Spanair accident at Madrid

[B2N2]

Don't know if this has been posted already but here is a computer simulation from El Mundo:

Gráficos | elmundo.es (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/graficos/ago/s3/t4_spanair.html)

Let it load and click on the photo....

[ETOPS]

Where the presumed track crosses the perimeter fence the, caption says "marcas de ruedas" which is "wheel marks" in English.

[Seat62K]

Desertia,
I saw El Periodico on Thursday and it contained a number of inaccuracies in relation to Wednesday's crash. It does not seem to be the kind of newspaper which contains "quality" journalism as far as its reporting of civil aviation stories is concerned.

[justme69]

Not to judge anyone, but the press has been displaying graphics and even 3D animations without any foundation on reality (I still get nervous when I watch the ones showing an engine explosion).

Regarless, graphics today seem to show a fairly good representation of the strip and path, give or take a few 10's of meters.

From someone's description of the remaining airplane parts on the ground after rescue efforts finished: almost entire tail, both bare engines but in (quite) separate places (w/o capots), a broken boogie, bunch of metal threads of what used to be the wheels (rubber fully burnt out). Some remains of galleys, a toilet, some food carts, some catering (cans of dring, etc), some partially burnt content of luggage (shoes, etc). Not a whole lot. No doubts whatsoever, the impact speed must have been quite high and, of course, the fire took care of whatever little was left.

[FlyingOfficerKite]

DJohnsen

Thank you for your comments which, bearing in mind your published qualifications, are worthy of note.

Setting aside the aircraft issues for a moment, it still does not resolve the issue of passenger weights and no one will convince me that passenger weights are generally less than those calculated by the flight crew. The load sheet states the mix of passengers - M/F/C/I. How many people did you see on your last flight as a passenger who were over the limits of Male - 85kg, Female - 70kg, Children under 14 years - 35kg?

Aircraft are often loaded close to MTOM and a significant increase in actual passenger weight would make the aircraft overweight. Not legally, but practically. Irrespective of whether this is unsafe or not, it is eroding safety margins and detracting from flight safety.

My partner, her daughter and myself on a recent flight to Spain, although not excessively overweight overall, I calculate, with hand baggage, we were 50kg over the standard allowance. Multiply that by the 150 or so passengers, most of whom appeared heavier than ourselves, then the additional weight could have been in the order of 2,500kg.

You may say that the figure is exaggerated, but ask yourself how many of you weigh LESS than 12 stone, 9 stone and 5 stone for men, women and children respectively. Or with clothes, clutter, hand bags and hand luggage less than 85kg, 70kg and 15kg - the standard weights?

One website in the USA states the average weight of an adult male is 189.8 lbs = 13.55 stone = 86 kg. Add to that the weight of clothing and hand baggage and the average weight is some 10 kg greater than the 'standard weight'. If women the same applied to women and children, then with everyone being 10kg overweight, a typical flight with 150 passengers could be 1,500kg over-weight. Not as much as my estimate, but still on the wrong side.

This does not take into account the demographics of the populations travelling - no substantitation whatsoever, but it is the more affluent populations who travel by air. It may be that the average weight of an 'air-traveller' is higher than that of the general population (well-fed, relatively 'fat cats'). Who knows. But it would make an interesting thesis for a PhD in Air Transport Management!!!

A large number of people would regard these comments as scare-mongering - but it's worth considering as no one knows how much an aircraft weighs, absolutely, at any stage of flight.

fireflybob:

Interesting comment. I wonder if anyone else has actual data to refer to in this manner?

[XPMorten]

MD80 Takeoff field length charts give (if I understand them right :rolleyes: );
Required available field length of about 9300 feet (2800m)

Gross weight of 69T,
Temp 30C,
Elev 2000'
Flap 15+Slat,
7 kt tailwind,
slight uphill,

Thats about 64% of the available runway at Madrid.

XPM

[justme69]

Also, please keep in mind that the airplane is said to have "bounced around" a few times (after touching ground), the extend of those "bounces" not clearly stated. So perhaps the airplane had all wheels off the ground more than once. There seems to be skid marks both, on the runaway and off of it and first sign of potentially broken airplane parts some 140m off the strip.

A wing is said to have hit the ground briefly at some point, but it's totally unclear if it was after some "bouncing" or as it first "fell" or at what point during the accident. It was stated that the airplane "continued" after the wing (believed to be "mild") impact. The wing hitting the ground could be the reason of the first loose parts found (pure speculation on my side).

Obviously many other broken parts or pieces could've come off the airplane soon after hitting the ground presumably "hard" with all that weight (fuel for the 2.5h flight+full PAX).

A better transcript of the Spanair explanation of the return-to-gate situation has been reported. It's 100% clear now that the automatic switch of the probe heater was disconnected (i.e. not the probe itself). Four key quoted literally-translated sentences:
-Malfunction of the heater of the ouside air temperature ...
-Its function to avoid formation of ice during flight ...
-The mechanism that activates the heater was disconnected ...
-Not fully repaired inmediately because there was no risk of ice formation during the flight...

A detail of the timeline:
-13,05 Plane leaves finger.
-13,42 Plane comes back to finger.
-Tecnician works with pilot on malfunction for 33minutes.
-14,15 Plane leaves finger for second attempt to take-off.
-14,24 Ground control clears plane for take-off.

Technician is confirmed 41yo, 20 years experience (9 for Spanair), with current valid license by Dirección General de Aviación Civil for MD82, and airbuses 319, 320 and 321. Companies in charge of maintenance of the airplane: Spanair, with Iberia y Lufthansa Technik in charge of major maintenance and Volvo, ITR México and Aerothrust for the engines.

As you know, Spanair is wholly owned by Scandinavian Airways SAS headquartered in Sweden. Maintenance standards in Spain are relatively high, and this is the first accident with victims in Madrid in 25 years (and I believe may be the worst in number of victims also). The airplane involved was 15yo, about 5 for Korean Airlines and about 10 for Spanair, with 31.961 hours of flytime. Major 5-year revision passed Jan 24th, minor (120 days) revision May 23rd, annual flyability license permit about to expire in 9 days (administrative requirement involving only flying an inspector with access to the cabin during a regular routine flight with PAX).

[JW411]

Harry Mann:

I flew 4-engined and 3-engined Performance A aircraft (military and civil) from 1962 until 2006 and I never ever timed one single take-off nor was I required to.

I have however heard of the V-Force doing this but then they did not operate to Performance A standards.

[west lakes]

justme

-13,42 Plane comes back to finger.

Can I refer to this post

http://www.pprune.org/4341496-post376.html

It was being authorized to go to remote parking area 12 where it stays not much time.

If correct it never returned to a finger

[justme69]

My bad. I wasn't sure how to translate "return to base", so I assumed it went back to a finger.

[vanHorck]

The El Mundo graphic shows a deviation to the left before veering off to the right. First time i heard that one! Deviation to the left due to the left engine failing and over-correction to the right leading to touching the right wing briefly as often stated?

[PJ2]

justme69; (B2N2, I know you were only posting a link but please take note);

Not to judge anyone, but the press has been displaying graphics and even 3D animations without any foundation on reality (I still get nervous when I watch the ones showing an engine explosion).

Regarless, graphics today seem to show a fairly good representation of the strip and path, give or take a few 10's of meters.
I think it is a very good thing that you get "nervous" when you watch this animation showing an engine explosion and interference with the rudder, (I don't read Spanish but I see the red arrows).

As you say, there is no basis in reality for the media to create fancy, convincing animations when they do not possess any information beyond eye-witness and passenger accounts as to what happened. We have no information on the flight data recorders but they certainly haven't been made available to the public let alone the media.

An animation can only be built from flight data. Anything else is from someone's imagination who almost certainly has no aviation background or experience. The animations are misleading and worthless. They answer no questions, they increase wrong answers and increase the anguish of families thereby.

Technical prowess in the graphic arts and editorial license in reporting "as truth" what is in fact not known, is irresponsible journalism which plays with the victims' families and convinces most others that "the truth is now known", which of course it is not.

I do animations from flight data all the time as part of our ongoing flight data analysis program. Crews are free to call us (though management is not), to ask about their flights. The tool is very helpful in answering many, though not all, questions that flight crew may have. The tool helps crews understand what may have happened during an approach (or other event) that they weren't happy with and wanted to know more about - it is an effective safety tool because learning is involved.

I know what it takes to produce an accurate animation which can tell as much of the truth as the data will permit but even then we have to be very cautious about what we see.

The media will have created this "animation" out of a standard graphic software like Studio Max and as such it is an extremely powerful, enticing image, which is completely without foundation.

This illustrates why second-hand story-telling in the wrong hands (the media, as well as some of the wilder theories seen in this thread) can produce seriously flawed results and draw people unknowingly to incorrect conclusions about what happened.

vanHorck:

The El Mundo graphic shows a deviation to the left before veering off to the right. First time i heard that one! Deviation to the left due to the left engine failing and over-correction to the right leading to touching the right wing briefly as often stated?
If I may, I don't mean to be unkind but it is your comment which illustrates precisely the problem described in the post above. The animation has no basis in fact and should be dismissed completely. No one has any information on whether the airplane first went left then right or ...?

[barrymung]

QUESTION:

Why are planes not fitted with video recording systems? Indeed, why aren't airports fitted with such systems?

The cost of digital video has fallen vastly and storage capacities are huge...

Buses, taxis etc are fitted with such systems...why not large planes/large airports?

(Such a system would go a long way to explaining what happened here, the London 777 crash, Athens crash etc...etc. and whilst they often wouldn't provide conclusive proof it'd certainly point investigators in the right direction..)

[bobwi]

Today Spanair announced that the reason for returning to the gate was the heating system of the temperature sensor. In other words the heating to prevent ice getting on the temperature probe. It was disactivated by the mechanic according to the MEL. The airplane is aloud to fly with it for 10 days before it needs to be repaired. Since the weather was good and there were no icing conditions the decision to depart was correct if what Spanair sais is correct.

The mechanic is 41 years old and has 20 experience. He is at home with a depression after the accident. I sure feel sorry for him.

The take of was filmed and there were no visible flames from the engine and some sources now say it was the right engine.

It will take some time before we will know what happened but for sure it is an extremely said event.

[justme69]

I have relatives air-controller and pilots (me being neither) and we are all amazed at highly profitable airports operating in the first world w/o any sort on video surveillance pointing to the landing strips with the aim of capturing accidents during landing or take-off.

This in a world where a high-definition camera costs under $500 and DVR recorders can be had for under $200.

It's usually only low-resolution, wide angle video surveillance cameras that are deployed and then again only on a handfull of airports.

So many questions that would cost so little to answer.

Thankfully, this accident was recorded in video, so a few scenarios can be dissmissed off-hand such as any large visual explosions or large visual fires on any of the engines before the plane hitting the grown.

Unfortunately the video seems to the layman only show a "normal looking take off" but with a long (to their eyes) period of time until it lifts off, some sense of the plane lacking power to complete take off (unspecified), behaving erratically on the air (rolling) and then falling/bouncing/hitting/catching fire (any, all, or any combination of those in who-knows-what-order) to finally crash-n-burn a few hundred meters later.

But 3 or 4 cameras strategically situated on each strip of major airports would statistically be able to assist on investigations of many incidents during landing and take-off, no doubts. Someone should start demanding new large airports to deploy this.

[vanHorck]

The mechanic may not have made mistake and the two events may not be related. It s too early for that.

I m sure some of the emergency crew dont feel too well either after having to deal with this accident...

[agusaleale]

PJ2:
The graphic posted by justme69 is concordant with the declaration of the captain from Iberia whose statement I copied in post #549

[justme69]

Rescue crews speak of most survivors being confined to a specific area where many "soft landed" on a small creek (with shallow water/mud). One survivor speaks of how it was the water that woke her up. One rescue worker speaks of difficulty walking through the mud to assist. A handfull were conscience, even a few mostly mobile, but most with fractures and unable to move or unconscience.

[PJ2]

barrymung;

Post discussing cockpit video recorders (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/275598-flight-pilot-suicide.html#post4200650)

[PJ2]

agusaleale;
The graphic posted by justme69 is concordant with the declaration of the captain from Iberia whose statement I copied in post #549
I understand that very well. But the animation is not data-driven. It is only an interpretation by a non-aviation person of another's account, in this case an highly-experienced aviation observer. Eye-witness reports, especially by those who are experts, are helpful to investigators in pointing to ways in which the accident may have begun or to ways in which if unfolded. That said, you will know that eyewitness reports, even by experts, are far less accurate than the data available from the recorders. That is the only standard by which both initialization of, and sequence of the subsquent accident, can be determined. All else is second-hand speculation.

Still, I do know what you mean and know that such responses by the media are seen as "legitimate" by the viewing, curious public who are hungry for information. The thing is, that information can be wrong and lead to all kinds of harmful conclusions. The basis for such animations is not "accurate information" but mere curiosity and, unfortunately, legal interests.

[Avionista]

XPMORTEN:


MD80 Takeoff field length charts give (if I understand them right :rolleyes: );
Required available field length of about 9300 feet (2800m)

Gross weight of 69T,
Temp 30C,
Elev 2000'
Flap 15+Slat,
7 kt tailwind,
slight uphill,

Thats about 64% of the available runway at Madrid.

XPM


Just been reading an article on the Madrid crash in the "Sunday Times" which suggests that the crew may have failed to select the slats/flaps before commencing their T/O run. Highly unlikely, I know, but if this did happen, how much more runway would have been required for an MD80 to reach a safe T/O velocity?

[ankh]

These days it's possible to build a scale that would fit under the wheel contact area and handle the range of weight expected -- all solid state, no springs or balance levers. Why not have a little square cut out of the pavement at each aircraft gate on which the wheels of the various sized aircraft will rest, instrumented, to measure the weight on that area? Turn on the ones for the specific aircraft, make sure it's parked within the painted lines, sum the total weight. Ding! Why (rolls eyes) I can't imagine why any airline wouldn't want this information .... Wrong topic, just mentioning it's doable nowadays. The rocketeers must do this, they really need to know exactly what their rockets weigh before they launch them.

[golfyankeesierra]

-14,15 Plane leaves finger for second attempt to take-off.
-14,24 Ground control clears plane for take-off.

Wonder what happened in those 9 minutes.
Were they rushed or distracted?
Any timepressure on them for the schedule?

My money is on a configuration error, but then again, 9 minutes is short but not too short.... 3 minutes for startup and 6 for taxi.

I guess it must be relatively easy for the investigators to rule out.

[el #]

Ankh,

if you spend time reading pprune and other venues of discussion, you will easily learn one simple truth:

The aviation industry at large is very against any change, unless they can bring an immediate economic return (and in some cases, not even if so eg, flying more direct routes).

There are thousand of methods and techniques that would improve safety. Many, actually even make sense. Still, they are not adopted.
The reason can be given to you in various forms:
"studies have already proved ..."
"an interesting suggestion, unfortunately ..."
that we can all resume as:
"it's not so useful, beside it costs money".

Since the overall safety record of air travel appears satisfying to most, status quo will remain.
Accept that, or fight like Don Quixote.

[Finrider]

Just to answer a couple of points raised by previous posters (a couple of pages back in this fast evolving thread!) about RAF ops. Just about every RAF airfield (I can't think of one that doesn't) has distance to go marker boards (in thousands of feet) along the sides. The Tornado force doesn't time the take-off roll, but we do an acceleration check, looking for 100kts by the time you cross the approach end arrestor cable, about 1200ft from the start of the take-off roll. Additionally, during the landing roll, we check that our groundspeed is less than double the distance to go (eg 100kts at 5000ft to go board), braking/rev thrust as appropriate if it is not.

Additionally, as a minor difference from commercial ops, in the event of a loss of thrust post decision (we don't call it V1, just simple, straightforward decision speed), we select COMBAT thrust (equivalent to TOGA) as a matter of course, rather than leaving thrust as set unless satisfactory performance is not being achieved. Our Vmca is well below our stall speed so lateral control is not an issue.

Fin

[SpacePilot]

PJ2
An animation can only be built from flight data. Anything else is from someone's imagination who almost certainly has no aviation background or experience. The animations are misleading and worthless. They answer no questions, they increase wrong answers and increase the anguish of families thereby.

Rubbish there are many ways an animation can be produced. I would suggest the relatives might be anguished by people telling them that the situation is a 'disgrace', when in fact, it is no more than human curiosity.

How do you know, as a fact and not an assumption, that whoever made the animation did not have someone who witnessed the video to help them?

Technical prowess in the graphic arts and editorial license in reporting "as truth" what is in fact not known, is irresponsible journalism which plays with the victims' families and convinces most others that "the truth is now known", which of course it is not.

I suppose a pilot telling the media how to do their jobs, is a bit like the media trying to explain how the pilot flew the doomed aircraft

[md80fanatic]

"Thankfully, this accident was recorded in video, so a few scenarios can be dissmissed off-hand such as any large visual explosions or large visual fires on any of the engines before the plane hitting the grown."

There is a large gap between a normal running engine and one displaying large fire and explosions. Engine issues (even twin failures) cannot yet be fully discounted.

[PJ2]

SpacePilot;
Rubbish there are many ways an animation can be produced. I would suggest the relatives might be anguished by people telling them that the situation is a 'disgrace', when in fact, it is no more than human curiosity.

How do you know, as a fact and not an assumption, that whoever made the animation did not have someone who witnessed the video to help them?
I know that. I've already stated that graphics can be manufactured using a number of standard animation software programs. In terms of calling such work a disgrace it depends upon how accurately one wishes to know what happened. I've learned that in spite of the fact that investigations take a very long time to determine what happened and why, over the long run next-of-kin want the truth.

I have also discussed eye-witness accounts in the construction of animations, in terms of their relative reliability and I have also acknowledged that they are viewed as "legitimate" media responses by many. But let us be clear - what such amateur animations may tell us (and by virtue of that fact, what most people "know" about the accident"), and what a thorough safety investigation by trained and experienced accident investigators tell us can be wildly different. Though painful in the extreme, waiting for truth is, in my experience, what most prefer. That's my only point. Clearly, one cannot stop tides nor should one be able to!... ;-)

best,
PJ2

PS; justme60, B2N2, SpacePilot, just for the record, I would like to ensure that I do not doubt your entries here - what I am being "stringent" about, (perhaps) is the methods, not the actual portrayals of flight paths, wreckage parts, etc. I clearly have strong thoughts on the use of partial or eye-witness information. I know such is valuable as part of the investigation but it is only by very strict rules of evidence, including what's shown as "possibilities", that the truth can be arrived at. I am all for informed speculation so long as "judgement is suspended in favour of curiosity" until at least the recorders are read. That is the intent of all my posts - my apologies if the initial entry sounded a bit direct.

[ppppilot]

I am not saying that was the reason of the accident but I am sure the JK5022 was overloaded same as more than 50% of the actual flights. I find this post very interesting on the theme:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/315101-why-dont-aircraft-weigh-themselves.html
Edit to specify overloaded from the loadsheet values

[boardingpass]

I've read reports that some of the surviving pax... ...owed their escape to being thrown from the plane into a stream, thereby avoiding severe burns. (BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7575776.stm)). Does anyone know if:
They weren't wearing seatbelts (I hope this wasn't the case),
Their seatbelts failed,
Their entire seats were ejected with them,
An entire floor section of the plane finished in the stream,
Or if this report is a bit exaggerated.It occurred to me as I was checking seatbelts in a cabin this morning.

I feel very sorry for everyone involved.

[snowfalcon2]

Also please consider that only the passenger weights are unknown; weights of the empty airplane, the fuel and cargo are already available with high precision. Passenger weight is on the order of 25-30% of the airplane's total weight.

Weighing the fully loaded airplane pre-takeoff, assuming a 2% accuracy, is therefore about equally accurate as obtaining the passenger weight with about 7% accuracy. Evidently the present system works well enough so that the proposed airplane scales would not be a cost effective improvement.

[justme69]

Nobody dismisses the possibility of one or both engines malfunction at all. Actually, it would be a likely scenario to explain the accident. Just the possibility of any large visually intense malfunction such as a large explossion, large fire or other indications (i.e. smoke, etc). Of course, some other malfunctions, even internal catastrophic malfunctions that were well contained, are possible, as are birds etc hitting an engine, etc.

We don't know how clear the angles and resolution of the video recordings are. We can assume it was carefully viewed more than once by a couple of pilot advisors besides the politicians and they agreed they couldn't see anything off-hand that indicated any problems with the engines and only and apparent lack of enough "power" to carry on the maneuver successfully was appreciated, erratic behaviour very soon after airbone, and "fall or attempt to land".

They insisted that no fire whatsoever could be observed until after the airplane hit the ground and "bounced around". That's what they claim to have observed. This, of course, doesn't mean that there wasn't a prior fire, just that it wasn't apparent in the video and therefore it couldn't have been too large externally since smoke would've likely been noticed earlier.

Every possible scenario opens, except those discarded by the tape, such as an engine falling off or large explosions.

Also, nobody dismisses the value to the general public of non-exact simulation graphics, but the media is to blame for a lot of incorrect information being presented as facts on big letters and flashy graphics EVEN AFTER OTHER FACTS INVALIDATE THEIR ACCOUNTS, or at least put them in doubt. A few HOURS after the accident, a 3D graphics showing an engine explosion and crash was repeated ad-naseum on spanish TV (can't remember what channel). If you talk to just about anyone in Spain on the street, after seeing the footage they automatically will tell you the accident was due to an explosion in the engine and the airplane crashing to the side.

Even DAYS after this seems unlikely, public image is still that of the first 3D recreated account. Of course, each news channel´s and each newpaper´s graphics, 3D animations or charts on what happened was slightly different. The media routinely chooses flashy headlines, changing small but important details in favour of more flashy sentences (like talking about "deactivated heat probe" instead of "probe's heating device") and attractive graphics over truth and precautory restrain. They are in the bussiness to sell audience even if that means playing with people's expectations and the hard truth.

[Teddy Robinson]

Guys/Girls ... wait until the initial finding are released ... this level of hypothesis is not really helping anyone, all you are doing is helping some elements of the media turn personal tragedy into a circus.... people are without sons daughters fathers and mothers.. this is not a microsoft game, people died.

Very sad for everyone involved in this.

[justme69]

The word "fall" has been used by me many times because it's unclear what those I'm quoting meant. Some speak of "fall", some of "coming down", some of "landing". But in spanish it becomes ambigous enough, plus those speaking are often not experts, but newscasters using their own words to convey information gathered by non-expert witneses or officials.

I have heard first hands 3 officials, 2 of which direct witnesses of the airport video recording of the accident and one that had it explained to him by another politician first hand. But most of the other reports I have not seen/watched/heard directly, but instead I have seen the words of a news reporter to whom those accounts were explained. Technically, about 80% of what I've been reporting is already 3rd hand information. Once you read my words, it becomes 4th hand information. Not good for a not-clear-cut event.

I have the feeling that nobody will be able to come up with the real cause(s) of the accident until after the (damaged) data recorder information is analysed, as way too many scenarios, most of them equally unlikely, could have happened and likely it wasn't the result of a single, major cause.

We all care about the victims and their families (my own 16yo daughter was by herself on a MD-82 Spanair flight between the Canary Islands and Madrid about a week ago), but we are in this board because our way of dealing with the accident is to try to find the truth or, at least, when not enough facts are available to find it, to try to find out what factors or events are more likely than others as the cause of the accident using whatever expertise in the subject each may have (I've never been a pilot, traffic controller, airport/airline personel or airplane hobbyst, but I speak spanish, some english and know my physics).

[pichu17]

Mi quest is how the pilot detected this fail. No light,no ammeter current because this heater dont have power in ground.
Secont: the mecanic disconect the heater: HOW? .If pull the respectic CB let the TRP without power.
May be the opposite:the pilot detected current in the ammeter, but is improbable because this check is before start engine.Some is wrong in this information.

[misd-agin]

This post doesn't address this incident specifically because what occurred, or didn't occur, isn't known as of right now.

Comments on flying and aircraft configuration have been asked. Some comments -

1. An a/c without flaps will accelerate faster because a clean wing(no LE slats/TE flaps) creates less drag while accelerating on the runway.

2. Post #733 shows the stall speed/configuration/wts graph. LE slats typically lower stall speed on commercial jets approx. 30-40 KIAS while ALL the TE flaps reduce the stall speed approx 20-30 KIAS(airspeed to non-pilots). For this case it looks like a clean wing would stall approx. 40 KIAS faster than a Flaps 5 T.O. configuration.

3. Someone asked how far it would take to accelerate to a safe speed without slats/flaps? Answers based on Post #733 data - You would have to accelerate approx. 48 KIAS(40 KIAS + 20%) to have the same safety margin that a typical takeoff has.

4. In ground effect(basically within one wingspan of the ground) a/c will be able to fly at speeds lower than stall speeds out of ground effect PROVIDED precise AOA(angle of attack) control is used. Trying to increase AOA(ie typical rotation after liftoff) or exiting ground effect can make an a/c that was once flying completely unflyable. Doing both, AOA increase and exiting ground effect, compounds the problem. Air Florida 737 KDCA and NW DC-9 KDTW crashes are examples of a/c that 'fly' but can't stay airborne due to AOA/ground effect problems.

5. V2 or V2+10 is typically very close to clean stall speeds. Should this situation(inproper T.O. configuration) occur staying 'on the deck' and acclerating on the runway, or in ground effect, can be a lifesaver. (sim experience from reenacting DL 727 KDFW T.O. crash and NW DC-9 KDTW crash, both with no slats/flaps extended)

Again this is not commenting on this incident since the facts aren't known at this time.

[justme69]

The repairs were reported on the press and on TV by spokepersons for the technician as both, having being "disconnected" and having the "fuse removed".

The most sensible scenario seems to be: Pilot informs PAX that he is not proceeding with (first) T/O because a 'red light warning indicator came on' and he is unsure about what it is and wants it checked out by techs, they return to gate (or service area) and repair tech and pilot decide the fault indicated is with the heater to assist probe readings in some weather conditions. Since no danger of those weather conditions exist, they decide in compliance with manual procedures to disconnect it and both signed the plane fit-to-fly. The Pilot informs PAX that it was a fault with a "heat sensor" that was fixed already and they were ready to take-off.

What 'warning light' the pilot was talking about is, of course, not clearly stated anywhere.

[agusaleale]

Los familiares de las víctimas del avión siniestrado el pasado miércoles (http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2008/08/espana/accidente_barajas/portada.html) en Barajas nunca podrán conocer las conversaciones de los pilotos que están grabadas en las cajas negras del aparato MD 82 porque están sometidas a "un código de confidencialidad".
Así lo ha asegurado el subdirector de Spanair, Javier Mendoza, al cerca de centenar de familiares de víctimas del accidente con los que se ha reunido durante una hora en el Hotel Auditorium de Madrid y a los que ha mostrado unas diapositivas de cajas negras y croquis sobre su ubicación en un avión de las características del siniestrado.
"Las grabaciones, nunca se harán públicas", ha insistido Mendoza, que ha precisado que únicamente servirán para avanzar en las investigaciones que llevan a cabo la comisión creado a tal efecto por Aviación Civil y el Juzgado de Madrid encargado del caso.

The relatives of the victims of the Spanair flight will never know the conversations betwen the pilots that are recorded in the black boxes, because they are submitted to a "confidentiality code", said Javier Mendoza, Spanair´s vicedirector to one hundred of relatives in Hotel Auditorium in Madrid. He showed them the photos and draws of the black boxes and their position in a plane like the one that suffered the accident. "The recordings will never become public", insisted, and will only be used for investigations to be done by the comission designed to study the case.

[PAXboy]

boardingpass asks about this:
...owed their escape to being thrown from the plane into a stream, thereby avoiding severe burns
One possibility is that, as they shot off the end of the slide - they landed in water.

[pappabagge]

The Canadian Lesson, or "Lex Canada" post the SWR111 disaster; despite Canada having - at least on the statute books - a total capping of public CVR and/or ATC R/T disclosure, it only took a matter of months if not weeks before the world was able to access, download or by other means listen to the actual voices of those involved as the situation developed.

As Spain is involved, I can only imagine the timescale will in this case be shortened by a power of ten.

Transparency, my rear end! :oh:

[justme69]

Survivors have said to find themselves amid mud/water outside the airplane already (didn't specify if still attached to their seats). One survivor speaks of relatives seated by her side and another ambigously accounted as "by her other side" (but could easily be in front, or across the aisle). She said her partner (or brother, I forget) was still by her side (another survivor if I recall correctly) but the other relative, when she went to "check on her" was not in the "right (relative) place" and actually she 'found someone else there' and couldn't find her relative nearby.

Remember virtually no large section of the airplane survived the impact and the fire just took care of whatever was left, but the airplane was already broken in many (actually way many) parts.

This wasn't exactly a large chunk of the plane seats that produced lots of survivors, but an area with relative few obstacles and much softer (and wet) ground where some of them ended up still in not-too-large chunks of fuselage. They say to have felt the shallow water and walk off/crawl off by themselves. One of them, an emergency rescue worker herself that happened to be a passenger in that flight, realized she had a broken femur when she tried to stand up twice after feeling water 'awoke her' and tried to help nearby victims, not very succesfully.

Once the in-flight recordings reach the judiciary system here in Spain, as it has been stated, if they are anywhere near "interesting" they will be leaked to press in all likeness in a short time. This country does not believe in "secret anything".

[overthewing]

Warning: not a pilot, so probably about to use all the wrong terminology.

Passenger evidence suggest the pilot saw a warning light displayed, but wasn't sure what it meant.

Of course, it could be that the passenger didn't pick up the pilot's words accurately, but assuming that he did, is it usual for a warning light to be difficult for a pilot to interpret, ie needing an engineer's analysis? I imagine pilots get frequent warning lights, and I've always assumed they could make reasonable sense of them on the flightdeck. If they can't, does that suggest a problem that needs a bit of careful analysis by maintenance staff?

If it was a warning light, that would suggest that the relevant systems had detected something wrong. Would the activation of a probe heater normally set off a red light, or is the pilot simply 'notified' that the heater has switched itself on? Does it make sense for the probe heater to set off a warning light?

The heater deactivation seems to be about the only unchallenged fact we've been given so far, and something about it doesn't make sense to me. If the red warning light was a bit of a mystery, could it be that the 'solution' didn't fix the real problem?

[aa73]

Today Spanair announced that the reason for returning to the gate was the heating system of the temperature sensor. In other words the heating to prevent ice getting on the temperature probe. It was disactivated by the mechanic according to the MEL. The airplane is aloud to fly with it for 10 days before it needs to be repaired. Since the weather was good and there were no icing conditions the decision to depart was correct if what Spanair sais is correct.

It's been a while since I've flown the 80... but doesn't the Thrust Rating Indicator require an input from the TAT probe to compute a thrust setting, whether reduced or max?

Could the inop TAT probe have possibly computed a false thrust setting that results in one much lower than required? (similar to Air Florida, except that ice on the P2 probe caused that one.)

Just curious, what do you folks think?

[justme69]

I'm not a pilot or crew member, but have flown enough to figure out that pilots would usually inform the PAX generically of some warning light/indicator calling for a return to gate to have it checked.

It is quite normal for the pilot just casually mention he/she is unsure of what the problem may be and is opening the doors to allow a technician come on board to check it out.

With a device as "remote" and probably little used in practice on Spain's weather as the outside air temperature probe intake heater, it's reasonable the pilot wasn't compleatly sure what the heck was going on with whatever indication he saw (which maybe wasn't even a "warning red light" but any other light or indication and he was just small-talking the PAX). There was talk of an "overheating warning indicator light" at the beginning of the reports of the accident, but probably that was more of a "heating device malfunction indicator light" instead.

Also, the pilot probably just casually mentioned something like "the heat probe has been fixed" rather than bore the passengers with the more correct "The heating device assisting the temperature probe has been bypassed/disconnected/whatever"

So just take all the reports on a "warning light" or "the pilot being unsure what it was" as 3rd or 4th hand account of casual small-talk on the side of the pilot to the PAX rather than hard, factual accounts.

Unfortunately the more "technical" explanation offered by Spanair didn't mention the exact nature of the indication that the pilot saw (i.e. whether it was a light indication of the device being on when it should've been off, a diagnostic light indicator of some malfunction with the device, the lack of light when there should've been one, etc). What was clearly stated is that both pilot and technician decided it was the heating device causing the problem/warning and it was disabled for the duration of the flight as it wasn't necessary for the expected weather conditions of the flight.

[PJ2]

pappabagge;
The Canadian Lesson, or "Lex Canada" post the SWR111 disaster; despite Canada having - at least on the statute books - a total capping of public CVR and/or ATC R/T disclosure, it only took a matter of months if not weeks before the world was able to access, download or by other means listen to the actual voices of those involved as the situation developed.
Just for the record, it is CVR conversations that are primarily covered by Canada's Safety Board Act (http://www.tc.gc.ca/acts-regulations/GENERAL/C/ctaisb/act/ctaisb.htm#TDJ3DDN). ATC conversations are considered private and privileged under the Act as well but that has been challenged under Canada's Privacy Act by the courts, (which have also challenged the CVR part of the Act and won in one specific case). The following is a small part from the Safety Board Act:

Privilege for on-board recordings



(2) Every on-board recording is privileged and, except as provided by this section, no person, including any person to whom access is provided under this section, shall (a) knowingly communicate an on-board recording or permit it to be communicated to any person; or (b) be required to produce an on-board recording or give evidence relating to it in any legal, disciplinary or other proceedings. Practically speaking, with ACARS trackers, scanners and whatnot and the internet it is too high an expectation that Pilot-ATC conversations will not be subject to you-tube exposure etc, such as the SR111 tapes are. However, the SR111 CVR recordings are not available on the web - only the ATC part is.

Cheers,
PJ2

[el #]

Justme69, all what you say makes perfect sense.
However, nobody so far has been able to confirm how a probe heater malfunctioning (overheat or what else) would lit some light (which one exactly ?) in the panel.
Another unanswered question is about layout of the CBs, which ones are close to the one controlling RAT heater ?
Certainly these are not crucial questions now, but having a definite answer would help dispelling rather than supporting certain theories.

On the investigations side, I learn from Spanish media, that Spanair had denied relatives access to CVR recording, meaning it has been listened already by someone. Consequently, the box reportedly damaged is the FDR, hopefully useful data can be extracted anyway.

[justme69]

It is the flight data recorder the one damaged, while the voice one seems to be in good enough shape. Indeed, a perfectly precise explanation of what made the pilot call-in for a technician is not known, speaking only of a generic "malfunction indicator/red light", but of course could be anything else. What is clear is that technician and pilot agreed it was that device's fault and turning it off would solve the problem temporarily.

[overthewing]

Unfortunately the more "technical" explanation offered by Spanair didn't mention the exact nature of the indication that the pilot saw (i.e. whether it was a light indication of the device being on when it should've been off, a diagnostic light indicator of some malfunction with the device, the lack of light when there should've been one, etc). What was clearly stated is that both pilot and technician decided it was the heating device causing the problem/warning and it was disabled for the duration of the flight as it wasn't necessary.

I'm sure you're right about the announcement to PAX. I'm just curious to know what the pilot would actually see if the probe heater were to switch itself on while still on the ground. Does some kind of light come on in the flightdeck? Assuming that the operation of the heater is a 'silent' activity in normal conditions, ie not notified to the pilot, is there some system for detecting that it's operating when it shouldn't be?

I wonder if any MD-80 pilots / engineers could answer?

(I've spent years of my professional life untangling problems where the real cause is often nothing to do with the visible symptoms, and something about that warning light niggles me.)

[xkoote]

Quote from 777fly,


Xcoote,

Your ignorance of aircraft handling techniques, aerodynamics and mechanics indicates that you cannot be a commercial pilot, surely?

I have no experience of MD80 operation, but if the free air stall speed is 200kts, it will fly at speeds well below that figure while in ground effect.

For other posters, ground effect has nothing to do with air density.


Mr 777fly,

1. Unfortunate how your post singlehandedly dropped the grade of this thread quite a few points.

2. It his highly advisable when insulting someone else you be able to do what kindergarten teachers always say before a test: "Start by writing the name correctly"

3. I never stated that the plane won't fly without slats. I said a certain speed is required.

4. The MD80 strikes it's tail at around 10°. Does anybody know for certain if at this "theoretical" speed 10° of body angle is enough to get the plane airborne?

5. A poster posted 2800 m of runway required in Madrid's case. But it is with flaps 15°. Remember that in a belanced runway departure and on this lenght of runway they would have taken off with less than 5° of flaps.

6. pichu17, we're definitely Mad Dog collegues. This is als a question I had and posted from the beginning. The story of lights in the cockpit and the time when they noticed simply does not add up.

7. Just to give some an idea, at 65t, the flaps up/slat retr stall speed is at around 175 knots. At 2000 feet and 30° the ground speed would be at almost 190 knots.

Hence my question again. (written in italics for those who think I'm arrogant) I find it quite a feat for this plane to rotate and become airborne without flaps or slats, wobble around, then come back down, leave the runway and come to a stop before runway end. It may be possible if we have overestimated this plane's TO weight, which can entirely be the case.

Again to 777fly, it's a shame why you felt the urge to insult a poster based on one post I made where I just wondered how it was possible.

Xander

p.s. a few interesting quotes from the Northwest 255 NTSB report. I highly recommend reading it.

"Witnesses generally agreed that flight 255’s takeoff roll was longer than that normally
made by similar airplanes. They stated that the flight began its rotation about 1,200 to 1,500 feet
from the departure end of the runway, agreed that it rotated to a higher pitch angle than other
DC-9s, and agreed that the tail of the airplane’came close to striking the runway."



Assuming proper takeoff configuration, the airplane should have lifted off between a 6” and 8”
noseup pitch attitude. In this instance, the airplane rotated to an 11” noseup attitude, stabilized at
that attitude, and accelerated to a higher airspeed before liftoff

[ExSp33db1rd]

Never heard this at all...



HarryMann - not a criticism, but I agree with NigelOnDraft, in operating 4 eng. heavies from 1958 to 1994, I also never even heard of timing to V1, but that doesn't mean it was never suggested, but I'm pretty sure it never went beyond the Boffin stage if so, however I was told by a senior RAF Training Captain on V-Bombers that at certain airfields they worked out a distance to achieve V1, or aborted, but it did need marker boards, and the distance was variable for each and every take-of of course, being related to full power, or reduced power take-offs - and a lot of other factors as well, it just wasn't practical for a Worldwide airline to encompass.

[el #]

This very discussion about "time/distance to V1", and the obvious possibility that is automatically checked / flagged by a system, has been had recently on pprune, but I don't remember on which thread.

If I'm not wrong, the outcome was that even if at first it seems something easy and inexpensive to implement in the interest of safety, it can also be opposed for reasons that I don't remember now, but are quite convincing when you hear them.

I do remember however that certain pilots stated they made silent or briefed commitment to abort if they not had reached, say, one half of R/W at the 100 Knts call that some do.

One further demonstration of how difficult is to have changes in the aviation industry and how tortuous is the road to the Good.

[Rananim]

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the flightcrew's failure to use the taxi checklist to ensure the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the absence of electrical power to the airplane takeoff warning system which thus did not warn the flightcrew that the airplane was not configured properly for takeoff. The reason for the absence of electrical power could not be determined."

After liftoff, the wings of the airplane rolled to the left and the right about 35” in each direction.

The flight characteristics used to determine the stall speed of the DC-9-80 series airplanes are, in part, “A roll that cannot be readily arrested.. ”


The CVR recording showed that the flightcrew neither called for nor accomplished the TAXI checklist. The first item on the TAXI checklist required both pilots, in response to the checklist’s challenge, to check and verify orally that the flaps and slats were positioned correctly. This item was
not performed, and the flightcrew did not discover that the airplane was configured improperly for takeoff. The omission of the TAXI checklist was further corroborated by the flightcrew’s inability to
engage the autothrottles at the start of the takeoff because they did not, as required by the TAXI checklist place the TCI in the “T.O.” mode. However, they were able to rectify this omission by the time the airplane accelerated to 100 KIAS. Once the takeoff began, however, there was little chance they would detect any of the visual cues--the flap indicators in the up position, the absence of the blue takeoff light on the slat indicator light panel, and the absence of the ART ready light--that
might have alerted them to the fact that the airplane was not configured properly. All of the visual cues relating to the flaps and slats were located outside, or on the perimeter of, those areas normally
monitored by the captain and the first officer during takeoff. The Safety Board concludes that the failure of the flightcrew to accomplish the TAXI checklist in accordance with required procedures
was the probable cause of this accident.

Quotes from the NTSB report on NWA 255,a DC-9 that crashed on takeoff August 1987 in Michigan,USA.

Evidence against engine failure at Madrid is growing so maybe the answer lies in the past with this DC-9 crash?Is there any connection between the MEL work carrried out and disabling of takeoff config warning system??
I know practically nothing about the MD but the report spoke of 2 automated stall protection systems for the DC9;autoslat and stick-pusher,but both are disabled with slats retracted.Stall recovery technique is to apply and call for MAX POWER,FLAPS 15,release back pressure and avoid secondary stall.

The report speaks of six lines of defence against such an omission(failure to perform a checklist) :

The first line of defense was human vigilance; the second, another crewmember detecting error; the third, secondary indications, such as cockpit displays and instrumentation; the fourth, warning and alerting devices;the fifth, persons other than crewmembers detecting the error, i.e., ATC personnel or ground personnel; and the sixth, machines that take action on their own to rectify the error, i.e., the DC-9-82’s autoslat and stick pusher systems.

If you apply it to the Madrid case you can see how each line of defense could easily have been breached:
-vigilance-the tech problem and return to gate may have distracted crew and lowered vigilance levels
-another crew member detects the problem-"Do you want the before takeoff checklist?" or even "Did we do the checklist?"-again the tech problem could have upset their natural rhythm
-cockpit displays-the blue slat light or ART ready light-TCI not in TO mode distracts them and they miss all the signs and theyd be looking outside mostly anyway.
-warning device-takeoff warning system may have been disabled without the crew realising-was it checked pre-flight?Who checks it?both pilots?Its a major item..in my book,the skipper must check it but many airlines now have the First Officer checking these vital systems pre-flight while the skipper enters the flightplan in the computer!wrong way round.
-ATC-wouldnt apply here
-automated systems-autoslat/stickpusher disabled because slats retracted.

If it wasnt a takeoff warning system fault,then the other possibilities might be:
-blown tire at high speed..improved climb takeoff at hot/high airport,tailwind,slope.. all present at Madrid..
-thrust reverser deployment..but then why the bank left and then right?
- overweight or improper loading...with 2 engines working and correct takeoff configuration,less likely unless the discrepancy was sizeable..combined with another problem,like an engine failure or tire blowout,would be deadly.

[sevenstrokeroll]

pichu 17 is quite right...a current indication would not be present on the ground for the RAT probe heater.

AS I said earlier, if the RAT probe was being heated on the ground the EPR information would be very wrong.

Therefore, I believe the plane "thought" it was in the air (when the RAT probe is heated)...being "in the air" the takeoff configuration warning wouldn't warn the pilot if the flaps/slats were not extended.

IF the mechanic just disabled the heater of the RAT probe and didn't understand the plane "thought" it was in the air, the stage was set for disaster.

Of course by "thought it was in the air" simply means the ground shift mechanism wasn't working properly in one way or another.

[BelArgUSA]

Please research some discussions published in Pprune about the "3 killers"...
One or two years ago...
The 3 single reasons why an airplane will crash on takeoff...
TRIM, FLAPS, SPOILERS...
Check list completed or not - every time I line up for takeoff, I CHECK my 3 killers.
xxx:
:ugh:
Happy contrails... repeat after me... TRIMS-FLAPS-SPOILERS

[Dairyground]

VanHorck and PJ2 (posts #771 and 772)

The El Mundo graphic shows a deviation to the left before veering off to the right. First time i heard that one! Deviation to the left due to the left engine failing and over-correction to the right leading to touching the right wing briefly as often stated?


There is a claim by a distant observer, reported in post #202, that dust was being raised from the ground on the left of the runway before the first grounding of the right wing. Whether reflecting reality or otherwise, that report may underly graphics that show an initial deviation to the left.

[HarryMann]

The 3 single reasons why an airplane will crash on takeoff...
TRIM, FLAPS, SPOILERS...Maybe add ICE to that... (a form of inadvertant configuration malaise)

[Rananim]

sevenstrokeroll,
Let me get this straight.You're saying failure of air/gnd system?Surely there would be more indications of such a failure than just this probe heater warning?Like antiskid/RTO disabled,cant set parking brake...

[dicksorchard]

justme69 (http://www.pprune.org/members/274866-justme69)A photo of the wreckage seems to show one of the engine with the thrust reverser engaged and locked, indicating either an attempted abort during take-off (or forced landing, depending on how you look at it, as it seems to have happened seconds after airbone).

I am very curious about this statement my reasoning being that a very good friend
( ex monarch captain 17 years ) and i were having a discussion on the telephone about this accident yesterday .

I was talking about the fact that there was a lot of discussion on Pprune about the direction in which the aircraft veered off the runway versus the supposed engine failure and its position .

One of the first things he said was that it sounded more like an attempted abort & the thrust reverser had possibly been activated ? when i told him that the thrust reverser had been photographed and that it was engaged & locked he went very quiet .

I wanted to ask have there ever been any other accidents where a thrust reverser was engaged in error where an aircraft had crashed ? and have there ver been any incidence's where a thrust reverser engaged due to a mechanical fault of some kind ?

im not a journo just someone who is very interested in aviation & off corse my own personal safety . The more i learn the more informed i become .

thankyou

[sevenstrokeroll]

rananim:

I've been in the cockpit flying the mighty 9 (earlier version...dc9)...just sitting at the gate reviewing takeoff info.

Checking what we call the rat / epr gauge/display, the takeoff epr was very very low.

this can't be...something doesn't make sense.

so, we looked around...called mx, and a wise old mechanic came out...said:

the plane thinks its in the air and the RAT probe is being heated on the ground when it shouldn't be. so the rat probe thinks the temperature for takeoff is about 50 degrees C. (much warmer than the 20c actual).


he showed us a circuit breaker (can't remember where) that had popped, reset it and a few seconds later the RAT probe cooled down and showed a normal epr for takeoff.

the other things you mention may or may not be present...but at slow speeds, the anti skid doesn't matter on the douglas etc.

I think those in charge of the investigation must be considering this scenario...or something close to it.

[curi]

Some photos of the engines


http://www.elpais.com/recorte/20080825elpepinac_1/XLCO/Ies/20080825elpepinac_1.jpg

http://www.elpais.com/recorte/20080824elpepinac_5/XLCO/Ies/20080824elpepinac_5.jpg

[sevenstrokeroll]

did I see something about the flight data recorder not working right?

if so, I just checked my old DC9 manual ( I was on the 9-30, not the 80, but things should be simliar)

the flight data recorder would be affected by the ground shift mechanism.

also, the anti skid is not affected by ground shift according to my manual.

can someone confirm the FDR wasn't working right?

[philipat]

It is a shame that full ground TO video WITH AUDIO is not available. Eye witnesses are notoriously unreliable but the reports of hearing a loud bang, also repeated by some of the survivors are intriguing. Also, the ground video, taken from Terminal 4, presumably only see the near/Port side of the aircarft on 36L, although this is not clear also. I am just wondering outloud if, after all the earlier speculation of possible failure of #1, that it might actually have been a problem with #2? Such failure, which may not necessarily have been accompanied by fire, but probably would have been accompanied by a loud bang, would have been out of the visual/audio capability of the video?

[Airbubba]

-warning device-takeoff warning system may have been disabled without the crew realising-

Or, even worse, in the NW255 crash, it is thought that the crew may have pulled the takeoff warning breaker to avoid the nuisance horn while revving an engine up during single engine taxi inbound to DTW. Pulling cb's was common practice a couple of decades ago from my observation. In one of Delta's DFW crashes the takeoff warning horn was found to be inop and the flaps were up although the checklist response for flaps fifteen was given.

Modern Boeings will not engage the autothrottles for takeoff with flaps up (so I'm told :) ), perhaps this came from the NW255 crash.

[justme69]

At least 4 different people, two pilots and two politicians that have seen the footage plus an additional politician that had the events of the tape explained to him first hand by another viewer of said tape, have all stated, quite cathegorically, that no fire, smoke or large faults can be VISUALLY OBSERVED from the tape and sort of implied that the visual was good and that the plane looked perfectly "normal" until it started "hitting" the ground. One politician even goes as far as suggesting that "nothing about the cause of the accident can be directly observed by watching the tape" (i.e. everything looked pretty much normal to those who've seen it, except for that "apparent" lack of "power" to accomplish take-off and the erratic behaviour once airbone).

The Flight Data Recorder has been reported as "damaged" (rather than non-operative, not-working or broken, but implying that unlike the voicer recorder, this one can not have the information recovered "as-is" and perhaps some information could be lost).

One of the major newspapers in Spain ran a new article concentrating on the possibility of one of the reversers being accidentaly deployed, but mentions that the airplane didn't show any signs of having trouble keeping a straight line while taxing or rolling.

Here are the highlights from that article:

-They estimate the landing strip at 4.440m and 60m across, with the airplane leaving the ground about an estimated 500m over the recommended or usual run for the flight.

-Video shows that the airplane starts to go "off-course" (deviated from a straight line) after elevation, not before. After reaching "almost the end of the runaway", it goes up a few meters, during 6 seconds, and then falls "escorado" (not sure the term here, would be with one wing lower than the other) to the right. The first thing to touch the ground is the wing. It bounces no less than 6 times on the runaway (pavement) and then "explodes". That's what the article says, but probably not exactly how it happened, but close enough.

-One of the engines was recovered properly reversed.

-Tail wind again reported as 9knots. Meteo measurement at 14:30, about 7 minutes after the crash, was 7knots from south.

-174 on board, they estimate 15 tons including luggage plus around another 15 tons of fuel. The same plane was sometimes used for Canary Islands-Denmark flights, where weight is usually even higher.

-They say Barajas Airport is 610m above sea level. They quote temperature as being 28º (I've read 29º and 30º on different places).

-There is no communications with ground control from the moment they receive (and ack) autorization for T/O.

-Speaking about the prior return-to-gate, they say: "The pilot decided to turn around and request service when he realized the outside air temperature probe measurements were too high. It was found to be because the anti-ice heater was on. The mechanic disabled the heater." (Finally, a likely scenario and would account for the earlier reports of the pilot speaking of "overheated sensor").

-Spanair has reviewed all past historic maintenance data for the airplane and it was all according to regulations, with no inspections finding unusual problems with engines in the past, etc.

[PJ2]

sevenstrokeroll;
the flight data recorder would be affected by the ground shift mechanism.
I think most DFDR's start with the anti-collision light being turned on and continue until it's shut off - I believe that's the way it worked with our '9's and '8's but that's going back about 30 - 35 years.

I think earlier in the thread it was mentioned that apparently there was some damage to the DFDR. - possibly heat damage.

[skyken]

I'm glad I retired after 40 years. You guys know way more than I'll ever know.

[xkoote]

The FDR would still be operative. Remember, the only thing happening is that the plane "thinks" it's airborne and thus the FDR normally works when airborne.
Indeed if the RAT probe is heated on the ground, it could give high readings to the DFGC. But remember it was disabled, so it should not have been a problem for the subsequent TO.

I strongly beleive that they tried an RTO becuase the landing gear failed to retract. The gear will not retract if the plane arrived in this condition!
If the plane indeed was in airborne mode, remember my words. This is an item in the MD-80's Emergency Abnormal Checklist.

Xander

[PJ2]

dicksorchard:
I wanted to ask have there ever been any other accidents where a thrust reverser was engaged in error where an aircraft had crashed ? and have there ver been any incidence's where a thrust reverser engaged due to a mechanical fault of some kind ?

Try Pacific Western Airlines B737, Cranbrook, 1978 (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19780211-0)

[PJ2]

xander;
I strongly beleive that they tried an RTO becuase the landing gear failed to retract. The gear will not retract if the plane arrived in this condition!
If the plane indeed was in airborne mode, remember my words. This is an item in the MD-80's Emergency Abnormal Checklist.

Nonsense. There isn't an airline crew in existence which would attempt an RTO if "the gear failed to retract". I know of no such drill in my 35 years' experience which would be included in any Emergency Abnormal Checklist. Logic alone precludes such an outlandish suggestion.

[philipat]

The earlier picture of an engine with TR engaged continues to confuse. The picture appears to show the engine at the END of a runway. I wonder if that was a genuine picture and, if so, how can that be?

[justme69]

Not sure about the picture, but one engine was significantly (actually very) far away from the other. First debri from the plane is said to have been found some 150m off the runaway to the right (most of the rest was spreaded over 3-400m away, I think).

I think parts of the airplane were moved kind of early on during rescue and fire efforts, trying to find victims and survivors. One of the engines was picked-up much earlier than the other. The last two unaccounted victims couldn't be found until larger pieces were moved the following day.

[Airbubba]

I strongly beleive that they tried an RTO becuase the landing gear failed to retract. The gear will not retract if the plane arrived in this condition!
If the plane indeed was in airborne mode, remember my words. This is an item in the MD-80's Emergency Abnormal Checklist.

Huh?

Somehow I don't think this is a likely scenario.

[Chronic Snoozer]

I have the feeling that nobody will be able to come up with the real cause(s) of the accident until after the (damaged) data recorder information is analysed

Mmmmmm.....do you think?

[Pedota]

Airline Transport World report does not support engine fire speculation . . .

Spanair crash probe: Video of failed takeoff doesn't support engine fire theory
Monday August 25, 2008

Spanish investigators are backing away from blaming an engine fire for last week's Spanair MD-82 crash following emergence of a video of the failed takeoff that shows no signs of fire until after the aircraft, which elevated only a few meters off the ground, crashed back down on the runway.

Initial speculation following the accident that killed 153 passengers and crew centered on a possible engine fire (ATWOnline, Aug. 22), but investigators are finding little evidence to support that theory and believe there may have been multiple causes, El Pais reported. Civil Aviation Director General Manuel Batista told the newspaper that "more than one breakdown" likely caused the accident. "I'm not so sure the engine failed," he said. Even if it did, he explained, an engine failure would "not cause an accident" unless it combined with "other causes."

Despite initial eyewitness accounts that an explosion and fire were spotted as the aircraft ascended, an airport video of the attempted departure and crash reviewed by inspectors revealed that the fire-sparking explosion occurred "several seconds after" the MD-82 hit the runway, El Pais reported, citing sources close the investigation. The video also revealed that the aircraft fell to the right after its slight ascent.

Controversy continued to swirl around the decision of Spanair maintenance technicians to clear the aircraft for takeoff after it returned to the gate owing to a malfunctioning air intake probe. Jose Maria Delgado, president of the airline's mechanics union Assetma, said the technicians who worked on the plane disabled the probe and cleared the aircraft for takeoff. He said the maintenance manual for the MD-82 allows for it to fly for up to 10 days in that condition, adding that the device is more relevant in cold winter weather because its main purpose is to prevent ice from forming on engines. It is not important during the summer and its disablement is "not at all" relevant to the crash investigation, he told the paper.

But investigators reportedly are examining whether the cockpit warning light indicating that there was a problem with the air intake probe could have been indicating a more serious problem. "The pilot detected something" that caused him initially to abort a takeoff attempt, Bautista noted.

by Aaron Karp

[Ignition Override]

PJ2:

As for uncommanded thrust reverser extensions, this happened decades ago during or soon after rotation to an Eastern Airlines' DC-9 crew.

They identified the 'bad' engine and kept the plane under control.
This is much worse than a simple engine flame-out as any pilot can imagine.
If a pilot rushes and does not coordinate with the other pilot, they won't survive a mistake.

[BND]

This is a serious problem. On 4 July 1966 an Air New Zealand DC 8 ZK>NZB was on a training flight in which simulated engine failure procedures were rehearsed.
The Check Captain rapidly retarded No.4 engine moments after lift off/rotation. This generated inertial forces that caused the associated brake thrust lever to rise and enter the reverse idle detent. Recovery was impossible before the aircraft impacted the ground about its starboard wingtip and cartwheeled several hundred metres along the Main taxiway , adjacent to the main runway, with a/c breaking up and catching fire in the process. Two of the five crew on board were killed. There were no passengers.
This accident highlighted a potentially fatal flaw in the DC8 throttle system not previously encountered during developmental or test flying, and led to subsequent modifications.
If a thrust reverser had been engaged at a critical moment in the rotation/lift off recovery may have been impossible.

[xolodenko]

This line from the ATWO report quoted above looks confusing to me:

the device is more relevant in cold winter weather because its main purpose is to prevent ice from forming on engines.As seen from this pic, RAT probe is located way forward of the engines under the cockpit so how the heck could it (???) or its heater prevent icing on the engines??
http://i35.tinypic.com/mio106.jpg

[PJ2]

Ignition Override;

I didn't know about the Eastern incident. I know we had an accidental deployment at 350 on a '9 in the late 60's early '70's; it tore the reverser off, rolled the airplane near 90deg but the crew recovered.

A reverser deployed accidently is indeed a very serious circumstance from which recovery can be difficult to not possible depending upon flight regime and the stated crew coordination. The 320 drill was to "control roll with rudder, perform the engine shutdown drill"...having done it in the sim it was "academically" controllable if you were quick but it was no mere engine fire (which is even simpler than an engine failure most times), again, as stated.

[411A]

Check list completed or not - every time I line up for takeoff, I CHECK my 3 killers.
... repeat after me... TRIMS-FLAPS-SPOILERS

Yup, the old PanAmerican configuration check.
I follow it, likewise...before every takeoff, without exception.

[xolodenko]

Here is an airport camera shot of a crash involving a similarly designed (2 rear mounted engines) Tu-134 Russian aircraft:

YouTube - Tu-134 crash (full version) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xX_yB3mKdUg&eurl=http://lj-toys.com/?journalid=618741&moduleid=612&preview=&auth_token=sessionless:1219644000:embedcontentiurl=http://i1.ytimg.com/vi/xX_yB3mKdUg/default.jpg)


The scenario is very close to this one here: long takeoff roll eating up much of the rwy, feeble liftoff, l/h roll (r/h in our case), falling back on the rwy, break up and fire.

What do you think?

[galvonager]

Here is an airport camera shot of a crash involving a similarly designed (2 rear mounted engines) Tu-134 Russian aircraft:
The scenario is very close to this one here: long takeoff roll eating up much of the rwy, feeble liftoff, l/h roll (r/h in our case), falling back on the rwy, break up and fire. Not the same at all, I think. In the TU case, one engine failed (forget if it was birdstrike or something else, you can see it on the video), and the pilot aborted (I seem to remember it was a mistake). Then, they landed back (not fell) and just overshot the runway; there was no damage prior to that. Luckily, they walked away from it (don't remember if everybody walked, but some definitely did, and there were no fatalities).

[T-21]

Was there any significant crosswind. If so the bang heard could be a compressor stall on one side leading to reduced power take off ?

[justme69]

At this point, talks of a "bang" noise heard before the airplane hit the ground for the first time are not necessarily reliable.

Only survivors (and not all) speak of hearing a bang, but never before being airbone (which only lasted 6 seconds) and it's unclear whether it may have been when they already hit the ground or prior to that. They may just be confused. Very possibly they heard the "bang" when the airplane first touched ground with the wing to then "continue" bouncing around some 6 times on the ground until it caught in fire and crashed some >200m (3-400m likely) away.

They all describe the airplane as moving "side-to-side" (possibly rolling) and falling very shortly after airbone, though. And one survivors speaks of: "lift off, steep side-to-side 'weird' (erratic) movement, hearing a bang, crashing, loss of memory til she found herself outside the airplane amid mud".

Survivors are 8 women and 7 men age 22-60 plus 3 children (6-11). 2 survivors are still in very serious condition. The 3 children among them are not in extreme danger (boy and girl with single leg fracture and another boy with skull fracture and other face wounds).

[sevenstrokeroll]

Focus on Wing Flaps
In Spanair Jet Crash
No Evidence Found
Of Engine Failure
In Preliminary View
By ANDY PASZTOR
August 25, 2008;*Page*A7


The Spanair jetliner that crashed during takeoff from Madrid last week apparently didn't suffer an engine shutdown or fire before impact, according to people familiar with the details, but investigators suspect movable panels on the wings weren't properly extended.

As preliminary information trickled in over the weekend about the accident, which killed 154 people, an international team of experts continued to comb the wreckage looking for parts of the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 used to extend its flaps, these people said. The flaps are movable panels at the rear of the wings designed to provide extra lift during takeoffs.

Another major goal of the team is to determine whether some internal fault or engine-control setting may have caused a malfunction in the twin-engine jet -- a workhorse for international airlines since the 1980s.

At this point, investigators believe the engines were working properly and putting out adequate thrust.

It's still too early for investigators to draw definitive conclusions, and Spanish government officials and a spokesman for the airline, which is owned by Scandinavian airline SAS AB, have declined to comment on the direction of the investigation.

Several people familiar with the effort said various portions of the plane that have been recovered, along with video footage taken by cameras at the airport, don't show any signs of fire or explosion during takeoff. Initially, eyewitness reports and comments from airport officials indicated that flames were coming out of the left engine during takeoff.

Investigators believe both engines were turning as the plane struggled to get airborne using much of the roughly 10,000-foot-long runway, flew briefly and then smashed back to the ground.

Investigators in the next few days intend to enhance video images, while the U.K.'s Air Accidents Investigation Branch will attempt to determine what happened by examining the plane's so-called black boxes, which record flight parameters and cockpit conversations. At this point, investigators don't believe that a defect detected in an outside-temperature sensor before takeoff played any significant role in the accident.

According to people familiar with the Spanair probe, investigators are looking at a variety of possible causes but they are focused on trying to determine whether the pilots may have been distracted during the pre-flight checklist, or received incorrect indications about flap settings. Two U.S. jetliners have crashed since the 1980s because pilots failed to deploy flaps as part of their normal checklist procedures before takeoff.

[T-21]

Yes the bang could have been the aircraft contacting the ground but little mention of possible intake stalling so far. Could anybody please post the Barajas weather actual at the time ?

[Rainboe]

Someone has if you would take the trouble to look it up yourself in this very thread!

Please would people stop posting irrelevancies and primitive theories of their own! It is making it difficult to sort wheat from the chaff with this cascade of idiocy. 43 pages on very little is absurd!

[fireflybob]

Quote:
Check list completed or not - every time I line up for takeoff, I CHECK my 3 killers.
... repeat after me... TRIMS-FLAPS-SPOILERS

Yup, the old PanAmerican configuration check.
I follow it, likewise...before every takeoff, without exception.

Yes and that's also what BOAC taught me when I did the B 707 conversion in 1970 - stuck with me since!

[charangui742]

sevenstrokeroll,

according to what you said at the end of your post, which is also valid, but this case it should be focused on whether the a/c lifted off or not (some survivors mentioned to have lifted off or they may have confused with the rotation??)...only if confirmed not lifted off the ground that theory of an incorrect or absent drill of the before take off checklist by the pilots could be brought up, otherwise flaps were selected correctly.

over 10 years ago in South America there was a B737 which because of bad cockpit procedures & no discipline of checklists at all, started the take off roll with flaps up, disregarded the TO warning sound thinking of a false one (even more crazy on them), but the thing is the a/c rotated but obviously never lifted off, all dead at the end of the runway.

So, the flaps setting issue in this case should be related only to that lift off...unless any asymetric flaps setting not been checked during checklist?? this last i don't think so...

[hambleoldboy]

Me too Bob, trouble is on overstretched aircraft like MD's the Stab Trim 'Green Band' can be moved as well...

[NigelOnDraft]

??)...only if confirmed not lifted off the ground that theory of an incorrect or absent drill of the before take off checklist by the pilots could be brought up, otherwise flaps were selected correctly.Total Rubbish I'm afraid... :ugh:

Just the slightest bit of research and/or knowledge would reveal an identical type taking off without any flats/slats. It got airborne for some 4000' before hitting things (lightpole).

Aircraft with zero/insufficient Flas/Slts configurations will tend to get airborne. However, they will adapt an unusually high nose attitude, wing rock, and very shallow angle of climb. The Flt Crew will probably be experiencing a stick shaker, which will distract them / might convince them to land back on. I will leave you to deduce which of these seem to fit some of the "facts" (or rather "rumours") around this accident...

NoD

[xaf2fe]

Nigel, if you are referring to NW 255 in Detroit on Aug 16, 87 your facts are incorrect.

From the NTSB accident brief:

NORTHWEST FLT 255 (NW255) CRASHED AFTER TAKEOFF FM RWY 3C AT DETROIT METRO AIRPORT. WITNESSES SAID NW255 ROTATED FOR TAKEOFF 1200-1500 FT FROM THE END AND LIFTED OFF NR THE END OF THE 8500 FT RWY. AFTER LIFTOFF, THE WINGS ROCKED LT AND RT AND THE ACFT FAILED TO CLIMB NORMALLY. 18 FEET OF THE LT WING SEPARATED WHEN THE WING CONTACTED A LIGHT POLE 2760 FT BEYOND THE RWY END. THE ACFT ROLLED STEEPLY TO THE LEFT AND STRUCK POLES, A BLDG, AND AUTOMOBILES BEFORE CRASHING INTO A RAILROAD EMBANKMENT. THE ACFT WAS DESTROYED. THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THE FLAPS AND SLATS WERE IN THE UP/RETRACT POSITION AND HAD NOT BEEN DEPLOYED FOR TKOF. NEITHER PLT RECITED THE ITEMS OF THE TAXI CKLIST. STALL WARNINGS WERE ANNUNCIATED BUT AN AURAL TKOF WARNING WAS NOT ANNUNCIATED BY THE CENTRAL AURAL WARNING SYSTEM (CAWS). IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT 28 VOLT DC PWR WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE CAWS PWR SUPPLY #2. THE REASON FOR THE LOSS OF ELECTRICAL PWR WAS TRACED TO A CIRCUIT BRKR BUT NO MALF OF THE CB WAS FND. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, SEE NTSB/AAR-88/05


So the airplane flew for 2,760 feet (1/2 mile) no higher than a light pole, not 4,000 feet as you said.

[charangui742]

NoD,

yes, but your very elegant suggestion is valid when having enough remaning runway after VR, so as to continue accelerating the a/c at least to any minimum speed needed for that, maybe on that Madrid runway being long enough.

on that B737 accident in the past, runway was only 2000 mts long, by the time it happens what you say, you will be off the runway already...

rubbish is always what human beings never wanted to consider until it happens...

[xkoote]

PJ2,

you are correct I am speaking utter nonsense, the drill I refer to is for when the system is stuck in the ground mode...:ugh: .
However the reverser deployed theory has been covered extensively about 200-300 posts ago.

Xander

[NigelOnDraft]

xaf2fe Apologies - I added the rotation point to impact - not airborne, so ~maybe 3000' airborne - although in fact it took 4.5s after liftoff until it passed the end of the runway which pushes it back to 4000' again;) Whatver, read the post I was responding to - a definitive statement that ??)...only if confirmed not lifted off the ground that theory of an incorrect or absent drill of the before take off checklist by the pilots could be brought up, otherwise flaps were selected correctly.that if the aircraft got airborne, the flaps were selected correctly.

Again, reading the report - the MD-82 referred to "should have got airrborne" at 163KIS (V2+10), but actually got airborne at 169KIAS... so speed at liftoff / ground run used was not markedly different. What was different was the attitude required, and drag / wing-rock / stick shake / climb rate achievable.

I am not going to draw conclusions about Madrid. All I was doing was correcting a definitive, and provably incorrect statment I had read...

NoD

[Munnyspinner]

Overthewing - post 802
Passenger evidence suggests the pilot saw a warning light displayed, but wasn't sure what it meant.



I'm sorry but if the fare paying public actually thinks any Pilot doesn't really understand what a warning light means - we have a problem. What the light means is usually obvious - what is causing the underlying problem is often not. That's why, as a precaution, the crew return to have things checked out. Often, the underlying causes are minor and irrelevant. Sometimes the warning requires more attention.

I have yet to see an A/c Commander agree to proceed with a flight if there is any doubt about servicability nor and engineer sign off a tech sheet without being staisfied that the fault has been cleared or that he is totally satisfied that there is nothing to concern the safety of the flight.

[pichu17]

1) Part of the ground sensing ,change to flight condition.( A circuit breaker open or some wrong in relays or circuit)

2) Pilots, during first takeoff intention, notes the RAT increase and EPR reduction ( Rat probe was heated)

3) The mecanic not detected the condition and choice disconect the heater feeder wire ( the plane stay in flt condition)

4) In this condition the Take off configuration warning is inoperative.

5) The roll inestability is típical a stall condition because the wings d´not enter in this condition simultaneously.

6) when there are some problem ,the pilots atention is focused in this and rest is out of the loop.

PD : The flight recorder start in ground whith either fuel lever is open and parking brake is release. In flight ,the ground sensing, bypass this items

The voice recorder start when the plane is powered

The thrust reverser is operative in ground and flight (is prohibited used in flight)

[xkoote]

Does someone remeber if there was metion of the time the aircraft stayed at eh blocks whilst the mechanics looked over the aircraft? I don't know if this is the procedure with all MD80 operators, but I have always been accustomed that the captain call for flaps and slats to be retracted during taxi in. Even if you decide to leave all checklist items as is so you can quickly start the delayed flight again, I think you have the tendency to call for flaps and slats retract even though the taxi in checklist was omitted. Does anyone agree that this could be an issue?

To those offended by endless dribble and nonsense, I'm sorry but with a major accident you will get more people posting. It is in any case MUCH more interesting to comment about a major accident, than to comment about MEL items in log books etc. So it is logical that these threads are MUCH more expansive. And to those who say that only facts need to be posted here. Than this page should have 2, maybe 3 posts. These posts would contain the same info you can find in any other news site. So grow up guys. Stop stroking those ego's. I'm an ATP and took the time to read through the WHOLE thread before posting. I didn't complain.

[GP7280-POC]

heute.de Nachrichten - Traurige Gewissheit: Familie aus Pullach unter Absturzopfern von Madrid (http://www.heute.de/ZDFheute/inhalt/4/0,3672,7298052,00.html)
http:// 3w.heute.de/ZDFheute/inhalt/4/0,3672,7298052,00.html

Report:
Weak engine possibly a cause...
With the search for the causes for the tragedy the investigators in the meantime obviously assume an engine was too weak. The fact that the airplane on the runway rolled unusually for a long time, before it took off leaves the investigators on this possibility to close, reported the newspaper " El País" on Monday with reference to investigator circles at the police

Long rolling on the runway
A video of airport cameras, held under catch, shows according to the report that the airplane put a much back to long distance on the runway. Loud " El País" it drove 500 meters beyond the point recommended for the start. According to the report one of the engines could have turned - an attitude, which is made with landings for braking. Thus it explains itself that the airplane leaned immediately after taking off on the right side, reported " El País" with reference to a aviation engineer, whose name was not called

An engine turned
According to the newspaper the investigators discovered at the scene of the catastrophe that one of the engines was turned (reverse thrust). Unclear it was however whether this was already when starting the case or whether it took place via the crash. Loud " El País" the video shows besides that one of the bearing areas arose first on the ground and that the airplane six times struck the ground, before it exploded.

-end of report-

[N1005C]

dicksorchard # 818


Lauda Air flt NG004 Boeing 767-300ER reg OE-LAV (VHHH) VTBD LOWW May 26, 1991

[sevenstrokeroll]

does anyone know which pilot was making the takeoff?

do any other douglas operators practice takeoff stall recovery? firewall power flaps 15?

that would have saved the plane, if my theory is correct.

pichu 17 has the idea.

[wileydog3]

Exsp33db1rd said, not a criticism, but I agree with NigelOnDraft, in operating 4 eng. heavies from 1958 to 1994, I also never even heard of timing to V1, but that doesn't mean it was never suggested,

we used a minimum acceleration check when I was in the USAF. Don't know if they still do but it was based on reach x velocity by the 1000ft or 2000ft marker. Very useful in the old KC-135 'water wagon'. We also computed a time.

Based on that previous practice, I began timing my takeoffs. I can't remember the exact numbers (now retired) but I think it was something like :30 seconds from application of takeoff thrust to rotation. IF it took more than :30 seconds you were heavy and if it took :45 seconds, you were very heavy.

Also, I seem to remember at least 80kts by 1000ft and about 120-125kt by the 2000ft point. I will have to begin timing my takeoffs again. It is not really relevant for my airplane now (C-II) as we don't operate off anything but long runways.

[BOAC]

For Tubby:

As I see it, the aircraft had an MEL item entered which may or may not have caused a problem for the take-off.

The wind on 36L may have been a slight tailwind, but this is by no means uncommon and allowed for in airline ops and especially at LEMD. It rotated some distance down the runway (at present not defined, but SAID to be ???'longer than usual'???), appears to have climbed initially to around 30-60mtrs with no signs of engine fire, before descending, POSSIBLY wing-rocking, and it is thought the right wing struck the ground. It veered off the runway to the right, leaving initial debris to the right of the runway before traversing unfavourable terrain which caused it to break up and catch fire. One engine was found with T/R deployed which would be in complete accordance with an attempt to stop. An initial photograph APPEARS to show a clean wing detached from the fuselage. A video of dubious definition of the take-off was recorded somewhere and has been seen by the investigators. There are reports that the FDR is 'damaged' but the CVR is reported as ok.

That, as I see it, is that. Total. If there is more FACT, or some of the above is incorrect, I would be pleased to see it posted here. Everything else elsewhere.

[testpanel]

Whilst it is by no means certain that the circuit disconnected by the technician in this case also disabled the flaps/slats not configured for takeoff warning

Any MD8x driver willing/able to explain this system?
If that probe-heating was deactivated acc MEL, what would be the consequences?
Anybody willing to share a pic/diagram of the MD8x circuitbraker panel?

[Capvermell]

Out of interest. The FA who survived. She was in seat 1E. An ordinary passenger seat. Is this common practice amongst cabin crew?See British woman survived Madrid plane inferno after being hurled into a stream by explosion| News | This is London (http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23543913-details/British+woman+survived+Madrid+plane+inferno+after+being+hurl ed+into+a+stream+by+explosion/article.do)

Meanwhile, details have emerged today about the only surviving member of the ten-strong crew of the Spanair flight - 27-year-old air hostess Antonia Martinez Jimenez. She remains in intensive care with bruises all over her body, a broken arm, a cracked vertebra, a broken breast bone and a stitched up head wound.
Doctors say the woman, who breathes through a mask, is out of danger and in a better condition than some of the other 18 survivors of the flight.
Ms Martinez, Toni to friends, told relatives at her bedside: 'I felt the plane judder violently to the left, and then right, before it went down.
'Then I felt a sharp blow in my chest that sent me flying several metres. I ended up in a ditch with water in it, which must have protected me from the flames.'
Toni, who lived in Castelldefels near Barcelona, emerged almost without burns and says she owes her life to being seated right at the front of the plane, by the window.
'Flight attendants usually sit at the rear of the plane, but I was right at the front, in seat 1E.
'That part of the plane was hardly burnt. It was a miracle.
'All around me I could hear people crying out for help. They were shouting and calling desperately but I couldn't move, I couldn't do anything.
'A few minutes later I heard the sirens of the rescue teams, I knew they were going to save me.'
As soon as she was carried into an ambulance she asked the nurse to call her parents.
She told them: 'Mama don't worry, I'm alright, a bit knocked about but fine.'A number of the members of Spanair cabin crew travelling on this flight were "dead heading" (travelling as passengers) to Las Palmas for a return flight but I'm not clear if Ms Martinez is one of those so that this is the reason she was sitting in the front row. I expect someone here will know.

[lomapaseo]

Let's not forget that "if" the wings did stall (airflow separation) that the wake behind the wings will affect the engine inlets and also cause them to stall-surge-bang.

ala All the DC9 series including the -80 series that pranged in off the runway.

The confirmation of this will be had from the CVR and/or the DFDR, however of little significance to the investigation.

[Rainboe]

Why should the wings stall? Has there been any confirmation that flaps were retracted? Does this model have leading edge slats? Presumably there would have been TOCW warnings if the flaps were inadvertently not extended when they should have been.
There has been so much hang-up on the supposed 'left engine fire/failure' and this defect that they returned to stand for that the wood is not being seen for the trees, and I just cannot wade through 44 pages of amateur conjecture. The description of the aeroplane behaviour from what I can pick up bears similarity to previous inadvertent flapless take-offs and those tragic flights with iced wings that are just unable to maintain flight. The alleged vibration/wing rocking says stall as you said.

[mlog]

Yes the bang could have been the aircraft contacting the ground but little mention of possible intake stalling so far. Could anybody please post the Barajas weather actual at the time ?


Until the engines are inspected by the experts and the FDR data is evaluated, I believe a surge is a possibility. If there was a surge, it should be evident at least on the FDR data.

[BOAC]

Presumably there would have been TOCW warnings if the flaps were inadvertently not extended when they should have been.
- somewhere back in the jungle there are suggestions that the TOCW could have been knackered by the MEL action???

boardingpass asks about this:

...owed their escape to being thrown from the plane into a stream, thereby avoiding severe burns .
One possibility is that, as they shot off the end of the slide - they landed in water. - are you actually suggesting the slides were deployed?...........:confused:

[PJ2]

Rainboe;
Does this model have leading edge slats?
The DC9/MD80/B717 model types have all had LEDs since the DC9-30 series built in the late '60's; The DC9-10 series had a hard wing, not sure of the -20 series.

The TOCW issue has been discussed at length in the thread as one of the potential (not determined!) issues surrounding the maintenance actions on the TAT probe (air-ground issue, forgotten checklist issue); Time will tell if the theory holds any water. The failed/exploding engine theory is set aside in some posts but the notion that either engine had a reverser deploy inadvertently or that either high angles of attack and/or disturbed airflow from partially-stalled wings was upsetting one or both engines is being discussed.

To date, nothing is known; there are only theories.

xander;
In an "air-ground switch" issue, the crew may not be able to retract the landing gear (had it happen in the '9 once - no gear up, no pressurization, etc - returned) but in the '8 if I recall, there was a manual way to release the locks (which was applied to the handle, not the landing gear, of course). Still, an airplane in "ground mode" wouldn't cause a rejected takeoff because the crew logically wouldn't know it was stuck there until they were in the air. QED.

[XPMorten]

Weather at LEMD August 20, 2008

METAR/SPECI from LEMD, Madrid / Barajas (Spain).

METAR LEMD 201800Z 20006G16KT CAVOK 30/00 Q1016 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201730Z 22005KT 150V290 CAVOK 31/00 Q1016 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201700Z 23006KT 150V280 CAVOK 31/00 Q1017 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201630Z 23003KT CAVOK 31/00 Q1017 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201600Z 23004KT CAVOK 31/M00 Q1017 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201530Z 23005KT 180V340 CAVOK 31/M01 Q1017 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201500Z 26005G16KT CAVOK 30/01 Q1017 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201430Z 24006G19KT 170V340 CAVOK 30/02 Q1017 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201400Z 24003KT CAVOK 30/02 Q1018 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201330Z 19007KT 110V240 CAVOK 30/01 Q1018 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201300Z 14004KT CAVOK 29/03 Q1018 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201230Z 18007KT 090V240 CAVOK 28/02 Q1018 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201200Z 35002KT CAVOK 28/06 Q1019 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201130Z 16005KT CAVOK 27/08 Q1019 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201100Z 17002KT CAVOK 26/09 Q1019 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201030Z 12003KT CAVOK 25/10 Q1019 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201000Z 21002KT CAVOK 24/10 Q1019 NOSIG=


short TAF from LEMD, Madrid / Barajas (Spain).

TAF LEMD 201700Z 201803 VRB04KT CAVOK=
TAF LEMD 201400Z 201524 25005KT CAVOK=
TAF LEMD 201100Z 201221 19005KT CAVOK=

large TAF from LEMD, Madrid / Barajas (Spain).

TAF LEMD 201700Z 210024 02005KT CAVOK
BECMG 1113 18010KT TX34/16Z TN17/06Z=
TAF LEMD 201100Z 201818 VRB03KT CAVOK
BECMG 1113 18010KT TX33/16Z TN17/06Z=

XPM

[Avionero]

XPMorten,
didn´t you mix up local and zulu times here? I thought the accident happened and 14-something LOCAL?

[dicksorchard]

N1005C (http://www.pprune.org/members/65268-n1005c) BND (http://www.pprune.org/members/224952-bnd) PJ2 (http://www.pprune.org/members/67532-pj2) T-21
(http://www.pprune.org/members/187665-t-21)
Just wanted to thank the above posters for taking out the time to reply to my querys about reverse thrusters .


I see that another very interesting post refering to the reverse thrust issue has been posted by GP7280-POC (http://www.pprune.org/members/166290-gp7280-poc) which quotes an El Pais Article ( A usually very reputable spanish newspaper) See below

Long rolling on the runway
A video of airport cameras, held under catch, shows according to the report that the airplane put a much back to long distance on the runway. Loud " El País" it drove 500 meters beyond the point recommended for the start. According to the report one of the engines could have turned - an attitude, which is made with landings for braking. Thus it explains itself that the airplane leaned immediately after taking off on the right side, reported " El País" with reference to a aviation engineer, whose name was not called


An engine turned
According to the newspaper the investigators discovered at the scene of the catastrophe that one of the engines was turned (reverse thrust). Unclear it was however whether this was already when starting the case or whether it took place via the crash .

Maybe the reverse thruster issue is a relevant one especially as the video evidence on take off seems to show no fire in any of the engines .

However Im interested in another issue Relating to the interaction of a Captain & first officer in relation to aborted Landings & take offs and i need to know if the information i have been given is in fact true ?

My friend ( ex pilot ) has told me that within his airline if an aircraft had a techincal fault after coming off stand which had to be repaired and that the initial take off had to be aborted then the Captain would be at the controls on the next attempt at take off - even if the first officer was due to fly that leg of the journey ? Is this standard procedure/ practice within other airlines ?

Im very curious because in this general conversation my friend said that he had known during his flying career of Captains having to take over the controls from First officers and vice versa at crucial times when landing / taking off etc & decididing to abort .

He said this would be a split second descision and may well account for tany descision to abort take off and it going drastically wrong . So this may be why the reverse thruster was deployed .

My interest in this aspect of communication between Captain & First officer has been more than aroused by the below post

Ignition Override (http://www.pprune.org/members/18559-ignition-override) If a pilot rushes and does not coordinate with the other pilot, they won't survive a mistake.

Especially when you consider The Tenerife disaster and read the air accident report which infers that the first officer was actually scared of questioning his Captains descisions even tho he was very uncomfortable about the situation that he found himself in ?

[JM340]

XPMorten,

check times, at LEMD is Zulu+2. You should be looking at 1230z or so observation. As been said before, a little tailwind at the time of the crash.

Regards

JM

[XPMorten]

Avionero

Right, noticed too late, Madrid is zulu+2?
So the accident was around 1230z

M

[testpanel]

XPMorten,
didn´t you mix up local and zulu times here? I thought the accident happened and 14-something LOCAL?


What´s this:
METAR LEMD 201300Z 14004KT CAVOK 29/03 Q1018 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201230Z 18007KT 090V240 CAVOK 28/02 Q1018 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201200Z 35002KT CAVOK 28/06 Q1019 NOSIG=


Antenna3, a tv-station in spain, just reported 10 minutes ago that a argentinian journo presumably has the last few seconds of the cvr........
Keep in mind that spanish afternoon shows, as in more countries, is full of bull..it, but............

[LR322pilot]

Refering to the loud bang heard shortly after take off this might be consistent with a compresser stall due blanking of air flow to an engine if the aircraft was in a stall condition.

[Rainboe]

Yes- the $64,000 question is why the aeroplane should be in that condition in the first place!

[Green-dot]

dicksorchard:

With reference to my post #662 and this reference:

ASN Aircraft accident Fokker 100 PT-MRK São Paulo, SP (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19961031-0)

gives some additional information regarding a #2 uncommanded thrust reverser deployment and the consequences.

Regards,
Green-dot

[el #]

Spanish media reports that the investigating judge has finally taken vision of the video after much delay. To be honest he requested it only saturday.
He is also getting another video from TN Argentina that has apparently broadcast a piece with CVR extracts, said programme is not however on TN's website.
Reportedly from CVR, Cpt was PF, reported left engine trouble, then F/O took control.

From some statements, and the fact that no mention yet about FDR readability I'm worried there can be trouble that is not being disclosed now, but this is only a conjecture and I hope very much to be wrong.

[bobwi]

Spicejetter: "Out of interest. The FA who survived. She was in seat 1E. An ordinary passenger seat. Is this common practice amongst cabin crew?

I beleive there were 6 cabin crew, for a 200 seater, meaning there are 2 more crew than required. Does the M82 only have 4 cabin crew stations?"

There were 4 operating cabin crew onboard and 3 positioning crew. So she was on board as a passenger to operate a flight later from Gran Canaria. That is why she was sitting in 1E. Very common practice.

I understand there was also a third pilot onboard. I think he was on a private travel. Maybe as an extra

[sevenstrokeroll]

knowing how vital it is to get the gear up, douglas made a nice over ride button to press if the gear has to go up and the plane "thinks" its on the ground.

oddly enough, in my scenario, that button would have become flush with the instrument panel if the plane "thought it was in the sky"

it is obvious now to me that the RAT probe heating on the ground was the symptom of a bigger problem...that the plane ''thought'' it was airborne.

turning off the heater was simply taking care of a symptom...but the full diagnosis was misunderstood...again this is a theory.

[lomapaseo]

el #

He is also getting another video from TN Argentina that has apparently broadcast a piece with CVR extracts, said programme is not however on TN's website.
Reportedly from CVR, Cpt was PF, reported left engine trouble, then F/O took control.



I would like to examine this statement in more detail

What is TN Argentina?:

How could they possibly have access to the CVR? perhaps we are talking about ATC tapes?

I really don't see how the F/O could take control and have this known as a fact yet. The plane was so little in the air that you just can't hand it off can you:confused:

[Old_Fokker]

Never intended to actually post here as I am not pilot nor in any other way connected to the airline industry. Nevertheless, as someone living in Spain and understanding the Spanish language (and culture) quite well, I believe I need to post the following:

A word of caution on the alleged CVR transript which TN Argentina claims to have. CadenaSer of Spain says (1) that they have contacted TN Argentina about this alleged CVR transcript. TN Argentina clarifies that they have not listened to the recording themselves but that some parts of it (the phrases "corta gas" ["cut throttle" or "I cut throttle"*], "rotate igual" ["rotate nevertheless"] and "dámelo" ["give it to me"] were given to them by their sources and that the transcript as a whole as presented by them should not be taken completely literally.

The TN Argentina clip, including a Spanish version of the alleged transcript, can been seen on Youtube (2). Below is my translated version. Perhaps user Justme69 (who has done an excellent job sofar in resuming the Spanish media in general and separating fiction from facts in particular) can correct me, if needed.

Alleged TN Argentina transcript [translated from Spanish]:

FO: THE LEFT ONE! ENGINE FIRE! CUTTING THROTTLE
CM: OK, I'VE GOT IT, I'VE GOT IT, ROTATE NEVERTHELESS
FO: POSITIVE CLIMB, OH GOD!
CM: I'M LOOSING IT, MORE PEDAL, GIVE ME MORE
SOUND: (EXPLOSION?)
CM: INSULT
FO: GIVE IT TO ME
SOUND: CRASH END


* While TN Argentina claims the phrase was "Corto Gas" (which means, "I cut throttle"), CadenaSer reports the phrase as "Corta Gas" which means "cut throttle" but as a command to someone else. It's only one single letter which differs but it makes a 'helluva' difference.




(1) El fiscal investigará la veracidad de la grabación de un canal argentino con la supuesta conversación de los pilotos en CADENASER.com (http://www.cadenaser.com/espana/articulo/fiscal-investigara-veracidad-grabacion-canal/csrcsrpor/20080825csrcsrnac_7/Tes)
(2) YouTube - Accidente Barajas (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwBKoufH898&eurl)

[NotPilotAtALL]

Hi,

TN Argentina:
TN.com.ar (http://www.tn.com.ar)
Check the tab cessiones and internacional tab...
It's a video with extract CVR !!! ??? and the El Mundo animation...

Cheers.

[XPMorten]

From the TN site;
Anyone that can transelate?

http://www.xplanefreeware.net/morten/DOCS/TN.jpg

XPM

[PJ2]

dicksorchard;
My friend ( ex pilot ) has told me that within his airline if an aircraft had a techincal fault after coming off stand which had to be repaired and that the initial take off had to be aborted then the Captain would be at the controls on the next attempt at take off - even if the first officer was due to fly that leg of the journey ? Is this standard procedure/ practice within other airlines ?

Im very curious because in this general conversation my friend said that he had known during his flying career of Captains having to take over the controls from First officers and vice versa at crucial times when landing / taking off etc & decididing to abort .

He said this would be a split second descision and may well account for tany descision to abort take off and it going drastically wrong . So this may be why the reverse thruster was deployed .

My interest in this aspect of communication between Captain & First officer has been more than aroused by the below post

It isn't standard procedure in my experience at one major carrier. If it was the F/O's leg, s/he took it unless the captain deemed otherwise - sharing legs has always been an informal process at the captain's discretion - that said, gaining experience is part of the "apprenticeship" so to speak. "Post MEL/maintenance work", the airplane is expected to be normal and so no accomodation would normally be expected. If it is and there is concern that "only the captain should fly", the decision to depart is itself, questionable.

Your friend is right about "split-second decision" etc. He is also correct about captains taking over at times from first officers. Although it is not always the case, captains are usually the more experienced of the two crew. Regardless, s/he is the commander of the aircraft and one does not normally take such action, not, at least, without extreme reason.

I know of no SOPs, airline operations manual or "informal, un-stated" arrangement where a First Officer would ever reject a takeoff or interfere with the controls in any way. That said, there is one situation of which I am aware which may apply and that is when a training captain is sitting in the First Officer's position (traditionally the right-seat) and a thorough briefing about who will do a rejected takeoff is undertaken beforehand.

In flight operations, unless the aircraft is in immediate danger and the captain was not appearing to do anything to mitigate the danger, I don't know of any circumstance where the F/O would take over from the captain. That is a very high-risk action with largely unpredictable consequences because both command of the airplane and communications are then in question and it is very difficult to re-establish order and cockpit discipline in a short period of time, personal relations and qualities, abilities, knowledge and experience of the F/O notwithstanding.

The words loudly and clearly spoken, "I have control" (or similar) are absolutely required so that all crew members know who is in command of the airplane. That mandates that the other crew member take over the radio work and, since such action would have almost certainly resulted from an abnormal or even emergency circumstance, provide the new PF, Pilot Flying, with basic situational awareness such as airspeed, pitch/roll attitudes, rate of climb/descent and acknowledge then cancel any aural/visual warnings associated with any system failures then standby for the call for drills.

Your friend is correct: taking over is a very serious operational decision and requires the utmost in coordination and re-established discipline.

[OCEANIC CLEARANCE]

I cannot believe that's the real CVR!! They say some words that a pilot from Spain would not use in an emergency situation, but if that was true seems like if they retarded to idle the engine running :ugh:

Anyway, I don't think that argentinian tv has the real CVR.

[Diver-BR]

The CVR extract goes like this:

Note: Keep in mind that this is my free translation, I'm not a native spanish nor english speaker, so this isn't anywhere near an "official transtation", neither is confirmed that the TN news is real.

F/O: The Left! Engine Fire! Cut gas.
CPT: Ok. I got it, I got it, rotate anyway (Note: original is "Rotate Igual")
F/O: Positive climb. Oh god!
CPT: I'm losing it, more rudder (Note: Pedal), gime me more.. you
<noise (explosion?)>
CPT: <cursing>
F/O: Give it to me
<noise - crash end>

[JM340]

The video on TN Argentina is just too much. Absolutely rubbish :mad: . Posted on the net almost next day after the crash. It´s just unvelievable ...
Not even the investigators could have reached the recordings so fast. :mad:

JM

[OCEANIC CLEARANCE]

http://www.xplanefreeware.net/morten/DOCS/TN.jpg

COP: The left! Engine fire! I retard throttle.
PIL: OK. I got it, I got it. Rotate anyway.
COP: Positive climb. Oh God!
PIL: I'm losing control. More rudder. Give me more...you
NOISE: (Explosion)
PIL: (insult)
COP:Give it to me.
NOISE: Crash end.

[justme69]

I'm not fully going to dismiss the transcript shown on that TV program, but unless the copilot happened to be speaking Argentinian (rather than Castillian Spanish, as it "should've been"), those are very likely NOT the exact words on the recording a spanish pilot would use (or rather, copilot).

So, while I strongly suspect it's bull they have the cabin sound recordings, here is my most accurate translation (not all makes full sense) of the "transcript".

Copilot: The left one - Engine fire - Cutting fuel (Please note that engine is transcribed as being said in English, while in all likelyhood a spanish pilot would have referred to it in Spanish using the word "motor" instead)
Pilot: OK - Got it - OK - Got it - Rotate same (way) (or anyway, ambigous) - (Same as before, the word "rotate" is either latin spanish, intead of castillian, or english, which wouldn't be the kind of word a Spanish pilot would likely ever use).
Cop: Possitive ascend - Oh God.
Pil: I'm losing it - More pedal (rudder?) - Give me more - You (you, give me more?)
Sound (explosion?)
Pil: (Swears)
Cop: Give (it) to me
Noise. Crash ends.

Please note that, at the very least, whoever made the "transcript" wasn't a professional at all, with some expressions etc (such as "crash ends") and other subtle semantics details that look HIGHLY amaterouish.

Again, not diminishing its validity. But if you ask me my honest opinion, I would bet serious money it is a TOTAL BULL PRANK. At very least the copilot would've had to be of Argentinian origin, which hasn't been mentioned, and the moron transcribing the tape, a drop out college freshman. But anything is possible, of course.

Reportly (but again, probably wrong), the airport recording that finally made its way to the judge in charge of the investigation is only about 7 seconds long. That's probably incorrect and it's longer, but anyway, we can only comment on what we are told by the press or by officials speaking live on TV.

[NotPilotAtALL]

Hi,

So .. fire in a engine and lost of control ..... case closed ....
The rest is for the forensic engineers.. :)
That was one of the most quick investigation I had seen !

Cheers.

[testpanel]

So .. fire in a engine

I always want to have A fire in all the engines...:bored:

[toro11]

A Spanish pilot never, never , never will use that kind of words. Unbelievable how much rubbish using the pain of people

[testpanel]

From www.airdisaster.com (http://www.airdisaster.com):


[quote]Here you have 4 of the many reports being discussed within aviation forums in Spain.

My personal view regarding the reverse issue. Only 3 alternatives.
- Pilot commanded it out to stop the a/c (why Engine 1 reverse is closed?).
- Uncommanded deployment, dramatically reducing thrust and throwing it to the right side of runway.
- Maybe it´s just the crash that deployed it (however it´s a quite symmetrical deployment of both shells). I´ll try to upload the picture.
http://www.jetphotos.net/user-uploads/1219302341669.jpg
Picture was provided by the man in Report 4.

************************************
<FONT face="Times New Roman">REPORT 1fficehttp://forums.jetphotos.net/images/smilies/redface.gifffice" />

[T-21]

Found this on Google interesting reading Salon.com Technology | Ask the pilot (http://www.salon.com/tech/col/smith/2008/08/21/askthepilot287/print.html)

[sevenstrokeroll]

if this cvr transcript is accurate, my theory regarding the rat probe etc would not fit. if so, I am sorry, but perhaps we have all learned something about the DC9/80.

NOW, if the left engine fire warning was part of this, why did the pilots cut the throttle so close to the ground?

we climb to 1000'agl and then fight the fire. there is still thrust being produced by the engine.

wondering why there wasn't enough rudder authority?

it is very interesting and I hope we get clarification from spanish authorities soon.

[justme69]

Please, note that although the claimed transcript of the last moments of the cvr is likely a TOTAL BULL PRANK, this is the direct link to the ARGENTINIAN TV program reporting it.

www.tn.com.ar/2008/08/21/index.html?id=937314 (http://www.tn.com.ar/2008/08/21/index.html?id=937314)

It has been reported that, after obtaining the necessary judiciary permissions, the recovered voice and data recording boxes were being shipped by courier to an specialized company in England to have the recordings extracted. The data recorder is damaged so the information would have to be recovered and likely will take a long time, due to the care it has to be exercised to try to retrieve as much as possible w/o further damage.

The CVR seems to be in good shape and authorities were confident the recordings could be extracted without problems.

[el #]

Again on CVR "transcript" that I wasn't able to pull while it was just there.

Yes it's very suspicious: - has surfaced very early - nobody else has it - TN doesn't cite it anymore and likely will not defend its authenticity. Understandably the judge is investigating that aspect too.

We'll know, but if it is pure invention as suggested, whoever made it is a really low form of life and should be prosecuted.

[lomapaseo]

Previous actual CVRs decoded with an engine fire were annunciated with a bell, followed by a female voice "fire left engine" and were not annunciated by the crew.

So who is kidding who:confused:

[Rananim]

Only time you take immediate action to cut an engine between V1 and 400' is thrust reverser unlocked with buffet/yaw.For this reason,I am sure the video is a hoax.Professional pilots arent trained like this.

Sevenstrokeroll,
I think the TOCW was disabled;just a question of why.Can you set the parking brake in the MD80 when airborne or arm the T.O position of the autobrakes on approach?

[Rainboe]

I think we can end speculation about the CVR- it is evidently fake as the real recording will barely have been downloaded and will be carefully guarded, presumably at Farnborough. It just would not get out. Some kids got themselves a nice little earner there out of some gullible news organisation.

There has been determined speculation that a compressor stall is the cause because of high temperature, tailwind and heavy. I have done higher temperature, stronger tailwind and heavier takeoffs from MAD. Not a problem. Again the focus falls on the wrong place. Rather than be the cause of the problem, the root is what may have caused that surging in the first place (if it happened at all), not the fact that it occurred.

It increasingly sounds like the aeroplane was not flyable. How so? Scenarios are:
Large error in take-off performance calculation with speeds much too low (unlikely)
Erroneous power setting for take-off (unlikely)
Wrong flap configuration for take-off
Technical failure beyond the critical time- wheel shredding, fire or engine failure- unlikely as this should have been handled.

There has been enormous focus on the returning to stand to fix a minor error as if this is the cause! What is needed is wider vision. This can only come from experienced people and not from people desperate to make their mark and stake their claim to the final solution! Like this work of art from a true idiot!:
I strongly beleive that they tried an RTO becuase the landing gear failed to retract. The gear will not retract if the plane arrived in this condition!
If the plane indeed was in airborne mode, remember my words. This is an item in the MD-80's Emergency Abnormal Checklist.

[justme69]

Ministry of Fomento in Spain, advised by the accident comission, has released an official statement negating that the presumed "leaked" transcript from the pilots conversation in the cabin shown in the Argentinian news program is real.

General Attorney was notified in case the prank could be a criminal offense such as obstruction of justice, as the accident is part of a judiciary investigation under secrecy (standard procedure at the beginning of an investigation where some documents or other evidence could "dissapear" or be destroyed or concealed. Usually a few days later the investigation becomes "public" instead of "secret").

[PaperTiger]

It increasingly sounds like the aeroplane was not flyable. How so? Scenarios are:
Large error in take-off performance calculation with speeds much too low (unlikely)
Erroneous power setting for take-off (unlikely)
Wrong flap configuration for take-off
Technical failure beyond the critical time- wheel shredding, fire or engine failure- unlikely as this should have been handled.

There has been enormous focus on the returning to stand to fix a minor error as if this is the cause!Although likely not the direct cause, any time an unusual or extraordinary situation intervenes with a departure, and then an accident does occur, it should not be ruled out as a possible contributing factor. Did they perhaps fail to recalculate the numbers after the 1hr+ (?) delay ? Not get the current ATIS ? Were all the remaining electronics functioning ? Etc., etc.

Many times we have seen that the end trap consists of little things along the path. Swiss cheese.

[lomapaseo]

....There has been enormous focus on the returning to stand to fix a minor error as if this is the cause! What is needed is wider vision. This can only come from experienced people ...

No sense in citing non-sense.

The reason that the crap rises to the surface is because the more experienced are waiting for something like real facts to emerge. We can find faults in others pet theories but that is quite boring after awhile.

[md80fanatic]

(standard procedure at the beginning of an investigation where some documents or other evidence could "dissapear" or be destroyed or concealed. Usually a few days later the investigation becomes "public" instead of "secret")

Is this true? I am supposed to start feeling more confident about this investigation when?

[justme69]

As we all care deeply for the victims and their families, the good news today is that one of the children survivors (6yo, craneal fracture and other face injuries) was the first to be discharged today from the hospital to return home.

He crawled by himself out of the plane through a hole in the fuselage, unbuckling his own safety belt, after checking on her sister (16, not a survivor) sat by his side and thinking she was asleep.

Often the judge, when he fears some big company or someone may try to hide evidence, would call for the investigation to become secret for a (short) while, not letting anyone out of the judiciary system know what/who he is investigating, so he could "show up by surprise" so information would less likely be revealed (leaked) to the the press in advance aiding those that the judge is thinking about pressing charges against conceal information or run away or whatever.

It is quite normal to have a big case with too many pieces of evidence and too many people involved or large number of victims to be clasified as "investigation under secrecy" for a while, until the risk of the (slow) proceeding of the investigation aiding those that (potentially) would be charged, dissapears. Then days (weeks, months?) later, the whole account of the investigation becomes public, detailing the steps the judge took.

Spain's judiciary system is so slow, it borderlines "unfit for purpose", as most investigations etc greatly benefit from being carried fast and efficiently, rather than incredibly slow and well ... not so efficiently at all.

This investigation is, of course, parallel and separate from the National Civil Aviation authorities as well as authorities' from other countries invited (the US has formally been invited to be part of the investigation as manufacturers of the plane as has the EEC), and is geared towards finding criminal behaviours or responsabilities on any of the parties involved (acts of terrorism, etc), but it's the investigation with the highest rank of authority, so it's the first one any evidence etc needs to be presented to. After the judge declares that no criminal neglicency, intent or behaviours can be observed and classifies the case as an accident, then they no longer need to be consulted/asked for permission/etc to continue technical and safety investigations.

Judiciary system's workers routinely leak information to the politicians and even the press on the proceedings before the final conclusions are even put on paper by the judge. Politicians, trying to save the day and knowing the public doesn't want to wait 2 years w/o any news, leak this information as well when they feel it's safe (certain) enough to do so.

[lomapaseo]

This investigation is, of course, parallel and separate from the National Civil Aviation authorities as well as authorities from other countries invited ...and is geared towards finding criminal behaviours on any of the parties involved, but it's the investigation with the highest rank of authority, so it's the first one any evidence etc needs to be presented to.


Well if there are mechanical issues look for Service Bulletins or AD's from the US in the near furture.

Anything else, don't hold your breath for at least a year or two.

[xkoote]

Rainboe,

funny how your post is just a recap of the same blabber you've made the past pages. Hence probably 2,000+ posts. You say absolutely nothing new yet thrash people for trying to understand.
I simply hate dwellers like you, who spend their time asking away, then blast those who post simply to enlighten ourselves. Because in ALL crash theads it is all it is. Yo ufinish your post with a set of questions asked since the SECOND PAGE !? Is the small apartment going to your head? Maybe the weather? I don't know.

I made that statement, together with 10 or 20 MD80 facts which haven't been mentioned before. PJ2 said he never heard of this nonsense, I mentioned that it could be a factor in my post. So I went in to my manuals to refresh my memory

http://i168.photobucket.com/albums/u163/xkoote/EAC2.jpg

As you can see it refers only to being stuck in ground mode. I corrected myself and the thread continued. Here comes Mr. retard, barging in open doors and arrogantly asking questions posted 5 days ago :rolleyes:
So please, stop insulting, let your ego back in the cage and read all posts.

Someone asked about the CAWS system being inoperative. If the aircraft had failed in the airborne mode you'll get the problem of the RAT probe being heated on the ground. The other one being that the CAWS stops giving TO warnings.
I don't have an opinion about the CVR script, it may not be the official ne, but maybe the essense of the CVR was given by an insider. One thing I know is that an engine failure alone "should" not be the cause of such troubles in getting the plane airborne. There must be something else. But at the expense of healthy debate I will refrain to avoid forum member closely affiliated with the Lord himself from passing judgement to the "idiots" ;)


Xander

[md80fanatic]

...for the clarification. I certainly misunderstood you the first time.

[Mat Sabo]

Good on you, xkoote!

[PJ2]

xander;
I corrected myself and the thread continued.
That's the way I saw it...no issue. Helmet fires aren't limited to the great unwashed...I'm living proof, :)

[ExSp33db1rd]

IF it took more than :30 seconds you were heavy and if it took :45 seconds, you were very heavy.

I agree with those timings -which I've been monitoring as a pax. for some time - and if we're not airborne by 45 secs. I've decided that I'm going to start putting my head between my knees - after re-checking the emergency exit !

Looks like the Military are the only ones to check acceleration rate - interesting. makes sense, but the application Worldwide might need more than just a wish ! :)

[ExSp33db1rd]

Just read the so-called CVR transcript translation - or whatever it is.

Reminds me of one of my first sim. sessions on the 707, crew were asked what was the first action in the event of a fire warning or suspected engine failure ? Won't bore you with all the replies, but the answer was - Nothing ! sit on your hands and think before touching ANYTHING. Then silence the aural warning, and so on - we all know the rest, or should.

Maybe not relevant, sorry.

[sierra5913]

Hi All,

My first post on this forum.

I would like to throw a theory at you all. Relatively low percentage chance of happening though.

I'm not knowledged in the intricacies of the MD flight management computer, but are the final V1-Vr-V2 speeds programmed into the FMC at the gate? Reason I say this is as the aircraft returned to the gate less taxi fuel used, would the used up fuel, after taxi to Rwy36, return to gate, then more used up fuel again to Rwy 36 have affected the V numbers already programmed into the FMC?

Did the pilot order more fuel at the remote gate to cover the loss of the taxi out/in/out?

If not, would the 30 minutes or so of fuel used in the taxi out/in/out change the actual Vr speed if the crew did not reprogram the V speeds? On top of this, changes in temperature, air density etc due to the 1 hour delay originally from the gate may change the V speeds?

Bad V speeds may have caused the early rotation and over-rotation due to passing of V1 in haste to get airborne, then onset of left wing stall.

Cheers.

[xkoote]

The MD80 uses about 200 kilo's of fuel for a 10 minute taxi and takeoff. Given they used 10 minutes out, 10 minutes back and 10 out again means they used let's say 600 - 800 kilo's. But remember, they are lighter, not heavier, so that fact should have helped their case, not hurt it. They would have theoretically taken off with more speed than needed. But with these weights it would not have differed more than 2 knots. I don't know if they refueled, I asked recently about the time spent at the gate for another reason also but don't know yet. If they refueled you would have the correct speeds again in the FMC. If they overfueled you would come back to the same 2-5 knots at the most per ton of difference. our MD's don't have intergrated FMC's as we don't have EFIS. But I think the speeds are manually entered in EFIS MD's. Not sure though.

In a recent post I talked about the commands "Flaps up" and "Slats in" given by the captain while arriving at the gate. Our operation does it independantly of the taxi in checklist although it is also stated in there.
They are done last minute to reduce FOD while taxiing by keeping the flaps at 15°. If they decided that it would be a quick fix and omitted all checklists so they would be ready to go when finished it could be one scenario of having the high lift devices not in the correct position. I say this because if they did the checklists it is very difficult to miss this item. It is many times the first one on the taxi out.

One last thing. I remember someone posting about the fact that he's never seen an SOP where the F/O executes an abort. In our operation, the F/O handles the full takeoff, including a possible RTO. The only limitation we have is if a F/O gives a "stop" command it should be regarded as an advice to the captain. Otherwise the first officer handles everything and also keeps his hands on the throttles until V1....;). I know however that indeed there are many other companies where this is not the case.

[ZQA297/30]

I am not going to speculate on the specific cause of the accident, but will submit that it will eventually be attributed to the conjunction of a number of adverse factors.

I will illustrate with an incident that happened to me thirty odd years ago.

Taxiing out in DC-9-34, route training flight, trg Capt in RHS.
Shortly after we entered the runway backtracking (checks completed "down to the line"), got message, "please return to ramp XXX (senior civil aviation dept official) wants to talk to you.
Turn onto taxiway and official comes on radio requesting medevac for a seriously ill female. When asked if patient has Doctors certificate, answer negative. Sorry, unable to accommodate without certificate. Taxi back onto runway and proceed with takeoff.
Climbing out through 400' starting departure turn, experience some gusty turbulence and a couple of momentary stallwarning/stickshaker. WTF???
Stall recovery, flaps 15, max power.
The source of our problem then became apparent; flap/slat retracted.

Trg capt had retracted them as we cleared runway heading for the ramp, and then became involved in the decision on the medevac request. I failed to re-check (that vital PanAm et al last double-check) configuration because of numerous distractions, on PA to pax (explaining turn on to taxiway then back onto runway), checking with FAs etc.
The warning system had failed.

What broke the chain of events-luck. The aircraft was relatively light, full pax but short sector fuel. I was in the habit of fairly gentle rotation when plenty of runway was available, so we breezed through the critical zone totally unaware of how lucky we were.

Incidentally the medevac patient turned out to be the daughter of an even more senior Civil Aviation official, and she turned out to have acute appendicitis. The official called me to say I may have saved her life according to the doctor, if she had flown in that condition the appendix could easily have burst causing dangerous complications. Luck again.

PS. Prior to this incident flap/slat warning check was once per detail, it then became prior to each flt.

[grumpyoldgeek]

Sometimes struggling through 40 odd pages of speculation is worth it for one post. Thanks ZQA297/30.

[BenThere]

Looks like the Military are the only ones to check acceleration rate

Another nice thing military aircraft usually have is the AOA gage. It will tell you your honest weight, your real approach speed, and your best rate and angle of climb, all based on what the aircraft is feeling. I think it should be required on all transports as a vital crosscheck. It's not expensive.

[xkoote]

Quote from ZQA297/30,

Trg capt had retracted them as we cleared runway heading for the ramp

This is exactly what I am referring to. Flap/slat retraction on taxi in is usually not done by checklist but by heart. Thank God you guys made it through. Glad to have you still roaming the skies.

Xander

[glad rag]

Yep. thanks for sharing ZQA297/30. :D

[HarryMann]

I seem to have started something mentioning timing runway acceleration to a pre V1 speed... which some hadn't ever heard of but quite a few others seem to have.
The whole theory was simply that whilst V1 was/is a prime parameter, it's 'calculated' for a set of conditions that can't always be guaranteed - Thrust profile; known TOW (debated earlier); Tyre drag due runway water/slush/brake binding; etc.
No good finding oneself at V1 and RTO if you're too far down runway -

Long since leaving the industry I'd assumed that today accelerometers (or an INS mode) would be keeping an eye on take-off progress.

No, I'm not advocating it or criticising anything, possibly a sideways glance at how 2-crew operations have changed the flight deck and more than anything from a design aspect, how critical it is to keep things as simple as ergonomically possible to reduce workload and aid rapid and clear decision making under stress.

ZQA297/30 - Thanks, a ray of light. As frank, well-meaning and educational a post as you'll get on here.

.. and whilst the media (in their own way) and indeed many on this board struggle to put some perspective on how such a dreadful accident could happen, I say a little prayer for all those lost souls last week :sad: - lest we forget what this is really about.

[broadreach]

ZQA297/30
Thanks for that post. I've been pax on one hurried, slat-less, flap-less departure (737-200) and I've sometimes wondered if it doesn't happen more often than we hear about.

[bubbers44]

Yes it does. My friend was an FO that took off at LAX in a 737 200 with no flaps because the circuit breaker was pulled because maintenance moved it to the gate and didn't want to hear the takeoff warning horn every time they advanced power. They got stick shaker on take off rotation so lowered the nose. Everything turned out ok but it was a big FU. Hate to add to the ridiculous reasons why this happened on this thread because I agree, we have no facts and endless speculation with no facts is a waste of time.

In the simulator we did a no flap take off at SNA with their short runway and we got airborn by rotating to normal and waiting to get the proper speed for that configuration. I wonder when we will get any data about this accident.

[misd-agin]

Pan Am used the term "Killer items" for their 'takeoff configuration check'.

I use FET, misspelled FAT, as in "I'm in fat city", which is U.S. slang for being in great shape.

F - Flaps
E - Engines
T - Trim

"Taxi into position and hold." Runway's clear, no one on final approach, FO calls out last minute checklist items...silently check FET(flaps, engines, trim). Good to go.

[justme69]

Here are some translations of relevant parts of another news article quoting some survivors' recalls of the accident.

-42yo female colombian doctor: "I didn't truly feel anything (wrong), it looked to me like a plain-and-normal flight until it took off (went up) and it started to "tumble". I was shot out of my seat. I saw fire and smoke ..." (No mention of loud bangs or noises)

-30yo male: "Prior flight was full, so I had to take this later one. As soon as the airplane left the ground, it made a "bandazo" (sudden move more properly translated to side-by-side-towards-one-side, but likely refers to a hard roll) to the left, then another to the right and I knew we were going to crash. He could hear people asking for help: "I'm suffocating", but didn't see the fire as it was behind him and the front of the airplane didn't (quite) catch on fire. (No mention of large bangs or noises).

-27yo female: A flight attendant and only crew survivor in the flight. Is in fairly good health and recovering from sternal/vertebrae and elbow fractures. Also has some facial burns. Expected to leave the hospital in a few days. Has already been debriefed. No details of major technical significance have been reported. She has declared to have heard cries for help among survivors, but that she was unable to move.

Some of her statements to the police have, of course, leaked to the public. Here are the ones of most technical value from a news article:
"I noticed the plane didn't have "power" (force/fuerza) when it started to take off (elevate)" - "Most other survivors agree on the plane feeling sluggish, w/o enough power to take off". She was rendered unconscious and woke up in the creek (river). She testified she wasn't inside the cabin and, therefore, didn't hear any pertaining conversations among the pilots.

Most survivors agree that they couldn't (or didn't) hear from the pilots during or before the accident or have loss memory from ever hearing from them in the few minutes prior.

41yo female, the only survivor with minor injures (possibly to be discharged in a matter of hours). Was the person to help rescue two of the children.

56yo female. 4 broken ribs, her condition is good.

68yo male, in serious conditions (burns by inhalation).

67yo female: wife of the passenger above, one of the survivors in very serious condition (head and leg fractures).

22yo male. Sternal and vertebrae fractures.

30yo female. Lung and various other traumas.

40yo male. Pelvis and femur fractures. Flying also in the front section of the plane (most of the survivors were from a 4 row section of the front).

8yo male: single leg bone fracture. His father died in the accident.

44yo female, mother of the survivor above, is the one in the worst condition.

6yo male: skull fracture and other face injures, has already left the hospital. Was flying with 16yo sister, who sadly didn't survive.

29yo male: torax trauma and lung condition.

11yo female: single femur open fracture. Mother and 14yo sister didn't survive.

47yo male: father of the girl above. Torax trauma and pelvis fracture. His life is not in danger.

Female (>40yo): burns and coma, evolving favourably. Her 20yo daughter died in the accident.

57yo male: very serious condition, several bone-deep wounds, malar and femur fractures, left ankle fracture. Lung condition.

Doctors only fear for 2 patients not fully recovering or getting worse at this point, with the rest evolving favourably and out of inmediate danger.

Identification of some 40 victims' remains could take up to 3 more weeks, as they are relatives among themselves (brothers/families) and therefore DNA tests need to be complemented with other measures.

Those of us that have listened to the evidence and the experts, I think by now have very little doubt about what happened in all likehood, in spite of the media insisting, even in this very same morning articles, on one or both engines losing thrust.

Altough nothing can be cathegorically dismissed, of course.

Only details such as why pilots didn't realize what was happening sooner or didn't take the appropiate measures to correct it are still unknown, but a number of likely scenarios are also pretty clear to help explain how that could've happen.

Those "minor" (but no doubt make-or-break) details are gonna have to wait for the investigation results, as the only 100% reliable source would be the (unfortunately damaged) FDR, as visual clues such as pieces of wings showing slats/flaps deployed or engine reversers locked, could've happened AFTER it was too late into the accident events while trying to recover from stall, become airbone again, trying to brake, etc.

By looking at the debris only w/o the FDR info, we can't really know the timeline of events. Without knowing what happened-before-or-after-what, and so many scenarios (unlikely but) still possible, such as accidental reverser deployment during T/O, well ...

FRD analysis is a loong way off, so I guess we'll meet again a few months from now to speculate on ways the aviation industry could prevent this from happening again.

[grumpyoldgeek]

Pan Am used the term "Killer items" for their 'takeoff configuration check'.

First lesson with my new instructor, "There are three things that will kill ya on takeoff and you should double check them...."

[reepeg]

According to El Mundo, the CVR recordings presented in TN Argentina are fake, the intention of the journalist was to "reconstruct" what could have happened.

DIFUNDIDA POR UNA TELEVISIÓN ARGENTINA
La conversación entre pilotos de Spanair es un montaje

La conversación entre pilotos de Spanair es un montaje | elmundo.es (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/08/25/espana/1219681917.html)

//Peter

[paull]

So, perhaps we should add flaps to the CC checks. You know, seatbelts fastened and check we have some flap selected.

Or we could add it to the safety briefing
"Will those of you seated near the overwing exits please contact the CC if the captain has forgotten to select enough flap" :mad:

It sort fits with that "Safety is Everybodies Business" view.

Joking apart, the data should be there as to how often it has been done, who has the figures?

[BelArgUSA]

Ex PanAm pilot here 1968-1991.
xxx
The correct "PanAm 3 killers" are TRIM FLAPS SPOILERS...
These are 99% of the reason of takeoff incidents and accidents.
Everytime I line-up for takeoff, I verify the 3 killers.
In my career (retiring in 3 months) - it saved my neck TWICE...
Twice flaps were UP - yet check-list had been properly completed as per SOP.
There are NO guarantees that the takeoff warning horn will operate.
You might forget other items... i.e. pitot heat... that will make you crash 10 minutes later but T/O will be ok.
xxx
In this sad accident, what I gather so far from "extracting" valid information, it looks that this aircraft was not configured (slats/flaps) and flew at rotation in "ground effect" to some 50 ft AGL, then stalled - maybe even got engine compressor stall as well at that time. Did their T/O warning horn fail...?
xxx
P.S. I think the "FET" FLAPS ENGINES TRIM goes back to the DC-6/7 days.
:)
Happy contrails

[T-21]

BelArgUS Thats the best appraisal I've read so far .Thank you.

[bobwi]

This morning El Mundo informs that the investigators told they have an initial idea since they discovered that at least one of the reversers was not locked. So one may have been open.

[txl]

Spanish media reports say investigators on a preliminary assessment found no apparent evidence of explosion or fire on either engine. Instead, they seem to be directing their attention to the thrust reversers, as it seems that at least one reverser had been deployed.

Maybe someone better at Spanish than me can expand on that.

[pietenpohl]

ATW Daily News today includes this article which tends to corroborate some of the speculation already posted on this forum.

ATW Daily News (http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=13804)

Spanair crash investigation focuses on engine thrust, flaps
Tuesday August 26, 2008
Spanish investigators are focusing on whether the Spanair MD-82 that crashed last week had reached adequate speed for takeoff and whether its flaps operated properly.

The MD-82 ascended only briefly from the Madrid Barajas runway and, while initial speculation regarding an engine fire has faded (ATWOnline, Aug. 25), investigators are examining whether there was a lack of necessary engine power as the aircraft attempted to take off. El Pais reported that an airport video of the failed takeoff and crash being studied by investigators reveals that the plane lifted off about 500 m. farther down the runway than it should have, indicating that it did not have adequate thrust when it reached the spot normally designated for takeoff.

After lifting off, it almost immediately banked to the right and then crashed back down onto the runway. Investigators reportedly are trying to determine if there was a problem with the flaps that prevented a level ascent.

As the death toll reached 154 over the weekend with the death of one more passenger, one of only 18 survivors addressed reporters and said the aircraft seemed to be going "very slowly" as it moved down the runway. Just after lifting off "it made a turn, as if the wing dropped abruptly," she said. "We were still very low, very close to the ground."

As Spanish media continued to speculate over whether Spanair's financial problems led to a falloff in maintenance oversight, Spanish Civil Aviation Director General Manuel Batista came to the carrier's defense. Speaking at a press conference in Madrid, he said the airline had a strong safety record and has passed all inspections of its maintenance program conducted by the government this year. "We have not detected any problem that affects safety or a link with cost-cutting policies," he said.


by Aaron Karp

[bsieker]

One of the recent threads where timing V-speeds has been discussed was that of a China Airlines 737, which took all of the runway, and then a bit, and only just got airborne: Cracked CAL 737 only just gets airborne (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/295114-cracked-cal-737-only-just-gets-airborne.html)

What made that one even more confusing was that it was an empty test/transfer flight after significant structural repairs.

Probably not of direct relevance here, since indications are that they did not use up excess runway.

----

Stall recovery?

The consensus seems to be that the stall recovery procedure calls for "Max thrust, flaps 15°"

However, in the (admittedly not very recent) FM that I have seen it says for stall recovery at low altitudes merely to call and set "MAX THROTTLES", which means firewalling the throttles to the forward stop, and levelling the wings if in a turn. It specifically mentions that:


Less altitude is lost and the recovery is simplified by not changing flap position.

I'm just curious about the flaps setting, and when or if, and why the procedure might have changed.


Regards,
Bernd

[Green-dot]

Just my thoughts,

Wouldn't a partially deployed or recycling thrust reverser (on one side only) explain the extra 500 meters of runway used before lifting off? If that is a plausible scenario, why was there no reverser light or warning indication on the flight deck? Apparently the crew had no notion of anything wrong with the aircraft during the take-off roll.

And could the "bang" heard by some survivors have been the reverser extending to fully deployed position just after lift-off?


Green-dot

[LUALBA]

The supposed CVR data showed on Argentina TV is just a FAKE, nothing real. Not reliable at all. This info is now confirmed.

[F4F]

ZQA297/30 a big bow and thank you :D
Finally a post that puts some value back to the reading of tons of crap on this supposed "Professional Pilot" site.

It proves once more that no checklist nor warning system will protect you to no end...

I applaud and share with your habit of fairly gentle rotation when plenty of runway was available It is a good (and comfy for pax) way of letting the lift and energy built up. Many a MTOW what is the wind doing or not too sure if wings clean TO will benefit from this technique. Unfortunately there are still many pilots yanking the craft in the element iso of the gentle pull necessary to aviate...


live 2 fly 2 live

[RatherBeFlying]

In the 1978 Cranbrook B-737 accident, the accident report mentioned as one of the causes that the uncommanded reverser deployment caused the throttle to come back to idle so quickly it broke the thumb of the pilot with his hands on the throttle at the time -- the distraction from the resulting pain was cited as a contributing factor.

So if an uncommanded reverser deployment before coming back to ground happened on this flight, how hard would the throttle come back on this different type?

We are looking at possibilities of insufficient thrust combined with insufficient flaps/slats, and/or reverser deployment. Ockham's Razor of course argues against fancy combinations, but transport accidents are usually a result of lining up holes in the cheese.

Next question: How many pilots have tried out a flapless takeoff in the sim? I know the Viscount would never lift off, but that's all I can contribute.

[Frangible]

The earlier debate about the value of having the runways and general airport area monitored by cameras was deflected by news that the investigators were studying video of the crash. Can anyone enlighten us whether what we are talking about is:

a) amateur or plane spotter video,
b) CCTV cameras designed for passenger or road traffic surveillance that “caught” the crash by accident, or
c) Cameras installed by the airport specifically to monitor take-offs and landings for safety or flight operations performance that we haven't yet been told about.

[sevenstrokeroll]

Ockham's Razor...I don't think ockham flew a jet...finding an easy answer doesn't mean its the right answer.

gentle rotations...I would like to think that long ago we learned that a gentle rotation is vital...especially with icing conditions.

someone mentioned the CVR transcript is now a phony...if so, will someone please verify!

as to thrust reverser deployment, the engine should go to idle, you attempt to stow and if unable you shut down the engine...BUT DURING EVERY EMERGENCY, YOU FLY THE PLANE FIRST.

I noticed that someone was talking about a "takeoff stall" recovery and said the call was "MAX THRUST"...we say "FIREWALL POWER" and or FIREWALL THRUST...SELECTING FLAPS 15...but if you already have flaps 15, that is just a confirmation . There is a difference between max and firewall in our lexicon.

It would seem to me that if the CVR was recovered an initial playback should have recorded a stall warning, or a fire bell. And if neither were present, we have something really odd.

[Avionero]

"How many pilots have tried out a flapless takeoff in the sim?"

And I would like to add the same question concerning uncommanded reverse.

My experience on the sim on this (corporate jet, though) is restricted to a deployment on ground, well before V1. Even knowing what´s going to happen, it´s quite a task. I could imagine that they would have had a hard time if the reverse popped open during or shortly after rotation.

[sevenstrokeroll]

avionero:

the first time in the sim for this type, without any briefing, the thrust reverser deployed just after takeoff. our sim instructor said, without looking at any checklist, what makes sense to try to fix this?

so we tried to stow the reverser...unable
and then we cut the fuel to the engine

and then we flew around the pattern and landed like we would on one engine, because we were now on one engine.

Remember a thrust reverser does not reverse 100 percent of thrust...perhaps 60 percent at max thrust is reversed...and at idle, its not too bad.

[whopper2]

It's in Spanish, but I found a forum thread from a person that saw the accident from ground:

Foros de AviationCorner.net - Testigo en directo de accidente de MD Spanair (http://www.aviationcorner.net/view_topic.asp?topic_id=3972)

"Lo 1º quiero expresar mis condolencias a todos los familiares de la tripulación como del pasaje. Descansen en paz.
Estaba en rampa de la T-4s, eran aproximadamente las 14:25, vi como despegaban un md de Spanair y me llamo la atención que utilizó mucha distancia para despegar casi igual que la que utilizan los A-340.
Levantó casi a el final de pista y se ladeaba hacia la izquierda luego se giró hacia derechas y el ala tocó el suelo, a continuación el avión se arrastró 500m se metio en una arboleda y explotó provocando una bola dem fuego grandisíma.
En ese mismo momento me temblaban las piernas por lo que habia visto, no daba credito, fue espeluznante el pensar que el avión estaria repleto de pasaje.
Espero que mis ojos no vuelvan a ver una cosa semejante.
Siento asco por lo que esta saliendo en los periodicos, no logro como pueden publicar que un piloto puede volar si su avión no esta enb condiciones; poniendose peligro su vida y la todo el pasaje.
Estos comentarios envenenan a los familiares de las victimas.
Soy nuevo en la web y lamento que mi primer comentario sea por una castrofe en un aeropuerto español.
Un saludo a todos.
DESCANSEN EN PAZ"

[Volume]

And if neither were present, we have something really odd.
Like a pulled C/B you mean?

[xkoote]

I haven't done a flapless TO in the SIM, but did do a few deployed reversers. The first being in my initial. Let me tell you. Close to the ground it is hell to get out of. You will get an uncommanded yaw like you have never seen. It is almost to the point of saying that this scenario is one instance where priorities change. Memory items, aviate, navigate :sad:.
It is imperative to remedy that situation. 100% thrust on one side and -60% on the other absolutely kills you. However an unlocked reverser that close to the ground should have been seen by the investigators on the video. If the engine does not surge you will see two huge shiny slabs on one side and in many cases soot shooting from the reverser buckets upwards and downwards. I think the reverser was a last ditch attempt to stop the plane...........ASAP.

[Rananim]

Eyewitness accounts of the aircraft's excessive takeoff run and difficulty getting airborne are easily explained and its not power.
-aircraft was heavy
-hot high airport
-tailwind
-improved climb speed-take less flap to improve climb grad-reduced thrust/flex and improved climb shouldnt go together btw-

Now thats for a normal situation,an aircraft that is properly configured.It will use more of the runway to achieve a higher V2 speed and better climb gradient.But once it reaches Vr,it will rotate and lift off at 6-8 deg body angle(MD-80) and climb away normally.For an aircraft that has no flaps/slats extended,it will rotate until 11 degreees body angle,struggle into the air,and if the stall recovery procedure is not flown,it will stall on leaving ground effect.On this aircraft,the stick pusher/autoslats would not have been active because the slats were retracted.Also,it is quite possible that a flex takeoff was performed although this is naughty.Some operators deliberately use opt flap to improve engine life(actually youre supposed to use it when you're climb limited)..ie..take very low flap,still reduce thrust by about 20% and end up having ridiculously high Vr and unnecesssary RTO risks.It should be done with full TO thrust.

Could some Mad Dog pilot please be kind enough to say what signs you might get when this bird is stuck in air mode whilst on the ground?Anything you can think of like parking brake/antiskid/autobrake anomalies..so far the reports indicate that the pilots mentioned only this probe heater to the engineer which sevenstrokeroll has already confirmed is heated whilst airborne but not on ground.They would have armed the autobrake in the T.O position as part of pre-flight.If the aircraft was in the air mode,presumably a disarm light would have alerted them and this may have been mentioned to the engineer as well.

[marchino61]

Translation of Spanish post above (to the best of my ability):


First I would like to express my condolences to all the families of the crew and pasengers. Rest in peace.

I was in ramp of the T-4s, at approximately 14:25, I saw how a Spanair MD took off and it caught my attention that it used a long distance to take off, almost equal to what the A-340 uses.

It lifted off almost at the end of the runway and was rolling to the left when it turned to the right and the wing touched the ground, after which the aeroplane dragged itself 500m, hit a grove of trees and exploded in a huge ball of flame.

At that moment my legs shook over what I had seen,(no daba credito) ,the thought that the plane was full of passengers was horrifying. I hope that my eyes never see anything like it again.

I feel disgusted about what is appearing in the newspapers - how can they publish that a pilot could fly if his plane was not in condition? putting his life and that of all the passengers in danger.

These comments embitter the families of the victims.

I am new in the web and i am sorry that my first comment is about a catastrophe at a Spanish airport.

My salutations to everyone.

[xkoote]

I think the MD80 is one of the planes with the most amount of differering options out there. There's EFIS, non-EFIS, autobrakes or not, FMC's or not, switch locations on the overhead, TOW options etc etc. I have flown 4 MD-82's and one MD-83. 2 82's were the sisterships. One had a higher TO weight of 67.8 tons, but the units were in pounds. None had GPS-FMC's. The 4th -82 has the same TO weight of 67.8, but weights in kilo's and some switch positions wre different. The MD-83 is a HGW version which at one time was supposed to be delivered to the US military if memory serves me correct. Than planned didn't go through and there are a few out there. The have a TO weight of 72.6 tons and a MLW of 68.0 tons. That's 9 tons of extran landing weight than an -82. 5tons more than a normal -83.

The reason I say is that this plane may not have had an autobrake system. On the MD-82, the most prominent item being the RAT probe. It is the most obvious. Other than that, the cabin blower fans under the front cabin floor will stop operating. But only a lot of experience and a relaxed keen ear can detect that. If it was night time, you can also see the strobe lights flashing away on the wing tips. Other than that even though there's quite a list of inputs few may be aparent to crews. Remember also that the ground shift system abviously has a mechanical part and hydraulic part. It may be that for example that the landing gear anti retract knob which should retract when airborne, or the rudder controlled nosewheel steering which should be disconnected if the plane is in air mode, do operate as it should because electrecally the plane would thinks it's in the air, but mechanically (because the nose strut is still compressed) it is in gournd mode. I think these two systems are affected mechanically.

EDIT: If the taxi out checklist was carried out you would also have noticed that when carrying out the flight control check, the SPOILER DEPLOYED caution light fails to illuminate. In the check you verify that the light illuminates to confirm if your flight controls behave as they should. So if the checklist was carried out they should have noticed it.

Xander

[sevenstrokeroll]

rananim

there is a button near the gear handle that is sticking out about an inch...press it and you override the ground shift mechanism and you can retract the gear on the ground

thinking it was in the air, this button would be flush with the instrument panel.

xantham above is quite right...we just don't know the exact configuration of this plane. indeed, former TWA ships had switches moving opposite direction to american airlines ships.

the RAT thing is really weird, you just don't see EPR settings that WRONG unless the plane is heating the RAT...and the only way it heats the RAT is when it thinks its airborne.

Now that the CVR thing is a phony, I stand by my theory

[JM340]

Look at this photo of the skid marks in the grass to the right of rwy 36L. Not being published before

Informativos Telecinco.com - Imgenes exclusivas de la tragedia - Galería de fotos (http://www.telecinco.es/informativos/sociedad/galeriadefotos/45138/1/Imagenes+exclusivas+de+la+tragedia)

(sorry don't know how to put the image on the forum, is picture 1 of the gallery, if anyone can help on this please do so)

JM

[enginefailure]

"Wouldn't a partially deployed or recycling thrust reverser (on one side only) explain the extra 500 meters of runway used before lifting off? If that is a plausible scenario, why was there no reverser light or warning indication on the flight deck? Apparently the crew had no notion of anything wrong with the aircraft during the take-off roll."


i am no professional pilot but:
if the right reverser would have deployed during take off run don't you think the crew would have realized that the plane drifts extremely to the right ?

[sevenstrokeroll]

I think the thing that would get my attention if the reverser deployed would be the light that says reverser unlocked and rev ready

they are in front of your face, and if you can see the airspeed or horizon you would see these

the stall warning is a huge sign saying "stall", a profound HORN and a stick shaker, though no pusher. it can scare the hell out of you.

does anyone know if the plane pushed back or did a power back (reversed)?

[justme69]

Spanish media speculates with the investigation concentrating in just about anything. Let's assume the plane stalled soon after leaving the ground, as the video tape and witnesses account seem to indicate.

Depending on what press you read/watch, even as today, still each claims the investigation is concentrating on one of different scenarios (pick your choice):

-Sudden engine failure. But there is no hard evidence on noises, fires, recovery procedures failing (full thrust on the other engine, etc), reliable witnesses, etc, prior to the airplane hitting the ground. Of course, it could've still happened and could be a likely cause, but shouldn't have been enough of a single cause to stall so early on and pilots not be able to recover. Also, doesn't quite fit the picture of the reportly somewhat long taxiing, etc.

-Others, on engine "lacking thrust". But surely crew felt it all seemed good enough to reach V1 and trusted it was enough to become airborne. Compressor(s) may have stalled etc, but likelihood of both engines failing to produce V2m after V1 w/o pilots being to do anything about it and no "loud" (i.e. explosion, etc) signs while still deciding to try to become airborne ...

-Others yet, on assymetrical reverser deployment. But the airplane showed no signs of difficult yaw/roll while on-ground, only shortly after it became airborne at enough height to roll both, to the left and to the right according to witnesses/survivors (pilot could probably over-recover, but still kind of unlikely) before the wing hitting the ground. Reverser seemed fully and properly deployed in at least one engine, but nobody has authoratively stated (some have, but never mentioned sources) that the second reverser was or was not deployed.

Still, having one or both reversers getting accidentally fully deployed, apparently after V1 but before V2, is a long strech. But it could've happened, of course.

Nonetheless, chances are that, once it became clear they were gonna crash, pilots probably tried to deploy them, but perhaps damage to the plane at that point or other factors (such as pilots being already injured from the first/second/third "fall" while bouncing around up to 6 times during about 500m before final explosion) made fully deploying succesfully only one of the reversers possible.

-Very few media is emphasising flaps/slats mistake or malfunction or speed/thrust gross miscalculations, coupled with alarms performance malfunction (i.e. plane thinking it was in air mode due to other sensors malfunction) or alarms de-activation (from earlier aborted T/O and/or repairs).

The likehood of this, I'll leave to each one of you to decide. How this could've happened w/o the pilots noticing on time, or the alarms failing to warn on time, or the pilots being unable to recover from stall on time, I'll also leave to each one of you to decide.

Let's remember this was likely a plane loaded on the heavy side, on lowish-density air and that it possibly did take some extra (grossly estimated) 500m than usual to become airborne and that it reportly hardly left ground-effect area with two (let's assume properly working) engines. There is some vague reporting on nearby witnesses thinking the "angle" of attack during roll was also "unusual" (i.e. either too steep or too shallow).

Many other scenarios are, of course, possible (sudden cargo imbalance, etc) or could've helped with the accident, but there is little hard evidence on just about anything other than the plane rolled and fell shortly after a T/O maneuver that looked to several witnesses (on video or survivors or external witnesses) like didn't have enough "power" to be completed successfully with no other apparent (visible or audible from the outside or the PAX inside) warnings.

[Green-dot]

i am no professional pilot but:
if the right reverser would have deployed during take off run don't you think the crew would have realized that the plane drifts extremely to the right ?


There is one known case where the crew had no indication whatsoever that they dealt with a #2 reverser deployment under similar circumstances, in an aircraft with a relatively comparable geometry, a Fokker 100, TAM Flt. 402, Oct. 31, 1996:


YouTube - TAM 402 de 1996 com legenda - transcrição caixa preta + FDR (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TH1L2HuE6o8&feature=related)

Fokkerpilot.net - TAM 402 - CVR/FDR video. A must see! (http://www.fokkerpilot.net/modules.php?name=Sections&sop=viewarticle&artid=14)

What follows is a narrative of flt. 402:
Quote:
TAM flight 402 was a regular flight between São Paulo (CGH) and Rio de Janeiro (SDU). At 08:25 the flight received clearance for takeoff from runway 17R. Wind was given as 060 degrees. At 08:26:00 the throttles were advanced for takeoff power. Ten seconds later a double beep was heard. The captain said "O auto-throttle tá fora" and the copilot adjusted the throttles manually and informed the captain: "thrust check". With this information he confirmed that the take-off power had been adjusted and verified. Ar 08:26:19 the airplane accelerated through 80 kts. At 08:26:32 the copilot indicated "V one". Two seconds later the airplane rotated at a speed of 131 kts. At 08:26:36 the air/ground switch transited from "ground" "to "air". The speed was 136 kts and the airplane was climbing at an angle of 10 degrees. At that same moment a shock was felt and the EPR of engine nr. 2 dropped from 1.69 to 1.34, indicating the loss of power. In fact, the nr.2 engine thrust reverser had deployed. An eye witness confirmed to have seen at least two complete cycles of opening and closing of the nr.2 thrust reverser buckets during the flight. The loss of power on the right side caused the plane to roll to the right. The captain applied left rudder and left aileron to counteract the movement of the plane. The copilot advanced both thrust levers, but they retarted again almost immediately, causing the power of the nr.1 engine to drop to 1.328 EPR and engine nr. 2 to 1,133 EPR. Both crew members were preoccupied by the movement of the throttles and did not know that the thrust reverser on the nr.2 engine had deployed. The throttles were forced forward again. At 08:26:44 the captain ordered the autothrottle to be disengaged. One second later the nr.2 thrust lever retarted again and remained at idle for two seconds. The airspeed fell to 126 kts. At 08:26:48 the copilot announced that he had disengaged the autothrottles. He then jammed the nr. 2 thrust lever fully forward again. Both engines now reached 1,724 EPR. With the thrust reverser deployed, the airspeed declined at 2kts per second. At 08:26:55 the stick shaker activated, warning of an impeding stall. The airplane rolled to a 39 degree bank angle and the GPWS activated: "Don't sink!". Seven secons later the airplane impacted building and crashed into a heavily populated neighborhood."
Unquote

And this is the source:
ASN Aircraft accident Fokker 100 PT-MRK São Paulo, SP (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19961031-0)

Apparently there was no drift to the right until the aircraft became airborne. And please notice the flight control inputs in the simulation (based on CVR and FDR data) in an attempt to compensate for the yaw to the right. There are procedures in place on the Fo100 in case of a thrust reverser unlock situation, which can be managed if a reverser unlock light is presented. This crew (TAM 402) unfortunately did not receive any indications and were fighting the engaged AT before finally disengaging it. By then it was too late. Perhaps this crew never realized they were fighting a deployed #2 reverser because until the very end the copilot jammed the #2 thrust lever fully forward. . . . . .

Again, there is as yet no conclusive evidence this scenario fits the Spanair MD82, but it cannot be ruled out either until the facts are known.


Regards,
Green-dot

[misd-agin]

Let's not jump to conclusions if one of the T/R was deployed. The possibility exists that the crew deployed it after ground contact in an attempt to slow the a/c.

Several have mentioned about slow acceleration or apparent lack of power. Rananim is correct, hvy a/c, hot temps, optimum flap setting w/flex takeoff power can have completely different sense of acceleration vs. a lighter a/c taking off in cooler temps from a lower altitude.

[xkoote]

Looking at the skid marks........

that unidentified mark starting in a position just outboard of the outboard of main wheel #4 is about the position a bucket would be at. It's incredible to see how it goes straight while the aircraft veers.

That combined with the fact that given the lack of scorched earth and the horror of watching that picture, together with the "damned" ravine makes me think how "relatively" better the outcome could have been for those involved. My heart just sinks and my insides churn at imagining how they had a chance..........unfortunately until that embankment reared it's ugly head. I feel so sad.........


Xander

[sevenstrokeroll]

two things we all have to agree upon:

low density air isn't what pilots say, we say high density altitude. that is the plane is performing as if it is taking off from a higher elevation.

2. thrust reversers, if the plane hit the ground and the pilot was holding on for dear life, he might have pulled the thrust reverser lever by accident.

what position was the landing gear in?

[Frangible]

Regardless of all the operational and mechanical considerations, A340's posted link to the skid-marks gives us the completely definitive immediate cause of the disaster: the plunge into the ravine. The plane was on the main gear and given a longer flat overrun area it would presumably have come to a stop unharmed, with the proviso that we don't yet know if the right wing had touched the ground, and leaked fuel which caught fire before they went over the edge.

The area between the two runways should have been flattened and filled in and all overrun areas be kept clear as far as possible. If it is sensible for overrun areas to be longer, or at least for arrestor beds to be installed, then it must also be true of the areas to the side of the runways.

The area between the runways does nothing, has no purpose. It is entirely dead ground. The only thing it can do is destroy an aircraft that otherwise might survive veering off the runway. The terrain also prevents emergency vehicles reaching the scene. It is possible – although we cannot know yet for sure -- that more lives could have been saved if the tenders and the ambulances had been able to drive right up to the wreckage.

But that’s not the whole story. If you look at the Google earth pix you can see that the stream in the gully where the plane crashed has been channeled in a ditch around the end of 36L. Had they overrun in line with the take-off direction they aircraft would have been broken up by the river channel there, instead of in the ravine by the side of the runway. Just like the A340 at Toronto, MK 747 at Halifax, Kalitta 747 at Brussels, A320 at Warsaw, A320 at Cogonhas… the list goes on and on and on.

[forget]

JM340. (sorry don't know how to put the image on the forum, is picture 1 of the gallery, if anyone can help on this please do so)

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b270/cumpas/mad1.jpg

[Lodrun]

I an interested in the theory that the flaps were not selected correctly for take-off. Does the MD-82 have a config warning to prevent this?

[NigelOnDraft]

The area between the two runways should have been flattened and filled in and all overrun areas be kept clear as far as possible. If it is sensible for overrun areas to be longer, or at least for arrestor beds to be installed, then it must also be true of the areas to the side of the runwaysFor how far out of interest? 100m? 500M 1KM?

Oh - and I presume whatever number you conjour up, we will have to clear all taxiways out that far as well - since a taxiing aircraft there would have caused the same result... :ugh:

[dba61]

The image above showing wheel marks alongside a runway cannot relate to the subject Spanair accident, not least because this is definitely not the same runway that was involved.

[Airbubba]

I noticed that someone was talking about a "takeoff stall" recovery and said the call was "MAX THRUST"...we say "FIREWALL POWER" and or FIREWALL THRUST...SELECTING FLAPS 15...but if you already have flaps 15, that is just a confirmation . There is a difference between max and firewall in our lexicon.


Most operators now leave the flaps and gear where they are (same for GPWS and windshear recovery) and call for 'Max Thrust' these days, at least on the Boeings and Airbuses I've flown in recent years. The additional flap call may be a legacy from Douglas or peculiar to the DC-9 variants.

'Firewall Thust' on older non-Fadec engines would have you push the throttles all the way up, possibly overboosting, overspeeding or overtemping the engines in an effort to save the aircraft. In newer engines pushing the throttles all the way to the stop gives you the maximum with appropriate limits so Firewall Thrust is the same as Max Thrust for a lot of us.

Sometimes you will have to do something to cancel a derate if you want Max Thrust after the throttles have declutched on the take off roll. The DC's I flew had human autothrottle so I'm not familiar with those new fangled twin engine DC models.

[forget]

dba61 The image above showing wheel marks alongside a runway cannot relate to the subject Spanair accident, not least because this is definitely not the same runway that was involved.

Are you serious? Please explain. :confused::confused:

[PJ2]

A detail from the above photo of the ground-track:

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/GroundTracksDetail.jpg

dba61 - The photo is from a series of 33 (quite poor) photos as per the link above. If it's not the same runway, could you please elaborate so these photos can be withdrawn if necessary? Tx.

[NigelOnDraft]

dba51 The image above showing wheel marks alongside a runway cannot relate to the subject Spanair accident, not least because this is definitely not the same runway that was involved.Looks pretty like 36L to me ?

[dba61]

"Looks pretty like 36L to me ?"

NigelOnDraft

Are you saying that you personally recognise the area seen in the background of this photo (which is not T4, which would be further down at the far end of the runway to the left of the photo) comprising various airport buildings, aircraft and a town immediately behind up to the horizon?

[xolodenko]

All previous info indicated that the plane ended up in a ravine and there were some trees which it hit before going down there (as indicated by the ramp onlooker) but on this photo the tire tracks end up at some sort of an embankment. Does not quite match up huh?

[forget]

dba61. You made a statement-

The image above showing wheel marks alongside a runway cannot relate to the subject Spanair accident, not least because this is definitely not the same runway that was involved.

Rather than quiz Nigel on Draft on what he may recognise at Madrid would you be kind enough to explain yourself? Thank you.

xolodenko, The 'embankment' is the edge of a ravine - which goes downwards. :bored:

[JM340]

@ Forget
thanks for the help with the image.

@dba61
Sadly, yes it´s Rwy 36L. The photo is taken from one of the rescue helicopters that responded to the crash. It appears to be over the crash site and looking at south west. You can even see T4 in the background with lots of IBE tails. Don´t mix up with T4S , wich is in between Rwy 36L/R and not visible in the photo.

JM

[procede]

The photograph shows the wheels tracks intact to the bank, and obviously something large, heavy and hot has detached and has maintained a straight course of its own through the wheel tracks. From where it started and other photos, I would dare to guess it was the no.2 engine. If it was, I would not expect the pilots to be able to deploy the TR before it came loose.

[west lakes]

The area between the two runways should have been flattened and filledBear in mind that the threshold of 18R is 81ft (25m) lower than the threshold of 18L
the threshold of 36R is 42ft (12m) lower than the threshold of 36L

there's still going to be a slope there.

Comparing the photo to the satellite pic, it sure looks like 36L, and matches the description given by an Iberia captain in a much earlier post

[BOAC]

That was a severe swing to the right, and an equally quick correction. I would support the theory that the 'straight track' is the starboard reverse, possibly at high power until ?reduced? to correct the swing, or did its trail fade as perhaps the wings levelled? Equally, as Rainboe says, it could have been something 'hot and heavy' and detached. So, was it asymmetric reverse or the right wingtip drag that caused that dramatic swerve to the right?

It is now possible to tie down the exit point from examination of the R18 touchdown markers, and it would appear to me that the initial touchdown was off the runway and already angled well to the right.

I have tried zooming to max pixellation and cannot identify the debris between the wheel tracks and the runway. Is that part of an engine casing just right of mid-picture?

[NigelOnDraft]

Are you saying that you personally recognise the area seen in the background of this photo (which is not T4, which would be further down at the far end of the runway to the left of the photo) comprising various airport buildings, aircraft and a town immediately behind up to the horizon?Sort of... ;) The Terminal / Aircraft you see are either N end of T4, or maybe the new cargo (?) maint (?) area built more recently to the N of it? I'm sure I've seen something there whilst getting lost in the 36L holding area :{

The buildings seem to concur with Google Earth.

The built up area behind you drive through when coming in from the city (I think).

I would not swear it is 36L - rather I can see nothing to state it is not :)

NoD

[el #]

For how far out of interest? 100m? 500M 1KM?

Oh - and I presume whatever number you conjour up, we will have to clear all taxiways out that far as well - since a taxiing aircraft there would have caused the same result...


You made it clear your point many times already, it's the same "should not crash in first place, hence ...". Well I don't agree with that.

All the airport area, ground, etc should be made free of obstacles for as much as possible, and allow unobstructed acess to emergency veicles.

Taxing aircraft is different - they don't slide for kilometers.

I'm sure a reccomendation about eliminating rough areas will be present in the accident report.

[PJ2]

BOAC;
would support the theory that the 'straight track' is the starboard reverse,
I'm wondering about that... - more likely the nosewheel/nose? The track described continues straight, between the main-gear tracks during the changes in direction. The rear engines would track with the main gear and follow the main gear tracks.

I realize this would mean a significant difference between heading and track at touchdown but bear in mind the airplane had just been dragging it's right wing... Also, it is difficult to tell how deep the tracks are as they track to starboard - the lateral 'g' would be significant.

The main gear touchdown point shows a relatively wings-level attitude. There are no marks "outboard" of the main gear tracks so wingtip marks would be earlier in the sequence.

[west lakes]

Location
For the doubters?) the white /beige building seen towards the top with 7 small chimneys and 6 dark shapes facing the camera.
Look on Google Earth at 40deg 30' 07.57" - 3deg 34' 35.61". looks to be the same building. To the immediate right is another building with a set of cooling fans on the roof, prominent on the Sat photo

[lomapaseo]

That photo of the skid marks appears too simple for an out of control aircraft.

I expect though that some of the folks on here may make sense out of it :)

In my experience skid marks may not be uniform for several reasons

The ground is not uniform

The antiskid system leaves different marks on different sides

The weight on wheels varies with aircraft wing roll

If you can sort this out in a stalled aircraft case considering rudder inputs then you may have a clue

[forget]

dba61. The image above showing wheel marks alongside a runway cannot relate to the subject Spanair accident, not least because this is definitely not the same runway that was involved.

Then you posted this, and deleted it. Ok. I don't recognise any of the background in the photo. I may be wrong, but I'd like to see if anyone confirms that this is definitely Madrid and tells us what building we can see in the background with all the aircraft beside it.

Images below show rough bore-sight of the camera. Red dot is common reference. See the background building - 'with all the aircraft beside it'.

By the way, cracking first post. :hmm:

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b270/cumpas/mad2.jpg

[Frangible]

One mainly just uses one's common, Nigel. The space between two parallel runways, I am sure you would agree, is not a good place to put a big building for your plane to crash into. No more so a bloody great hole in the ground for it to fall into.

Equally, don't put things in potential overrun areas that don't need to be there, e.g. sunken roads, ditches, berms, concrete lighting bases etc. which were only put there because it didn't occur to them a plane could hit them. The Canadian TSB recommended 300M clear flat areas around runways after Toronto, roughly in line with the NTSB's rec of 1000ft. Good enough for me, since you asked. That could well have saved this lot.

[LuckyStrike]

I find it odd not being able to track the nosewheel marks... That can only mean one thing for me; nosewheel was above the ground (i.e. no contact), so pitch angle was +ve...

[justme69]

Please, note that the airplane, after touching the ground for the first time (reportely moderately hitting it with the right wing first) is said to have bounced up and down (possibly meaning that all wheels left the ground) at lest 6 times and "use" another aprox. 500m of terrain until it "exploded".

Imagine this scenario.

1) Pilots rotate unaware that their configuration for take off is wrong (i.e. both slats not correct, flaps angle insufficient, etc). Perhaps warning signs of incorrect slats/flaps were disminished by the result of the first call to service (i.e. airplane was in air/ground mode, alarms disconnected inadvertly, some other malfunction, etc).

2) Pilots don't take much action although rotation lasts for a bit longer than it should. Maybe they figure they were a bit heavier than they estimated or tail wind was playing them up a little. They are after V1 anyway and can't figure out anything wrong (yet). Their nose angle is a bit off.

3) Airplane takes off. Stall warnings come up as soon as ground effect is over. Perhaps some of the alarms didn't work properly for the reasons stated above or unknown. Airplane starts an uncontrolled roll for random stall conditions.

4) They concentrate a bit on controlling the roll which delays their action of nose-down, flaps-15, max throttle. Their reaction is perhaps late because the aureal alarm didn't sound and only the shaker indicated the stall plus they had to control the heavy roll "first", unsure of the stall warning being real. Perhaps they even decided to (or accidentaly) "pull up" a bit as first reaction (against training, but after all, they were taking off and "pull up a bit" is a natural first reaction if you are falling and you want to go up).

5) The airplane touches the ground, barely hitting the wing first, but off-course. But the pilots already commanded full throttle, lowered the flaps/correcting slats, and are already nose-leveled, but a few seconds too late to recover from the slightly low V2 speed and heavy weight. Some mechanical damage is sustained from the fall, as it was above max landing weight (fueled-up/heavy/harsh 15m stall fall) plus the wing touched ground. The pilots may have suffered some injuries too.

6) Now the airplane "recovers", starts accelerating again, and has good wing configuration, but rotating is hard (landing gear may have problems, airplane might be off path on the landing strip, etc). The airplane bounces around a few times, wheels leaving the ground briefly, but not quite (bad nose angle, weight, other control problems). Just a couple of seconds after the full throttle was commanded and perhaps even before the engines could start to truly perform (low air density), the pilots decide to abort.

7) They try to deploy reversers, brake, partially or fully successfully. It's too late. The airplane has even accelerated a bit, and after 3 or 4 more bounces, it hits obstacles at very high speed.

A million different things could've happened. Some more likely, some less, some way less/almost impossible. But such complex scenarios, as the one described, without one major clear-cut cause, is going to have to be widely speculative and therefore of little value since only hard-evidence (FDR) can (dis)prove it.

We'll just have to sit and wait for the official investigation, hope it can shed enough light to find a very likely cause(s) and a way to improve a solution.

[vanHorck]

the start of the "centre track" seems to show substantial burning (blacker than later) perhaps the right engine detached from the plane there and there was a fuel spill causing the scorching?

I believe running engines when detaching tend to continue having a forward motion (El Al Amsterdam) for a short while

The tracks start some way off the runway, suggesting that the touchdown was on the grass, not the runway. No visible loose parts on the runway.

So uncommanded trust reverse on the right engine with a hard landing on the grass, could this lead to the engine detaching?

[PJ2]

LuckyStrike:That can only mean one thing for me; nosewheel was above the ground (i.e. no contact), so pitch angle was +ve...
With the tremendous drag from the mains, I don't think that would be the case. I believe the nosewheel mark is the straight line which starts at some distance ahead of the main gear t/d point and tracks - comments made 5 posts back.

[vanHorck]

PJ2

I think there is a nosewheel mark, though much more slight than the main wheels and intermittent, as if they were still attempting to rotate

[snowfalcon2]

There are news stories on RTVE and El Mundo of a first appearance by CIAIAC (investigation body) head Francisco Javier Soto.
No tire or other marks found on runway. Plane came down in the "fringe zone" beside the runway.
Plane did three "leaps" due to uneven ground and traveled 1200m until coming to stop.
Plane touched down tail first (not clear if at initial contact or after the leap it must have made after the service road seen in the photo)
Black boxes are in the UK for examination guarded by Spanish authority representatives.
Those who are better at Spanish, please fill in and correct.

[JM340]

At a press conference held this afternoon, the CIAIAC (in spanish Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil) gives the first preliminary data about the accident:

- The aircraft first contact with the ground was with the tail, that detached (not clear from the statement if all the tail cone) from the fuselage.
- No skid marks on the runway, nor any sign of impact of other parts of the aircraft in the runway.
- The aircraft bounced three times, as it encountered different terrain level off the runway.

In spanish, newspaper El Mundo :
El avión accidentado impactó primero en el suelo con la cola y ya estaba fuera de pista | elmundo.es (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/08/26/espana/1219770484.html)

JM

PS: @Snowfalcon2,we were almost posting at same time, according to the news, the first contact was with the tail, then skidded 1,200 meters.

[vanHorck]

there are a few other odd things about the picture:

1. It seems the plane landed slightly earlier/heavier on the left (see initial indentation size as opposed to right gear)

2. Whatever made the straight trajectory (3rd mark), which starts with a serious ground scorching, seems to have dragged on in a straight line, not the tumbling you would expect of an engine

[justme69]

The new article makes these points of interest:

-The tail hit the ground first outside of the landing strip, breaking/detaching itself.
-The plane continued another 1200m after this, not on a "straight line", but bouncing 3 times (due to the shape of the terrain) and sustaining more and more damage each time.

This is official information from the technical secretary of the comission for civil air accidents.

This ends the question on trying to control it or taking off again after the first fall and obviously means that the first fall was more off-course and more severe than previously reported. Also, that it wasn't the wing that hit the ground (first), but the tail.

As reported previously, flight recorders are in England to have the information extracted/recovered.

They expect to have a preliminary report stating only known facts (not speculating on probable causes) in about 1 month.

Both engines are in reasonable good condition and are being analysed.

[NigelOnDraft]

One mainly just uses one's common, Nigel. The space between two parallel runways, I am sure you would agree, is not a good place to put a big building for your plane to crash into. No more so a bloody great hole in the ground for it to fall into.

Equally, don't put things in potential overrun areas that don't need to be there, e.g. sunken roads, ditches, berms, concrete lighting bases etc. which were only put there because it didn't occur to them a plane could hit them. The Canadian TSB recommended 300M clear flat areas around runways after Toronto, roughly in line with the NTSB's rec of 1000ft. Good enough for me, since you asked. That could well have saved this lot.They didn't "put" a "bloody great hole" there... it was already there ;)

So what "clear flat area" do you think MAD has established? My quick measurements show ~250m in the area this aircraft left... and for much of the MAD 36L/R construction, somewhat more (and some less). What do you measure it as to that fence? If it is ~250m, and you wanted 300m, given those tyre tracks I reckon the result would have been the same?

LHR fails to meet the 300m in quite a few areas? As I am sure do may others...

NoD

[AlexGG]

Nigel, problem is not even with the ravine, or river, whatever.
Problem is: an area exists within an airport perimeter (airport property) which fire truck has difficulty accessing. Some sort of a common sense says that I want fire cover in the airport, and now comes a nasty surprise that although the equipment is damn close, they cannot reach me (in time).

[blackboard]

...4500 by 300 m as posted by myself in post #563.

See Spanish AIP AD2-LEMD

[Eagle402]

justme69,

Is it possible that you can clarify the literal translation re the tail assembly please ? I ask as the translation engines in Google and the like tend to lose
the nuances of the original.

I ask as the initial impact marks and the tracks in the field adjacent to the runway are not consistent with the suggestion that the tail section was separated from the airframe.

Much obliged for your help.

Eagle402.

[forget]

New Article - The tail hit the ground first out of the landing strip, breaking/detaching itself.

I don't think they mean the tail plane/fin detached itself. The item marked is the cone for the tail escape slide - I think. To my mind that's the bit 'they' refer to as the tail. Or is this obvious?

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b270/cumpas/mad3.jpg

[blackboard]

The detachable tailcone is what the comission refers to as having detached upon first contact with the ground.

They also refer to this as the first airframe part to contact the ground after T/O.

[Eagle402]

Forget,

I suspect that, as ever, you are spot on and the report does indeed refer to the cone, as per your kind graphic.

Regards,

[justme69]

Yeah, as usual, different newspaper reporters say ever so slightly different things like if it was all the same.

The all say the tail hit the ground first.

Some say the tail broke/detached itself from the rest of the plane.

Some say the back part of the tail broke/detached itself from the rest.

I think it's safe to assume it was the tail cone, but then again, the whole tail is one of the larger pieces found "intact" and slightly away from the rest of the plane, but this could've happened later.

A second survivor was discharged (the female doctor). 16 remain hospitalised. 1 has gotten worse. 1 is not believed to be able to recover from the coma. 1 remains very serious condition.

[LuckyStrike]

PJ2:

With the tremendous drag from the mains, I don't think that would be the case.

Well, if that's the case then you wouldn't be getting airborne again, would you? Combined with such a drag force, a stall would make your nosewheel come down closer to the ground leaving a deeper mark and possibly a gear collapse...

I am just trying to visualize the force diagram at the moment the plane touched the ground... Maybe I am getting old but what I see from those marks is what would be left off on the runway if you would be applying the "crab technique".

[justme69]

I just saw "first hand" parts of the secretary for the accident commission press conference on TV.

-By their regulations, they are required to present a preliminary, factual report (no conclusions or probable causes, just the facts stated), in aprox. 1 month. Actual investigation thought to last several months.

-It's confirmed that the voice recordings and the fly data have been extracted in the UK facility it was sent. They are now being enhanced (voice clarity, etc), recovered & verified.

-He hasn't witness the airport video footage of the accident, but it is part of the investigation and others have seen it.

-Based on marks on the ground, it seems that the airplane first hit the ground outside of the landing strip, on the service route just adjacent to it, touching the ground first with the tail, tail cone coming off.

-Plane kept tumbling ahead for 1200m, bouncing 3 times (matching unlevel terrain marks).

[XPMorten]

Skidmarks,

I support the theory that:
- acf is in a severe slip to the right when it hits the grass
- tail hit's first (small trail closest to rwy), cone falls off
- left main gear hits ground.
- raight main hits.
- Nose gear hits
- acf straightens its path.
- ...

If there had been a burning engine falling off at this point,
why did the dry grass not catch fire here as it did further down the track? And why didn't it stop in this area like the cone did?

There has been significant LATERAL forces in play here judging
by the rwy exit angle. Rudder use or asymetric thrust.

M

[PassengerDan]

Given the latest reports about the plane "bouncing" doesn't anyone else question how the perfect skid marks in the images recently posted could tally with such a deduction? Or did the bouncing happen after the dip into the ravine. (all this assumes the images are genuine of course).

[vanHorck]

to me it seems there is some burnt area right at the start of the "third major trail", possibly caused by some fuel leak at engine break off,

The engine is not visible in this picture so if i m right it continued it s track past the ditch next to the road

As Madrid is hot and dry, depending how hard the ground is, there would have been only minimal deceleration when the plane touched down on the grass, so if the drops are several towards the gully, it is not surprising the planed "hopped" several times untill speed had been lost sufficiently for no more lift to occur.

To the pilots based in Spain: Thank you for keeping us updated!

[blackboard]

Let me just add to Justme's posting that the comission's secretary also stated that the FDR data quality was better in some channels than others, implying (my own deduction) that data integrity could be compromised in some channels.

I hope this partial lack of integrity does not hamper the investigation significantly.

[blackboard]

For Spanish speakers, the full 73-minute Investigation Board report in today's press conference can be found here:

rtve.es/noticias - Vídeos - Rueda de prensa Comisión de Investigación del accidente de Barajas (http://www.rtve.es/mediateca/videos/20080826/rueda-prensa-comision-investigacion-del-accidente-barajas/268967.shtml)

[snowfalcon2]

Thanks, but unfortunately the RTVE videos don't load. Anyone else having the same problem outside of Spain?

[Green-dot]

Same here, the RTVE videos do not load.

[west lakes]

For those that didn't find this

A much earlier post regarding the marks in the grass

http://www.pprune.org/4343420-post549.html

[blackboard]

I am viewing it now and will report anything significant in English in about one hour.

[yeagerx1]

I'm seeing the RTVE video without problems...