Spanair accident at Madrid

[Trimbuster11]

:=:=:= Definately your imagination....!!

[RatherBeFlying]

In the 1978 Toronto overrun accident, the runway is now 9697' and the a/c stopped at the bottom of the ravine with a good portion on the slope as did AF358. I had a good look at both hulls.

El Mundo's diagram shows 4.35 km from the end of the runway to the debris which is about 14,300' which leads me to suspect the a/c was in the air for a short distance.

[bubbers44]

reports were the right thrust reverser was out so don't think they were trying to continue the take off.

[PJ2]

RatherBeFlying;
In the 1978 Toronto overrun accident, the runway is now 9697' and the a/c stopped at the bottom of the ravine with a good portion on the slope as did AF358.
A minor correction if I may - aside from there being only one parallel runway on the south, (there are two on the south side and one on the north side now, and AF358 was on the south parallel of the two, the DC9 was on the original parallel which is now the north parallel of the two), in 1978 the ravine had a much sharper "cliff" edge to it. The aircraft left the grass surface at about 54kts, "flew" over the cliff edge and pancaked, breaking the fuselage in two places. The wings remained intact. Two passengers died, one who was not wearing his seatbelt. The ravine was later "filled in" so to speak, in the form of a sloped surface - still a deep ravine with a stream but not an abrupt cliff. The north parallel has the same overrun feature.

AF358 missed (short by about 30ft) the large cement pillars upon which the approach lights to 06R are mounted - so much for "frangible" towers...

http://img135.imageshack.us/img135/2245/af35820vd3.jpg

[Trimbuster11]

It is known in official Boeing doc's as the DC9-82 ;)

[25thID]

I don't see how any strike issue could have anything to do with this. Such speculation is pure absurdity and I am surprised at such statements on this forum anyway.

[Sleeping Freight Dog]

Look at this photo of the tailplane, to me it appears there is damage
to the forward leading edge while the opposite appears to be less so...
Plane Crash in Madrid Leaves 153 Dead (http://news.aol.com/article/plane-crash-in-madrid-leaves-153-dead/141804)

Obviously it was torn off in the impact. It appears to be facing the
opposite way it would be on the aircraft..

[PJ2]

Look at this photo of the tailplane, to me it appears there is damageto the forward leading edge while the opposite appears to be less so...
Plane Crash in Madrid Leaves 153 Dead (http://news.aol.com/article/plane-crash-in-madrid-leaves-153-dead/141804)

Obviously it was torn off in the impact. It appears to be facing the
opposite way it would be on the aircraft..
Sorry, were you thinking of this kind of damage being a hint as to cause? Usually this kind of damage occurs during the break-up sequence and would be less "tell-tale" than, say, a collision sequence or in-flight break-up. Your second comment is more important because it relates to the question of why they're cleaning up the mess so early and quickly. Mapping wreckage as it lay is usually important to an investigation for many things including ruling out some causes such as pre-impact breakup. That's why post #156 should be set aside - the reversers may be planted but we can't assume that that is an indication that one or both were deployed - physical markings as well as the recorders need to be examined for such conclusions. The engines and the main gear tires are obviously key targets for initial investigation as will flight crew history and training records. Though I think human factors is a rich area of investigation, I agree with those posters who dismiss the industrial side of this.

[Nickctaylor]

I think the word you are looking for is "taste" not censored.

I have two questions. Early reports said the fire brigade could not get to the site quickly because the crash set the dry grass on fire. Surely this needs sorting IF true. As a layman I thought the idea of the fast response tenders was they could get to the site and try and keep the blazing side under control while escape was out the other.
Secondly what is the history of rear engined crashes like this compared with under wing engined aircraft. In a crash of this sort of level would the engines being right next to the fuselage be worse with fire breaking out?

[dash 27]

Speculation, and potentially apples and oranges. I fly a similar type, and an open thrust reverser has been demonstrated to me in the sim. Very violent procedure, and the aircraft will yaw, and reduce speed at a stagering rate until the engine is shut down (if its identified as such). An F100 did come to a similar end i think with TAM a while ago with this sinario. I wonder if the apparent fire from the left engine was an overspeed to compensate from a reverser on the right.

Speculation, and the investigation will show, but just sharing what I know from a similar type.

Condolences to all involved and to the operation.

-27

[27mm]

Dear Danny,

Many thanks for your article in today's Torygraph - can you please replace all these aviation "experts" that are wheeled out on the news?

[whartonp]

It was reprted on one of the news channels late last night that the A/C had returned to stand due to a problem with an OAT sensor/gauge (not sure which). I don't know much about the MD80 but is the OAT gauge an MEL item?
If OAT is not correctly applied to performance calculations and something unrelated occurres leading to loss of engine power after v1 i would think that there would potentially be some real control issues. It is easy given the position of the A/C to see how it could have stalled & "toppled" to the right.

[sandbank]

It seems that :-

The aircraft had returned to the gate because of technical trouble - (insufficient power?).
A repair had been carried out (hastily?).
The repair had been signed off - (presumably?)

...What I can't understand is why the passengers were aboard when the aircraft was subsequently cleared to fly on what was essentially a test flight.

This wasn't a case of an airliner suffering some trifling technical problem in some remote location and having to be repaired in the field this was Madrid for heaven's sake!

I doubt if this airline will survive this crash - and I'm sure all airlines will surely have to revise their procedures and, after any repairs, test fly all their aircraft empty before being cleared to embark passengers again.

[PJ2]

sandbank;

May I ask what aircraft you're on?

[whartonp]

Sandbank, you have a very interesting notion of how A/C maintenance should be carried out. A/C are very often attended to by an Engineer at the gate and subsequently cleared for flight. If your proposal was ever imposed i think it most unlikely that the industry would survive.

[sandbank]

Passenger survival should take priority.

The aircraft should be tested and proved to be safe before taking passengers aboard - that's all.

...Surely you are not arguing the contrary?.

[Taxi2parking]

sandybank clearly isn't aircrew - at least I hope not since he obviously doesn't understand what an MEL is or does.:ugh:

[one post only!]

really sandbank, no-one has ever thought of that idea before, you are a genius, quick write to all the airlines worldwide to let them know your thinking!! Sheesh.......

[sandbank]

Test flights after repairs are surely basic common sense.

But we all know that no one in the industry would want to do it - this has to be imposed by Governments.

[ara01jbb]

Only now had a chance to watch yesterday evening's news reports. Considering the silence of some airlines after incidents I'm impressed with the speed and frankness of the statement from the Spanair managing director Marcus Hedblom... reminded me of Michael Bishop's rapid and honest statement in the hours after Kegworth.

[Velikiye Luki]

Sandbank, have you got any idea what you are talking about here....?????

:D

[sandbank]

Yes. Procedures which would have saved 153 lives

[PJ2]

Taxi2Parking;
That's why I asked. Always the benefit of the doubt... ;-)

sandbank,
...Surely you are not arguing the contrary?.

No, we're not arguing the contrary. The absence of your expected response does not prove your case. Besides sir...we are "first"...

A sign-off and departure is no more a "test flight" than the next flight you happen to take is - aircraft are operating under MEL (Minimum Equipment List) deferrals all the time. Is your car perfect every time you back out of the driveway? Would you take your car for a "test drive" after a bulb change? While there is very little opportunity to park, there is also a huge and unnecessary economic penalty for what you suggest. Now if you would like to triple your airfare and those of all other passengers, we will do a test flight first...

Most mechanical items on airliners can, with set conditions, be "deferred" for repair. There is a time limit and usually operational limits. It is authorized by both the manufacturer and the country's Transportation ministry. I hope this helps allay your fears.

[NOLAND3]

Had to post... Sandbank you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about.. :ugh:

[faa_cpl_h]

sandbank, the comments directed to you are a little harse; what people are trying to point out to you that the aviation industry is not driven by safety; it is run as a commercial operation where profits are put ahead of true safety. If you do not believe this, look into how most official crash investigations end in recommendations on how to improve safety as opposed to directives to ensure safety.

[PJ2]

NOLAND3;
Sometimes there are serious misconceptions about what we do including within the media obviously. We'll see by the next response from sandbank if a little patience and information helped - we may collectively assure him/her that the MEL process is a satisfactory dispatch tool. If we don't need the item, we depart and when/if it is needed, regardless of the MEL we set the park brake and order the item to be fixed, period. It's the captain's ship.

[Velikiye Luki]

What are you guys talking about? If the plane returned to the gate due to a TAT probe (or the like) problem, applied the MEL (which probably allows them to go), and then went back out to take off - what is the problem?

That is the way the system works?????

:confused:

[one post only!]

Sandbank, how many time does an aircraft return to stand with a snag, engineer attends. Fixes problem or defers in accordance with the MEL. Aircraft is fit and SAFE to fly. It is not a test flight!!!

Crew arrive at aircraft in morning. APU fails to start. Test flight required!?!?!?!?!?!?

Sandbank are you posting so that later on someone from the media can refer to a "pilots website" where someone has got "proof" the airline were not carrying out maintenance and the aircraft was actually on a test flight?????

[TINBASHER99]

I do not normally post but Sandbanks post has got me going,

A test flight for every mainetnance action is just impossible, there would only be empty aircraft flying ! A test flight is normally only required if there have been changes to flying control systems. For engine work (Including replacement) an engine ground run is performed as per the manufacturers instructions, with a level based on the work performed.
Any maintenance tasks performed to aircraft 'critical' systems require a duplicate inspection of the work completed by two independent Engineers

Just my thoughts.

[Miserlou]

Well done, Sandbank.
Tell the investigators to go home since you seem to have done their job for them.

A repair, component replacement or maintenance procedure does not mean that the following flight is a test flight.
By your reasoning, every flight is a test flight to see if all components are still functioning properly.

[PJ2]

faa_cpl_h;
what people are trying to point out to you that the aviation industry is not driven by safety; it is run as a commercial operation where profits are put ahead of true safety.
Absolutely true. However, the point being made was, "why wasn't a test flight carried out first?" Would you agree that a test flight is required for MEL items? Are we placing passengers "at risk" by departing thus?

My historical posts are absolutely clear on flight safety and organizational issues including profit-before-safety issues. However, the challenge from sandbank was as stated above and it is a misconception of how a mechanical is handled. The comments are not only not harsh, they are largely, though not wholly, instructive.

[faa_cpl_h]

PJ2, I accept your posts have been informative as opposed to harse but there have been several posts where people take exception to someone posting who clearly has a limited understanding of the industry.

If journos do post on here for info for their articles maybe clear informative feedback will encourage them to get their facts right instead of making one post and then giving up and leaving the bunfight behind.....

[xxxchopperpilot]

SandBank, finally we see someone who knows what they are talking about.

An aircraft that has to abort a take-off due to an engine fault is a serious issue.

Maintenance then carried out to correct this would then require a test flight, not a revenue flight.

For a pilot or engineer to release/accept the aircraft under such circumstances without carrying out a test flight dependent upon what the circumstance was would be classed as negligence.

May i remind you all that accepting commercial pressure is classed as negligence. The engineer releasing the aircraft makes the call as to whether the aircraft will require a test flight or not, the company has no right to over rule this decision.

Think about that people.

[whartonp]

I wish i had never said anything now! Does anyone know if the MD82 OAT system is and MEL item. I can't believe that the OAT isn't a no go item but i would be interested to know for sure.

[philipat]

Might I suggest that we get this thread back on topic?

[Velikiye Luki]

I don't know the specifics of whether the OAT/TAT is a go/no go item. It doesn't really matter. The plane returned to gate, and the issue was looked at by the engineers.

WHAT ON EARTH DOES A TAT PROBLEM HAVE TO DO WITH TEST FLYING???


:ugh:

[one post only!]

XXX where did you get your information from about the aborted T/O due to an engine problem? Just that the information on here previously was talking about a OAT sensor/gauge problem.

[PJ2]

faa_cpl_h;
I am a strong advocate of teaching/learning especially when it is taken to heart. Initially, there are no stupid questions. However, if learning doesnt' take place and a point continues to be pressed by someone who isn't an airline pilot they either see something none of us see or have another agenda not associated with learning and contributing. Thanks for your kind response.

xxxchopperpilot;
The judgement as to the nature of the mechanical issue is, as you would know (just from your handle) is in the hands of those examining the issue and the relevant documentation. We dont' know what the problem was with the airplane so we can't judge the outcome. I've had plenty of engine faults where I've returned to the gate and either had parts replaced while passengers waited on board or the fault cleared in the ACARS/AIMS system. Sometimes a test run-up is done to test for fuel or oil leaks if those systems have been worked on. I've had FADEC faults, reverser faults and so on but none would require a test flight and I and the crew have always been 100% happy before we depart. More than one occasion the park brake is set and the aircraft stays at the gate until we're happy. When we tell the passengers that, in exactly those terms, nobody complains and when the air is clear about our intentions, things happen.

[whartonp]

VL

Nothing to do with test flying at all which is just as well because just in case you are not aware this thread is not about test flying.
Perhaps somebody who has some knowledge can answer my question since it is directly related to the matter in hand, ie the tragic event at Madrid.

[agusaleale]

I just read a post where a pilot who was at Barajas in that moment says that it ressembles to an old accident, the one with Binter in Málaga. Gotcha?

[XPMorten]

Speculations;

Several eyewitness reports state the aircraft was airborne before crashing.
If this was the case, at that point, most pilots in most situations would
not attempt to land and do a G/A.
Now lets assume the pilots did everything by the book, which means
a normal loss of an engine can be ruled out since they are well trained for this.

So, this leaves us with the plane for some reason got "unflyable".
We had reports that there were engine problems before the flight,
also that one ore more thrust reversers were deployed on the wreck.
Could it be that one thrust reverser buckets self deployed at rotate
or later?

XPM

[PJ2]

whartonp;
The thread was indeed about test flying for a moment but that dealt with, I think it's back on track...

I suspect the OAT (TAT & SAT indications, ADIRS info for the Airbus, ADC for the MD80?) would be an MEL item depending upon the availability of a second probe, (usually the case). Not sure if both probes are u/s. Anyone?

[xxxchopperpilot]

PJ2,
May i remind you that "Until we're happy" is a statement that you will NEVER find in any Aircraft Maintenance Manual. I think, recalling to memory you may find this statement in a "Complacency" Manual. If the manual says do a test flight, then you actually do a test flight. A test flight under no circumstances will involve commercial passengers. I hope i never board an aircraft that you are in command of, as i don't think that you are up to the job. If you truly are a professional pilot then have a GOOD think about what you are about to write.

[sussex2]

There is a very steep gully at this point, difficult for a lot of vehicles to cope with.
Madrid in the summer = hot and dry, fire would have spread very quickly. In the TV news shots here helicopters could be seen dumping water to attempt to put the fire out.
Brush fires and the use of helicopters are common things all over Spain.

[hambleoldboy]

Possible scenario:

Tech problem, aircraft returns to gate - delay, duty time, industrial situation distracting crew etc etc...

Fault in aircraft warning systems but departure allowed.

Taxy out for second attempt, rushed procedures, before takeoff check not performed, aircraft attempts take-off with slats and flaps retracted...

Unlikely? It's happened before - Northwest MD82 N312RC Detroit 16th August 1987.

Sorry don't know how to post a link to the NTSB report for the above.

[MrNosy2]

Does any one know if any of the crew survived?

[one post only!]

XXX, this is our point totally and we are in agreement. Read manual (MEL etc) and if it says do X to repair. You do X. If it says don't have to repair as long as conditions Y are met, you make sure conditions Y are met, aircraft is signed of and then you go flying.
If anywhere it said test flight is required one would be carried out. If none required it will go straight back into service.
Assuming you are a heli pilot and perhaps you have to test fly after lots of snags but on modern airliners most problems either cause the aicraft to be grounded or continue to fly in accordance to the MEL. As long as MEL conditions are met we take it.
This is what the previous comment about being happy will be. Not just a case of I reckon it will be ok but a case of being happy that all the legal requirements are met!

Also if the aircraft is grounded and repairs carried out, once it has been signed off the aircraft is then flown on a commercial flight with passangers on. Why, because thats legal and safe. No test flight required (in most cases).
Ground runs are often carried out for many engine snags. Engine performance satisfactory and it is signed back into service. Very very few cases actually require a test flight by a test pilot. Why do you think most airlines only have a handful of guys signed off to test fly? Its quite an uncommon occurance. If a test flight is required though it will be done.

PJ2 is totally correct and sounds like he knows what he is talking about. I would be happy to fly with the chap!!! When he's happy I would be happy!

[limp_leek]

Totally off topic and I know it but....

All I saw were pictures and video from the "media" without a time line but.

The amount of ambulances scrambled to the incident was amazing, the emergency services really responded!

As to the helicopters dumping water/retardent on the grass fire... Did they practice that or was that some really good situational awareness by the authorities?

I know the discussion on here will be aircraft related, but from what I saw the emergency services at Madrid were text book!

[NamelessWonder]

WIth regard to the El Mundo Images (I'm not even going to comment on their insensitivity to the injured and bereaved!) a couple of points that seem obvious to me, but have not been commented on:-

1. In picture 1, There appears to be a section of main wing in the foreground with the tailplane in the background resting on the downslope of the gully (note, this assumes we are seeing the image from the rear i.e. point of arrival). Would I be right in thinking that this would suggest that the aircraft broke up before it reached the gully, rather than from the impact of the sudden descent (assuming, of course that some other factor didn't move the wing-section)?

http://estaticos03.cache.el-mundo.net/albumes/2008/08/20/accidente_spanair_barajas/1219268689_extras_albumes_0.jpg

2. In picture 2, aparet from the fuselage section being removed by crane (which would seem questionable in itself, as per previous posts) all of the debris seems to be in very small pieces - not what I recall having seen from other t/o crash images, where fuselage (and wing sections etc) remains largely intact, if broken and burned. Would this not support the probability of a high-speed, or very violent impact, rather than a "pancake" or "slide".. If so, this would seem to support the previous suggestion that the a/c got airborne and was not in the process of an RTO.

http://estaticos03.cache.el-mundo.net/albumes/2008/08/20/accidente_spanair_barajas/1219268630_extras_albumes_0.jpg

Speculation I know, but from what is evident rather than witness accounts.

A sad day for all.

[The Bartender]

I suspect the OAT (TAT & SAT indications, ADIRS info for the Airbus, ADC for the MD80?) would be an MEL item depending upon the availability of a second probe, (usually the case). Not sure if both probes are u/s. Anyone?Found a MMEL here (http://www.opspecs.com/AFSData/MMELs/FINAL/Transport/DC-9%20R37.doc).

I found no mention of OAT or TAT-indications, but RAT and SAT are mentioned:

RAT/Thrust Rating System (Series 30,40,50,80).

---------------
(M) (O) The RAT portion may be inoperative provided:
a) A SAT or Standby RAT indicating System or PMS SAT readout is available,
b) Other Systems affected by the RAT Probe (DFGS, CADC, Thrust Rating, FMS, OMEG, PMS) are considered,
c) Thrust Rating System portion is considered inoperative for the Series 30, 40, and 50 and
Procedures are established to verify engine power setting.

---------------

(O) The EPR Limit/Thrust Rating portion may be inoperative provided:
a) A RAT or SAT Indication System or PMS SAT readout is available,
b) EPR Limit Chevron Automatic Mode is considered inoperative for the Series 80,
c) EPR Limit Mode of the auto throttle is placarded inoperative, and is not used on the Series 80, and
Procedures are established to verify engine power settings
...and...

Static Air Temperature Indicator

---------------

(O) May be inoperative provided Ram Air Temperature (RAT) System is operative.

[jotape]

I raised this point yesterday, and saw it was questioned again in #255. Its a SLF view on things and I think the answer is the one I have always believed in: there are no "best" seats in the case of crashes. Its all about luck (none in this crash), and if lucky then its about following proper evacuation protocols (e.g. BA38).

The facts emerging are that the survivors (who mostly seem to be in desperate conditions) were seated in rows 14-17 - as per El Mundo who have no doubt checked this against the manifest.

Info on the graphic sequence here:
Gráficos | elmundo.es (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/graficos/ago/s3/t4_spanair.html)
(click "comenzar", ignore graphics themselves which are clearly suppositions, the one with the survivor seats is at the end)

[SPA83]

“The organised chaos in which the company exists can’t continue,” said the Spanish pilots’ union Sepla.

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air carriers
in order to ensure dependable and adequate service it is necessary to ensure that an air carrier is at all times operating at sound economic levels;

[tin pusher]

Think this could easily be find out as (most probably) ATC has a legal recording of their SMR (Surface Movement Radar) and ASR (Airborne Survailance Radar) including altitudes and G/S.

[swish266]

The only confirmed facts so far:
1. A/c became airborne before crashing.
2. Witnesses reported engine fire on the runway.
3. Full pax load but well below MTOW on this sector.
4. CAVOK wx conditions.
5. Gate return due tech problem.

Based on this very few "established" facts so far it looks like loss of control due failure.
An engine fire even though dramatic can be a less contributing factor for control loss (compared to engine fail/severe damage) as the engine does not loose thrust instantly in a normal fire scenario. A turbine/compressor disc separation is another but very, very unlikely case even though to an outsider it might look as a fire. On a tail eng mount the yaw is even less pronounced than on a wing mount.
I personally have not flown this type but I presume a thrust reduction t/o must have been performed in this combination of wx/TOW conditions. Which further reduces the impact of yaw on directional control in any eng fail situation.
I would not speculate on the gate return until Spanair or the authorities release the techlog data. For sure it must have increased workload/stress for the flight crew.
So IMHO unless it has been a catastrophic compound failure e. g. an eng turbine/compressor disc separation resulting in flight controls major damage this accident should have been quite manageable.
But we would only know for sure when the FDR, CVR and trajectory data are published with the final report from the competent authorities.
:(

[Vortex what...ouch!]

It's amazing how so many are going on about how "current procedures are safe" and "we are happy to take it with this snag or that" but did I miss something or didn't an aircraft following those procedures just crash and kill 153 people?

[NOLAND3]

Yes Vortex, but how many aircraft 'following those procedures' are departing and getting back to terra firma without any serious issues?? We're human and not everything is perfect... think about it

[Brian Abraham]

Vortex what...ouch! - the only thing missing is the facts. Maybe they followed procedures, and on the other hand, maybe they didn't. In fact it would not be the first time that following procedures caused an accident. Time will tell. Be patient.

[RoyHudd]

Silly comment Vortex. (Not the only one on this thread though)

Flight crew following Standard Operating Procedures enhances safety; it does not guarantee absolute safety. Catastrophic turbine failure rupturing fuel/hydraulic lines, as an example, can cause immediate loss of control. No amount of slavish adherence to SOP's can avoid that.

I wish non-pro pilots would keep off this site. Their comments are almost always unhelpful. The internet is vast; there must be other sites they can go to and speculate at will. As for education of these individuals, again there are many good websites to visit. It is abundantly clear that some posters here have not a clue about handling big jets, MEL's, test flights, SOP's, Engineers' responsibilities, weather, runway surfaces, or aviation in general.

Engineers and pro-pilots only please.

[atakacs]

It's amazing how so many are going on about how "current procedures are safe" and "we are happy to take it with this snag or that" but did I miss something or didn't an aircraft following those procedures just crash and kill 153 people?

How on earth do you know if procedures where followed in this case ? Every human loss is obviously tragic but the only way to avert them is to act rationally and cold minded. Please stop your rubbish - it doesn't help a bit !

[Romeo India Xray]

You are aware of the Swiss Cheese theory? It is rarely a single component, error or failure that causes a catastophe like this. If you are professional aircrew you will know this and also understand the requriement of MEL and deferals in maintenance.

In an ideal world we could all fly 100% servicable AC at all times - But we live in the real world.

I await the official report and my thoughts and parayers are with all those involved.

RIX

[Brian Abraham]

Vortex - you need to separate the sciolists from the professionals (a bit hard to do at times I admit). But you do seem to be over reacting. Do you have a personal involvement?

[Honeytruck]

To reply to Limp Leek, I'm told by a forensic pathologist friend that the systems in place for a major catastrophe are very much better in Madrid than anything we have in place in the UK, as shown by the response to the train bombings. She apparently asked a colleague there what he thought they could have had done differently afterwards, and the reply was "Nothing".

[Hudson Bay]

I'm not familiar with this aircraft but it is being reported that the EGT / TGT gauge was the reason why the aircraft returned to the gate. I know that this is a no-go item for the majority of aircraft and I find it hard to believe that it would be allowed for the MD82.

If this is true and the crew departed with the gauge in-op this would be a serious error of judgement. Madrid is alot hotter and higher than most airports in Europe. The monitoring of gas temperatures is critical at any airport but to a greater degree at Airfields such as Madrid. I hope this is not the case.

[sandbank]

The company's press conference will be starting shortly - probably it will be shown live on Sky and relayed on Radio Five Live.

Some contributors here may not have seen that Spain's Transport Minister Magdalena Alvarez said the plane had taken off, but plunged back to the ground.

[Capt H Peacock]

I would caution drawing any significant conclusions from many of the reports, since many are translations from one language to another or perhaps more. Much meaning can be lost in the process.

If the take-off was rejected, there would be assymetric thrust reverse on the operative side, which would create a tendancy for the aircraft to veer right if the left engine was inoperative.

How did the fire services respond, and were they able to reach the stricken aircraft? In the case of fire, seconds are vital to the survivability of any accident.

A great tragedy, much sympathy to those involved and their comrades.

[FloWa]

Hi,
I'm not sure if this has allready been mentioned before, but if you look at the first picture you seem to be looking at the leading edge section of the wing and it seems that the slats are retracted. I'm not sure about the certified takeoff configurations of a MD80, but this might be somehow a factor in the accident(could anybody provide more info if the MD80 is certified for a No Slats/Flaps only takeoff?). On the other hand it might ofcourse be possible that the Slat retracted after loss of hydraulic power after impact-so pure speculation, but does anybody know if the slats are held in position by hydraulic or just pushed to position by hydraulic and hydraulic power then removed on the MD80 series?

[spinnaker]

So IMHO unless it has been a catastrophic compound failure e. g. an eng turbine/compressor disc separation resulting in flight controls major damage this accident should have been quite manageable.
But we would only know for sure when the FDR, CVR and trajectory data are published with the final report from the competent authorities.

I have only ever flown jets with under wing mounted engines. My question is, how significant is the adverse yaw on the MD82. I found it strange that the left engine failed, yet the A/C went off to the right of the runway. Is it possible to miss identify a failed engine and input the incorrect contol? (its been done before).

[Max Stryker]

In response to your question about the MD taking off without slats:

No can do -. as soon as as move the flap/slat lever into the first slot, the slats come out. The second slot selects slats/flaps 11, which would be the standard TO configuration.

[Christodoulidesd]

hambleoldboy:

How would that (forgot to properly set flaps and slats) explain the reported fire on engine no.1 and (again, reported) explosion?

[facelac]

Too early to speculate on how/why aircraft veered to the right. No facts on what engine actually came on fire.
If ... still beeing speculation, one engine totally separated this would most likely change the center og gravity of the plane so far forward that it would be impossible to control in pitch .... so if airbourne the aircraft would be forced into descend/uncontrolled landing .
Know of a DC9 that suffered severe damage to eng attach points after hard landings, but no clues if this has happened to MD's at all.

[GP7280-POC]

McDonnell Douglas MD-82
EC-HFP 53148/2072 1993-11-01 2 P&W JT8D-219

or 2 P&W JT8D-217A/C ??

Anybody competent outthere to CF ?
thx

[Clandestino]

I hope that CVR and FDR survived the fire - it would make 99% of this sorry thread obsolete in a couple of weeks.

[Pointy Pilot]

Article in today's Torygraph. Madrid plane crash survivors tell of miracle - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/2595364/Madrid-plane-crash-survivors-tell-of-miracle.html)

I heard a horrible noise as we were taking off and the next thing I remember was being flung from the aircraft. I must have passed out but woke when there was a loud explosion.

Support for the "exploding" engine theory?

[Capvermell]

One would imagine that in the event of an evacuation first class seats would be much more desireable. Trying to squeeze out of the can of sardines that is economy class when there is a fire raging sounds like one of the worst possible ways to go.Any reasonable review of catastrophic crashes of large passenger aircraft will in fact show you that the most important factors are to be (a) near an emergency exit that can be opened and (b) in the rear of the aircraft which often breaks off cleanly and does not then burn. Being in First Class or Club Class is only likely to help you in the event of a fire on board an otherwise intact aircraft.

The front of an aircraft (where first and club class are) is usually one of the worst places to be in a major crash since the front of the aircraft frequently takes most of the impact when the aircraft hits something. All of the small number of survivors on the Japanese Air Lines 747 crash where over 500 died for instance were in the very rear of the aircraft. The same thing on the Korean air lines 747 that crashed in Guam.

[slip and turn]

The questions about prior maintenance/fault diagnosis are obviously a horrible thing to have to contemplate - there's a suggestion being aired at the moment that an aircraft from this fleet suffered some kind of engine problem or query whilst in the Canaries at the weekend. Not known if it was the same one. We must all be careful not to second guess these things. The engineers must already be feeling absolutely awful without implying that they were actually personally negligent so early in the investigation. It just isn't fair to even hint at it without absolute evidence.

However, I do think from lessons that might be learned from a number of accidents now, we can conclude that a good new airport is not one measured by whether it has a terminal building designed by Foster or Rogers, pleasant though that may be, but one which has 360 degree level uncluttered surfaces throughout the airport, between and alongside runways and way beyond those actives.

If money can be found to buy and build car parks and motorway links, then surely it can be found to just buy scrubland and scrape it level?

[MAVERICK 1]

I think there is something very odd. If indeed the eye witness accounts are correct that the no.1 engine was on fire why did it yaw right and crash?

I cant help but wonder if there maybe 2 scenarios here.

Maybe it was the classic sim nightmare scenario of engine fire on one engine and engine failure on the other and they delt with the fire first and closed that thrust lever without noticing the no2 engine had failed there by leaving them with not enough thrust to fly but enough thrust from no1 to cause a right yaw?

Or maybe they shut down the wrong engine. It has been done before and no matter how aware of that you are us pilots are human at the end of the day. It may have been identified correctly and wrong thrust lever closed or maybe mis identified and the wrong engine shut down.

Some eye witnesses (normally unreliable) say the no1 engine separated. If that happened and it took out the left hand side of the tail plane lift will still have been produced on the right hand side turning the a/c to the left plus the no1 engine would have forced the aircraft to the left if it was running!

Now before anyone gets offended that omg how can he say its pilot error and get their knickers in a twist i would like to make 2 points.

1)Pilots love to speculate in situations like this, with and without all the facts, right or wrongly (just like we love to moan).

2)The fact is i really hope it was not pilot error that led to the final hole in the swiss cheese but facts are facts and in most cases pilot error is the biggest cause of crashes, we are the last link in the error chain and if we get it wrong then there is no escape!

My thoughts go out to the crew and pax of the flight and their families that are left behind.

[CirrusF]

French television report that the pilot reported the problem on the initial RTO to company ops, and asked for further advice. Company Ops told them to go.

An interviewed aviation expert also said that probably the exploding engine severed hydraulic lines to the tail control services, preventing the pilots from continuing the departure on a single engine.

[flynowfl250]

I have found the pax list, but I can´t find any information on the crew members? Has anyone ran into that list yet?

[Biggles225]

From todays Times on line:
'Experts suggested that a powerful gust could have forced the pilot to put too much pressure on the engine during take-off, making it burst into flames.'

Expert scmexpert

[MAVERICK 1]

Just looking at the pics posted by Namelesswonder on page 16, on the first pic looking at the tail there is damage to the righthand side of the tail!

All witness accounts state the left hand engine being the problem.

If there was a disintergrating engine those pics would suggest it was no2 not no1 therefore explaining the right yaw, which leads to the point if that was the case maybe loss of all hydraulics caused by debris of the disintergrating which led to a totally unflyable a/c!?

[BAe 146-100]

Looking at an acars search the last time the aeroplane appears to have flown apart from yesterday was on the Monday night (18th August) on a flight from Malaga to Madrid. It appears that the aircraft did not fly on the following day (Tuesday) at all. Whether the crew of that flight reported a problem therefore the a/c was to be taken out of action on Tuesday remains to be seen.

Interesting though.

[Max Stryker]

Company ops shouldn't be able to tell them anything. If they tell me to go with a broken plane, I'll kindly tell them where they can go.:E

And as for the expert's comment on the exploding engine severing hydraulic lines - I think that an uncontained failure is highly unlikely, and even if the hydraulics have been affected, the MD still flies on cables, bless its conventional soul.

Like I said before - my two cents would be riding on either a reverser opening (and possibly starting to produce thrust), or a failure exactly at rotation (compounding a fast pull during the same), and overusing the ailerons during the initial response to the failure, causing the plane to start oscillating wing-to-wing.

I don't know about the bus or the 73, but the MD is prone to that, should you be overzealous on the initial response to the yaw. Like someone here already said - a lot of rudder (and you will need all of it in the MD, on TO thrust), and minimum bank (up to 5 degrees) to maintain directional control.

[Fake Sealion]

Having followed this thread from early on in this tragic incident I have been aware of the numerous uses of the word reported
Reported engine fire
Reported explosion
Reported smoke from engine

and so on.....

Is it now time to install a high quality CCTV system which records each and every departure at major airports. Such unambiguous evidence would surely permit in some cases, the AAIB teams to reach important conclusions very quickly and set in motion remedial action to enhance safety.

For example if a component is seen detaching itself from the aircraft this will form an immediate and crucial part of the post incident investigation permitting structural checks on similiar aircraft to take place in days rather than months.....maybe avoiding more loss of life?

[saman]

Maverick,

Your quote :- "If that happened and it took out the left hand side of the tail plane lift will still have been produced on the right hand side turning the a/c to the left"

Sorry Maverick, but the tailplane does not produce upward lift but download; the cg of all commercial aircraft being forward of the centre of lift. That being the case, it would have rolled t'other way.

Let's wait (im)patiently for the report shall we?

[virginblue]

as a veteran SLF, would like to know where the survivors were sitting - instinctively would assume in the front as MD engines are in the back


Neither nor. Apparently they sat in the middle in rows 14 to 17.

[Madbob]

This is a tragic accident and IMHO it is too early and inappropriate to speculate as to the cause. From the photos I would say that it was a miracle than anyone got out alive from this.

I also believe that the crash response by the various Spanish agiencies was first class and that lives have no doubt been saved as a result. It makes me question though what kind of response one might expect to an accident of this magnitude in most countries of the world - including the UK.

Bambi buckets from helos in the UK - I don't think so! The fire and medical first responders looked like they had also trained for this and knew what to do. Well done. The fact that flying ops continued on other runways (at a reduced capacity) was quite impressive too. If this had happened in the UK I think there would have been mass diversions and delays.....

Via con Dios.

MB

[leeds 65]

IF the decision is to go no recall items take place below 400agl

I presume the flight crew didnt touch the throttles or fire bottles.they were probably struggling to control the bugger and raise landing gear with positive rate.

thats my opinion

[as17]

I think the reason for the aircraft crashing off to the right despite it having a fire on its left engine may be because its right wing touched the ground first, as eye witness reports state. Surely this would mean it cartwheeling off to the right?

[parabellum]

You may wish to ask exactly how much fire cover was available to cater for the incoming after the accident, was it sufficient, or reduced, should all ops have been stopped?

Don't be too ready to knock the UK response from emergency services, when it is an emergency they are second to none.

[AmeliaJane]

Seeing the pictures takes me back to the 2006 Atlantic Airways accident (Only 16 people onboard, of which 4 were killed). I went to the crash site as part of my job before the aircraft was removed. I don't like to speculate about the causes of accidents, holding off any judgement until the NTSB etc. return with their findings. They are much more qualified to determine the cause than I am.

Normally I would therefore refrain from commenting on an accident that's under investigation, but I guess this one hit a little to close to home, bringing back images I had hoped would be more blurred by now. And I only saw the wreck, met some next of kin, and a few of the survivors once they were out of hospital. I do not envy the rescue workers at either accident site, the images must be nightmarish.

The pictures show the plane having ending up in something like a gully/ravine. The reason I'm reminded of the 2006 accident is because that aircraft went over the edge of the runway, and broke apart, then engine fire and explosion. Pictures are eerily similar, and I remember thinking then how fortunate it was the plane was almost empty.

I've seen it mentioned in the thread about a large area of grass/brush being on fire, which is of course highly likely (burst fuel tank, leak, fire). The brush caught fire in that 2006 accident, and some survivors got burned after leaving the aircraft. What happened to the four inside, I don't know, and would prefer not to think about.

Am amazed at the emergency efforts, including helicopters to douse the fire. They may have made the difference for those few who did escape (or got thrown out). I'm not sure the brush being on fire could cause emergency efforts to be slowed, but the gully/ravine is another issue. I'm not familiar with the airport in question, so don't know whether emergency vehicles would have been able to get close, or if they'd have to aid from up high/at a distance?

[faa_cpl_h]

fake_sealion's suggestion: 'Is it now time to install a high quality CCTV system which records each and every departure at major airports.' sounds like a good idea, after all we spend thousands (millions?) a year filming drunks on a fri/sat night in our major cities. Wouldn't take much to extend the existing security systems at most airports to achieve this.

[Frangible]

The incredible numbers browsing the site, more than I have ever seen for a crash here, have not been rewarded, with some exceptions, with the usual level of informed opinion (e.g. BA 038). There has been far too much flaming of the media and of ill-advised posters who should have been filtered out. And why not simply delete most of the first 4 or 5 pages when nobody knew anything at all, and try and concentrate on what people believe to be credible rumours and make informed and responsible speculation?

For my tuppence worth, what about a stall of the right wing? The eye-witness driver is unlikely to have been wrong about seeing the wing hit the ground. If the wing was stalling, would that cause it to veer right? Maybe if a hydraulic failure caused the leading edge slats to retract (or is there mechanical lock-out?). It still leaves open the question of what was going on with the good engine. Aspects of this crash recall the DC-10 at Chicago 1979.

From seeing the el Mundo pictures it also seems that the aircraft fire started a brush-fire, which would explain the white smoke and the water-bombing helo and the large area of blackened ground around the emergency vehicles.

[OFSO]

Is it now time to install a high quality CCTV system which records each and every departure at major airports. Such unambiguous evidence would surely permit in some cases, the AAIB teams to reach important conclusions very quickly and set in motion remedial action to enhance safety.

Absolutely ! When I was last at Barajas the same thought occurred to me. There are many parts of the airfield that are out of sight from the tower. Trouble is you'd need a lot of cameras.

Still, I agree with what you suggest - although bean-counters will (as ever) say - how many crashes occur ? How many times would camera produce useful results ?

Location is always a problem. Remember the Britannia 757 crash at GRN a few years ago ? Admitedly at night and in a severe thunderstorm, but it took over an hour to locate the aircraft, which was so near the terminal building that some survivors had already arrived there on foot.

R

[Taildragger Pilot]

Captain: Antonio Garcia Luna
F/O: Fco Javier Mulet Pujol
C/C: Lourdes Romero Florez
C/C: Sonsoles Lorenzo Simarro
C/C: Sonia Rodriguez del Castillo
C/C: Susana Marin Ramos
C/C: Raquel Perez Sanchez
C/C: Gabriel Guerrero Duran
C/C: Antonia Martinez Jimenez

The only one known to be alive is Antonia
Last 3 were flying as pax.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Post # 29 ( long way back - sorry ! )
I would have thought it a good learning experience for you as professionals.

Pilotinmydreams - I really don't like being rude, but are you from another planet ? What do you think has been happening following every accident since the Wright brothers ? You're in the same box as sandbank, absolutely no idea of what the aviation industry is about, I wouldn't dream of trying to tell you how to do your job - whatever it is - so keep out of ours.

Despite all the learning, all the experience, all the practice, there is often the unexpected ' next time ' and one does the best one can at that time.

I have absolutely no idea what caused this disaster, and at the moment neither does anyone else, but we all will - eventually, and it will be filed in our personal RAM for future reference.

[NigelOnDraft]

fake_sealion's suggestion: 'Is it now time to install a high quality CCTV system which records each and every departure at major airports.' sounds like a good ideaGuess you'd ban LVP Ops as well then :{

Might be a good idea, if (and only if), it turns out the accident investigation is hindered by lack of such cameras... But I do not recall any (?) Accident Reports recommending such cameras, and I'd rather go with their suggestions than pPrune posters wanting instant answers ;)

NoD

[OFSO]

AmeliaJane wrote: Am amazed at the emergency efforts, including helicopters to douse the fire. They may have made the difference for those few who did escape (or got thrown out). I'm not sure the brush being on fire could cause emergency efforts to be slowed, but the gully/ravine is another issue. I'm not familiar with the airport in question, so don't know whether emergency vehicles would have been able to get close, or if they'd have to aid from up high/at a distance?


Living here in Catalunia (Spain) I can tell you fire-fighting helicopters and other aircraft are stationed everywhere. As in, it's rare not to have a week pass by without training flights or infra-red scans of powerlines from helicopters. And roadside/railside fires nearly always are dealt with from the air, let alone the terrible scrub/forest fires we get when the Tramontana is blowing.

Our local drop-zone (Empuriabrava - LEAP) has had four yellow amphibian water-dropping aircraft stationed there all summer and the nearest fire-fighting helicopter base is on the road to Girona, about 15 miles south.

Every community here has large water resevoirs for the choppers to dip into (they used to use swimming pools but owners objected !) and when it gets really bad the big Bombadier's arrive with water plus supressant foam.

I can't speak for the rest of Spain although I suspect it's the same, but aerial fire-fighting in Catalunia is very well organised.

[Christodoulidesd]

"But how do you cover the entire runway length without a manned camera (like some USN carriers)? Whichever angle is chosen will exclude another one.Do you go for infra-red cameras at night ?The A380 has a high and wide (angle) camera looking forward from the vertical stabiliser.It may be more useful to record this on the DFDR for future build aircraft."

I am a professional video editor and videographer and i can easily tell you that if they employ one more person (each shift) that his job will be to be sited in the control tower or somewhere else in the airport facilities and control the cameras via remote control and console with multiple screens (i've done it several times in auditorium halls and concerts locked in a closed control and monitor room where i had no direct visibility to the actual source i was filming other than the monitors and had absolutely no problems), things are way easier than what some people might think are. Problem is who will be willing to invest in such a system which admitedly costs a lot and the handling personnel.

[faa_cpl_h]

(especially for farrell): A number of cameras tasked automatically by the ground surveillance radar?

[Pilotinmydreams]

Sorry - I wasn't meaning to be demeaning. I highly respect you all as professionals doing a job which I could only dream about. I was just interested to learn how you as pilots learn more as a result of tragedy like this. My apologies if I offended anyone - it wasn't the intention.

[A A Gruntpuddock]

As a non-flyer I hesitate to intrude into such a thread, but every time I see reports of an aircraft accident and the resulting confusion I wonder why cameras are not routinely installed.
I get 1 hour of 640*480 video on a 2gb memory card so surely the cost of recording is not a major problem.
You could probably cover all runways in an airport in good detail with about 20 cameras.
As the aircraft tailplanes seem to survive most accidents, perhaps cameras could also be mounted there which would show engine condition, flap and thrust reverser deployment, etc.
Apologies if this causes any offence to other posters.

[Frangible]

The practical value of video runway surveillance at airports has been known for decades and has been (pretty sure about that) recommended by crash investigators. Even if it hasn't, the benefits are still pretty obvious. A few cameras on the control tower would do it, with infra-red for nighttime. It could be used by airlines to monitor landings, enable analysis of RTOs and go-arounds, minor collisions on the ramp, etc. etc. And that is before stating the obvious value in a crash investigation on or near the airport (about 70% IIRC of crashes are within a mile of the tower). And in the US there is a lot of worry about land and hold short, and about potentially disastrous on-ground collisions and runway incursions. Video would help analyse all that.

The reason they are not installed is because if any such images became public it would be bad PR for the airport and the airline.

[PassengerDan]

Now I read that another MD 82 had to make a emergency landing at Gran Canaria just recently following trouble with both engines on a flight from Lanzarote to Madrid. Just posting what I have read as reported......

[Kyunghee]

The Guardian is reporting there was a problem with a Spanair plane's engines at the weekend:

"Spanair confirmed an MD-82 was forced to make an emergency landing last Saturday on a flight from Lanzarote in the Canary Islands to Madrid because of problems with both of its engines. The plane landed in the nearby island of Gran Canaria, the destination of yesterday's flight.
A company official said he did not know if the same plane was involved in both cases."

If said official "did not know", I would have thought it quite easy for him to check if it was the same aircraft.

[ORAC]

Passenger list as published by The Times (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4579823.ece)

[dgutte]

Sky News just reporting that the aircraft experienced "overheating in the air intake valve"

[forget]

Pilotinmydreams, I was just interested to learn how you as pilots learn more as a result of tragedy like this.

A professional aviation accident report is a work of art. The UK's AAIB is up there with the world's best. Take a look at THIS (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_502831.pdf) example and let me know of anything they missed.

[Flight Safety]

Video camaras (regular and infrared) viewing runways and taxiways at airports, with recorders, is an outstanding idea for many many reasons. Can't imagine why it hasn't been done before now. Compared to the costs of most airport infrastructure, as cheap as dirt. Heck, even Walmart does it.

To the relavent authorities, make a decision, get it done.

[Kyunghee]

A US newsaper reports the following:

Spanair says the plane that crashed in Madrid experienced overheating in an air intake valve prior to a first attempt at takeoff. It is not clear if this had anything to do with the crash that killed 153 of the 172 people aboard.
Company spokesman Javier Mendoza says the device, called an air intake probe, was reporting overheating in the front of the plane under the cockpit.
He said Thursday that technicians corrected the problem by ''de-energizing'' the probe, or turning it off. He says this is standard procedure.
Spanair says the plane was cleared by company technicians after the problem was fixed

[efatnas]

looks like a pencilwhip regarding the temp. probe; OPS pulls the same old number over there too, he; if they would have looked the engine over a little better, which you would expect after a taxiback, nothing would have happened; never flown a DC 9, but friends tell me the plane can be a squirly handful low and slow; to me fatal getthereritis got them
Ciao

[boeingdream787]

Its being done already fellas........!!! You just dont know bout it.....nor will u ever.THATS the whole purpose.Self utilisation and internal use only!! SCARY.........
The cameras on the runways and taxiways that is........

[Lost in Saigon]

A US newsaper reports the following:

Spanair says the plane that crashed in Madrid experienced overheating in an air intake valve prior to a first attempt at takeoff. It is not clear if this had anything to do with the crash that killed 153 of the 172 people aboard.
Company spokesman Javier Mendoza says the device, called an air intake probe, was reporting overheating in the front of the plane under the cockpit.
He said Thursday that technicians corrected the problem by ''de-energizing'' the probe, or turning it off. He says this is standard procedure.
Spanair says the plane was cleared by company technicians after the problem was fixed

So which is it? Is it a valve or a probe? That is an example of why you can't put much faith in these types of reports.

[The Bartender]

It says the probe reported overheating in the valve... ...so it's both...

[Airbus Unplugged]

I imagine they mean Bleed Air Overheat.

[X-37]

It's not much use speculating as to which bit failed.After the failure the a/c was either unflyable or the guys were unable to fly it. The recorders should reveal which.

[AOB9]

This is actually my first day on this forum. I have joined other 'pilots forums' but have made a policy of not posting. I am not a pilot and not qualified in any aspect of aeronautics. Therefore I do not feel I have any right to comment on dreadful accidents such as this. However, I have a deep love of flying and aviation, that is why I visit these forums.
I agree with a few other comments on this and other threads that 'non-aviators' should not post on 'professional' forums. However, (as much as I agree) how can such a 'read only' policy be properly policed.

All I can say is that there are some pretty silly statements being made since yesterdays accident, some of them by the gutter media such as Sky News. It makes my blood boil when I see 'tabloid types' attempting to look convincing when using techical jargon of which they have absolutley no understanding. I also believe that journalists are posing on websites such as this in order to 'stir it up' and get someone to react by making potentially damaging responses, but tasty news.

[skyken]

Total Air Temperature probe is the correct terminology. It is energized and provides heat to dispel any water or ice or precipitation that may occur. It, in my opinion had nothing to do with the crash. As far as reporting, the correct terminology may have been given to a reporter but then the reporter bastardizes the info or it gets lost in translation.

[JamesT73J]

Possibly a total red-herring, like the Concorde reverser work at CDG before the accident.

[fireflybob]

Any loss of life is a tragedy but you have to face the fact that life is a bit risky! But perhaps the media should concentrate on the 3,500 people who die on British roads every year (not to mention countless others who suffer serious injury) but this isn't headline news because it's "just" a few every day.

If you are going to pack scores of fragile people into narrow tubes and shoot them through the air at circa 600 miles per hour supported on wings full of inflammable explosive then maybe you shouldnt be surprised when things, very occasionally, go wrong. By any yardstick modern avaition is outstandingly safe. This is not a reason for complacency. Everyone who is involved in our exciting industry knows that the price of "failure" is high. The media (and to some extent all of us) are looking for instant answers in an age when speed is the essence. But accident investigation is a painstaking task which can take months if not years in certain cases.

I feel for the friends colleagues and family of all that have perished at Madrid. There is a comradeship in aviation which spreads worldwide - my prayers and thoughts are with those kindred spirits who were doing the challenging task which so many have now come to regard as "routine". We should remind ourselves that aviation is a miracle of the age we live in but the stakes can be high.

[Nemrytter]

I've just seen this posted elsewhere:
I got a friend that work's on barajas tower i've asked him about what happens he said:

JKK5022 was at 36L ready to go and the crew request to return to the parking area because they reported something about technical issues.

It was being authorized to go to remote parking area 12 where it stays not much time.

New taxi to 36L this time.

Once it starts to take off...
- Rotated well but once on air the motor 2 started to burn V1 ok but not reached V2 then the plane started to bank right probably in a stall... goes down.

The plan of this plane was go from madrid to canarias it means at least 80%++ fuel, so the plane was probably full or so... so you know what this means.

I think he has a little bit of confusion going on in that text, but I felt it might still be useful to post here. Make of it what you will.

[apaddyinuk]

4 of the cabin crew were MAD based.
4 more were BCN based positioning down to operate a flight the following day. Spanair bases are relatively small so everyone tends to know everyone within their base. So needless to say the entire airline is in a serious sense of shock and to have two base sets of crew involved is almost like a double knocking.

[Capt.KAOS]

Sky News just reporting that the aircraft experienced "overheating in the air intake valve"This was translated in teh biggest Dutch newspaper as "problems with the air supply of the heating systems"...

Darn journalists.... :ugh:

[sevenstrokeroll]

errors in translation? who knows...but if the fire loop was "turned off" because it was detecting a hot air or BLEED air leek...maybe something else going on in the engine??

the DC9 has a RAT (ram air temp) does the MD80 have a TAT or A RAT (not ram air turbine in this case)

[Eagle402]

Apologies if this has been mentioned earlier in the thread but I'm not prepared to go though every post as most of this thread is utter dross especially the initial tit-for-tat 'updates'.

Putting that aside, I have noticed that the Times Online website is using selected posts from pprune and heading them as "from the respected pilot's website, pprune.org". Interesting use of the apostrophe suggests that that the pilots themselves are respected and not the website, which , considering the drivel posted by many of the contributors, is remarkably accurate.

[slip and turn]

@Frangible: Have a heart for the moderators on this one :ok:. I happened to be watching the news when it first happened and your suggestion of deleting a goodly proportion of the first few pages indeed happened. You can see from the first post when the news first hit the international headlines. Well I can tell you that in the first hour after that I saw Duck Rogers had very concisely and properly cut at least three pages down to two, despite it growing like Topsy with some chaoticly conflicting reports from very respected news agencies like Reuters, and attempts by some to follow every turn in the numbers (I reported one reversal myself so as not to raise false hopes too long when some said 2, some said none, some said 7 fatalities). But no-one in the first hour or two of tv reporting could have foreseen the scale of the disaster from the limited video available except dear old Chris Yates actually, who was rather put on the spot albeit being paid for it you might argue, and actually cautioned gently that it looked serious when he first saw the smoking aftermath in that long range El Mundo video). He did allow himself to hope on hope as we all did for a period after that when Reuters and one other had 'confirmed' no fatalities, but he is only human.

We might not enjoy his ums and ers but he was trying his best to be sensitive first and foremost to the needs of worried friends and relatives I think as the scant news hit the airwaves. And actually that was the priority and remains the priority, as SAS's CEO went to pains to say this morning.

Sadly, despite a brief twenty minutes or so yesterday of 100% false hope, this was not a BA038 'alls well that ends well on the day'. That's why it feels much different I guess just 24 hours in.

I think the mods have worked their socks off. From what I have seen, they were extremely quickly on to it like the PPRuNe emergency it was. They know that PPRuNe on such a day acts as a kind of repository for all the news as it breaks, and as such I think they have edited it admirably in the first cuts, and no doubt once they catch their breath, it will continue into the weeks ahead in some further tidied guise as a thread which commands the gravity it and this website deserve on all the major issues...

[wileydog3]

I am a strong advocate of teaching/learning especially when it is taken to heart. Initially, there are no stupid questions.

Yes, initially a novice can use that defense for questions but once the question is answered by those who know, it is no longer a learning situation.

Those who fly and who know about MELs and CDLs and systems have tried to explain that test flights for minor systems problems is not warranted anymore than a test drive in your car after replacing the knob on your radio. But some persist... and therein is the problem.

NO ONE knowingly takes an an airplane, car, bicycle, skates, horse that they think is defective and will cause injury and/or death once they attempt to use it. Often there seems to be some suspension of reality when it comes to applying normal human consideration and reasoning when it comes to airlines, pilots and flying. It is as if pilots and mechanics, who do this stuff everyday, have no understanding of consequence. Rubbish! and silly rubbish at that.

[wileydog3]

what people are trying to point out to you that the aviation industry is not driven by safety; it is run as a commercial operation where profits are put ahead of true safety. If you do not believe this

Safety is merely one of the drivers and it competes with resources. You can be completely safe if you never fly but that will not make any money. There is no single factor and to say that any industry is driven solely for profit is not a correct summary.

Safety, reliability, efficiency are all in the formula and they are in conflict. So one has to decide what risks can be accepted. For example, many US carriers have stopped doing NDB approaches because the potential rewards do not justify the risks. Same with circling approaches.

There is no silver bullet, magic wand or single driver.

[Wodrick]

The MD 80 has a single RAT probe, anti ice heated of course, and three outputs CADC #1 & #2 and Flight Deck instrument or System Display Panel which will depend on airframe age and instrument fit.

[VAFFPAX]

AmeliaJane, you echo the concern I raised last night (about a drop in elevation between the runway and its runoff beyond the end) and the strip of 'nothing' between the runway and its parallel counterpart. Even on Google Maps you can see that it is relatively rocky terrain with one map by a Spanish site showing the two streams that cross it. One apparently saved some of the passengers flung out of the plane.

As OFSO also points out, any major city with an airport in countries with very dry weather (where grass can suddenly go up in flames purely thanks to a shard of glass) will have some sort of well-planned emergency response to a major brush/bush fire. South Africa for example is also very well-prepared for this, especially considering that in winter there is generally no rain to speak of and high-speed winds can tear across the countryside, carrying fire very quickly across a very large expanse of terrain.

So the response by Madrid emergency authorities was well-executed.

S.

[wileydog3]

Vortex It's amazing how so many are going on about how "current procedures are safe" and "we are happy to take it with this snag or that" but did I miss something or didn't an aircraft following those procedures just crash and kill 153 people?

The airplane was airborne and thus beyond V2. So no, procedures were not followed and that poses the question. Why?

No one trains to abort the takeoff after V1 and especially after getting airborne. You may remember a -1011 at JFK a few years ago when the crew got a false stick shaker warning and put the airplane back on the runway after getting airborne, again with negative consequences.

So, yes, you did miss something.

[Trojan1981]

it has two flaws...bad piloting and bad maintenance.

The DC9 was called the last "pilot's airliner".

If you point at the md80 crashes by the third world airlines, see the above

You are right. I don't personally beleive the A/C is inherently unsafe, as stated (but ignored) in my original post.
But the bad maintenance is not restricted to third world countries.

Alaska Airlines Flight 261 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Airlines_Flight_261)

[xkoote]

Hi all,

I've taken the time to read 20 pages of posts. Some more "apt" than others to be sure i don't kick in open doors or appear to be a quick poster.
Here are some reasons why I'm leaning more and more to extraordinary circumstances in the emergency phase of this flight.
Here a few facts about the MD-80 and this particular situation. Some haven't been mentioned before, some have.

1. Contrary to some posts and article the MD80 is a VERY safe plane. Especially in this scenario because,

2. Together with the MD-11, (dunno about the DC-10), the MD-80 is one of the very few aircraft equipped with the "dial a flap" system allowing the optimum use of ANY flap setting for a specific runway (e.g. Flaps 3.8°). Meaning that at the long runway, that particular flight wold have had a VERY high rotation speed because of very low flaps settings. Maybe even less than 5°!. This system of course must be used by the airline. The high speed does not bode well in case of an RTO due to extra mass, but the high speed and low flaps are invaluable in an N-1 situation and airborne.

3. The MD80 has conventional controls, and were the rudder to lose hydraulic pressure (in this case due to damage, as the rudder receives hydraulic pressure from thr #2 system) it would automatically revert to a control tab setup. The high rotation speed in this scenario would benefit the control tab operation.

4. The MD80 has 2 independant hydraulic systems, one AUX pump in the #2 system (because of the importance of the rudder), PLUS a transfer pump that is able to trasfer hydraulic pressure from one sytem to the other.

5. The MD80, contrary to some erroneous articles is highly dependant and highly redundant as can be seen from point 4. This model was newer than some A320 even, throwing away the notion that old planes are unsafe. Remember the 777 engine shutdown problems? The A320 flight control computer woes in the late 80's and early 90's? The MD80 had nothing of the kind. The AA MD80 grounding was because they neglected to perform an AD note that had been issues for at LEAST one year.

6. A system on the MD80 automatically reduces rudder movement with increasing speed, helping the pilots in eliminating the need to pay extra attention to rudder overuse.

7. A reverser deployment between V1 and V2 I think is indeed one of the most horrific scenrios a well trained crew can face. But the obvious mention of and explosion and/or fire rules that out "in my opinion".

No, in my opinion there must be something else we don't know yet (actually we don't know jack sh*t). It may have been an uncontained explosion severing important control cable to the rudder. It may also be incorrect procedures followed for this situation. One other thing the crews did have going against them "probably" was the fact that being a long runway, they would have been derating the engines. On the MD80, when you derate, you lose the Automatic Reserve Thrust feature. Of course this, together with runway length, temps, any MEL items, winds and more, are automatically taken into account in the load sheet software and runway analysis/takeoff speeds and weights. But it's still a small tool they could have had. Even so, there's another system called the ATR (automatic Thrust Restoration) which "should" have set the thrust of the remaining engine at least to G/A thrust in this particular scenatio.
Other than that, the only thing I can see as working against the crews that fatefull afternoon, was if MAYBE the RAT sensor was measuring errouneously and this sending false data to the thrust rating computer. But it's a wild assumption (as is most of what I'm saying as we simply don't know yet). Lastly, the MD80 is loooong. Small elevators, swept wings and a very narrow wheel base. She's NOT an easy plane to fly.

Lastly I want to point out that my post is intended as information to those interested in a more technical view and not those fed by newspapers. It's not my view of what must have happened. I'm an airline pilot and in any case deeply mourn the loss of life and know that no matter how many times you enter a sim, life throws curves at you. My conelences to those affected, and let's at least hope we can all learn from this devastating situation.


Xander

[PPRuNe Towers]

Depending on your personal settings most of you will see 20 posts on the first page of this thread.

However we can see 37, an indication of how the 4 mods working this forum yesterday were cutting away the breathless pack.

Additionally we spent much of the evening and again today briefing journalists contacting us. There aren't any excuses for them not being able to write without speaking to current pilots who can excise the nonsense.

Rob

[wileydog3]

EFANAS looks like a pencilwhip regarding the temp. probe; OPS pulls the same old number over there too, he; if they would have looked the engine over a little better, which you would expect after a taxiback, nothing would have happened; never flown a DC 9, but friends tell me the plane can be a squirly handful low and slow; to me fatal getthereritis got them

So you believe the pilots would not have any reservations about someone 'pencil whipping' a potentially serious problem?

And try to explain, please, why the crew would have 'gethereitis' when they are departing for an station that is not a domicile. Generally 'getthereitis' is associated with trying to get HOME, not trying to get away from home.

[md-100]

1.
You apply a certain amount of power, since the time taken to accelerate a jet engine from idle is not only significant, but varies between engines... Once you have the engines "stable" at a mid power setting, it takes far less time, and less variable between engines, to takeoff power...

In practice, this means if you just pushed the throttles forward form idle, one may well start producing significant thrust well before the other, and the aircraft turn - all rather embarrassing



In md80 (jt8d-200series engine) for takeoff, first you have to acelerate to 1.4 EPR, let both engines stabilize and then aply full power. That is because the engines take its time to accelerate and it happens frecuently ( depenending on bleed configuration and other stuff), sometime one engine spools up faster than the other and if you aply full power could yaw the aircraft. Another fact is that you have to check parameters at 1.4 EPR (all shoud be ok to proceed). Another fact is that at 60 kts the autothrottle uncluth (clump) and no longer control the throttles lever, so if you dont reach take off power at 60 kts, the autothrottle just leave the power it reaches at 60 kts, so lets suppose one engine reach takeoff power, the other just spooling, airplane starts to move, a moderate headwind, the airplane reaches 60 kts and only one engine reaches T/O power, the other less power, then engine failure of first engine.....


2. the md80 is one of the safest, strong plane, most of the accident involve md were pilot or mnt problems.

3. the md has 1 rat probe, and give information to the TRP (thrust rating panel) which tells the different max EPR for different cnfig (t/o, clb, etc), but you always have a t/o card that tells EPR T/O and have to match the EPR T/O on TRP, if it doesnt something is wrong.

4.Someone said it is difficult to control yaw in V1cut in md80, that is not true, you even need less rudder pedal than 737 and a little aileron.

5. just wait what CVR and FDR say.

[Steve Michell]

Fellows,

A couple of questions.
What has a fixed TAT probe to do with loss of control of an aircraft?
What has a malfunctioning bleed air valve to do with loss of control?
Why didn't the plane fly earlier in the day?
What is a 'overheat in an air intake valve'?
Why did it return to the gate in the first place?
Why is there no follow up on the picture of a deployed thrust reverser which in itself, when deployed in flight, caused other aircraft to loose control? No pilot in his right mind will EVER deploy a thrust reverser in flight.

I am an airline captain. Flying MD aircraft. So, please, only professional responses to these questions.
Anyone has any information regarding the aircraft techlog?

Steve

[BenThere]

I don't know what happened and am not speculating, but the thought occurred to me that if a reverser deployed at or around rotation, or at least after V1, there would be very little time to recover, if recovery is indeed possible at all.

Such an instance might be an exception to the 'go' decision after V1 where the pilot considers the aircraft incapable of flight.

A deployed reverser would possibly account for the erratic flight path at Madrid and the loss of control.

Again, this is an idle thought and I have no evidence that it pertains to the Madrid accident.

On another topic, even though MD-8x engines are near centerline, the yaw caused by asymmetrical thrust is exacerbated by the aft moment of the engines. The leverage is probably greater than an outboard engine on a four engine aircraft. As on the Lear mentioned earlier, you can't be too judicious with the application of rudder. It takes a full foot down, and conscious holding of that foot to the degree necessary to maintain track.

We used to deploy reversers in flight on the DC-8, though I never met anyone who liked doing it. The 8 had no inflight speed brakes.

[Wirelock]

one theory we were discussing at work last night....
IF the P2 probe was faulty on the right hand engine.... lh engine experienced a compressor breach(theory only) and engine fire.
as the P2 probe is faulty the RH is not producing enough thrust to get in the air.

as i am told spanair SOP for a fire in the engine is to keep thrust on even with engine on fire.. get in the air and then address the engine fire.

if there had been a catastrophic engine failure of the LH engine then ,it would not have been producing thrust anymore, coupled with the probe problem on RH engine to cause the crash

a collegue( licenced engineer, on MD80 but not current) was 1 of the 1st on the scene... he said that the TR camshell was stuck in the grass and completely seperated form the aircraft. in his opinion they were trying to stop the take off. he also witnessed skid marks on the tarmac.(i know that this is his opinion but i am sure the accident investigators will be looking for his account of what he witnessed)

although i am not familiar with the MD80 MEL, from info here, it seems as the P2 probe is a go item... but for me there must have been another event that brought the bird down

[PaperTiger]

just wait what CVR and FDR say.Which will confirm or dispell the many "facts" repeated here.

Airborne or not.
Engine failure/fire/UEF.
Reverse selected.
Aileron inputs.
Rudder inputs.

An engine out at or after V1 should not result in loss of control providing the correct procedures are followed. Something clearly exceptional occurred here. Eye witnesses and the media do not know what that was and neither does anyone here.

[Otto Nove Due]

What do they mean by this?

There were reports that pilots had complained of strong winds on the runway. Experts suggested that a powerful gust could have forced the pilot to put too much pressure on the engine during take-off, making it burst into flames.

Madrid plane crash: ‘Everything is burnt. It is the closest thing to Hell’ - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4576776.ece)

[orangelitebulbtech]

As a licenced engineer i find it very sad and somewhat laughable that some people would suggest that any engineer would allow an aircraft with a serious defect to leave the gate knowingly. There are strict guidelines which govern whether an aircraft is despatchable or not..... On a daily basis engineers carry the burden of responsibilty and always have safety as their number one consideration... Nobody wants to see this type of thing happen.

My best wishes and thoughts go out to all involved in this tragic accident.

[RoyHudd]

This site MUST be re-named....to say the Aviation Rumours Network, or the like....simply to avoid any of the media confusing educated professional opinion with general public outcry, however well-meaning it may be.

There is such an abundance of ill-informed material on this thread alone, it makes me shudder to think that the Times, Sky, BBC, or others may be attributing this to Professional Pilots, as per the title of the web-site.

As a professional pilot, who has subscribed to this once-excellent website, I believe the time has come for us pros to dissociate ourselves from this vehicle of rumour-mongering, in order to ensure our reputation as a professional body is not further damaged. That is not to level criticism at the moderators, who are excellent. This has nevertheless become a circus.

And as regards this nasty accident, no-one yet has the slightest clue as to what caused it. Just theories, without all the facts to hand.

[PaperTiger]

What do they mean by this?

There were reports that pilots had complained of strong winds on the runway. Experts suggested that a powerful gust could have forced the pilot to put too much pressure on the engine during take-off, making it burst into flames.It means they are talking out of their collective @rse.

The only conceivable interpretation I could put on this is the possibility of a compressor stall due to airflow blanking in a crosswind. Not a viable "cause" I think.

[WhatsaLizad?]

24 hours later and we are well into 11 pages of mostly useless conjecture and although well intentioned, many rather naive questions from interested from posters that never have participated on this forum until a sensational tragedy.

At the moment 99% of the posts here are just useless noise.

Perhaps in the future when we have these inevitable events, PPRUNE can have two threads on the event.

One thread could be reserved for open questions/conjecture/rumours/newbies/journos/uneducated theories and questions.

Another thread could be reserved for posters who identify their pilot/flight ops/engineering/technical and airline management backgrounds, before they comment on events like this.

Just a thought for future events.


My thoughts are with those affected by this accident. It's sad when it happens to a large carrier as it's happened at mine, even worse with a small tight group who knows everyone.

[Aileron Drag]

I so agree with RoyHudd. This site is now contaminated by 'wannabe' pilots, and folk who clearly don't know one end of an aeroplane from the other.

Can we either move to a new site, with stricter rules for membership, or keep this site but weed out the non-pros?

I, too, shudder at the thought of media people thinking this thread is authoritative.

[Volume]

An interviewed aviation expert also said that probably the exploding engine severed hydraulic lines to the tail control services, preventing the pilots from continuing the departure on a single engine.
Isn´t the elevator and rudder control system of the MD 8x fully mechanical, using small tabs and air pressure to move the control surfaces ? Or does this just apply to the elevator ?
On the other hand, how high is the risk of losing an elevator tab due to an uncontained engine failure? Will one Elevator be enough to control the aircraft?

[JW411]

Roy Hudd;

Oh God, how I agree with you. I am ashamed to think that any of the unadulterated crap that has appeared on this and other forums could possibly be attributed to us professional aviators by the media or anyone else for that matter. It simply makes me cringe.

We desperately need to get pprune back to being a respectable website or else, we rename the website as you suggest.

Somehow or other we have to get rid of the postings from the promising and not-so-promising hysterics that are all too prevalent nowadays.

This is like having The Guvnor back but with a thousand assistants!

[PJ2]

xxxchopperpilot;
May i remind you that "Until we're happy" is a statement that you will NEVER find in any Aircraft Maintenance Manual. I think, recalling to memory you may find this statement in a "Complacency" Manual. If the manual says do a test flight, then you actually do a test flight. A test flight under no circumstances will involve commercial passengers. I hope i never board an aircraft that you are in command of, as i don't think that you are up to the job. If you truly are a professional pilot then have a GOOD think about what you are about to write.
The phrase "until we're happy" means exactly what you've written. If a test flight is required by the maintenance manual, then of course it is done, without question, and with no passengers. But read the thread and my response more carefully - the original comment was, why wasn't a test flight done?, and you know very well yourself that test flights aren't done after signing off every MEL item - that's all that was being conveyed. As for choosing aircraft upon which you will and will not travel based upon one post in an anonymous forum doesn't make any sense so I assume it's intended as a personal remark against a fellow aviator. Is that what you intend or can we carry on this dialogue in a civil and professional manner? Over to you.

[motohead]

Don't know much about flying MD hardware but here are the Metars either side of departure time of 1425 (presumably Zulu):

METAR LEMD 201500Z 26005G16KT CAVOK 30/01 Q1017 NOSIG= METAR LEMD 201430Z 24006G19KT 170V340 CAVOK 30/02 Q1017 NOSIG= METAR LEMD 201400Z 24003KT CAVOK 30/02 Q1018 NOSIG= METAR LEMD 201330Z 19007KT 110V240 CAVOK 30/01 Q1018 NOSIG= METAR LEMD 201300Z 14004KT CAVOK 29/03 Q1018 NOSIG=

Its interesting to note that although mean speeds remain below 10Kts, there is a marked increase in gusts and also a 50 deg veer in direction. Could cross wind component be approaches/exceeded in TO roll?

[wileydog3]

Onepost only
wileydog3, it doesn't sound like they tried to land back though. I don't think it was a case of not following procedure and landing back (after V1, passing V2, sub V2, or whatever speed/phase they were at!!) more than losing control after a serious failure(s). All this from reports on here though, but it doesn't sound like a re-land attempt. The talk of “rolling” and “one wing tip striking the ground” etc etc. Sure they were doing their best to follow procedure and get it into the air!

You make a point but then we have more things to explore. If there was an over-rotation, they would be getting a stick shaker normally at what? 1.15Vso? It's been a while since I had the privilege of flying the -80 so I don't remember what the shaker was calibrated for.

But again, some of the posts suggest the suspension of reality and the inherent and desire for self-preservation. The crew did not intend to crash and thus we have to begin asking why they acted/reacted as they did.

I may have posted this but I like Dekker's comment that cause is not found, it is constructed and to even construct a plausible cause, we have to get inside the 'tube' to try and ascertain what the crew was seeing, what the crew was thinking and how they were responding to the events.

No doubt, some one will come along and say they should have 'connected the dots' but that short changes the process and is afforded the bright light of hindsight. I also like the observation that during the evolution of an event, the process is fairly opaque and afterwards starkly evident.

[Feathers McGraw]

Gents

I really hate to say this, but how do you all think that you can maintain the sanctity (assuming that is what you really want) of PPRUNE in the face of the increasing access that everyone has to virtual forums of this nature? If the nonsensical speculation doesn't appear here, it'll pop up elsewhere and still the press will seize on it and print it or air it to get their few moments of fame.

Many years ago, when Usenet news was limited to a very thin slice of society because access was hard to come by, it was a very useful place where the contributors were knowledgeable and would nearly always know the answers immediately. Once internet access became common, this state of affairs began to disappear, eventually reaching the point where it became necessary to trust people because you knew their style and decided on whether to take any notice of them. It's no different here, really.

Do you really think that clearing out the non-aviators (and I'm one, but still an engineering professional) will help? And do you really think that the majority of people tar all of you with the brush of the clueless that appear here?

Not at all, many of us read and learn and post rarely. It's in sad circumstances such as this that we all come in the hope that we'll learn things that the mainstream news organisations are simply unable to tell us.

You already have your company specific forums where proof of employment is needed to participate, please don't withdraw from engaging with those of us that celebrate the whole business of aviation even though through one reason or another we were unable to participate ourselves.

PPRUNE is an extraordinary place and is simply the first choice of anyone that is seeking information on aviation, and we're amazingly good at ignoring the unfounded speculation that appears in a thread such as this.

Thanks for listening.

[Munnyspinner]

That'll be the problem then!

Last time I looked Jet A1 was not classed as an explosive. Perhaps fuel vapour mixed in the right ratio with air is potentailly explosive but, generally, one has to go to a fair amount of effort to get it to burn - that's what a gas turbine does!

In a catastrophic accident then spilt fuel does have a tendencey to ignite becuase it has been vapourised by force and there are numerous ignition sources.

If I find the fuellers have been filling my a/c with exlposive I will have to think twice about flying!

[airship]

PPRuNe Towers
Dep Chief PPRuNe Pilot
(IC Lavs & Dunnies) wrote:

Depending on your personal settings most of you will see 20 posts on the first page of this thread.

However we can see 37, an indication of how the 4 mods working this forum yesterday were cutting away the breathless pack. I believe the default setting is that there are 20 posts which appear on each page of every thread. Does this mean that the cooks (mods) miraculously conjured up another 17 posts? :confused: But hey, wouldn't it be fun to know that whilst 1 mod was deleting a post, another mod was reinstating it, another was censoring bits of them and another complaining to the EU's human rights commission - if you get my inference...?! Oooooh, a battle of the PPRuNe mods (I mean't cooks) - this should be fun (I can't remember the last time but I'm sure it's all happened before - but maybe only in JetBlast)...?! :ok:

[Caudillo]

For what it's worth, TVE - the Spanish equivalent of the BBC appears to have some pretty authoritative information on its website. In Spanish naturally.

The Transport Minister (roughly) Magdalena Alvarez has confirmed that the aircraft was airbourne, at 200ft when this happened.

TVE reports that the left engine fire and failure was uncontained. Cites sources from their CAA saying that debris from the left engine damaged the rudder and/or the right engine, causing uncontrollability, veering to the right and the crash.

[Dairyground]

Has the eyewitness account translated in post #202 been authoritatively discounted? The claim is that the aircraft was throwing up sand from off the left hand side of the runway and that the right wing then struck the ground, with the aircraft then disappearing off to the right.
This would seem to be consistent with an initial swing to the left on losing power from the port engine followed by an attempt at recovery that was hindered by impaired directional control.
If, as has been reported more recently, the aircraft became airborne, impaired yaw control may have indicated that an attempt to land on the remaining runway was the least worst option.
Perhaps those guys were just a few metres sideways from success.

[Flight Safety]

Caudillo, if true, there was probably nothing the pilots could have done.

[Frangible]

Apologies to mods and Danny.
I realise now how much crud you must be binning.

[PJ2]

wileydog3;
I may have posted this but I like Dekker's comment that cause is not found, it is constructed and to even construct a plausible cause, we have to get inside the 'tube' to try and ascertain what the crew was seeing, what the crew was thinking and how they were responding to the events.

No doubt, some one will come along and say they should have 'connected the dots' but that short changes the process and is afforded the bright light of hindsight. I also like the observation that during the evolution of an event, the process is fairly opaque and afterwards starkly evident
Precisely - I think Dekker's work has much to contribute generally in terms of how humans interpret the world and history, but in both accident prevention and investigation specifically. His 2nd latest, "The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error (http://www.amazon.ca/Field-Guide-Understanding-Human-Error/dp/0754648265/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1219334537&sr=8-2)" 2nd ed, (his latest, "Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability", January 2008) are both worth reading and not just for aviation professionals and accident investigators.

I would commend many of the contributors here to these books alone, for comprehension of the investigative process and a more thorough understanding of human nature, and not only in aviation.

If nothing else, Dekker makes clear the strong human motivation to re-write experience to be in accord with post-event learning, while those involved in the event are only faced with perhaps dozens of avenues in terms of choice and dozens of "cues" which afterwards assume are so clear.

[SeniorDispatcher]

I was driving crosstown back in the mid-1990s after adminstering an FAA exam, and news of TWA 800 broke on the radio. That it was TWA 800, JFK-Paris, and that the aircraft was down in the water off Long Island were all factual points, and it took less than 30 seconds of listening to get them, at which time I turned OFF the radio. I did so because I knew what would follow (in the absence of other "facts" yet to be determined) would be endless blathering and idiotic speculation and contradictory information in order to fill-up otherwise dead broadcast airtime, as is typical within he first 24-48 hours of any major aviation accident.

Like some others, I also wish there was an effective way to "turn off" PPRUNE from being a vehicle for such 99% nonsensical and speculative comments before the wreckage had even cooled, but I don't know what the answer is on how to best accomplish that.

Kudos to Danny, Duck, and the others who have taken the time to cull that kind of stuff from the thread.

[foresight]

Really annoyed! I was mentally composing a post when I find that Feathers McGraw has stated my case far more eloquently than I could have done.

Any intelligent layman will be able to sort the wheat from the chaff. There is enormous value in providing access to information and opinion when the media let us down so badly. There are genuine non aviation people who want a feel for what it is all about. If a post annoys you, then stay professional and don't rise to the bait.

Incidentally I have 1200 hours on MD80's (long time ago) but feel no need to offer an opinion - there is simply not enough information to hand

[PJ2]

Flight Safety;
If I may,

Caudillo, if true, there was nothing the pilots could have done.
Quite possibly - we'll know in due time of course, assuming the recorders survived the fire. But I would like to offer the notion that many, many statements are tautologies in the sense that the conclusion "proves" the initial statement. I believe informed speculation is worthwhile, if not cathartic for a few, but we know that much will be settled when such speculation ends and the investigation begins, with data, possible video from airport cameras, the CVR and DFDR, (any FOQA equipment, if Spanair was doing a flight data program likely would not survive). It may indeed be the case that the situation deteriorated so rapidly that the crew was along for the ride - a number of legitimate scenarios have been posited (Northwest MD80 at Detroit, reverser unlocked, catastrophic engine failure accompanied by hydraulic system failure and loss of rudder power etc etc). It seems that the aircraft had lifted off by many reports which would explain, along with terrain characteristics, the nature of the break-up but I suspect these would all be after the initiating event.

foresight;
Any intelligent layman will be able to sort the wheat from the chaff. There is enormous value in providing access to information and opinion when the media let us down so badly. There are genuine non aviation people who want a feel for what it is all about. If a post annoys you, then stay professional and don't rise to the bait.
Very well stated. While difficult to endure at times I think keeping the forum wide open to all is best and what you say will happen. We're not going to solve this or any accident here but frank (sometimes very frank) professional discussion enlightens, educates, and provides comfort for some who may be casting about for anything that intelligently explains their experience. As for the punters, so far, it's a free forum and inappropriate posts can be ignored. The one issue is, it is abundantly clear that most who post statements that don't make sense have not read the thread carefully first and just shoot from the hip - tough to wade through.

FWIW...
PJ2

[ECAM_Actions]

FWIW, someone posted this over at the MD80.net forums:

http://c.imagehost.org/0691/1219302341669.jpg

They note that it is in the fully extended position.

ECAM Actions.

[dbee]

Awful; those few who escaped may still die from their injuries. From the pictures that I have seen, ( fuselage on its side) it would be virtually impossible or people to reach, let alone open, the emergency exits :* .............dbee

[WhatsaLizad?]

Feathers McGraw,

That is my point regarding this situation. At the moment, PPRUNE can't exclude every ignorant poster.

My suggestion is one thread for the endless naive questions and suggestions, and have another thread where those with relevant aviation experience that are requested to have their qualifications noted first on their posts.

That way those of us in aviation can ignore the undeducated thread and participate on the "experienced" thread about any incident.


Just a suggestion.

[crewcostundercontrol]

WhataLizard

I agree, I think PPRUNE is fantastic for those of us in the industry. If someone could start a new formum website for Pofessional pilots only, with some kind of vetting then I would sighn up today. This place is now full of armchair experts and spotters. I know it has been talked about before on here but it would be nice to have a CPL/ATPL only forum to cut out the crap.

[wileydog3]

PJ2. I would also recommend the book by R. K. Dismukes, B. A. Berman, & L. . Loukopoulos (2007) The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents, Ashgate Publishing Company

Sometimes there just isn't a solution or if there is a solution, there may not be enough time to implement it. For example, Nick Warner and the 1994 A330 crash at Toulouse. (From talking to a few people, Warner was considered not only one of the best but one of the VERY best.)

[PJ2]

ECAM_Actions;

Thanks for posting this.

Whether the reverser was deployed before ground contact or during the breakup sequence can be determined in a number of ways - obviously the recorders, but also by traditional methods.

I haven't seen info on this..can any MD80 fleet type operators tell us if these engines are FADEC controlled? Tx...

[bookworm]

Don't know much about flying MD hardware but here are the Metars either side of departure time of 1425 (presumably Zulu)

No 1425 local, 1225Z:

LEMD 201030Z 12003KT CAVOK 25/10 Q1019 NOSIG=
LEMD 201100Z 17002KT CAVOK 26/09 Q1019 NOSIG=
LEMD 201130Z 16005KT CAVOK 27/08 Q1019 NOSIG=
LEMD 201200Z 35002KT CAVOK 28/06 Q1019 NOSIG=
LEMD 201230Z 18007KT 090V240 CAVOK 28/02 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEMD 201330Z 19007KT 110V240 CAVOK 30/01 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEMD 201400Z 24003KT CAVOK 30/02 Q1018 NOSIG=

Could cross wind component be approaches/exceeded in TO roll?

So it seems unlikely that wind was a factor -- though of course a METAR is just a snapshot and you can't be 100% sure what was happening between.

[PJ2]

wileydog3 - thanks, will pick it up; have recently ordered Just Culture. There is much here for airline managements as well as flight safety departments wrestling with limited resources and how best to focus them as SMS is implemented.
I always thought that CRM was as good for a marriage as it was for the cockpit... ;-)

Cheers,
PJ2

[bardos]

Los dirigentes de la aerolínea Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), a la que pertenece Spanair (http://www.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2008/08/20/economia/1219241635.html), han justificado el despegue del avión siniestrado ayer en una multitudinaria rueda de prensa celebrada en Madrid. No obstante, admitieron que el avión presentaba un problema de "calentamiento excesivo en una toma de aire", que fue "aislado" y, posteriormente, la nave "fue despachada para el vuelo".
Ante la pregunta sobre si aislar el problema significa solucionarlo, el subdirector general y director de producción de Spanair, Javier Mendoza, aseguró que hay distintas formas de tratar el problema y que, en esta ocasión, "se aisló el sistema quitando el interruptor que le da energía".
Mendoza afirmó que "ésta es una condición que es aceptable para el vuelo y es una práctica normal. Hay un documento que es la lista de equipos mínimos que refleja esta actuación". Por tanto, según estas explicaciones, la avería no fue totalmente reparada, sino "aislada".


In a massively heavily attended press conference in Madrid, the Management of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), to which Spanair belongs, has justified the take-off of the crashed airplane. Nevertheless, they admitted that the airplane had a problem with “over-heating in an air-intake valve”, which was “cut-off” and then the airplane “was sent on its way”.

Faced with the question of whether cutting off the problem means fixing it, the assistant general manager and production manager of Spanair, Javier Mendoza, maintained that there are different ways of dealing with this problem and on this occasion “the system was cut off by turning off the switch which gives it power.”

Mendoza stated that “this is an acceptable flight condition and is normal industry procedure. There is a document which is a list of minimum equipment requirements which supports this action”. Therefore, according to these explanations, the breakdown was not completely repaired, it was “cut off”.

[Groundbased]

All,

I have been reading Pprune for the last 5 years in order to build up knowledge of something I find fascinating. I've enjoyed the technical debates on Tech Log and many of the other forums along with R and N.

I've always felt that when the "no amateurs" discussion has surfaced that I should support not banning them. After all, I read to learn, and if I feel I can frame it in suitably knowledgeable terms I would post a question or a view if relevant. surely others are the same.

Regrettably reading this thread I have changed my view. The uninformed rubbish that has been posted here defies belief and obscures the pertinent and knowledgeable content that has been contributed.

I believe you are right and some method must be found to return this board to what it was 5 years ago when I first, joyously, discovered it. I just hope that some way can be found that I may continue as "read only" on these fora (but still contribute to Jet Blast!).

[DozyWannabe]

PJ2:
can any MD80 fleet type operators tell us if these engines are FADEC controlled?
Not an operator (or even a professional pilot) but I'm pretty sure the answer is no. JT-8D-200 series aren't, as far as I can remember.

And as for the "ban all non-pilots" calls, is it really worth potentially throwing out many babies with the bathwater for the sake of not having to put up with a bunch of idiots for a couple of weeks a year at most?

[ECAM_Actions]

The MD-82 doesn't have FADECs - it uses mech linkages to fuel control valves and other assorted bits.

General

The airplane is equipped with two axial-flow, bypass, turbofan Pratt and
Whitney engines. The JT8D-217, -217A and –217C (-219 operated as -
217A) engines have a normal static takeoff thrust rating of 20,000 pounds
and a maximum takeoff thrust rating of 20,850 pounds.
An automatic reserve thrust (ART) system is installed. In the event of an
engine failure, the ART system, when operating, increases the thrust on the
remaining engine.

Each engine is equipped with an acoustic treatment in specific areas for noise
suppression. The engine nacelles are supported from horizontal pylons by
vibration-isolating side mount systems. The nacelles are isolated from the
fuselage by a firewall within the pylon and by a secondary fireseal at the
pylon fuselage interface. To provide additional protection, the secondary
fireseal extends above and below the pylon on the fuselage surface. To
achieve necessary nacelle compartmentation, a fireseal is installed aft of the
rear engine mount, which provides separation of the accessory compartment
from the reverser section. The nacelle ventilation system is designed to
provide adequate cooling of engine and accessories and to prevent
accumulation of combustible mixtures.

For monitoring engine operation, an EPR (engine pressure ratio) gauge,
thrust rating indicator, N1 and N2 tachometers, EGT (exhaust gas
temperature) gauge, FUEL FLOW gauge with a FUEL USED readout, oil pressure
gauge, oil temperature gauge, and fuel temperature gauge are provided for
each engine.

The left and right engine EPR gauges receive sensing signals from the
respective engine air inlet pressure (Pt2) probe and the low pressure turbine
discharge pressure (Pt7) probes. Engine pressure ratio (Pt7/Pt2) is a measure
of thrust being developed by the engine that is displayed on the EPR gauge.
Power to operate these gauges is provided by the respective AC bus.
The thrust rating indicator is interfaced with the ram air temperature probe
and digital flight guidance computer (DFGC) 1 and 2. Ram air temperature
(RAT) and EPR LIM (limit) are displayed on the indicator. Mode buttons are
provided on the indicator for selection of desired mode (T.O., T.O.FLX, GA, MCT,
CL, and CR). The DFGC’s supply data to the indicator for automatic display
of EPR LIM for mode selected.

The left and right N1 tachometers indicate the respective engine low-pressure
compressor rotor RPM as a percentage. The left and right N2 tachometers
indicate the respective engine high-pressure compressor rotor RPM as a
percentage. Power to operate these gauges is self-generated.

The left and right EGT gauges indicate in degrees centigrade the temperature
of the exhaust gas of the respective engine. Each gauge receives signals from
temperature probes located in the exhaust gas path of each engine. Power to
operate these gauges is provided by the Emergency DC bus.

The left and right FUEL FLOW gauges indicate the rate of flow in pounds per
hour that fuel is being delivered to the respective engine. A FUEL USED
readout on each gauge displays a digital readout of fuel used in pounds by the
respective engine. A FUEL USED RESET switch is provided to reset the FUEL
USED readout on both gauges to 00000. For further description of FUEL FLOW
gauge/FUEL USED readout and FUEL USED RESET switch, refer to Fuel section.
Power to operate these gauges is provided by the respective AC bus.

http://c.imagehost.org/0739/reversers.jpg

HTH.

ECAM Actions.

[lnav-vnav777]

any news from the crew?

[Litebulbs]

If it was an uncontained engine failure, then it is luck, not aircraft design that makes an event either an incident or accident. It matters not, whether the control surfaces are hydraulically or mechanically actuated. If a piece of engine decides to pass through a hydraulic pipe(pipes) or cut a control cable(cables), the result is the same, reduced or no control. Put that at or around V1, Vr or climb, then it is down if the pilot flying to use every ounce of their training and experience to attempt to recover the situation.

Passenger aircraft are not designed to contain within its systems and controls, an uncontained engine failure. Thought and design goes into system redundancy, but you do not fire bits of hot engines at airframes and see what happens if?! You cannot predict which bit of engine will not be contained and where it is going to travel after it has left the engine casing and cowl. That is why engines are designed and tested to contain engine failures.

Now, why did it fail? I do not have authorisation on the MD82, but jets are jets. They all use the laws of physics to work. I am making an assumption, so please feel free to flame me, but from what I gather from previous media statements is that their was a problem with a sensor that is used by various systems including thrust management, to derive a temperature. If this temperature was inaccurate, or missing, then it is possible that incorrect thrust settings could have been used or manually calculated, with a possible outcome of an over boosted engine. There would obviously be other parameters to watch such as engine temperature or N speed, but this could be just another hole in the cheese. The engine could have been on watch, with degradation being "on condition" monitored by repeat boriscope inspections, which would normally be OK within its normal operating margins, but on this day, it failed at precisely the wrong time.

Lessons will be learned and god bless the people who have lost through this terrible event.

[ChristiaanJ]

lnav-vnav777,
See post #351.

[Guy D'ageradar]

RoyHudd, Aileron Drag et al shame on you.

Perfect example of the elitist attitude that unfortunately also tars the image of your more open minded colleagues. I don't know if you've looked down from your pedestal recently but FYI pilots and engineers are not the only professionals involved in aviation. I think you'll also find that a large amount of the spam on this thread was contributed by some of your fellow super-human beings.

Get a grip. :ugh:

[BenThere]

I've only been flying multi-engine jets, and making a living at it, for 32 years, so obviously I have much to learn. In fact, I've barely scratched the surface of all there is to learn about aviation.

But it seems to me that those who complain loudest about non-pros have the least to offer themselves. They are first to denigrate, last to contribute to the discussion, IMHO. I see it as a manifestation of insecurity or inadequacy when one resorts to insults and ridicule, but that's just me.

I welcome all inputs, from pilots, engineers, passengers, and the simply curious, and will decide for myself whether or not to take in the message or reject it, thank you.

This incident has given me a lot to think about as I set out on my next trip tonight. These pages have provided insight regardless of those who are put out by the non-technical intrusions. If the press wishes to peer within Pprune, more power to them. I hope they, too, can separate the chaff from the informed opinion. If a journalist takes it upon himself to read the entire thread, he will come away with a better perspective. We have nothing to hide, therefore why the concern about spies?

[Wodrick]

Thrust Reverse operation is inhibited by A/C not on ground.

[ECAM_Actions]

BenThere - I couldn't agree more.

The press are capable of spouting rubbish without reading a darn thing on the subject.

Can we get back on topic, please?

ECAM Actions.

[Feathers McGraw]

Thinking a little further, I wonder if Danny and co could arrange for a little "verified industry insider" icon to appear alongside ones login ID and also provide the ability to only see posts from the so verified PPRUNErs if desired.

That way, you get to choose what you see and respond to.

As to the comment about this thread changing the view as to whether non-aviation types should be allowed, I thought it was no different to the initial BA038 thread in this regard.

Actually, learning how to recognise and ignore the clearly ill-considered from the knowledgeable is one of the small enjoyments of this sort of place. But it does mean you need the time to read and digest.

[Double Zero]

' Passenger aircraft are not designed to control ( substain or constrain, my words ) ' an engine failure ?

Unless very unlucky with the hot end disc, I really reckon they ARE...

Yours, airmchair pilot and experienced ( fighter ) test & development team member, who obviously ought to be chucked off this site for not being a 757 etc aircrew -

In the brief time I have left before being buried in 'Jetblast',

How many actual airliner aircrew / airliner engineers & designers agree about ' containment' being designed in - though a few instances lately seem to indicate it is still a goal rather than achievement ?

[skyken]

Ram Air TURBINE has nothing to do with temperature.

[Litebulbs]

Double Zero -

Using your words, you are correct. Using my word "uncontained", then I will stand by my understanding of aircraft design.

[BeechNut]

On the pro vs non-pro debate. Obviously I am not a pro. I am a PPL who loves all aviation. While only a 600 hour PPL, I am current and own my own aircraft. I strive to operate it in as professional a manner as possible, and I have much to learn from the pros here. While this accident bears little resemblance to what can happen with a Beech C23, nonetheless I think all pilots can learn from every accident, even if that lesson is simply to never take things for granted.

That, and I have a sentimental love for the DC-9 series; many many hours as SLF aboard one, including in the jumpseat when such things were allowed, and my first ever jet flight (and second ever airline flight) was in a DC-9, as an 11 y.o kid way back in the late 60s (the outward leg was a Viscount...).

That said, many here, I have noticed have engineering/science backgrounds in non-aviation fields (I myself do in physics and chemistry, and vibration analysis). They can bring interesting info to table provided they, and we, understand the limits of their knowledge. This can be particularly useful in the Qantas analysis, regarding the storage of high-pressure gases and the physics an chemistry of the gas in question.

Lastly, with regards to lurking journalists, I would hope that perhaps some of them will actually gain a bit more appreciation for the complexities of aviation, and will at least learn to get basic facts correct, such as not confusing a stall with an engine failure (which happened in Canada's national newspaper recently). Also, they might learn how and where to search for data before making inane comments about the safety of a particular aircraft series that in fact has a pretty normal safety record. One hopes...

'nuff said, back to reading what the pros have to say.

[forget]

Skyken, Total air temperature (TAT) is also called: indicated air temperature (IAT) or ram air temperature (RAT)

There's a discussion on smartarses like you in the last few posts. Please read them.

[sevenstrokeroll]

skyken:

I mentioned RAT...and said NOT ram air turbine in this case.

RAT can also mean "ram air temperature". I asked if the MD80 had a Ram Air Temperature gauge or a total air temperature gauge. I flew the DC9 and it had a Ram Air Temperature and it might have changed with the MD80.

Just like TR can mean thrust reverser

it can also mean transformer rectifier

(or teddy roosevelt for that matter).

[ChristiaanJ]

Posts: 4
Title: "I smell a RAT"
Ram Air TURBINE has nothing to do with temperature.

Oh dear, I almost start to feel sympathy for all those arguing for a professionals-only forum....

Yes, 'RAT' can refer to a 'Ram Air Turbine', as on Concorde.
In this case it refers to a 'Ram Air Temperature' sensor, which is simply another term for a 'TAT', i.e., 'Total Air Temperature' sensor.

Were your three earlier posts of the same calibre?

CJ

[PJ2]

ECAM_Actions;

Superb descriptions/schematics from the book, thank you. I suspected the installation wasn't FADEC-controlled but wanted to be sure.

delorean79;
Can a Pilot deploy full reverse on flight, flying a MD80?
While a few aircraft designs in the past (DC8, Convair990) could deploy reversers in the air, no present designs are certified for this and therefore either mechanically or through software or combinations of both, prevent reverser deployment in the air.

That said, I know of at least one DC9-32 series, (not an MD80 series) where it did occur at cruise altitude and we know of the Lauda Air B767 accident which was apparently a FADEC fault. Most fleet types have an emergency drill (memorized...) for reverse deployment in the air. The drill usually involves appropriate rudder input, (foot/rudder pedal in the kitchen and then some), ensuring directional control, and shutting the engine down. FADEC-controlled engine designs on the Airbus (CFM56 installations and likely others) command IDLE thrust if a reverser-deployed signal is sensed in the air.

That also said, most AOMs caution that controllability is a significant issue. For the record and for knowledge of non-pilots, going around after reverse is selected is absolutely prohibited. An accident (PWA B737, Cranbrook BC) led to this warning for crews.

NOTE: None of this post or discussion is to be taken as speculation that a reverser was deployed in the air as a possible cause. This is simply not known. This is only an informal professional discussion on the operational aspects of reverser deployment in the air to which crews are trained to respond.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

It was dissapointing to see a disgruntled Spanair Pilot on TV stating how hard they worked, even stating he had to fly 5 days in a row, up to a maximum of 15 hrs a day. We all know that Spanish FTL is quiet flexible (have they moved to EU Ops Sub Part Q?) but only the investigation will hint if fatigue could have been a factor.
It would be better if he supported his Employer and work colleagues at this truly sad time :\

[Pat Malone]

Now that this has quietened down a little, I thought I might make some observations on the media and its relationship to aviation accidents, and to pprune. I have played both sides of the street, having been a newsdesk executive on several Fleet Street newspapers as well as being a pilot. I have never been a commercial pilot, but have worked as a helicopter instructor.
It is no use railing at the foolishness of the media, or expecting it not to speculate on the causes of accidents. With precious few exceptions, broadcast and print media are profoundly ignorant not just of aviation, but of all specialist subjects. The halcyon days of the air correspondent gave way in the 1960s and 70s to the ‘aviation correspondent’ whose brief was largely to cover the emerging package holiday industry; a survey in the mid 1990s showed that not a single aviation correspondent in Fleet Street could fly a plane.
Newspapers must be filled, and broadcast journalists must avoid the nightmare of ‘dead air’. A major incident is meat and drink; in 35 years in the business I can remember only one instance in a newsroom where journalists were personally affected by the story they were writing, and that was Dunblane. The media will go mob-handed to the scene, it will trawl the cuttings library for previous similar events, and it will speculate. Every hack has a contacts book of honest-to-goodness experts who will stand up on their hind legs at a moment’s notice and pronounce on any given subject, not always for money. As a rule of thumb, whenever you read the word ‘expert’ in a newspaper or hear it on TV, reach for your revolver.
There are honourable exceptions, but few. Everyone in Fleet Street has David Learmount’s number. He does an excellent job of fulfilling the requirement for a talking head while avoiding speculation and leaving few hostages to fortune. It’s a difficult tightrope to walk, but if he were not on air, they would find someone less qualified. If you really want to improve matters, then you need good to drive out bad; I’ve often thought BALPA might provide such a service, having someone with media savvy to satisfy the cravings of the beast, while making it plain that the only certainty in an aircraft accident is that the initial speculation will be wrong.
Those who want the media to ‘clean up its act’ must first reflect on the difficulty of cleaning up pprune. After the media, the prattling poster is the target in most accident threads. Much can be done here. I think the lumping together of ‘rumours’ and ‘news’ is unconscionable. You can’t expect newspapers to separate the two when pprune blatantly treats them as one. I also believe that anonymity is a profound mistake. There may be occasional instances where it is justified, but they are few and far between. Anonymity encourages those who know least but have most to say. Every one of us can take action to improve pprune on that score.

[md80forum]

I'm a non-pro. I addition to that, I am a journalist. For 13 years I have run an MD-80 forum on the web, largely at my own expense. Over time, I have got 400 pilots on board. I have seen them use my web facilities to compile an impressive knowledge base about things you don't find in manufacturer's manuals. I have seen them advertise themselves and pick up jobs, paid far beyond what I'll ever earn; not a dime nor thank you coming my way.

Every major MD-80 accident or incident has been a professional challenge for me as an information worker; Venezuela, Phuket, belly landing Istanbul, Atlas, Alaska 262 ... to compile what bits of information there are to be put together for the orientation of people who know far more than I do.

Now then, Spanair 5022. MD-82, they say on the news. "One of mine". Couldn't make me roll up my sleeves and do it again, tired of this pro arrogance you'll have to expect every time.

:ugh:

So, inform yourselves. Show me how to do it.

[lomapaseo]

We desperately need to get pprune back to being a respectable website or else, we rename the website as you suggest.

Somehow or other we have to get rid of the postings from the promising and not-so-promising hysterics that are all too prevalent nowadays.

This is like having The Guvnor back but with a thousand assistants! :}

I'm sympathetic with your frustration at the amount of uninformed speculation and claims on this forum vs some of the more informed discussions on the BA038 thread in the later days.

Unfortunately, I fear that we may lose in the end if we attempt to curtial postings by newbies. Thus it took me two hours today just to read through the chaff before I post this single reply. In spite of this we can choose either to ignore the drivel or to counter it with advised replies.

I fear that we can never do anything to ensure that the casual reader gets the correct message, but at least we can help the more advised reader to understand.


I am reminded that at this time we still have no confirmation that an engine failure was involved in this accident. so all discussions to date are assumptive in this matter. We can go further with this if and when the official investigators comment

Whether the reverser was deployed before ground contact or during the breakup sequence can be determined in a number of ways - obviously the recorders, but also by traditional methods.

The traditional methods include examination of the two or three command links that must be satisfied to deploy a reverser in-flight. These include finding and detail examination (X-ray etc.) of pistons and valves to determine if they are in a commanded mode or not. THis will take a degree of laboratory examination to be certain.


If it was an uncontained engine failure, then it is luck, not aircraft design that makes an event either an incident or accident. It matters not, whether the control surfaces are hydraulically or mechanically actuated. If a piece of engine decides to pass through a hydraulic pipe(pipes) or cut a control cable(cables), the result is the same, reduced or no control. Put that at or around V1, Vr or climb, then it is down if the pilot flying to use every ounce of their training and experience to attempt to recover the situation.

Passenger aircraft are not designed to contain within its systems and controls, an uncontained engine failure. Thought and design goes into system redundancy, but you do not fire bits of hot engines at airframes and see what happens if?! You cannot predict which bit of engine will not be contained and where it is going to travel after it has left the engine casing and cowl. That is why engines are designed and tested to contain engine failures.

The above quote can not stand alone in front of the public. Else the public fearing that flying is a crap game will decide to control their own individual stakes by driving a thousand miles.

Containment/non-containment are addressed both at the engine level and at the aircraft level. All part 25 aircraft including the MD80 series have been designed to minimize the catastrophic effects of any uncontained engine failure. They meet this expectation by certified tried and true designs that apply the principals of redundancy, shielding and separation of critical aircraft control systems.

There is little sense in speculating further along this line until the investigators have had a chance to determine if:

did an engine actually fail?

was there an uncontainment?:

was there significant resulting damage to the aircraft?

I'm still awaiting any new facts such as close up photos or press releases by the investigating team.

Please continue to post along these lines.

[johnmhunt]

There has been understandable question why the loss of left engine thrust resulted in an accident site to the right of the takeoff runway. A possible explanation is that the right wing tip accidentally touched the ground during the moments immediately after departure from the ground, which possibly could have diverted the flight path to the right . If the pilot either perceived or anticipated the beginning of a right wing up roll velocity resulting from the pronounced right wing up roll moment caused by left yaw he may have overcorrected with aileron.

I have not read all of the many posts. So please forgive me is this reply is useless.

[Jetdriver]

From a moderating standpoint, one of the obvious facts concerning this thread is that the subject is a major news event. As such it attracts a very high level of interest from all quarters. Anybody with any insight into aviation realises that when a tragic event such as this occurs, the search for the cause takes far more time than the normal "shelf life" of a newsworthy item, which is obviously frustrating and is partially satisfied by all spectrums of speculation from the wildly ignorant, through the uninformed, to the informed, to the guesswork and collateral knowledge of those with some expertise in the various arenas.

On television news channels, the event draws an increasingly large audience who are not held by a 3 minute report and the statement that further accurate information may slowly come to the fore in a few days or weeks or months. They (we) tune in for the up to the minute pictures, commentary, speculation, eyewitness reports, "expert" comment. Most of the time it is perfectly obvious that those reporting have little information but are nevertheless required to "keep talking, you are live on air" because that is what is drawing and holding the audience. That is the nature of that media.

Here this is an open site normally populated and primarilly targeted at Pilots and other aviation professionals. However it isn't and never has been the exclusive domain of those groups and as such draws interest from anybody with a contribution, question, comment, observation, opinion, statement, or simply non contributory perusal of the threads. The nature of this media (internet) of accessible discussion forums, is that anybody can take part, and of course anybody does. This site has a high number of moderators assigned to various forums to trim away the wilder excesses that are often seen on other popular open sites, however the format still attempts to encourage a wide cross section of contribution from a similarly wide cross section of interested contibutors.

This particular event and single thread, at its current stage of newsworthiness is drawing between 1000 and 2000 on line readers for most of the day. In turn this is attracting an unusually high level of contribution from not only the regular contributors, but also a high proportion of new and infrequent subscribers. The result is that a lot of moderation is being applied to the subject, not to curtail the discussion, speculation or comment, but to stop the thread being an even more unwieldly mess of "RIP, condolences, thoughts are with...." comments. The unmoderated script is a much longer tome of all the usual breathless excitement, willy waving, pointless nonsense, spelling police, tantrums, and other non relevant detrius.

whilst trying to remain as impartial as possible, we also roll our eyes at some of the posts we still allow to remain in the thread. That is a case of not trying to censor or drive opinion whilst still trying to balance a need to prevent unnecessary repetition and maintain the rules of conduct that apply elsewhere on the site. At the moment this thread is very busy, but it will settle down to normal levels of discussion and moderation in due course.

[El Grifo]

Just returned an hour ago from Las Palmas after a couple of days. The atmosphere is pretty sombre over there and Gando is eerily quiet, apart from the squads of TV crews hogging both arrivals and departures.


I am sure this information is of little use to anyone, but this is "Rumours and News" after all

The commonly held belief there, based on the information going around, is that that after a catastrophic failure of an engine at around 40m, the tailplane assembly seperated from the aircraft and the whole thing plummeted in a right arc, into the barranco.


Like I said, this is the version of events from Las Palmas.

[lomapaseo]

PJ2

...and we know of the Lauda Air B767 accident which was apparently a FADEC fault. Most fleet types have an emergency drill (memorized...) for reverse deployment in the air. The drill usually involves appropriate rudder input, (foot/rudder pedal in the kitchen and then some), ensuring directional control, and shutting the engine down. FADEC-controlled engine designs on the Airbus (CFM56 installations and likely others) command IDLE thrust if a reverser-deployed signal is sensed in the air.


The FADEC sic (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) controls the engine not the aircraft and its reverser system. The FADEC does use inputs from the aircraft systems and in the event of an uncommanded deployment in-flight it will command the engine to be reduced in thrust to flight idle. Unfortunately, in the case of Lauda etal. the aircraft upset occurred before the engine could fully spool down.

In order for the Lauda reverser to deploy it needed to have a malfunctioning stow/deploy valve as well as weight on wheels (two degrees of protection failed).

All reverser designs had a degree of suceptibility as incident data has confirmed

Newer designs now require a third degree of protection (a positive mechanical lock).

[arem]

I write this as a retired 23000hr airline pilot, but reading this thread, regardless of whatever the technical reasons for the crash, surely a large part of the blame for this enormous loss of life must be down to the airport authorities and their governments.

By this I refer to what has already been referred to by other posters and that is the terrain at the side and ends of runways ie gully's,ravines and just plain rocks. Said authorities may be able to construct some beautifully smooth runways and taxiways but stray from these in an emergency and you are in deep poo!

How many airports are absolute death traps and lets face it the performance figures in the event of a rejected T/O close to V1 - especially in the wet - you are not guaranteed a stop within the confines of the runway. Let alone circumstances similar to the TAM A320 at CGH.

ANC, Bilbao, NRT, even BRU as in the Kalitta 747F and many many more, they spend millions on beautiful Terminals and shopping malls, they should spend more on smoothing out the terrain around these runways or at least installing that material ( the name of which I cannot recall) that slows the aircraft down without causing it to break up.

Just how much cost compared to yesterdays tragic loss of life?

[sevenstrokeroll]

sir: I saw an animated representation of the crash and it is as you described...something I find very hard to believe.

HOWEVER, stranger things have happened.

having an engine problem and having it knock the tail off is very serious business...no pilot on earth could handle that.

I do hope we find out soon if this is the case...it would change the way we fly or at least inspect and maintain a plane.

[PJ2]

lomapaseo:

The FADEC sic (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) controls the engine not the aircraft and its reverser system.
For clarification, yes, I understand that, especially the fact that FADEC does not control the aircraft - sorry if that impression was left from my post. On FADEC and the reverser system, I only know and am experienced with Airbus 319/320/330/340 fleet types' FADEC systems and FADEC does control reverse, (we knew this from the TAM thread):

From the A340 AOM:

The thrust reverser system is independently controlled for each engine by the associated FADEC. It is
controlled and monitored by each FADEC channel.
The thrust reverser system on each engine includes :
– 4 actuators
– 4 latches
– door position switches
– A shut off valve which allows the hydraulic pressure to the HCU.
– a Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) which :
• pressurizes the thrust reverser hydraulic system
• regulates the blocker doors speed
• supplies actuators with hydraulic power
Each pivoting door moves independently (no synchronization). The total actuation time is less than 2
seconds.
ACTUATION LOGIC:
Deployment requires :
– one FADEC channel operating with its associated throttle reverse signal
– aircraft on ground from at least one LGCIU
– TLA reverse signal from PRIM 1 (FLT CTL PRIMARY COMPUTER 1) or associated PRIM
– switch reverse signal from associated EIU
Before the transit completion of the blocker doors, the FADEC sets reverse idle thrust.
IDLE PROTECTION:
The FADEC will automatically select idle thrust if the reverse thrust is not selected and one of three
following conditions occurs :
– 4 doors are unstowed or,
– at least one door is unstowed and the thrust reverser system is pressurized, or
– the thrust reverser position is not determined and the reverser system is pressurized.

[Litebulbs]

Lomapaseo,

I would credit the general public with a little more common sense. They would have just witnessed an accident where peoples lives have been lost, but they were certainly still getting on aircraft this morning as far as I could see.

Aircraft designers do not try to design dangerous aircraft. History has shown us that a bit of metal on a runway, or a microscopic fault within a component of an engine can cause disaster. People watch the discovery channel and see Seconds From Disaster, because it is entertaining and the probability of it happening to them is minute.

You smoke a fag, have a drink or drive a car and you have an understanding of the risk involved. Flying is the same. It feels unnatural but it is safe.

[Smilin_Ed]

Aircraft designers do not try to design dangerous aircraft. Litebulbs, you are correct and, despite what too much of the general public thinks, the vast majority of professional pilots are not daredevils, itching to take any piece of junk into the air. The vast majority are professionals. Sure we make mistakes. I made some in my time, but I never took a plane that had known serious faults.

[sevenstrokeroll]

the dc9 series 30 can (but is not authorized to) deploy the thrust reversers in flight. just pull throttles aft, and pull reverse levers up and back.

NOW, again YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED to do this!

We train for uncommanded thrust reverser deployment in the sim. if unable to stow the reverser, you shut down the engine and fly on the remaining engine.

I've asked if the reverser in the span air crash case deployed in flight, but I have no data to think that it has happend in this case.

The douglas dc9 series of planes have demonstrated inflight thrust reverser deployment and the ability to fly the plane.

boeings do it with mathematical models and theory.

[PaperTiger]

All part 25 aircraft including the MD80 series have been designed to minimize the catastrophic effects of any uncontained engine failure.Not to be a semantic pedant, but I think "mitigate" would be a more accurate description.

A Delta MD88 had a UEF on the ground which killed passengers by shrapnel. And the 767 that was actually destroyed by one, on the ground. Depending on the failure mode, there really is no predicting where the bits will go and what damage they will do. Pods are designed to withstand a certain level of explosive force, but I wouldn't say they do so to a minimum.

If indeed this was a UEF.

[rog747]

its taken me all afternoon to trawl and poodle through 24 pages of the pprune rumour post on the awful spanair accident...
i have been away from this site for many months as it was pathetic to often read what so-called pro's started to rant about, howver i popped in back today.

frankly i was amazed that the toys didnt start being thrown out of the pram until quite along way through the pages,
possibly the more childish pro's and non-pro's are on their summer hols hence the more restrained comments,

i had 30 years aviation industry in ops and latter in safety and am not a flying pro and am retired now.

out of these 24 pages with my safety cap on and only having seen the press clips like most of you (one or two of you state you have friends in informed places) i have paid attention to TWO things,

1, a witness ( was it two?) states aircraft leaving runway in clouds of dust and sand (possibly not getting airborne?) and crashing into the lower field areas beyond the end and right of the runway.
IF, it got airborne then did it do so purely because the ground ran out and it shot off the end and plunged into the field further along.
i dont see any debris trail from the runway to the crash site.

2, a photo of the back part of the engine with the reverser assembly open.
(i dont see any fire damage so could this be from the RH engine, the LH engine was seen to be on fire>?)

these points are the only things that concern me that the pilots for whatever reason decided to try to stop and not 'go'

has anybody (pro) considered this too...?
we know that all v ref's speeds temps weights etc would indicate you must 'go' and you should safely C/O and be able to return,

this is only a slight concern i have to reading what a 'witness has told one of you and seeing that photo.
any investigator would feel the same to include this notion at the beginning then eliminate it as quickly as possible upon more detailed findings.

i am amazed that this crash has left survivors, it looks totally non-survivable to me,
a high speed uncontrolled crash similar in phase to the md-87 of SAS at Milan some years ago at the same phase of t/o, that left no survivors,
so for survivors to occur here at MAD is amazing but i'm sorry to learn of a such a nasty fiery accident to a respected airline at a very modern airport.

[golf yankee one one]

I'm just a voyeur who turns to pprune when I want to know more about an aviation incident, but I have been involved with the investigation and classification of adverse events in a healthcare setting for 20 years. We have been persuaded in recent years that we should model our risk management on the aviation industry because you are so successful at establishing and maintaining very high safety standards. Please consider this before you restrict access to you site; if we can learn from you ......

None of us can avoid speculation, and the two things that strike me most forcibly about the Madrid crash are the return to the gate and the gully or ravine; very few of the posts seem to have tried to illuminate these aspects of the tragedy.

[DozyWannabe]

lomapaseo (and PJ2):
In order for the Lauda reverser to deploy it needed to have a malfunctioning stow/deploy valve as well as weight on wheels (two degrees of protection failed).
I seem to remember reading that the supposition in the Lauda case was that the protection in the reverser deploy electronics was circumvented by chafed and/or faulty wiring. I'm also pretty sure I remember that a modification to prevent this happening again was very quickly developed, tested and installed.

Again, regarding the calls to restrict R&N to pilots only - while I can understand it and sympathise completely with the poor moderators, you'd be preventing people who've made massive and timely contributions to these threads in the past, like PBL, bsieker and VnV2178B - and I still think there'd be a vast amount of dross in the immediate wake of incidents and accidents.

Of course, there's a degree of self-interest here as well - but I, as well as many other genuine enthusiasts try to keep to the background unless we're pretty sure we've got something to contribute, and it's a privilege and an honour to be allowed to. I for one would really hate to lose it.

In this case I think the lack of concrete information is allowing all kinds of rubbish to fill the vacuum and I hope that as proper, corroborated data is released some of the fancier theories will fall by the wayside. Those holding the BA038 thread up as an example seem to forget that the first few days were a free-for-all, with theories of computer failure, UFOs and even Gordon Brown's Death Ray doing the rounds until the dust had cleared.

[onthehill2]

A terrible accident and my prayers are for those who lost their lives and to those left behind... As an outsider looking in to the avation industry, what effect does this crash have on pilots flying the same type of aircraft? Is there now a loss of confidence in the plane you are flying or maybe there is a "there for the grace of God" attitude. How do you deal with something like this?

[DozyWannabe]

onthehill2 - Read the thread. The DC-9/MD-80 series is much beloved by pilots and with proper maintenance is as safe as anything else flying.

[Aeromar27]

the dc9 series 30 can (but is not authorized to) deploy the thrust reversers in flight. just pull throttles aft, and pull reverse levers up and back.

NOW, again YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED to do this!

We train for uncommanded thrust reverser deployment in the sim. if unable to stow the reverser, you shut down the engine and fly on the remaining engine.

I've asked if the reverser in the span air crash case deployed in flight, but I have no data to think that it has happend in this case.

The douglas dc9 series of planes have demonstrated inflight thrust reverser deployment and the ability to fly the plane.

boeings do it with mathematical models and theory.

Well, the media here in Spain is gathering opinions from witnesses and workers from the airport who, more or less, have a knowledge of how aircraft work. All engineers insist on the fact that failure reported by the pilot during the first takeoff had nothing to do with the following events (apparently it was a probe heat problem). More and more we start to hear people talking about a potential explosion of the engine itself. From which i can deduce loss of control due to damage of control surfaces. But i know where you are going by mentioning the reverser deployment. And yes, on the MD-8X, according to the limitations manual "Inflight movement of reverse thrust levers or use of reverse thrust is
prohibited."

[Major Nevitt]

post 376 mentions problem with number two engine?

[RiSq]

Guys - Having skipped through some of the posts, and reading what has been said, I go back to what I asked around page 9 - Only Professionals need answer please.

If there was an explosive engine failiure (Fan piercing the engine casing), is there any chance it could of ruptured hydraulics for the control surfaces? I earlier brought up the United incident with the explosive engine failiure. Is there any chance something like this could have happened in this case? do the control systems run along the top or the bottom of the aircraft?

Look forward to what you guys have to say

[ELAC]

PJ2,
May i remind you that "Until we're happy" is a statement that you will NEVER find in any Aircraft Maintenance Manual. I think, recalling to memory you may find this statement in a "Complacency" Manual. If the manual says do a test flight, then you actually do a test flight. A test flight under no circumstances will involve commercial passengers. I hope i never board an aircraft that you are in command of, as i don't think that you are up to the job. If you truly are a professional pilot then have a GOOD think about what you are about to write.

xxxchopperpilot,

I wonder if you understand how truly offensive your remarks are, and the level of ignorance they betray both of the subject at hand and the individual you are addressing.

Since it's obvious that you are unaware, you may wish to know that PJ2 is a recently retired senior captain of a major airline who has exercised the responsibilities of command for a good many years, quite possibly more years than you've been alive. His contributions to the field of aviation safety are well know to many of us on this forum and others, and he has been actively making those contributions both as a part of professional discourse and in response to inquiries from interested non-professionals all the way back to the BBS days of AVSIG.

You, with your sum total of 7 posts in one month of membership on PPRuNe might not have understood the import of his response to you, so let's get things clear on a couple points:


As a respected professional in this industry he was not suggesting to you that "until we're happy" was a substitute for the completion of required tests. In fact, just the reverse, "until we're happy" reflects a state of mind that is inclusive and sees the entire situation and ensures that all concerns are accounted for before we go flying, not just those that are enumerated in a maintenance manual. It's this approach to problems and exercise of judgement that marks a real captain, which he most definitely is.

Because he's the gentleman that he is PJ2 has chosen to take the time to try and explain these concepts to sandbank, yourself, and others with similarly uninformed viewpoints on how the profession works. Frankly, most of the rest of the real professionals here are far less patient with such naiveté and if they respond to you at all it will be with a good deal less courtesy than PJ2 has shown you. That you were unable to discern the points that he was trying to make to you is no excuse for your appallingly rude and insulting response to him.

I suggest that the next time you log onto this forum you take a good, careful look at what he wrote and then do the only honourable thing left to you and retract your remarks, offer the gentleman an apology, and think much more carefully about what you know and what you're saying before posting anything further.

ELAC

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

This isn't speculation. I have no idea what happened!

Madrid is about 2000' elevation.

It was hot- 30C.

They must have been heavy. c. 175 pax + fuel for a long sector.

( Could have been unlucky with pax weight as they were prob using standard weights.)

Wind was flukey. could eaily have been still air or even a tailwind.

Everyone knows the 'Mad Dog' is powerful, but 'on one', in the above conditions, surely it will need very careful handling.

Even if only a 'straightforward' EFATO or Fire on t/o this could have been really challenging and might even have left them with an a/c that wouldn't- or would hardly climb- alright, that IS speculation.

I pray for the families of those who are dead.

:sad: A tragedy.

[Mr Good Cat]

Risq,

In answer to your question (although not familiar with the type involved) YES an uncontained engine failure CAN rupture hydraulic lines.

This does not necessarily mean that you immediately lose all your hydraulic fluid though, or lose it all that quickly.

[Smilin_Ed]

A terrible accident and my prayers are for those who lost their lives and to those left behind... As an outsider looking in to the avation industry, what effect does this crash have on pilots flying the same type of aircraft? Is there now a loss of confidence in the plane you are flying or maybe there is a "there for the grace of God" attitude. How do you deal with something like this?

Whenever there is an accident, or an incident for that matter, all aviation professionals, pilots, mechanics (engineers in British parlance), air traffic controllers and others are highly interested in finding out what caused it so that it can be avoided in the future. We don't dwell on it, we simply go about finding the cause. To dwell on it would render us unfit to take on the next flight just as a surgeon can't dwell on the potential consequences of making a mistake. Aviation safety has improved dramatically since the days of the Wright Brothers due to professionalism.

[matblack]

The MD80 series is certainly a fine plane on which to be a passenger, silent & smooth. I use it weekly MAN-CPH. It does rotate differently than other types though. Regularly, especially when full, as it rotates the back end tends to drop slightly which tends to give you slight negative G loadings as it quickly arrests the drop and powers up. I think someone referred to it's tendency to do this when slightly over rotated in an earlier post. I always feel this when I'm in the overwing exit seat and the flight is full. It gives you a real pressure on the head pushing you in the seat for a couple of seconds. Never happens on other types. This particular flight was full and also on its way to a holiday destination. This implies significant luggage load. Specualtion of course but there is a possibility that the aircraft was at max t/o weight for the conditions, suffered an engine failure at the critical point of rotation. Possibly the take off calcualtions were eroneous due to the faulty OAT probe and the aircraft could not maintain flight (possibly Vr was too low). Pilot tries to put it back down as there's not enough power to sustain flight, reverser deployed, slews off runway, down ravine etc. There's always a chain of events with these accidents and it certainly won't put me off flying the MD82 next week. Fortunately these events are rare and lessons are learned from these tragedies.

[lomapaseo]

If there was an explosive engine failiure (Fan piercing the engine casing), is there any chance it could of ruptured hydraulics for the control surfaces? I earlier brought up the United incident with the explosive engine failiure. Is there any chance something like this could have happened in this case? do the control systems run along the top or the bottom of the aircraft?


simple answer .... yes

Liklihood slim

I could go into this much deeper, but it would only fuel wasted speculation and discussion. Let's wait for a tidbit of additional facts from the investigators on-scene. We probably will hear something within 24 hours

PS I still feel that my word mininmize was properly used earlier, to wit, one mitigates the damage in order to minimize a specific consequence from occuring :)

[bsieker]

Just a few remarks.

Modern turbofan engines need to show, as part of the certification, that their casing can contain the separation of a fan blade during a maximum power run. There are impressive videos of such "fan-blade-off tests" on Youtube.

What cannot usually be contained is the failure of a compressor or turbine disc. These will exit the case at unpredictable angles (though more or less perpendicular to the rotational axis) and at high momentums and energies. At least since the Sioux City accident, where fragments from the tail-mounted #2 engine of a DC-10 ruptured all three hydraulic lines, one of the design factors mitigating the effects of such occurrences is to route redundant systems through different physical locations, if possible.

Great care is taken that such failures do not occur. But they still do, very rarely.

The DC-9's control systems, including those of the -80 series (otherwise known as "MD80"), are mostly cable-mechanical. The cables, connected to the control wheels, and control columns, move tabs at the ailerons and the elevator, which in turn move the control surfaces themselves by aerodynamic forces. Roll-control is supported by hydraulically activated spoilers, and nose-down pitch control in a stall situation is also hydraulically assisted, if necessary.

Normal rudder operation is hydraulical, but in case of a hydraulic failure, or when decativated manually, rudder control is also mechanical via a tab.

I have no idea about what happened in Madrid, and I would also not offer an opinion as to whether hydraulics are more or less vulnerable to shrapnel than control cables. Both seems possible.


Bernd

[RiSq]

Last thing I wanted was to speculate, I was just intrigued as more reports are indicating an explosion, but knowing what 99.9% of the media is like, it was much less dramatic. Obviously having seen the Southwest explosive fan failure ( The damage to the casing ) and the United incident, I thought it may be worth putting into the light.

So I take it the control systems run along the top of the plane?

I hope that the forums don't lock out us ethusiasts. I may not be a Captain, but the only time I post is when I feel something may be helpful.

I don't condone posts such as "maybe livestock onboard caused the crash" I mean, come on....

I really hope I can read the facts and the truths....the Media just makes me :ugh: - If I want the real answers, I come on here....

[sevenstrokeroll]

I can't find anything about control cables being compromise on any dc9/md80 type in an engine failure scenario.

a delta md88 blew an engine in pensacola and parts came through the fuselage and killed two seated in the rear most seats.

the rudder is hydraulically powered, but has full manual reversion through an aerodynamic tab.

the elevator is manual by way of aerodynamic tab...it has a hydraulic ram for nose down in an unusual scenario called a deep stall.

the ailerons are manual though tabs.

the spoilers are hydraulic.

failure of the complete and total hydraulic system leaves this plane completely controllable in all 3 axis of control.


the 737 does not have manual reversion on the rudder...many other planes don't either!

[Aeromar27]

A couple of things about the MD's Flight Controls:

Lateral Control:
Provided by ailerons that are not hydraulically powered, helped by the spoilers. The yoke is cable connected to control tabs which aerodynamic forces move the actual aileron, hence a little delay for actuation upon input.

Directional Control:
Provided by the hydraulically powered rudder. It also has a manual mode, selectable by the use of a lever in the cockpit. Upon loss of hydraulic power or by shutting off its hydraulic control, the rudder automatically reverts to manual mode.

Longitudinal Control (important):
Provided by "non hydraulically powered" elevators. Ill explain why the quotes. The control column is cable connected to tabs (one per elevator) which aerodynamic forces move the elevator. And the elevators also have a "sby" hydraulic augmentor, to provide effectiveness under extreme AoA conditions to assure the possibility of lowering the nose. In that case, an annunciation comes on "ELEVATOR POWER ON".

Its also important to say that the longitudinal trim is provided by a movable horizontal stabilizer. It is moved by it's primary ELECTRICAL motor, or an alternate one. So no hydraulics here either.



I wont speculate. I'm just saying the little i know about the MD. Through all these situations we learn new things and we should take advantage of the rich conversations that take place in moments like these. Lets try to keep this as informative as we can.



EDIT: sorry for repeating stuff, i didn't know other people were going to do the same. I was probably still typing when u guys posted you comments.

[DozyWannabe]

RiSq, I'm not 100% on this but I believe the control cables and hydraulic lines run through the floor. To the best of my limited knowledge the only aircraft that runs then through the ceiling is the 747 due to the position of the flight deck above the main passenger cabin.

[Gnazio]

Hi,

MD80 reverser can be opened in flight if the throttles are at idle.

One thing is sure, the reverser from one engine were deployed. The investigation will tell us if this was an attempted abort after rotation.

Regards

Gnazio

[brittleware]

It seems really odd that in an age where nearly every street in Britain is monitored by CCTV the runways on an airport as busy as this are not. I've watched this thread and its associated (poor) news coverage since the start. In particular the crap graphical cartoon representations of "what might have happened" offend.

Surely for the cost of two hard drive (security style, say three hour) video recorders and two cameras almost buried in the ground using long (telephoto) lenses at each end of the runway, we'd be able to see something of what really did occur?

Such a low cost solution to early answers ...............tell me where I'm going wrong?

[Rananim]

Never flew this type but one engine out at WAT limit does require special handling on any type.The key is being gentle and good stick and rudder skills.Rotation should be slower and BA will be less,typically only 13 deg.Crews must remember that an engine on fire does produce thrust and so PF applies rudder as he retards the thrust lever.Slowly and in a coordinated fashion.If you're ham-fisted about it,you can get into trouble,like over-control and large bank angles near the deck.Bank,any bank,is your worst enemy at this critical time.
I dont know what happened in this awful tragedy but I do know that stick and rudder skills and airmanship are being sacrificed at the altar of political correctness,SOP overkill and computerized hi-tec aircraft.

[A330driver]

bsieker,

Just to add - th JT8D engine was originally certified before fan containment was required. Grandfather rights are in effect and are not required on derivatives.

[Aeromar27]

About the disposition of the control cables and hydraulics lines. I'm 90% sure that they run under the floor. In the main gear well you can find the two 17 Gal reservoir deposits, one for each of the two hyd systems, as well as some pulleys with some cables running (not sure what those cables are though).
http://www.md80.com.ar/imagenes/DSC02723.JPG

It seems really odd that in an age where nearly every street in Britain is monitored by CCTV the runways on an airport as busy as this are not. I've watched this thread and its associated (poor) news coverage since the start. In particular the crap graphical cartoon representations of "what might have happened" offend.

Those recordings do exist. Remember that rwy 36R is the newest of the airdrome, of course it has cameras. It has been said that the recordings of the CCTV cameras containing the footage of the crash are still being used by the investigation committee. Remember that on one of these investigations, any contracting state is invited to take part of the investigation, as well as a committee from the state of manufacture (Boeing people are already in Spain). It will be a long time until tapes, recordings or FDR information becomes publically released.

[bsieker]

1. Contrary to some posts and article the MD80 is a VERY safe plane.

I'm not at all saying that the MD80 is an unsafe aircraft. I've recently flown on an MD87 without any qualms. However most of your points are non-sequiturs, and I'm not sure what you mean by "VERY safe". Indicating that other, more recent types are less safe? The statistics see a slight advantage for the 737classic and NG, and the A320 over the MD80.


Especially in this scenario because,

2. Together with the MD-11, (dunno about the DC-10), the MD-80 is one of the very few aircraft equipped with the "dial a flap" system allowing the optimum use of ANY flap setting for a specific runway (e.g. Flaps 3.8°). Meaning that at the long runway, that particular flight wold have had a VERY high rotation speed because of very low flaps settings. Maybe even less than 5°!. This system of course must be used by the airline. The high speed does not bode well in case of an RTO due to extra mass, but the high speed and low flaps are invaluable in an N-1 situation and airborne.

I don't see how this is relevant at all. It may sometimes be nice to have an intermediate flap setting between, e. g. the five settings on the A320, but I'm not sure the possible slight benefits outweigh the potential problems in actually setting the desired setting.

4. The MD80 has 2 independant hydraulic systems, one AUX pump in the #2 system (because of the importance of the rudder), PLUS a transfer pump that is able to trasfer hydraulic pressure from one sytem to the other.

Most other aircraft with which I am familiar have three independent hydraulic systems, of which a single one allows the aircraft to be flown and landed, albeit with reduced manoeuverability.

E. g., on the A320:

The three systems are called "blue", "green" and "yellow", blue is pressurized by an electric pump or the RAT (ram air turbine in this case), green by an engine-driven pump, yellow by an engine-driven pump or by an electric pump, or, for cargo door operation, by a hand-operated pump.

There is also a power transfer unit, through which the yellow system can pressurize the green system, or vice versa.

Each system has an accumulator to assist during high demands, and to operate the brakes during a failure.

Does that seem less redundant than the MD80's system?

Remember the 777 engine shutdown problems?

The jury is still out on that one.

The A320 flight control computer woes in the late 80's and early 90's?

And these caused which accidents exactly? (And don't tell me Habsheim.)

6. A system on the MD80 automatically reduces rudder movement with increasing speed, helping the pilots in eliminating the need to pay extra attention to rudder overuse.

So does the A320. Also note that this automatic travel limiter on the MD80 does not work in mechanical backup ("tab") mode.

Lastly, the MD80 is loooong. Small elevators, swept wings and a very narrow wheel base. She's NOT an easy plane to fly.

Interesting point. As in: how is an aircraft that is not easy to fly, "VERY safe"?


Bernd

[RiSq]

Brittleware

What you state regarding the recording of take offs/ landings I'm sure has been brought up before. If anyone has seen the B2 footage from Guam, you'll notice that this was taken from a "Security Camera" at the base, that was watching the departure of the B2's. Although it doesn't answer all the questions, it can help. In the B2 instance, you can see something detach from the aircraft and its pitch for rotation is way too steep, which results in a stall and the left wing clipping the ground.

Like you say, video footage would have provided vital evidence.

Maybe someone more in the "know" will be able to explain why it hasn't been put into affect, but I know it has been suggested countless times before.

EDIT: Just see that someone has posted that such cameras were in use. I'm sure they will show some vital information. Are they now a requirement or "Advised" to have them?

[ECAM_Actions]

And these caused which accidents exactly? (And don't tell me Habsheim.)Off the top of my head:

* Paris air crash (still can't decide which version of events is correct)
* A330 under-going autopilot test flights (AP couldn't be disengaged after a go-around and it stalled).
* Incident with A320 making un-commanded pitch maneuvers on approach, but thankfully didn't crash.

Most other aircraft with which I am familiar have three independent hydraulic systems, of which a single one allows the aircraft to be flown and landed, albeit with reduced manoeuverability.Maybe it's a weight issue? Exec jets tend to only have two systems, I know the Fokker 70/100 has only two systems. It doesn't make them "less safe". The A380 only has two hydraulic systems (5000 psi systems), with electric backup!!

The DC-10 had three systems, but there were a couple of crashes where it didn't make any difference - all three lines were severed by a single event.

ECAM Actions.

[ZAGORFLY]

just some idea:
1) if they haven't rejected the T/O is because they reached V1 way down the runway. this is evident of un underpowered engines performances for some reason (FLEX temperature?) (FADEC? )
2) If they had lost engine 1 while airborne or after V1 why they were not able to fly on one engine? Is evident to me that also Eng.2 was not delivering 100% of its power.
3) what kind of warning make the CT to return to the gate? An outside temp failure gauge? (effecting the EPR computation?)

It looks tragically similar to the 737 incident that flew into the Potomac river soon after T/O because its TAT engine probe was blocked by ice.

I'm truly sorry for the vacationer that perish and I am very sorry for the workers that perished to carry them.
note:

I followed the incident reporting from CNN a soon it happened. It was disgusting how they were making a show asking perfect idiots like me incredibly stupid questions receiving never-ending and stupid answers to feed their stupid audience. Only BBC was reporting the tragic facts.
however CNN Richard Quest (ex BBC economic journalist turned into business traveler for CNN) become instantly an aviation expert (because he travel I suppose) When he quoted that MD80 rotate at 180-190 kt. (Concorde was 200...kt) He did gave me the different impression that expert. But I realized he was reading PPrune forum for his entertaining coverage source information . So Guys, is worth to keep more "professional" and lesss "rumors".

Regards .

ps :My written English is not easy to read (I know that) sorry.

[Aeromar27]

Oh well, apparently the crisis committee has already watched the CCTV tape and investigations are being based on the hypothesis that whatever happened to the engine did in fact damage control surfaces of the aircraft.

Someone mentioned something about the certification of the JT8D not requiring fan containment, i would like to know details about that, and how it has been adapted to the new certification criteria. Have no tests been conducted at all... bird or hail ingestion?


EDIT: mentioning how useless this post is, makes it even more useless. There are a couple people here trying to share useful information so that we all learn something from this. So, considering that people have already stopped repeating what they hear on the news, lets try not to state how useless their comments were over and over again.

[lomapaseo]

A330driver

Just to add - th JT8D engine was originally certified before fan containment was required. Grandfather rights are in effect and are not required on derivatives.

I have no idea where you got This from but it is all wrong

[agusaleale]

A fact is that the plane was in the air, between 40 and 50 mts (160 feet).

At the moment of the take off, one of the survivors (Ligia Palomino) explained that the plane was shakiing from one side to the other.

[Carnage Matey!]

Off the top of my head:

* Paris air crash (still can't decide which version of events is correct)

What Paris crash?

* A330 under-going autopilot test flights (AP couldn't be disengaged after a go-around and it stalled).

Not even close to the truth there.

* Incident with A320 making un-commanded pitch maneuvers on approach, but thankfully didn't crash.

More details please. Off the top of my head it seems you are a little confused.

[bsieker]

A330 under-going autopilot test flights (AP couldn't be disengaged after a go-around and it stalled).

- That is inaccurate. The autopilot was left engaged for a very long time intentionally to be able to analyse the problem better after the flight. It could have been disengaged earlier.

- It was not an A320

- It was the autopilot, not the flight control (fly-by-wire) software. The MD80 also has an autopilot, which is computer software.

- It was a test flight.

See also the entry in our compendium (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/compendium/incidents_and_accidents/toulouse_a330.html).


Paris air crash (still can't decide which version of events is correct)

:confused:


Incident with A320 making un-commanded pitch maneuvers on approach, but thankfully didn't crash.

This was caused by an intermittent fault in the THS actuator system. Nothing to do with software.


Bernd

[RiSq]

Aeromar Wrote:

Oh well, apparently the crisis committee has already watched the CCTV tape and investigations are being based on the hypothesis that whatever happened to the engine did in fact damage control surfaces of the aircraft


Is this confirmed Aeromar? Where did you source the information? interesting if it was proven that they are looking into this, especially after the last few posts regarding it.

Or was there some sarcasm there that I missed...

[ECAM_Actions]

What Paris crash?My bad - the Paris airshow - the one where it went into the trees after doing a 100 ft fly-by.

Regarding the A330 - Oops. 1994 A330 test flight crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A330_test_flight_crash)

DC-10 - I'm not confused there. There were a couple of accidents whereby the #2 disintegrated and took out all the hydraulic lines.

ECAM Actions.

[Carnage Matey!]

Paris airshow? You mean Habsheim, which is not Paris, and which somebody previously told you not to mention because it's entirely irrelevant.

If you are getting your info on the A330 crash from Wikipedia then I'd suggest you really aren't qualified to be discussing the subject.

[bsieker]

My bad - the Paris airshow - the one where it went into the trees after doing a 100 ft fly-by.

Oh dear. Here we go again. That was Habsheim, which is a long way from Paris, and it has been discussed to death.

The ultra-short version:

- Idle-power low-flyby at local airshow at small aerodrome with grass strip
- Planned for 100ft
- Executed at 30-50ft
- At this height agl, the alpha-floor-protection (TOGA thrust) is inhibited
- alpha-floor-protection was permenently disabled for this flight by Captain
- Captain realised critical situation too late
- engines took their usual 6 seconds to spool up from idle
- engines ingested trees
- wings and fuselage impacted trees
- aircraft came to rest in trees, caught fire. Three people died.


It was not caused by the flight control software in any way.

See also the latest pages in the BA 038 thread.


Bernd

[Loose rivets]

So, if we have a loud bang and masses of vibration, on or just after V1, how many people would elect to abandon rather than carry a obviously physically damaged aircraft into the air?

Or conversely, how many people think they can look out of the window and assess whether they have enough concrete left wherever the V1 call was?

[SeniorDispatcher]

It looks tragically similar to the 737 incident that flew into the Potomac river soon after T/O because its TAT engine probe was blocked by ice.

As a former QH-er, I think you'll find that was an EPR sensor...

[Willoz269]

An interesting snippet....I was watching satellite news when this happened, and 2 witnesses at the end of the runway, not far from the crash, said unequivocally one engine exploded..."you can see it, one engine is over there (pointing to one side of the runway) and the other is in the wreckage, barely visible in the rubble)". I am usually the first to listen to witness statements with a grain of salt, particularly as adrenaline immediately after the accident accentuates things you see or perceive, but the clincher was him saying he saw the explosion and is pointing the engines out to the cameras. Maybe he thought he saw it, not sure, but an uncontained failure is possible.

I am of the opinion the probe had nothing to do with it, I have been in cockpit rides with good friends cursing about having to nudge the throttles in an MD80 up and down to get stable readings, we land, the engineers unscrew the probe and water comes gushing out...screws back on, and away it goes....and behold, the readings are fine.

[xkoote]

bsieker,

I was pointing the general fact that the MD80 is not an unsafe plane as many articles would have us beleive. Unfortunately I have NO idea whatsoever who you are, nor do I understand your need to defend the A320. Just want to inform you about the idea of taking off with as little flaps as possible as runway permits. Other types are limited to the flaps selector. You'll takeoff with less runway, but with less airspeed and more drag. That's the principle of the dial-a-flap. It's just enough flaps to get airborne. The more energy you have going airborne the better. You may not think it's significant enough, but MDC definitely thought so. And I'm more inclined to believe them.

As for defending the A320, I don't exactly know why as I wasn't attacking other planes as your post suggests. I know the A320 systems good enough, I know all planes have the same characteristics to make them safe. Hence the question that may be you can answer. Why does the media blame the MD as being a plane with a dubious safety record ? ?

Take a chill pill my friend, I'm just an MD80 pilot explaining to the non-pro's in the thread the particulars of the MD80 system. And don't fret, I won't mention the habsheim incident..........nor the A340 incident over the atlantic :oh:

Regards,

Xander

[Jackonicko]

I am a journalist and a UAS-trained PPL, and I make no apology for reading this thread from start to finish. Civil air transport isn't my usual beat, but I am inevitably asked for my opinion and it's useful to have some 'fibre' to go with my stock protestation that it's too early to say, and that we don't know which parts of what we're seeing are facts, and which parts are speculation.

I'm only human, too, and I'm honest enough to admit that (outside what I might write) I'm privately interested in what may have taken two of my fellow pilots.

And privately, it's starting to sound like a catastrophic engine failure, and one wonders whether the aircraft was then mishandled - one of the higher value PPRuNers pointed out that there could be "a disastrous combination if the engine fails at TO, causing wing-to-wing amplitudes that take some sorting out." This might explain the right wingtip hitting the ground, I guess? Or could we have had the lethal combination of a failure of the left hand engine, followed by extension of the RH thrust reverser? Whatever the truth, it's plainly still too speculative to write about - but not too speculative to think about!

I've refrained from posting until now, but I have just seen an interview with one of the Spanish fire-people which throws some light on the survival aspects. He stated that most of the survivors came from the section of fuselage that ended up "in the river", who were able to extricate themselves from the wreckage "unaided". It sounded as though others survived the impact, but were unable to extricate themselves..... Tragic and awful stuff.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I do think that checking the accident in 1985, location, Milwaukee, WI, USA of a DC9 flown by Midwest Express airlines may , (MAY) shed some light on this span air crash.

[DozyWannabe]

Loose rivets - at this point we don't know whether the vibrations were felt before, at, or after V1 and the only human beings that could confirm that are dead. So despite our natural inquisitiveness and desire to solve the problem, we're basically fumbling in the dark until we get some kind of preliminary bulletin or press release.

So I think if we're not angling to make fools out of ourselves we should keep our powder dry and our minds open. That means cutting the personal cr*p and the pet theories and only contributing if it helps, whether a professional, an interested layman or just someone browsing though.

Come on people, right now all we have to go on is conjecture. The MD-80 series is derived from an old design, but it's a type just like any other. Pilots who fly the type know its idiosyncrasies just as pilots who fly other types know their idiosyncrasies. As such, comparison to A320/737/whatever is pointless and unhelpful.

Until we know, we can't really compare this incident to anything.

[Airbubba]

I do think that checking the accident in 1985, location, Milwaukee, WI, USA of a DC9 flown by Midwest Express airlines may , (MAY) shed some light on this span air crash.

Definitely some similarities in the accident profile. It was a baby -9, no slats, the PF botched the control inputs according to the NTSB:

AAR-87-01 (http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1987/AAR8701.htm)

As I recall, the POI for Midwest Express had never flown a jet, she was a Shorts pilot...

[The Dude2]

OK enough. In every airline incident there is always a number of factors which lead to the inevidable. First, an engine failure, not a catastrofic event by itself. The crew should have taken it into the air and returned to Madrid. As it happened, they did get airbourne, that was the safest place for them. They tried to place the aircraft back on the runway which unless they popped the 2nd engine was a death call. List one incident in aviation history where this was successful. There are none. The inquiry will list a multitude of factors in this crash including not only mechanical, but crew failure to follow simple SOP'S and deal with the problem in the air. The fact that the reverser was found deployed can only be attributed to weigth on weels and reverse was selected. This incident although not initially the crews fault will ultimately be blamed on them. Sad but true.