying to stick to SOP's but the latter is not as capable as the former.
I agree with the sentiment that attention needs to be brought to ...bear?.. beer? ...bare on the flightdeck environment when these calculations/briefings are being done. I often observe ground staff bursting into the flightdeck having started their questions and statements without regard to what is happening inside. I don't blame them, they have obviously not been trained properly. A ten minute video on the consequences of distractions at this stage of preparations would probably do the trick.
I'm learning a lot from this thread,
Regards, Framer

[stillalbatross]

Aviation Reports (http://www.taic.org.nz/AviationReports/tabid/78/ctl/Detail/mid/482/InvNumber/2007-001/Page/1/Default.aspx?SkinSrc=)[G]skins%2ftaicAviation%2fskin_aviation

[TWT]

Lucky there wasn't an EMAS at the end of RWY 16.....

[stilton]

A very good point and one I pondered before !


Great to stop an overunning Aircraft, not so good when you are struggling to lift off !

[EMIT]

A belated answer to post #858 by CONFiture:

YES, you can force the laptop into any approved take-off configuration.
It will provide the applicable figures, if a valid solution is available, or it will make clear that with the selected conditions, take-off is not possible.

Often airline managements will obligate the crews to use the OPTIMUM configuration output, because they fall for the word OPTIMUM.

In the instructions for the performance programs, you can read what the meaning is of the OPTIMUM CONFIG: it is the configuration, which will enable the highest lift capacity under the entered conditions, when using FULL THRUST.
The configuration that is thus determined will also be labelled OPTIMUM under conditions of reduced thrust.
The configuration that is labelled OPTIMUM often, but not always, also provides the highest lift capacity with reduced thrust. However, many times the assumed temperature that rolls out at lower flap settings is the same, or just 1 degree lower, than for the OPTIMUM CONFIG.

Often, the performance based maximum mass that can be lifted off a runway is far above the structural mass limit of the aircraft. Often, the differences between the Optimum and the other configurations amount to just a few hundred or a few thousand kilo’s, with all configuration providing performance far above the structural limit (FULL THRUST condition)

Yes, it is true that a higher performance limited mass gives you more margin in case of an engine failure, but seriously, a few hundred kilo’s difference on a total of more than 350 tonnes is not gonna give you much extra margin.

Realizing that the performance of the lower flap settings is hardly any less ON THE RUNWAY, it may be worthwhile to look at the performance once airborne. The climb performance with CONF 3 (an approved landing flap setting!) of course is abysmal, compared to a climb out with CONF 1.
The management bean counters should have a look at the amount of fuel that could be saved by the better climb performance! Than they would quickly reconsider their insistence on the use of laptop derived OPTIMUM CONFigurations.

Using minimum flap for take-off and only more flap when required for performance, would make it easier for crews to establish a mental reference of what is normal in terms of speeds for a certain mass (but yes, I know that also in fixed flap operations, errors are made).

P.S. This post is not a sneer at Airbus, their performance instructors properly explain the use of the laptop procedures, it is airline managements that order the improper use of the equipment.

Next point.

One important phrase from the ATSB preliminary report is about the use of the laptop(s). One laptop was used, the other was kept as spare, in case of breakdown of the first one. WRONG WRONG WRONG!
If pilot 1 closes the laptop and pilot 2 opens it again, to check the calculation, he will be staring at a screen with all the numbers as filled in by number 1! When glancing over numbers as a check, it is easy to overlook errors.

Pilot 2 should have autonomously filled in numbers on his own laptop and pilots 1 and 2 should have compared the outcome of their respective calculations. In that way, there would have been a comparison of independent calculations.

I do not know what the Emirates SOP’s were with respect to laptop use.

[CONF iture]

EMIT, thank you for your interesting extensive answer.

If I understand it well, by using the LPC laptop, crews end up using CONF 3 when most of the time 2 or even 1, for a mere flex degree or even a single knot, would be as good if not better.
So I’m glad we’re still old fashion by using the paper performance charts where it is definitely easier to keep an overall view. And I can hardly see anyone entering a paper chart 100 tonnes off !?
Also, with a book, one guy extracts some figures, then closes the book. When ready the other guy proceeds with its own independent calculation, usually both results don’t even differ enough to worth mention.

[EMIT]

Exactly, CONFiture, and indeed we even do not use the OFP as a bookmark to the "correct" runway page, so that the other guy will really start from scratch in his independant performance calculation.

[Antman]

Great post EMIT
The other thing people should remember that the Green Dot speed displayed on the MCDU perf takeoff page is calculated using the TOW in the MCDU init-b Page.

If you press F9 on the LPC then it generates a Perf takeoff page with a Green Dot speed calculated usig the TOW entered in the LPC.

Assuming your loadsheet too MCDU check is water tight, the Green Dot speeds must be the same. IF NOT WHY?????? This is if you use 1 or 10 laptops.

[h3dxb]

It went all the time through my mind, and I could dark remember that I heard it on a course:

A345 AMM

4
Pitch rotation law for takeoff

This FCPC law is engaged during rotation phase.
A pitch demand depending on pitch rate and side stick position is added to the ground law orders.
This law avoids tail strike if there is a side stick input from the pilot.

How the guys got managed to override this ?

[AirBusted320]

Often airline managements will obligate the crews to use the OPTIMUM configuration output, because they fall for the word OPTIMUM.

EMIT, while you clearly understand a bit of the background with the laptop, you're a little 'off' on that response. That's not the reason why some companies choose to recommend the OPTIMUM setting for FLAP at all on Airbus FBW.

Many Airbus operators know the background for OPTIMUM (as you correctly say it's the flap setting that allows the theoretical max weight to be lifted off the runway...)

BUT they are NOT necessarily 'falling' for anything by choosing OPTIMUM as a standard procedure.

No. The simple reason is this; if OPTIMUM were NOT used by the crew, it leaves the process open to pilots making a large number of laptop calculations... fiddling with various flap settings (1/2/3) while they 'explore the envelope' to see what the max flex is. That's probably NOT a good idea. Why?

Because MORE laptop calculations for a single takeoff, means a GREATER chance of a MISTAKE :eek:

Using OPTIMUM CUTS DOWN the number of calculations... and makes it clear to crew they are not supposed to run calculations at various flap settings to find the max flex.

Considering the minimum financial gains from using a flex value a degree or two greater... clearly running more than one calculation to maximize flex is really a waste of time. Particularly when unnecessary calculations can add significantly to the risk.

Some airlines might be better off using TOGA everywhere... (when even one event costs millions of dollars and (mis)use of flex is often a factor).

Although this is not likely a practical solution in management's eyes, because that airline may be ridiculed in the industry, TOGA everywhere might still be safer. Considering the number of events which would have successful takeoffs, instead of running into the grass at the end of the runway (before finally getting airborne).

Worth thinking about.

[CONF iture]

Considering the minimum financial gains from using a flex value a degree or two greater... clearly running more than one calculation to maximize flex is really a waste of time.
I am a bit confused here : Is the computer handling things that differently from FCOM ???
The main two FCOM procedures are :

Use the conf giving the max flex.
If equivalent flex is obtained, choose the conf giving the lowest speeds.

My assumption is the computer is doing just that ... am I correct ?

So this is not possible to maximize flex more than the computer already did, but as EMIT mentioned, it is sometimes possible for the same flex or one only marginally lower, to reduce the conf and therefore significantly improve the climb performance.

[AirBusted320]

Internal-programming causes the Airbus LPC (Less Paper Cockpit) program, as far as Flap setting goes when OPTIMUM is left as the default, to choose the Flap setting that allows the maximum aircraft weight to be lifted off the runway.

For example, say the actual aircraft weight for takeoff is only 175T. The LPC program will calculate what Flap setting could lift 230T (or perhaps even more) and use the Flap setting for that 230T figure (disregarding the fact that the actual weight plugged into the laptop is much less).

What some pilots will then do, is go into the program and play around with the Flap setting to see if they can get a greater Flex (and use less thrust).

Why they do that, I don't know. Generally not wise, unless choosing a greater Flap setting for other reasons, such as tail clearance to avoid a tailstrike (FCTM contains text guidance that tail clearance is increased with a greater Flap setting - but tailstrike is really not a problem if SOPs are followed, anyway).

Playing with LPC flap settings is against FCOM SOP guidance (at a number of companies) is likely of little benefit (as far as we pilots are concerned) because pilots do not get paid extra for doing additional calculations with different flap settings. In fact, they may actually be punished for playing around with the Flap setting in the LPC... if they make a calculation or other mistake as a result.

If it ain't broke, don't :mad: with it. Safer for the career.

[pool]

Playing with LPC flap settings is against FCOM SOP guidance (at a number of companies) is likely of little benefit (as far as we pilots are concerned) because pilots do not get paid extra for doing additional calculations with different flap settings.

Your statement, allthough not wrong, goes along with the trend in aviation. Personally I find it lacking aviation common sense.
First of all, it is not merely "playing" with flap setting if a pilot choses another setting. As it seems to be against SOP, it shows that the issuers know as little about that matter than the pilots adhering to them religiously.
You rightly pointed out that the computer goes for the setting giving the most weight in relation to the lowest power setting. That's what it is programmed to do, point. The pilot however can take into consideration much more than that. For example surface condition. With an extremely rough surface he can go for a higher flap setting, as to get airborne earlier. If there are no obstacles impeding such a choice, it might be even the safer one. So why would SOP interdict that?? If windshears are predicted, icing or turbulence at low level, the pilot might opt for a lower flap setting as to get better climb performance and better power/drag ratios. If the runway is long enough and no other parameters against such a choice, why shouldn't the pilot be allowed to chose such a setting??
It all comes down to knowledge of aerodynamics and performance of your aircraft, because this raises the overall awareness of what might happen and what the values should look like. If we just punch in some numbers, and we all agree that this can go wrong, and we are only allowed to do exactly this, then we need zillions of crosschecks so it will never go wrong, instead of the good old gut feeling that this just doesn't look right.

Another point. I stated earlier that with the computers at EK, you could chose another flap setting. However you cannot chose a lesser flex/assumed temperature. This forces you to take either the lowest possible (proposed flex) or the highest possible (Max). Again, if some windshears are predicted, a low level inversion etc. etc. and you are light, the max power is not a very astute choice. Neither is the max flex . If you could reduce the flex by 5 to 10 degrees, you would be able to add a healthy and safe margin. The only way to build in a inbetween safer margin, with EKs procedure, would be to increase the weight input into the laptop. But you don't want to do that in the FMS because you'll get wrong trim settings. So there goes the crosscheck with greendot or Vref!!!! So it is very much not SOP, thus very much not recommended. With a editable flex/ass temp, this crosscheck remains fully in charge, as the procedure is consistent with laptop program, FMS and loadsheet, thus perfectly legal and safe.

I would love a more flexible programm, with a more flexible SOP as to get TO performance. It would raise not only the pilots awareness, but just as much the safety level.

[Obie]

Isn't there always someone who wants to rewrite the manual?

A 'wannabe' FOM or FSM?

I think Pool is one of these.

Just apply SOPs, Mate!

They were written by smarter people than you! :ok:

[pool]

Oh dear Obie, or should I write Odie?


A lot of noise and praise for the powers in charge, but no own analysis of the matter.
If any proposal of change or raising a question as to the viability of procedures concerning safety just creates your pathetic " ... follow the SOPs, they're written by smarter people than you ..." , then you have put yourself in a very low corner of aviation professionalism.

Just stay there and I hope we never meet in the real world ...... Mate!!

[JenCluse]

Sorry, Obie, but your non-critical faith in those who write SOPs is entirely misplaced.

I have personally re-written sections of manuals as an FO, and had them published to the manual; challenged Boeing performance parameters and had Oz legislation changed as a result; been asked to write SOPs when I didn't have the skills, and declined; and seen quadruple SOPs for the same machine dictating four different procedures. The classic was a certain US manufacturer stating that on a certain three engine aircraft the statistical possibility of a double engine failure was too miniscule to write a procedure for ! ! Too many times I've bitten my tongue at operational stupidities.

I find your acceptance of everything in print frightening.

Pilots must first of all think. Follow SOPs as best they can when all is going well because it makes the cockpit an easier place to work in, but have a deeper well of knowledge & experience to draw on, hopefully, when the proverbial hits the spinning bits.

Rules are for the guidance of wise men, etc.

[CONF iture]

I also agree with pool : work with your head first !
On top of that, what he mentions is part of the FCOM, and the first thing to do to apply SOP's is to respect the FCOM.

The only way to build in a inbetween safer margin, with EKs procedure, would be to increase the weight input into the laptop.
From the FCOM, one of the two possibilities to improve the takeoff performance is to :
Move towards the left side of the takeoff chart (tailwind) while remaining with the same configuration and looking for the same actual takeoff weight.
This produces a lower flexible temperature and, in general, lower takeoff speeds.
Isn't it possible with the laptop to apply such recommendation ?

[AirBusted320]

Hello Pool. Your comment;

First of all, it is not merely "playing" with flap setting if a pilot choses another setting. As it seems to be against SOP, it shows that the issuers know as little about that matter than the pilots adhering to them religiously.

At operators I have observed, it often IS the pilot playing around to get the max flex (even when greater flex [i.e. less thrust] is not really in his own career best interest).

Really, why bother saving a few flex degrees? A greater flex is not really in your best interests as far as career prospects go (ask the MEL guys). And you will NOT get a medal from the Company.

Because they don't care.

Now, if you want to use a different Flap setting for reasons such as windshear, rough runway etc. Sure. Use common sense. And for the most part, the books will back you up on those scenarios.

Probably not a good idea to make unnecessary calculations just to get a greater flex, that's all. Especially at operators where dual calculations are required. 3x calculations each = 6 calculations (and a lot of extra chatter).

It's up to you of course. But don't be surprised if you wander away from the Optimum setting, and make unnecessary calculations followed by an error.

Might not look good in the ensuing investigation :=

[pool]

@AirBusted320:

I don't want a greater Flex, I want a lesser Flex!!
If you would read my post correctly, I am talking about wanting a bigger safety margin, with a smaller Flex setting, between the Opt (maximum) Flex and Max Thrust ......


@CONF iture:

Your proposition works with tables. With the laptop it is more delicate and not advisable. When inserting a different wind (more tailwind), you might get a different flap setting. You would have to insert/block the flap at the proposed setting and then insert more tailwind. I personally don't like such procedures, again for awareness reasons. Inputs should always be whats really on and happening. Additionally we don't see behind all the programming and might end up with unpleasant results if we try tricking Microsoft!!
Inserting a lesser and deliberately desired Flex would be clear, clean and safe. All other required inputs are correct, I just want a little less assumed temperature as to obtain a little more thrust/safety margin with all inputs on the laptop AND the FMS correct, thus crosschecking possible and correct aswell.

[Busbert]

All the discussion is interesting but...


Where is the aircraft?

What is the final disposition?

Is it being worked on?

Scrap in MEL, repair in TLS?

[derab]

Busbert,

The aircraft is still sitting outside the John Holland hangar in MEL,
looking right at it as I type.

No idea about the other questions though

Derab

[EMIT]

On post #878.

Pool, obviously, different operators have enabled or disabled available features in the interface of the LPC.
In my outfit, you would get a list of all possible thrust settings, from TOGA down to the max FLEX temp that still provided a safe take-off. Of course, standard procedure was to use the maximum amount of FLEX, but it was possible (and not outright prohibited) to FLEX a little less if you deemed that necessary. Of course, for all the FLEX temps, LPC would list the applicable take-off speeds.

One such an option that may be locked out is the mass and balance module - how many of you guys make a manual loadsheet on the LPC? Some people might argue that it would be much to dangerous to do that, loadsheets should be made by an automated process in which check-in data (from scanned boarding cards) are loaded into the loadsheet program without human interference. Funny though that the error than hides in a simple transcription error of 100 tons. I a pilot makes a transcription error in a manual loadsheet and, for instance, makes an error of 100 passengers, then the mass error would only be 8.800 kg (males) or 7.000 kg (females), or even just 1.500 kg for 100 bags. Not quite such a dramatic error.

Airbusted320
The notion that there is risk involved in viewing different flap settings is wrong. All the solutions that the LPC provides, are valid, that means, safe. If there is risk in "calculating" more than once, then what do you do: always use wet runway, so you don't need to redo the numbers when it starts to rain? Never pick up the most recent ATIS, because you might have to redo the numbers? Not accept LMC's, because the numbers have to be reworked? Not accept a change of runways after you have commenced taxiing?
The safe way is, both pilots must calculate a solution independently and compare their outcomes - they must be identical.
As a commander, you could "experiment" as much as you like, not every experiment has to be double checked by the co-pilot. Only the configuration that you are going to use, will have to be double checked. e.g. Yes, I have checked that intersection, performance from there is not adequate, we will take the full runway length. Because wind is light and variable, I have used 5 knots tail component. Compare outcome, slightly different, oh, I see, you have used take-off mass from the flight plan, actual mass is a little heavier, here check it on the loadsheet. That sort of work.

It's good to see some professional discussion again appearing in this thread.

Reason for edit: typo (forgotten word)

[B772]

Busbert and Derab. I understand the A345 has been 'evicted' from the hangar as the space is required by another a/c. There appears to be a problem getting approval to ferry the a/c through Aust airspace enroute to TLS for major repair. The problem being structural integrity in the tail area until Airbus can satisfy the Aust authority.

[Joetom]

This link is worth a look.
.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/AAIR/pdf/AO2009012_Prelim.pdf
.
Nice pics as well.

[jurassicjockey]

Joetom, thanks for the link.
Captain logged 98.9 hours in the last 30 days. :eek:

[mickjoebill]

According to the report, the flight data recorder was dislodged from its support!
I note that the report also states that the FDR ceased functioning just after take off.

I suggest that the FDR should be more securely attached so it can continue to record events post a tail strike or other sudden bump.


mickjoebill

[AirBusted320]

Hello EMIT. You're extrapolating the previous comment (pertaining to unneeded calculations some pilots make in the hope of maximizing Flex...which is unnecessary).

Leaving that aside, to help illustrate the career danger you could put yourself in, with your line of thinking in post #881. Take a look at this. (words are taken from your post);

Board of Inquiry (BOI): "You say you made additional LPC calculations, not called for by SOP. Why was that?"

YOU: "I experiment as much as [I] like, not every experiment has to be double checked by the co-pilot."

BOI: Do you think you messing around with flap setting in LPC might possibly have been factor in why you didn't detect the FO [insert the unrelated departure mistake here]

YOU: "The notion that there is risk involved in viewing different flap settings is wrong."

BOI: "Who says that, Airbus? Where is it written in the FCOM?"

YOU: "Well, no. It's not written anywhere in Company docs. But that's what I think"

BOI: "I see. That's all"

YOU: "Thanks, Bye."

BOI: "By the way, we've been firing people for lesser mistakes than the one you made on departure. Please wait outside."

Starting to see the picture? :{

[groundfloor]

Good post EMIT, Options are the name of the game...Don`t use the word "experiments" rather "options".

Common Sense is not very common any more.

Keep thinking and looking at all those options, not much place for Pavlov eh..:}

[CONF iture]

Absolutely !
Using paper charts, options are regularly reviewed, very convenient, it is done in a glimpse of an eye.
More complicated when runway is contaminated, but that's the exact time it HAS to be done.
Now, if the laptop makes things more tricky, maybe it's not an improvement ...

AirBusted320, there is no "Hidden Danger in LPC Calculations" the way EMIT put it. The Danger comes from NOT challenging through an INDEPENDENT calculation what your partner put in the FMC.

A few knots or degrees of flex mistake is not a big deal, 100 tonnes mistake on your TOW is.

[kenbuck]

Any update on the aircraft. Is it still in Australia ?

[rmm]

The aircraft is still in Melbourne and the damaged area was being worked on yesterday & today. Not major work though. It looks like a patch up job to get it home.

[aussiepax]

So at what FL is it getting over there at ? did they repair the rear pressure bulkhead or not ?

[rmm]

aussiepax,

I'm not sure of those details. I was just driving past the hangar and the doors happened to be open.

[Hempy]

The damage to the bulkhead can only be repaired in Toulouse, the repairs in Melbourne are to make the aircraft structurally sound enough to either fly it back to the factory unpressurised (i.e 10000 or below) or to fly it to the scrapyard (can't be scrapped in-situ). Considering the damage to stringers etc my bet is on the latter.

[gruntyfen]

I guess it depends on how badly the airframe has been stressed. It is possible that the aft fuselage will be replaced at the production join. Otherwise there are so many repair schemes to replace stringers and frames, splice in sections - which may take longer and cost more. All depends on the detailed assessment of the damage and possible options to return to an airworthy condition with costs/schedules before those decisions can be made.

[EMIT]

Hello AirBusted320, post #883

It's been a while, this thread has fallen quiet now that everybody is on to the AF447.

On SOP's: they make it possible to step onboard an aircraft with someone you have never met before and fly away safely and efficiently!

The SOP of a company however, is not the ONLY thruth in aviation. The biggest hassle when moving from one company to another, while going to fly the exact same type of aircraft, is to learn the SOP's of the new company.

When sticking to SOP's religiously, like a real fundamentalist,how would you solve the following problem: my company SOP is to lower the gear on ILS glideslope, while passing 2.000 ft. German law (for noise abatement) requires me to keep the gear up until 1.300 ft. Either I violate SOP or break the law?
How about a pragmatic approach? When I cannot see the airport in a timely way, I have to be stable at 1.000 ft, so I will stay close to my SOP's.
When I can see the airport early enough, I can use the company SOP to be stable at 500 ft (in visual conditions), so I stay close to the German regulations and delay gear extension beyond my SOP rules.

Evaluating options is not a breach of company or Airbus SOP's: the SOP's require that the calculation that is used for the actual take-off is properly (double) checked.

As far as boards go, I do not stick to SOP's out of fear for any board. If I would make an error in the way that you describe in #883, then I have made an error, period. I try not to make errors and I use SOP's as an efficient way to trap errors, whether made by me or by my mate.
The error could just as well be blamed on the cup of coffee that I drank during cockpit preparations. The main thing is, after all the "fooling" around, concentrate on the important items when needed (not only in Melbourne, but also in Madrid, for instance).

[Payscale]

The quick answer is that you must follow the stricter rule. A company's SOP may not invalidate a national air law. The company knows this as they sent you to this airport...

[parabellum]

I heard to today that it is going to be repaired, fairly reliable source, I believe. Possibly have to fly it to Toulouse, unpressurised?

[Orangewing]

Indeed it is. Plane is being flown to toulouse at 10,000ft for repair any day now. Routing via perth and dubai I believe......:bored:

[rmm]

$100m repair bill for damaged Air Emirates A350 | Herald Sun (http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25656948-662,00.html)



EMIRATES will pay an expected $100 million to repair a jet severely damaged in a near disastrous take-off incident at Melbourne Airport.

A team of French pilots and engineers, which has been working on the jet for the past five weeks, plans to ferry the plane at low altitude to Toulouse next week.

* Multimedia interactive: How the near disaster happened
* Earlier report: Air Emirates jet was centimetres from crashing

Once there it will undergo one of the biggest aircraft salvage jobs ever undertaken by Airbus.

The entire tail and last two sections of fuselage will be stripped away to allow engineers to replace a fractured bulkhead, a huge salvage task that has never been done before.

Because of the bulkhead fracture, the cockpit and passenger cabin cannot be pressurised, which will force the ferry crew to fly the plane at no higher than 12,000ft.

Senior pilots have said the low-altitude, four-day flight will consume copious quantities of fuel and cause the pilots to put down in Bali, Singapore, Dubai and Cairo before the final leg along the Mediterranean Sea to France.

"For the crew it will be like flying as it was in the 1950s when passenger jets had to make the journey unpressurised from Australia to Europe," long-haul pilot Capt Ian Woods said.

"Because of the low altitude the four engines will simply guzzle fuel, but there are plenty of places along the route that they can put down," said Capt Woods, a veteran long-haul pilot with more than 20,000 hours in his logbook.

Iain Lachlan, Emirates senior vice-president for engineering, told how getting the plane ready to fly after the March 20 incident where the tail struck the tarmac on take-off, had involved replacing several lower skin panels on the fuselage.

A number of structural frames and stringers used to join sections of the airframe had also been replaced, he said in an email.

"The aircraft is currently scheduled to begin commercial operations in late October or early November after undergoing the required safety checks," he said.

Emirates' decision to repair the four-engine, A350-500 Airbus rather than buy an identical model secondhand for about the same price follows a precedent Qantas set after one of its Boeing 747s over-ran the runway at Don Muang airport at Bangkok in September 1999, where it ended up with an engine ripped off.

[Globaliser]

$100m repair bill for damaged Air Emirates A350
...
Emirates' decision to repair the four-engine, A350-500 Airbus Never mind "one of the biggest aircraft salvage jobs ever undertaken by Airbus".

If they're repairing an EK A350-500, it'll be a veritable miracle.

[kenbuck]

I wonder if the media report is not confusing the facts of the Qantas incident with the proposed repair to the EK A340-500

I doubt that it would cost 100 million to repair, if it is going to be back in service by November.

From memory the Qantas incident cost 100 million to fix and took a very long time to repair in Bangkok. The aircraft should have been written off. But Qantas wanted to maintain its safety record of never loosing a hull.

The Qantas incident was more substancial than an engine been torn off.
Note, Qantas has always referred to this as an incident and not an accident.

[captainsmiffy]

or 'LOSING' a hull? Maybe the hull is 'loose' as in not tight as well - for an intelligent group such as this it is incredible how many do not understand the difference between 'lose' and 'loose'! Drift thread, I know!

[woftam]

I'm with you "smiffy" :ok:
It's amazing how many people don't know the difference. :ugh:
lose definition | Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/lose)
loose definition | Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/loose)
;)

Sorry to continue the drift. :E

[Louis Cypher]

she's on the way to perth right now...scenic flight at 10K!

[WynSock]

Would it not be possible to fly it back to France at normal cruise flight levels - with the crew on O2?

Rather than burning a gazzilllion tonnes of kero at A100?

[James7]

No problem at all

[training wheels]

At 10,000 ft, they'd be OCTA most of the way...

[Finn47]

It seems some unnamed individuals have sent emails to the Australian regulator, blaming the airline´s corporate culture, according to this article:

Emirates pilots speak to regulator | Herald Sun (http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25662023-2862,00.html)

[411A]

No problem at all

Clearly...James7 is unfamiliar with the pressure breathing requirements using oxygen at high altitudes.:rolleyes:

One wonders...is this (James7) an example of the airline pilots of tomorrow?

[Deeday]

I gather that the ferry flight will be conducted with the gear up (the article doesn't mention it); anybody knows? I'm surprised that the range is so severely limited, even at FL100, given that the aircraft will carry no payload, presumably.

[Wiley]

James7, I think there are quite a few here who'd be very interested in hearing whether you still believed it to "no problem at all" after you tried what was suggested (normal cruise levels, unpressurised, crew on oxy) for just one short-ish sector, let alone Melbourne-Toulouse. Even if you managed the oxygen - which would be debatable - I'd just love to see how you handled the cabin temperature.

No problem at all.:(

[fire wall]

Wynsock / James,
Ever heard of nitrogen narcosis aka "the bends" ?

[Airbubba]

Yep, years ago a Connie Kalitta DC-8 crew famously tried to fly unpressurized at FL330 with the inevitable result:

NYC94LA062 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20001206X00986&ntsbno=NYC94LA062&akey=1)

[Louis Cypher]

I gather that the ferry flight will be conducted with the gear up (the article doesn't mention it); anybody knows?

Next hop is PH direct Dubai at 10K, 13+ hours, so I'm guessing it's with the dunlops up.

[Flight Detent]

Hey Wiley...

Just a thought...maybe he meant...unpressurized, but not unairconditioned!

Just cause you're not pressurized doesn't mean you're not airconditioned!

i.e., you can run the packs with the outflow valve(s) fully open!

Just a thought,

Cheers...FD...:)

[Greatbigairplane]

As I understand it, the aircraft does not necessarily have to be over water to safely dump. Most, if not all, of the fuel will simply evaporate when dumped above a couple of thousand feet...

An old, tired Flight Dispatcher...

:)

[James7]

411 pressure breathing is not required untll 40,000 feet, where it is essential. There are many aircraft that fly at 30,000 ft unpressurised.

This book is well worth reading:
Fundamentals of Aerospace Medicine By Jeffrey R. Davis, Robert Johnson, Jan Stepanek.

Firewall : Nitrogen narcosis is an effect on the brain of gaseous nitrogen that occurs to divers who go below 100 FSW, due to the laws of partial pressures.

[JW411]

We used to go to 38,000 ft unpressurized and without pressure breathing (H Type mask). Mind you, we weren't up there for very long for the Vampire ran out of fuel very rapidly!

[cosmodrift]

...involved in accomplishing simple things like having your meal or going to the toilet when you are attached to a mask above 30.000ft...:confused:

[Wiley]

Flight Detent, I'm quite aware that airconditioning would still be available, but I think the packs would be a tad overwhelmed trying to keep a halfway bearable cabin temperature at 30000'+ if unpressurised, particularly on an extended flight. And a trip to the toilet would be 'interesting', to put it mildly.

[Prada]

I see here some misinformation about the subject and would like to correct it. As a diver I know what is going on in human body with pressure and various gases.

Nitrogen narcosis.
It starts normally at the depths of 30-40m of water. With ambient pressures of 4-5 bar. Narcosis can not happen in flight. Never! narcosis is not related to gaseous nitrogen in brain. If gas appear in your brain you are having serious decompression sickness. It is very serious and life threatening1

Decompression sickness.
Its mild forms are called also bends. If ambient pressure drops too fast, either due to too fast cabin decompression or too fast ascent to surface, nitrogen, dissolved in body tissues starts exit tissues and to create tiny nitrogen bubbles in joints, muscles and if problem is serious in your bloodstream. The result is pain in joints, and numbness and skin iching in less serious forms. Bubbles in bloodstream block bloodsupply and if these bubbles block bloodsupply in heart or brain, result is serious. This will certainly incapacitate just anybody.
There is an important factor - older, less fit, more fat and tired persons are much more prone to decompression sickness than younger, fit, and healthy persons. The difference is remarkable. Really.

When flying at 10000m (was it 36000 foot?) then ambient pressure is approx. 0,27 bar, and using pure oxygene is pretty normal as oxygen partial pressure must not drop below 0,18 bar. Below then hypoxia developes. The problem here is that removing nitrogen part and decreasing ambient pressure to 0,27bar would make the normal, dissolved nitrogen exit tissues quite fast. There is no problem if you breath oxygen at sea level. Problem could arise when ambient pressure is decreased as well. As decreased pressure will force nitrogen out of tissues more rapidly.
Thats why some pilots who fly high, need to breath pure oxygen before flight - to reduce nitrogen, dissolved in tissues, to avoid incapacitating deco sickness.
So, with uncompressed cabin, breathing pure oxygen, flying at normal flight levels is possible, only you must reduce your dissolved nitrogen before flight.

Hope that helps with understanding of deco sickness, partial pressures, nitrogen narcosis. Though I've never seen any deco tables for flightcrew :)

[I'm not joking sir]

The aircraft left Dubai for Toulouse this morning, again filed at 10k.

[punkalouver]

Thats why some pilots who fly high, need to breath pure oxygen before flight - to reduce nitrogen, dissolved in tissues, to avoid incapacitating deco sickness.
So, with uncompressed cabin, breathing pure oxygen, flying at normal flight levels is possible, only you must reduce your dissolved nitrogen before flight.



So what would happen if you were at FL310 for example on a cargo flight and had a depressurization and decided to continue on 100% oxygen?

[Capn Bloggs]

So what would happen if you were at FL310 for example on a cargo flight and had a depressurization and decided to continue on 100% oxygen?
You'd have the very real probability of getting the bends, big time. :eek:

[eropuri]

News Limited newspapers in Australia have an interview with the pilot of EK407 today. Sadly the article doesn't appear to be on their website yet (except referenced in an editorial at Emirates hero | Herald Sun (http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25766543-24218,00.html)) but here are some snippets:

Realising the plane had not reached a speed high enough to get airborne, and with the end of the runway reapidly approaching, the pilot and co-pilot were desperately checking controls, trying to find the problem.

At the last second, the pilot engaged a rapid acceleration known as TOGA and lifted the plane off the ground.

...

"I think I reacted on instinct," he said. "I had a feeling that (something) wasn't working, but I couldn't find out what was wrong. I knew I couldn't stop. At that point I knew we just had to go. And we got it off the ground, miraculously."

...

Over a number of interviews the pilot revealed:

He had slept for only 3.5 hours in the 24 hours before the flight taking off on March 20.
The brush with death upset him so badly that he did not sleep for four days.
He and his co-pilot were ordered to resign and handed pre-prepared letters of resignation when they returned to Emirates headquarters.
He was still so horrified by the incident he could not bear to think about it.
He needed to find another job, but did not know if he would every fly again.

[Sue Ridgepipe]

Here is a link to the complete article in today's newspaper:
Emirates pilot in tail strike near-disaster tells his story | Herald Sun (http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25766891-661,00.html)

[zerozol]

Hi all!
I read the Herald articles, amazing...
About the repair of the aircraft: someone mentioned that the Qantas B747 cited in the article was repaired because of their will of having an "incident" and not a "loss"...

Could be true to this EK A345 as well?... Repairing for a nice sack of money just to not to have it written off? Is it really reasonable to do this work? What are you, experts thinking about it?

[barit1]

It's a matter of balancing the cost of repair against the aircraft market value after repair. An A340-500/600 still commands a healthy price, right?

...and methinks Airbus Industrie has a nearly new, only slightly used A340 aft end on hand for a quick job... :}

[ventus45]

Indeed, so we sanction cuts & shuts on aircraft now ?
I knew aviation standards world wide were in decline, but I didn't think they had sunk to such low levels yet.
Thank you for informing us so.
I suppose the authorities will accept this hybrid as a "remanufactured" aircraft ?
I wonder which serial and line numbers will it get - the front end numbers, the back end numbers, or a new "third set" ?

[pool]

Finally the perfect melting-pot!!

The ultimate Etihad of Emirates, to create a Phoenix called Airbus A340-550, front from EK, rear from EY.

Dear Sheikies, did it really have to take two screw-ups to show you the way? :ugh:

[Unregistered09876543]

What article in the herald?

[zerozol]

Hahaha, really, there's an A346 aft part in the cupboard at Airbus' Toulouse facility. :D

"Unregistered", search back a little, in June someone mentioned a Herald-article about the repair of this EK A345.

But, i see a problem in this mix of Etihad and Emirates aircraft parts: A345 is 17.1 m (56 ft 1 in) tall, and A346 is 17.3 m (56 ft 9 in)... i suppose because of the different moment arm - because of the different lenght.
So the 2 aircraft part is not compatible to each other... Or?

Anyway, for a joke, it was really nice, but i should kill it with these inches. :)

[Marooned]

Interesting to contemplate a cut and shunt of a Eithad rear onto an EK head... such a graft wouldn't last long as they would head off in opposite directions before long... Probably be a case of the tail wagging the cockpit anyway.

[Belgianboy]

Remember the B-17 Swooze

[barit1]

...or the B-17 "Liberty Belle" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Belle_(B-17)). I rode in this newly-rebuilt ship four years ago, and noted that every stringer was spliced (very professionally) aft of the waist gun positions. I'm sure that at least two wrecks went into rebuilding this ship.

[fran35780]

As a Long-haul Fligtsr etired Pilot, i think this accident is mainly due to the pilots fatigue :

<< The pilot, a 42-year-old European man, spoke to the Sunday Herald Sun on the condition his identity not be revealed.

HE had slept for only 3 1/2 hours in the 24 hours before the flight taking off on March 20.

Since the accident, several Emirates pilots have spoken to the Sunday Herald Sun, saying fatigue was a major problem with the airline, which is one of the world's largest long-haul carriers
The pilot said it was hard for him to know if he was fatigued or not, but that he had very little sleep when the near-fatal error was made.
"I had the flown the maximum in the last 30 days. One hundred hours in 28 days, it's an Emirates rule," he said.
"I'd flown 99 hours. You can fly 100 hours in a month. There a big difference in long-haul, nights, it's a mix of everything."
He said he had told ATSB investigators he had little sleep in the day before to the 10.30pm flight on Friday, March 20.

This long-haul flying is really, really fatiguing. Really demanding on your body," he said.
"When I did that take-off in Melbourne I had slept 3 1/2 hours in 24 hours.
"You feel sort of normal, abnormal."

He said he had been in Melbourne for 24 hours before his flight.
"That (the Melbourne-Dubai flight) is the most tiring trip I have done in my career.
"You're always out of whack."
The pilot said he and other pilots tried hard not to make any mistakes, but occasionally errors happened.
"It's never on purpose," he said.

He said there had been four pilots in the cockpit - he and the co-pilot, who had been at the controls as the plane taxied along the runway, and two augmenting pilots who were on board because of the length of the 14 1/2 hour flight to Dubai.>>




.

[barit1]

Indeed, so we sanction cuts & shuts on aircraft now ?


Not a new concept.

A 707 (Pan Am? TWA?) had its cockpit explosively removed by Damascus terrorists in the late 60s. About the same time a BOAC/BA 707 was nearly destroyed by an engine fire at LHR. Those clever engineers snipped off the cockpit of the latter and spliced it to the fuselage of the former. I think it continued in service until the 707 fleet was retired.

The nose section of G-ARWE was salvaged, and used on a Boeing 707-331B, TWA's N28714, [1] c/n 18408. [6] The recipient aircraft was previously registered N779TW, which had been hijacked on a flight from Rome to Athens . Its cockpit had been destroyed by a bomb at Damascus , Syria on 29 August 1968 . The aircraft was sold to Pan Am as N706PA.

[HarryMann]

About the same time a BOAC/BA 707 was nearly destroyed by an engine fire at LHR.

Remember that, very tragic, I think one of the cabin crew received a George Cross (posthumous) as she went back into the fire after having helped others out.

A terribly frightening circuit and approach but they got it down and stopped OK then wind direction became a problem as well as the slides twisting and burning :sad:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:G-ARWE-1.jpghttp://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/3/34/G-ARWE-1.jpg/180px-G-ARWE-1.jpg << That's the engine falling off.

The five people killed in the accident were Flight attendant Jane Harrison (the only George Cross awarded in peacetime); an elderly wheelchair bound woman; a widowed woman on her way to visit her brothers; an Australian teacher; and an eight year old girl who was emigrating to Perth with her family.[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BOAC_Flight_712#cite_note-Mag-0)

The Chief Flight attendant, Neville Davis Gordon received the British Empire Medal. (4 pax lost out of 116)

The aircraft involved in the accident was a Boeing 707-465 registered G-ARWE (manufacturers serial number 18373, Boeing line number 302).

[zerozol]

Hi!
Days-weeks ago there was an idea here to take Etihad's scrapped A340-600's tail to this Emirates A340-500...:)
Although it was definately a humour-rumour, I suppose this couldn't be made indeed. :) Look at this:

The remains of the Airbus A340-600 (msn 856) written off before delivery to Etihad on Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/digitalairliners/2950140830/)

A340-642 MSN0856 F-WWCJ [EY] remains on Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/a380spotter/3375258993/in/set-72157615644884161)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/digitalairliners/2950140830/
http://www.flickr.com/photos/digitalairliners/2950140830/

[thegypsy]

HarryMann re that B707 at LHR. I seem to recall the F/E and/or Pilot failed to pull the fire handle resulting in fuel feeding the fire?

I only recall this vaguely as it came up for discussion during my B707 conversion. The engine dropped of near Epsom I think?

[Georgeablelovehowindia]

If you click on [1] on in HarryMann's posting above, it will lead you to a comprehensive and reasonably accurate description of events that day.

Just to avoid thread drift. :ok:

[cielazur]

Emirates near-miss vanished on radar at Melbourne | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,28124,26061798-23349,00.html)

What really happened - from the cockpit:
The devil is in the data | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26056145-28737,00.html)

[Super VC-10]

Re BOAC flight 712, Susan Ottaway's book is highly recommended reading. :ok:

[cessnapuppy]

The Emirates Airbus contained a laptop that calculated take-off speeds based on the manual input from the pilots of various parameters including take-off weight, temperature, air pressure and wind. The pilot's calculations are then checked by the captain as part of what Emirates says is a four-part process of cross-checks.

Somehow, during the preflight calculations, one of the Emirates pilots -- it's unclear who -- entered the aircraft's weight as being 262 tonnes when in fact it was 362 tonnes.

But a colleague, whose identity is also unclear, failed to pick up the mistake during the cross-checks.

This 100-tonne difference was the equivalent to the aircraft having an extra 20 African elephants on board, or a fully grown adult blue whale.

Thats the big flaw in the system, entering an end product number vs entering the values that went into it - there is no way of validating the data.
In other words, if the spreadsheet had them enter
fuel load taken on (noting the current fuel already on board)
number/weight of passengers
weight of luggage freight
THEN the manually calculated take-off weight

The system would then have a way of self-validating it's inputs. Its easy to say the pilots should have caught the error, but their impaired state led to the error in the first place! And what we know of human confirmation-bias also tells us that if you use the same evaluation process twice, you'll tend to get the same results...twice!

[limelight]

It is IT 101 to design a spreadsheet that can do the calcs, but the addition of some simple questions would have averted this error.

How about Aircraft type, sector time, no of passengers. These three components would give a weight range for the flight, anything put into the calculation from that point that was not within spec should have generated an error.

Very very simple.

Anyone got an overview of the 'program'?

[Shingles]

At in the air - news, views and tips for frequent travellers (http://insidetraveller.co.uk/blog) there is comment on how Emirates has shot itself in the foot over trying to manage this story."This is where it becomes very difficult for Emirates. The original story was “news” in Australia for a day or two but would have been unlikely to get outside the country. However, Emirates felt it necessary to produce a detailed rebuttal of the story – and this was sent all round the world and appeared in many publications that would never have bothered with the original."

How imminent is the Australian report on the incident?

[Trackmaster]

What log is the publisher of "inside Traveller" hiding under?
Does this person seriously believe that news of such an incident would be "unlikely to get outside the country"
Why, because Orstraaleea is so far away???....and they don't have this modern technology stuff way down there.
Yes, Emirates did stuff up...but I would say Inside Traveller just stuffed up their credibility.
And the report is out...go back in the thread

[Pilotti]

Hello,

system has a "built-in" cross-cheking.. if it is used. After entering data from the load sheet to MCDU's INIT-B page check out the trip and extra fuel calculated by the system and compare them with the values you have in the OFP. Then make performance calculations with laptop and check clean speed ("Green dot") calculated by the laptop against the one on PERF-page. As clean speed is only function of a/c mass you will spot errors in no time.

[sydflyboi]

Hi there not sure if you have already seen the prelim report but the ATSB here in Australia released some time ago a report regading the incident which if you havent seen has some intersting pictures and the prelim findings

[Shingles]

I really think Trackmaster has not understood my comment - I apologise for not being clearer.

I was simply echoing the point made in the blog that Emirates' professional and thorough rebutal to the points raised in the preliminary enquiry of this incident were in a sense counterproductive because they reignited to a wider audience a story that happened far far away (Orstraaleea) some some time ago - in fact the world had moved and they hadn't noticed.

This a problem for new managers everywhere, but I for one take some comfort in the thought that perhaps that the old saw "all publicity is good publicity" does not actually hold up in all instances.

And has the final report been released? I've googled but can find nothing - then I'm not an expert.

[limelight]

This sounds awfully like a half baked program. If you use proper IT systems, you write a 'program' with significant cross checking.

A spreadsheet is not a program, full stop. It can be altered and does not have adequate cross referencing. This is not to say what is used, nothing has been forthcoming from EK as yet.

Anyone got a sample?

[yoyonow]

Limelight,

My God you are absolutely right. 48 pages and 948 posts just to discover the spread sheet a few of the boys put together one night after a few too many at Scarlets just isn't up to the job......

Rest assured, the program is as good as any. The SOP, if followed, was pretty robust but has been updated and improved to placate the authorities.

The human interface can screw up any system given the right set of circumstances.

[barit1]

A spreadsheet is not a program, full stop. It can be altered and does not have adequate cross referencing.

Well, it IS a program, but it's not a STABLE program.

I used to have to do SQA (software quality assurance) on engine performance programs that had far less safety implications than EK's. And after my programs were signed off, they were compiled into 1's and 0's as a bulletproof executable routine.

Can't believe that isn't a "best practices" in the industry. :uhoh:

[kenbuck]

Does any one know ths status of the aircraft repair and when it is expected to fly again.

Also what happened to the pilots who were forced to resign. Have they being able to gain employment?

[zerozol]

For your first question i found answer only in german:
aero.de - Luftfahrt-Nachrichten und -Community (http://www.aero.de/news/Emirates-A340-500-soll-ab-November-wieder-fliegen.html)

It's a news from August, and it says the aircraft will be flying from November, after Sections 18 and 19 were changed in its hull.

About the pilots i don't know anything...

[Shangaan]

The aircraft in question A6-ERG will be ferried back to Dubai from Toulouse
on the 24 November 2009 to join the fleet again.

[High 6]

As far as the performance software used for these calculations I believe it is the fully certified Airbus Flight Operations Virtual Environment (FOVE) software that is being used by most Airbus operators, including EK.

The system requires the pilot to select a specific airport and runway, input environmental data and TOW from which the speeds are then calculated. The TOW is usually derived independently from the FMS which works this out from the ZFW and Block fuel input made by the pilot. However, if an error is made in entering one of these figures into the FMS then the same problem would occur, an incorrect TOW would be derived from the FMS and input to the FOVE, resulting in incorrect speeds . It seems that when the aircraft is static on the ground, there is no way the aircraft can know it's own weight apart from pilot input. The last check is done on receipt of the load sheet when the take off weight can be verified, but history shows that this check has failed in the past as well.

The true weight only becomes apparent when the operation becomes dynamic and actual physics takes over. If Lift does not exceed Weight iregardless of what was entered in the computer, a/c does not fly.... pretty basic!! In other cases where similar but smaller errors were made, the problem became evident after lift off and V2 was inside VLS, but above Vs1g allowing a/c to get airborne and basically accelerate in ground effect to a safe flying speed.

Still room for development in this critical area of the operation and I believe the onus lies with the manufacturers and not with operators trying to develop clever SOP's to double and triple check figures. etc... The aircraft should be able to do it's own independent "weigh in" somehow and tell the pilots at door closure or first engine start if their entered figures are within a given tolerance allowing for safe flight.

[iflytb20]

Does any one know ths status of the aircraft repair and when it is expected to fly again.Found this pic online
Copyright
http://www.skyliner-aviation.de/photos/A6ERG.jpg

[White Knight]

Well I'm pleased to see the old girl return to the fleet:ok:

[tailstrikecharles]

Still room for development in this critical area of the operation and I believe the onus lies with the manufacturers and not with operators trying to develop clever SOP's to double and triple check figures. etc... The aircraft should be able to do it's own independent "weigh in" somehow and tell the pilots at door closure or first engine start if their entered figures are within a given tolerance allowing for safe flight.

Indeed. The aircraft 'knows' how much thrust it is getting from the engines and the speed. It should calculate all it needs before even approaching V1 speeds

[zerozol]

Major repairs involving the pressure bulkhead of any aircraft, always send a shiver up my spine. Although lessons will have been learnt (one hopes) and that Airbus themselves are handling said repairs - one is always reminded of the Japan airlines / Air China incidients.

JAL and China Airlines were only reparations, as long as this Emirates A345 saw a complete change of sections 18 and 19, as you can see on the picture linked by iflytb20, and in the article i mentioned above! A big difference. :)

[barit1]

The aircraft 'knows' how much thrust it is getting from the engines and the speed. It should calculate all it needs before even approaching V1 speeds

Posts #445 & 446 in this thread address the idea of assessing takeoff performance early on by use of accelerometers (already onboard in IRS). It's also been discussed elsewhere in PpRuNe. This would cover a multitude of sins - incorrect thrust set thru instrumentation errors, dragging brakes, etc.

It's important to note, though, that ATM (Flex) thrust provides margin built into the system. When you set thrust equivalent to (e.g.) a 48C ambient, the airplane wing is flying in a much cooler air mass; and so the GS (TAS) is lower than if it were 48C outside. So Flex takeoffs have plenty of margin if done correctly.

[Tediek]

according to the article they flew the plane back on a max alt. of 10000-12000ft. that must have been a long flight, as they were flying a much lower speed. does anybody know the route they were following and some more details on the flight time, speeds etc...:confused:

[barit1]

I would not be surprised if at that altitude/IAS etc., better specific range can be had by shutting down two engines at TOC. :cool:

(Or perhaps after burning off some fuel...)

[Manu.h]

does anybody know the route they were following and some more details on the flight time, speeds etc...

Hello,
I read that the A340's route was: Melbourne - Perth - Dubai - Toulouse. I don't have any ideas about the flight time and the speed.

Manu

[gate4]

A6-ERG operating Brisbane-Auckland-Brisbane as EK434/435 today.

[zerozol]

Yes, A6-ERG is back in service, apparently since 1st December.
aero.de - Luftfahrt-Nachrichten und -Community (http://www.aero.de/news-9435/ATSB-fuehrt-nach-Tailstrike-ergaenzende-Sicherheitsstudie-durch.html)

Plus in the link: ATSB proposes studies about Flight Performance Planning, examining the incidents similar to this.