EK407 Tailstrike @ ML

[Andu]

bluewater, can I suggest you add your post to the "You can tell when you've been in the Middle East too long..." thread on jet blast? After some years in the desert, I'm as paranoid as the next bloke about my (expat) lords and masters, but I think you've been reading too many Robert Ludlum novels, mate.

[45989]

Uncle Fred

Be very careful, common sense is NOT allowed anymore.

The SOP/Commitee will come up with a LEGALLY waterproof solution for every scenario.

They will not be there on the day when it happens though, and won't be seen for dust when the solids hit the fan.

Btw I use pretty much the same rule of thumb

[Nicholas49]

bluewater - having read your post I wanted to ask you what you thought about the Twin Towers conspiracy documentary?

[disillusionedek]

Using the 1230Z YMML METAR from post #16, the weights from post #103 and the Airbus laptop performance figures (FOVE) the approximate computed optimum take off performance probably should have looked something like this;

363,000 KG TOW V1 154 V2 163 VR 173 FLAPS 3 FLEX TEMP 40C

If an input of 263,000 KG TOW was made the laptop would have spat out the following instead;

263.000 KG TOW V1 144 V2 147 VR 154 FLAPS 1 FLEX TEMP 73C

and if the ZFW of 227,000 KG had been entered as the TOW you would get

227.000 KG TOW V1 142 V2 142 VR 150 FLAPS 3 FLEX TEMP 74C

FOVE shows the take off run for both 363T and 263T as in the order of 3400-3550M where as 227T would be a take off run of only 2650M.

Perhaps some of you rocket scientists out there know the difference in thrust between Flex 40 and Flex 73. All I know is it is going to be significant! I haven’t flown one for a while, but if I recall correctly, Max Flex is a 40% reduction in thrust on the A345.

If it was an input error, it is easy to see that if you are planned to be down near the end of the runway anyway and then you add 100T, remove 10-20% of the thrust and rotate 15-20 knots early, the result is not going to be a good one.

Anyway, thank goodness everyone is alive to talk about it.

[pool]

Let's for a moment go along with the situation that a wrong figure was set up in the box and not picked up (for this incident or others that happened).

What can lead to such errors?

1. Some guys state this should have been picked up by "feeling" the speeds can't be right for such a weight. With the optimizing on computers for many different flap/weight/reduced-thrust settings, this becomes very difficult. With former aircraft it was simple: Less flaps -> higher speeds. Today, and especially with Airbus, this simple equation no longer applies. How many times was I surprised when changing the figures (LMC),by what kind of weird different speeds resulted.
Solution: Maybe a more linear and logic function would help us.

2. Second reason is overload and overcrowding of the cockpit during preparation, leading to serious distraction. It is a utterly silly EK characteristic, that the augmenting crew (2 in this incident) have NO seats allocated to them in the cabin. They are doomed to go to the torpedo tube (lie down only!!), situated in the very remote back of the aircraft when airborne. For the whole ground time and TO/Ldg, however they will be confined to sit in your back. Now having the loadmaster, mechanic, purser, company representative already trying to bring in their priorities, the poor two sods only block space and bring in distraction. As much as I like 4 more eyes during T/O, Ldg or emergencies (which is NOT possible inflight with the crap EK set up!! because they are stuck in the back!!), as much do I like a calm cockpit during preparation and all kinds of calculations, so as to NOT screw up these things.
Solution: Maybe EK should go over their management induced bad set-up.

3. Time for preparation is another factor. As EK does not provide its crew with company laptops, nor provides them as a standard with internet access (home or abroad), this leads to receiving the figures, notams, WX etc. and access to charts upon arrival on the aircraft only. We all know that the stress only starts then. A thorough preparation going through all that stuff might be easily disturbed by too many sods hanging around. Sending the flight info to the hotel would allow studying during transport, as the really cheap variant, but not even this is done by EK.
There is a lot of room for improvement there, but, halas, it all costs some Dirhams and they are unfortunately spent on more VPs, but not on operational improvements.

[thefoxandfirkin]

Bluewater,

Great conspiracy - almost ranks next to the one about the lunar landings!

EK can and will do many things to protect its image but I can't see how they can make one individual do something which will potentially give him 5 + years in jail for plus a top spot on the terrorist watch list for life!

Just think about it for a mo.. the SVP (EK conspirancy department) calls you in for tea and biscuits ("right billy, its like this.... we need you to..." ). Get real, the two events are unconnected!!

But hey that's why its a rumours network and makes interesting reading next to v speed and load weight theories.

For fox sake getting me a firkin beer :ok:

[Malcom]

Can't the manufacturers just fit a little wheel at the back to protect the structure, then we wouldnt have 7 pages of contradictory and irrelevant drivel?:zzz:

[bluewater]

bluewater, can I suggest you add your post to the "You can tell when you've been in the Middle East too long..." thread on jet blast? After some years in the desert, I'm as paranoid as the next bloke about my (expat) lords and masters, but I think you've been reading too many Robert Ludlum novels, mate.

Andu – affirmative, been around ME and other more clandestine areas in my 20+ aviation years, which reaffirms my “speculation”. As an aside, occasionally get the MRS to slip into an abaya for our evening distraction, which makes me think (and you I suspect) the ETD is not too far-away! PS. Who’s Robert Ludlum?

bluewater - having read your post I wanted to ask you what you thought about the Twin Towers conspiracy documentary?

Nicholas49 – I think you know my answer to that. Curiously, we just had an interesting topical conversation over dinner on my latest night stop, over exactly that. Worthy of note, the Americans recently opened there biggest Embassy (outside of the US) in IRAQ, being somewhat self-evident that there’s going to be a fairly sizable commitment to Iraq by the U.S. government in all forms, for several years, 21 buildings on 104 acres. I am diverging from topic at hand and Andu, yourself and foxandfirkin will want me locked up.

thefoxandfirkin – heaven forbid, not suggesting for a minute there was any “tea and bikies” and they gave the poor bloke a brief! That would be ranked next to the lunar landing!

BTW – its only a theory...a bloody good one:D

PS. "You can tell when you've been in the Middle East too long when you know which end of swarma to unwrap.

Best of luck to the crew. Whatever caused the predicament, it seems they solved it very well.

[Phantom Driver]

Pool:
Let's for a moment go along with the situation that a wrong figure was set up in the box and not picked up (for this incident or others that happened).

What can lead to such errors?

2. Second reason is overload and overcrowding of the cockpit during preparation, leading to serious distraction. Now having the loadmaster, mechanic, purser, company representative already trying to bring in their priorities, the poor two sods only block space and bring in distraction. As much as I like 4 more eyes during T/O, Ldg or emergencies (which is NOT possible inflight with the crap EK set up!! because they are stuck in the back!!), as much do I like a calm cockpit during preparation and all kinds of calculations, so as to NOT screw up these things.

3. Time for preparation is another factor. As EK does not provide its crew with company laptops, nor provides them as a standard with internet access (home or abroad), this leads to receiving the figures, notams, WX etc. and access to charts upon arrival on the aircraft only. We all know that the stress only starts then. A thorough preparation going through all that stuff might be easily disturbed by too many sods hanging around. Sending the flight info to the hotel would allow studying during transport, as the really cheap variant, but not even this is done by EK.

Are you guys not able to access the (Lido?) flt plan in the hotel room prior to departure ?;( assuming room inet is free -(company agreement ) and working ok-not always the case these days).

In my outfit, the CFP is available for viewing online generally 3 hours before departure, (with a cross check of the latest plan # once on board )and I try to make a point of having a look if possible (long haul ) before leaving the room, also same at home; (15 minutes before pick up is good enough), purely to avoid the pitfalls of which you speak--predeparture mayhem in the cockpit as you try to prepare for the flight.

The calm of the room is the place to digest info about rtes/loads/notams/intams/mel/fueluplifts/wx etc. etc. etc. Once on board, the old adage of "too many cooks spoil the broth" still holds true.Quite easy to miss things with the inevitable distractions.
http://static.pprune.org/images/buttons/reply_small.gif (http://www.pprune.org/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=4813214&noquote=1)

[ima birdbrain]

Pool raises valid points regarding flight deck management in Emirates and over crowding on the Flight Deck .

Having Access to the Lido Flight plan and looking at this either at home or in the hotel makes my life easier and simplifies briefing, yeah I know its a bugger you might have to fork out for the Internet connection.

I don't like the concept where EK have us operating 3 very different Aircraft Types A330-200 then the A340-300 and A340-500. Operationally Emirates view this as only 2 different types for currency purposes. That is you could be checked out on the A345 however as long as you operate the A343 for currency purposes(very different machine than the 345) you are deemed to be current on the both and vice / verse . I remember it took me a while to feel comfortable with the 345 for the very reason that I hardly flew it yet was deemed current as I had flown the A343 !

[SOPS]

just to make something clear...EK flight plans/notams/WX are available to crew (about 3 hours before depature)..anywhere in the world. At some EK hotels computers are avaiable to log in and down load, at others internet is free but requires a crew member to have a laptop...at others there is no free access at all........

having said that....if you dont get too carried away about airports you will never go to..airport briefing is ok (standby for incoming)

[Jetset320]

Some valid points raised by Pool.

The amount of paperwork we need to check prior to a flight makes the check-in time (usually 1hr), hardly viable.

When the going is good, it's fine (just about). However with just one distraction, pilots then have to make up the time somehow. And that is when corners are cut....... or gross errors not noticed.

[Capt Groper]

The pre departure preperation, if MANAGED well can work effectively and be incorporated as a third safety check.

For example, get sombody else (support F/O) to do the LPC check too with the other LPC and compare results with the operating F/O. Ask the aug. CA to check the Log Book prior to other duties. etc.

The distractions will always be there, just manage them well.

I like the wheel idea!!:ok:

[White Knight]

Groper- it's a TWO CREW aeroplane!!!!! The augment F/O isn't there to check YOUR LPC calculations.. The augment crew is there so that you can TAKE INFLIGHT REST..

How the hell do you cope on a two crew Doha flight mate????????

The whole problem is that there are TOO MANY PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHTDECK, and that includes THE AUGMENTING CREW.....

I ALWAYS tell them to stay out of the flightdeck until cabin doors close for departure - I DON"T WANT their "HELP" and I DON"T NEED it:ugh::ugh: Do not even touch the laptop!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Birdbrain - I've found it quite easy operating 3 different types over the last 5 years or however long EK have had 332,343 and 345.. What's the problem you have 'cos I don't understand it:confused:

[Capt Claret]

Slight thread driftWhen the going is good, it's fine (just about). However with just one distraction, pilots then have to make up the time somehow. And that is when corners are cut....... or gross errors not noticed.

And here is where we pilots make the rod for our backs. So time conscious, and proud of being able to make an on-time departure, we find a way to do more and more in the allotted time, proving to our employers that the job can be done with less and less time. We should run late when conditions contrive to delay normal preparation and just accept the appropriate delay code. :ugh:

[oxenos]

Malcom is a genius. All these years of messing around with drivel like Perf. A, TORA, headwind component, air density etc. and it turns out we can dispense with it all if only the manufacturers would put a little wheel at the back.

[Dysag]

Malcom is only 40 years too late:

http://www.concordesst.com/model101/taster/sd16.jpg

[iceman50]

White Knight

Great CRM and Command Skills "MATE" - using all the valuable assets you have to assist in a safe departure.:ugh::ugh:

Seems you are the ONE with the problem if you cannot work with more crew, can't you multi task?

Thank goodness my company encourages assistance where possible from the "heavy" crew.

[derab]

I could be mistaken, but A6-ERG seems to be missing from Melbourne airport this morning (26mar)?
Has it been moved elsewhere during the night?
I can't see it anywhere over at the John holland hanger or the cargo apron.

[Knackerbag]

No, I think A6-ERG left Melbourne 2 hours after the incident and flew the Tech Crew back home..... I think you'll find that's what happened... ;)

[paulg]

I see Knackerbag. I guess you were on it. Or maybe you are on something else altogether. :{

[SGT Schulz]

where are the pics of the tracks and damaged loc ant???

[RAD_ALT_ALIVE]

Oh Knackers, I had a good belly laugh over that! I guess PaulG didn't read the entire thread by his reaction.

As for White Knight...

I nearly had a good chuck over your assertions. If you're truly serious about what you wrote, then I have to agree with Iceman that you've just espoused the worst possible CRM edict that I've ever had the misfortune to read.

You must be a delight to work with; sharing, open, a real mentor...

NOT!!

I've now worked for a couple companies who would string you up if you were ever foolish enough to verbalise that drivel in front of other pilots.:uhoh:

[paulg]

Rad_Alt _Alive. Yes I have read every post on this thread. I was one of the ones who got sucked in by the very early rumour that the crew had departed post haste for Dubai. I did appreciate the joke too.
Paul

[pool]

To make it clear:
EK has a LIDO viewer and access to flight plan on the net. BUT, ... you need your own laptop, where their self elected industry standard (for crew rest comparison), the newbees down south, have this industry standard, providing laptops with all capabilities, but suddenly this is no standard anymore ..... Not a big deal you might say, almost agreed.
Then you need to buy the internet access in about 50% of hotels. Again, not a big deal, just some 100dhs a day. Additionally in most hotels where you really appreciate early info, the connection is painfully, if not prohibitively slow. As a third, where you really like early info (ULR, ex. JFK) due to early pick-up and volume, you can be almost assured the flpl + notam is not yet loaded when you have to leave.

Overcrowding of the cockpit cannot be solved by just sending out the collegues. Where do they go? Pax are boarding and galleys busy. It's not only them, but just as much their crewbags that block. Outside check ok, but this happens early and takes 10'. It's when all comes together towards the last 10': actual ZFW, fuel calc, info to mechanic, to station, TO-calculations, new ATIS, rwy change, gathering pre-dep-clrc etc. etc. Allthough I do not agree with the tone of lovely White Knight, he's right about having to do that stuff yourself together with your FO/CAPT. There is a distinct routine that is established with a TWO man cockpit, not three or four, so at this stage they should be able to sit on a nice seat, away from the cockpit, not in anyones way (they should also be able to sit on a 7 hour rest, and not just forced to lie flat ... but that's another beautiful EK story).
For lookout and radio back-up monitoring they are great in the cockpit, but it stops quite there, otherwisew they distract.

I think most pilots know how to manage distractions well - (thanks for this heads-up, I wouldn't have thought of it ... :ugh:) - until the distractions distract them. I'd rather have them out than having to manage them, the unforseen will pop up just as much.

[High 6]

If I may add my two dirhams worth to the aircraft weight issue...

With the current airfield technology available, why can't they design weighing pads at the parking stands that will give an aircraft's weight dynamically to within a given acceptable tolerance e.g (+/- 1000kgs) and displayed on a board somewhere that all can see.

This would be used only as a reference weight for load masters and aircrew, the load sheet would still remain the legal dispatch document, but at least the risk of a gross error can be greatly mitigated.

I believe this is used on some helicopters and biz jet operations, although those systems are portable, similar to the lift/pushback tugs. Of course trucks have been using the drive on system for years for road tax purposes, why can't we use the same to make aviation safer?

As for the other ongoing discussion on the "EK ETD - 15 mins window of controlled chaos" , this is certainly an area that could be better managed, having been subjected to it for the 15 yrs.

But for sure, the assistance of the other relief crew members is an added bonus and definitely not a hinderance. I do not agree with the ramblings to the contrary on this forum. H6

[Dropp the Pilot]

You will never, ever see a real time weight for any flight.

The primary reason for that will be that if you sign off on any loadsheet which says you are departing at your RTOW you are probably at least ten tons over that weight in truth.

Reason:

-unrealistic average weights for passengers
-hilariously unrealistic weights for carry on bags. I did a flight to Toronto a little while back and the queue of pax lined up in the jetway bent almost double under the weight of their carry-ons looked like a 19th century expedition to discover the source of the Nile. If I had stood in front of them with cheroot and a pith helmet we could have had a tableau vivant.

[Capt Groper]

Thank you, merci ICEMAN50 and Trimotor

You took the words right out of my mouth, cannot be bothered answering WhiteKnight as he missed seeing the forest for the trees.

Cheers:ok:

[Wiley]

-hilariously unrealistic weights for carry on bags.Amen to that.

[Fly_by_wire]

Bring On The Photos!!!

[Obie]

Well, I gotta tell ya, Trimotor and Groper...

you're both a couple of amateurs compared to White Knight...

who's obvious experience makes you both look like a couple of cowboys!

Get real!...get some experience! :ok:

And then come back and talk to the Pro's!! :ok:

Oh! and by the way "iceman"...

...'bout time you started to run the show yourself, don't you think?

And not rely on others to do what you're paid to do? :ok::ok:

[What-ho Squiffy!]

Why so tough on White Knight?

What he's saying actually makes sense. If it takes two crew to run the aircraft, any more is just a pain in the @rse.

If two crew can't do things in time, then operations need to change.

Granted the delivery could have been better, and I have to say White Knight - you came across as a pit of a w@nker with your last comment...

[deltayankee]

With the current airfield technology available, why can't they design weighing pads at the parking stands that will give an aircraft's weight dynamically to within a given acceptable tolerance e.g (+/- 1000kgs) and displayed on a board somewhere that all can see.

Oh no, not again. This is one of those topics that comes up eventually after every tailstrike. Do a quick search and you'll find plenty of threads that answer this question. Quick answer: who is going to pay for it and why?

[dustyprops]

White Knight....WOW, just about sums up your rant really.

We went to very different schools on common decency and respect towards others I think. If a fellow pilot who is a necessary part of the crew wants to look at 'the numbers' before you go or has some input on what's about to take place, then what's wrong with that, as long as it's at an appropriate time. "Can't we all just get along?"

[Obie]

...err!... I think you might actually be "The W@nker", Squiffy...

...when one considers your profile!! :ok::ok:

And for you Props...you wanna start showing some some "command potential"?

[What-ho Squiffy!]

Thanks Obie.

And remember, don't throw stones in glass houses... "big one"!:D

[Obie]

"Don't throw stones in glass houses"...

Would you like to decipher that for me, Squiffy? :ok::

[paulg]

Hey guys. Back off a bit. What about getting back to the thread.:=

[CEJM]

Interesting opinion of your augmented crew you have, White Knight.

If you got the aug. pilots in the flightdeck does it really hurt (apart from your ego) to have them check the figures?

Earlier on this thread somebody owed up to inserting the wrong figures into the box, This got picked up by the AUG. F/O!!! Who in that case might have saved an embarrasing incident or dare I say an accident with or without loss of life.

Manage your resources carefully, one day they might save your arse.

[What-ho Squiffy!]

Good call paulg.

Suitably castigated!:oh:

[badairsucker]

White Knight,


Remind me never to fly with you when you are operating.

3 or 4 pair of ears and eyes are better than two. Your CRM is appalling.:ugh::ugh:

[easyduzzit]

SO...... now that the "boys" are hopefully done with their immature little scrap...
what nos & figures did the EK407crew, unfortunately, punch into the MCDU for TOW & flex T.O. values???

[woodja51]

I like flying with the extra crew personally but ( and apart from his tone level and style which was c@#p) White Knight has a small point.

I am of the (personal) opinion that having extra crew on the flight deck is a double edged sword.

yeah - great to help do a bit of the work etc. but I anecdotally believe that sometimes it may not add to safety.

I like the idea of the three pilot crew ( 1 skipper /2 f/o's) as the delineation of command is clear. Sometimes too many cooks etc etc.

This is a little like having two QFI's in the one aircraft - there used to be silly incidents as command was a little blurred sometimes.

Personally , when I am augmenting I offer to do what ever the other captain wants but don't volunteer for anything specifically.

I certainly don't wear a head set normally on take off or interfere on arrival.

Reason - they are good enough to operate by themselves ( of course I will ask if they want help and keep my head out just in case there is something really obvious) but if you are not on the head set etc you cant interfere, they don't assume you will help and when /if it goes south you cannot be held to blame ( assuming it is not fatal of course).

Might be seen as a cop out but I give the two guys in the operating seat the benefit of the doubt that they can do the job they are trained for. Well .... most of the time but EKs recruitment and training lately seems to have missed something but we are all human!!

tail wheel - hmmm like that idea...

So ... back to the thread... what were the numbers in the box... and how small was the yellow trend arrow on take off... just my 2 cents. And the guys were not new to the jet so must be more to it..perhaps busy getting wound up about the change in Ops policy or discussing the FG1 with the big ta ta'S... at least that would be a reason!!!

dont mean to get anyone off side - all is tongue in cheek and meant in a nice tone and style as if we were at a bar chatting over a pint...you know ... civil!!!

[Hempy]

ask Al Haynes what he thinks of aug. crew ;)

[cw6]

It seems to me that this has similarities with the MK Halifax disaster. Let me be clear and explain.
As stated and , as I understand it the rotation was late and climb out speed "slow".
This is not exactly what happened in Halifax , but there are lessons to be learnt and similarities between the facts of MKJ and what appears to be a thread here.

The Halifax incident sighted in the report as wrong take of power set and (it was the same take off power as the previous , almost empty ferry sector from North of New York , Bradley I think from memory).
So if the wrong take off figures were calculated, based on unreliable, unrealistic weights, then it would seem that the end of the run way arrived sooner than expected, causing the over rotation and a tail strike.
MK's senior mangement and again from memeory the flight safety officer and ops Director were approached by Cranfeild to try and design / understand a method of speed calculation verses runway length etc to prevent this from happeneing again. Whether or not this is ongoing i dont know, but there was an effort to improve and reduce this from happening again.

Not the same as weighing the aircraft on stand but with the same end result in mind.

MK Halifax was caused as we who were involved know by the fatigue and lack of knowledge on the BLT and the latent faults that laid within it. Not wishing to bang on the same drum that was beat for so long , post Halifax but many of the PPruner's balmmed the MK culture for dangerous practice and all the rest of the rubbish that was going around at the time and many blamed Mike Kruger for all sorts of things, many he could be held accountable for, along with 70 % of every other airline owner COO /CEO. But who now will critisise the safety and procedures of EK, not many I would imagine. But you see , and I know hindsight is a wonderful thing, Mike Thorneycroft and his crew were in exactly the same position as the EK crew, only there was an obsticle at the end of the runway (a 10 foot high burm), otherwise they would be here today.

Lessons to be learnt, yes i think so. Dont critisise untill the final incident reports are out.
Goes with out saying that the EK crew did well and got the aircraft on the ground safely, that has to be the message we all focus on not looking for argument fuel, not withstanding this is a rumour forum.

Nuf said :)

[Michael Birbeck]

There's enough material here for a Phd in aviation psychology and not all of it "normal". Some of the commentators here truly look for the "loneliness of command". When it all goes tits up for them then they surely will be alone, very much so. I can't see any reason why a commander wouldn't use the brain power of everyone at his/her disposal to "work a problem". The buck stops at the commander's side of the aircraft of course.

[trimotor]

The only reason we don't routinely have more than 2 sets of eyes and ears on the flight deck in normal ops is cost, so certain technologies were developed and employed to wind the min crew down to 2.

Granted, the aug crew needs to know what's appropriate and not, though where there is discussion about procedures, performance, other life-threateneing stuff, I'm in the loop - it's my bum too, and just because I'm not the operating captan, dare I say it at this juncture, won't obsolve me from the responsibility of taking any reasonable opportunity to prevent a problem (at best) or having to answer difficult questions as to why I took no notice.

Ask yourself, how would the ensuing investigation view an aug crew's lack of 'oversight' that resulted in a problem? Perhaps we are about to have a definitive answer on that one. Realise one thing though: as the aug crew you are sufficiently disconnected from the operation to have the spare capacity to recognise when things are not right. Seize the opportunity. How you then approach the question of intervention is up to your CRM skills.

I AM on headset for arrival and departure, and have been pleased to be so several times, with incorrectly understood clearances, and other little career-affecting gems cropping up a the end of a long day..

Perhaps some of us here are frightened of being monitored, fearing scrutiny. If so, it's time to question your own operation: if it goes wrong, your life will be nothing but scrutiny. Ask the poor sods imn MEL: at least we can.

Now, back to what happened in MEL...

[Payscale]

Aug crew has no duties in the flight deck during ground stop. They dont even need to be present. Its actually nicer when they are not. Less people. Less interference. Hence they carry no responsibility. If EK chooses to change that, then print out yet another FCI...:suspect:

[NO LAND 3]

Agree with you. Aug crew are all too often a distraction - even with the best of intentions. Would be different if the operation was designed for four people but its not. Disruption of normal habit patterns is a hazard.

[GoreTex]

when I am the augmenting crew I always stay out of the flight deck till the doors are closed, there is no space in the cockpit, its full of ground staff all the time.
but if I am the operating crew I would never throw out the augmenting crew I think whitey is still traumatized from the boarding school experience.

[JW411]

I do wonder how some of you out there would have coped with the 4-man cockpit? (I just missed the 5-man cockpit by the way).

[NO LAND 3]

Aha JW411! I have operated 4 man cockpit - Engineers, radio operators et al.
The point I want to stress is the operation and procedures were designed for the extra crew members so all had specific roles. And there was only one captain!
In my opinion its squeezing 4 pilots into a two pilot operation without addressing certain protocols that creates potential human factors problems.

[Gulf News]

Four pairs of eyes including one TRE didn't pick up the embarrassing reason for RTO and subsequent return to stand on the 380 last week.

Reason for RTO = no FMA indications when take off thrust selected.
Reason for no FMA indications= both Flight Directors off. :eek:

W.K. does have a point however not very diplomatic put. As woodja says a double edged sword. Should this incident turn out to be a data entry error however then I am sure we will here much more about the active role of augmenting crew.

[broken spring]

We all make mistakes, and this looks like a grave error in performance calcultion. Top job for getting it back on the deck so everyone can tell the tale! I personally knew 7 who are not able to have that privillige in a very similar scenario .

The boys up front are going to take some heat, but don't be fooled,any one of us could be next. Learn from their mistakes.

Bottom line- Stick to SOP's...And if White Knight is in the other seat cut his throat!

Safe flying

[Capt Kremin]

Hey Mig 15, where do you get off bringing this thread back to the point??

Why doesn't someone start up an aug crew pros and cons thread somewhere relevant... like JetBlast, and leave this thread alone?

[crazyaviator]

Augmenting crew dont have set /standardized "jobs" to do ,,,if its ad-hoc ,,,it will be looking for an accident to happen ! Distractions are up there in the causal factors leading to accidents. Awareness, situational or otherwise, cause their fair share of prangs ,,,, and this is coming from a Cessna 150 pilot !!! You are either an INTEGRAL part of the crew on that segment OR you are NOT !!!!

[Nicholas49]

I am not a professional pilot, so it is not really my place to post on this discussion, but one thing is shouting out to be said.

The Turkish incident at Schipol involved a three-man crew with a safety pilot. It is not yet official and we do not know the other circumstances, but there is speculation on the other thread that the third pilot also failed to spot the speed decay etc.

So, my question is, was he operating as White Knight (and others) would like him to? That is, staying out of the picture, not raising a concern? You get my point.

[HarryMann]

It's reported that he (the 3rd man) did say '... Boss, power, power!'

Whether that was during the attempted recovery (when the PLs came back again) or before the stick-shaker we don't know yet..

[chase888]

Even allowing for the Oz public service record for inertia, am a bit surprised at least some preliminary finding has not emerged.
Even verification of the cargo weight and distribution ought to have been revealed.
After all, some poor sods are paying premium rates to get their cargo delivered by air.
I would assume it is possible to have the FDR analyzed in Oz?:confused:

[Dairyground]

I have no practical experience of any aspect of aircraft operation, other than those that become obvious to fequent SLF. However, at various time during a long working life I have been involved in the design and programming of computer systems, ancient and modern, been Quality Manager in a software development activity, and worked as an ISO 9000 Lead Auditor.

From a quality management perspective, I am amazed at the divergence of opinions expressed by apparently experienced flight crew about the correct way to use (or not use) relief crew during flight preparation. As an ISO 9000 Auditor observing the activity I would almost certainly have raised an "Observation" if the SOP did not address the situation and a "Non-conformance" if the SOP said something and it was not followed. But then, I have not seen any airline claiming ISO 9000 conformance for any aspect of its business.

Calculation of V1 (and other critical speeds) depends on the mass of the aircraft, and in the case of V1 on the runway length and surface condition. In all the relevant posts I have encountered in this and other threads there seems to be an assumption that the mass fed into the calculation is accurate and the assumed power will be achieved. These assumptions are obviously realised fairly closely in most cases. However, if you are much heavier than assumed or pushing less hard than necessary, V1 may be achieved with too little concrete left to stop on and v2 might not be achieved in the available distance. If I had been given the job of designing such a safety-critical system I would have built an additional output into the calculation, the time to achieve V1. Failure to meet that time would require the takeoff to be rejected. "Reject" calls at other, lower speeds could be included in the system, but are not really necessary. If you are accelerating too slowly, then you will have even more distance to stop in than if you had reached V1 in the expected time. Going by the stopwatch is surely much simpler than looking for external markings or markers on and around the runway.

The idea of having an aircraft sit on a weighing machine at the gate is superficially attractive, but I can appreciate that there are vast complicaions of cost and reliability. However, it is not necessary to weigh the whole aircraft. Simply measuring the weight on the nose gear, along with the assumed total weight, should give enough information to calculate the position of the centre of gravity. A gross error in weight would show up as a CofG far removed from what was expected. In principle it should also be possible for an aircraft to weigh itself without external equipment, by use of strain gauges on the undercarriage legs, or through a computation based on oleo internal pressures and suspension displacement.

And finally, I am horrified by the need, or even just commonly used technique, of giving the engine control system an inaccurate air temperature in order to operate at reduced thrust. Specifying the required thrust, either directly or as a proportion of the nominal maximum, would surely be less error-prone. Say what you want, and let the computers work out how to give it to you.

[trimotor]

Dairyground,

Well constructed post. Note that, in answer to your last comment, there are two methods of operating the engine at reduced thrust: one is a 'fixed % derate' and the other is 'assumed temperature'.

In the former, should additional thrust be required, the crew will find that it is not available. In the latter, while the temperature that the engine is being asked to 'assume' will be higher than the ambient (at least 1°C higher), this calculation can be done with tables and charts, based on all the usual performance criteria, though is typically done by a performance computer of some kind. This 'assumed temp' is then passed to the aircraft system. Should the crew decide that 'max chat' is required (there are a number of scenarios), full power will be available to them. This undoubtedly saved the day in MEL recently.

It should also be noted that in the assumed temp method, there is a significant performance margin, starting with the aeroplane (aerodynamically) not knowing that the engine is assumign it to be warmer than it is. This will have also helped in MEL.

In short, the assumed temp thrust reducted method is safer than a perormance limited full thrust take-off. As for the sysem of determining and entering data, that is another story (and would affect all departures).

Acceleration times to V1, and he mointoring thereof, is interesting and seems to be confined to some military ops. Frankly, I don't need to be monitoring a stopwatch approaching V1 on many departures, where the V1 can approach three miles per minute. That said, I'd be surprised if it were not a simple thing to automate. The side effect might be that we begine to find out how much heavier the aircraft are than the loadsheet says, given pax and carry-on baggage weights...

[Pedota]

Different aircraft and in test configuration, but interesting video nevertheless -

Airbus A380 Tailstrike 1 - Video (http://www.metacafe.com/watch/1155270/airbus_a380_tailstrike_1/)

[What-ho Squiffy!]

Good post Dairlyground.

All I would add is that the distance/time check could be done before V1, and still leave room to reject. As some other posters have said, pick a speed, and if you're not there by "x" time, then abort because something is wrong.

[NO LAND 3]

No need for a speed / time check on 777 as ASI has a speed trend vector incorporated in its display. Effectively it is an obvious indicator of your level of acceleration during takeoff. On 777 it will usually extend 30 knots. I would think the Airbus would have similar.
Assumed temp method of calculating reduced thrust take-offs is the most conservative method because the various takeoff speeds it provides assume conditions are more restrictive than they really are. Full thrust can always be selected after V1 without fear of being below Vmcg.
Its very simple in practice and not a factor so long as correct data is input.

[pool]

This gets interesting!

Notwithstanding the different oppinions on how to integrate the augmenting crew, it will run down to whether a misinput will be determined as fault, and subsequently HOW the enquiring bodies will define the role of the second set of crew. Will they have any mention of beeing in the slightest way implicated and therefore blamed not having helped to pick up the mistake? Or will the active crew make any statement as to any distraction by too many people in the cockpit?

If an augmenting crew will in any way be held co-responsable, what will be the definition as per when their participation starts? Once they are in the cockpit? Once on board, as their time is logged as well?
If so, then the forcing of them beeing on the deck (by not providing seats) will be very delicate. In my former company they had seats and it was the active crew who would allow or disallow, or ask them to be present, the augmenting guys able to deny.
By forcing them to attend and if they will in any way be held responsible, a subsequent question will be: What happens enroute, when they are sequestred in the rearside topedo tube? If the signing skipper is there and unable to regain his seat in case of a emergency, will he be also implicated in any verdict?

The report and verdict of the concerned authorities will be very, very interesting. It might have huge implications on future SOPs, even hardware solutions ....

[ironbutt57]

The speed trend arrow is extremely useful in determining airspeed acceleration, but provides no direct information as to how much ground you have covered doing so (correct me if I am wrong please) the time/distance check is the only way of ensuring that..

[NO LAND 3]

Well, it is a good gross error check. And I love the way on the 77L it shoots up to the top of the scale.

Distance/time check has certain practical difficulties, particularly at night which is most of our ops.

And think about this: even a distance/time check would have to be something calculated for each takeoff to account for weight/rwy etc etc. The key word is "calculated". It would be subject to the same input error.

[A37575]

The speed trend arrow is extremely useful in determining airspeed acceleration, but provides no direct information as to how much ground you have covered doing so (correct me if I am wrong please) the time/distance check is the only way of ensuring that..

Many decades ago I watched a USAF Douglas B-66 Destroyer (Twin jet engine all weather day/night reconnaissance aircraft) line up and commence take off from Townsville runway 02. It made lots of noise. In those days distance to run markers were set in the flight strip and lit at night. When two thirds down the runway the pilot aborted and was extremely fortunate to stop in the over-run even though the runway then was 8000 ft long. The brakes overheated.

An hour or so later the pilot had another go at getting off and this time was successful. We were later told by ATC that the B-66 had aborted because it had not reached a certain speed by a certain distance down the runway. Yet when the pilot did the second take off the wind and OAT were same as before.

From that, we got the impression that the speed versus distance abort policy was primitive at its best, and a risk laden way of determining whether to stop or go. Certainly no way would you try that sort of approximation in a modern jet transport.

[Capt Groper]

And if they rejected even more interesting?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UocxPoUUnIQ

:bored:

[NO LAND 3]

Pool,

I agree with you - roles, responsibilities, protocols, hazards.... lots of strands.

[AutoAbort]

Interesting article from Flight International about Flightdeck distractions.

Distractions frequently cause flapless take-offs, NASA reveals (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/03/24/324207/distractions-frequently-cause-flapless-take-offs-nasa.html)

AA

[trimotor]

In terms of accel vs. time checks, there are a couple of things here:

1. Accel vs. time is going to be simply a function of excess thrust over weight, surely. It will not indicate where you are, or should be/have been on the runway. Unfortunately, a position on the runway is what we need to know -and is effectively what V1 gives us (assuming correct acceleration), based on ambient conditions.

The question then becomes "When we get to V1 will we be at the correct spot?' Waiting until V1 to see the result will only tell you whether things are about to go badly, or not, so:

2. We need a distance to go vs. speed check, again based on ambient conditions, at a convenient point prior to V1. Unfortunately, current wisdom has seen distance to run markers all but disappear. Bugger-they were quite useful for landing as well..

Perhaps there is a possibility of an acceleration rate check, based on ambient conditions and groundspeed, driven by GPS/RAAS and triggered when the TO/GA switches are pushed on departure? Something for the boffins...

As for the 777, yes, the airspeed trend vector is very useful, though nothing is formalised regarding its use on takeoff, other than as a windshear indicator, or did I miss something? As others have said here, it's a good crosscheck, nonetheless.

[NO LAND 3]

Perhaps there is a possibility of an acceleration rate check, based on ambient conditions and groundspeed, driven by GPS/RAAS and triggered when the TO/GA switches are pushed on departure? Something for the boffins...



Now that might work, but I go back to a point I made earlier - it would still have to a calculated point based on inputting the same data, hence subject to the same error.
Would guard against P1 malfunctions resulting in lower than indicated thrust though. EG The 737 in Nauru or the Potomac crash.

Nice one centurian!

[Bullethead]

We used to do time check to 80kts when flying Hercs off an unimproved strip. The NAV would start a stopwatch at the beginning of the takeoff roll and at eighty knots either say CONTINUE or STOP depending on the time taken. The timing was, of course, worked out well before the take off started and was usually around 12 seconds dependent on all the usual variables.

It worked well until you rolled into a boggy spot at 90kts!! :sad:

I can't see why something similar could not be done for RPT ops.

Regards,
BH.

[chainsaw]

NO LAND 3 has the answer if you're operating EFIS with speed trend vector.

No need for a speed / time check on 777 as ASI has a speed trend vector incorporated in its display. Effectively it is an obvious indicator of your level of acceleration during takeoff. On 777 it will usually extend 30 knots.

Correct! And that's because the speed trend vector will usually show predicted airspeed in 10 seconds based on current acceleration! OK, it may vary from type to type, but normally at heavy weights and at about V1, an aircraft is travelling at about 200 to 300 ft per second, so it's therefore accelerating at 3 to 6 knots per second.

Therefore, if the speed trend vector is showing (about) 30 kts predicted speed increase, then acceleration is probably OK and about 3 kts/second.

Remember though, that the above is an 'approximation' only, and to be totally accurate you'd need to get SPECIFIC figures for the type that you operate. However, like all 'rules of thumb', the 'approximation' is probably fairly accurate in practical terms for the purpose of determining whether take-off is 'normal'!

[kingoftheslipstream]

Folks

WRT integratin' the augment crew with the operatin' crew there's a lotta high spirited barkin goin' on but the fact remains that the A345 is a two person flight deck.

The SOPs taken from FCOM 3 make no reference whatsoever to CM3 or CM4, there is only a CM1 and a CM2. CM1 and CM2 are further allocated duties by reference to wether 'er not they are PF or PNF. Period. This is the way the manufacturer certified the aircraft and the regulators agreed.

The FOM, Ch 14 has some interstin' stuff regarding this and you kin bet that from AAR down they'll all be havin' a good study of it. Fer reasons of corporate confidentiality I won't be referin' to chapter 'n verse, nor will I publish it on this here forum. Suffice to say it's a document that like most of what this company writes give one more than enough rope ta let ya hang yerself with. It's airy fairy 'nuff to screw somebody over perty good, but it don't specifically define responsibilities an' it don't take in ta account what might be happenin' when the engineer is in the centre jumpseat completing the tech log with the fuel figgers or what might be gettin' handled in the cabin on behalf a the opertin' crew by one of the augmenters... say chasin' down stuff fer the CRC or gettin' the walk around done er whatever. It's a pretty grey area.

As the poet says: I ain't so wise as those lawyer guys... but I reckin' that the augmenters got a pertty good case for being let alone here.

That's ma two bits worth

[CONF iture]

Different aircraft and in test configuration, but interesting video nevertheless - Airbus A380 Tailstrike 1 - Video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iKtFHh9H00)Some more comment on what happened :
Airbus A380 Tail Strike Test (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwQMXz9PbrY)




And if they rejected even more interesting?
YouTube - Airbus A340-600 Rejected Take Off (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UocxPoUUnIQ)
Unfortunately or ... fortunately :
This video contains an audio track that has not been authorized by WMG. The audio has been disabled.

[cats_five]

Some more comment on what happened :
Airbus A380 Tail Strike Test (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwQMXz9PbrY)
Unfortunately or ... fortunately :

Very interesting, thanks for posting that.

[Dune]

I have to admit this accident/incident bothers me tremendously as I have thought about this issue of performance assessment on the takeoff roll for some time.

The velocity vector is a useful "secondary tool" but until the specific performance specifications using the V.V. are documented and mandated by the manufacturer as a check item on takeoff roll, to my mind its' use is "vague" at best. In fact, to my mind it is only slightly better than the "seat of the pants" judgment many experienced Captains currently use to judge the rate of acceleration on a given takeoff roll on a given day.

The V. V. is based the aircraft's computed future speed based upon a current rate of change of acceleration over a given time frame projected forward ("XX speed" will be achieved in "XX time" projected forward based upon current the current rate of acceleration).

This vector is totally dependent upon the performance data criteria selected by the crew in the flight management computers given the actual a/c weight and current runway length, field elevation and airfield wx (temp, wind and QNH).

Case in point:

If I were to take off at MTOW in any given aircraft (A-319 through to A-380 or Boeing equivalent up to 747-400) on a 20,000' runway at sea level at ISA wx conditions, you would expect a max flex t/o (irrespective of weight given the runway length) and a minimal "benign/subdued/non-aggressive/etc?" velocity vector displayed on the PFD during the take off roll through 100 kts given the conditions.

Take that same a/c and put it on an 8000' runway at 6000' above sea level and the velocity vector for the same given weight on that runway would be considerable different. How much V.V. on the PFD is right at that weight on that runway length at that temp at that elevation on that day? How much is "not enough"?

Under a different scenario, what if you take the same a/c on the same day at a "simple airport" (long runway, near sea level, normal temps, etc) and make a gross input error (due to crew fatigue/distraction/etc) in the computer inputed ZFW or max TOW data to calculate the performance figures?

Unless experience tells you to expect that based upon the given aircraft type, field and wx conditions, and actual t/o weight you should expect a V1 of "XXX", a configuration of "XX" and a V.V. above 100 kts of "XX", you might be happy to see "100 kt + your comfortable "XX" amount" on the V.V. on the takeoff roll and be totally wrong in your assessment.

My point is that using strictly V.V. without some specific manufacturers numbers to match up your "seat of the pants" assessment of it's use is to my mind incorrect and should not be relied upon to assess performance takeoff criteria.

The real question is why have the manufacturers not published the performance data using the velocity vector as it is something that is easy to document (at the manufacturers level) and the display of the data ( the Velocity Vector) is already a part of the modern airline cockpit?

Why have Airbus and Boeing not provided airline crews with this easily produced and readily available data?

To my mind that is the key issue in this incident and one that Emirates, all other airlines and the regulatory authorities in every country must contemplate in assessing fault for this incident.


Dune

[woodja51]

C130 operations - a long time ago in my career - on short field ops we calculated exactly that event - time to 80 kts( for example)

the nav called 'time' with the precalc'd seconds and you either had the speed 'go ' or you didnt - and 'stopped'..

it picked up runway condition / slush mud etc - not entirely relevant to civil ops but the point is there.

I notice we get bogged down starting the friggin clock when we roll the jet ( apparently so we can monitor take of thrust - or time to next coffee break or something??)

Unfortunately it seems that no matter how fool proof the engineers try and design something their model of the real world is continually tested.

I think the highlight of Dairy's post was the observation of how 'non standard' our attitudes and beliefs are with regard to how standardised we really think we are...but arent..?? sorry poor english again.

Several of these posts comment on the lack of incorporation of 4 crew into a 2 crew system - ad hoc etc.

This surely needs to be addressed? more eyes, more seen, does not make.

some really good posts guys ... keep thinking there are some excellent ideas out there..

[woodja51]

did I used to fly with you - think I repeated your post!!!

Woodja!

[Smilin_Ed]

Not sure I've read anything like that in the training manual... :rolleyes:

If it isn't in the manual, maybe it should be. Maybe the folks who write the "training manual" should pick 100 knots or something below V1. Then calculate how long it takes to get there or at what distance marker (if there are any). It looks like the guys flying this one could have used something like that.

[HarryMann]

Agree.
Might even have saved the Manchester United team at Munich
Has been promulgated countless times, after overshoots and 'just made its'
Remember particularly in the 70's when it was being considered
Military use time to distance a fair bit or speed at runway marker

Rules of thumb are enough, we're not talking 3 decimal places !

[BouncingBlueMeatBall]

Not the same A/C, not the same WX and a different carrier and location ...... but nevertheless interesting and instructive for me to see what happens to this Tunisair A320-200 when the spoilers deploy.

YouTube - Almost tail strike Airbus A320-200 Tunisair (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpuYjDlNfhg)

Apologies if this has already been posted or is deemed irrelevant.

[CONF iture]

Interesting article from Flight International about Flightdeck distractions.
Distractions frequently cause flapless take-offs, NASA reveals (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/03/24/324207/distractions-frequently-cause-flapless-take-offs-nasa.html)

Quote from this article :
An examination of the US confidential aviation safety reporting system (ASRS) shows that, since 2000, 55 take-offs have been carried out unintentionally in the USA without take-off configuration having been set ...

In that perspective, I must say Airbus developed an excellent concept to avoid that kind of event and I would not think any of these 55 cases came from an NG Airbus ... (?)

[mrs nomer]

I wonder what the sea level stopping distance of the A345 at 360 + tonnes is from V1 at, say, ISA + 10 ?

[trimotor]

African or European, laden or unladen?

[NO LAND 3]

Perhaps there is a possibility of an acceleration rate check, based on ambient conditions and groundspeed, driven by GPS/RAAS and triggered when the TO/GA switches are pushed on departure? Something for the boffins...

I think Trimotor came closest to a practical suggestion here. But I keep coming back to my point that any check has to be calculated for each take-off using the same variables as the original take-off calculation. IE it will vary for type variant, weight, departure point, slope, rwy surface conditions - the list is long!
So it will be subject to the same input error and be pointless.

If the input is correct then the performance will be correct. I suggest we are concentrating on the wrong end of the problem.

We should be thinking of how to ensure the correct figures make their journey from the airport data and loadsheet...to the performance computer...to the FMS.

That is the key. So simple and yet so full of human factor traps...

[NO LAND 3]

African or European, laden or unladen?

WHAT is the flight velocity of...

Don't get me started Trimotor!

[9 points]

I was thinking..

What if we just look at this in simple kinematics terms (not sure of the spelling).

We can create a table that we enter with Vr, move across to TORA and find a resultant IAS 10 second trend minimum.

OK I know this is really vague but if you run the numbers it is interesting that you get a vector that can be anything from 10kts to 40 kts.

These are minimum averages and are independant of weight or conditions. A completely different input from that used in the LPC calcs.

So I start a take off with a fugure of say 25 kts in my head as a guide for this runway/Vr combination.

Just a thought.

[4PW's]

SQ changed the procedure for checking and rechecking performance data after an investigation of contributing causes to the Auckland accident.

NOT SURE if what happened in Melbourne to EK is the same thing, but it does seem sensible to suspect this accident has a very similar genesis.

Planes don't mysteriously disappear or crash. This isn't a tv program. It's the real world. Something went wrong, and the probability rests with that something beginning with the input of erroneous data.

Not that I'd know. I wasn't there. But if I was a betting man...

On the subject of accelaration rates and what not, NO LAND 3 has the unequivocal answer. "Don't screw up the input."

Others are talking about all sorts of novel ideas. Why? Are you trying to reinvent the wheel? The analysis of performance characteristics is faultless. Got that? Faultless.

Applying the analysis by way of inputting the derived data is another thing altogether. Why make it harder? Why reinvent the wheel? The data's all there in the book. All it needs is to be accurately transcribed into the FMC. And there's the trap: all it needs...

I'm with the low viz guy :ok:

[SIUYA]

US Patent 6175315 - Aircraft takeoff acceleration indicator system

Inventors
Millard, Wayne C.
Millard, Carl W.

Application
No. 180473 filed on 11/10/1998

see Aircraft takeoff acceleration indicator system - US Patent 6175315 Claims (http://www.patentstorm.us/patents/6175315/claims.html)

Claims
What is claimed is:

1. An instrumentation system for use in aircraft, during the takeoff roll from standstill to V1 speed, that continuously displays a target airspeed at which the aircraft should be if it is meeting the acceleration required to be at V1 at the anticipated distance, wherein a related computer with a database stores information on curves of takeoff acceleration graphs of the type and model of said aircraft with respect to speed versus time on said takeoff roll as well as distance;

an actual airspeed display continuously displaying the actual speed of said aircraft wherein, during the takeoff roll up to V1 speed, said computer continuously controls the progressive movement of target airspeed display in said actual airspeed display, to display the target speed at which the aircraft should be if it is meeting the computer-stored acceleration curve based on time;

and a display for continuously displaying the computed distance that said aircraft is currently lagging behind when said actual speed is less than said speed at which said aircraft should be if it is meeting said computer-stored acceleration curves.

2. An instrumentation system as claimed in claim 1, further including an instrument panel having an indicator to continuously display said actual speed of said aircraft, and a needle to indicate said target speed.

3. An instrumentation system as claimed in claim 2 wherein said indicator comprises a reference line.

4. An airspeed display as indicated in claim 1 wherein said target and actual airspeeds are displayed on a rotary dial type airspeed indicator.

5. An airspeed display as claimed in claim 1 wherein said target and actual airspeeds are displayed on a tape type airspeed indicator.

6. An airspeed display as claimed in claim 1 wherein said actual airspeed is displayed by a reference line and said target airspeed is displayed by an arrow generated from said reference line.

7. An airspeed display as claimed in claim 1 wherein said target airspeed is no longer displayed when said aircraft reaches V1.

8. The display of claim 1 wherein said airspeed display is an electronically generated readout.

9. An instrument for use in aircraft, during the takeoff roll from standstill to V1 speed, that continuously displays a target airspeed at which the aircraft should be at if it is meeting the acceleration required to be at V1 at the anticipated distance, wherein a computer with a database stores information on curves of takeoff acceleration graphs of the types and model of aircraft with respect to speed versus time on said takeoff roll as well as distance;

an actual airspeed display continuously displaying the actual speed of said aircraft wherein, during the takeoff roll up to V1 speed, said computer continuously controls the progressive movement of target airspeed display in said actual airspeed display, to display the target speed at which the aircraft should be if it is meeting the computer-stored acceleration curves based on time;

a reference line against which said actual speed of said aircraft is displayed, and a needle to indicate said target speed;

and a window in said instrument for continuously displaying the computed distance that said aircraft is currently lagging behind when said actual speed is less than said speed at which said aircraft should be if it is meeting said computer-stored acceleration curves.

10. An instrument for use in an aircraft, during acceleration of the aircraft from 0 velocity to V1, for continuously monitoring actual velocity of the aircraft versus target velocity of the aircraft required to accelerate to V1 within an anticipated distance from a standstill position comprising:

(a) input means for entering parameters affecting an anticipated distance from the standstill position required to accelerate to V1;

(b) comprising means for calculating from said parameters;

(i) a V1 value for said aircraft;

(ii) anticipated distance from aid standstill position required to accelerate to V1;

(iii) time required to accelerate to V1; and

(iv) target velocity continuously required to accelerate to V1 within said time required;

(c) means for operably storing said V1 value of said aircraft, anticipated distance from standstill position, time required to accelerate to V1, and target velocity continuously required to accelerate to V1 within said time required to accelerate to V1; and

(d) means for continuously and simultaneously displaying and monitoring the actual velocity of the aircraft and the target velocity required to achieve V1, comprising a linear readout airspeed indicator having a reference line against which said actual velocity is displayed, and wherein an arrow generated from said reference line displays said target velocity;

(e) means for displaying continuously the actual distance said aircraft is lagging said aircraft's actual position behind an anticipated position determined by the anticipated distance from the standstill position required to accelerate to V1.

Maybe this is what's needed? :}

[What-ho Squiffy!]

It's always amusing when the Walts start lending the benefit of their experience.

Thanks for that. :D


Smilin_Ed already said it: It doesn't really matter what speed is chosen/SOP'd, as long as it's before V1 and you have time to react before decision time.

[Wiley]

The military distance to go siteboards were(are?) great for what they were designed for, but are not suitable for current civil ops. For example, they'd be totally useless in a limited viz takeoff, which is very much a part of any airline's operation these days, and, if anything, is a situation that cries out for some such 'acceleration check' system far moreso than a CAVOK takeoff. Remember the days when we always did TOGA takeoffs in such conditions? (Whatever you come up with, gentlemen, let it NOT be another female voice cluttering up my headset. Miss *** RAAAS - another 'slam the stable door after the horse has bolted' extra we've had added to the system, blocks or partially overrides far too many ATC calls as it is. Hands up all those who'd like to see all her airborne calls dispensed with?)

Coming up with some sort of simple calculation for the trend arrow on the PFD is probably the most promising suggestion, although I was taught by the man who first endorsed me onto the 777 a very long time ago now (a 'personal extra' on his part, I hasten to add, that is not to my knowledge mentioned anywhere in the Boeing documentation), that anything under a 15 knot value on the trend arrow means something is seriously wrong and best you do something about it.

Any 777 pilot will know that, except on the highest AUWs and at the most marginal of conditions, the trend arrow is usually well above that, as much as double it. However, it's one of my 'little extra things' that I check on every takeoff, a bit like that last look on short finals that there really is a 'gear down' indication. (I don't care how many bells, whistles and other aural warnings Boeing have built in to the system to prevent a gear up landing, it's just another one of my 'things', part of the 'belts, braces and chastity belt' approach I take to most of my flying as the 'old' has increasingly replaced the 'bold' in my operation.)

I'd have to agree with quite a few others that the current situation during the 15-20 minutes before doors closed with an augmented crew on board is far less than ideal - (and Mutley, your 'take' of the number of people coming and going to the cockpit during that time is far different to mine). I can recall one very senior EK checkie (Robin H.) telling me, many years ago now, that he'd counted one day the number of interruptions between his taking the seat and pushing back. It was 27. I don't believe things have changed since. Just an example: on your average trip, how many people do you usually have come up to the flight deck to ask if they can close doors, even after you've called the CC who's manning the door on then interphone to give the go ahead?

After starting out with the attitude that, as augmenting crew, I'm an extra overseer on the flight deck, I'm now very much one in the 'stay off the flight deck as long as I can prior to engine start' camp. Unless you dibs the right jump seat, you're at best, very much in the way and at worst, a distraction to the operating crew.

I don't think we, the Great Unwashed, will ever see it in print, but I believe the CVR of those 30 minutes prior to engine start on this flight will make for some very interesting listening - and not just in the most obvious areas - for the investigators.

[What-ho Squiffy!]

380 drvr, fair point; but that doesn't prevent a worst-case calculation being used as a rule of thumb does it? Perhaps this would then be a meaningless figure...

[MR8]

Gentlemen,

I think the EK SOP's regarding loadsheet and T/O data entry are foolproof. If guys mess up they clearly didn't follow the SOP's for whatever reason.
I am not saying that I never made a wrong entry, and quite often I find an error in the TO data, BUT, I trap these errors because of the SOP's!

The only thing that might to be changed is the order. I's prefer us to get the loadsheet, check the numbers and only then do the T/O figures.

In the loadsheet procedure, we check DOW, ZFW, TOW, ZFWCG and ECAM CG together. After that the F/O checks the ZFW again by himself.

For the LPC: the F/O prepares the data and writes them down, the Capt checks them and inuts them, then crosschecks with the numbers the F/O wrote down.

The weight should have been checked by both, and to finalize it, we do a GREEN DOT check.

Don't get me wrong, I'm open for improvements, but we check, crosscheck and have a final 'redundancy' in the green dot check.. how far do you want to go?

If something needs to be improved, it is the disturbances during the preparations which gets us out of sequence or skip things... If operations could be a little bit more streamlined, the fuel and tech log should be finished at least 20 minutes before departure. (considering we should get the ZFW around 40 minutes before STD). By then the loadsheet should arrive and the crew should have the following 10 minutes without anyone coming in the flight deck to brief and do the loadsheet/LPC check.

---

The A345 is a 2 man operation, and I would advise everyone to keep it that way. Recently a B747 cargo operator had almost an identical mishap, scraped the tail, but because it was a cargo, not too much fuss about it in the newspapers. In the following investigation, it came to light that the augmenting guys had 'helped out' with the T/O numbers and got it wrong. They left with speeds for 100 tons less then their actual weight..

---

Even to consider to abort a T/O around 100 kts because the acceleration 'doesn't feel right' or the trend vector is not showing what I expect should be punished by the electrical chair in modern airline operations. (slight exaguration :E )
Let me explain myself a little bit:

First of all: a jet engine does not produce the same thrust at different speeds with the same thrust settings, basic thermodynamics. Your acceleration (even in a perfect world) will initially increase, then decrease again. So you can not put a certain number on the acceleration itself.

Second: The trend vector is coupled to the AIRSPEED!! So there you are on a rather short runway, hitting a negative windshear. Your trend vector will be less then expected and according to quite a lot of guys above, a reason to stop the take off. Your groundspeed on the other hand might be a lot higher then you think and you would set yourself up for an overrun... The only good action would be to slam the TOGA and fly the windshear maneuver.

Acceleration monitoring can only be done with special equipment for that purpose only. Should be coupled to RAAS so the equipment knows what the runway is like. But again, it is dependent on weight, so as someone posted before, if the crew puts in the wrong weight, all the systems will fail to pick up the error.

The only thing that would make sense is the aircraft weighs itself. It can't be that difficult to put some kind of weight measurement in the struts of the mains. With the cg known to the aircraft, a gross error check can be made by the aircraft, e.g. only accepting TO weight that are within a preset margin of the actual measured weight. It doesn't need to be spot on, so no need for expensive very accurate 'scales'. As long as it picks up a significant error... But that's one for the manufacturers, not the operators...

[point8six]

The AKL incident (or accident) was a repeat of a similar SQ incident about a year earlier, in which the crew climbed out at V2 - 8kts. Both were caused by the fleet's procedure of overwriting the FMC computed figures with data from the airport analysis tables WITHOUT the requirement to check any differences with the FMC figures. It was a classic case of history repeating itself. Maybe the EK report will compare with the earlier T/O incident at JNB.
The problem may be in the method used to determine T/O performance figures rather than measures used to check the accuracy of those figures.
Personally, after "re-learning" how to obtain the numbers the SQ way, I wrote a list of V2's and EPRs for every 10 tonnes weight on the back of my clipboard and would set the V2 according to the flight planned T/O weight on the MCP during pre-flight scan checks - it gave me an instant cross-check when the co-pilot produced the figures for T/O from the loadsheet.
Methods for determining thrust/speeds vary from airline to airline for the same a/c type, few airlines seem to train such extractions well.
I would generally agree about the presence of both augmented pilots in the cockpit before departure - one is a useful extra pair of eyes, two are usually a distraction ( too much superfluous chat!).

[NO LAND 3]

I agree getting the figures from the OPT (performance computer) into the FMS is almost foolproof now.
However I still see gross errors on the OPT from time to time. Most commonly ZFW put into the TOW field or the wrong rwy intersection selected (and there is a trap to using the "first 4" option).

[chainsaw]

MR8,

I've been waiting for this:

Your acceleration (even in a perfect world) will initially increase, then decrease again.

TOP MARKS MR8! You are 100% spot-on!!!!! :D Pity there's a few punters here who don't realise this, and if they actually took the time to understand high-capacity transport category aircraft performance a bit better then they'd realise there's a lot more to it than meets the eye!!!

Recommended reading for those who want to find out more about the machinery that they drive - BOEING JET PERFORMANCE TRANSPORT METHODS (D61420). Yeah, and guess what........it applies to the Bus too! I know!

Spend some time 'Googling' if you don't believe me.....you WILL find the actual graph that substantiates MR8s TOTALLY correct statement!

A380-800 driver............do you want to elaborate on your concept of:

40% of available take-off power

Because there's a VERY big difference between REDUCED thrust and DERATED thrust. :=

As an aside, I had to stop flying in 2007 due to the big 'C'. The stuff that you guys keep posting, the sheer diversity of opinion, and the 'ruthless' pursuit of reason amongst many (most??) of you makes me really appreciate just what ENORMOUS talent is out there in our industry, and how glad I was to have been part of it while I could!

Thanks all! :)

[woodja51]

toga every takeoff and rotate at last 2000' - should cover all the screw ups??
oui?

[bar none]

MR 8,

It cannot be too hard for an aircraft to weigh itself.The Merchantman (Vanguard freight conversion) used to do just this. The system was called STAN and on taxi out it used to give a gross wt check and a CG check as well.

[Wiley]

I suspect that the main resistance to the aircraft self-weighing system would come from Commercial Dept.

As has been mentioned by others earlier in this thread, given the unrealistic standard pax weights and the totally unrealistic pax carry-on baggage allowance currently used, I don't think they want to know how much the aircraft really weighs.

[OBOGS]

I'm not saying the "spares" being in the cockpit is a necessity but if the capt can't deal with someone being in there and looking over his shoulder, how does he cope in the sim or on a line check?

Anybody in the idea, that it would be voluntary for the augmenting crew to be present in the cockpit (unless resting) might want to doublecheck the FOM before making any further statements.

With a bit of "SA" (i.e. when to be where in relation to the Engineer etc.) it can be accomplished rather easily, as suggested by Muttley C.

My thoughts go with the crew, whatever the outcome of the investigation.

Cheers

OBOGS

[NO LAND 3]

I'm not saying the "spares" being in the cockpit is a necessity but if the capt can't deal with someone being in there and looking over his shoulder, how does he cope in the sim or on a line check?


Ah yes but...

performance anxiety is quite real among pilots! Sit there and watch the operating captain when you are augmenting (or checking for that matter). In most cases their behavior will be subtly different than when alone. I believe thepsychs would have a term - its kind of like "mirroring' behavior between individuals establishing communications.

You can deny it till you are blue in the face but it won't change human behaviour.

[FrequentSLF]

performance anxiety is quite real among pilots! Sit there and watch the operating captain when you are augmenting (or checking for that matter). In most cases their behavior will be subtly different than when alone. I believe thepsychs would have a term - its kind of like "mirroring' behavior between individuals establishing communications.

I question from SLF. On a ship there is no augmenting crew. There is always only one Captain on board. Would you mind to explain who is in charge of the aircraft for the whole trip? Sorry for the stupid question, but I would like to understand the hierarchy on board in case of augmenting crew.
Thanks

[Dairyground]

No Land 3 says:
I think Trimotor came closest to a practical suggestion here. But I keep coming back to my point that any check has to be calculated for each take-off using the same variables as the original take-off calculation. IE it will vary for type variant, weight, departure point, slope, rwy surface conditions - the list is long!

So it will be subject to the same input error and be pointless.
If the input is correct then the performance will be correct. I suggest we are concentrating on the wrong end of the problem.

I agree that the time or distance to a selected speed has to be calculated for each takeoff, and if the correct numbers are put into the calculation all will be well. The point I was trying to get across in my original post was that some redundancy, an extra slice in the stack of Swiss cheese, can provide protection against wrong or incorrectly entered data.

If all the numbers provided are realistic and are put into the system accurately, as happens almost always, then the check is just that, verification that things are as planned. However when something goes wrong, when the passengers are all Sumo wrestlers rather than teenage gymnasts, or there is more slush on the runway than expected, or that supposedly empty container has been stuffed with a few tons of some illicit substance, or ..., then a check on time or distance to speed can save the day.

I suggested use of V1 as the check speed, simply because it is something already calculated and monitored. There is no reason in principle why some lower speed could not be used. Whatever speed might be used, the way to choose it should be decided by the owners of the SOP, taking into account input from people with appropriate ergonomics expertise and the PNF workload during takeoff.

I suggested basing the check on time rather than distance since the equipment required is miminal. Roll distance is not so easily measured, but could require extra hardware or modification of the software of existing systems. A conceptually simple system would be to adopt automotive technology and count revolutions of the landing gear wheels.

To drift slightly further from the main topic, one post a few pages back suggested that measuring time or distance to speed could give a reasonably accurate estimate of the weight of cargo and passengers, and averaged over a large number of flights be used to update the average wight of passengers and their carry-on baggage. Could the same information already be extracted from correlation of data captured by the flight data recorder and the loadsheets?

[Smilin_Ed]

I don't think an acceleration check is the answer, because of all of the variables, specifically runway length.

Runway length is a factor in properly determining V1.

[jack schidt]

I have written several statements and cancelled/deleted them. I wait for the report , but if the guys in the 2 front seats used 100T too little in the comp then good luck in your future jobs but dont make it a career in aviation!!! I have sadness and sympothy but no remorse, everyones life is in a pilots hands when on their a/c, i would willingly have borded this flight knowing that it could have happened to any of us, they were the poor bastrds and thank god it wasn't me? Good luck to them and GOOD LUCK to the rest of us!!

[snowfalcon2]

1. Time-to-V1 could indeed be a useful parameter.
With today's modern digital acceleration meters and computer power it should be quite feasible to have a computer monitor the take off run in real time too. I'd guess that it could already when 1/2 the calculated time-to-V1 has elapsed predict what the actual time-to-V1 will be, and call for more thrust if required.
2. Weighing pads on the ramp have their problems. One of them is the effect of any surface wind. Wind causes the wings to create a lift force, which can vary depending on the wind direction and aircraft deck angle. This can cause significant errors in the measured weights. This is probably one of the reasons such systems have not been successful so far.

[ExSp33db1rd]

.......Would you mind to explain who is in charge of the aircraft for the whole trip?


Normally, in my experience flying for two International airlines, one Captain is designated as being " In Command " and the other will be subordinate legally, but it doesn't stop the arguments between them of course, or the unspoken dominating personality of one over the other. As has been said before, Human Nature Rules, OK ?

That is why many prefer the augmenting crew to be off the flight deck when not actually required - just easier, sometimes.

[Khaosai]

Hi,

sympathy for the crew involved, hope all works out for them.

How about some form of head up display that shows the actual runway ahead, even whilst in LVO conditions. As soon as the aircraft starts its acceleration it shows the approx point of rotation. Could be shaded to accentuate that area. Some form of dynamic principle that varies with wind speed etc.

The company i worked for previously had the weight the aircraft thought it was displayed in the FMC. The V speeds were also displayed, based on that weight. Most of the time it was over the loadsheet weight produced !.

Rgds.

[crazyaviator]

In this era of stiff competition and corporate fat boys wishing to pocket more $$ and their shareholder friends looking for incessant profits , do we have here a culture of "just enough thrust for the job " ? Why go with extra thrust when the runway is long and the airplane is light ??? Sometimes, reality and murphys law comes to bite those who become complacent and behind the aircraft computers and the corporate SOP' s , designed to save a dollar and DECREASE safety !!!

[Smilin_Ed]

Time-to-V1 could indeed be a useful parameter. It needs to be something short of V1 where you have time to react. At V1, you're committed.

[andrewr]

Distance/time check has certain practical difficulties, particularly at night which is most of our ops.

And think about this: even a distance/time check would have to be something calculated for each takeoff to account for weight/rwy etc etc. The key word is "calculated". It would be subject to the same input error.

V1-time should not be too difficult though. It must be used in the V1 calculation already, because that's how you know how much runway is used to get to V1 therefore how much is left to stop - it just isn't an output I guess.

If the input data is incorrect, yes it will be in error but that error is exactly what flags an incorrect weight. Instead of monitoring only V1, you monitor V1 and time - if time occurs first, you abort the takeoff. If this happens you know:
- you are below V1 and
- you have have more runway ahead of you than you would have had at V1, because you have been moving more slowly than planned

This wouldn't pick up an error in the runway length however. It also wouldn't flag an incorrect heavier weight being entered, although I imagine that wouldn't be likely to be catastrophic.

[andrewr]

It needs to be something short of V1 where you have time to react. At V1, you're committed.

If you reach "time to V1" before V1, you are not at V1 by definition.

The only way it can work is if you abort once the time is reached, before V1 - if you wait until V1 and say "that took too long" you don't have the stopping distance that was used for the V1 calculation. If you reach "time to V1" before V1 and continue, you can be sure that at some point you will be below V1 without distance to stop - because the calculated stopping distance is used up by slower acceleration.

And it can't be a rule of thumb - it has to be a hard go/nogo number like V1, output from the V1 calculation.

[What-ho Squiffy!]

Lots of discussion about acft weight here, and how it likely to be underestimated. Suggested solution has been to weigh the acft, which is difficult, expensive, and potentially inaccurate.

What about switching to actual pax wt? With the technology available, it would be quite easy to incorporate a weighing system where people checking in stand. That way, pax weights along with ALL the normally un-weighed carry-on baggage is also weighed. No extra time taken, because they are weighed as part of the normal check-in.

Would potentially increase safety, but would almost certainly decrease profit margins. Perhaps the accountants don't want this info?

[KRviator]

With respect to carryon bags, and the lack of weighing, how does an airline manage this?

Ie, you have 100 pax, do they multiply that by 7kg to come up with a "Carry-on-bag-weight" of 700Kg as standard, and include that in the ZFW?

Reason I ask is not everyone will have carryon, and not everyone's carryon will be right at the 7kg limit, thereby offsetting the overweight carryon bags for those that have them...

[MR8]

Guys,

Although time to v1 looks suitable, it is not!!

It would be if there was a thrust problem. For a weight problem however, you are calculating time to a WRONG v1, with a WRONG thrust. On a short runway, I will not have any indication that I can still stop the aircraft after the WRONG time to the WRONG v1 if I suddenly weigh x tons MORE...
So it is the old saying... BS in, BS out.. and that goes for time to v1 as well...

MR8

[Andu]

Reason I ask is not everyone will have carryon, and not everyone's carryon will be right at the 7kg limit,KRviator, you have obviously never travelled with EK. How shall I put this? The... "95 percentile" EK passenger is pathologically incapable of travelling with less than 7kgs of hand baggage - and would (does??) carry 70kgs of hand baggage if he/she could lift it. (Granted, not on EK, but on another carrier serving the Middle East), I have seen a long succession of (admittedly tiny) Filipinas carrying backpacks so heavy that it took two others to lift each bag onto each one's back - and then, most could carry it only by leaning forward and when still, resting it on a rubbish bin.

Go on a Lagos flight and you'll find a whole new description for the term "Big Momma" - and the size of the hand baggage they all carry is almost beyond belief.

Seriously though, what you suggested is pretty close to the industry standard. A standard passenger weight and a standard hand baggage allowance in theory allows for the percentage who will be above standard being offset by the hopefully equal percentage who will be below it. Likewise with the hand baggage. However, as has been suggested above, from daily observation, in many areas of the world, it may be time a new standard weight for both people and what they carry to be accepted and adopted.

Again seriously, any form of 'real time' weighing would be a commercial nightmare, which is why it hasn't been adopted. (Can you imagine the fights between captains and load control?) Boeing, and I'm sure Airbus, allow a generous 'bugger factor' in their performance calculations. I've (purposely) done a takeoff in the sim. in a 777-200 forty tonnes over MTOW with an engine cut (severe damage and separation) at V1 +1. It was curvature of the earth stuff, but we did climb away, if at a very low rate of climb, and managed a full cleanup.

[grusome]

http://i101.photobucket.com/albums/m41/grusome_2006/6507-16Small.jpg

I would argue against abandoning the take-off on the basis of a "rule of thumb" speed check against distance. This photo, at Danang 1965, is of the remains of a USAF B57 that used this methodology. The pilot thought his acceleration wasn't good enough, so he jettisoned his underwing load and stood on the brakes. Unhappily, the US Marines had just dug a new series of trenches across the overrun. It was fairly exciting - I was waiting for a take-off to the north at the invert where you see an aircraft turning on to the runway, idly watching a B57 squadron scramble into the south. Suddenly, all these iron bombs were bouncing across my nose, followed by the smoking B57.

My choice would be, when reduced power is used for take-off, is to use the methodology applicable to your type that allows full (rated?) power to be introduced if there is any doubt. Clearly, on types where Vmcg is an issue, that speed would need to be known.

[mig3]

I understand the reasons behind why operators like to use reduced thrust on take-off - noise abatement, prolongs engine life etc.

My question is, does anyone know how significant the effect is? Especially with jet engines - would conducting every take-off at normal take-off power significantly reduce the engine time between overhauls? Or is it more a theoretical engineering idea that's just become ingrained into airline operating culture?

[flyonthewall]

Haven't posted for a while but have just caught up on all the posts after a few days away. I'm no scientist but from what has been brought up in the technical posts......

The 744 had a gross weight calculation system as an option. This was years ago. We never used it, can't remember why. If Boeing built it back in the 80's, then a previous poster was probably right in assuming that the commercial departments of the world discounted the usefulness of such a system in favour of the lucrative "standard weights". Maybe it should be re-introduced. Just how much water are we carrying for those First Class showers.....?

Using a flex temp at a light weight or TOGA thrust at a heavy weight, in the same aeroplane, on the same runway, with the same environmental conditions, will result in you using roughly the same amount of runway. That's the whole premise behind using reduced thrust. You use all the runway and less thrust to get you to the required speed when you are light. If you are heavier, you need more thrust to get you to the required speed before you run out of tarmac. It follows that you should rotate near the same part of the runway regardless of your weight. This is great if you fly on and off that particular runway often. Not so great if you visit 100 destinations a year.

The trend vector shows on your air speed indicator, and is thus an indication of your rate of change of AIR speed (which is what you need to get airborne). The reactive windshear system uses airspeed fluctuations (among other inputs), that you see on the trend vector, to warn you when you get into a windshear situation. Before trend vectors previous posters used timed airspeed checks or distance to go markers (both of which gave you an idea of your rate of acceleration in airspeed). If you have a trend vector, you don't need a timed check or distance to go markers (although Bitchin' Betty the RAAS lady will calmly tell you that you have 1000 remaining). The trend vector is more or less instantaneous and is thus more accurate than a timed check, or gut feeling as you whiz past the distance to go markers.

If we have

GPS
Trend Vector
Wind Vector
Runway length
Weight (an accurate one)
Elevation
Temperature
Runway conditions


We should have all we need to tell us whether out acceleration/energy is sufficient to get us airborne before the end of the runway. I know this is all stuff that we work out before we blast off, and that the speeds we come up with are supposed to cover us, but humour me and read on.....

The first three items in the list are aircraft system derived.
The remaining ones are what we punch into the FOVE/BLT.

If you can combine all these elements, (plus a few more, including Bitchin' Betty) would you not have a system that could tell you instantaneously (as the reactive windshear system does) that you have insufficient energy to get off that runway on that day?

It could activate when TO thrust was set (Flex, Assumed Temp, or TOGA) and give you the option of going TOGA straight away or discontinuing the takeoff.

This all makes perfect sense to me at the moment, but feel fee to fire away as I'm sure there is something I haven't considered that will see my brilliant idea shot down in flames!:)

[JenCluse]

Like Jack Schidt, I have been trying to not poke my retired nose in here, but I do believe I can offer a couple of points not yet fully explored.

The first is a bit of local knowledge. 16/34 is long, but a cow of a R/W. 16 slopes down 0.9%. The threshold area of 34 has a localised slope of about 1.15% before it rolls over and aligns itself with the 0.9% up-slope. This means that it requires a very deep flare to not slam it on, and that necessarily higher flare point at night is always very hard to pick. It’s almost like a crop duster’s strip. On the 727-200 I carried a min of +15 to have extra energy on hand for the flare, and with any wind around, at least +20. So an overweight landing was almost certain to be heavy unless the PF grew up at YMML.

The downhill T/O on 16 can be & has been neutralised by the wind shifts along it. I’ve raised dust myself once, to everyone’s surprise definitely including mine. We rolled into a quartering headwind, but down the other end the sock was showing a stiff tail wind. Acceleration was slow, then seemed to stop, but by that point there was no way we would have been able to stop in what distance remained. You should have heard me go on about V & Distance checks after that! A wooded hill sits in the NE corner of the field, and it (the A/p) is surrounded by deep river gullies, producing marked local wind variations. Swirling winds don't always show at the sock or the anemometers. I can recall two occasions when microbursts out of a clear sky put one 727 down out of site in a gully off 27, and another 727 was held low off 16, rattling a lot of tiles quite a few miles out on the extended centreline. They got away, but both times by dint of being US aircraft which have always philosophically allowed beyond-limit-power to be set, and the engine's reduced life accepted.

I was involved years back in an AFAP tech reassessment of Boeing's wet runway stopping distances, and after a lot of work we were able to prove they were grossly in error. Oz T/o charts are now realistic for Acc/Stop in the wet, but it taught me that what is put out by a manufacturer can be determined by the sales team as often as by the performance wizzes, and I didn’t blindly accept all numbers. I worked through every new endorsement’s charts to produce a summary of rules of thumb, one mid-range speed for every approach, fail, & landing configuration, with a kts variation per coarse weight adjustment. It was soon easy to be within +/- 1 kt of the actual chart, and 3 or 4 times caught a gross error.

Back in the early 60's down at East Sale I watched a USAF C-124 Globemaster heading home to Hawaii. Loaded to the gills and hoping to overfly Fiji, they aborted 6 (yup, six) times before finally raising dust at the far end and disappearing over the curvature of the earth (it seemed). That led me into deep discussions with two other USAF crews, and I have been a convert of their system ever since. Their achieved_speed_Vs_distance check was (& still is as far as I can find on-line) set so that zero wheel braking was used for the abort. Mind you, the tyres must have been jolly hot towards the end, but the check can easily provide a completely low stress abort speed. Speed x time is a coarser check, but 80 kts by 1,800’ was a good catch all. Still is by the sound of it. A friend who has more hours up down the back than I ever got up the front mentally prepares to adopt the crash position on any T/O if the nose isn’t starting to lift by 37 seconds, FWIW.

Personally I think that the most valuable comment in this series was that of Dairyground - what an eye-opener. We aren’t the only safety obsessed people, and it sounds as if the aviator sector may need to think more widely. What >is< ISO9000, and why don’t I know about it? Dairyground?

Thanks all for bringing me up to speed.

This report is going to be an interesting read.

[NO LAND 3]

Hey Flyonthewall - thats Trimotors idea! Hands off!

[NO LAND 3]

Oh actually its a bit better - still got to get the right weight in there though. And you'll be approaching v1 by the time it finishes its calculation! Think you're on the right track.

Anyway those of us on the big twin are not quite as exposed to these performance things (as long as they both keep turning) - maybe two engines is the answer!

[brokenenglish]

jack schidt wrote:
I have written several statements and cancelled/deleted them. I wait for the report , but if the guys in the 2 front seats used 100T too little in the comp then good luck in your future jobs but dont make it a career in aviation!!!...

So what happened to "I wait for the report"?

[Dysag]

You asked:
"would conducting every take-off at normal take-off power significantly reduce the engine time between overhauls? Or is it more a theoretical engineering idea that's just become ingrained into airline operating culture?"

No it's not theoretical. Some airlines track the life history of individual engines, so they know how they've been treated and their cost.

But the great experts are the engine manufacturers. Every customer demands a maintenance cost guarantee. The numbers they are quoted depend on, amongst other things, the average derate used. No good using what you call "normal power" and claiming on the maint cost g'tee. It won't wash.

[andrewr]

Although time to v1 looks suitable, it is not!!

It would be if there was a thrust problem. For a weight problem however, you are calculating time to a WRONG v1, with a WRONG thrust. On a short runway, I will not have any indication that I can still stop the aircraft after the WRONG time to the WRONG v1 if I suddenly weigh x tons MORE...
So it is the old saying... BS in, BS out.. and that goes for time to v1 as well...

I'm not convinced. If the weight entered is too low, it IS essentially a thrust problem.

(Making numbers up) If your V1 is 120 kt and you need 1000m to stop from V1, if you haven't reached 120kt by the calculated time you know:
- you are slower than 120kt and
- you have more than 1000m to stop.

The wrong time and wrong v1 only cause a problem if the extra weight has more effect on braking distance than it does on acceleration distance. This is possible, but it doesn't sound likely to me.

Time to V1 catches the error where your weight is too high and the thrust is too low - and the errors accumulate to provide extra margin.

[snowfalcon2]

V1 is not the whole story. You also need to reach Vr before running out of runway.
If the weight is more than calculated, Vr is higher and acceleration is slower. The computer may sense the slower acceleration, and ask for more thrust, but it should also account for a higher Vr i.e ask for even more thrust.
Might be possible to do in real time but I'm not convinced yet.

[bernardd173]

It sounds like the answer is not so much the time to V1 or any other speed, but what is your speed after the calculated time? If it's way below V1 you have a problem but also, by definition you have enough tarmac left in which to stop because you're stopping from a slower speed.

Isn't the right solution therefore to calculate how long it should take to get to V1 - if your speed is below V1 after x seconds then reject the takeoff?

[Dysag]

Since no-one else has picked up on this, I come back to a point raised by mig3: "use of reduced thrust on take-off - noise abatement".

I may be (I am) out of touch, but I can't remember take-off thrust routinely being influenced by noise abatement. Cut-back is another thing, but start-of-roll?

Not only that, I think it could be counter-productive, as it's best to be as high as possible over the measuring point. Comments?

[Cee of Gee]

The actual mass of PAX, cabin baggage and cargo has already been mentioned.

Do EK use a notional or actual mass for checked baggage? (I'd be very surprised if this alone would "upset" a 340....:confused:)

C o' G

[PJ2]

Dairyground;
Roll distance is not so easily measured, but could require extra hardware or modification of the software of existing systems. A conceptually simple system would be to adopt automotive technology and count revolutions of the landing gear wheels.

To drift slightly further from the main topic, one post a few pages back suggested that measuring time or distance to speed could give a reasonably accurate estimate of the weight of cargo and passengers, and averaged over a large number of flights be used to update the average wight of passengers and their carry-on baggage. Could the same information already be extracted from correlation of data captured by the flight data recorder and the loadsheets?
The timing method was discussed, if I recall, as a sidebar in the Madrid Spanair accident thread. Most agreed that if the takeoff run was longer than about 45 to 50 seconds, it was starting to get into outlier territory.

To be meaningful, timing to V1 would involve a number of factors as we know and, as has been pointed out, would require more accurate weight information than the industry, including the regulators, seem to be presently satisfied with.

A long time ago when designing the FOQA program, we decided to include a takeoff distance calculation for each takeoff. The IRS groundspeed parameter, (sampled once per second), is converted to feet-per-second and summed until the liftoff point. We do the same for landing distance.

Though not accurate to the foot because of the 1" time slices used, it presents a sufficiently accurate snapshot of takeoff performance. Most but not all of our aircraft LFL's, (logical frame layouts) are programmed to record wheel speed (in meters-per-second). The parameter is also not 100% reliable - so we use the groundspeed method. This collected information could then be married with the data you suggest in your post and then compared with the numbers that the "manufacturer sales people provide".

All this requires trained resources which no airline seems willing to provide these days but the matter itself does have data solutions. The fact that the airline doesn't use any of this data in any meaningful or productive way is beyond our control but the information is there for each takeoff to provide a full picture of the fleet's takeoff performance over long periods of time in varying conditions off different runways.

I have to say that Airbus provides far more information for the contaminated runway case for both takeoff and landing which includes the use of the CRFI, (Canadian Runway Friction Index (http://bathursted.ccnb.nb.ca/vatcan/fir/moncton/WeeklyTopics/Archives/20031221/CurrentTopic.html)) tables for landing, than other manufacturers I've seen but that's a bit of thread drift.

[What-ho Squiffy!]

To be meaningful, timing to V1 would involve a number of factors as we know and, as has been pointed out, would require more accurate weight information than the industry, including the regulators, seem to be presently satisfied with.

The travelling public are lucky that development of this "satisfaction" has coincided with engines designed for failures > 1 x10^9 flying hours. Or perhaps not luck at all; maybe it's because engines are so reliable that this relaxed and comfortable attitude with aircraft weights has become normal.

[PJ2]

Squiffy- Yes, I think the travelling public is on the receiving end of some very good work over the decades. I think in flight safety work, some sources of "comfort" are justified, such justifications to be found mainly in the data. For example, the data has justified ETOPS work yet serious, (in my, and others' view) questions remain regarding an actual vs. planned diversion under worst circumstances, (pressurization failure, arctic/polar/trans-Pacific routes, etc). Like the case under discussion, reliability has justified the approach taken. And of course, we all know and accept that the risk of failure is always present but has been examined (and hopefully constantly re-examined).

[What-ho Squiffy!]

Exactly PJ2. As I've mentioned elsewhere, it all comes down to the actuarial tables. If 1 airframe with all souls is lost at an interval of greater than 10^x flight hours, then that's acceptable.

It might not be correct, or moral (who can tell at what point this happens); but it's acceptable data.

[MTOW]

Since we've drifted into the mention of ETOPS - (warning: thread drift of sorts; but something dear to the heart for many EK pilots) - I would like someone to quantify the risk in placing the captain (and on some flights, he is the the only captain on board) in a "rest" area about as far as it is possible to be placed from the cockpit, [which in a 773, is a considerable distance - further, in fact, than the Wright brothers' first flight!] as it is on only EK's 777 fleet, and to a only slightly lesser degree, on EK's A345s and 380s.

(The " " surround the word "rest" for reasons we won't go into here, but mention torpedos, U-Boats and the lack of anywhere where rest can be taken in a sitting position to any EK 777 pilot and all will be explained.)

Others have mentioned in earlier threads the difficulty for a captain or FO to get back to the cockpit from the rear cabin past milling passengers and especially meal trolleys in normal circumstances. To do so after a decompresssion or a cabin fire would be near impossible, at least in good time to have any say in the immediate and not so immediate decisions on how the emergency (sorry - "non normal") is to be handled.

Comments from the panel of experts?

[Whiskery]

MTOW

Makes no difference where the Captain takes his rest or how long it takes him to get to the cockpit in case of an emergency.

The point is,there should always be aircrew on the flight deck that can handle any emergency without the help of the Captain.:ugh:

[7x7]

Just a wild guess on my part, Whiskery, but I'm assuming you're an FO. (Or senior managment, which your profile would suggest you are not.)

I'm sure MTOW was implying no insult of any FO's ability or professionalism, and nor am I, but if you don't understand the rather pressing desire of the man who signed for the aeroplane and who will be held responsible for the outcome of the "non normal", whatever than may be, to take part in at least the subsequent execution and decision making after the problem has occurred, you come from a very different mental space to the one I come from.

[trimotor]

Concur....

[BreezyDC]

Personally I think that the most valuable comment in this series was that of Dairyground - what an eye-opener. We aren’t the only safety obsessed people, and it sounds as if the aviator sector may need to think more widely. What is ISO9000, and why don’t I know about it? Dairyground?I'll leave it to Dairyground to explain ISO 9000 quality standards in more detail, but in the interim, it is a set of standards for documentation, communication and establishment of standardized work processes across the organization (Six Sigma is another quality standard used in aerospace manufacturing). These don't come down from on high, but are the result of process mapping and collaboration across work areas over time. More importantly, someone is designated as the owner of each work process, responsible for keeping it up to date and in use. The company must be audited initially and regularly by an outside certified auditor, with discrepancies addressed prior to registration or recertification. If something is happening that is not documented, or not happening that is, or worked around, it is addressed at a collective review meeting (did I get that right, Dairyground?).

This extends to not just well-documented work processes required in aviation authority regs like Part type SOP's and checklists, but also the regular corporate functions where things can fall through the cracks (e.g. communication between finance and maintenance). I don't have the full list of ISO 9000 registered firms, but I know UPS Air is ISO 9001 certified, as is United's Engine Maintenance Division.

In terms of its specific application to this thread: In addressing takeoff performance, under ISO 9000 a company should address the full end-to-end process, including some issues raised here that go beyond the preflight and checklists: e.g. availability and distribution of laptops, information available prior to crew pickup, thrust and weight calculations, speed checks, etc. Would checks have been implemented for catching erroneous figures or calculations under ISO 9000 if that's not addressed? Should be, but depends on the effective feedback and input from the parties involved.

The feedback from the accident review will probably serve as an interesting after the fact "audit."

[Mark1234]

For another perspective from a cynic who's been exposed to 'ISO9000' certification (in a non-aviation industry); it's paper pusher's heaven: Basically you must document your 'process', and show compliance to that process. The process it's self can be as broken as you like, just so long as you have a (documented) process (and follow it). Fixing the process becomes a complete nightmare. It's the sort of thing that makes some people a lot of money whilst getting in the way of real work :E

I will however grant that the implementation may have been badly broken, and the company has since gone bust..

[ferris]

Anyway....

It's being reported in the ME forum that the two gents involved have resigned- read into that what you will.

[Weapons_Hot]

"Resigned" or more likely: "Both of you can resign, and in which case, we will gladly accept it, or don't resign, and we will sack both of you".

[Nudlaug]

Latest info from Dubai

Composite pressure bulkhead is damaged along with 3 skin panels, lots of frames and stringers.

Airbus repair, possibly a complete bulkhead replacement.

This bird won't go anywhere for some time

:ouch:

[Smilin_Ed]

...reported in the ME forum...

What's the "ME" forum?

[Baldur]

Middle East

[SouthpawSLF]

"ME" is for Middle East:

http://www.pprune.org/rest-world-non-english-language-forums-8/

[GMDS]

If politicians scr#w up, they ass u me "responsibility", demission and get a thefty retirement for life. The taxpayer pays the mess.

If bankers scr#w up, they get huge bonusses and retirement for life. The taxpayer pays the mess.

If local talent around here scr#w up, they get shiny awards, a house and retirement for life. The expats clean up behind and the fuel-taxpayer pays the mess.

If pilots screw up, they get convicted and fired. They have to come up for the mess themselves, even for the one the constructors, companies and regulators helped creating.

Any pattern here?? :yuk:

[GearDown&Locked]

Just to see if I understood it correctly, and to give an image to some thoughts of previous posters.

It doesn't stop an error from being input, but given the RWY distance punched at the FMGC/MCDU and all the calcs for the V speeds (temps, wx, weights etc),
you just need 2 more parameters:
- Speed trend vector
- a way of measuring ground distance elapsed(GPS derived or wheel sensor)

Then its easy to determine if you'll be able to reach V1 inside min safe stopping distance, or at least if you'll get airborne at the very end of the RWY without taking the antenas with you. You just have to keep it above the green line.

http://img187.imageshack.us/img187/1741/accelversusspace.gif

Go easy on the flack! :eek:

GD&L

[alamah]

So the smoke in the cabin a direct result of tail strike??

[bernardd173]

GearDown&Locked

I don't know for sure but I suspect both the speed relationship with time and with distance are non-linear.

I'm a great believer in K.I.S.S. and in this case you don't need complex integrals of ground speed to get distance - if you (or your computer) can calculate the expected time to V1 & VR for the weight and power settings, then you check your speed at those times - if your speed is below the projections you're running into trouble, but at least you know you have the tarmac left to stop. If the speed is at or above projections at those times then you're good to go.

This approach is inherently safer than measuring time to V1 - what happens in that case if acceleration is low? You could easily find yourself in a position where you don't have space to stop.

[RevMan2]

it's paper pusher's heaven: Basically you must document your 'process', and show compliance to that process. The process it's self can be as broken as you like, just so long as you have a (documented) process (and follow it)

Certainly CAN be a "paper pusher's heaven" if the company isn't committed to quality and continuous improvement.

In the real world, customers will tell you everytime when you're providing a rubbishy service or product, either with or without ISO 9000 certification.

[ZimmerFly]

Dysag

Not only that, I think it could be counter-productive, as it's best to be as high as possible over the measuring point. Comments?

Exactly :D

[BreezyDC]

Revman2 is right, it's a question of corporate commitment to quality, and whether its just pushed down from the top.

Turns out there is a specific application of ISO 9000 type standards for aerospace that "recognizes the role of regulatory authorities":
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
AS9100: Quality Systems
Aerospace - Model for Quality Assurance in Design,
Development, Production, Installation, and Servicing
NIST GSIG: SAE AS9100: Quality Systems/Aerospace (http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/Global/as9100.cfm)

All this is no panacea though, it's still up to the people involved, and more importantly (as reflected in this thread) the corporate culture -- whether ISO certified or not.

[Capt Kremin]

I agree with Bernardd 173. Waiting till V1 to get an acceleration check would be too long and the V1 calculation and would be invalidated by the initial error anyway.
A time check to 80 knots would be much more useful, and guarantee that any subsequent rejected take-off would be in the low speed regime and with sufficient runway to stop.

[glad rag]

ISO 9000?

Once put to me as "It ensures you can produce anything including a total load of crap as long as you can consistantly make the same total load of crap every day".

It doesn't mean your product is any good, just consistant!

"And so speaks the old guard"

so obviously your customer is consistently wide of the mark as they pay you $$$$$$$$$$ bucks for your consistently poor product that complies with their consistently poor performance markers...idiot!:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

[mrs nomer]

All this discussion about times to V1 and assessing whether the take off is proceeding normally is all very interesting. BUT, the problem is that it’s very subjective.

Risk management design just doesn’t allow this type of guesswork into such critical phases of flight.

We need to come back to the take off data as designed by the manufacturer and certified by state authorities as the reference performance document .

Data is accessed on every take off, whether it’s via tables or laptop and, (unfortunately) relies on human input to obtain correct figures. If the crew, on the day, make an error in the input data, then they’ve made an error and wear the consequences (aircraft loss, damage, injury etc) as seen in numerous incidents and accidents with varying outcomes.

This error though, is the end result only. In most take off events such as this, there are generally systemic issues that prevented error trapping at multiple points during the pre flight, start, taxy stages of the flight, before the aircraft has even lined up on the runway.

We have to accept that it’s “normal” for all of us to make errors. That’s why we design processes that supposedly mitigate against the types of errors we are talking about.

Design of error management and trapping processes and procedures is the responsibility of management, not the responsibility of line pilots. Crews should follow these SOP’S with the reasonable expectation that they contain appropriate traps to prevent that final error.

If crews choose deliberately ignore SOP’s, then, yes, they have to accept responsibility.

But, if the process itself is flawed, then it’s senior management who must accept most of this responsibility.

Sadly, history has proved that flight crews are often the scapegoats for senior management shortcomings. This event will probably be no different.

[ZimmerFly]

Unfortunately this thread is littered with "Stable Door" solutions for dealing with gross errors. (Most are assuming some sort of gross error in the takeoff weight calculation and/or thrust setting).

Threat and Error Management (TEM) should have trapped any errors long before the aircraft started the takeoff run.

Timing and/or distance acceleration checks are just too late as any errors so discovered invalidate both the "Go" and "Stop" calculations (and probably use the erroneous information anyway !)

mrs nomer
you just beat me to the same conclusion as I was composing this offline :8

[PETTIFOGGER]

Has anyone built and tested one of these yet? http://www.patentstorm.us/patents/6133857/description.html (http://http//www.patentstorm.us/patents/6133857/description.html) Not that I have seen, but then I am not a pilot, simmer or aircraft engineer. I guess that many would say that such a device is an unnecessary expense for what amounts to a double-check. Others might see it as an essential piece of safety equipment.

The key element in this design appears to be the independently derived real-time data, which does not rely 'assumed' values entered before t/o, but calculates them during the roll. As long as the right airport and runway is entered into the FMGC, it should 'work'. For complete confidence, link the system to the auto thrust.

[Smilin_Ed]

Risk management design just doesn’t allow this type of guesswork into such critical phases of flight.

We're not talking about "guesswork". We're talking about charts that should be in the documentation for the aircraft that give time to accelerate to some point short of V1 that will tell the pilots whether they are accelerating properly. This should be independent of and a cross check on any other calculations made. I can't believe that the major airframe manufacturers don't have this data from their pre-production flight testing. Low acceleration can be caused by more than gross weight errors. Weak engines or a dragging brake could also be at fault and not have anything to do with input error by the crew.

Although the preliminary report will probably clarify this, it seems clear to most of us here that they weren't accelerating fast enough and should have recognized it. Although management should give them the tools to recognize insufficient acceleration, and maybe did, it seems like the crew was asleep until the end of the runway loomed in the windscreen.

[MR8]

Gentlemen, again...

I have to agree with mrs nomer and ZimmerFly. This should have been trapped before the aircraft starts rolling. I think the SOP's we use at EK are wellequiped for that, but unfortunately, lapses do happen, especially operating in an environment such as EK for reasons well explained before and in other threads.

GearDown&Locked:
Your check would indeed work if you knew the correct v1/vr/v2. If the error has been one of entering the wrong weight, your speeds will be a lot lower then required, and even with your acceleration check being ok, you will run out of runway before getting airborne. And this time with a safe feeling because your acceleration check has been ok...

Just for your info, on the typical EK A345 operations, we do very short trips on the A345 as well as the ultra long haul it was designed for, Hence, our v2 speeds will range from somewhere in the lower 130's up to the higher 170's.

Again, about the whole acceleration check thing. As I posted before I am completely AGAINST it. It is NO good way of checking your take off numbers. If you do your checklater in the takeoff roll, it is too dangerous to stop. You might have encountered more tailwind then expected, a windshear, ... Since you don't know if you can still stop, it is ALWAYS better to hit the TOGA and GO!!
I know that you could calculate the correct GS vs. Runway remaining etc.. but then you would get kind of conditional speeds. Like in: Before the v1 of xxx knots we call STOP unless the GS is XXX and the runway remaining etc etc... Not a good situation for a speed designed to make a QUICK STOP/GO decision.

Whilst an acceleration check at 80 knots vs. remaining runway might sound like a safer option, since you will always have enough runway to stop if the check should be unsatisfactory: even this check would be useless. At lower speeds such a check can only be done out of a static TO condition, e.g. beginning of the runway, stopped, applying thrust. Loads of time we enter the runway for a rolling take off. If this is done in an expeditious way, we are above 30 knots by the time we apply TO thrust. An acceleration check at lower speeds would thus be invalid and set you up with a false sense of safety.

Conclusion: the ONLY way to stop this kind of errors is to either have the ACTUAL aircraft weight at your disposal for a crosscheck (which the industry wouldn't like) or as mentioned in the start of my post, by trapping the error before the doors are shut.

MR8

[dofus]

The latest from MEL is that the evaluation work on the repair has just finished. Rear pressure bulkhead is cracked . Aircraft has been moved into the Old Ansett hanger at a cost of $28,000 per night ! Rumour that an Insurance write off is now being considered as cost of repair and requirement to get the a/c to Toulouse (unpressurised at 10,000ft ) to carry out the repair work is going to cost a fortune. At least 3 months out of service for repair work to be completed.:{

[What-ho Squiffy!]

This should have been trapped before the aircraft starts rolling.

Isn't it because it was not trapped the very reason why another level of scrutiny is required? It's all very well to say something should have been trapped, but that's no bloomin' help after the event passed through the trap.

[stickyb]

It doesn't stop an error from being input,

GD&L

And that is the problem.

If you want to build a system to catch errors in another system, then you have to assume that everything in the system being checked could possibly be screwed up.

If there is a possiblity that the weight can be input incorrectly into the first system, then you have to allow that the same error can be made if the weight is input into the second check system.

There again, if the weight could be derived automatically from sensors or weighbridge, why would we need the second check system anyway?

[GearDown&Locked]

The main idea is to give you some predictive notion of how fast you're going to reach your calculated V1, for instance.

IMHO this aid could be as simple as coloring the speed trend arrow from red to yellow to green while on the TO roll, depending on the acceleration the A/C versus the distance it travels on the ground. This is not a system that checks another system, simply a visual cue for the numbers the pilot has punched in.

If you keep getting a red arrow along the TO roll until, let's say 80 or 100 KIAS, it means that you're not getting enough acceleration to get airborne inside the RWY distance. V1 doesn't come into play here as you could be too slow for TO but well inside a perfectly safe braking distance.

GD&L

[Obie]

...I think you mean lambert, don't you, woodja 51?...

not Dude! :ok:

[Propjet88]

For info the outfit that I am familiar with uses reduced thrust / flex takeoffs wherever possible and I think that most outfits do. In lay terms this uses an "assumed temperature" method of calculating thrust that "fools the aeroplane" into thinking that it is weight limited due to ambient temp.
Hence the aircraft always rotates at about the same distance from the end regardless of weight. (Sounds funny until you think about it / less weight - less thrust).
Following on from this the length of the trend vector is always roughly about the same - regardless of weight. In the particular aircraft I am familiar with it is about "25 - 30 kts in length". The only time it varies is on a light weight/high thrust takeoff - unusual but possible due to contamination or MEL requirements etc. In this case the thrust vector is longer. So a simple "gross error" check can be made very early in the takeoff roll - like just after thrust is fully set.
In my aircraft, if the length of the trend vector is less than 25 - 30 kts - stop! It can be done so early in the takeoff roll that the stop is quite gentle - i.e not a passenger screaming abort at high speed. As I'm sure most drivers are aware the trend vector is a fabulous indicator of wind shear on the runway and I am a big believer of the PM being "trend vector aware" during the takeoff roll.

Following the Auckland accident I tried setting up the FMC (in the Sim) with the ZFW set as the TOW and believe me the trend vector was really short - like about 5 - 10 kts. Unforunately the heavies in our airline didn't want to consider introducing the idea of trend vector monitoring by the PM as standard. They did concede however that it was acceptable as an "individual airmanship check".

Interested in whether other use this or considered views.

[cats_five]

I guess the per-night charges at LBA back in '85 were relatively cheaper, as a TriStar spent some time there after a landing overrun. (watching it get put back on the runway and moved away was a local spectator sport for a couple of days)

Photos: Lockheed L-1011-385-1 TriStar 1 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/British-Airtours/Lockheed-L-1011-385-1-TriStar/0455462/M/?width=1600&height=1079&sok=&sort=&photo_nr=&prev_id=&next_id)=

[Des Dimona]

Smilin Ed,

I can't agree with you at all.

In a very dynamic situation at speeds in the order of 160 KIAS, it's simply not possible to look outside and accurately determine whether planned acceleration is matched by actual. The aircraft at this stage is travelling at over 250 feet per second.,

Stick to the take off performance data. It's the most empirical data.

[ferris]

Do the commercial departments weigh up the cost of the risk that reduced thrust take-offs represent, versus the money they save? Everyone assumes they do, but do they?
Clearly, if you are going to severely damage (or worse) an airframe every year or two by planning EVERY take-off to involve rotating at the end of the available runway (and you cannot {as proven} have zero error in such ops= an accepted level of risk/loss), there has to be an enormous benefit in engine life/maintenance to offset.
As PIC and accepting the risk, shouldn't you be privvy to those numbers?

[fourgolds]

GMDS , your sentiments on accountability are so right. Its sickens me how the other " professions " are never held to account for their bad day at the office. Sorry dont mean to create a thread creep. But I have more respect for every single one of my colleagues ( brown nosing incapable office types excluded), but not a single member of those " professions" .

[Jetjock330]

As prop jet says, Airbus makes use of the full length of every runway in their performance and reduce the thrust as much as possible to a minimum allowed value. You're most welcome to use more thrust, or TOGA, which would shorten the take-off length. Most airlines promote the Flex take-off for engine life/cost.

Thrust may not be flexed below 25% (A340-300) 40% (A340-500) ref FCOM 2.02.01 pg 14, of the entire thrust and all climb gradient segments must be made.

This is to say, that on a wide body in general, medium to long flight, you will always be having the opportunity to visit the far end of most runway rather closely when rotating.

Screwing up the figures or weights, will always have a disastrous effect.

[EMIT]

Reading the postings, it seems that people think that the risk only lies in reducing thrust - not so!
Even if you would use full thrust on every take-off, if you have determined the associated speeds with the Zero Fuel Mass, instead of with the Take Off Mass, you will probably scrape the tail on rotation. Granted, it will happen not so near the departure end of the runway, but still the airplane will be damaged.

As for self weighing aircraft: they do exist! Many cargo aircraft have such a system. Not terribly accurate, but it should provide protection mainly against gross Centre of Gravity errors. However, if such a system is u/s, aircraft dispatch will be allowed according MEL - and then, safety is provided, as on any other aircraft, by rigorous procedures.

[Belgianboy]

Mig 15, fully agree with you. Never read such a pertinent description of ISO 9000 so far.

Willy Henderickx
Loss Adjuster

[Bus429]

Flight Global reports pilots have resigned.

[sandfrog]

Nobody ever gets fired from ek!

[jack schidt]

Resign = Admit responsibility for the error and take your saved company scheme cash.

Sacked = Don't admit full responsibility for the error (other factors also at play) and company won't let you take the cash = BLACK MAIL!

So....Your liablilty (they win when you resign as not their fault). Part company liability possibly (they won't pay out your cash and they win when they fire you).

[sandfrog]

let me rephrase, ek always wins as you resign as never ek's fault?

[Smilin_Ed]

In a very dynamic situation at speeds in the order of 160 KIAS, it's simply not possible to look outside and accurately determine whether planned acceleration is matched by actual.

We aren't talking here about 160 knots. The decision has to be made well before that, probably not more than 100 knots. In any case, it has to be before V1 and in time to abort before V1 and stop safely in the remaining runway. On fields without Distance Remaining boards, or where you can't see them, it has to be determined by time. If you don't want to do it, fine, just keep on they way this crew did. They (and their passengers) are still alive, just out of a job.

[Smilin_Ed]

As prop jet says, Airbus makes use of the full length of every runway in their performance and reduce the thrust as much as possible to a minimum allowed value.

Does this mean that V1 and Vr are always the same?

[crazypilot]

Pilots resign after Emirates A340-500 accident
Kieran Daly, London (01Apr09, 13:11 GMT, 155 words)

The pilots flying the Emirates Airbus A340-500 that suffered a severe tailstrike at Melbourne on 20 March have left the airline.

A spokesman for the carrier says: "I can confirm that they have resigned." He declined to give any further explanation.

The aircraft (A6-ERG) remains in Australia after being extensively damaged on take-off from the 3660m (12,000ft) runway 16 during which it suffered at least one tailstrike and is reported to have struck antennas just beyond the runway end.

It climbed to an intermediate altitude before dumping fuel for about 30min and then returned to Melbourne instead of continuing to Dubai. It landed without further incident.

No further information on the cause of the accident has been released, although ATI understands that suggestions of a problem with one of the four Rolls-Royce Trent 500 engines have been ruled out, despite passenger reports of seeing sparks or flame from one of them during the take-off run.

Source: Air Transport Intelligence news

[herkman]

From early days, we have seen the concept of lets blame the pilot, particularly if they cannot answer for themselves. In some cases the situation just like this one, can be part pilot error, but often there are other facts that come into play, and if it suits the operator they can be smoothed over.

Does appear that in this case the pilots made a severe error of judgement, but then the system of checks should have caught the situation, long before it became life threatening. In this case the operators of the aircraft, are sitting back in their offices confident that they have had justice done. However they are failing to understand that wall papering over the cracks does not fix the problem.

I am sure that on this forum, there are many who are thinking "there but for the grace of God go I". It will interesting to see what change of operating procedures Airbus will bring out to avoid this and other situations coming back to haunt.

As for the pilots, would have thought this incident would have made them better pilots and should not be a reason to put them on scrap heap. Certainly showed considerable skill in their handling of events after the scrape.

As an after thought, I wonder if the rest of the fleets bulkheads have been checked, if the story put around of regular over loading has merit, perhaps some of the damage was already there and was only compounded by the incident.

Regards

Col

[herkman]

QA standards at least in Australia, is focused on procedures and paper flow. It has nothing to do with quality of product at the end. It has nothing to do with even if proper process takes place, what it means is the flow of events is docuemented and is followed.

One could be producing the same crap product day in and day out but you could still meet the needs of the QA policy.

So the paperwork could be perfect, but the actual product like in this case could be flawed.

Regards

Col

[Dale Hardale]

Ed,

The issue here may well have had no different result if the wrong speeds were used. ie the acceleration to (your speed) of 100 KIAS would probably have been within a few seconds of normal.

The problem could have been trying to rotate the aircraft at much too slow a Vr. The aircraft just wasn't ready to fly. They would also have been above the "wrong" V1, and we are all trained to go after that speed.

As has been said before, it is an extremely dynamic situation and valuable seconds would have been taken in wondering why the aircraft wasn't responding. The rotation process over say 5 seconds would have consumed well over 1000 ft in itself, and probably much more with the drag of a continuous tail strike.

The hindsight committee will no doubt say they should have lowered the nose to the correct pitch attitude and immediately apply TOGA thrust. The crew on the night was faced with a situation that they had never ever seen before - so comment after the fact is of little consolation to them.

Time assessment on very heavy take offs, once again, would be a subjective process, even at 100 KIAS. I can't see authorities approving such a system unless it was able to be calulated for every take off. That would also require inputs for possible dragging brakes, airframe deterioration etc etc etc.

It's just not possible to do it accurately.

[Gillegan]

To those who seem to think that the resignation of the pilots makes the results of the investigation fait acompli, this may or may not be true about the internal EK investigation but remember, there will also be an independent investigation by CASA. CASA has a pretty good reputation for independence and I would bet that "if" an error was made, the very next question will be "why". While I don't really expect much introspection from EK, I would by shocked if CASA refrained from looking into the human factors aspect of this.

[sunnySA]

ATSB & CASA would/should both be interested.

[framer]

It's just not possible to do it accurately.

I'm no performance guru, but I think we could do it accurately. Why have the military persisted with timing take-offs if it is such a difficult thing to get right?

Surely there could be a chart for your a/c type and engine configuration, down the Y axis is the N1 %, across the X axis is the weight, where they meet is the maximum time to 100kts.
Question for the performance types; how would the actual ambient temp be taken into account with something like this? Could you have bands of say "0-10degrees" 11-20 degrees, and 21-30 degrees, or would that be far too course?

Here is how I imagine it working; if for example you put the data into the laptop and it came out and said max time to 100kts is 35 seconds. You then trundle out to the runway and roll, at 35secs you notice you are only at 98kts, either abort or TOGA and off you go, if you get to 35secs and you are at 85 kts...abort.

I am looking forward to being corrected and having the weak points of this method pointed out as it will help me learn :)

[woodja51]

Not being a rocket scientist but Framers idea is quite plausible.

The other alternative as I said earlier is to use toga and those speeds for max TOW - that way ( almost) no take off becomes marginal ( except where you are below max structural- which in Emirates happens only in rare occasions).

Turning a high performance aircraft into a marginal performing one - which is what the current procedures end up doing.

Ask the punters if they want to pay an extra few dollars to use full power - or not... once again like telling them we fly slow and get them to places late when they have paid for a ticket - just to save fuel.

Granted, if you measure all variables with a micrometer - so that you can extend the field length out to a 'balanced field' ( where you can stop or go at V1 within the avail field) then this might save engine life etc but get any one of these wrong ( pax/pallet weights/bit more tailwind at one end of the runway etc) then all of a sudden you have no buffers left.

From basic newtons law stuff - s=ut+1/2 at.t

ut =zero therefore

at any point s=1/2 a. t squared.

a= comes from the accelerometers, therefore if constantly integrated over the changing values of acceleration a figure for time to get to a particular distance is really easy. ( yeah I know that is the trend vector)

All this information is on the jet....position/accel/et etc

I really think it would be possible to use the graphical method that Framer comes up with to come up with a gross error check point.

HOWEVER.... there is already gross error check points ( green dot/vref for the FMC weight etc) and these were ( possibly) not picked up.

Another possible and easy check would be for the performance figures to be pre calc'd for the ETOW by the company and transmitted on the OFP for the predicted take off conditions. or via acars. (Or.... even up linked like some operators)

This should be done on every takeoff to work out regulated anyway ( but it isn't where I work until the pilots do it for most takeoffs)

Would at least give some ball park numbers... but once again it has to be checked by someone ...

I think this is the point of all these possible solutions.... they still require a process to be followed.

Might reduce the swiss cheese holes but still wont stop the problem - just drive the stats out to past 1x 10-9.!

Anyway I really feel for the guys - these mistakes - if that is indeed what happened could happen to anyone of us.

We dont live in a perfect world the more we model it to suit ourselves the more it jumps back at us!

[ACMS]

At CX we uplink the Takeoff data from the main frame in HK. We then enter it whilst carefully crosschecking the load sheet in a SET routine patter.

However, it is still possible to screw up the data entry and have both guys miss it.

We are only human after all.

The ONLY way is for the aircraft to weigh itself and come up with V1 VR and V2 numbers which if more than a few knots out wont let you enter the numbers from the RTOW calculations without giving you a clear warning message first.

Until this happens, no matter which way your company does it, there is no way to take out the "human error" aspect.

Just be slow and methodical, know you aircraft and what to expect.

[Belgianboy]

As a SLF, I wonder why economics might influence the safety of the flight. We, all, agree that if maximum available power is used more fuel will be burned, lifetime of the engine will be reduced and tbo eventually reduced. The risk of overstessing the engines might induce failures.

On the other hand, if lesser runway is used, the chance of remaining on the runway after an aborted take-off close to V1 increases.

Shouldn't engines be operated at a compromise setting between maximum power and settings currently used?

I stand to be corrected and would appreciate to read comments from aero engines specialists.

Thks in advance.

[Carnage Matey!]

They already are. Take Off calculations already allow for a 15% increase in take off run plus a further third of the distance from airborne to 35 feet. How much more margin do you want, and would it make any difference if you've used the wrong weights in your calculations anyway?

[Belgianboy]

Thks for your early valuable reply.

Willy

[Wiley]

Not so many years ago now, I know of one (now ex-) 707 operator (military, southern hemisphere) whose SOPs on takeoff calculations were that one pilot prepared a set of figures, then handed the books over to the other with the book closed and no pages marked so that the the second pilot had to go through every step again himself, totally independent of the first.

Then they'd compare figures; and if they didn't agree, they'd look for the error.

On the EK 777 fleet, it was very easy to do something similar until progress intervened with the latest arrivals to the fleet not having the two inbuilt electronic flight bags. It was my habit, (and still is on the older aircraft fitted with the two EFBs), to do the takeoff figures myself, and then, with the very handy XFR button, I could very easily compare my figures with the FO's.

However, this doesn't address the problem of the wrong figures being put into the FMS, and I have to admit that I don't do it for every takeoff. On occasions, if there's the possibility of a runway change, I'll have the figures for the second runway in the other EFB pre start so as to save the FO having to be 'head down' inputting the new figures after taxi.

Having said that, I made a comment way back on page 1 of this or the other thread covering this incident that I'll repeat here, if not in exactly the same words. I think there'd be very few professional pilots who would not say "that could never have happened to me", even with every safety measure known to man in place.

As someone has said before me, the two operating pilots, how ever badly they may - (stress, at this stage, may) - have screwed up initially, did an excellent job in revovering the aircraft from the initial situation and then getting it back on the ground in one piece without injuring anyone among their passengers and crew, (I'm sure very ably assisted by the B crew).

I'd like to think I would be able to half as good a job as they did after the initial problem reared its head and pray to God I never have to.

[BusyB]

"The ONLY way is for the aircraft to weigh itself and come up with V1 VR and V2 numbers which if more than a few knots out wont let you enter the numbers from the RTOW calculations without giving you a clear warning message first."

Some of the -400 freighters are fitted with this weight and balance system. Perhaps it should be more widespread.:hmm:

[Obie]

Wiley has summed it up!

They stuffed it up...and they quit while they were ahead!

It wont happen to me...but, it could happen to you!...

so, be prepared!!

[Sheikh Your Bootie]

So you have seen the report Obie have you??? You are so far ahead of everyone else, muppet habibi!! Some colleagues are too quick to hang, draw and quarter their own, simply amazing :=:=

SyB :zzz:

[BEA 71]

The old Vickers Vanguard ( Merchantman ) was fitted with a " STAN ",
I can´t remember what it stood for. However, as soon as the freighter
moved it displayed a rough indication of weight and trim, which was then
compared with the load/trim sheet figures. It worked perfectly and saved " big mouth ", one of our load controllers, from getting into serious trouble
when STAN indicated a ten ton weight difference. I know it wasn´t perfect, but it was helpful.

[mates rates]

As a brand new first-officer in his 1st airline job I was taught by my Training Captain, when the load sheet arrives,to ask yourself "what is V1 and is it logical"? Whilst this was a turbo-prop operation and didn't have the complications of rated thrust or assummed temperature methods or whatever it is called on the Airbus,I asked this question of myself throughout my career.
We know the empty weight of our aircraft,we know the approximate passenger load,(multiply by 100 KGS)we know how much fuel we want.So we know our approximate TOW before we even see a load sheet.The only large variable will be freight.If the difference between my estimated TOW and the load sheet is not the freight or extra passengers THERE IS AN ERROR.
While this method isn't fool proof and V1 can vary greatly with large TOW weight spreads and power settings and runway conditions,it eliminated the weight error possibility and made me think about the logic of my V1 speed.It worked for me throughout my time.
Of course none of this accounts for the added problems of duty time,time zone changes,accumulated fatigue,flight deck preparation interruptions,commercial pressure,company morale,flight operations department integrity,company operating procedures,flight planning,maintenance,MEL's and all the other distractions which the modern airline pilot has to deal with as part of his so called "normal operation".
It was a much safer flight deck preparation when we didn't tolerate interruption to this preparation.
Shooting the messenger will not fix the problem.

[Wiley]

Obie, if you say I "summed it up" with the message you read into my post, I have a serious communication problem.

I'm assuming you have your tongue firmly in your cheek with your following paragraphs.

[Super VC-10]

I've read every post in this thread that I can. As far as I can tell, nobody has asked this so far:-

Wouldn't safety be enhanced if every flight started as far away from the far end of the runway as possible? - i.e no starting from intersections with 300m of empty runway behind you.

It might not have made a difference in this accident, and I'm not sure whether or not they did start at the end or part way along the runway. Anyone else got that info?

[bernardd173]

framer

You said : Here is how I imagine it working; if for example you put the data into the laptop and it came out and said max time to 100kts is 35 seconds. You then trundle out to the runway and roll, at 35secs you notice you are only at 98kts, either abort or TOGA and off you go, if you get to 35secs and you are at 85 kts...abort.


Which is exactly the point I was trying to make. If you do it this way it works - if you measure the time to 100 kts and discover it's actually 45 seconds not 35, what the heck do you do next? Can you be sure you have enough tarmac to stop?

It strikes me that if more departures are going to be made at reduced power using a bigger percentage of the available tarmac for economic resaons, then it's becoming essential to check the progress of the roll, other wise we're going to see more events like EK407.

[FullWings]

Here's the spec. for a TakeOff Performance Monitor, published in 1987: sae.org (http://www.sae.org/technical/standards/AS8044) I think that's what we're all asking for? If you have $61 to spare, you can even read it!

I haven't seen the document but I'd assume the problem is a little more complex than you might initially think. However, in these days of GPS and abundant storage/processing power, I'd have thought it would have been possible to construct a device that took as inputs the stabilised N1/EPR from the engines and the flap setting, measured the acceleration (and so determined the mass), then did a quick calculation from knowing (independently) where you were and where the end of the runway was.

If this calculation showed that you wouldn't get airborne in the length available, it would trigger a warning (possibly configuration?). If the warning system was set up so that it would only trigger on recognising a severe performance issue (= impending crash), then there would be much less likelihood of false warnings. The technology is there - certifying such a device is another issue completely...

[Smilin_Ed]

It's just not possible to do it accurately.

Interesting. I did it for 20 years and didn't realize that.

[taipanlead]

I fly as an F/O on 742 and am a great fan of checking acceleration at 100kts. Though its not a simple calculation as altitude, wind, T/O weight as well as actual performance margin need to all be taken into account. I have an excel program which spits out a value for each Take off which I find accurate to about 3 sec. I start timing as we go through 60% and interestingly the acceleration times vary from 15 - 30 seconds ( I add 2sec for a static T/O ). The greatest variable I find is the F/E technique applying T/O thrust, a problem which won't occur on the new a/c using auto throttle for take off. As I'm in the right seat its will not be my decision to stop however I can at least inform the Capt if the acceleration is way off, possibly he may "feel" it too. I see it as a last resort strategy as I believe if you did mess the figures up you will "feel" that the accelaration is slow and now have a number you can compare it too. And can then make a reasonable decision based on the factors of the day.

[Dale Hardale]

Ed,

Interesting. I did it for 20 years and didn't realize that.

All I can say is that the lawyers would have a field day if it went to court and all you were able to say is that "it looked right at 100 kts."

[What-ho Squiffy!]

All I can say is that the lawyers would have a field day if it went to court and all you were able to say is that "it looked right at 100 kts."

Why do so many people have a problem grasping the concept of this extra check?

The point of this check is to insert another safety mechanism on the takeoff roll, in order to prevent an aircraft becoming a very fast mode of ground transport.

In your example, the crew had chosen to commence the takeoff roll, meaning ipso facto that they were happy with their configuration and calculations to do so.

Without any intermediate check, they would have continued the takeoff roll anyway! By this (ficticious for the example) crew saying "...it looked right at 100 kts..." does not have a bearing on the outcome - they were going anyway! Thererefore legally it has no meaning.

The only way the 100 kt check can change the outcome of a departure is for the crew to abort the takeoff, turn around and have another go; after re-assessing their configuration and calculations. Hardly unsafe.

[canadair]

oddly enough you say that, but in truth the 100 kt point is very telling, I always say 100 kts, 30 seconds, now that is my airplane, empty or full, a 747.
I say this because if I have not reached 100 kts by 30 seconds I know two things, either I have incorrect power set for the weight, empty or full, or I have a significant speed reduction, ie dragging brake, etc. Either way I know from time on type I may reach V1, but never VR in the confinements.

Rules of thumb are just that, a gross error check, but they serve the purpose to put doubt in your mind, and if I reach 100 kts and I am 20 seconds, I am stopping, if I reach 100 kts and I am 28 seconds I am very very observant. It cast doubt, and thats exactly what a rule of thumb is intended to do. It alerts you to impending disaster, and you react accordingly, I reach 120 and it still looks odd, I am now stopping.
beyond that, my options are limited.
Thankfully this has always carried me through, I have reached V1, and subsequently VR, albeit sometimes pretty far down the available surface, but it has worked.
I can say, from years of flying heavy aircraft, go oriented is a mindset, but the reality is always that the spread between V1 and VR can mean you may make V1, but never VR.
That is a reality I hope I never encounter.
I can well imagine what these guys saw, I hope to never see it, but I feel that gross error checks have their place, and it is exactly this scenario.

I cannot help but think that reliance on technology has pushed the gross error checks to the side, which may be a shame.

I would never dare to criticize the the crew involved, they acted on what was the information of the day. They now live and die by that inputted information, they undoubtedly believed in what they did at the time. I understand they were high experience, well established crew, unfortunately, as previously stated, you are as good as your last flight.

I suspect that training has shifted to reliance on given information, and it is very easy as crew to take face value information as gospel, I have seen it on occasion, the flight plan gives you a fuel, OK put it on, did you check it vs time and burn? no, it was on the plan, but they realize that they will never make destination.... after they depart.
A gross error check would have caught that, average burn VS FP fuel, for your weight.

We as crew are the final check, not dispatch, not load planners, because guaranteed when the flight goes all wrong, none of them are to blame.

The CPT signs the book, and will be fully accountable, and thats why in my back pocket I always hold a few gross error checks, they may seem old fashioned to those trained on glass, and fully reliant on given information, but they have served me well so far, and I have seen no compelling reason yet to give them up.

[Feather #3]

FI reports that the chaps have resigned.

G'day ;)

[Buster Hyman]

Indeed Feather#3, as reported in our local rag (http://http://www.theage.com.au/travel/travel-news/emirates-pilots-resign-after-melbourne-airport-incident-20090403-9lxh.html)which, by the way, has used ZK-EBC's photos & credited Pprune.org as the source!

[man on the ground]

It might not have made a difference in this accident, and I'm not sure whether or not they did start at the end or part way along the runway. Anyone else got that info?

full length

[Super VC-10]

Man on the ground - thanks for that. So it wouldn't have mattered in this accident. I'd be interested to see others opinions on the question in general. Always use the full length of the runway or not? If not, why not?

[ZimmerFly]

Intersection departures are perfectly valid and acceptable...as long as you are not trying to fly half way around the world, ...... and you have the figures available.

I don't have the charts but, from memory, I can see little difference in using the full length of 27 at MEL or departing from the 27/16 intersection on 16. :8

I don't think I would be very popular with the local residents. :E

[amos2]

....so, noise abatement is more important to you than the safety of your 150 or so pax?...is that what you're saying? Or have I misread you? :confused:

[ZimmerFly]

I think you have misread me.

Noise abatement is just one (low importance) consideration.

I was merely stating that just because you have 2000 feet or so of concrete/tarmac behind you on r/w 16 it does not make it any less safe than r/w 27 as there is still 8000 feet or so in front of you.

If I was trying to fly an aircraft at anywhere near MTOW, I would of course prefer the longest r/w available.

Thread drift in the prevaling wind.......;)

p.s. Have you never requested/done a takeoff with a slight tailwind in preference to a 3 mile taxi for a slight headwind ? All perfectly safe.

[Ndicho Moja]

I read on the Melbourne Age Newspaper web site that the have resigned.

[deltayankee]

I read on the Melbourne Age Newspaper web site that the have resigned.


This was already reported just six posts above yours, with the additional comment that their source is PpruNe.

:ugh:

[puff m'call]

Pilots resign after Emirates A340-500 accident (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/01/324648/pilots-resign-after-emirates-a340-500-accident.html)

[dofus]

The facts ! Both operating pilots were forced to resign following a flight operations debriefing in DXB this week. The management had decided to effectively SACK both guys before the publication of any official reports were published. Following the meeting both pilots were taken into the SVP fleets office where two 'pre prepared' letters were awaiting their signiture ! Both a resignation letter and a confidentiality statement. Both guys were told that failure to agree to resign and sign the letters would lead to legal action against them and were told " thing would get very ugly " for them .Both guys have therefore resigned and have been given approx 3 weeks to pack up their lives and get out of town.

[brokenenglish]

dofus wrote:
The facts ! Both operating pilots were forced to resign following a flight operations debriefing in DXB this week... ...Both guys have therefore resigned and have been given approx 3 weeks to pack up their lives and get out of town.

And yet the briefest of glances at this airlines internal roster system shows that both crew members are in fact still available for duties for the entire month of April. Nevertheless dofus does seem pretty sure of himself. My gut feeling is that the people who really know wouldn't be posting here.

Seems that some unsubstantiated posts have been made on this board which have been picked up on by the press. Trigger another poster coming along using the press reports (based on PPRuNe postings) as conclusive evidence of what has happened. Kieran Daly and the Melbourne Age as two examples.

[Smilin_Ed]

Several things do you no good:

The fuel not taken on

Airspeed already bled off

The altitude above you

The runway behind you.

[Dale Hardale]

They used the full length.

[4PW's]

Love it.....any more gems, Ed?

[ferris]

Brokenenglish
Kieran Daly and the Melbourne Age as two examples. "The Age" quotes Emirates as the source of the info that the crew resigned. Several posters have confirmed the rumour. What more do you want from a rumour forum?
I put it to you that the absence of any denial by the company, those involved, or any of their colleagues etc.etc. trumps the appearance of their names in the rostering system.

[brokenenglish]

ferris

They may have resigned, but the airlines internal reference system shows not.

The Age credits its photos to PPRuNe and with the continued absence of any official statement within the company I suspect this is where the 'spokesman' they refer to got his information from too.

[5LY]

A vortex of flying crap as they and we fight for space up each other.

[Jonny Suave Trousers]

Weight, V1 etc etc. Maybe the FO got distracted sending a text message? Hard to do whilst driving a car (especially with an Iphone) imagine how dangerous it is while rotating.

[positivegee]

Smilin_Ed "Intersection Takeoffs
Several things do you no good:
The runway behind you. "

That's all well and good Ed when you are operating for yourself.

In airlines that I am familiar with, once you hit V1 you go! ie You take off regardless of how much runway is left.

If you acted the hero, and aborted after V1 because you new you had lots of runway left, and if you damaged the aircraft or if anyone was injured, the airline would have your balls and probably your job!

Many operators prefer intersection departures because it saves heaps of time and money.:ugh:

Reduced power take-offs are preferred as they save money as well, and as far as the pen pushers are concerned, providing the minimum amount of overrun is available, that is all that is needed. Why spend more money on the take-off roll than you need to?:ugh:

As pilots, we are between a rock and a hard place. Pilots want maximum performance to use minimum runway to get off the ground earlier to minimise any potential threat, to improve the safety of all. On the other hand, airlines want us to use minimum power, to use the maximum amount of runway, to have the minimum theoretical safety margin, to save money. :{
Of course the decision to use max power is always up to the PIC, however any pilot who chooses to go against the company SOP (as shown up in the quick access flight data recorder) can expect a "please explain" from the relevant manager and possible job loss.

Unfortunately the decision to use reduced power or not (or an intersection departure (that was not the case here)) is not as simple as it should be. The decision not to abort after V1 can also be questioned.

Upon reaching V1, the pilots of EK407 would have been expecting everything to continue as normal. At VR (I assume they got to that too) they would have pulled back and expected to lift off as it has always done. When lift-off did not occur, the PIC and EFFO would have faced a very unusual situation as to "what to do now"? Correctly, and this should be applauded, they decided to continue and apply TOGA thrust (apparently, from other posts) and avoided a disaster that could have cost many lives and the future of EK as an airline.

Sure, these pilots may have made a mistake with their data input, but their company SOP's should have prevented this error. There were 4 pilots on deck at the time so if there was any gross error someone should have seen it.

Unless this is a case of gross negligence, which I doubt, and if it is found that the EK SOP's were part of the cause, I hope the pilots are re-instated and are shown as true hero's for carrying out a successful recovery and preventing injury to all passengers and crew, after a "faulty" take-off.:ok:

[Tu.114]

In fact, the point is not so much fuel saving. By reducing T/O power, you will not only extend your roll, but also reduce the climb rate until selection of climb power. So you will remain at lower altitudes for a little longer, where the engines tend to use more fuel than they have to.

The thing that makes a reduced power T/O save money is the reduced wear on the engine. By reducing power, you will also reduce RPM and most importantly the exhaus gas temperature that the turbine has to digest. Consequent use of reduced power thus has the ability to extend engine lifetime and therefore saves rather on maintenance costs than on fuel.

Tu.114

[Flying Spag Monster]

Broken English you are persisting on this forum and others with your roster argument re: the fate of the operating crew. My roster says I will do many things before the end of the month yet I know it will change, so too for the 407 crew. If you resign you are not automatically taken off the roster and I would suggest that this is why you still see duties for this crew, but they will not be doing them. I assure you that what Dofus says is true and request that you give it a rest.

[brokenenglish]

I assure you that what Dofus says is true and request that you give it a rest.

As I have mentioned twice before they may well have resigned.

My real agenda is to counter the inappropriate and dubious details of the resignations posted on this board and maybe balance up the curious sense of relish that is a feature in the posts of some of the armchair experts and 'sayers of doom' in these two threads.

If you resign you are not automatically taken off the roster

Depends on whether they have been given the contractual 3 months or just 3 weeks as posted by one of the experts. If it's 3 weeks it should appear in the system.

[Smilin_Ed]

In airlines that I am familiar with, once you hit V1 you go! ie You take off regardless of how much runway is left.

I don't know how V1 got into this. Of course you go if you hit V1. What I'm saying is that if you take off from an intersection, the runway you don't use is of no use. Try explaining to a court why you didn't use all of it..

[411A]

was fitted with a " STAN ",
I can´t remember what it stood for. However, as soon as the freighter...



STAN, Sum Total and Nose, also installed on many B707's
Worked quite well, if maintained properly.

[positivegee]

How Did V1 Get Into This?

Ed, I was just pointing out that the amount of runway ahead of you after passing V1 is irrelevant as you are committed to take-off.

Try explaining to a court why you didn't use all of it..

The court would understand because you were following company SOP's.

+G

[expat400]

"Upon reaching V1, the pilots of EK407 would have been expecting everything to continue as normal. At VR (I assume they got to that too) they would have pulled back and expected to lift off as it has always done. When lift-off did not occur, the PIC and EFFO would have faced a very unusual situation as to "what to do now"? Correctly, and this should be applauded, they decided to continue and apply TOGA thrust (apparently, from other posts) and avoided a disaster that could have cost many lives and the future of EK as an airline."

+G, although I would not normally recommend anyone in a heavy "Heavy" to abort after V1 I belive that in this case they were closer to a disaster because they DIDN'T abort. In reality they were way below the "true" V1 and thus they had plenty of runway to stop at.

SAS had a 767 in CPH once were ZFW was entered instead of TOW. When they reached "VR" (which was actually some 30 knots below the real VR) and the aircraft refused to lift off the captain aborted.

They stopped well before the runway end and we don't know if he would have been able to get airborne had he continued.

This is not said to discredit the EK crew's action. They acted correctly and in accordance with general knowledge and training. I just wanted to point out that in real life decisions are not always black and white.

Disclaimer: above reasoning is based on the assumption that wrong weight was entered in the FMC. I don't know if that's the case. The investigation will tell.

[Wiley]

expat 400, whilst I agree that the computer V1 may have been well under the accurate V1 for the runway/conditions/aircraft weight and configuration, I think most would agree that your comment and thus they had plenty of runway to stop atmight be highly debatable.

You're making the Monday Morning Quarterback's classic mistake: coming up with a course of action, after two weeks to consider it and with considerably more information available to you than the crew had immediately to hand. Remember also that they had to make an immediate decision in a vaery dynamic situation.

The only circumstances that immediately come to mind that would make me consider aborting a takeoff after I had passed V1 would be a restriction in the flight controls or my only then becoming aware of a CofG so grossly out that I was having difficulty controlling the aircraft and therefore, that I considered might not be controllable after liftoff.

I think I speak for quite a few EK pilots when I say that I am deeply saddened if the story I have read here about the way the pilots were invited to resign is true. I would like to think that the management pilots who asked them to do so were doing so on orders from above and acting very much against their will.

One mark of a professional aviator is to drag an impossible situation - perhaps especially one that an error on his own part has caused - and get on with dealing with it and recovering the situation to a satisfactory outcome. It's sad to say, but true, that there'd be some (a small number), who'd throw their hands into the air and give up after making such a mistake. Whatever this crew did wrong, like the Jo'burg crew, they did a remarkable job of fixing their mistake.

If the company felt it had no further use of services, I'd like to think that that decision would not have been reached before the full report was to hand.

[GMDS]

The only circumstances that immediately come to mind that would make me consider aborting a takeoff after I had passed V1 would be a restriction in the flight controls or my only then becoming aware of a CofG so grossly out that I was having difficulty controlling the aircraft and therefore, that I considered might not be controllable after liftoff.

Wiley, I guess pulling on the stick at V1 and all that happens is a tailstrike, but no lift-off, seems to me could be interpreted as a problem controlling the aircraft! Therefore a decision to abort would not have been wrong, according to your own argument. Who guarantees you that the bird will fly even with hitting TOGA? There might be another reason for no lift-off than simply inadequate thrust.

I am not pretending to know which decision is the correct one, but both seem equally reasonable.

[BAOREY]

ABU DHABI // The two Emirates Airline pilots involved in an emergency landing at Melbourne Airport last month have resigned. It was reported that the jet’s tail hit the runway on take-off.

In announcing the resignations, Boutros Boutros, the airline’s senior vice president for media relations, said he did not know why the pilots had quit. He declined to give further details.

“We do not like to talk about it because now the investigation is ongoing,” Mr Boutros said. “We have to wait for the investigation. I know that they resigned; that is all I can confirm.”

[expat400]

Wiley,

I'm not saying they should have acted differently. Read my post again:

"This is not said to discredit the EK crew's action. They acted correctly and in accordance with general knowledge and training."

But, if they were 20 knots under the true V1 they would have enough runway to stop on, don't you agree?

[jungle drums]

Not if it had taken most of the available runway to get anywhere near V1 due to incorrectly flexed thrust.

Complex Ops Manual procedures are inherently dangerous. KISS & concentrating on 'killer' items keep us safe.

ISO managers don't like the word 'killer' - it doesn't look good in their matrix....but have a guess what happens if you miss them.

[NO LAND 3]

although I would not normally recommend anyone in a heavy "Heavy" to abort after V1 I belive that in this case they were closer to a disaster because they DIDN'T abort. In reality they were way below the "true" V1 and thus they had plenty of runway to stop at.

Well that would depend on several factors, for example a lower weight may give a lower flap setting and higher take-off speeds. Also field length and "optimisation" of speeds for climb performance will affect V1 and not necessarily quite the way you might expect. It depends on stop vs go performance.
However, even assuming the only variable as weight, a lower than required power setting would mean V1 was achieved far further down the runway. Furthermore the higher mass would further reduce the likelihood of stopping in time. In fact V1 is not even relevant as the problem would not manifest itself until VR and I am going to speculate that it would have been far too late to stop.
Note, if you will, that I have had an idle half an hour an half a glass of wine to think this through.
The crew on the day had zero time to think yet still managed to react correctly and recover the situation as well as possible under the circumstances. I hope if it ever happens to me I can do as well.

[blueloo]

As a matter of interest what is the minimum thrust/maximum derate available.

I am surprised even a heavily loaded bus, even with max derate would have had trouble getting airborne on a nearly 4 km long downhill sloping runway.

(of course safety heights etc would not be met and it may waffle into the air - but it should still accelerate without dramas...)


As an aside - what are minimum unstick tests for? To prove that an early over rotation will still be able to get airborne ? Do they test this at MTOW?

[expat400]

Wiley, Jungle drums and No land 3.

Fair enough, I understand what you're saying. And once again, I never critisized the actual crew. They did what was expected of them in a difficult situation.

I only wish they would have been treated the same as the SAS crew. That could have been an inspiration for all other EK pilots.

[Phantom Driver]

I am surprised even a heavily loaded bus, even with max derate would have had trouble getting airborne on a nearly 4 km long downhill sloping runway.

(of course safety heights etc would not be met and it may waffle into the air - but it should still accelerate without dramas...)



True; after all, the guys managed to get the groundhog A 340-3 airborne taking off from the taxiway (heading 250) rather than runway 32 at Anchorage some years back. Some 7000 ft available, but they still made it, albeit after running the tires over a snow "berm" (?) at the end. Continued on to Taipei without further ado (10 hr plus flight, so can't have been too light on takeoff). I believe the augmenting Capt on the jumpseat was a training guy, but I could be wrong; would need to reread the report.

Gremlins will forever be standing by waiting to trap the unwary.

[Smilin_Ed]

With a long enough runway and the right weight, etc., V1 could be after Vr. It doesn't happen often but it could. Therefore if it didn't fly at Vr, an abort would still be feasible. It's when V1 comes before Vr that you are committed at V1.

Also, if you make an intersection takeoff and you've computed V1 using the full length of the runway, then the computed V1 is no longer valid. It's something smaller.

G+ The court would understand because you were following company SOP's.I wouldn't bet on it. Lawyers don't think that way. They would simply say the SOP created a dangerous situation and continue the lawsuit.

Intersection takeoffs mean you've negated some of your safety margin. If you choose to make one and you have an accident, you have put yourself in jeopardy for not choosing the safest course of action. Following SOP might help you keep your job with the company but won't help in a lawsuit.

[Wiley]

V1 could be after Vrhave I got your message right, Ed? You're suggesting there's someone out there (you?) who'd sit there and conduct a pre-takeoff brief that included the gem that he would abort AFTER the nose wheel was off the ground?

Not this little black duck - nor very many others who actually fly for a living, I think. What do you fly? MSFS?

[Dale Hardale]

Ed -

Out of curiosity, do you currently fly Airbus, Boeing/MD heavy aircraft ? :confused:

[canadair]

Ed.
V1 exceeds Vr???
great, well
its not what we train and its not what we expect so if you can quote an example, fantastic, but we are not conditioned for it, nor do we expect it.

Airline pilots train and expect 2 scenarios,
1 V1 = Vr
2 V1, accelerate, VR
anything else is not the norm.
That is the airline world. If you can show or have real world experience, it is not relevant to this scenario.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

This thread is clearly going to absolute farce.

We have one idiot suggesting V1 may be greater than Vr and another giving legal advice which is clearly imbecilic at best and dangerous at worst.

I wouldn't bet on it. Lawyers don't think that way. They would simply say the SOP created a dangerous situation and continue the lawsuit.

I've read some nonsense in my time, but that is a belter......

[Looseliver]

Hey, why don't you name-callers climb out of your cribs and contribute something other than hot air? If you don't like what's been contributed, then put up a counter argument.

Fools.:mad: