Spanair accident at Madrid

[UNCTUOUS]

One probability/possibility, based upon the eye-witness account of flames from #1, is likely to be:
.
a. A tread-worn port main-gear tyre shredding at the point of rotation (Vrot) and being ingested into the port engine. During rotate, the engines are momentarily much closer to the ground and ingestion of point-of-rotate tyre debris becomes more likely.... partly due to the changed airflows over the slats/wings/TE flaps at rotation. Aircraft was at or near (or slightly in excess of?) max AUW for take-off (172 souls going on holiday with excess luggage). Who knows what the Spanish Regulator stipulates for average pax weights nowadays? The obesity epidemic is as prevalent in Spain as elsewhere in Western civilization. It was inevitable that there should eventually be an average pax-weight related jet crash equivalent to that Beech 1900's at Charlotte-Douglas. Think about the momentary "pivot-about-main-gear" effective weight increase pressure on the tyres at Vrot. V1 cuts have always been the main area of concern for engine failure and that is why these drills are emphasized in simulator training. If an operator is trying to save money on tyres and is using re-retreaded casings and also changing them very late in their wear-cycle, then they are increasingly liable to this type of "point-of-rotate" failure event for a heavily laden jet. A high-speed abort following a port tyre failure(s) would lead to directional control problems - notwithstanding what may have happened by way of debris ingestion.
.
On January 27, 2003 the FAA issued Notice N8400.40 requiring a number of operators of 10 to 19 passenger seat aircraft to validate the Weight and Balance Control Program to sample passenger weights, carry-on baggage weights, and checked baggage weights for part of their flights.
The survey showed that the average passenger weight was higher than the estimates by 20.63 pounds, carry-on bags were higher by 5.72 pounds and domestic checked bags by 3.81 pounds. Consequently, on May 12, the FAA reported it is adding 10 pounds to its estimate for passengers and five pounds to luggage (Notice 8300.112). This notice was cancelled by the publication of AC 120-27D August 11, 2004.

[Aeromar27]

The fact that the reverser was found deployed can only be attributed to weigth on weels and reverse was selected.Not on all MDs... some of them can deploy the reverses in flight provided engines are idle. Its use in flight is prohibited according to the manual. And from what i saw on the image, it looks not only deployed but also locked.

[The Dude2]

There was never a series of DC 9'S MD etc which allowed for in flight reverser deploy other than DC 8 'S

[hunbet]

1- Tires are more likely to fail when new or newly recapped.Less rotational mass as
they wear.
2-The MD-80 has deflectors on the landing gear to prevent this type of ingestion.
3-Where are the pictures of the rubber on the runway? The engine can't eat it all!!

[el #]

From 22/08 edition main article on the accident:

there is a video and is being examinated
video shows a/c not reaching more than "few" meters above runway
reportedly, no engine explosion is seen in the video
a/c is seeing veering off r/w, rebounce and burst into flames while breaking up.
FDRs have been rescued. One is damaged.
A (probe ?) heater failure is reported to have been the cause for the initial return to ramp. This fault was on the same engine that then apparently failed.

[fdr]

Dude II:
List one incident in aviation history where this was successful.


Travis AFB, CA, departure on one runway, landed on offset parallel. All walked away. Don't recommend as a training matrix item.:} C-141? pre 1980.

[The Dude2]

FDR thanks, was thinking of either Delta or TWA L1011 where they became airborne then due to a faulty AOA sensor they put it back on. Wasn't pretty. No easy answers on this one.

[Steve Michell]

A survivor is quoted talking about shuddering of the plane. The plane reaches 40m or so. We all know that ground effect reaches up to about half the span of the plane. In other words: the plane never flew out of ground effect. Important point. Shuddering might indicate 1. airplane stall, engine stall or engine vibration. Also a desintegrated tire produces quite some vibration. Would like to know the seat row of the quoted survivor.
Density altitude: 30 degrees @ 2.000 ft: approx. 4600 feet.
Aircraft fully loaded. Performance not critical but margins probably thin. I do not know performance of MD82 at this runway, but with this density altitude engines were temperature limited. Certification.
Inadvertant TR deployement is a problem. Below 400 feet no actions by crew although action is required. TR deployment in flight increases VMCA dramatically. Those of us with twin rating know what that means. Loss of control: kill the engine that is producing power and lower the nose. That would have put this plane back on the ground. As happened.
A too high angle of attack in tail engine aircraft distubs flow though engines. Even to a point of stalling. Engine stall produces flames coming from engine and very loud banging. Although engine is not damaged by stall it is not producing thrust until flow through the engine recovers.
MEL procedure. A lot is written by perfectly normal MEL procedures. One point I would like to make after a press statement by Spanair management about this procedure. I do not know what an overheat in air intake valve means (I don't fly MD82's) but I assume it refers to Bleed Overheat. Now that can be dealt with by securing bleed Air valve for a limited period of time. And perhaps other restrictions. However, before signing anything off the reason for the failure or complaint has to be investigated and dealt with. It looks to me that a gate turnaround of only 40 minutes or so is barely enough to secure the valve closed and do paperwork. Not for investigating why the alert appeared in the first place. Sadly enough this is almost an industry wide accepted omission for too many MEL sign offs nowadays. And It is the Captain and nobody else to accept this or not. I certainly never accepted this. Read chapter 1 of any MEL. It says so: the source of the failure must be known.
What happened to the report of a photo of the leading edges with slats retracted? Were they really? That would have triggered a T/O warning unless it was broken. Remember these cockpit crewmembers were on a lot of stress. Just an hour or so before the flight they were supposed to go on strike and here they were, after a, no doubt, stressful RTO, late, rushed. Go figure.

Please only professional responses. And that, of course, includes engineers and other aviation professionals.

Steve

[crisb]

Latest news from El Pais (Apologies for the translation)

The video shows no explosion or engine burst into the air. After falling, the fuselage escorado toured the track. Only exploded several seconds after bouncing against the ground, according to sources close to the investigation.



Translated version of headline from http://www.elpais.com/ (http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.elpais.com/&sa=X&oi=translate&resnum=1&ct=result&prev=/search%3Fq%3Del%2Bpais%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dsafari%26rls%3De n-us)

[dogcharlietree]

I was just interested to learn how you as pilots learn more as a result of tragedy like this.
We can only learn so much in the classroom and obviously there are far more variables than can ever be thought of.
So the old saying comes into play "learn from other peoples mistakes" (no offence meant).
Most professional pilots have amassed an incredible library which contains many books on aircraft accidents.
There is more than once in my professional career where a flashback to an article or chapter has been incedibly worthwhile. Through this aviation safety is improving.

[The Dude2]

Once the aircraft leaves the gate, more importantly, the ground crew via headset, the failure of any system is considered to be taken as in the air. We apply MEL to it and carry on, if it is a no go we return to the gate. Otherwise it it is written up on next arrival station, providing there is maintenance or we wait till we get home. Safety always prevails, no shortcuts.

[Skydrol Leak]

I am not an Einstein,but if I was a PIC I would not continue the flight with this a/c. Every indication of a high temperature in the air intake valve promises only problems especially in axial flow turbines. MEL is up to a discussion; it is a PIC's call rather than maintenance opinion,but i agree that every MEL has to have an info about the core of the problem.
Months down the road we will know the probable answer to this cause,but right now i would point a finger at the Captain of this flight; on the end of the day he is responsible for the lives of people he /she carries that day. All the issues about being under the stress because of the strike,intake valve problems,MEL,being late at destination etc is just a part of a life being a pilot.
IT depends how you co-ordinate them and put your priorities in orderly manner that day no matter what stress you are under.If you are not ready to execute the flight because of safety concerns or whatever is the case it is your responsibility and right as a PIC to terminate that flight. This was probably not the case with this flight.

[The Dude2]

All discussion seems to reflect a TAT/SAT temp probe. This has nothing to do with engine performance as long as the auto throttles are not engaged. These temp indicators are used by the CADC for a number of issues including auto throttles. Provided the crew did not select auto throttle, it's a non issue in this accident.

[md-pilot]

Not true. Thrust reversers can be used in flight. Our manual states that the use of thrust reversers are prohibited in flight. (10,000+ hrs on the -80, still on it).

My thoughts go to the victims of this accident. RIP.

[PJ2]

md-pilot;
Thrust reversers can be used in flight. Our manual states that the use of thrust reversers are prohibited in flight.
By this is it meant that reversers are able to be deployed in flight (no preventative interlocks) but that the manual prohibits this? Thanks...

[vapilot2004]

The reversers are completely hydraulic with mechanical control links (cables) leading to the cockpit. In flight a dedicated accumulator will keep the clamshell doors in the stowed position.

The only springs I know of are part of the door latching mechanism and will also keep the doors latched with or without hydraulic pressure.

[blackboard]

Please stop the nonsense about RTO. This should only be used when the take-off run is aborted, which was not the case.

This was reportedly (source El Pais and Spanair) simply an RTG (Return-to-Gate) when the crew noticed a too hot indication in one of the Ram Air Temp sensors

Nothing to do with bleed air either.

Let us not veer speculation in this forum away from the (believed to be ) known FACTS.

See post #520 for some of the currently reported facts.

[sussex2]

According to www.elperiodico.com (http://www.elperiodico.com) the theory of an engine fire could be being discounted.
The article states that indeed there are cameras pointed from T4 towards the runways, though rightly also points out that at that distance the quality is not too good.
According to the article initial investigations put into doubt theories about an engine fire, but, quite rightly, the authorities are refusing to confirm or discount anything.
The brief recording shows that the aircraft reached an altitude of 60 metres.
That is according to elperiodico as released by the authorities.

[Pontius]

Just wonder where we stand as crew if we are seen by PAX to be detaining them against their will? I dare say a good lawyer would attempt a human rights action.

A good lawyer has already tried and failed. It is not illegal once the passengers are on board and the aircraft has departed.

One could argue the semantics in this case but I have absolutely no intention of getting into a back and forth discussion. They had departed once (and then returned to the gate). That they had to 're-depart' would probably have some people (mentioning no particular names, but an area in Poole, Dorset springs to mind) saying he had not departed but, as those who understand the literal meaning (as applied to transport category operations), we know they had and, therefore, had every LEGAL right to keep the pax on board.

The likes of Steve Mitchell have tried to explain the vagaries of 'influencing' passengers to remain on board but it seems there are plenty of armchair experts here who (a)do not read what they don't want to see and (b)think they are correct even though their knowledge is based on nothing more than guesswork. Yes, it's far, far better to have calm, relaxed passengers who are reassured by the Captain's words that repairs have carried out in accordance with the manafacturer's instructions, that dispatch is in accordance with the MEL (as written by the people who build the machines) and that as far as is humanly possible, everything is as safe as it's going to be. That there are still people who choose not to believe these reassurances is going to be a situation that captains have to endure until tele-transporting comes into being but, at the end of the day, whether they like the reassurances or not, the Captain is not bound to let them disembark.

I can't remember the exact details of the legal case that set the precedent for this but I seem to recall it was a group of American passengers who brought the action against El Al when they were detained for a considerable time on the aircraft. The case went to court in the USA and it found in favour of El Al, quoting the details I gave above re having departed and the Captain having legal command over the aircraft and it's 'contents'.

Now, cue the 'you're wrong' brigade who base their rants on nothing more than supposition :rolleyes:

[jumbocpt]

It was a TWA L-1011. JFK, takeoff on 13R. Extra cabin crew deadheading on board certainly helped in the evacuation.
The AOA sensor had been written up in the logbook in the past. hmmmmm.

[ibelieveicanfly]

It is still unclear what really happened,wait for the balck box what they will unveil!
What is sure is that MD80 series aircrafts are reliable planes(I have 6000hrs on these series) if they are correctly maintained and flown basically like any other commercial airliner.
What is sure also is that an MD82 cabin version charter with around 160 seats is the absolute maximum capacity.add to this:
-holiday luggage (which maybe different from what say the loadsheet if std figures are taken),that said makes a DOW of around 40t+ at least 13500kgs of payload+ min block of around 10t= min weight 63,5t
-not new engines so that T/O calculations perfo are certified for relatively new engines in tables.
-very high density altitude
-pilot technique at VR with engine loss(this plane is not easy to handle at the critical time for eng fail especially at high gross weight),seen that many times in the sim with new pilots
-eventually fatigue for pilots(duties times,strike about to come,motivation,one RTO before the second attempt,etc...)

[bardos]

MARÍA J. GARCÍA
PALMA.- "Estimado Lars", así arrancaba una carta que la sección sindical del Sepla en Spanair envió por e-mail en abril de 2007 al entonces director general de la aerolínea, Lars Nygaard. La primera misiva trasmitía "la inquietud" de los aviadores por un "caos operativo que hace poner en riesgo el pasaje, razón de ser de Spanair".
Diferentes e-mails del Sepla a la dirección y a la presidencia de la aerolínea durante más de un año, a una cadencia casi mensual, han repetido el mismo mensaje: el caos y la mala gestión pueden influir en la operativa de la compañía.
La primera misiva, perteneciente a una serie de comunicaciones a la que ha tenido acceso EL MUNDO mostraba la preocupación de los pilotos por la situación de la aerolínea: "Los sábados días 19 y 20 [abril de 2007] hemos tenido asambleas con los afiliados a Sepla, y es nuestra obligación informarte de la elevada inquietud que reina entre los mismos por el modo en que se realiza la operación diaria desde hace un mes".
"El elevado número de vuelos retrasados, las escalas programadas en tiempos que se escapan a la realidad, la falta de recursos, calidad de medios en tierra, los reiterados AOG's en las flotas, la escasez de tripulaciones y el sistema de movimientos de los tripulantes, para lograr una tripulación concreta, hacen que el sentimiento general sea de caos operativo que hace poner en riesgo el pasaje, razón de ser de Spanair", continúa la carta.
Al referirse a AOG's, los pilotos aluden a un acrónimo que se desglosa como Aircraft on Ground, avión en tierra, y supone que una nave tiene un problema tal que no está autorizada a despegar. "No cumple los requisitos para volar", explica Javier Navas, jefe de la sección sindical del Sepla en Spanair. "Por ejemplo, si al avión del miércoles no le hubiesen autorizado despegar al volver al finger, hubiera sido un AOG".


“Dear Lars” is the way in which an e-mail began from the Spanair Group within the Spanish Pilots Union (SEPLA) to the then director of Spanair, Lars Nygaard, in April, 2007. This first communication communicated the “concerns” of the pilots in relation to “the operational chaos which puts at risk the passengers, the main reason for the existence of Spanair.”
Monthly e-mails from SEPLA to management and to the President of the airline over the course of a year, repeated the same basic message: chaos and mis-management could influence company operations.

The first letter, which forms part of a series of communications to which El Mundo has obtained access, shows the pilots’ concerns for the situation of the airline: “On the 19th and 20th of April, 2007, we have held meetings of SEPLA members and it is our duty to inform you of the high degree of unease felt by its members with respect to the way daily operations are being carried out over the past month.”
“The high number of delayed flights, the totally unreal flight transfer times, the lack of resources, the quality of resources on the ground, the countless AOG’s in the fleet, the shortage of crew members and the system of crew transfers in order to achieve a full crew gives the overall feeling of operational chaos which puts at risk the passengers, the main reason for the existence of Spanair,” the e-mail continued.
Mentioning AOG’s, the pilots are referring to the acronym for “Aircraft on Ground”, and it means that an aircraft has a considerable problem and is not authorized to take off. “It does not meet the requirements for flight,” explained Javier Navas, chief of the Spanair section of the pilots’ union SEPLA. “For example, if Wednesday’s airplane hadn’t been authorized to take off after returning to the hangar, it would have been an AOG.”

[Volume]

Would like to know the seat row of the quoted survivor.

All Survivors are row 14-19

[spinnaker]

Once the aircraft leaves the gate, more importantly, the ground crew via headset, the failure of any system is considered to be taken as in the air. We apply MEL to it and carry on, if it is a no go we return to the gate. Otherwise it it is written up on next arrival station, providing there is maintenance or we wait till we get home. Safety always prevails, no shortcuts.

How does that work then? Did you mean refer to the QRH? I always took the MEL applies prior to dispatch, not after. How do you accomplish maintenance actions?

[yakmadrid]

"This is very sad.
What gets me it looks like over running has lead the airplane to crash off an elevated runway end which I'm sure is responsible for the seriousness of this accident.
When are ICAO EASA etc going to mandate Engineered Material Arresting Systems at the end of all runways. If this was in place in Madrid then this would be a serious incident not a fatal accident.
Airports are making record profits but refuse to spend money on these safety features and should be held accountable".

1. Do you know how long is rwy 36L in Madrid? Obviously not.
2. 2000ft. an elevated rwy? I guess you have never flown into Quito.
3. Actually Barajas is one of the few airports in the world that have an arresting system at the end of the rwy. Do your homework and find where they are.

Please wait until you finish high school before making any more comments.

[Poof in Boots]

A person who claims to be a pilot with nearly 40 years experience of flying the DC9/MD80 said that the plane could be difficult to fly because it had a "super critical wing".

Strange how KALITTA loses two 747's in 6 weeks with barely a mention in the international press.......

[triton140]

What gets me it looks like over running has lead the airplane to crash off an elevated runway end


I've so far restrained myself from commenting on this accident, because I really don't have any facts to venture a credible opinion (and I'm not a commercial pilot to boot, just lowly PPL) - but the above comment just beggars the imagination - please read the thread - there's lots of evidence it ran off the runway before the end. Not saying of course that things might not have been different if the ground had been graded between the runways because there's no doubt things might have been less severe - but speculation aside I think we can all agree running off the end of the runway is not a cause.

[forget]

2. 2000ft. an elevated rwy? I guess you have never flown into Quito.

Please wait until you finish high school before making any more comments.

By 'elevated runway' the poster was, I believe, (:bored:) referring to the terrain drop-off adjacent to the runway.

[bsieker]

xkoote,

thank you. I intended no offence, and I don't doubt the MD80 is a well thought-out and thoroughly engineered aircraft, not inherently more or less safe than other types.

I felt compelled to address some of your points since you made it sound like you thought the MD80 was a lot more safe than comparable types. As to mentioning the A320 specifically: two reasons. (a) it is the type I am most familiar with, and (b) you specifically mentioned its flight control software, which has not, as such, caused a single accident, although cockpit ergonomics could be argued to have been a causal factor in some. But the same is probably true for many types.

About my person: I am Senior Reverse Engineer of a small company specialising in the causal analysis of incidents and accidents. Often we are hired to perform analyses for legal proceedings, using rigorous causal analysis methods; we have been working on microlight, as well as transport aircraft. We are associated with the research group RVS (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/) of the university of Bielefeld, headed by Prof. Peter B. Ladkin PhD, that has developed the Why-Because-Analysis (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/research/WBA/).

Bernd

[Fangio]

DUDE 2
I suggest that you read AAIB report 3/2001, re G-OJEM 30 March 1998 Stansted airport. Uncontained engine failure after V1/Vr

Fangio

[Chomeur]

Skydrol leak, I would totally agree that you are not an Einstein. I cannot agree with your "pointing the finger" at the crew in the almost total absence of definitive information at this time. ANYBODY who has been in the flying game with ANY common sense will wait for proper investigation and analysis to take its course before making such pronouncements.

[Capot]

From the same post.....

ust an hour or so before the flight they were supposed to go on strike and here they were, after a, no doubt, stressful RTO, late, rushed. Go figure.


Please only professional responses. And that, of course, includes engineers and other aviation professionals.

Yeah, right.

[Colocolo]

Strange how KALITTA loses two 747's in 6 weeks with barely a mention in the international press.......

Unfortunately, when crewmembers only (Kalitta is a cargo hauler; mostly?)are involved, the press usually does not follow up because the public is not interested.

Colocolo

BTW: is Tortilla Flat east of Phoenix towards Roosevelt lake?

[Michael SWS]

All Survivors are row 14-19Press reports suggest that a six-year-old boy sitting in 6A survived. His sister, in 6B, did not.

[D-OCHO]

Strange how KALITTA loses two 747's in 6 weeks with barely a mention in the international press.......

Not strange.
In those crashes not 150+ people died due to the fact that Kallita is an mostly if not all cargo airline.

[GSMini]

Apparently there is a short video of the accident from cameras next to the t4 or the satellite pointing to the RWY. It´s been viewed by the authorities and some media.

It seems that the MD took off "short of power", stalled, right wing made contact with the rwy en then..well we know what happened.

Doubts are arising about any engine failure because here seem to be no explosion in any engine. The aircraft apparently exploded when it crashed agains the rwy and the adjacent field.

A pilot landing (returning from Guayaquil..IB pilot? )saw that the MD was taking a lot of the rwy to depart, and he thought that they were not gonna make it.

He has been called by the police to tell them what he saw.

All this info is from www.abc.es (http://www.abc.es) Sorry, no translation.

Regards.

[DWG46]

I just recieved the following email

Madrid crash: sparks caused explosion

Friday, August 22, 2008

Martin Ferguson ([email protected])


The explosion which killed 153 passengers in Wednesday’s Madrid air catastrophe was caused when the plane’s fuselage hit the runway, according to reports in Spain.

The latest information from the Spanish capital suggests that sparks created by the aircraft skidding on the concrete caused the blast by igniting kerosene in the fuel tank, rather than an overheated engine as initially reported.

The Spanair flight 5022 – a code-shared flight with Lufthansa 255 – was en route to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. The McDonald Douglas MD-80 aircraft had 172 passengers and crew onboard.

DNA tests are being carried out to identity most of the casualties, according to government officials. Deputy prime minister Maria Fernandez de la Vega last night said 59 bodies had already been identified.

Foreign forensic experts have flown to the Spanish capital to assist with autopsies.

Families of the dead are demanding an investigation be launched to establish why the aircraft was allowed to take off only two hours after being grounded with technical problems.

Pilots had reported a problem with a temperature gauge, but it was thought to have been fixed. An independent commission has been established to lead the inquiry.

Politicians yesterday declared a day of national mourning, and vigils were held across Spain to remember those who died.

Some of the survivors remain in “critical” conditions in Madrid hospitals, while others, according to Spanish reports, have showed signs of improvement.

The casualties, who were mostly Spanish, came from 19 countries, including Germany, France and Italy.

It is the worst air disaster to hit mainland Spain since 1983, when a Boeing 747 operated by Colombian airline Avianca crashed near Madrid on landing, killing 181 people.

In 1977, 583 people died when two aircraft collided at Tenerife airport.

Link (http://www.ttglive.com/c/portal/layout?p_l_id=61139&CMPI_SHARED_articleId=1146504&CMPI_SHARED_ImageArticleId=1146504&CMPI_SHARED_articleIdRelated=1146504&CMPI_SHARED_ToolsArticleId=1146504&CMPI_SHARED_CommentArticleId=1146504)

Taken from TTG (Travel Trade Gazette)

[sussex2]

See my post #527..

[Big Burd]

The Emerald Airways accident at STN is interesting comparison. The crew actions were praised by AAIB although they contravened OPS procedures. Similarly, AAIB report 1/2001 ( I think) Cessna 404 Titan at Glasgow which resulted in fatalities was potentially as a result of crew following standard operating procedure - to complete a circuit and land after single engine failure.
( In fact it was finally concluded that the wrong engine was shut down - leaving the aircraft without power after failure at or just after Vr.)

Indeed, that aircraft would also have been capable of flight subject to reduced climb performance. It was close to MTOW and perhaps had the crew elected to land ahead initially, they may have managed a landing outwith the airport boundary.

It seems at Madrid there was catastrophic engine failure at a critical point. If the crew decided to try and land ahead I expect they had a very good reason for making that decision. Engine failure at close to MTOW when hot and relatively high is never easy. Add potential hydraulic leakage/pressure failure due to a breached pipe and resulting in control authority issues and then there may be even less hope of continuing a climb and return.

The evidence suggests the aircraft was airborne- but only just. Without a positive rate of climb and with perhaps some runway and overshoot ahead it might be seen as a reaosnable option to try and set down rather than continuing. TORA at Madrid relative to Aircraft MTOW and TODR would perhaps leave a margin of which the crew would have perhaps subconsciuosly been aware or could see. Not being proficient on MD80 I can only speculate as to the view ahead after Vr and initial climb.

I think the crew may well have made the right call.

If the port engine had an explosive failure then it would seem strange that the aircraft would then veer off to starboard. The loss of an engine alone should not result in a huge turning force given the engines on MD80 are relatively close to the centreline. However, reverse thrust on the starboard side only would establish a positive turning moment which would be difficult to balance with rudder ( assuming that the hydraulics had not been fatally damaged). If the port clamshell was inop ( liklely) or if there was no thrust available anyway on the port side. Then would this be enough to slew the aircraft off the airfield?

All the above is pure speculation for which I should offer some apology. However, in circumstances it is inevitable that the crew's actions will be criticised by some. My point is that they will have done everything that they were trained to do to save the passengers. They made the best decisions at the time based on the information at their disposal. Sometimes that makes no difference to the outcome.

[agusaleale]

pilotosdeiberia.com :: Ver tema - Accidente Barajas. Comentarios sobre posibles causas. (http://www.pilotosdeiberia.com/foro/viewtopic.php?t=7018&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=45) THIS QUOTE HAS BEEN WRITTEN BY AND OLD IBERIA CAPTAIN ALREADY FLYING.

Os diré lo que he visto hoy y me ha dejado absolutamente perplejo.
Hago un vuelo Madrid-Las Palmas-Madrid. Lo echamos a suertes y el salto Madrid-Las Palmas lo hace el copiloto, yo me hago la vuelta.
Despegue por la 36L de Barajas, la pista por la que despegó el MD de Spanair.
Llegamos a V1, rotamos y ya en el aire digo “Positive climb” y el copiloto me dice “Gear Up” Cuando estoy subiendo la palanca del tren veo a la derecha la superficie quemada por al accidente. ¡No está al final de la pista sino entre medias de las dos pistas! Pero lo más sorprendente, es que se ve perfectamente en el suelo, en la tierra las huellas del tren de aterrizaje del MD, totalmente nítidas en la hierba, como se sale el avión por la derecha de la pista, ¡Cuando todavía quedaban más de 1000 metros de pista, y acaban, desviándose cada vez más en la zona negra quemada.!
A la vista de esto pienso:
Si el avión llegó a volar, no creo que se elevase más de 20 o 30 pies del suelo. Cayó sobre la pista de nuevo, pero no estrellándose, pues de lo contrario habría partido o dañado el tren de aterrizaje y las huellas de las ruedas están totalmente nítidas a la derecha de la pista sobre la hierba.
Si ni llegó a volar, cosa que parece verosimil, el avión, aborta el despegue y se va a la derecha de la pista, abandona ésta y corriendo por la hierba, se desvía cada vez más hasta que acaba en medio de ambas pistas, en donde hay un pequeño barranco y ahí se debió destrozar.
Es decir el MD no se ha estrellado en el verdadero sentido de la palabra. Si voló algo, aterrizó de nuevo sobre la pista o en su borde derecho, pero no de una manera tan violenta que partiera el tren, ya que las huellas de las ruedas están muy nítidas en la hierba y sin otras señales de que haya arrastrado el fuselaje o las alas. Se desvía cada vez más y acaba en el barranco entre las pistas.
Donde se salió, o desde donde se ven las huellas de las ruedas que abandonan la pista hacia la derecha es un poco pasado la antena de la senda de planeo del ILS de la pista 18R, es decir en ese punto queda todavía más de 1000 metros de pista asfaltada por delante, ya que el umbral de la pista 18R está desplazado 950 metros de la cabecera.
¿Cómo se pudo desviar así? Lo ignoro, ¿Quizás metió la reversa derecha a tope y la izquierda no y eso le sacó “al verde”? Pues es posible. Lo que yo he visto claro es que el avión no se “estrelló” en el verdadero sentido de la palabra, simplemente se desvió hacia al derecha, se salió de la pista, no sé si antes llegó a volar algo o no, pero lo que está claro es que el tren de aterrizaje estaba intacto al salirse de la pista, corrió por el campo desviándose cada vez más y acabó esa carrera en el barranco que existe entre las 36L y 36R.
Ahora que cada cual saque sus conclusiones. Yo estoy bastante perplejo

What I have seen today has left me absolutely perplexed.
I was in a flight Madrid-Las Palmas-Madrid. The flight Madrid-Las Palmas was made by the co-pilot, I did the return.
Liftoff for the 36L, the same runway that took the MD of Spanair.
We arrived at V1, rotate and in the air I say "Positive climb" and the co-pilot tells me "Gear Up" . When I am pulling the climbing lever I see to the right the area burned in the accident. It is not the end of the runway but between the two tracks! But the most surprising is that it is seen perfectly on the ground the tracks of the landing gear of the MD completely clear on the grass, the plane exiting by the right side of the runway, when there were still more than 1000 meter of the runway, and ultimately, diverting in the area burnt black.!
In view of this I think:
If the plane was flying, I do not think that it rose more than 20 or 30 feet above the ground. It fell on the track again, but not crashing, otherwise they would have damaged part or the landing gear and the footprints of the wheels are absolutely clear on the right side of the runway on the grass.
If it didn´t got airborne (that seems plausible) the plane aborts the take-off and goes to the right of the runway, leaves it and runs in the grass, finishing just in the middle of both runways, where there is a small ravine and finishes destroyed.
That is to say that the MD did not crashed in the true sense of the word. If it flew, landed back on the track or at its right edge, but not so violent (it did not destroyed the langing gear) as the tracks of the wheels are very sharp on the grass, without any other evidence that the fuselage or the wings had dragged the soil. It diverted more and ended in the ravine between the tracks.
The place where it left the runway, or from where you can see traces of the wheels leaving the runway to the right is a little bit passing the antenna of the gliding path of the ILS runway 18R; at this point there are still more than 1000 meters of runway ahead, as the threshold of the runway 18R is moved 950 metres from the header.
How could it diverted like that? I dont know, Maybe put the right thrust reverser on top and not the left and that made the plane exit "to the green"? It is possible. What I've seen clear is that the plane did not "crashed" in the true sense of the word, simply was diverted towards the right, left the track, I do not know whether it flew before or not, but what is clear is that the landing gear left intact the track, ran throughout the ground, deviating and finishing in the ravine between 36R and 36L.
Everyone has to get it own conclusions. I am quite puzzled

[parabellum]

I have laboured through the last 500 odd posts but may still have missed it.

An engine FIRE does not necessarily mean a loss of thrust, usual drill - cancel the bell, continue climb to 400', carry out fire drills and assess the situation, usually an immediate return. An explosive failure accompanied by a fire would be different and not only cause an immediate loss of thrust but if the rotating parts also seize then the torque and yaw effect of the sudden power failure on one side will be considerably increased. The mis identification of a fire, (no loss of thrust), with a failure and a subsequent rudder input, especially at low speed/height, could well prove disastrous, but we don't know, do we?
Once again, sorry if this aspect has already been covered but I missed it.

[Big Burd]

I agree that a fire alone would not create any loss of thrust and there would therefore be no immediate reason to abort take off. However, we do not yet know, if there was afire, what was the cause.

The report of wheel tracks off the runway add weight to my theory that the aircraft landed back on the tarmac and then suffered loss of control authority - for whatever reason. Did the stb clamshell activate alone with no thrust on the port side or did the port clamshell fail to operate as both engines were being used with reversers in an attempt to arrest the aircraft?

The topography at Madrid seems to have contributed to the break up of the aircraft in the 'ravine'. Had it skidded acorss flat fields and even wiped off the undercarriage I would be suprised if the force involved would have resulted in complete break up- there is plenty of evidence to suggest not.

So the crew perhaps took the correct action but then went off a cliff, whilst still within the airport perimeter - tragic!

[Skydrol Leak]

Choumeur,

Mange le fromage and enjoy the posts without insulting others. IT IS an opinion and not a conclusion.These two words have different meanings...

Not an Einstein

[forget]

Reference Iberian crew's comments above - have I got this right? :confused:

I'd somehow assumed that the aircraft had left the airfield. Not so - it seems. From Iberia, it came to rest between the runways. Northern end of 36L is at 1,995 feet AMSL. The gulley between the runways is, at its lowest, 1,925 feet. Leave the runway and you're straight into a 70 foot gully! To my simple mind that is in no way an airfield.

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b270/cumpas/spanair.jpg

[CLEE]

Airline engineer, not aircrew, a bit puzzled.

Given that aircraft will, on occasion, leave the runway for a variety of possible reasons, and sometimes at high speed, why is anyone surprised that an incident turns into a disaster when a "small ravine" gets in the way? What is that "small ravine" doing there?

Would I be wrong in stating that this is not the only recent accident that ended much more badly than it might otherwise have done because of what it encountered after leaving the runway? That A340 at Toronto went into a ditch, burned and everyone involved was very lucky. I believe that was the second time that, that scenario unfolded at Toronto.

What are the airport regulations on quality of terrain, covering of drainage ditches, gulleys, hummocks, trees, roads, fences etc. What I would like to see is a large expanse of soft sand, covered drainage culverts and short grass (long grass burns too much). Why is this sort of thing not as obvious as having fire engines?

[Diver-BR]

Spanish media says that the airport tapes shows that apparently they used more runway than usual, climbed about 50m, with no visible sign of engine fire but with an attitude that indicates less available power than required. It banks to the right, the right wing touches the ground and they lost control.

[NigelOnDraft]

forget... Yes - known since shortly after accident it's in the gully between the runways...

You say "it should not be allowed" but why? Runoff areas are specified - but in general in line with the runway. At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...

NoD

[forget]

Does anyone have any idea where this extended and locked (?) reverser ended up? I don't see any blacktop within 2,000 feet of the ravine.

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b270/cumpas/12193023416691.jpg

Why is this sort of thing not as obvious as having fire engines?

I'm becoming even more baffled. The fire trucks couldn't reach part of the airfield between the runways because of terrain and scrub.

[Big Burd]

I agree a ravine between two runways is a bit extreme but how far out do you make everything flat? If this happened at LHR on 27L then you would end up in T5!

[forget]

At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...

Not so. 18 is never used for take offs - we're told. :bored:

And terminals are a necessity. Ravines - not welcome.

[sevenstrokeroll]

a couple of ideas in light of the new video:

is it possible that the mx staff pulled the wrong circuit breaker while placing whatever system on "mel", somehow disabling the flap/slat/takeoff configuration warning system, and that the pilots somehow didn't set the flaps/slats properly? (think detroit)

is it possible that the engine power was not properly set to desired thrust?

did the pilots, when faced with problem, firewall the throttles?

a takeoff stall recovery is firewall power/slats/flaps 15 (or in the md 80, to the dial a flap detent I think)

[procede]

I'm sure we'd all love to see runways which are 10km long and wide (which have the advantage of being used in any wind direction), but it simply won't fit in most locations (with the exception of maybe DEN) and would be way to expensive. Indeed most airports will have buildings, roads or even other active runways there instead of trees and ravines.

[Two-Tone-Blue]

Air Traffic Controller - retired.

Airfield Safeguarding Criteria cover a range of issues, including vertical obstacles and frangible items within designated distances of the RW centre-line and end zones. I can't remember any of the numbers now, but essentially the criteria provide a degree of protection for any ac departing the RW pavement, and include an element of "reinforced grass" adjacent to the RW. They are not, however, intended to cover situations where an aircraft substantially departs the operating surfaces.

In a perfect world, given unlimited funds, the area within [pick your own distance] of the RW would be level and unobstructed. How far would you extend? How much of Madrid would you level in the process [or indeed the Bath Road adjacent to Heathrow]?

[blackboard]

On the ref'd comments on airport design, I would just like to let you know that LEMD follows the recomendations of ICAO Annex 14.

As forget's picture shows, there is a large FLAT area (actually 4350x300m) surrounding both runways, which is over the recomendation.

Te actual location of the crash can be seen here.

Gráficos en ELPAÍS.com (http://www.elpais.com/graficos/sociedad/Tragedia/Barajas/elpgra/20080820elpepusoc_1/Ges/)


I am no airport design expert, but I now a flat area 4350x300m is a lot bigger AND wider than a lot of other airfields. It would have been better to have it 2000m wide as suggested, but in no way can it be said that LEMD is unsafe because of this: safety criteria is based on international recomendations, (which may or may not have to be amended a s aresult of this accident)

Do I need to remind you of the hundreds of international airports wtih a lot of bigger hazards surrounding the runway?



By the way: no, I am not connected in any way to that airport, other than as a user.

[slip and turn]

Very little of Madrid is built between these runways.

If you have been to Spain recently and seen the hundreds of kilometres of perfectly smooth grading they have made to their autopista network in the last five years to link cities with key airports like this then it begs the question why was this terrain left with textural consequences?

[forget]

In a perfect world, given unlimited funds, the area within [pick your own distance] of the RW would be level and unobstructed. How far would you extend? How much of Madrid would you level in the process [or indeed the Bath Road adjacent to Heathrow]?

I do understand all of that - necessary compromises. But, as if the gully wasn't enough, would you operate a quarry between runways as Madrid appears to be doing? That does strike me as a little .......... er, deranged.

(Unless, of course, they're filling it in. ;) )

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b270/cumpas/quarry.jpg

[Two-Tone-Blue]

I will admit I was looking more towards to the south-east of the airport ... where there appears [on Google Earth] to be a rather tiresome river and a lot of industrial buildings.

However, my point is more general: I say again ... how far does one go? and at what cost?


@ Forget ... I take your point. An "interesting" activity. However, well outside the safeguarding areas. Change [extend] the parameters and, world-wide, you would be bulldozing whole swathes of cities, motorways and other infrastructure [and filling in those lovely useful reservoirs west of LHR].

[Fangio]

BIG BURD

The Emerald Airways accident at STN is interesting comparison. The crew actions were praised by AAIB although they contravened OPS procedures.

The above statement is not correct.
The crew did not contravene OPS procedures. The Emerald OPS manual clearly stated that it was at the captain's discretion to land back on if this was the safest option.
Whilst the HS748 is a Perf. A aircraft, the length of RW23 at STN was more than twice the accelerate/stop distance required at the WAT, and the take off was from the start of the runway, not an intersection.
The uncontained failure was a catastrophic event, depositing the turbine compressor wheel on the runway, the wheel had exited the cowling vertically severing fuel lines, hydraulics and fire protection system, spilling burning fuel over the wing an undercarriage. While the severe fire that followed was rapidly burning through the main spar. On the flightdeck, there was no fire warning, audible or visual, until the arcraft had safely landed back on the runway and just before the overrun onto the grass. All 46 pax and 4 crew walked away uninjured, hence the praise you refer to.

This is an identical incident with the same type of engine the Rolls Royce Dart

]The Transportation Safety Board of Canada report number H90001, Quebecair F27B CF-QBL Flight No 255[/B]Fatal accident at Quebec City Airport, 29 March 1979
The flight lasted 1min 12secs fourteen passengers and three crew died in the crash.
"At time 36 seconds(after brake release) there was a loud bang from the right engine as it disintegrated and a severe fire developed. The aircraft was at approximately 103 kts and 40 feet above the runway.
time 42 The captain started the engine failure/fire emergency drill.
At time 45 the tower controller who had noticed flames from the right engine advised flight 255 that the right engine was on fire and authorised them to land on any runway.
From time 50 to 1:05 the crew attempted to raise the landing gear which never came up.
The aircraft climbed to about 120 feet above the runway elevation and started a right turn, apparently in an attempt to complete a short circuit, remain visual and execute an emergency on the airport.
At time 1:14 the captain called for the propeller to be feathered. Up to this point the crew did not know that the right engine had separated at the first stage impeller and the forward section of the engine along with the forward section of the engine along with the propeller and some cowling had fallen onto the runway
At time 1:24 the No 1 fire bottle was fired and the aircraft continued in a right turn at about 100 feet above the terrain at a very low airspeed. The engine fire continued.
As the aircraft approached the College de Sacre Coeur, the angle of bank increased and the aircraft started to descend until impact.
Impact occured in a nose down, right wing low attitude at approximately 80 kts.
A fierce fire broke out and most of the fuselage forward of the wing was consumed by fire."

There but for the grace of God.

[xkoote]

Just once more to clarify two important issues with an MD-82 takeoff in this particular scenario. I have already mentioned this in a previous post.

1. Madrid's runway 36L is 14271' long !

2. Given that length and given a collegues experience taking off from that runway, even at a gross TO weight of about 66 tons (given my personal guesstimate) the MD-82 would have taken of with between 2° and 3° of flaps and a rotation speed of close to 160 knots.

3. It is clear that even so the MD-82 did not even leave the airport perimeter. And that the MD-82 "appeared" to have encountered problems with still a lot of runway remaining.

4. If the crew made a derated TO, they would not have automatic emergency thrust applied as that (ART) system must be OFF when using TO FLEX.

5. Even though they did not have automatic emergency thrust, the ATR system should have set EPR G/A on the remaing engine if it was set below that EPR setting.

6. A quick shove of the autothrottles would have given them emergency power (or even more) if needed as the MD-82 has conventional (auto)throttles.

7. Given the amount of energy they had at liftoff, the MD-82 would have no problem whatsoever in continuing it's takeoff engine failure profile.

8. For an MD-82 travelling at close 170 knots probably, it seems odd that it could not have gotten off to more than 20-50 m height.

9. The crew "appeared" to either have aborted after becoming airborne, or they encountered a deployed reverser at liftoff. Either one a far fetch. Let's hope all becomes clear in this matter.

Xander

[VAFFPAX]

forget, the 'quarry' you refer to is, by the looks of it anyway, a remnant of the construction of the two runways, i.e. a depot, a yard where concrete was being made.

If you use Google Maps (not Google Earth), and you zoom out to 1000ft/200m, it appears to be part of a now-rerouted motorway/dual carriageway between the north-west and the south-east end of the airport (zoom out to 1km/1mi ratio, and you can see how that cleared bit merges with the southern end of 36R, and naturally appears to continue to the northern end of 33R).

Perhaps our Spanish/Madrid residents can help out on what changed when MAD T4 was built; there are two crossing points on the southern creek and the northern creek (where the fuselage ended up). But there IS elevation, that much is clear.

I found this link that explains some (but not all) of the changes: Madrid Barajas International Airport (MAD/LEMD) Airport Technology (http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/madrid/)

S.

[lomapaseo]

Is there any way that we can convert this rumor of a video showing:

no engine fire,

a long takeoff roll

a drop back to the runway with a roll

as a fact:confused:

If so we can probably trim out quite a few speculations to date.

Unfortunately the thrust reverser questions will take some time to be disposed

[aguadalte]

I'm more inclined for a Reverser Unlock after V1...

[Tee Emm]

I admit without reservation that the following is nothing more than considered speculation based on what I have read on these pages and what I have observed in similar cases in the simulator.

Aircraft has compressor stall left engine very close to VR. Witnesses report flames seen from left engine which are a characteristic of compressor stall. Reason for compressor stall unknown yet. Indications of compressor stall in cockpit may include hearing bang and slight yaw and some vibration. Vr is called and pilot (captain or first officer?) instinctively starts rotation then changes his mind and de-rotates. Someone pulls hard reverse on both engines as part of abort procedure. Probably gets reverse on right engine but possibly not on left engine depending if actual engine failure. Aircraft pulls right under influence of full reverse right engine and fatal delay in countering the right departure from runway centreline. Depending who was PF at the time, critical delay in handing over control to captain who presumably would have initiated abort process. Lack of good braking on grass or hard dirt verges extends stopping distance already compromised by abort action during rotation. Pure speculation of course but fits the reported track of aircraft.

[sussex2]

Any number of airports the world over have significant obstacles alongside the runways, from terminal buildings to housing and roads, rivers etc..08 at LGW springs to mind as those terminal buildings and parked aircraft seem pretty damn close. Funchal perhaps?
Given the amount of fuel the aircraft would have had on board, and that it got airborne, then the likelyhood of the crash being survivable at all is very remote.
I am amazed that anyone survived; and we should be grateful for the small mercy that the only casualties were on board. At a lot of airports it could have been a very different story.

[Lost in Saigon]

Is there any way that we can convert this rumor of a video showing:

no engine fire,

a long takeoff roll

a drop back to the runway with a roll

as a fact:confused:

If so we can probably trim out quite a few speculations to date.

Unfortunately the thrust reverser questions will take some time to be disposed

Here is a Babel Fish translation of a Spanish article that refers to the video.
El MD-82 despegó escaso de potencia y no se incendió en el aire, según las grabaciones - Nacional_Sucesos - Nacional - ABC.es (http://www.abc.es/20080822/nacional-sucesos/perdido-todo-lamenta-padre-200808220738.html)


The images recorded by the cameras of security of the tracks of Barajas show that the MD-82 of Spanair that crashed Wednesday did not have sufficient power when initiated the takeoff, according to sources of the investigation consulted by ABC that already have visionado the sequence. It does not last more than two or three seconds. The image corroborates the testimony of the pilot of an airship that landed then in parallel: “That airplane does not take off, is eating the track”. As much he, as the rest of the crew of the airplane that came already from Guayaquil has been mentioned to declare by the Civil Guard. I collate of that recording, the marks left by the apparatus in the track - del wing, rest of the undercarriage, scattered to both sides, and the first successfully obtained testimonies, still without determining the causes, aim at that the accident took place of the following form.

The MD-82, with 162 passengers on board and ten crew, initiates the maneuver of takeoff to the 14,20 hours. It is the second attempt; almost one hour before a failure in the outer temperature sensor had had to return to the door of boarding when detecting the commander, that communicated to the passage. All the sources agree in which that anomaly does not have relation and so it happened later, but also it is being investigated. A technical inspector of Spanair certificó that McDonnell Douglas could fly. The manual anticipates that the switch takes off who gives energy him to the blower pipe, located under the cabin of the copilot, according to the company.

The airplane initiates the takeoff by track 36 left; the commander notices the lack of power, surely just after reaching the V1 call - when no longer the maneuver can be aborted; VR or turnover rate is arrived at. The aircraft, that had not risen more than 50 meters, inclines (probably after failing the right motor, although the doubts persist); one hurries to the ground, the right wing is striking the track and the pilot loses the control. The airplane to more than 280 km per hour is undone and crawling about 500 meters - there are marks of that uncontrolled maneuver. He does not arrive at the end of the track, leaves by the right, he crosses the peripheral fence and one hurries by a semislope staggered among five and seven meters until the channel of the stream of the Fertile valley. There the loaded deposits of kerosene explode and the apparatus catches fire. The dead and bodies alive are scattered in the lowest part of valley throughout about 400 meters. The crew did not get to put the undercarriage, went it leaving after falling to both sides of her route. “An established height does not exist to gather it. The normal thing is that the “train arrives” becomes ordained two or three seconds after the rotation, when already you have sufficient height and with a positive regime of ascent”, details a pilot to ABC. From a few approaches, everything is incognito. Who have seen the images yes assure that any motor is not appraised burning in the air, the lack power, the abrupt turn and the imbalance of the aircraft.


The little power can be due to multiple reasons: overweight, heating, failure of motor or one more a failure more serious than, in theory, must have detected in the revision of maintenance. “It surely raised to the front wheels and also the backs”, explained the minister of Promotion, Magdalena Alvarez. Sources of Civil Aviation draw attention on the failure of the motor: with the one nonoperative airplane it could have flown. They say that if that failure existed it had to take place after taking off, if the commander would not have aborted the maneuver. A human error is not discarded either. Nothing is it. Now the investigation, several parallels in fact, must be giving light all to these questions. The black boxes and the recording of security already are in the power of the Court number 11 of Madrid. One of the boxes is damaged, but the data will be able to be reclaimed equal. They are two: in one they are recorded the conversations of the members of the cabin and the outer control systems; second it is the technique, the one that operation of the motors, temperatures registers more of a hundred of parameters of the situation of the airship such as, pressures or atmospheric situation.


Collection of pieces and turbines Recovered after the wreck, they constitute one of the main probatory elements. The ones in charge to analyze them are the members of the Commission of Investigation of Accidents and Civil Aircraft incidents (Ciaiac), that depend on Promotion. Are seven civil servants, supported by personnel specialized in aerial security of the United States and the European Union and expert of the implied companies. To them he is incumbent on to them to explain all the technical part. They followed in “zone zero” picking up pieces, turbines and rest to label them yesterday and began to take the material to a room yielded in the airport. This investigation, longest in the time, comes together with other three: the corpse identification, the ocular inspection and the diligences. The team of Great Catastrophes of the Civil Guard, Scientific Police of the CNP and tens of forensic work without rest to conclude as soon as possible. The experts consider that by the traditional methods - tracks, photographic reconnaissance, identification of objects it will not be possible to put name to more than 60 or 70 victims, dice the state of the bodies; for the rest it will be necessary to resort to the DNA. The ocular inspection nothing else began to finish the rescue of victims. It has been entrusted to the central equipment of the Service of Criminology of the Civil Guard with support of his laboratories. Tens of agents are dedicated from Wednesday to take photographies in the zone, to determine the point of impact, to elaborate croquis, to mark the area in which they were scattered corpses, to separate properties, documentation, to resist each found rest. The police diligences have been ordered to the Judicial Police of the Command of Three Songs, supported by members of the Operative Central Unit. The agents will reflect in hundreds of folios the declaration of the wounded - still it has not been possible to take any; the one of the witnesses - they already are being located and being mentioned: the one of the personnel of the airport, personnel of the airline, technicians of maintenance, rescue teams. Puzzle of words to try to explain what it happened and how. The testimony of the survivors of the JK5022 will be key, whose flight plan was assigned the past to commander 17 of August. They will explain if she inquired to them into what happened, if a different maneuver were tried, if they noticed something. The last critical moment tens on agents and rescatadores lived yesterday. To 8,45 in the morning they recovered the cuerpecito burnout of a baby, covered by the weeds and the fuselage. To the 13 hours they found another minor, with the member amputees. They were those that lacked.

[Two-Tone-Blue]

Or indeed Jersey ... a 50m drop off the departure end of 27, and the old control tower/terminal building actually penetrates the 1:7 slope that's intended to protect against "untidy overshoots in IMC".

As with so many things in life, we have to start with where we are ... undoubtedly "it would be nice" to start with a blank sheet of paper [and an unlimited budget].

[safetypee]

Re the apparent low-power take off; - the take off run appeared longer than normal.
Assuming that the TAT probe was the errant device; is TAT used in the calculation of thrust in the MD?
In some aircraft, TAT is used by the thrust management computer. If the TAT value is erroneously high, it can give a low thrust setting. The crew should cross check the demanded value with that required; if TAT is at fault, a manual value can be entered for computation or the required thrust level set manually.
This problem was often seen with non aspirated TAT probes which detected radiant energy from hot concrete surfaces.

Low power could contribute to low speed immediately after take off if normal pitch attitudes were used, i.e. attitude for the initial climb as opposed to speed, or before a speed schedule was reached.
Extending the speculation, then if the aircraft would not, or was judged that it could not continue to fly, then the landing should have been relatively ‘straight ahead’ (~ crosswind). However, if the low speed situation resulted in loss of directional control (wing drop) then a more severe veer-off might result in an ‘off airport’ landing.

Is the standard MEL practice for isolating the TAT probe via a breaker, if so what breakers are adjacent to TAT?

[xkoote]

Guys,

please do not take the "too little power for takeoff" and takeoff roll longer than normal" too litterally. The plane took off, became airborne and dropped back to the ground, all in less than the length of the runway. In other words a normal (near) MTOW takeoff. That's all.

Takeoff roll longer than normal makes absolutely no sense and depends on so many variables. Remember that by default, runway analysis is based on letting the plane roll and gain speed on the ground as much as possible before getting airborne. An MD-82 near MTOW and using a balanced runway concept on this giant runway would have used a LOT of runway. Rotating at 747 speeds of 160 knots. I can't stress this enough.

Too little power during the takeoff roll means that the crew would have aborted as soon as you see that the engine(s) are not delivering the thrust required by the speed card. So be carefull how things are translated.

Xander

EDIT: To try and make it clear what I mean, look at this video of an MD-83 departing Valencia, Venezuela in 0 wind conditions with an elevation of 1400' and a temperature around 28° Celsius. Almost similar conditions.
This particular model is a HGW MD-83 with a MTOW of 72.6 tons i.s.o. 67.8 tons. This flight would have been close to 70 tons that day. Even with a static takeoff, the takeoff roll was still more than 40 seconds long.
Would it have crashed if an engines was lost? No, because it is calculated that you can takeoff in such conditions and that weight and those speeds. Beleive me, these procedures are not guesstimates. Also you can see how little flaps is used on this takeoff. That's around 7° of flaps.

YouTube - Despegue MD83 Insel Air (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nAcksHZ1_KQ)

Hear those Pratts roar ! ! ! God I love it.

[Dairyground]

Big Burd

I agree a ravine between two runways is a bit extreme but how far out do you make everything flat? If this happened at LHR on 27L then you would end up in T5!


Going the other way, off 09R, you would be into T4 even sooner and could be into BA Engineering if you went off the other way.

[CLEE]

BigBurd
"I agree a ravine between two runways is a bit extreme but how far out do you make everything flat? If this happened at LHR on 27L then you would end up in T5!"

I would say that you make everying flat as far as you can given the physical restraints imposed upon you. I appreciate that other airports have similar hazards too, and rather than that serve as an excuse for this accident, why can't this accident serve as a pointer to all those hazardous situations? If that means fixing Leeds-Bradford or the Bath Road, so be it (I'd like to see BAA's risk assesment for that).

The wording you find in many Airworthiness Directives "a hazardous situation has been found to that is likely to exist on similar types of aircraft . . ." generally goes on to mandate the spending of a lot of money by the airlines. Does a similar system apply to airports? - it should, they make enough money out of the airlines. How much money do you think airlines have spent on TCAS or 8.33 KHz FM separation or FM immunity or lockable flight deck doors or any number of other safety features addressing scenarios that are far less likely, or lethal, than a runway excursion?

The point is that this ravine is a risk to all other aircraft taking off or landing on both runways - should a future aircraft depart either runway, and we have to assume that one day one will, then the result will be similarly tragic. Avoidably tragic. The authorities, rightly, do not accept that sort of thing for technical faults on aircraft and issue ADs in response. Substituting this ravine with suitable drainage, infill and grading is a no brainer.

[Desk Jockey]

I think the T/Rev in the picture is sitting on burnt grass not tarmac.

Is the probe mentioned in previous posts heated by bleed air as the 767 is? (Bleed air too hot? )

..........and how do you quote a prev post?:ugh:

[Two-Tone-Blue]

@ CLEE
The point is that this ravine is a risk to all other aircraft taking off or landing on both runways - should a future aircraft depart either runway, and we have to assume that one day one will, then the result will be similarly tragic. Avoidably tragic. The authorities, rightly, do not accept that sort of thing for technical faults on aircraft and issue ADs in response. Substituting this ravine with suitable drainage, infill and grading is a no brainer.

Arguing against myself, in this specific case I could agree ... although presumably the Airport Operating Authority would then be looking for some fiscal support to justify spending on dramatically exceeding Internationally agreed norms ;)

However, the ravine is no more a risk than anything else [such as mentioned previously] that lies outside the Safeguarding Criteria. The idea is to protect aircraft operating normally. Where do you stop? or indeed, even start?

[agusaleale]

Dear Lost in Saigon:

As you already know, the parallel runway is used in this case only for departures. So the pilot landing on paralell sounds unreal. Moreover, there is a testimony of a pilot who was waiting for the departure on the parallel runway and saw the accident, he told that the plane went to the air normally, then a sudden flash in the engine, unusual position of the nose up and then the fall to the right, the position of the nose kept his attention, although recognized that when seeing it from behind he may have been deceived by the perception.

How do you realize that the power at the moment of initiating the take off was not enough? Even though there are cameras, I read that they are far enough to get a fair picture of the plane, considering that the very clear and hot day didn´t help (I´d say like in the desert, you see mirages due to the very hot weather and the very clear surfaces)

I suspect that there may have exist more direct witnesses, as the surrounding area to the right is an elevation with full of houses, and I suppose someone else must have seen something else.

[NigelOnDraft]

At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...

Not so. 18 is never used for take offs - we're told.18 is used for landings - and before you doubt me, I've done it more than once as a skipper - and overruns / excursions from landings probably more likely than takeoffs :{

NoD

[Munnyspinner]

Clee,

the CAA designated PSZ was changed about 10 years ago from a fan shape spreading out from the end of a runway to a triangle with its base extending either side of the centreline and coming to an apex as it extends from the end of the runway. For example LHR has a PSZ designation of both 27L and 27R which extend from a base 350m either side of centreline to an apex at 3.5Km.

Th PSZ is based on modelling of aircraft accidents since WW2 apparently - i.e. the further you get from the end of the runway the less likley you are to crash and, if you do, the more likley that you will be close to the centreline.

On this basis I would agree that within the perimeter there seems to be a very srong arguement that ground is free of non moveable obstacles which could potentially create a more dangerous situation for aircraft in an runway excursion. This would include large gullies and ravines.

The airport operators must undertake the risk assessment and should justify their decision not to undertake additional works that may be deemed reasonable. The cost is actually passed on to the users through airfield charges - so the passenger pays eventually!

Going back to LHR its not just Bath Road if you apply the Spanair circumstances to 09L you would find yourself either in the fireground or the Virgin, BM of BA hangar complex - not good!

[Oval3Holer]

Does anyone have a crew list? I've only seen a passenger list.

[Two-Tone-Blue]

Crew list was posted somewhere round page 20 ...

[Desk Jockey]

["QUOTE"]
Does anyone have a crew list? I've only seen a passenger list.
["/QUOTE"]
Already posted, yes 30 pages to read...

[Rightbase]

Use search thread for crew. post #350 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/339876-spanair-accident-madrid-18.html#post4341299)

[Two-Tone-Blue]

Munnyspinner the CAA designated PSZ was changed about 10 years ago from a fan shape spreading out from the end of a runway to a triangle with its base extending either side of the centreline and coming to an apex as it extends from the end of the runway. For example LHR has a PSZ designation of both 27L and 27R which extend from a base 350m either side of centreline to an apex at 3.5Km.

Th PSZ is based on modelling of aircraft accidents since WW2 apparently - i.e. the further you get from the end of the runway the less likley you are to crash and, if you do, the more likley that you will be close to the centreline.

On this basis I would agree that within the perimeter there seems to be a very srong arguement that ground is free of non moveable obstacles which could potentially create a more dangerous situation for aircraft in an runway excursion. This would include large gullies and ravines.

Difficult without a picture ... does that triangle originate at the take-off threshold? or the departure end?
If the first, it just avoids the LHR terminals lying between the runways, but doesn't even reach the far end of 27 l/R..
If the second, the MAD quarry/ravine lies outside, as does everything and anything in between the parallel runways.

Innit?

[VAFFPAX]

I would say that you make everying flat as far as you can given the physical restraints imposed upon you. I appreciate that other airports have similar hazards too, and rather than that serve as an excuse for this accident, why can't this accident serve as a pointer to all those hazardous situations? If that means fixing Leeds-Bradford or the Bath Road, so be it (I'd like to see BAA's risk assesment for that).
Or even LTN and the A505... The A505 runs in a cut between the end of Rwy 26 and the Vauxhall parking lot east of Vauxhall Road. And just a bit further is Luton Parkway on the Midland Mainline, another major railway connection.

In the case of MAD, it would take a LOT of landfill/earthworks to eliminate the drop, but is probably doable, in the case of LTN, a cut and cover tunnel could do (but I believe there's some significant roadworks already to improve access to LTN from the A505, trying to eliminate the roundabout for airport traffic).

But all the pontificating in the world (granted, I'm guilty of it) about what could/should be done won't mean a jot until we know why the jet went down.

S.

[tomahaw]

In the link below there is a inphografy of accident with known actual data.
Press over "PULSE PARA CONTINUAR" below the MD-82 image and follow the sequence with indicators (arrows).


Gráficos en ELPAÍS.com (http://www.elpais.com/graficos/sociedad/Tragedia/Barajas/elpgrasoc/20080820elpepusoc_1/Ges/)

[deniasol]

Hi, this is my first post because I'm not a pro (I do have a PPL SEL). I do have a questions for the pros, though. According to Spanish TV, at least one passenger wanted to get off the plane while it was being repaired at the gate. Ruben Santana, one of the victims, is said to have sent an SMS to a family member prior to the accident saying he wanted to get off the plane and that his request was denied. Question: shy would such a request be denied if the plane is at the gate and there is plenty of time for the pax to get off? Who would it be up to to grant or deny such a request? Thanks.

[tubster]

If i was you id start from the beginning and read back through this thread, it's been covered a few times!!

[WindSheer]

There are a lot of comments as to why the a/c wouldn't have enough power to get up after an engine failure.
Is there any proof this was a 'contained' failure?? The chances are the tail plane or rudder could have been severely damaged forcing the roll/pitch that caused the accident.

I am just speculating as much as everyone else...the fact of the matter is...god's wishes to everyone involved. Absolute tragic...:(

[greuzi]

Can I suggest that if we are about to review every airport in the world for an off runway excursion that we start a new thread please?

The thread is about an accident and thread 213 should be read by all. Page 11

For an off runway excursion, the answers are the same. You will hit another aircraft, a terminal, a motorway, the sea, an ILS array, a noise bund etc. Maybe even a tree or a Toyota Camry. In fact you can guarantee you will hit anything that is in the way...

Then there is also what is "in the way" on the approach and the climb if something goes wrong....BA 777?...and then the cruise. And then on route if we need somewhere to land because we can't make it to an airport.....to veer off the runway when we get there....

The aim of all in the industry should be that we put serviceable aircraft into the air and competent crew to get the aircraft out of trouble if luck is having a bad day. Sometimes with 100% planning things still go wrong.

[Munnyspinner]

PSZ is always measured form each depatrure end of the runway. It is a permanent designation at eaither end of each runway. Smaller airports ( less volume of flights) have a triangle with base 230m either side of centreline coming to an apex at 2.3km.

The ravine is outwith what would be a CAA designated PSZ ( public safety zone) but within Airport perimeter - no access to Public. ThPSZ is designed to identify areas of risk ,for departing and, I assume, arriving Aircraft. Within the bouandary there are inherent risks around the airfield - these whoule be assessed and mitigation measures employed to reduce or remove the risk

My point was that if the MD 80 left LHR 09L and followed the same path it would end up in the BMi Hangar!

[greuzi]

...and if it turned the other way?

[DozyWannabe]

xcoote:
6. A quick shove of the autothrottles would have given them emergency power (or even more) if needed as the MD-82 has conventional (auto)throttles.
I might have missed something in more recent posts, but I think I read earlier that if the engine temperature probe was MEL for that flight, then autothrottles would be considered unserviceable and would have to be disabled.

Could someone with more MD knowledge than me confirm or deny that?

Much appreciated.

[NigelOnDraft]

I might have missed something in more recent posts, but I think I read earlier that if the engine temperature probe was MEL for that flight, then autothrottles would be considered unserviceable and would have to be disabled

I am unaware (but willing to be corrected) of any type that uses "auto throttles" on Takeoff. There might be Thrust Mgmt systems, or gates, but not generally auto-throttles - which tend only to become "engaged" or "active" after Aa...

6. A quick shove of the autothrottles would have given them emergency power (or even more) if needed Not too sure about this "emergency power" term either :eek:

NoD

[forget]

My point was that if the MD 80 left LHR 09L and followed the same path it would end up in the BMi Hangar!

Granted, but give me a hangar over a ravine any day. At least the fire trucks would get to me. And hangars are necessary to an airport.

[Right Way Up]

Like the SAS at Milan which hit a hangar. I guess the people in the hangar would vote for the ravine.

[AlexGG]

Probably the idea is not "all land should be flat" but more like "the fire trucks should be able to reach any point within airport, except inside buildings"? and probably add "in five minutes or less"?

[Right Way Up]

Why is airport design not allowed in this discussion. At this moment nobody on this thread knows the exact trajectory of the aircraft. It might well be an important factor in the accident investigation.

[forget]

The thread is about an accident in which many people may well have survived if the airport didn't have a ravine in the middle - in my opinion. Fair point for discussion I'd have thought.

[octavian]

I may well have missed it amongst the many posts in this thread, but what was the previous departure and how soon after it did the Spanair depart?

[bsieker]

Quote:
6. A quick shove of the autothrottles would have given them emergency power (or even more) if needed

Not too sure about this "emergency power" term either

I'm not sure about the term, either, but the MD80's JT8D-200 engines, being mechanically controlled (non-FADEC), can deliver more than maximum rated thrust, if needed. This is called "MAX THROTTLE", and should be limited to stall and wind shear recovery at low altitudes; a normal go-around should not require more than maximum rated thrust.



If flight path control becomes marginal at low altitude, initiate the windshear recovery maneuver without delay. If ground contact appears imminent, either pilot calls “MAX THROTTLE.” Accomplish the first three steps simultaneously:

[...]

2. Aggressively apply maximum thrust [...]. To ensure maximum thrust is obtained with minimum delay, an overshoot to the mechanical stops is recommended until positive indications of recovery are confirmed

Similarly for stall recovery.


Bernd

[justme69]

I'm not an expert. Obviously there are many facts about this accident we don't know and won't for while. I'm not a native English speaker (spanish). I would like to summarize some of the facts as I have been able to find through media reports in Spain and the more credible of internet rumors (witnesses with videos/photos posted, i.e.).

-According to official statement from the company as well as witnesses reports (passengers phoned/texted on cell phones to relatives about the delay and the "cause" as explained to them), a first attempt to take off was very early (during taxing probably) aborted by the pilot due to a "malfunction indicator" (vague red light). The pilot explained the passengers it was a "heat sensor" (ambigous) and returned to the terminal to have it "repaired". The repairs were limited to disabling it (tripped-off) within about 1 hour. PAX remained on board all this time. The company confirms that some indicator relative to outside air temperature showed "overheat status" (ambigous) and was disabled as described above. Exact nature not fully explained. It would be good if someone with knowledge explained exactly what this is and how it could've affected the accident. It seems that a probe for outside air temperature is located inside an opening-tube near the cabin in the front of the airplane. Such device has a heating system to prevent ice from blocking the air-intake. The sensor for overheating in this device seems to have turned-on for unknown reasons (speculative, exact malfuntion indicated by the alarm probe not clear). Not clear whether only the sensor was de-activated or the whole device was turned off (on purpose or by mistake). Not clear if this would mean a lack of reliable automatic measure of outside air temperature. Not clear if this would mean that automated or assisted take-off systems that may have relayed on this information for take-off would function properly (assuming whole device and not just the probe was disabled "by mistake" or malfunction, ie). Not clear if the pilots would be aware that a fully manual take-off procedure was needed in that case, if at all applicable. Etc, etc.

-The pilot and maintenance technician agreed on a fit-to-fly status and geared for take-off. At this point of the investigation, this problem is not primarely considered by any parties involved part of the accident, but of course it's being investigated.

-The airplane reached V1 without any reliable sources claiming any potential problems (no pilot communications I heard of, no reliable witnesses reported). The fly was presumably at full weight capacity, perhaps even exceeding it a bit (fueled for the 2.40m flight, full PAX capacity, extra crew, holliday destination, Spanair is routinely forgiving of a few extra pounds of excess luggage, MAD-LPA is a VERY cargo-intensive route). Some sources say perhaps it was a little slow to reach VR, consuming more airstrip than usual, but possibly within reason. Obviously it had to be somewhat of a tight take-off.

-The airplane reached VR and take-off was inminent. Perhaps VR calculations weren't right, but we can assume a competent and experienced crew in a clear scenario they knew very well in good weather and plenty of available airstrip.

-The front landing gear is CONFIRMED to have left the ground. This has been confirmed by the sources consulted by the newspapers in Spain that cited sources in the investigation with access to the Aena Barajas Airport security cameras footage. The minister in Spain also confirmed on Tv appearance this as well as added "and probably also the back wheels (left the ground)".

-Most sources say that indeed both set of wheels left the ground and the airplane flew for a few seconds while ascending. One unconfirmed source cites a nearby pilot witness noticing a "strange nose angle" (ambigous).

*At this point, I think it's safe to assume that, unless the crew was wayyy off, the airplane was thought to have enough thrust and speed to carry on the take-off. A lot of airfield, well in excess of 1km, seems to have been still available at this point should they have noticed a lack of engine power or other unusual activity.

-For reasons unknown yet, the airplane abruptly descended again, possibly after some unsuall roll. First RUMORS spoke of a catastrophic external left engine failure. This has mostly been dismissed as no credible direct witness speaks of that and it doesn't show on the Aena video. One perhaps credible source citing a nearby pilot witness speaks of a flash on one engine, compatible with events such as a bird crash or perhaps even an engine stall or catastrophic contained malfunction, but not full-blow explosion, nor engine detachement, nor full-out-fire. Air density was low as was wind. I haven't seen a report on the extend of flap deployment.

*One of the most likely causes of the plane going back down to ground at this point would indeed need to be either a very badly calculated VR speed coupled with thrust problems ending in early and sudden stall or a very sudden loss of symetrical engine power coupled with not-the-best-of-the-best crew response. Scenarios such as a single engine reverse deployment would put the flyability seriously in danger too at that or near that point. Such accidental reverse deployment could've happened at exactly V1 or little after while there was still weight on the wheels, i.e. Purely especulative on my side.

-The airplane "hit the ground". Some witnesses described it as "bounced up and down several times" as it was "breaking down in pieces" and finally crashed. Oficials say "one of the wings touched the ground" and it bounced. Clear landing marks on the runaway show that the landing gear was still deployed and the airplane "hard landed", possibly with the brakes on, on all three sets of wheels, and after a short straight run it veired somewhat hard (right?) all the way out of the landing strip, when still close to 1km of runaway paviment was available on it.

-The airplane "lost control", possible suffered some landing gear or other damages when it hit the grouind (being fully loaded, it probably exceeded landing weight specs), kept rolling on the ground to the side of the airstrip until it hit enviromental obstacles at high speed a few hundred meters later, creating a ball of fire that dragged several tens of meters according to credible witnesses (nearby airport worker who shot video right after this). It completely broke into many pieces, with hardly any structure remaining intact at all, specially after the fire, fueled furhter by dry vegetation. Biggest pieces left seem to have been the very end of the tail and the engines. Some witnesses spoke of "broke-in-half", "broke-in-three-pieces", "completely broke into hundreds of pieces". Debri expanded over 400m area. Speed must have been pretty high considering it was probably brakeing.

-Survivors account the event as: "we heard a loud noise, the plane started to move from 'side to side' (ambigous) and then crashed". The most credible survivor doesn't remember the exact moment of the crash, but soon before and soon thereafter.

-A photo of the wreckage seems to show one of the engine with the thrust reverser engaged and locked, indicating either an attempted abort during take-off (or forced landing, depending on how you look at it, as it seems to have happened seconds after airbone).

As it stands, speculating as we all are trying to find some thruth facts that could be of help, I think hardly any scenario can be dismissed at this point. It could still be:

-Human error. Reverser could've been somehow deployed (unlikely), VR badly calculated (unlikely), speed-thrust a bit too low coupled with some other problem (perhaps), "voluntary" attempted TO abort after VR, etc.

-Mechanical error. Engine failure coupled with "bad luck" (i.e. wing hitting the ground before crew could recover from loss of thrust, affecting control). Control system malfunction resulting in the always dangerous decission to abort after VR (if they thought they couldn't control the airplane, they had no choice but to try to abort). A photo show some unusual damage to the tail structure, but way too early to make a call.

-Any other factor that made the pilot either lose control or decide to abort after VR. Credible reports mention the airplane banking and a wing touching the ground before-or-while attempting to "land" or perhaps just as it left the ground.

-The flight recorders have been retrieved although the telemetry one is damaged.

Please note that "landing" and "take-off" in this incident are blurred terms as the accident seems to have been a product of something that happened almost inmediately after the wheels left the ground that ultimately made the airplane touch the ground again very soon thereafter and somewhat lose control.

Sorry again for posting a non-expert (at all) speculative account. Just trying to help and perhaps I'm not, but I honesly hope I am not adding senseless noise to clear-headed truth seekers. Sorry for my bad english.

Condolences to the families and friends of the sadly deceased. Hopefully you'll find some confort on knowing, one day, the reasons this accident ocurred.

[parthura]

May I add to posts in the 200s referring to rudder inputs, as there were some questions:
Every aircraft has a rudder built in size and aerodynamic force adequate to stop the yaw induced by engine failure. On a B747 it is a lot larger than on the B737 due to the long arm force of the outboard engines, it could cover a one-side dual flameout (NOT discussing the performance capabilities at high GW here, only the induced yaw by failed engines on one side and max power on the other).
Otherwise, no commercial jet aircraft would be certified to operate if this was not possible.
The rudder on any commercial jet aircraft will be designed to cover this well, that means not by using maximum input, but rather large input under adverse conditions.
Not all too much larger. Much more may overstress the structure and would be absolutely fatal, if a pilot used full input on an overdimensioned rudder in a one-sided loss of thrust condition to recover from the yaw. It would rip off the tail section (New York A300 crash 2001 after encountering wake vortices and overcontrolling by rudder Yo-Yo). The B737 for example has a rudder pressure reducer to inhibit application of maximum rudder (for example by false hydraulic system behaviour), unless engine failure occurs at low altitudes (overriding the RPR system enabling full rudder).
Referring to previous writers, ANY aircraft would require almost full rudder input on an engine failure at takeoff (relatively low speed = low aerodynamic rudder effect) with full takeoff thrust on the opposite side in adverse conditions (worst: low gross weight meaning less speed, high takeoff power at low temperatures, like in a high obstacle climbout).
The rudder of the MD80 is of RATHER small dimension compared to wing-mounted engine aircrafts, for the reasons mentioned above, but sized sufficiently to recover from an engine failure under adverse conditions.
:ok:

[lomapaseo]

bsieker
I'm not sure about the term, either, but the MD80's JT8D-200 engines, being mechanically controlled (non-FADEC), can deliver more than maximum rated thrust, if needed. This is called "MAX THROTTLE", and should be limited to stall and wind shear recovery at low altitudes; a normal go-around should not require more than maximum rated thrust.


Here's an excellent chance for you to learn something and perhaps to share it with the rest of the forum

Do a google search on MD80 reserve thrust (excluding all flight sim products).

This neat little feature doesn't need pilot input, it simply looks for differences between engines of 10% or so.

[slip and turn]

I didn't start it, SirNo I did, as possibly something that was worth discussing pending the long wait for a full report on the specifics of this tragedy. The affect of terrain on the aftermath of this one is not really questionned, is it?

I am no expert on high speed upsets but I've watched racing motorcyclists sliding along tarmac at high speeds when they tumble, then seen them brush themselves down and walk away, and I have watched enough other racing incidents to know that if you can allow something to slide uniformly after it falls without further sudden decelerations in any plane, then chances are it will come to a halt largely in one piece.

That much isn't rocket science.

Formula 1 race circuit designers generally wouldn't permit a 70 foot gully between straights to be left as a likely final resting point for any of their people, so why should modern airport designers permit themselves to think differently?

As I implied before, Spain has spent billions levelling mountains and ravines in the last five years and built beautifully smooth wide motorways that generally link all these newly envigorated airports effortlessly. A few more days work with 360 degree excavators, pipelayers and graders would transform terrain like this into level survivable energy dissipating surfaces.

Sioux City had some horrible initial decelerative forces but if my memory serves correctly, people primarily self-evacuated from the large pieces after they slid to a halt. I am not sure that level access for the fire services was a significant survival factor on that one, just lots of level space to decelerate uniformly in one plane...maybe it was a bit of both, but the passengers fared proportionately so much better than in this one, I think?

[Right Way Up]

Have never flown the MD but would have thought their performance would be based on an improved climb with much higher V-speeds. Even if the performance was calculated incorrectly the chance of the aircraft being at an unsafe speed (for this reason only) seems unlikely.

[sandbank]

The Daily Telegraph reports one survivor as saying that captain, Antonio Garcia Luna, had warned passengers: "A light has come on, but I don't know what it means."

Ligia Palomino, 41, speaking from her hospital bed, told Spanish radio: "He said a light had come on but he didn't know what it meant." She described the moment the plane came down, saying: "Suddenly the plane started to shake, it was going from one side to the other untilit fell. Later I just remember people on the ground, smoke, explosions, and then I lost consciousness. I was saved by the paramedics. It's thanks to them that I'm alive. I feel like I've been born again."

The MD-82 crashed at its second attempt at take-off.The 164 passengers remained on board for 90 minutes while a fault was was repaired. Mechanics spent 40 minutes fixing the fault and the pilot signed paperwork saying he was happy with the inspection.At 14.23 it returned to runway 36-L and attempted to take off.

[Loose rivets]

DozyWannabe (http://www.pprune.org/members/54871-dozywannabe) post 507

I'm curious to know just what on earth the point of your post was. You seemed be doing almost exactly what you were pontificating posters should not do. i.e. wast bandwidth.

Since my post, which I confess was somewhat lateral in its logic, the captain that I was alluding to has been kind enough to PM me, and furthermore, other posters have mentioned what is obviously a reference to his decision making. Getting back on the ground can sometimes be the best action. V1 is not cast in stone.

No, we haven't got all the facts. If we had, there would be only about 30% of this discussion that would be of any point.

There have been some astonishing statements above. Tire marks indicating a flat-ish 'landing'. Astonishing if they are indeed belonging to this aircraft, especially since the failure sounded big enough to detach the tail.

Witnessed un-contained engine failure. There's another. The years that I spent on high tail 2 and 3 engine aircraft, the one thing nagging in the back of my minds was a chaotic disassembly of those close proximity parts. Hydraulic motors to Whipple Trees. They all spell disaster when a bit of hot engine schrapnel goes through their space.

Was there any prior warning of a pending engine failure? An exact relationship between the return to the pan and the ensuing failure. The link seems so vague.

After 45 years around aircraft, I accept the occasional horror story. What I'm primarily concerned with is the reduction of future accidents. Nothing more than swinging the statistics. They have never been better, let's keep improving the odds.

I would suggest that every professional on the forum has the same goal. Please, please let the Wannabees STOP telling us to wait until the official reports are out. This has been covered sooooooooo many times.

[xolodenko]

What is the new video you guys are talking about which "sheds some new light"? Is it available anywhere in the web? I've been reading this thread from the very beginning but still might have missed the video everybody's talking about.

[justme69]

The account above in the Daily Telegraph is a bit "off context".

The survivor is first talking about the first aborted take-off when it refers to the captain saying "a red light has turned on" and he didn't know what it was. Later, it seems, he informed the passengers it was a "heat senso alarm" and "was repaired by the technician" during the aprox. 1 hour it took to go back to gate, bring in the technician, do the "repairs" (confirmed to have been some sort of "switch-off" or bypass) and get ready for take-off again.

The later part of her statements do refer to the accident during the "second" take-off, when the accident happened.

Not sure if you are referring to the Aena Barajas airport security cameras pointing to the airstrip, which recorded the accident. The footage is not available, but at least one spanish newspapers has cited sources within the investigation that has viewed the footage and describes it as, basically, there was no explosion or (big) engine fire during "take off", the front wheels (at least) left the ground (possibly back wheels as well, but not openly stated), a wing touched the floor whle coming down again, no (big, visible) fire started at least until the plane was fully on the ground ("hard" landed, bounced around, etc).

Sorry to be so vague, but that's what the (major) newspaper reporter has said and therefore other accounts are more speculative. My personal take is that it briefly took off without visible problems and few seconds after full ascend commenced something, either a mechanical fault/accidental damage/stall or a pilot decission, made it come down again and attempt to "land", resulting in problems that led to lack of control, damage (reportedly wing hitting the ground) and runing-off the side (not the end) of the airstrip at high speed into enviromental obstacles which caused brekage and fire.

But only a the facts stated above are "confirmed" (as reported through a newspaper citing footage viewer, which as we know, may also be innacurate). My account is totally speculative.

Windshear or bad atmospheric conditions seemed unlikely. Other than low wind low air density and high ambient temperature, conditions seemed good enough.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Do a google search on MD80 reserve thrust (excluding all flight sim products).

This neat little feature doesn't need pilot input, it simply looks for differences between engines of 10% or so.

On most aircraft/engines with that feature - variously called things like "automatic power reserve", the official part 25 term is Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS) and its regulated by § 25.904 - the thrust level even with the thrust increased by the system is still constrained by engine ratings.

Whereas, as mentioned, a manual "firewall" of the engines will generate thrust potentially far in excess of rated power - causing economic damage to the engines, but potentially saving the airframe. On a hot day, such as the accident, the engine rated thrust will be restricted by engine temperature considerations, and there will be considerable mechanical scope to increase fan and core speeds. As a complete WAG, there could be 20% or more thrust available, albeit for a limited time. Of course, in the OEI case it's generally NOT a smart move, because all your VMC numbers are also predicated on rated/ATTCS thrust levels.

[andrewwordsworth]

Justme69 seems to have written an exact description of the current state of knowledge can further posters confine themselves to either responding to the data, or to introducing new data.

This is an interesting event and discussions about how air travel would be safer if the entire world was converted into one flat runway are obvious and uninteresting

[efatnas]

naaaahh; well, i don't know who you fly for, but pencilwhips happen usually not with consent of the flight crew; they happen between dispatch ops, maintainance ops and the mechanic working the plane; getthereitis is the desire to accomplish the mission, mainly desire of the crew to get to the hotel, looked the other way by all ops for obvious reasons; thats why unions are such a nice thing...

[390cruise]

Guys

I wonder if the security camera shows what flaps were set?

390

[flash8]

It is fair to say that they were probably in a bit of a hurry. I'd certainly want to know the flaps and slats were configured. In fact, its the first thing that came to my mind after sadly hearing about this. I see somebody has just mentioned this.

As most people here are aware a Northwest MD-82 was lost this was after the loss of the CAWS failing to alert the crew of their error.

[agamanx]

having read this subject from start to date, I'm amazed that intelligent people can be so wild in their guesses and theories. Why do you people who normally only deal maths and facts suddenly leap to speculative ideas which in reality until the official information is released is always guesswork. You complain about the media, but if you review this thread the posts are worse than than the guesses they make. Sorry but this thread just covers every possibilty that could go wrong in that situation. There's seems to be as lot of pseudo posturing about who is best at technical knowledge.
Read the thread again and see what you have all suggested.

[lomapaseo]

The question is appopriate for the on-scene investigators and possibly any close up photos of Leading edge devices and flaps. But I fear greatly that we will be inunadated with analysis of fuzzy stuff like vertical stabilizers etc. just because it looks like a wing.

[el #]

390cruise, the airport video, like the FDR and CVR are in possession of Spain's judiciary now.

Nothing else is known about video content beside the little reported in previous posts.

I guess they want the boxes fully decoded before making any strong statement based on the video only.

[theamrad]

justme69
bad summary ?? Personally, I think it's not bad at all - I find it useful to see a collection of what's known so far - even if the reason for 're-landing' is a mystery at this point.

Don't feel the need to apologise either - I think your welcome here as a non-expert, unlike the several morons posting rubbish (especially earlier in the thread), and especially the few masquerading as 'us'/'we' pilots - while referring to the 'relanding' of a transport category jet as if it were a cessna 182 heading for the fence with a flaming cylinder head. No offence to those who do fly cessnas - for they know we're dealing with different performance regimes, OEI climb gradient - or lack of!?!? etc.
For the most part, posts referring to playing with throttle levers, the flap lever, circuit breakers, or anything else while between Vr and 400AGL(the regulatory minimum) with an alleged engine fire/failure, are a bit of a giveaway.

This is an interesting event and discussions about how air travel would be safer if the entire world was converted into one flat runway are obvious and uninteresting

I agree, As is the mention of EMAS, since the aircraft went no-where near the END of the runway.

You complain about the media, but if you review this thread the posts are worse than than the guesses they make.

Actually usually, I complain about the media. In this case I think you're correct. In general, I don't think the media did as badly as in the past. The exception for me was the TIMES - quoting posts from PPRUNE verbatim (with anonymous contributors) is totally ridiculous and inexcusable. However, I found some of SKY's presenters references to the 'air intake valve overheat' with such authoritative tone to be hilarious - as if they knew what they were talking about and that it had to be an intrinsic causal factor in the accident! All the more so, because I was clueless to what the hell they meant - bleed air? air conditioning?, what VALVE?.

Since no-one knows yet (other than investigators) whether or not the return onto terra firma was 'involuntary', or deliberate pilot action, anything else is pointless speculation. If it turns out to be deliberate, then I guess the PF felt (whether justified or not) she was 'unable to fly' in the spirit of the V1 definition.

[Aeromar27]

Pitot, AoA sensor, EPR probe?.... same here.

It was the OAT probe... its heater actually. And yeah, that particular comment in the media also confused me.

[bsieker]

lomapaseo,

thank you. I've been reading my MD80 manuals. I was, and am, aware of ART (automatic reserve thrust) and ATR (automatic thrust restoration). Both features have previously been mentioned and put in context by xkoote in post 568 (permalink (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/339876-spanair-accident-madrid-29.html#post4343633)). Thanks a lot for that.

Here's what the Manual says about various takeoff power settings:

Reduced thrust (FLEX T.O.): ART off
Normal thrust: ART on
Maximum thrust: ART off

Autothrottles can be used in all three cases.

So, ART can be only be used for "normal" takeoff thrust. The other mechanism, ATR, is always available.

I don't know which thrust setting was used here. A very long runway might indicate FLEX, but high weight, altitude and temperature might have dictated normal thrust.

When the ART system detects a 30% N1 difference, invalid N1 or some other conditions, it actuates, and directly opens a solenoid-operated fuel valve, giving maximum thrust, regardless of thrust lever position.

ATR has different actuation conditions, and if triggered, advanced autothrottles to the Go-Around EPR limit.


Bernd

[md80fanatic]

Is the ART system's maximum thrust value dependent on the disconnected temperature probe's reading, by any chance?

[lomapaseo]

Bsieker

When the ART system detects a 30% N1 difference, ....

are you sure about the 30% number? Thats an awful lot of thrust loss (29% N1) to handle on a takeoff by the plane alone. I thought it was more like 10-15% for it to trigger.

[sevenstrokeroll]

funny, some airlines use the 400' agl rule to start action

ours uses 1000' afe to start clean up and actions...one could cancel a fire bell earlier, but we don't start shutting anything down till 1000'

[ECAM_Actions]

Thrust Recoveries for Engine Failure During Takeoff

In takeoff mode, two separate systems attempt to provide maximum available
thrust when the performance of one engine significantly differs from the
other. These systems are automatic reserve thrust (ART) and automatic
thrust restoration (ATR).

Automatic Reserve Thrust (ART) System

The ART system combines features of the digital flight guidance computer
(DFGC) and the JT8D-200 fuel control to provide maximum rated thrust in
the event of an engine failure during a normal thrust takeoff. Upon actuation
of the ART system, thrust is increased without throttle movement by the
opening of a solenoid-operated fuel valve in the engine fuel controls of both
engines.

The ART system is READY when the airplane is on the ground, the ART
switch is in AUTO, either slat is extended, both engines are operating at or
near idle, and the ART system self-test is complete. The ART system is
subsequently armed when the N1 on both engines reaches 64% RPM.

The ART system is actuated when the DFGC detects any one of the
following: 30.2% differential in N1 RPM, invalid N1, DFGC failure,
electrical power loss, or manual DFGC switching. Upon actuation, the ART
system increases the EPR of the operating engine(s) from normal takeoff
EPR to maximum takeoff EPR (an increase of approximately .05 EPR) by
opening the solenoid-operated fuel valve in the engine fuel control. Once
ART is actuated, the maximum takeoff EPR limit is displayed on the thrust
rating indicator, and the EPR gauge. Once actuated, the ART system is
latched (ART fuel valve remains open) until the ART switch is moved to OFF.

The ART has an automatic self-test feature. If the ART system fails the selftest,
the ART INOP annunciation illuminates. Dispatch is allowed with a failed
self-test; however, the ART switch must be moved to OFF to disable the ART
system.

The ART switch, with AUTO and OFF positions, is on the upper instrument
panel. Two annunciator lights are on the center instrument panel. The
READY light indicates ART has successfully passed the self-test. The ART light
indicates the system has successfully activated.

ECAM Actions.

[infrequentflyer789]

No I did, as possibly something that was worth discussing pending the long wait for a full report on the specifics of this tragedy. The affect of terrain on the aftermath of this one is not really questionned, is it?


I think it is relevant to discuss the terrain and that it probably did affect survivability. Two main ways it could do that - changing the initial impact and delaying the rescue response.

I don't think there is much doubt about the latter - just looking at the terrain it's obvious they wouldn't have got there as quickly as on the flat, and firefighters are now being quoted saying as much: "There were too few firefighters at the beginning".

In terms of the initial impact it depends on what exactly happened, which isn't at all clear yet. If the aircraft rotated and then came down again on its wheels and then veered off the runway, then on flat ground it might well have slid on its belly for a better result. On the other hand, if it became airborne and then (for whatever reason) put a wing into the ground (as some reports have suggested) then it could have cartwheeled in and broken up even on flat ground.


Sioux City had some horrible initial decelerative forces but if my memory serves correctly, people primarily self-evacuated from the large pieces after they slid to a halt. I am not sure that level access for the fire services was a significant survival factor on that one, just lots of level space to decelerate uniformly in one plane...maybe it was a bit of both, but the passengers fared proportionately so much better than in this one, I think?

Interesting one to compare to. Certianly a lot more survived 232 - almost two thirds, compared to around 1 in 10 in this case. "Bit of both" would agree with what has been written about 232. In terms of flat land it wasn't just the airfield:


in the back of
our mind that where we were, if we had to ditch, we could probably find
some fairly flat land, and we might have a chance of survival. So that
relieved a lot of pressure on us, in whether or not we were going to
make the airport.


In terms of the emergency response they had a lot of luck - a national guard unit happened to be at the airport to assist, and it was shift change at local hospitals meaning they had double shift of medical staff available.


There are some other differences which may considerably affect survival rate though:

- flight 232 had plenty of warning of the crash
- they were not at takeoff with full fuel load - in fact they dumped fuel (as you would expect)
- airport had advance warning and emergency vehicles were out and ready
- hospitals and surrounding emergency services had advance warning
- passengers on the plane had warning - brace position in theory allows much better survival of deceleration (although how it gets done in practice I don't know, I've never met an economy class seat it was physically possible in (excepting exit-row), and I don't think I am exceptionally tall)


Even if there are recommendations on survivability they may be largely academic - the industry tends to focus a lot more on not crashing in the first place rather than crashing and surviving. I am pretty sure that after Sioux city and Kegworth there were recommendations on infant seating and restraint - but two decades on they are still on parents laps. Then there's smoke hoods... or rather there aren't.

[BYALPHAINDIA]

THERE COULD BE MORE TO THIS CRASH.

The Times Online, Is now reporting that the Spanair Pilots sent numerous e-mails to the then Chief Executive - Lars?? informing him the way the Airline was run.

The Pilot's members of SEPLA, were so concerened at how the Daily operations were run they voiced their concerns.

It also said, The crews were transported around like 'Popstars' to run Spanair's busy route network.

They were concerened about the Airline's maintainence, And overall passenger safety calling it 'Organised Chaos'

SAS has being trying to sell off Spanair for the last year, And had planned to cut the 4,000 workforce by a 1/3.

There are now fears that SAS itself could lose alot of it's passengers, Due to it being the same company.

Spanair execs have not decided to ground the rest of the MD80'S believing that they are safe??

The MD80's should have been replaced by 2007 as promised.

Have Spanair being the contributory cause??

Sadly I can see a new theory of this crash now.

I hope not.

Full article @ Timesonline.co.uk

[ECAM_Actions]

Why stop flying the type? There is no evidence for this (yet).

From some of the info now available, it is looking that the #2 reverser deployed.

This idea fits with the following details:

* Low airspeed (Vr, maybe V2 if he's lucky)
* Apparently no fire/explosion evident in CCTV footage
* Aircraft crashed to the right almost immediately after takeoff
* Detached reverser found in fully deployed position on ground

Couple the low airspeed with yaw to the right induced by full forward thrust on the port engine, full reverse thrust on the starboard engine, and insufficient control authority coupled with decreasing airspeed and subsequent stall, and it's not looking good at all. :(

Given the above, they had little time to do anything.

ECAM Actions.

[misd-agin]

Can we agree that the supposed "facts" are being disputed when new "facts" are presented?

Let's wait for official statements from investigators.

[philipat]

The survivors are obviously not in the best mental condition so it is not clear how much their testimony can be relied upon at this stage. However, the way the matter is described, the vibration and yaw at and just after TO does seem to indicate a stall? Would it be reasonable to speculate on the most likely causes thereof. But then of course we are back to square one. Almost.

Regarding the terrain between parallel runways, I can only add that if this had happened under similar circumstances should there have been similar terrain between parallel runways at LAX, the Americal lawyers would already be salivating at the prospects. But then that would, of course, be true irrespective.

[BYALPHAINDIA]

Quote
Couple the low airspeed with yaw to the right induced by full forward thrust on the port engine, full reverse thrust on the starboard engine, and insufficient control authority coupled with decreasing airspeed and subsequent stall, and it's not looking good at all. http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/sowee.gif

Reply

Could the ground maintainance engineers have touched a wire (by accident) that connects to the Reversers when 'Quickly' cutting off the fault??

Sounds odd that the Reverser was open on the Starboard Engine.

Just a 'Theory' that's all.

No Beef.

[PJ2]

BYALPHAINDIA;

The complexities of discerning organizational influences, especially in terms of examining the traces back to original causes, is difficult, requiring special training, experience and support for the "broader" view. This isn't to say they're not there or to say that by their obscurity they are merely distant antecedents with less validity. Cultural aspects play huge roles within organizations but that role is invisible to all because it is "the way" things are done -the underlying assumptions are similarly invisible. We don't see "normal" - we only see "difference" when it emerges. It's akin to hindsight in terms of understanding what happened.

Most directly involved want "the" cause and are impatient if not in disagreement with complexity because they want some one or some thing to blame, typically not themselves.

Whether what you say is relevant or not depends first on those involved having the sense of such factors so they may see them for what they are and how they influence "normal" decision-making and how abberant decisions are "made normal", (as did Diane Vaughan in her book, "The Challenger Launch Decision" well worth purchasing/reading as is, "Organization at the Limit" about Columbia).

In other words, if one is examining a decision-making process (returning to gates, continuing with MEL items etc etc etc etc...), one must also remain cognizant of the organizational environment in which such decision-making takes place.

Pilots especially, are keenly aware of "the unwritten" and "the unsaid" in corporate cultures and may either be encouraged to exchange information with the organization's leadership or, as is almost universally the case, the leadership of the organization can dismiss them as "expensive resources" in hopes that they continue to fly the company's airplanes on schedule with minimal fuss and disruption.

I believe this touches on some of the matters you raise in your post.

Could the ground maintainance engineers have touched a wire (by accident) that connects to the Reversers when 'Quickly' cutting off the fault??

Almost certainly not. That's not the way airplanes or mechanics work.

We know absolutely nothing that is meaningful or important about the reversers, the engines, the takeoff, the flight path, the crew's demeanour etc etc. Even videos are not "knowledge".

Knowledge of the fleet type is part of a good discussion as is discussions about SOPs and what is actually known about the flight.

But it's a free discussion. (Steve, don't waste your breath and blood pressure on trolls...).

PJ2

[md80fanatic]

I believe two survivors described being bounced side to side, I was wondering if this could be a response to a "rudder dance" (from the perspective of rows 14-19), as described earlier in this thread?


EDIT: It seems a little soon to speculate on the TR(s) being open contributing to this accident. They could have been purposefully opened after touchdown.

[pasoundman]

Fake Sealion
Having followed this thread from early on in this tragic incident I have been aware of the numerous uses of the word reported
Reported engine fire
Reported explosion
Reported smoke from engine

and so on.....

Is it now time to install a high quality CCTV system which records each and every departure at major airports. Such unambiguous evidence would surely permit in some cases, the AAIB teams to reach important conclusions very quickly and set in motion remedial action to enhance safety.

Speaking as an electronics bod, I couldn't agree more. These are simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective. Heck, even my local pub has 8 cameras continually recording video to hard disk for security reasons. The visual (and possibly aural too) evidence such a system could provide would be invaluable. And no reason any longer to rely on questionable eye witness reports.

Ditto for landings too btw.

[justme69]

The Pilots' union letter to Spanair stating their concerns was basically your usual generic mostly-political-agenda in faith of a pending 1,100 jobs cut and pay reduction for another 700 employees plan propossed by the company recently. The pilots complained that "bad management" and bad "ground operation caos" was starting to affect fly security by means of "more stressed enviroments" among "delays, cancelled flights, insufficient man power".

I think it's fair to assume it's not "directly" related to the unfortunate accident. I have taken 6 Spanair flights between the Canary Islands and Madrid in the past two weeks prior to this accident and indeed one was cancelled and several delayed.

Spanair has promised more technical information about the accident to the families Saturday at 6pm.

Nothing else I have seen reported on the press except that whatever little wind there was (raging between about 7 and 9 knots) was actually tail-wind. Spanair approves of MD-82 fit to take off at up to 10kt of tail wind.

The flight had been overbooked. An additional couple of passengers was holding a ticket and reportedly checked-in luggage, but reached the gate 3 minutes late and were denied boarding. The flight operated at full PAX, so I don't know where they were planning on sitting them even if they had reached the door on time, not to mention that the airplane returned to gate after the "overheat warning red light" (likely a warning for a outside-air-temperature probe system malfunction) came on and finally took off over 1h late.

Again in low-ish air density, high-ish temperature conditions, presumably max. weight with good visibility on a "brand-new" long-ish airstrip where they reached V1 (perhaps a bit later than "normal"), VR, nose up, front gear left the ground, likely the back gears too w/o visual or reported anomalities other than perhaps a "bit weird nose angle" (no info on flaps/slats) and then perhaps moved erratically while airbone (survivors not clearly stating if felt "side-to-side" movement ocurred airbone or on the ground) to then for unknown reasons "attempted to land" (or falling down) again, bouncing-around, reportedly hitting briefly the ground with a wing (which doesn't seem to have left any large debri on the strip or produce extensive visual damage to the airplane structure at that point, but was reported by source cited as viewing the security footage), presumably sustaining some damage due to somewhat violent touch-down over max. landing weight (witneses saying things like "started to break in pieces", but no pieces seem to have been reported that close to the strip) and lost direction veiring off the runaway and later crashing against obstacles at presumably high speed a few hundred meters later with perhaps at least one thrust reverser properly deployed, leaving a river of fire along its path.

Skid marks were left on the landing strip that seem to show all three wheels were touching ground "properly" and braking on a "normal looking" straight line for a short while and then turning somewhat steeply to the side (significant strip length was still available in the front), exiting the runaway to the terrain in-between strips where it crashed very violently (hardly any pieces larger than a car where left at all of the whole plane and debri and victims expanded a significantly large area, thus the high victims count).

There is no clear account reported exactly like that, but it's what can be infered by the vague comments reported by press from witnesses or "oficials".

All that has been said repetidly and clearly is that "no fire was visible until it had 'hit the ground' 'several times' (bouncing around).

Some survivors seem to have been "ejected" from the plane landing in a small creek. One of them approached the wreckage and helped rescue two children. Most survivors seem to have suffered at least one (usually more) fractures (mostly limbs, limbs+ribs or limbs+skull). Many were "low mass" people (3 CHD, several women). There were possibly a few more inmediate survivors, but the fire spread quickly (vegetation didn't help, one survivor with internal burns from inhalation, one survivor helping rescue a woman's child at her petition only to return and find her and her other child 'unrescuable', one survivor and one of the first ground rescue personnel accounting for some people shouting "I'm soffocating" or "help"). Rescue efforts were very prompt and effective, but very challenged by the fire, very large spread-out scenario and not so easy terrain access.

One initial survivor died soon after in the hospital, leaving the total count to 19 current survivors. Only 4 of those remain in severe condition. Doctors are hopefull for all, but one passenger remains critical. Several are basically fully recovered (except for the fractures, which obviously take weeks/months to properly heal). About 50 of the victims have been identified, with the remaining aprox. 100 still in need for DNA identification, as physical matching was not possible. All victims accounted for, although it took an extra day to find the remains of the two initially unaccounted victims, a baby and another small children, at the devastation scene.

So sorry for all the victims and their families :'-(

Like it's normal in us imperfect creatures, we all would like to know what happened and how to try to avoid it and find some strange confort in trying to figure out the truth. I guess it's our way of dealing with the pain and frustration, specially knowing that with a damaged flight recorder the (hopefully) definitive answer on the cause may be many months, if not years, away. At this point, this accident doesn't seem to have a clear-cut probable cause and it seems further speculation on the many possible scenarios could be pointless without more information, so I guess we'll have to sit and wait.

Descriptions like this could help understand the damage that can results of high speed impact, aborted take-offs, unnecessary uneven terrain/vegetation around landing strips, fires, etc, and perhaps will help to avoid it happening again.

[xkoote]

You bet your @rse it makes a difference if the plae is overloaded. Although, in all seriousness we all kow that the meager standard weights used these days I personally think that any flight which is at MTOW on paper is a few hundred k's over. That's my opinion based on what I see entering the cabin sometimes, and the exceptional ability (especially the caribbean region) of passengers to have a 20 inch tall handbag weigh close to 30 pounds. The poor carriage wheels got stuck under the weight loooong ago to the point that they are half circle shaped as they've been scraped down to axle :}

But those extra kilo's are mostly carried over in the margin of error calculations, but to add 2000 Kilo's of known overweight into the plane will most definitely affect single engine performance.

I wanted to elaborate on the MD-80 thrust settings, but I see that it appears clear to most.

[justme69]

xkoote: in your opinion, assuming the MD-82 briefly was successfully airborne for a few seconds and lets assume the worst possible scenario of a bit of overweight, 10kt of tail wind and slightly low air density, a bit understimated V2, a bit oversteep take-off angle and a bit reduced thrust (i.e. slightly bad quality fuel).

How unlikely is that the plane could have stalled even with nothing else "wrong" (i.e. no major loss of engine power)? Does major engine malfunction is basically a necessity for take-off failure or the above conditions coupled with say a 2º error on Flaps deploiment be enough to potentially stall the plane?

If the anwer is what I think, then too many highly speculative scenarios open up on why the pilot could have decided to try to land rather than continue to fly.

Also, goverment officials said they saw the airport security tape and the accident was recorded but that they couldn't see anything significant (for them, speaking as politicians and not aviation experts) on the causes of the accident. In other words, they implied they couldn't see any obvious physical reason for the accident (no major explosions or large fires or obvious engine malfunctions or large errors on operation prior to the abrupt landing, of course, from whatever small image could be seen from the potentially far away camera). They didn't mention the reported wing touchng the floor when it "abruptly landed". They even said something to the bold extend of: "The accident was recorded but there is nothing on the tape as to why the accident happened"

[philipat]

Incidentally, I have read the complete thread and amny reports but cannot find a reference as to which engine was reponsible for the earlier return to gate? I have a feeling this about to become a more important issue. Can anyone confirm based on reliable sources?

[justme69]

What is known about the first return to gate was that a failure indicator lighted on the cabin. The captain informed the PAX that he wasn't sure what it was and was returning to gate to have it checked. He later said (and Spanair and technician in charge of the repairs, through the spokeperson for the airplane repair technicians' union confirms) that the indicator was for overheating of the device that warms the air intake tube orifice (that leads to the outside air temperature probe) to avoid the formation of ice on cold weather. Since the flight from MAD to LPA was not thought to be in any danger of bad weather or ice formation, it was turned off by taking the fuse out, in accordance to approved operations giving a 10 days margin for finding the fault and repair it properly.

The captain reportedly informed the PAX, which remained on board during the aprox. 1h delay, that it was a "broken heat sensor that was repaired" and were now ready to take off (late).

Captain and technician signed the flight fit-to-fly. The technician was totally confident his action couldn't be in any way part of the cause of the accident and expressed his sadness for the loss of the crew which he knew well personally and spent the last minutes of their lives with.

Most sources close to the investigation seriously doubt it was related to the accident, but of course it's being investigated. Worst case scenario would perhaps imply that outside air temperature automatic measurement could be off or not working properly, but even that is unlikely.

[ECAM_Actions]

IMHO, such anecdotal "Evidence" is, at best irrelevant and contributes nothing to the thread.With due respect, it is relevant. I've heard some horror stories that are very much based in fact. There are certain events I will not repeat here.

Overweight = BAD in the event of engine out, particularly.

I have heard of overwheights in the range of 2000kgs.
Could this be a contributing factor after an engine failure?It certainly wouldn't help. Being overweight doesn't automatically mean it'll stop flying, but it means the margins that the pilots are working to could be sufficiently out to put them on the wrong side of the performance. That's where it gets to be a problem.

2,000 kg over when you're looking at 67,954 kgs MTOW = 2.9% overweight.

A valid point is raised regarding standard weights and certain pax, and indeed luggage etc.. At least the luggage is weighed at check-in.

A "standard" male is now considered to weigh 80 kgs. I personally weigh 89 kgs. That's an 11% increase right there.

ECAM Actions.

[sussex2]

Luggage may be weighed at check in, but only for the purpose of detecting and hence charging for, overweight bags.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance.
A standard figure per bag (25lbs under FAA regs) is what is used. On the not unreasonable understanding that some will be under and some over the set weight.
Pax are averaged at 180lbs in summer and five more in winter, once again under FAA regs. Which to be honest seems pretty low given some of the people one sees on the street.
Now add the hand luggage and bear in mind that at least one airline has no limit to weight as long as you can lift it, and it doesn't appear dangerous.
The above figures are as stood the last time I had to know, they may have changed.

[skridlov]

"Luggage may be weighed at check in, but only for the purpose of detecting and hence charging for, overweight bags.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance."

The relevance to this accident notwithstanding, why not? The data's available.

[aussiepax]

With the reasonably large number of children on the flight, does this alter appreciably this hypothetical overweight scenario, or is it more on the baggage side of things?

[XPMorten]

According to MD80 stall charts, stall speed will increase about;

1 kt/tonn slats extended
1,25 kt/tonn slats retracted

XPM

[Kyunghee]

There appear to be mixed messages coming from Spanair and the head of civil aviation in Spain regarding the air temperature gauge.

This is from Associated Press and appears in several newspapers.

Police and investigators probing the deadly plane crash in Madrid have questioned the mechanic who cleared the plane for takeoff after tending to a minor mechanical problem, the airline said Saturday. Spanair said the mechanic dealt with a problem in an air temperature gauge that forced the pilot to abandon a first attempt to take off. About an hour later, when the MD-82 finally did take off, it crashed near the end of the runway, burning and largely disintegrating. A total of 153 of the 172 people aboard were killed.
The newspaper El Pais quoted unnamed sources close to the investigation as saying that during two sessions of testimony Friday - first with police and then with crash investigators - the mechanic insisted that the gauge malfunction was a minor glitch which had nothing to do with Wednesday's crash.
A Spanair official told The Associated Press on Saturday it had no details of the man's testimony, but reiterated that the mechanical problem did not cause the crash. The official spoke on condition of anonymity, citing company rules.
Aviation experts have told The AP this problem probably did not cause the crash.
All 19 survivors of the crash remained hospitalized Saturday, two of them in critical condition. The worst off was a 31-year-old woman with burns to 72 percent of her body. Her husband died in the crash but her six-year-old son survived.
Only 50 bodies have been identified so far. Many were burned beyond recognition and forensic teams have been using DNA techniques for identification.

Spanair said the mechanic dealt with the gauge problem by essentially turning the device off, and said this was an accepted procedure because the gauge was not an absolutely essential piece of equipment.
But the head of Spanish civil aviation, Manuel Bautista, told the AP in an interview Friday that the gauge should be closely examined to see if it did contribute to the accident.
Bautista said a combination of failures likely caused the disaster.
''A problem with a temperature sensor may not matter at all, or it can be very important, depending on what other circumstances accompany it,'' Bautista said. ''We will have to see what other issues were present.''
This can be no comfort to the greiving relatives who are seeking early answers.

[sussex2]

To SKRIDLOV
Yes the data is available but its' accuracy will depend on lots of factors. The accuracy of these scales can vary by terrific margins (handy hint if they try to charge you excess-use other scales). They may sometimes be calibrated but I have no personal knowledge of this being done.
These scales are subject to enormous wear and tear, dust, being moved about etc. all those fairy light staff jumping on them to see how much weight they have lost.
In other words they are not particularly accurate, and I for one would not like to see them used in a final weight and balance sheet.
The cost of what would have to be done to ensure their accuracy would not be welcome in a business cutting unecessary costs to the bone.
It is mooted that for smaller aircraft, less than 20 pax, the weighing of both the pax and the bags may be useful.
Then of course we get into discrimination etc..and lawyers involved.
As usual things ain't never as easy as they seem to be.

[spinnaker]

This can be no comfort to the greiving relatives who are seeking early answers.

Indeed. I hope that the Spanish authorities can publish an early initial report into the cause of the disaster, before the grieving turns to anger and bitterness.

[xolodenko]

Could somebody please clear up this business about the OAT probe once and for all?

What I have gathered from reading the posts regarding this probe here is:

1. There is OAT probe located at or inside the air intake of the engine which measures the temperature of the air "ingested" by the engine, right?

2. Then there's some heating device which is turned on to heat the OAT probe if the airplane enters icing or low temp conditions to protect the OAT probe from getting clogged by ice and snow and thus producing false readings, right?

So what the mechanic deenergized was the heater, not the OAT probe itself, right?
The OAT was still operational except that if the airplane had entered icing conditions it would have got clogged because it had no heating, right?

[BelArgUSA]

I have (probably) survived numerous incidents (accidents) using this simple figure...
100 kg per passenger.
That includes the passenger (his/her fat belly if any), his/her checked baggage, carry-on, and duty free.
xxx
If given "347 pax" from the agent, on MY paper, I write 34,700 kg total payload.
If I am given 330 adults, 15 children, 2 infants, it becomes -
Adults 33,000 kg, children 750 kg, infants "0"... = 33,750 kg total.
I do not care what the official standard weights are. This is what I use for my takeoff computations and speeds.
So far, no chief pilots have fired me because I disregarded standard figures.
xxx
I am still alive after many years of flying - Retiring in 3 months (and happy)...
And in my 747, in does not matter where they sit. The CG is always OK.
No need to say, I have a B.Sc in Math/Physics... and I use that "superior" knowledge.
Takes me 1 minute to get my payload. F/Os or F/Es take 5 minutes, and arrive to... 33,336 kg.
And a lot of wear with their erasers ("rubbers" in UK, and territories).
xxx
:ok:
Happy contrails

P.S. For Scanair departure from LEMD - I would assume their actual payload was 16,500 kg (165 adults?) -

[xs-baggage]

<quote>
"Luggage may be weighed at check in, but only for the purpose of detecting and hence charging for, overweight bags.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance."

The relevance to this accident notwithstanding, why not? The data's available.
</quote>

Not necessarily; not every DCS has integral W&B functionality, or is able to export the data to an external tool.

[mickyman]

All this banter about sensors etc reminds me of the Birginair B757
that sadly crashed a few years ago.Although in this case the sensor indicated to have been idled does not seem to be as important to flight.

Lets hope that the relatives can grieve for their lost ones without
conspiracy/speculation & allegations being allowed to fester.

mm

[agusaleale]

http://img27.picoodle.com/data/img27/3/8/23/f_02m_3f32b07.jpgpilotosdeiberia.com :: Ver tema - Accidente Barajas. Comentarios sobre posibles causas. (http://www.pilotosdeiberia.com/foro/viewtopic.php?t=7018&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=90)

[justme69]

The Spanair had 162 on board. 20 of those children and 2 babys. 10 were crew members. 19 are currently survivors (3 CHD). It's hopefull that all will survive, but 4 remain serious, out of which 1 severe and 1 critical. An additional 2 passengers were left behind when they showed up 3 minutes late at the gate after they checked-in their luggage on the reportedly (almost?) overbooked flight (I believe 2 crew members were off-duty or not required, but not sure).

Flights to the Canary Islands have the same standard 20kg check-in allowance per person (spreaded in as many bag pieces as desired) and are routinely charged overweight if it goes above about 23kg, but Spanair is quite forgiving generally on a bit of overweight. Spanish travellers usually go on the light side on carry-ons (compared to say North and South America travellers), but it's your usual "if you can lift it and it fits, it goes in" with most airliners in Spain, which don't even enforce the number of carry on items. At least one couple among PAX was returning from their week long honey-moon. I do believe that Spanair has some weighted checked-in luggage reporting software on their system to assist on load calculations (speculative).

Spaniards are not the heaviest on the world (about 25% of population is overweight), but it's safe to assume most standard males will be over 77kg and most females over 57kg. Very recent extensive study among women in Spain showed only 5% being moderately under normal weight, 24.9% overweight.

But MAD-LPA is a VERY cargo-and-courier intensive route. I think we can safely assume the plane was operating a full payload, perhaps even exceeding it a bit (speculative).

[XPMorten]

So the initial problem was with the RAT probe?

M

http://www.xplanefreeware.net/morten/DOCS/mdprobe.jpg

[ECAM_Actions]

I would assume their actual payload was 16,500 kg (165 adults?)The OEW for the type is approx. 78,549 lbs (35,704 kg) according to Boeing.

Assuming all the pax each had a bag weighing 25 kg, that's 165 x 25 = 4125 kg of luggage.

35704+4125+16500 = 56,329 kg.

Boeing state the MRW is 150,500 lbs (68,409 kg), with an MTOW of 149,500 lbs (67,954 kg).

67954-56329 = 11,625 kg worth of fuel they could take based on these figures.

I heard somewhere they had 10 tons of fuel on-board. That works out at full wing tanks, with about a ton in the center tank.

So the initial problem was with the RAT probe?If it was, doesn't this have implications for the calculation of EPR?

It's probably nothing, but where is the rudder control tab? The elevators still have theirs attached.

ECAM Actions.

[keltic]

Don´t expect the flight to be full of holidaymakers with heavy amounts of luggage. It´s not a charter flight, but a scheduled used mainly by locals and businessmen to get to the country capital. So we have to expect a lot of hand luggage "only".

[Green-dot]

As posted by ECAM Actions:


From some of the info now available, it is looking that the #2 reverser deployed.

This idea fits with the following details:

* Low airspeed (Vr, maybe V2 if he's lucky)
* Apparently no fire/explosion evident in CCTV footage
* Aircraft crashed to the right almost immediately after takeoff
* Detached reverser found in fully deployed position on ground


If #2 reverser deployment will be confirmed as a major factor in this accident, it reminds me of TAM flight 402 which crashed on Oct. 31, 1996 due to an uncommanded #2 thrust reverser deployment. This was a Fokker 100 (PT-MRK), an aircraft with similar geometry as the MD-82. Both types have similar (but system wise not identical) clamshell type reversers.

The Fo100 also became airborne briefly (no more than 150 feet), reached an attitude of pronounced tilting and veered to the right. Since this was Sao Paulo's Congonhas Airport, the aircraft descended and crashed into a residential area just outside the airport perimeter and below airport altitude.

In case of the TAM accident, the cause was traced to a dormant failure in the thrust reverser electrical control circuit. If the thrust reverser's secondary lock No. 1 relay failed in the energized position after normal deployment, this failure remained dormant without any indication to the flight crew. This was later corrected by a redesign of the electrical control circuit.

Green-dot

[justme69]

So the initial problem was with the RAT probe?



It has not been explained with an all out technical precission, but it has been reassurred as some "not important, minor issue" involving the RAT probe, believed to be either a sensor or a ice-protection heating device failure related to this probe.

It wasn't clear from reports what had been disconnected (tripped-off ... technician spokeperson speaks of fuse taken out) but in all likehood it was the ice-protection heating device and not the RAT probe itself.

Whatever it was, seems clear it was some minor glitch and that both the pilot and the technician clearly understood the limitations of their actions and felt confident on the flyability of the plane without issues.

Wheather in Madrid was fairly hot at the time (around 30ºC), which with the sea level at Barajas would've called for air density on the low side of things.

[Finn47]

It seems the families of the victims are already asking for immediate answers. The Canarias7 website has even conducted an internet poll of 2400 people to ask them what caused the accident. 43 % blame Spanair, 35 % say it´s a technical fault, 6 % blame the pilot and 5 % blame the Spanish aviation authorities :rolleyes:

Link here:

Crashed plane's safety licence 'due to expire' - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/2607120/Crashed-planes-safety-licence-due-to-expire.html)

[macroman]

Reply to Uncle Maxwell #662

Far as I know the authority ultimately responsible for the investigation are CIAIAC at CIAIAC - Ministerio de Fomento (http://www.fomento.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/)

I stand to be corrected on this though.

The accident has been listed on their website but no details have been provided as yet.

m@c

[Flight Safety]

Given that the accident occurred somewhere around 14:45 local time during takeoff with an outside air temp of about 29C/84F, I see no way how a disabled heater for the Ram Air Temp Probe could have contributed to this accident.

[justme69]

The annual flyability certification obviously expires every year and this plane was a few weeks away from expiration. A simple on-fly inspection during a routine fly is sufficient to renew it for another year. It's, again, likely not related to the accident and standard procedure.

"Real" technical inspections and permits were all fine with the 15 year old (about 5 on Korean Airlines and 10 on Spanair) plane. Airplane maintenance in Spain is usually very high, with Iberia i.e. servicing many other airlines throught europe.

This flight is not your typical "hollday destination overweighted luggage" PAX, with the majority being locals returning home, but again it's safe to assume at least almost full payload, but not necessarily over or way-over (if anything, possibly slightly over).

Spanair also being wholly owned by Scandinavian Airlines SAS, technically headquater in Sweden.

[el #]

Macroman,

you're correct about the aviation authority investigation. However, the "highest responsible" authority is actually the Spanish judiciary, in the person of a "fiscal" (inquiring judge). Judge and safety body will likely collaborate in any way possible , but if the justice wants to keep/exclude certain evidence or interrogate certain witnesses or indict people, he can do that before and independently.

EDIT: Said fiscal has mentioned that investigation results should be available within one month.

[bsieker]

First, a question (xkoote?):

From what I understand, the RAT probe heating was disabled, and, since it was MEL "go" item under the given conditions, flight could be dispatched.

Would that mean that the RAT probe would be inoperative or unreliable, or that only the heating would be inoperative, but deemed unnecessary, since no icing conditions were expected?


Second, an interesting bit from the Flight Manual, confirming that it almost certainly played no role in the accident:

the checklist for the ice protection panel for the first flight of the day contains:



Pitot, Static, and Probe Heat

All positions of the METER SEL & HEAT selector control, except RAT PROBE, should be individually checked for a meter reading to indicate a normal circuit. All heaters, except RAT probe are turned on as soon as the METER SEL & HEAT selector control is moved out of the OFF position. The RAT probe is not heated on the ground. The PITOT/STALL HEATER OFF annunciator light should be on when the control selector is returned to the OFF position.

(my emphasis).


It is recommended that when the AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST has been completed and work load permits, the PM make a check of the overhead panel confirming:
[...]
• Proper RAT probe heater operation.


They never got that far, so I wonder if possibly:

- the SOPs have changed since the release of my version of the FM, or
- SpanAir uses different SOPs, or
- there is an indication of RAT probe heater malfunction other than the circuit testing pre-flight, which, according to what I have, is not done for the RAT probe


Bernd

[sevenstrokeroll]

someone mentioned how the RAT probe couldn't be the possible cause for this crash.

at this time, we still don't know exactly what was wrong or done to rectify the RAT probe issuse (if it was the rat probe).

But.

There is a scenario in which the RAT probe gets heated (as an anti ice measure) on the ground when it is not supposed to be heated.

The system detecting whether the plane is on the ground (known by different names, squat switch, ground shift mechanism, weight on wheel) can be fooled and the plane "thinks" its in the air and starts to heat the probe. It usually means a circuit breaker has been pulled or otherwise not properly set.


I've seen this happen while on the ground. You get erroneous readings of temp.


BUT HERE IS THE RUB...if the Mechanic disabled the current to the RAT PROBE HEATER and did not recognize the problem with GROUND SHIFT MECHANISM...

YOU MIGHT LOSE THE TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION WARNING!!!!! THIS WOULD ALLOW YOU TO ATTEMPT TAKEOFF WITHOUT SLATS/FLAPS!!!! IF THE PILOT FORGOT,there would be no warning.

THIS MIGHT be a viable scenario!!!

OTHERS with MD*80 experience (mine is on the 9) please check and report!!!

[F14]

What about load sheet trim? is it easy to load this MD tail heavy? or indeed accidentaly overload the aircraft.

I have often wondered about the local effects of hot tarmac on performance calculations. ie OAT is +30, but runway temperature is nearer +40 (this is often commented on in F1)

Is the NTSB investigating as well as the Spannish? When can we expect 1st report of findings?

[el #]

F14, spanish minister of transport will report in a commission public audience next friday.
However, since the investigation is under judiciary secret, she may not reveal or even known certain facts or preliminary findings. It will be more likely an examination of the background safety situation in general. Be assured that Spanair and everyone involved with their fleet is being scrutinized now.

I think that eventually the public pressure will mount enough that more information will have to be released one way or another (think "sources close to investigation").

[XPMorten]

sevenstrokeroll,

I think you might be right. I'm no systems expert but a non-functional
RAT probe to me looks as if could cause ALOT of problems.

Attached below text is from MD80. The schematics is from B717, I'm unsure
if the system is identical on the two types but I assume they atleast are
similar.

http://www.xplanefreeware.net/morten/DOCS/mdprobe2.jpg

http://www.xplanefreeware.net/morten/DOCS/mdprobe3.jpg

XPM

[CecilRooseveltHooks]

[sevenstrokeroll] BUT HERE IS THE RUB...if the Mechanic disabled the current to the RAT PROBE HEATER and did not recognize the problem with GROUND SHIFT MECHANISM...

YOU MIGHT LOSE THE TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION WARNING!!!!! THIS WOULD ALLOW YOU TO ATTEMPT TAKEOFF WITHOUT SLATS/FLAPS!!!! IF THE PILOT FORGOT,there would be no warning.

THIS MIGHT be a viable scenario!!!

Before I mentioned (and my post was pruned) about the fact as SLF on Spanair in MAD last month I noticed for the first time one engine taxi out procedure on that carrier after 20 some flights on their maddogs.

from T2 to the 36s (especially R) is a long taxi. I'm not familiar with the procedures, but it appears that setting the flaps is executed after delayed start checklist.

So, with your (professional) speculation about mabye losing the config warning and my (slf) FACT that there is in my 3 yrs flying the carrier to/from madrid now the possibility of single engine taxi out procedure, calling for late configuration on an already delayed flight, it is a scenario that can line up some of the holes in the cheese.

[isol]

The preliminary results and the full report will be found here when available:

Relación de accidentes e incidentes. Año 2008 - CIAIAC - Ministerio de Fomento (http://www.fomento.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/ORGANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/INVESTIGACION/2008/default.htm)

[justme69]

The pilot was well aware on conversation with the technician what the problems with the probe could be and one would like to believe that he was attempting a fully manual T/O or, at least, was wary of the readings coming from the RAT probe.

If the wrong fuse was disconnected or the failure that led to the (reportly) "overheat warning" of the heating device was more severe than thought therefore rendering Outside Air Temperature readings unreliable and assited automated take off mechanisms were being used, do MD-82 pilots believe it could have affected the thrust calculations to the point of severe danger w/o the pilots noticing?

[el #]

XPM, from what we know, it was the anti-ice/heating system of the RAT probe to have problems, so it has been switched off. In such a case, the RAT is supposed to be working normally unless ice form to prevent that.

Otherwise, please explain why it could case "a lot of problems", as just an abridged and highlighted manual section doesn't help in that.

Obviously, nobody at this point can exclude that any pre-existing fault, and/or the engineer actions, are indeed related to the crash.
It is simply that there is no direct indication of that being the case, anything else is pure speculation at this point.

[bsieker]

Since some have asked.

We can expect a preliminary report after 30 days, as stipulated by ICAO Annex 13.

This first report will usually have nothing to say about causes, only statistical information about aircraft involved, persons involved, number of fatalities and injuries, timeline (as far as known), a narrative about what happened, and what has so far been investigated, and what is being investigated in the future.

Interim reports are published when something substantial and interesting to the public has been found, the final report takes however long it takes to tie up all loose ends.

Urgent other information, not necessarily interesting for the public, will be made available to manufacturers, operators, and relevant rulemaking bodies.

Reports must be made available in one of the ICAO working languages (English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish). For high-profile accidents in non-English-speaking countries, English translations are often made available. In this case, the NTSB may provide a translation, but the original version will be authoritative.


Bernd

[el #]

sevenstrokestroll, based on you experience, in case of ground/air sensor failure, what other indications (if any) beside "RAT probe overheat" are given to deck or somewhere else ?

Also what is the flow (must be indicated in the maintenance manuals I guess) that a trained engineer shall follow in presence of the alarm above. It seem obvious that the working of the air/ground logic must be confirmed before assuming the heating system is faulty, and a certfied engineer would follow this logic even without consulting the manual.

[xkoote]

Hi guys,

I'm 6 hours behind on your guys, so I'm always behind on answers.

To the poster whom asked about exactly what probe they were referring to.

If the captian indeed mentioned that a light came on, it would indeed be the RAT probe as no other temp probe malfunction is indicated by caution lights. The PITOT/STALL HEATER OFF caution light may be a possible light.
But, this caution light would not come on if the plane thought it was in airborne mode and started heating the plane on the ground. The light does not illuminate either if after the plane is airborne the RAT heating fails to illuminate. coincidentally a year or 2 ago, we focused on this system as it's circuitry is very complex, causing this light to illuminate in situations where the systems manuals would lead you to beleive it wouldn't. But the whole point of checking the current to the probe in the after TO checklist is that the system will not trigger the caution light if it fails to heat.
So with the current info I can't even suspect that the plane was in air mode. If it was, there would have been clues to that from earlier on. BUT !....if it was, if memeory serves me correctly they could also have problems in retracting the gear. This explains their decision to abort the N-1 takeoff. Max weight, engine failure and a gear that fails to retract???
In that case, we are talking about the wrong probe. Because the caution light DOES illuminate if the rudder limiter, pitot/static heats and AOA vanves fail to work. But on the other hand, it has nothing to do with being on the ground or airborne.

So you understand that I find this situation VERY vague. As someone also mentioned I find it unreasonably vague. In 2 days' time someone must know what light it was and what system it was. These explanations just don't make sense to me. In other words "I smell a rat". If it's there or net remains to be seen.

So being in airborne can make the crew decide to come back down, but I don't see any evidence that they could have been in airborne mode.

Xander

[er340790]

Something that struck me after the SIA disaster (dep on wrong runway), the Paris Concorde crash and again after the Comair, Lexington crash is why in this day and age it is not a requirement for all major airports to have F/T video recording of all runways / taxiways.

It does seem quite incredible that such an obvious AND CHEAP technology is not already mandated. When there's a crime on the High St or even a theft of a can of beans from your supermarket, the first thing the police / investigators do is pull any available CCTV footage. The Paris accident investigators were left begging for images from any passengers in the terminals who might have snapped a picture or a passing truck driver who happened to be handy with a video.

Granted this would not be a 'catch-all' solution, but video images for the investigators would be a simple yet giant step forward from where we are now.

[sevenstrokeroll]

cecil...you make a great point...funny, if I had a full plane and it was hot in spain, I would start both engines just to keep the plane cool (air conditioning)

el#

if all human beings did everything correctly, we would have very few airplane crashes. I can't tell you what the mechanic did...he may have done everything perfectly...but with the only thing involved in mx items prior to take off being the rat probe, I had to come up with a failure path.

it has taken a few days to finally decide that the item in question was the RAT probe...before, some were calling it "an air intake valve"...which I have not heard of

as to the "other" things that might show up...I will stop for now and wait for the report

I've given one possible scenario involving the RAT probe which could possibly lead to a takeoff without flaps/slats extended.

it is just a scenario and may prove wrong


I DO ASK all my fellow pilots to always check the "killer" items just prior to takeoff...and that includes flaps/slats and trim

among other things

[safetypee]

With the recent discussion on the RAT probe, I restate my questions in #576 (page 29) relating to the TAT probe = RAT probe.

…. is TAT (RAT) used in the calculation of thrust in the MD?

Is the standard MEL practice for isolating the RAT probe via a breaker, if so what breakers are adjacent to RAT?

[XPMorten]

@el

Like I said, I'm no systems expert and don't know how the
CADC and Thrust Rating Computers utilizes the information
it gets from the RAT probe. However, I assume that feeding
these computers with the wrong/none information on temperature
could influence thrust output and airspeed readings/settings etc
which could end up in a stall as it appears has happened here.

Maybe some of the experts can comment on that.

Maybe the RAT inlet got blocked somehow.
Some ground crew left their lunch box in there, tools, gloves, bird - who knows.
Could this trigger the warning light if the airflow got blocked?

XPM

[justme69]

A more technical explanation of the (reportly minor) maintenance issue performed prior to take off will be offered by the company to the families of the victims today at 6:00pm (5:00pm GMT).

One of the passengers have been "downgraded" (got worse) to the very serious condition cathegory, meaning 4 people are still potentially in danger (up to 9 are, but it would be unlikely that any of the other 5 would get worse).

Although 1 is better, 1 is worse, 1 is the same and 1 is the critical condition patient. Doctors are still hopefull they will not lose any of them and victims will remain at 153 count. Of course, with 9 seriously injured, this is still unpredictable.

Expedited DNA identification of about 100 of those victims are thought to start producing results as early as tomorrow. Spanair started to pay the €3.8m it has agreed as a advanced payments for indemnizations, which insurance company is suppossed to take over after preliminary investigations and are believed to amount to about €50m.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

It appears that there is a degree of confusion as to whether it was the RAT probe heater or the RAT probe itself that was the cause of the initial return to the gate.

However, whichever it was, there's provision in the (FAA) MMEL for either to be inoperative. For the heater, the provision is:
May be inoperative provided:
a) Flight is not made in known or forecast icing conditions, and
b) ER operations are not conducted.
or
May be inoperative provided an independent RAT system is operative

For the probe itself:
RAT/Thrust Rating System
The RAT portion may be inoperative provided:
a) A SAT or Standby RAT indicating System or PMS SAT readout is available,
b) Other Systems affected by the RAT Probe (DFGS, CADC, Thrust Rating, FMS, OMEG, PMS) are considered,
c) Thrust Rating System portion is considered inoperative for the Series 30, 40, and 50 and
d) Procedures are established to verify engine power setting.

(Taken from rev 37 of the MMEL, available here (http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/applications/mmel/tcbbs/mmels/DC_09.pdf))

Either way, there's a procedure for either case, which if followed should mean there's no impact on flight safety. Given the speed of the turn around I'd guess it was the heater, not the probe itself, which means the scope for subsequent issues is minimal.

[FrequentSLF]

Why the weight is estimated? There is no indication of the real weight of the aircraft?
Thanks

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Why the weight is estimated? There is no indication of the real weight of the aircraft?
Thanks

Mainly because experience has shown that estimated weights, averaged across passengers (with the adjustments people have mentioned for time of year and so on), are accurate enough. Bear in mind that there's always an element of conservatism in the way the aircraft performance is calculated, and the standard 'weight and balance' process accuracy is consistent with the methods used.

To accurately measure the aircraft weight would require additional sensors on the aircraft (there are some aircraft, mainly cargo types, with this feature) and that adds cost and the chance of that system breaking or being in error. So there's no real benefit to such systems.

[FrequentSLF]

Mad (Flt) Scientist
Thanks for you reply. If you do not mind I have a couple of more questions/comments.
Mainly because experience has shown that estimated weights, averaged across passengers (with the adjustments people have mentioned for time of year and so on), are accurate enough. Bear in mind that there's always an element of conservatism in the way the aircraft performance is calculated, and the standard 'weight and balance' process accuracy is consistent with the methods used.

Understood, however I do wonder if what you say is correct, why such topic is being discussed so widely in this thread. I have seen so many different figures of estimated weight.

To accurately measure the aircraft weight would require additional sensors on the aircraft (there are some aircraft, mainly cargo types, with this feature) and that adds cost and the chance of that system breaking or being in error. So there's no real benefit to such systems.

You are confirming what I was thinking however I am still puzzled because the cost of load cell weighing system will be a few tens of thousand of Euro. The measured weight could be compared with the estimated weight adding an additional layer of safety. If the system is broken or in error the estimated weight could be used.

Thanks once more

[snowfalcon2]

A few comments about weighing an airplane.
One issue is to be sure the airplane is levelled. Conceivably, that requirement may be relaxed if the only objective is to find out the total weight and the balance aspect (C of G) can be disregarded.
A second and maybe more problematic issue is that any wind affecting the airplane may introduce errors in the measurement. Wings produce lift, even at low airspeed. If the airplane happens to be parked head on to a breeze, the lifting force may be significant - and also dependent on the deck angle the airplane is sitting at. For this reason a proper weight & balance procedure (for GA aircraft anyway) takes place inside a hangar.
I don't know if these are real issues for transport airplanes in practical life, but they may be an additional reason why using estimated average passenger weights has been found a satisfactory method. :ok:

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Understood, however I do wonder if what you say is correct, why such topic is being discussed so widely in this thread. I have seen so many different figures of estimated weight.

that's because everyone in this thread is (unless they are privy to the investigation and breaking the rules by posting here) guessing. None of us know what Spanair's policy on weight calculations is. Or what the empty weight of that specific aircraft was (aircraft are weighed as part of maintenance every so often). Or what fuel load was on board. But it's safe to say that the crew had ONE figure for their takeoff weight, not a bunch of guesses. Was it precisely the weight of the aircraft - no. Was it close enough to be good enough - almost certainly.

You are confirming what I was thinking however I am still puzzled because the cost of load cell weighing system will be a few tens of thousand of Euro. The measured weight could be compared with the estimated weight adding an additional layer of safety. If the system is broken or in error the estimated weight could be used.

Why would I, as an airline, pay even that amount of money for a system which could only ever reduce my payload - since you're proposing using the estimated method as well. Such a system really only becomes attractive if I can add cargo or passengers when I use it. Yet by then it's too late, in all likelihood - once everyone is on board, I can't suddenly try to add more cargo without incurring delays.

snowfalcon has also noted a couple of the technical issues with such a system; they can be overcome, but its not simple.

[tubby linton]

I would like to ask the mods if they would make a sticky of the known facts of the investigation to save me wading through pages of conjecture.

[md80fanatic]

The basic structure designed in the 1960's, when precision weight measurements with onboard sensors were not around, the plane was probably designed for MTOW to be [worst case scenario + 15% or more]. The engineer of "yesteryear" would not place a absolute maximum anywhere near the actual lift limit of the wings, or structural limit of the airframe. Carrying more to even more weight than published should not significantly endanger the flight.

The pilots forgetting to configure the wings for takeoff is a rare event, and having the takeoff configuration warnings disabled for whatever reason is a rare event as well. Having both happen on the same flight is extremely rare and two cheese holes that have to be almost forced to line up (seems highly unlikely).

[justme69]

What's more, unlikely earlier rumors, no evidence of any of the engines (visibly) failing exists.

New public accounts by politicians briefed by other politicians with access to the Aena tape speak of the pilot "eating up the runaway to the limit" (probably not so much so) and the airplane "noticeably not having enough power to take off" (basically, speed seemed to them too slow to successfully taking off). Again, no visual indication of any catastrophic failures until the airplane "hits the ground".

All these reports should be taken for what they are: non-experts explaining to the public what other non-experts have explained to them.

One of the survivors, the woman in critical condition, died recently. Thus 18 survivors, 154 victims (2 died while in hospital). Now only 8 survivors remains in serious condition, with only 3 of those severe.

Someone shot the press an estimation of 15 months for the investigations to complete. ¿?

Spanair had a technician explain the (minor) maintenance that caused the first return to gate today.

[DJohnsen]

Greetings!

I am not going to comment on this particular event, but the issue of having sensors to measure actual aircraft weight.

This system has been tried out on several aircraft models over the years with little or no success. The problem is, as already has been pointed out, is to get an aircraft in a level position to get the weight right. This is virtually impossible on a ramp. The other issue is what type of sensors will be used...? Pressure transducers in the landing gear struts are most practical, but again level and friction in the struts will significantly affect the readings. We have the NLG pressure transducers on the B777 for "stab trim greenband" check, but are having trouble with this relatively simple system.

After all this; accurate OEW weigh jobs, pax and cargo weight estimates is still the best solution today and gets you within a safe range...:ok:

Dag

[justme69]

Newpapers report the pilot had some 7000 hours (10 years) of experience on MD-80's series and the plane had performed a Barcelona-Madrid flight previously to this one without incidents.

The oficial explanation on the maintenance performed prior to take off is:

"A malfunction of the heater of the probe that measures the outside temperature while on ground as well as flying". The failure was in the mechanism that allows the probe to be "on" during flight and automatically deactivate while on ground" (I know it's somewhat contradictory to say in the same sentence that the failure was thought to be with the heater to then say it was with the automatic on/off switch of the probe, but that's what the expert brought by Spanair said to the families).

The 41yo mechanic had 20 years of experience and decided to deactivate the *probe* (according to the ...ehhh... probably-not-too-reliable reporter writing the news piece), considering the weather conditions good enough to safely fly w/o said mechanism.

Again, freaking confusion, I think the reporters are saying the wrong thing and only the heater was de-activated due to some failure of the on/off autoswitch (to heat while in fly-mode and be off while grounded?)

Perhaps we should just assume the whole probe was innoperative.

So the "literal translation" of the news piece on the technical briefing is, once again, not-all-that-clear. Either the heater didn't work or the switch that turned it on/off on air/ground didn't work and was disconnected. Or something.

[Hiflyer1757]

Just a side note....up thread it was noted that this flight was normally not holiday types but business and residents so that luggage should be less.

As background I find that an interesting conjecture as after 30 some years in the industry I have seen it exactly the other way....couple bathing suits and sandals do not weigh much for the tourist but island residents will bring everything including the kitchen sink in an attempt to get around paying duty and higher prices on the island for the same goods than on the mainland.....and in more than a few cases goods that cannot even be found on the island at any price. In fact I see island residents pool together and send one on a shopping trip to bring back for many.....the one traveling get's a free trip to be the 'buyer'.

One other note in regards to weight....fuel is always far more expensive at an island station that on the mainland so aircraft are routinely fueled heavily on the outbound to reduce both cost and turn time for the return to the mainland.

Yes...all luggage is weighed but for the reason of charging for bags over the allowed weight....not to fill out a weight manifest. However, in the US the FAA has mandated that bags over 50 lbs be counted differently and a higher average weight used...whether this European carrier has the same procedure I do not know.

Overall I would expect the piece count per pax to be higher than an average Euro domestic trip/Holiday trip and the weight per piece also higher.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

More speculation.

Maybe the 'OAT' probe issue combined with the whole 'return to stand' issue and time pressure/ fatigue combined and caused them to miss something else.

To me it looks like they tried to fly an aeroplane that was not quite ready to fly.

Either it was too slow or not properly configured.

The 'deployed' TR was likely a product of an attempt to stop once they found themselves 'off piste'.

Having speculated- to no useful prurpose- I don't suppose it will take long for the truth to surface with this one.

There but for the Grace of God.......................

[daikilo]

Do I understand that
1) the aircraft lifted off and then landed again
2) prior to the flight something was wrong with and/or done to a probe and/or its controller
3) the data from said probe is only used in flight?

[ONTPax]

From Post # 358:

The practical value of video runway surveillance at airports has been known for decades and has been (pretty sure about that) recommended by crash investigators. Even if it hasn't, the benefits are still pretty obvious. A few cameras on the control tower would do it, with infra-red for nighttime. It could be used by airlines to monitor landings, enable analysis of RTOs and go-arounds, minor collisions on the ramp, etc. etc. And that is before stating the obvious value in a crash investigation on or near the airport (about 70% IIRC of crashes are within a mile of the tower). And in the US there is a lot of worry about land and hold short, and about potentially disastrous on-ground collisions and runway incursions. Video would help analyse all that.

The reason they are not installed is because if any such images became public it would be bad PR for the airport and the airline. (emphasis added)

* * * * * * * * * *

And THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG!!!

The various regulatory agencies (FAA here in the States) should have, as their top priorities, the advancement of safe operating practices, accident prevention, and a safe environment for passengers and crew. Instead, proposals such as this are permanently shelved because these agencies are, as you say, more concerned about bad PR for the airport and the airline.

I heard that, a few years ago, a very advanced version of the "black box" was being sabotaged by the Industry because the more information it could collect, the more likely it could pinpoint possible negligence by the Carrier. Heaven forbid. The corporate lawyers certainly can't have any of THAT!!!

The airlines call all the shots and the regulatory agencies just go along with it all. The tail wagging the dog. :mad:

[ChristiaanJ]

So far, after all the posts wasted on the subject, it's not even confirmed whether it was the OAT or RAT/TAT probe that caused the problem.

[sAx_R54]

This is my first (and last!) post since joining this forum. I would just like to say that even the 'clinically thick' are able to determine whether comments submitted to the PPRuNe are from individuals who are either CPL/ATPL and therefore know and understand the substance of matters they are talking about. I have long since been intrigued by the character of any individual who is able to sit at the front of a high powered tube and traverse long-distances over plains and oceans, where at any moment the dull and ordinary can rapidly move to the most terrifying of experiences.

It is clear (to me at least), those who truly understand what FADEC/EICAS/EGT/EPR/DME/ILS/AoA/BA/V1....etc means, and how these systems and processes are applied to control modern commercial flight. The quest for knowledge is liberating and the professionals on this forum should remain, so that those who do not know what they are talking about are clearly exposed.

As one of those SLF's who smells fear the moment the wings of any aeroplane moves a mm from the horizontal, my sincere respect to all those individuals who we rarely meet and equally less get to know, who are prepared to apply all their professionalism and skill to take us safely to any far flung part of this planet.

Finally, I would like to close with my deepest condolences to all those who have been affected by this most recent tragedy in Madrid.


sAx

[sharksandwich]

Any guesses how many weeks/months before the official inquiry results are out?

[ChristiaanJ]

sAx_R54,

Informed comments do not only come from "individuals who are either CPL or ATPL", who "truly understand what FADEC/EICAS/EGT/EPR/DME/ILS/AoA/BA/V1....etc means".

There are those individuals who design and/or maintain aircraft, who know equally well what that alphabetti-spaghetti refers to, and whose informed comments can be equally valuable.

CJ

[Vino Collapso]

Also the alphabettii - spaghetti can confuse the debate.

IF, and it is a big if, the evidence shows that this aeroplane left the ground at less than required aerodynamic flying speed or failed to maintain speed for more than a few seconds then it simply aerodynamically could not fly. Most student pilots who have studied the principles of flight could deduce that.

The reason for that could be down to the complex issues people are throwing into the ring here, or it may not. The only people who will truly know are those that decode the Flight Data Recorder.

[justme69]

Well, that's it. It seems the media has lost interest in the story and information has stopped to a trickle.

Information given is VAGUE and by non-experts, therefore conclusions as to what happened are somewhat speculative. But what was said before applies. Here are known facts coupled with my own free interpretation.

-Flight prepares for T/O but returns to gate after pilot warns PAX of a malfunction indicator (red light) he is unsure about and he wants checked by a technician. Plane returns to gate where technician and pilot agree it's a warning related to the outside temperature probe heating device (probably a faulty automatic on/off switch). Either the heating device (likely) or perhaps the whole probe (unlikely, just a few reports probably mistakenly speak of this) was tripped-off (or fuse removed). Pilot and technician agree no suspected wheather condition will make the heating device needed operative (no danger of ice to perhaps foil reading the outside air temperature). They both sign the plane fit-to-fly. Pilot informs PAX that the small problem with the "heating sensor" is fixed and they are now going to leave (after about 1h delay).

-Plane starts acceleration and rolls. Some account the plane as moving slow, rolling quite late in the strip (but at least +600m still available), perhaps having a "weird nose angle" (a bit too steep?) without any other visible indications of malfunctions. Politicians witnesses of the security tape insists on the plane looking like "it didn't have enough power to take off".

-Front wheels (and likely back wheels) leave the ground, only to have the airplane behave erratically and "fall" soon afterwards.

-Once on the ground, the plane suffers unspecified damage. Some official speaks of a wing briefly touching the ground. The plane, probably, tries to brake and briefly thereafter loses control and turns right, getting off the strip (when at least +300m, possibly +500m of flat surface was still available in front of them). It then crashes.

Information being insisted upon: No visible damage (i.e. fire) on the plane on the video recording of the accident until after it "came down and touched the ground". And "the plane looked like it lacked enough 'power' to take off", for unknown reasons. Fire or engine problems, from a visual point of view, only seemed to have hapenned as a RESULT of the inability to sustain flight (or fully take-off, as it can be interpreted also), and not as a CAUSE. Again, speaking visually from the outside of the airplane. There is definetly no "explosions" or obvious visual malfunctions of any kind with the engines at that point.

I have no idea how, in such a long runaway, the pilots couldn't notice on time a severe lack of thrust (presumably on both engines) and couldn't correct it (or abort) and instead tried to take off presumably below V2m and perhaps at a steep angle (or perhaps the angle was shallow and they were trying to compensate ... the angle is spoken of as only being "slightly weird" or "slightly unusual", but doesn't mention whether it was steep or shallow). No mention whatsoever of flaps/slats.

It seems reasonable that after hitting the ground (on the landing gear) and bouncing around a bit the pilots possibly decided to try to stop (i.e. deploy reversers, brake hard). Somehow control was lost and the airplane didn't continue (much longer) on a straight line, coming off the side and finally hitting terrain obtacles several hundred meters later at a very high speed (as plane damage and victim's injuries would suggest, where every single survivor spoken about had one or more fractures and reports of several hard to ID victims with limbs severed would suggest).

Unfortunately, the Flight Data Recorder suffered some damage, which would no doubt delay a better understanding of what happened and what could've caused it.

I have the feeling that unless some major startling discovery is made, the probable causes of this accident are a long time away. Those witnessing the tapes say things like "you can't see any problems on the plane from the footage" (perhaps the resolution is not good enough to calculate things like slats angles, etc, without heavy analysis)

[777fly]

I read a survivor account, as reported in the media today. She reported that the aircraft became airborne, abruptly dropped a wing, suffered roll oscillation and then landed heavily and broke up.
Having not read this thread before I have skimmed through and note:

1. Someone posted that the wing LE devices appear to be in the retracted position.( this from a photograph which I have not seen)
2. There is speculation that the pre departure rectification work could have disabled the takeoff configuration warning
3. It is reported by survivors that the Captain talked ( via PA?) of an unexplained warning light.

In my experience, it is essential, under conditions of disruption such as a return to the gate and/or maintenance rectification, that checklist discipline is strictly followed. Is is easy to overlook items, or falsely 'remember' that they have been completed, under the stress of a non normal situation.

From the survivor description sounds as if the aircraft entered a stalled condition after climbing out of ground effect. If the LE devices were not selected ( maybe the Captain saw a visual warning that they were not set, but was confused by not getting an aural warning?) and takeoff was commenced, rotation would start at the normal point, but the aircraft would not get airborne until a considerable distance afterwards. After a late lift off and climb to low altitude, the wings would stall as they came out of ground effect, leading to loss of lift and the observed roll oscillation.

Then assume the crew, having a fair distance of runway left, tried get it back down, touching the right wing as they do so. The priority would be to stop asap, so it would be natural to apply max brakes and reverse. That would explain the reverser deployment and runway skid marks. Loss of directional control would have lead to the break up and fire, in the drop off to the right of the runway.
This scenario would not have been helped by an engine failure or uncommanded reverser deployment in the air,of course.
This is, as are all these posts, speculation but appears to fit the facts as so far described.

A terrible accident which serves to remind us all how quickly the routine can turn to disaster, in a moment. Condolencies to all who lost family or friend in this.....

[pichu17]

In the MD,the RAT probe send temp data into Air Data Computers.These, in digital format feed both digital flight guidance computers.The DFGC compute the EPR for each flight phase and pilot seleccion through the TRP(thrust rating panel).The RAT probe is heated only in flight for anti ice purpose.If for some reason,the ground sensing relays ( energized in ground) change to flight condition,the Rat sensor is heated and the EPR is reduced. This change may be for a circuit breaker open or a ground sensor relay fail .This condition may afected the takeoff condition warning too.All of this is not too much evident for pilots.
The ART ( automatic reserve trhust) is used only in normal TO EPR. Not in flex. or max. Is activated when the DFGC sense diferences (30 % ) between both N1 .Not is autothrottle funtion but inside the fuel control unit. Increase about 700 lbs thrust or .05 EPR to the present thrust.
The ATR ( auto thrust restoration) with the last DFGCs (-972 and subsequent ) only is active in noise reduction cutback procedures.
Accept grammatical corrections

[flash8]

777Fly, I stated this in two lines approximately 100 posts ago and you are one of the few to even address this likely issue. Rushed Crew, failure to configure, loss of CAWS power. Would fit the picture. And I believe in the absence of any further information, the scenario that fits the accident most closely so far.

[sAx_R54]

ChristiaanJ,

'Those individuals', would clearly represent the collective noun of professionals of whom I earlier referred.

Over and out!

sAx

[Major Nevitt]

Before you regular posters attack me I want to point out I am a professional pilot but of the 737 classic? variety and have never flown any MD varient.

Once again, I refer to post 376.

It may well be a hoax (the poster never claimed it as his own) but it may also be genuine.

Many accounts say that the aircraft was veering to the right at an early stage. In the event of reduced but symmetrical thrust this would not happen until the stall.

I find it difficult to believe that an experienced pilot would not be able to control an engine failure, particularly in an aircraft with the engines so close to the centreline. I do take on board the points about atmospheric conditions and the possible discrepancy regarding pax weights.

In the SIM I have seen a heavy 737 get airborne with less than normal takeoff thrust get airborne at far less than normal speeds. eg Vlof <100kts.

Engines fail very rarely. The aircraft veered to the right.


In my opinion the rto will prove to be a red herring, although it is worth remebering that MEL items assume no other failures or combinations of failures.


It is only my opinion but I think an unlocked reverser is looking likely.

once again, just my own opinions

[dash 27]

777. Surely the L/E devices would've given a TO Config warning. And getting airborne early might be possible with mistaken lighter performance numbers, but in the ways of staggering into the sky, as has been described, surely a tail strike would have occured, if no slats, and or an early rotate.

Bummer bout the CVR/FDR.

Was there a heavy departure prior, 747 etc, which might have offered some dirty air in a no slats, lower than required speed departure.

And a flaming left and a reverser deployed on the right does give some evidence to the right turn prior to contacting the ground, unless as you say its been in a stall situation prior, or heaven forbid, stall caused from the reverser. If that was the case. :oh:

[lomapaseo]

I would like to ask the mods if they would make a sticky of the known facts of the investigation to save me wading through pages of conjecture

There are no known facts:=

There are only facts that are believed to be known based on credibility of source and the experience of the interpreter to convey them.

The mods do not fit this bill.

Sorry but you are just going to have to wade through the stuff in this forum and decide for yourself what best represents credible fact according to your own experience.

I'll give you a clue some of the stuff here is "expert opininon" however much of it is wishfull theory

[nicolai]

The BBC is reporting (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7579293.stm) that one of the survivors has died, bringing the total number of dead to 154. Unfortunately burns and burn or smoke damage to the lungs can be difficult to recover from and often prove fatal later, as here.

[fdr]

Birgenair ALW301: probable Pitot static blockage, suspected to be from mud dauber wasps.

Spanair 5022: ?`:confused:

Now if you suggested that AeroPeru 603 was similar (not identical: pitot vs static bloackages) to Birgenair 301....

Now, it is possible for a pitot/static event to occur at any time, not just with wasps nesting or tape applied over static ports, AND a failure would be a high risk factor on a takeoff, and historically such failures tend to be problematic for crews to manage.... one assumes that the DFDR and QAR fitted to this type will ascertain that readily, as it records IAS from the DFDAU, and while GS is not recorded directly, the L/L will provided a derived GS (which is just nice to have to identify quantitatively IAS errors when corrected).

again, common issues are;

3rd rock from sun,
sad
outcome.

Please, await (avidly, if you must) the formal report conducted under Annex 13. If there is something new that is identified as a threat, then one assumes the authorities know their obligations under ICAO, and under EASA and EC law.:zzz:

ref: http://www.flightsafety.org/ap/ap_oct99.pdf
AG RVS - News and Comment on the Aeroperu B757 Accident; AeroPeru Flight 603, 2 October 1996 (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Reports/aeroperu-news.html)

[el #]

Dand07, your post is grammatically and syntactically incorrect, then once one manages to read (interpret ?) it, you're insinuating a certain vested interest by pprune members that is neither clear nor likely.
Please refrain from wasting your and our time writing "under the influence" in the future.

Nicolai, not sure if you read this thread in full, but we're being given an update about survivors conditions few hours ago from someone citing spanish sources, by logic these should be more current than BBC, so in this case the sacred broadcaster is of no help.

[nicolai]

el #,
I've (re)read the whole thing and I didn't see anyone posting an update from any other source as to this (significant) change in status of casualties so I thought to put it up as a new piece of info, and I merely said "the BBC" to state my source; it's not a Spanish source because my Spanish isn't very good.
In this sort of news story, who gets the word out first can vary more with whether or not someone's sub-editor is on a teabreak :E rather than who has the info first, since the news will travel very fast.

[fdr]

The configuration of the Slats (and flaps) will be a basic part of the initial investigation to verify. The system is well decribed in the MD-80 LAMM Section 27-85-00 page 101-103, including the auto slat behavior and warning systems.


The Slat position is recorded to DFDR/QAR via the DFDAU
The cables may have witness marks to indicate position when tensile loads may cause separation of the cable
The actuator will indicate the position of the Slat drive drum (27-81-1), as will the autoslat actuator MI 76/77 etc. As well, the Flap/Slat handle position will be identifiable
.

quote reports unquote of possible lateral instability will certainly ensure some investigation is conducted in this area by competent investigating authorities.

As to CAWS: the 28v DC -L CB would need to be tripped, B1-832, AND the 28V DC-R CB B1-851 would need to be tripped for the crew to NOT get a warning of the CAWS being degraded/failed. (LAMM 31-51-00)

CVR will be interesting.

[el #]

Nicolai, look at posts by 'justme69', #685 and #694.
I do not want to diminuish your contribution, but it's just that as you said, news circulate fast and someone invariably will report to pprune with expeditiousness.

[whopper2]

(apologies if it has already been posted)

Survivor describes wobble, crash, painful aftermath - CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/23/plane.crash.madrid.ap/index.html)

"The airliner that crashed this week in Madrid had just barely got airborne and its right wing dipped sharply before the plane started wobbling and went down, one of the few survivors of the disaster said Saturday.
...
"But then it made a turn, as if the wing dropped abruptly," she said. "We were still very low, very close to the ground."
After the plane got a bit higher, it began to "wobble from side to side," she said, describing this as the last thing she remembers before the collision."

[justme69]

It seems at some point politicians were advised by two pilots "experts" who were allowed to watch the tape. A reporter writes about one of them saying: "It had to be a chain of errors ... a miriad of factors such as wind, bad cargo distribution or some external element such a large bird or a bad reaction from the pilots"

This expert is very puzzled that the plane (in the words of the reporter) "fell to the right when it would've been normal to fall to the left if the left engine was damaged" (as originally rumoured ... I don't know who came out with that rumor to begin with ...)

Both experts agree that it was very unlikely that the earlier fault that prompted the return to gate had anything significant to do with the direct cause of the accident.

But one of the two experts (I'm quoting the reporter now) "insisted that the accident could have originated due to an excess of weight in the plane and cited that as the most likely cause".

Ground airport personel at Spanair Barajas think that it's unlikely the airplane was grossly overloaded, but it was likely indeed either full, close to full or slightly over full capacity.

Once more, it's not fully clear how the airplane "fell" shortly after wheels left the ground. Seems it rolled a bit and fell, with one wing briefly touching the ground. Obviously at over max landing weight it could've sustained some damage from the "fall" and possibly injure pilots as well and start fires, etc.

My take on things: The plane was fully loaded, perhaps a bit over specs (but not necessarily). Some configuration was off-mark (either flaps or, more likely, slats). Enviromental conditions were not too good for sustenability (low air density, little but significant tail wind). Vr calculation was probably a bit short. Pilots unadvertenly used up a bit more runaway than usual without realizing something was off and then tried to take off a bit abruptly (your usual "if you want to go up, pull the wheel towards you"). For reasons unkown the plane stalled soon after ground effect was over w/o the pilots taking inmediate correction measures (perhaps they didn't have time as it rolled a bit much during stall for unknown reasons) or the engines failing to produce enough thrust and the plane hit the ground bouncing around for a while (perhaps accelerating after additional thrust was demanded a bit too late trying to complete take-off) sustaining damage (wing touching ground, landing gear over max. landing weight) or pilot injuries that led to lack of control, perhaps a decission to try to brake, and made it ultimately deviate to the right of the landing strip (wing hitting the ground damage could've produced assymetrical aileron configuration) and onto adjacent terrain where it finally crashed at high speed.

The plane rolling while airbone a bit too much could also be due to an assymetrical thrust situation (single engine failure or assymetrical reverser deployment, i.e.) rather than a random product of the stall in low density air or pilot action.

All of that, pure and baseless speculation of what could've happenned, but it's the mental picture I came out with while reading all the news about it here, in Spain. No idea how that could've happened, but it is what we've ambiguously been told by the media that happened so far.

[xkoote]

This accident has left me for a loss for words. Here's why.

- If the RAT Probe heater fails in the ON position no light will illuminate in the cockpit. What did the captain mean?

- A RAt with an INOP heater and released due to favourable weather conditions is the same condition and terminlgy stated in it's MEL. So we'll take the mech for his word that the heater crapped out. In this case, especially on 29 degree Wx, no effect will be noticed and temps read correctly.

- Airplane stuck in air mode, with the plane not configure for takeoff? Could be, but then how can a pretty stiffly loaded MD82 roll dor takeoff, become airborne then crash back down all in less than a runways' length?
For an MD80 to become airborne with no slats in that condition requires at least 200 knots. Otherwise it will not fly, period. Maybe flaps less than prescribed? Should make that much difference if the slats are in the correct position.

- As I already said. If the plane had a problem being in airborne mode, MOST likely they can not retract the landing gear! This coupled with an engine failure MAY convence the crew to try and abort the TO. Maybe even as desperate as to deploy reverser as quickly as possible.

This scenario is all I can come up with. Many thoeries do not add up given the distance it travelled from brakes release for final resting place.


Xander

[UNCTUOUS]

At 0938 Central Standard Time on 2 August 2006, a Boeing Company 717-200 aircraft, registered VH-NXE, took off from Alice Springs Airport, NT, on a scheduled flight to Perth, WA.

The applicable aircraft take-off settings and techniques were applied by the flight crew for the takeoff. The recorded data showed that, 4 seconds after lift off, when about 31 ft above the runway, the aircraft's stall warning system activated for 4 seconds, and that the aircraft did not approach an aerodynamic stall condition at any time during the stick shaker activation. In response to the activation of the stick shaker, the flight crew increased engine thrust and reduced the aircraft's pitch attitude.

It is almost certain that an incorrect left wing slat sensor signal was received by the proximity sensing electronics unit (PSEU) from one of the two left wing slats proximity sensors. Consequently, the different slat position signals from the two sensors in the left wing resulted in the PSEU defaulting to the slats not-extended indication for the left wing. As a result of the different slat position signals sent by the proximity sensing electronics unit for the left wing (slats not-extended) and right wing (slats extended), the aircraft's flight control computers used the flaps-extended/slats-retracted stick shaker angle of attack schedule, leading to stick shaker activation and other stall indications.

Although no explanation could be found for the incorrect signal received by the PSEU from one of the two left wing slats proximity sensors, the aircraft manufacturer concluded that there did not appear to be a systemic problem in the worldwide 717 fleet.

Download complete report (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2006/AAIR/pdf/aair200604439_001.pdf)[508 KB PDF]

Premature flap (in lieu of gear) retraction. REPORT (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1997/AAIR/pdf/aair199704041_001.pdf)

The Crash of Northwest Airlines Flight 255 (MD82) at Detroit Metro - REPORT (http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR88-05.pdf)

[DozyWannabe]

Loose rivets - apologies. The only part of post 507 where I was addressing you was the first paragraph. At the time there was a whole load of posts - since deleted - making major suppositions, and the rest of that post was addressed to them. Sorry, I should have made it clearer.

[ExSp33db1rd]

I find it in bad taste to be nit-picking - in what is basically a technical discussion - about how many died, how many have been identified, and how many survivors are succumbing to their injurues or fighting for their lives, and who is right and who is wrong. Is this an ego contest ?

Unless you had a friend or relative on board - in which case you will be getting personal updates - what does it matter to anyone else ? It is sufficient to accept that this is a major disaster, with massive loss of life and in due course the correct figures will pass into historical statistics. QED.

Leave it alone.

[UNCTUOUS]

ref the return to the ramp......

In the MD-82, the RAT probe sends temp data into the Air Data Computers.This data, in digital format, feeds both digital flight guidance computers.The DFGCs compute the EPR for each flight phase and for pilot selection through the TRP (thrust rating panel).The RAT probe is heated only in flight for anti-ice purpose. If, for some reason, the ground/air sensing relays (energized on the ground) change to an inflight condition, the RAT sensor is heated and the EPR is reduced. This change may be due to a circuit breaker opening (or a ground/flight sensor relay CB being left open by the mech after he deactivated the system? - shades of Helios?) or a ground/air sensor relay failing .This condition may affect the takeoff condition warning too. None of these prospective developments would be evident to the pilots.
.
The ART (automatic reserve thrust) is used only in normal T/O EPR. i.e. not in flex. or max. It's activated when the DFGC senses a difference of 30% between both N1 gauges. It's not an autothrottle function but carried out inside the fuel control unit. Its effective increase is about 700 lbs thrust or .05 EPR to the present thrust. The ATR ( auto thrust restoration) with the last DFGCs (-972 and subsequent ) is only active in noise reduction cutback procedures.

[WynSock]

Dear Edward Owen "in Madrid" for the Telegraph,

may I suggest you refrain from writing about any technical issues to do with the accident. Putting your name to rubbish like this:
"El País reported that a pilot who landed half an hour before the crash informed Barajas control tower that the wind was "150-9" which meant from the south-east at nine knots. He hoped they would change the direction of takeoffs and landings accordingly since planes should take off into the wind and land with it."does nothing but add to confusion and display the ignorance of you and your editor.

[Pinkman]

I cant understand why everyone is so puzzled about the roll off to the right. A classic manifestation of an incipient stall in ground effect and at high angles of attack is a kind of dutch roll (its not dutch roll). That means that the a/c would not be pointing along the centreline when it re-contacted the ground.

The "shuddering and side to side" motion described by survivors in Madrid is entirely consistent with a stall at high angle of attack and is identical to that described by survivors (or decryption of FDR tapes where there were no survivors) in MANY previous incidents. Sevenstrokeroll mentioned Detroit (DC-9-80, T/O configuration annunciator disabled, crew distraction, flaps/slats not set).

The yaw/roll degrades already insufficient lift (i've read by about 20%). The a/c just happened to be on a r/h yaw/roll when it returned to earth. If it had been on a l/h roll the survivability may have been very different.

Pinkman

[ZAGORFLY]

how many meters/feet after the power application the Md80 should have rotate?
Does the pilot refer only to VR to rotate or should he/she have an approximate landmark for the rotation point? (I guess Yes)
My modest theory is that if the pilots did not RTO is because they were underpowered hoping to be able to get airborne anyway since the runway was so long.
then a combination of density altitude and faulty (perhaps) EPR temp air data made such tragic cocktail .

what do you think?

then: "two decades of fear" Since I was flying the 737-100 I was always afraid of un-commanded deployment in flight. is in that old reverser design the Clamshell kept closed by sort of springs? if there is not hydraulic pressure could a reverser fall open by the air stream (is like a metallic parachute). Many Biz jet still use this old clamshell design..

[one post only!]

One thing that makes me wonder is if this aircraft did stall for whatever reason did the crew at any time attempt to get full thrust?

I wonder because after looking at accident details of the 73 going into the Potomac I always wondered at the time why no-one firewalled the thrust levers. It clearly wasn't flying so why not slam the thrust levers to the wall? This has always made me wonder that if as operating crews we lose something after sitting on a modern jet for many hours.

Obviously after V1 no-one has their hands on the thrust levers and hands don't go back on them till after rotation and climbing away. I remember early in my training on Jets being told by a trainer that I was putting my hands back on the thrust levers too soon after rotation. I was told there was no need to put them on so early, it wasn't required. I remember thinking - what if I need extra thrust??? What if the thing doesn't fly? Does this breed a mindset to leave the thrust levers alone?
However, a while back my company as part of the recurrent sim check did a V1 cut at a hot and high airfield. Several knot split on V1 and Vr and unless you toga'd the thrust levers the thing really didn't want to fly. Sounds like everyone did firewall it.
Also whenever we seem to run windshear stuff, particularly soon after rotation people do toga it. Is this because we make the connection - eng fail - need thrust. Windshear - need thrust. But what happens outside of these cases where you aren't getting flashing lights and bells but the thing isn't flying??

Can't help but wonder if you find yourself in a very unusual situation as these chaps did. Not seeming right but you aren't sure as nothing is clearly wrong, realise little too late that its taking way too long to get to speed, you are eating up runway, thing not getting airborne then stalling - you are going to be stressed and maxed out. As capacity shrinks do you have the capacity to think "f*ck me - firewall the donkeys" or do you grip the control column with both hands fighting it into the air?

I am not by any means saying keep hands on after V1 as we all know exactly why we do that. This event being extremely rare it would never justify it but do you think we do possibly lose that connection between struggling to fly (at very early stage after rotation etc) and slapping some extra thrust on?
This could potentially now be 2 cases where application of extra thrust may have saved the day. Unless of course these guys did do that and it still didn't fly!?!?

Guys that have been on jets for a while, what do you think? Do you think we do lose that instinctive connection or not? Particularly when maxed out due to a VERY abnormal situation? I would personally like to think not but.....

In no way thinking this is cause or contributing factor but this accident has made me wonder. Might be thread creep (might however be relevant) but do you think that unless it falls into a nice pigeon hole failure some crews may not realise in enough time that they need extra thrust? Sorry actually not working on a Sunday seems to have got my mind wandering!!

I'm not a TRI/TRE so don't see many people in the sim, be interesting to hear from you guys what you think as you see a lot of crews doing this stuff.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Does the pilot refer only to VR to rotate or should he/she have an approximate landmark for the rotation point? (I guess Yes)


Actually, No. I'm not aware of any civil operator using physical length of runway to measure if the acceleration is normal, this would need marker boards on every runway, and take-off calculations would have to relate speed to distance for every runway used - possible but not really practical, tho' I believe the RAF did this at some of their airfields - don't quote or shoot me, don't know for sure.

The critical speed is V1, after that there is insufficient length to stop in the remaining length of concrete, and it would be very difficult to judge - if the acceleration felt sluggish - whether to accept the overrun or haul it into the air at the last minute and hope for the best.

My reading of this situation is that there was apparently plenty of runway left after rotation, which would indicate that the crew thought that they had reached VR - rotation speed - and had attemped to get airborne, otherwise they would have held it down as long as possible, or even run off straight ahead, which doesn't gel with the suggestion that they might have been airborne too slowly and stalled - why would they pull it off if there was a lot of runway left, unless they thought they were at the right VR speed ? Which then begs the question - why didn't it accelerate to V2 - if that in fact happened ?

Still a long way to go, we will just have to be patient.

Whilst writing this I missed the post of OnePostOnly, and can accept that his hypothesis has some merit, except that I still feel that they must have reached VR, and started to fly, the question then is why didn't the acceleration to V2 continue, or when leaving ground effect, with some problem that they weren't aware of, even a mistake in computing V speeds maybe, OnePostOnly's theory then took over ? :confused:

[777fly]

Xcoote,

Your ignorance of aircraft handling techniques, aerodynamics and mechanics indicates that you cannot be a commercial pilot, surely?

I have no experience of MD80 operation, but if the free air stall speed is 200kts, it will fly at speeds well below that figure while in ground effect.

For other posters, ground effect has nothing to do with air density.

[XPMorten]

Some MD80 stall numbers.
At high gross weights, there is a penalty of around 30 kias
on stall speed not having slats deployed.

XPM

http://www.xplanefreeware.net/morten/DOCS/mdstall.jpg

[777fly]

XPMorten:

Thanks for the graph. From that I deduce that at max weight, the crew would be looking for a flap 15 climb speed of about V2+10, or about 165 kts, after rotation? The slat retracted stall speed is given as 172kts. The aircraft would certainly have been able to fly in ground effect, with a clean wing, with that small margin.

[Seat62K]

Many of these posts show the degree to which Anglophones are hampered in trying to understand a situation where so much of the available information is in another language.
"Justme69" has commented on the amount of runway used by the aircraft. A friend told me yesterday that El Pais reported that the aircraft used all the runway. This was, I think, reported to the press by the head of the autonomous government in the Canaries. My friend's Spanish is very good (much better than mine) but obviously care needs to be exercised here over the translation. Is there anyone who is bilingual able to comment on this? I don't think I've read elsewhere on this thread that the aircraft used all the runway (could have missed it, though).
P.S. Apparently, El Pais also reported that the wind direction changed shortly before the attempted take off and that the Spanair aircraft attempted its take off with a tail wind. There seems to have been a comment from flight deck crew of another aircraft (taking off, landing or moving on the ground at Barajas) about this.

[NigelOnDraft]

Seat62K (and others I might say) A friend told me yesterday that El Pais reported that the aircraft used all the runway. Please just look at the basic facts :eek:

The aircraft started it's takeoff run around the start of 36L. It accelerated, rotated, got airborne, landed back on the runway, veered to the right, then went off the runway, then went off the surface alongside the runway, then went down into the ravine, and once there broke up / decelerated / caused an "accident site". Some of that is conjencture / rumour / assumption, but in general seems a fair summary?

That accident site, by pretty near certainty, is approximately 80% of the way along 36L, and displaced to the right. To end up there, yet use all the runway, it must have turned round and come back from the N? Do you really believe that :{

I would suggest therefore the "rotate" point, whether or not intentional, was roughly halfway down 36L, and very unlikely >70%.

Re Density Altitude: Unliklely to be major factor IMHO. DA is more significant in landing, where it alters your energy management on approach, flare technique (TAS/RoD), and most significantly LDR. Whilst you could try and translate that into takeoff, in practice it is "looked after" in the Perf Calculations, one of the longest runways in Europe, a SH aircraft, twin engined, and takeoffs being critical in V speeds / IAS terms, which are not affected by DA.

NoD

[ExSp33db1rd]

Nigel on Draft - which brings me back to what I have just suggested, i.e the aircraft appears to have got airborne with plenty of runway left ? If so, it presumably must have reached the computed VR, or else why would the crew have tried to haul it into the air below VR with no reason to ?

If so, then something happened immediately it was airborne, to stop it accelerating ( if that is what happened ) or, maybe the computed VR was in error - wouldn't be the first time. I know nothing of present day FMS systems, but I would think that maybe there would be some way to make a gross error check built into the system, or are V speeds still extracted manually from the QRH and written on the back of an envelope - or similar !! which does leave room for error,but again, the VR might have been correct, but the aircraft wouldn't fly because of incorrect flap /slat configuration, as has also been suggested, and I started my comments in reply to a question as to whether or not VR was arrived at by a speed reading alone, or a physical runway position, but it wouldn't matter how the VR was confirmed if, at that point the aircraft was incorrectly configured.

Again - patience, Gentlemen.

[FlyGooseFly!]

Question: Could the ground maintainance engineers have touched a wire (by accident) that connects to the Reversers when 'Quickly' cutting off the fault??


Answer: Almost certainly not. That's not the way airplanes or mechanics work.



I wish I could be that certain or positive - those of us with longer memories could tell of non-return fuel valves having their nibs deliberately ground off to facilitate their fitting the wrong way round - resulting in a Vanguard ( Aer Lingus ? ) crash. Bad airframe repairs leading to catastrophic failures too. Just because the aeroplane industry is well regulated and inspected does not remove the "that'll do" attitude in everyone.


I'm also quite surprised by the number of self professed experts who post here who are prepared to state catagorically that this or that cannot possible happen only to be completely refuted by actual facts later on.




.

[Zypher737]

What if the crew where trying to follow an engine out procedure to avoid terrain, which is a factor in Madrid; For my company it would be a left turn normally, but what if Spanair's is a right turn?

I would say the aircraft suffered some sort of engine failure on T/O, got airborne and started right turn too early, below V2, possibly reducing the speed further towards the stall speed, ending up in a stall, with no additional engine power available resulting to the only option left being a descend.

A further contributing factor would be the unhelpful tailwind conditions.

[justme69]

I'm a native spanish speaker, living in the Canary Islands. English is a foreign language to me.

Some politicians spoke of the airplane using up all available runaway before "taking off". This is obviously way exagerated, since as we all know, the airplane was briefly airbone and crashed some (gross wild estimate) at least +200m short of the end of the runaway, possibly as much as +600m away from the end of flat terrain.

Skid marks attributed to the fly show the plane landing on the strip for a short while, then turning (hard, about 45º) right and getting off of it by the side into adjacent terrain with still significant flat terrain in front (significant but definetly way short to stop).

A more credible account of someone metioning how the security video was explained to him by some other politician that saw it, says that the last portion of strip had the ground painted in a different color at the 600m mark off the official end of the runaway, but fails to mention if that part was just visible on the video or the airplane was actually still on ground trying to become airbone when that area was reached.

Regardless, it does seem the airplane took somewhat more airstrip to become airbone than usual, thus the politicians insisting that the plane "obviously looked like it lacked 'power' to take off".

About the wind direction and intensity, pilots flying nearby reported anywhere from 2-3 knots up to 9 knots of tail wind for that flypath. I'm personally assuming 7 knots from available information and definetly 9 at most. Wind seemed low and therefore "inconsistent", changing directions a bit, increasing, decreasing, etc. Outside air temperature was said to be 30ºC, but many pilots keep insisting that temperature just above the paviment can be as high as 10º more at midday. Regardless, Madrid heat during summer midday plus airport sea level elevation seem to call for air density on the low side of things.

Of course, reports (and reporters) have said all kinds of non-sense "24/7" since the accident. I'm dissmissing some of the obvious mistakes and exagerations that are being said and trying to report in english here those informations that seem to have more than one credible source commenting on them, while producing literal translations on those terms that are ambigous (such as talk about "available power" or "airplane falling" or "moving side-to-side") and more reasonable translations when the facts are clear and do not contradict the picture (like when they say there was a problem with the heater automatic on-off switch to then say that the probe, instead of the heater, was disconnected, which is probably a reporting error when it can be inferred in other reports that it was the heater that was disconected, hence the comment on fit-to-fly under no ice formation danger).

I do find english newpaper reports, such as those from the UK press, to be much more ambigous due not so much to slightly wrong translations (they usually fit the exact same reports from the spanish press word-by-word, as it should be, since the source is the same) as to take the comments either out-of-context or out-of-sequence (like with the survivors account of the happenings). I've seen plenty of that.

Survivors speak of things such as the airplane taking-off, moving (or falling) side-by-side soon thereafter, one wing moving way down, falling and crashing against the ground. Obviously their memories of the whole event is, on their own account, not all that clear. But two of the survivors talk roughly of the same event in the sense of "airbone", "side-to-side movement", "falling" or "wing falling" and they both kind-of-lose memory of the exact impact events until they wake up amid the debri. I don't think their recalls from the point when the ground was first hit on can be much trusted and actually slightly contradicted each other subtly as written by the reporters regarding hearing noise (i.e. one news report may lead to believe that a survivor heard a bang noise after the abrupt side-to-side movement but before falling while it's more likely it was heard as the plane hit the ground).

[FlyingOfficerKite]

When determining performance on light single and multi-engined aircraft most of my mentors stated that it was unlikely you would achieve the performance stated in the manual as these figures related to a company test pilot carrying out the tests in a new aircraft in ideal conditions at known weights. Not too much of an issue, when flying privately in the UK at least, if the performance achieved does not match the performance published in the manual. This performance is factored for average aircraft and pilot performance.

Likewise jet transport aircraft are extensively tested by company test pilots carrying out the tests in a new aircraft, at known weights, with a manufacturer keen to prove to airlines that their aircraft performs as well as or better than its rivals.

When flying public transport on a daily basis pilots refer to standard performance tables, based on standard passenger weights in aircraft whose power output in taken as read. I have never known of any definitive testing of jet airliners at any other than theoretical weights. Who knows if jet engines always provide optimum power? Who knows if ALL the fleet will achieve comparable performance? Who knows if the performance figures calculated by the airline will be achieved in practice under all conditions in all aircraft? Has this EVER been proved? It would be interesting to take the actual weights of the passengers and compare them to the calculated standard weights to see if there is a significant variation.

The figures are taken as gospel, but unbeknown to most passengers the figures used to calculate performance are THEORETICAL - not ACTUAL passenger weights or PROVEN aircraft performance data. When was the last time YOUR aircraft was ramp tested to ensure it could achieve its book performance. Probably NEVER.

So a relatively old Spanair aircraft, flying out of a hot and high airfield, what performance was actually achieved?

It may be proved that the performance issue was not a determining factor in this accident, maybe only a contributory one. But next time you fly remember no one knows ABSOLUTELY what the weight of the aircraft is or can GUARANTEE that it will perform EXACTLY as stated in the aircraft manual. Safety factors built in to the calculations ensure aviation is a safe environment in which to operate and that aircraft don't fall out of the sky.

However, many aircraft have crashed in the past because of lack of this absolute knowledge of weight and performance and they will continue to do so in the future.

There are a lot of articles on the web calling for a change in the standard weight of passengers. Remember as an adult female in the UK and Europe the 'standard weight' is 70kg - That's about 11 stone. Take off hand luggage, which isn't weighed, the weight of your clothes, handbag and other items and the airlines probably assume the 'average' woman weighs around 9 stone. Similar calculations for men would result in a 'weight in your birthday suit' of 12 stone. So next time you fly and see people stuffing max size hand luggage in the overhead locker and see 'the fat family' sat next to you - or you weigh more than 12 stone as a man or 9 stone as a woman, the pilot will NOT have accounted for this excess weight.

Just do a quick quiz when your flying - look at the passengers, guess their weight and work out the excess. Makes you think?

Also check out Google (http://www.google.com) to see the articles calling for a revision to these THEORETICAL weights!

Any male passenger over 12 stone and any female passenger over 9 stone and any child under the age of 14 who weighs more than 5 stone, with hand luggage is compromising air safety.

[parabellum]

Whilst I have no doubt that performance figures are initially obtained by company test pilots on new aircraft it has always been my understanding that the test figures are factored to allow for an average line pilot, as well as other margins concerning the aircraft.
A manufacturer would be leaving themselves wide open to being sued if they only published test pilot figures for a company ops manual and I doubt very much if their product liability insurers would allow them to do so.

[Joetom]

Good info Nigel o d, tks.
.
Reading the last few posts, it's pointing my mind that maybe aircraft got off the ground with ground effect and then lift was less than required.
.
My thoughts with all involved.

[west lakes]

Looking at the distances and taking previous posts at face value

One quoted take off distance for 36L is 4446m
Looking at Google Earth a rough measure shows from the southern end: -
350m of "white" coloured surface
3090m of "black" top surface ending just past the piano keys for 18R and level with the first left hand turn off (possibly high speed) heading north
1000m of light coloured surface, ending just before a perimeter road and with another left hand turn off.

The above added together equal 4440m

A quote from an Iberia Captain makes reference to the skid marks and wheel tracks, possibly from this flight, in the grass to the right, at or about the first left hand turn off

A map, posted from the press, shows the a/c veer off location as this

[HarryMann]

If so, then something happened immediately it was airborne, to stop it accelerating ( if that is what happened ) or, maybe the computed VR was in error - wouldn't be the first time.Two things here:
Hot weather
Reversing winds reported (light and variable?)

We hear words of windshear; would prefer to hear of potential heavy thermal activity. In the above conditions its quite possible when a big bubble is kicking off upwind (in front) to have huge quantities of air sucked in, creating tailwinds of 20~30 kts at ground level - to a light aircraft that can accelerate quickly, an exciting ride, to an airliner that can't you can be taking off and losing airspeed as fast as you are accelerating (vs the ground) over the first 50~150 feet...

a third? Max weight take-off
a fourth? sightly premature rotation (based on low AUW estimate)
a fifth? Lower thrust, see below...

Outside air temperature was said to be 30ºC, but many pilots keep insisting that temperature just above the paviment can be as high as 10º more at midday.
Yes, that is just about possible but at only a metre or two above tarmac, known as a super-adiabatic layer, effectively giving a density inversion. This layer wants to be airborne but sticks to the ground especially within standing crops, and ultimately becomes so unstable that someone running through the field or a car passing by will trigger it. Sailpane pilots know all about this... and when it does go a million cubic metres of air can bubble up and has to be replaced - hence strong incoming winds to its core - so you don't want a big one going off upwind as you depart!

Runway markers?
After several accidents in the 60's and 70's I thought it had become routine to time acceleration to V1, maybe someone can explain - perhaps it's the massive increase in low-speed thrust that fan-engines introduced removed the need. But it was thought much easier to implement than runway markers at the time - it also reflected any combination of engine thrust deficiency and underestimated TOW.

Yes, I am not an airline pilot :rolleyes:

[Seat62K]

Thanks "justme69" for your post above.
Looking at the aerial photograph of Barajas on www.elpais.com (http://www.elpais.com), the latter portion of the runway does appear to be of a different material/colour. Am I right in assuming that aircraft are not expected routinely to use it? If so, this might explain the report that the Spanair aircraft used "all" the runway.

Apropos earlier comments about emergency services' access to the ravine, I was in Madrid on Wednesday and live coverage on television showed emergency vehicles descending into the ravine. Couldn't say how easy it was for them to do so, though.

[NigelOnDraft]

After several accidents in the 60's and 70's I thought it had become routine to time acceleration to V1Never heard this at all...

Please understand that on a VERY long runway, it is unlikely that a SH twin engined aircraft will ever have a "Stop V1" less than VR. Their manual might produce a "V1", but that may well be a "Go V1" or somewhere in between...

Whilst not an MD-80 pilot, and more than willing to be corrected by one, I fly A319/320/321 around Europe and rarely will a genuine "Stop V1" be produced - exceptions of course ABZ and similar ;)

NoD

[HarryMann]

Nigel, thanks... I'll reword that then.

In the 70's I became aware (and understood the reason was some slow acceleration aciidents) that either a suggestion had been made or it had actually been introduced by some airlines - the practice of 'timing' the roll up to V1.

I imagine if it was tested, trialled or used in anger, that a pre-V1 decision point of speed Vs time would have been implemented. That is, V1 itself would not have been the timed point...

Remember also that at that time, a 3rd crew member, namely flight engineer was common, who perhaps would have been the nominee for such a task...

Remember also that at that time, airliners had low-bypass engines and did not have the phenomenal acceleration they do today - everything was a good degree more marginal I imagine.

[bsieker]

However, many aircraft have crashed in the past because of lack of this absolute knowledge of weight and performance and they will continue to do so in the future.

Would you mind substantiating that claim by a number of concrete examples?

The standard tables and calculations include a big safety margin, and even a bit overweight, and with a bit less-than-rated power will ensure safe operation.

If the intakes or tailpipes are not badly deformed, identical engine types will produce the same thrust at the same EPR value. With less-than perfect engines it may vary with N1, and with fuel flow, but not with EPR.


Bernd

[Gergely Varju]

While I know that my theory is probably flawed, I would like to hear a few oppinions about it.

To me, accidents like this seems to be extremely rare events, and it is rare to see them happen without any "warnings". Mostly because comercial aircrafts are built with enough fault tolerance to be safe in most cases, and it is very rare to see different problems happen on same time. Incidents, serious incidents, etc. seems to be quite more frequent. Sadly when you deal with many incidents, you can't be sure that in 100% of the cases you will do the best to prevent a more serious event.

This is why I think any incident before the accident should be considered, even if we just try to take educated guesses. The limited amount of time spent with disabling the heating device for RAT probe is barelyenough for the paperwork, so it is safe to assume: Noone knows for sure what kind of malfunction(s) triggered the first warning. And noone was sure about the potential consequences.

IF we deal with an unknown electrical or computer related problem, that would mean: It is possible to have other system affected by the failure. Since people experienced with MD aircraft suggested it can be enough to affect takeoff condition warning. If I interpret what was said / what information could be found, I would also think in some cases it can affect the thrust generated, and in case of short circuits, some more serious Air Data Computer or DFGC related problems it could have other kinds of effects.

I think these problems can lead to less than expected thrust or wrong takeoff configuration, and this can lead to a stall when the plane would leave ground effect. And the rest was explained.

[petermcleland]

Just to mention a flight I remember from long ago as a First Officer on Vanguards...We arrived from somewhere at Madrid, Barajas to proceed onward to Heathrow. It was night and hot. The ground engineer was a bit hasty with refuelling and before asking, he loaded a more or less standard figure. The Captain, was pretty upset to discover that we were a Tonne overweight for take-off and insisted that he wanted some fuel taken off the aircraft.

Well as all will know here...Nobody will ever agree to do that without considerable discussion as the fuel taken off has to be re-processed and it has to be taken by a different tanker than the one that put it in etc. etc.

Captain was pretty angry at all this argument and was getting pretty heated.

I was P3 on this flight and after this had been going on for some time, I called the Tower for the latest surface temperature...It had dropped 2 degrees C since I had asked about 40 minute previously.

Problem gone...in the Vanguard, each degree C was worth 500 Kgs and we could now take-off. So away we went to London.

I have sometimes thought about this and visualised an ATC local controller peering at a dusty thermometer screwed to the window frame. I imagine him screwing up his eyes to focus on that scale of tiny degree marks on the scale and calling to me "Bealine 1207, the surface temperature is 28 degrees centigrade". Amazing and rather frightening to realise that this means we can get off the runway a whole Tonne heavier than we could 40 minutes previously!!! :hmm:

[777fly]

With a takeoff distance of 4446m available, a 10% overweight aircraft using reduced takeoff thrust in a 10 kt tailwind, in a temperature 4 degrees above reported, would STILL get airborne safely, if both engines keep running. The aircraft obviously could not fly once airborne, for the reason I have already proposed, and it was only the extremely long runway that enabled it to touch down again on a paved surface.

[FlyingOfficerKite]

The following article found on Google - there are many more.

http://www.nlr.nl/id~7793/lang~en.pdf

The issue of passenger weights will raise it's head from time to time, quickly to be squashed by the airlines as increased standard passenger weights equates to fewer passengers that can be carried on a particular flight and resultant reduced profits. The manufacturers would be compromised as well - would not be able to make the claims they do regarding passenger numbers, range and performance. A BIG NO-NO!!!

I remember being told (hearsay?!) that an aircraft crashed in Africa some years ago due to the passengers being on a charter to a convention of gold dealers/traders. The passengers carried their gold on their person and each passenger was well over the weight limit. The aircraft crashed on take-off due to being grossly over-weight - can't find it on Google, but I'm sure it's there somewhere?!

[Desertia]

Probably not worth a separate thread, but...

MADRID, Spain (CNN) -- A Spanair MD-82 jet made an unscheduled landing at an airport in southern Spain Sunday, just five days after another MD-82 operated by the airline crashed at Madrid's airport killing 154 people, Spain's airport authority said.

The plane landed safely at Malaga, a major airport on the Spanish mainland's southern coast, after the pilot radioed air traffic controllers reporting a problem in flight, the officials said.

The flight originated in Barcelona and was bound for Lanzarote on Spain's Canary Islands.

Flight JKK 2565 was carrying 141 passengers who were taken to a Malaga hotel while the plane was being examined, according to Barcelona newspaper El Periodico.

It appeared to be a charter, rather than a regularly scheduled flight, a Spanair telephone operator told CNN, referring the call to the company's charter line, which did not immediately answer

[El Grifo]

Not exactly true Desertia

AENA tells different !


Aena.es - Spanish airports and airspace - Lanzarote (http://www.aena.es/csee/Satellite?cid=1048607597321&pagename=subHome&Language=EN_GB&SiteName=ACE&c=Page)

Just type in the flt number JKK2565 for different version.

[DJohnsen]

To FlyingOfficerKite!

Who knows if jet engines always provide optimum power?

This has been tested several times and unless you have a problem with our EPR system for this particular engine, the engines provide the thrust they are indicating to you.

Who knows if ALL the fleet will achieve comparable performance?

For the most they do, with minor cruise performance differences.

Who knows if the performance figures calculated by the airline will be achieved in practice under all conditions in all aircraft?

Why wouldn't they unless you make a grave mistake such as not including cargo, pax weight etc. in your calculations?

It would be interesting to take the actual weights of the passengers and compare them to the calculated standard weights to see if there is a significant variation

Here in the US, and I would assume in most other nations, the FAA conducts routine audits of these figures and they are pretty accurate.

As I indicated in my previous post, the current weigh job procedures, provided they are done accurately, are well within the margins of safety for aircraft performance.

Dag

[fireflybob]

On at least 3 occasions in my flying career I have had all passengers, cabin baggage, and hold baggage actually weighed. In every case the actual total weight was less than would have been calculated using assumed weights.

On the type I fly (typical) an extra 500 kgs changes take off speeds by 1 (ONE) knot, although of course extra weight would affect performance. As has been stated previously Gross Performance is downgraded to Net and wind components (head and tail) are factored.

[sevenstrokeroll]

timing V1 was discussed for quite awhile, but was generally dismissed in civil operations in the USA. I do understand that some military operations did at one time , time v1.

our airline has us start the V1 call 5 knots prior to V1 in order to insure that the words are complete at V1 and not started at V1 (of course for 30 years before that, we started the call at V1)

About engine performance and the like. After the Air Florida crash in DCA (washington, dc, potomac river) I would like to think we all learned to take a good look at N1 as well As EPR...not just EPR. In this type, I can't see any takeoff power setting below about 97percent n1 give or take.

IF there was a stall (aerodynamic) on takeoff, I can understand the wings rocking or dipping as the plane was about to leave ground effect (teal effect for real old guys)

(as an aside, I have told my favorite people f/a's and pax alike that they should time the takeoff and that most jets rotate about 30 seconds after application of takeoff power...longer for high, hot,heavy, shorter for cold and light...if you are sitting in back, what do you have to measure the takeoff?)


I have these questions for investigators:

what was the position of the flap/slat handle?

what was the position of the flaps/slats (though * see below)

what was the position of the throttles

what was the position of the pilot seats.


*It might be a ''no brainer'' that if the flaps/slats were extended, there was no configuration problem, but part of stall recovery at this part of flight is to make sure the slats/flaps are extended

[justme69]

http://img147.imageshack.us/img147/2732/detallefinalrwy36lkj9.png

This is the picture he was trying to link to. I don't know who is the author, but got it from the blog that he is referring to.

EDIT: Sorry, obviously somebody posted the picture while I was still typing. The circle seems to be the area where the first loose debri was found and I'm guessing the red line shows the presumed path of the plane after coming back (or potentialling falling) to the ground.