The TNT B737 EMA/Birmingham incident thread

[Air Hop]

Does anyone know what is going on at BHX. NOTAM'd closed until 2359 with flights being diverted:confused:

Thanks

[flowman]

Aircraft landed with undercarriage problems, believed right side main gear retracted. Rwy covered in foam plus disabled acft. Awaiting AIB clearance to move it.

[positionand hold]

Jolly quick (but pessimistic?) NOTAM.

[Air Hop]

Many thanks for info. Any idea what a/c type involved?

[jon01]

OO-TNB STN-EDI

J01

[Daysleeper]

STN-EDI

Airport are saying it was the Liege - Stan sector. Would make sense for a div to Brum.

[Bumz_Rush]

I am confuxed.....if stan was dest and closed, and I expect Lut closed too...and now B Ham closed toooooo...

Bumz

[luoto]

Glad it got down safely.

OOI in the UK would TNT pay compensation to BHX and the operators for all the inconvenience and cost.

Maybe BHX should have a nother runway.

Can any of their smaller operators use CVT or is it EMA ?

[Daysleeper]

I am confuxed.....if stan was dest and closed, and I expect Lut closed too...and now B Ham closed toooooo...


Stansted operating reduced distances so better not land there with any doubts about your ability to stop before the JCB overrun arrestor.

Luton night closures, should be open again by now but its only scheduled to open about 6am local and is often later than this as they landed Brum at 0606 it makes sense.

[Avman]

As a matter of interest, don't cargo a/c have slides?

[jon01]

A/C was actually OO-TND LGE-STN-EDI

J01

[Daysleeper]

As a matter of interest, don't cargo a/c have slides
Some like the A300 do, others - the 757 for instance dont. Just depends on the mod. The advantage of slides is large numbers of people can quickly get down them. Freighters are only have a few seats and for the smaller ones it is practical to put "descent assistance" think death slide meets car seat belt meets parachute trainer - grab one and step out the door.

think that LUT's work is to a similar timescale:

Not last week: I operated into STN at about 3z and out again 4 ish its just shorter than normal, Luton is deffo closed nights and thus there is always a chance it wont re-open on time or that when it does the ILS is U/S or similar. So sensible planning would use somewhere else as an alternate, EMA which is a TNT gateway and was probably their "commercial" alternate was giving visibility of less than a couple of KM so Brum is the obvious choice. Though from a disruption point of view Gatwick might be better as they could have still operated from their spare runway/taxiway while the 737 was recovered. Perhaps there is an argument for a similar facility in the midlands.

[flybhx]

Wouldn't a military field such as Brize or Fairford have been more suited for this particular problem as they have long runways?

[bbrown1664]

EMA which is a TNT gateway

This is probably whey they went elsewhere so as not to screw up their own schedules ;)

[handsfree]

Rumour has it that they did pay a brief visit to EMA prior to BHX but unfortunately left some little bits there that make landing all that much easier.

[Kestrel_909]

The reduced distances;
REDUCED DECLARED DISTANCES, RWY 15 AVBL FOR DEPS ONLY. RWY 15 TORA 1650M TODA 1775M ASDA 1650M LDA NIL. DEP ACFT REQUIRED TO BACKTRACK RWY 15 VIA HOLDS E1 OR T1. 15 JUN 07:46 UNTIL 15 JUN 15:00 ESTIMATED

[Irish Steve]

would their choice of landing location have had anything to do with the RFF level available, and the ability or otherwise to foam the runway?

[Avman]

Seeing the info about reduced take-off distances, I'm a little confused as to where exactly the a/c came to rest. Looking at the photo, I thought it was the intersection of 15/33 with 06/24. Or is it opposite K1?

[jmc-man]

Handsfree, your post seems to have been overlooked.

I have also heard that a part or all of the RIGHT gear was in East Midlands, with the rest of the aircraft on the runway in Birmingham.

Seems absurd. I assume the aircraft was planned to EMA, being a TNT base.

We await further details with some interest.

JMC-man

edited by JMC-man due not looking before typing

[DH121]

Wouldn't be suprised if they find a chock from point of departure in the gear bay - it's happened before with 737s!

[rodthesod]

I have also heard that a part or all of the left gear was in East Midlands, with the rest of the aircraft on the runway in Birmingham.
JMC-man

If you look at the pictures kindly provided you will see that the left gear definitely made it to BHX - the right gear seems to be at fault.

rts

[fmgc]

According to Central News they couldn't land at STN due to fog, so it diverted to EMA but couldn't land there for some reason not specified but realised that they had a probelm with the gear, so diverted to BHX.

[warm beer]

As a matter of interest, don't cargo a/c have slides?


TND has a slide front right but not front left, twenty year old ex US Airways.

Aircraft going from LGG-STN, div to EMA when the gear was lowered it seemed that part of the right gear fell off, it was diverted to BHX because the possibility that part of the gear was on the runway and also the wx.

Well done to the crew for keeping it on the runway:ok:

[handsfree]

I'm led to believe that the aircraft overshot EMA but left a wheel on the runway - along with minor damage to the runway surface ??? Good trick if you can do it.

[Daysleeper]

If true we could have ended up with STN, LTN, BHX and EMA all closed for various reasons, not a good day to carry min fuel :eek:

[Boeingmann]

As a matter of interest, don't cargo a/c have slides?


Our 737-300 freighter is fitted with slide.

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

I marvel that 'they' manage to have both STN and LTN carrying out runway work over the same months. You would have thought a little planning, communication and forethought might have been deployed to avoid this.

I imagine that a flight ecountering multiple diversions and a gear problem resulting in bending the airframe would be dauntingly stressful. Whatever the outcome I hope the crew enjoy a beer and a good nights sleep tonight.

Cheers

WWW

[neil armstrong]

Got this of a belgium aviation forum (Luchtzak.be)

A/c was due for landing at EMA. During CatIII approach, autopilot was disengaged on short final. A/c slammed into runway, thereby ripping off RH LDG. The gear then slammed into the inboard flaps and aft fuselage.
Go-around initiated and after being airborne again, crew requested emergency landing at BHX due to weather conditions.


Neil

[aerolearner]

As far as I know, the only "European" airport that can foam a runway is Zurich. Istanbul also has the facility. Normally about 45 mins notice needed.
So, it's down to the RFF to lay down some foam/liquid if required.
I am aware that Geneva has the facility:
Foam laying vehicle (see "Titan" vehicle at page 21) (http://www.gva.ch/en/inst/docs/ssa.pdf)
MD-87 EC-GRL Iberia, March 20th, 1999 (http://www.airliners.net/open.file/030280/M)
Not sure about Zurich.

As far as I know, another European airport with foam laying capability is Athens:
Foam laying vehicle (http://www.rosenbauer.com/index.php?node_id=323)
B737-200 SX-BCF Olympic, September 20th, 1999 (http://www.geocities.com/aircraftfire/temp/atene.jpg)

Runway foaming is discouraged on airports which are not specifically equipped. This FAA CERTALERT explains why (see paragraph 3).
http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/airports/airport_safety/certalerts/media/cert0204.rtf

[OwnNav]

I thought a few Military airfields are designated MEDA and can foam, Waddington for instance.

[beamer]

Whilst these things do not happen often - such incidents do cause large amounts of chaos which affect many thousands of people. Someone I flew with some time ago speculated whether somewhere such as Manston could be designated as a Master Diversion Airfield (as it once was in its RAF days) -
fully equipped for diversions for aircraft with technical problems which could affect runway use for some considerable time. Bearing in mind Manston's position the cost of such a facility could be borne by UK/France/Belgium/Holland - certainly the runway is long enough and the airfield could continue to be used for normal operations as required subject to its diversion status. OK - its all down to money I know but the simple logic seems sound to me.

[Avman]

Thanks for the respective info guys. Beamer, that's all very well, but under the alleged cicumstances reported during their g/a at EMA, I guess the crew wanted to get down asap. BHX was only a few minutes away.

[aerolearner]

From RAF documents, only Zurich, Istanbul/Ataturk, Lusaka & Dhaka/Zia are listed as having dedicated runway foam capabilities. However, as aerolearner says, the Athens truck is very clearly labelled as a runway foam laying vehicle & the Geneva one looks very similar!!
Edit - I spoke with my company's handlings agents at both airports, the one at Geneva spoke directly with the RFF; they confirmed that runway foam was operational at Geneva/Istanbul. You learn something new everyday!!I forgot to mention the Turkish airports in my previous message. A foam laying truck should be in service at Ankara airport (see specs (http://www.rosenbauer.com/index.php?node_id=324)). I don't know about Istanbul.

[RISK AVERSE]

Hi

A bit more information... We reported the undercarriage to EMA tower (wheel tyre and strut). They were quite surprised. The undercarriage was in the grass between the Alpha taxiway and the runwa,y about 300m from TDZ - we were actually quite reluctant to tell ATC as we assumed that they knew already - but prudently we did.

The vis was about 350m rwy 27 and 250m rwy 09 at EMA at around 0540z, so any runway inspection may have missed the u/c in the grass. As we sit higher up we got a good view of the u/c.

This had been bugging us all day and on return to EMA for the 4th sector we had a good look at the grass with definite tyre marks in the grass - i.e. indicating that the aircraft had landed left of the runway before going around. The mayday reported gear and flap problems so I'll leave the flap problems to your imagination/knowledge of similar accidents...

Hope this info helps and that I've not made too many assumptions in the circumstances. Good luck to the pilots involved, hope they are ok.

RA

[Banzai Eagle]

Wonder what crew hours involved, hopefully not a 13 hr night as there may be trouble if so :eek:

[JW411]

Banzai Eagle:

"Hopefully not a 13 hr night as there may be trouble if so".

It is highly unlikely but exactly why would that be a problem then? You are of course totally familiar with Belgian FTLs?

[Banzai Eagle]

JW411 Surely am, ever heard of the word "tired"???:ugh:

[warm beer]

Under Belgium FTLs you can do a 12 hour night + two hours extention:\

[GOLF-INDIA BRAVO]

Brings back memories of the DC-8 at Stansted that hit another aircraft back in 70`/80`s and diverted to Manchester with a large gash in the wing and part of the flaps missing ( from memory )
When you looked at the damage you wondered how it ever made it to Manchester
Can anyone remember this and fill in the gaps for me

G-I-B

[Curious Pax]

This is going from memory, but my recollection of the DC8 incident is a Philipines registered DC8 doing a low go around at Stansted in early morning fog, clipping the tail of a Flying Tigers DC8, and diverting to Manchester. I think it was around 1982/3. A look round the net didn't find anything, but looking in the DC-8 database I found, I think that the offending aircraft was RP-C830 of Intercontinental. It was certainly a surprise to a young spotter who pedalled out one morning and saw it at Manchester - seems a lifetime ago when you just went on spec, and not because a message on the web had flagged something worth seeing!

[JW411]

Mike:

What it boils down to is this:

A 2-man crew has a maximum FDP of 14 hours (3-man crew is 16 hours).

If the FDP starts between 2000 and 0400 Local then the duty comes back to 12 hours.

An extension of 2 hours exceptionally may be made. In such cases a written report must be submitted by the captain to the Company and the BCAA.

Therefore a night duty is normally 12 hours (14 - 2) with 14 possible with an exceptional addition.

This is good for up to 4 sectors. The penalty thereafter is 30 minutes per sector.

Absolutely nowhere does the figure of 13 hours appear.

[blue up]

I was wondering......just how do you get a 737 off a runway when it only has one main gear. Negotiating corners must be a problem. About 20+ tons on a main gear leg so you'd need a strong baggage trolley to stuff under the wing.

Any experts care to explain?

[oilbseeingu]

It looks like it may never fly again. The airport authorities probably caused more damage then the landing(s) did. When being moved the stbd engine was lowered on to a trailer which was towed by a truck and the a/c was towed by a tug in the normal way, the trouble was caused by truck and tug not moving at the same time!:uhoh: Severe stress applied to wing and number 2 pylon.

[joh]

more pics

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/1060627/M/

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/1060628/M/

[FlyboyUK]

judging by the scrape mark along the runway, looks like they did a pretty good job of keeping it straight after touchdown

[captjns]

My question is this... How do you divert to BHX after landing at EMA and in the grass no less?

[microlight AV8R]

My question is this... How do you divert to BHX after landing at EMA and in the grass no less?

'cos they had a very exciting touch and go.

Have a read of the other thread about Birmingham being closed and it will all make sense.

Methinks it was a good bit of flying to recover and then make a very neat emergency landing with half of the main undercarriage missing plus other serious damage.

Glad nobody was injured.

[Mercenary Pilot]

Does anyone know what the reported vis was at EMA at the time of the missed approach?

[microlight AV8R]

Does anyone know what the reported vis was at EMA at the time of the missed approach?

Answer: Not very good. Take a look at earlier post by 'Risk Averse'

"the vis was about 350m rwy 27 and 250m rwy 09 at EMA at around 540z"

Suspect that after the mishap at East Mids they were not confident about the conditions in which they'd have to put her onto the ground there and elected to go to B'ham.

[Map_Shift]

Weird thing is that the right main gear has been ripped off, but they deposited it to the left of R27 at EMA - and pretty close to the threshold at that!

[Mr Angry from Purley]

JW - For the sake of an hour - who cares. What banzai was trying to put across was if the duty length could be a consideration for the mishap ?.

Mike J - DHL Air (UK) have a variation that allows 4/5 nights and 10.15hrs duty regardless of sectors flown with a max of 48 duty hrs rolling in 7 days.
If 1-3 nights they operate to CAP371 Table A :\

[Loose rivets]

Excuse me if I have missed something on a quick read though, but were the parts found at EMA showing signs of an impact other than to the runway surface, i.e. is there any local surface/property damage.

Weird thing is that the right main gear has been ripped off, but they deposited it to the left of R27 at EMA - and pretty close to the threshold at that!

Wheels can of course bounce a long way....but sideways? It would probably mean impact way before threshold. I assume that is your point. LR

[Mercenary Pilot]

What im wondering is weather they touched during a missed approach or did they go-around after touching down on the grass for whatever reason?

FLAMER DISCLAIMER:
Of course, anything discussed at this point is pure speculation and I'll be waiting for an official report before passing any judgment.

[joh]

I think it takes great talent to completely miss the runway.:D :D

Usually when u have to perform a cat3 u don't do it for fun, there is no talent at all to completely miss the runway when u can't see it.

When they saw the rwy they realized that they were "parallel" to it. Autopilot was disengaged on short final unfortunately the aircraft had landed left of the runway before going around.

[JW411]

Mr Angry:

"The duty length could be a consideration for the mishap".

Now there is a ground-breaking thought. Have you thought about passing on this amazing revelation to the AAIB et al?

"For the sake of an hour - who cares".

Well, I would suspect that the AAIB, the CAA, the BCAA and Uncle Tom Cobbly and All would care if the crew were one hour over the top so lots of people care. This is hardly surprising.

I was simply responding to the statement that the crew "had better not be over 13 hours or there would be trouble". I have tried to point out that under Belgian FTLs, 13 hours is irrelevant.

But then, what's an hour between friends?

[Magplug]

A couple of points....

Shooting a Cat 3 approach at EMA in the visibility described of 350m is not a completely blind manouvre. On the one hand a 737 crew can execute a Cat 1 landing in 550m vis and from deciding at 200' above the runway have a comforable period of time before touching down. Conversely executing an approach in the Cat 3 minimum of 200m still gives adequate visual cues for runway orientation on reaching DH at 50RA. In the example under discussion the prevailing visiblity was 350m, about halfway between the two scenarios.

For check purposes 737 simulators are set to show only the required 2 consecutive centreline lights although in the real world the visual cues on a 200m approach are more pleantiful. Even if the ILS deviation warnings failed (or you were so tired you ignored them), then the visual cues on a limiting 200m approach are sufficient to orientate yourself to the centre of the runway. Consequently it would be highly unlikely for a crew to suffer left/right disorientation and land on the grass in the given conditions. It appears equally inconceiveable that a 737 could stray far enough off the centreline to hit the grass in the final stages of the approach without flashing ILS indications warning both the crew of the situation.

There is mention of an auto-pilot disconnect at a late stage in the landing. If this disconnect was uncommanded it could well be as a result of the autopilot computer being unable to resolve a deteriorating LCZR tracking situation.

I think the level of pilot alertness may become a central issue in this investigation. The 737 has many poor design elements and two tired pilots doing their best can only do so much at the end of a long night.

After Helios.... will we see the antiquated design of the 737 flight deck come it for yet more examination?

[captjns]

Usually when u have to perform a cat3 u don't do it for fun, there is no talent at all to completely miss the runway when u can't see it.

When they saw the rwy they realized that they were "parallel" to it. Autopilot was disengaged on short final unfortunately the aircraft had landed left of the runway before going around.

Gee... you don't shoot CAT IIIs for fun? OK... I remember that the next time I shoot a CAT III approach. Oh well. Anyway, in any event, the autopilot during a normal CAT III approach is never disconnected until the aircraft is on the ground. That is the purpose of a CAT III approach... it also lands the jet because of the low minimums and the inabilitiy to have proper visual cues to disconnect and land the aircraft from as low as 50 feet. If the "carpet" is not seen at minimums, then the missed approach is executed, with the autopilot still engaged. On narrow bodied aircraft such as the 737 will successfully accomplish a go-around without contacting the ground. On wide bodied aircraft which I have flown it was not uncommon to skip off the runway during a go-around from a CAT III approach when initiated right at minimums.

It's unfair to comment on what happened without the facts.

[reevery]

I've been sitting passively reading this, but in response to the posts about "how you remove it" etc...

The plane was moved off runway 33 in time for the full length to re-open at about 1609 local, and was moved into the Alpha Loop. Overnight it was moved across to the western end of the currently unusable (due WIP) cross runway 24. This was all done with the RH engine on a low-loader, as it is now, and the markings have all gone. If this helps anyone, I've linked to the best photo I could get. I understand because of the reduced TORA some of the larger aircraft were being pushed back all the way from the gate onto the runway during the restrictions to get them out.

As for the "NIMBY alert" - yes, it's inevitable. But quicker to jump on the bandwagon was a senior BHX official, this morning quoted in the Birmingham Post as saying "If we already had the runway extension we plan to have by 2012, I think it would have made a difference," he said, "It would have allowed the larger plans to take off earlier."

http://www.reevery.net/gallery2/d/2968-1/577-7786_IMG.JPG

[Navy_Adversary]

Nice image Reev
I bet the low loader driver has a few stories to tell down the pub this weekend,
"I had a Boeing 737 on my trailer this week"
"Of course you did, I'll have a pint of what you've been drinking":)

[euroflyer]

Anyway, in any event, the autopilot during a normal CAT III approach is never disconnected until the aircraft is on the ground. That is the purpose of a CAT III approach... it also lands the jet because of the low minimums and the inabilitiy to have proper visual cues to disconnect and land the aircraft from as low as 50 feet. If the "carpet" is not seen at minimums, then the missed approach is executed, with the autopilot still engaged. :confused: ??

On the 757 if during an autoland approach, following LAND 3 annunciation, the Autoland Status Indicator (ASA) changes to LAND 2, execute a manual landing (weather permitting), or execute a manual go-around.

So it could be totally normal to do a manual go-around during a CAT 3 just an example, there are other scenarios which could make you do a manual go-around. What are saying, you should never disconnect during an autoland?

[captjns]

On the 757 if during an autoland approach, following LAND 3 annunciation, the Autoland Status Indicator (ASA) changes to LAND 2, execute a manual landing (weather permitting), or execute a manual go-around.

Your citation from the Boeing 757 AFM is correct. The same applies to the 737 in different words however.

An automatic landing system is fail passive if, in the event of failure, Autopilot disengagement causes no significant deviation of trim, flight path or attitude. After a failure the landing may be completed manually, or a manual go-around is executed if visual references are insufficient. The B737-NG incorporates a fail passive system.

An automatic landing system is fail-operational if, in the event of Autopilot Flight Director system (APFDS) failure, the operation may be continued utilizing the remainder of the system. The B737-NG is presently NOT Fail – Operational.

The CAT IIIA certified autopilot in the B737-NG is cleared for use down to 50 ft RA when coupled to the ILS. It will bring the aircraft into a “gate” at 50ft from where a landing can be made without large corrections to heading and attitude. In practice this means that at 100ft the aircraft should be placed:

• Laterally: Maximum 1/3 dot localizer deviation. The main gear should be within the extended runway edges.
• Vertically: Maximum 1 dot Glide Slope deviation. This equates to within 13 ft of the correct height.

Over the end of the runway at 50’ the crew should have been able to see about 350 meters, or almost 1200 feet of runway with an ample number or centerline lights being the fact that they are spaced 15 meters apart.

With a localizer deviation greater than 1/3 dot, a missed approach should have been initiated immediately. I find it hard to imagine that at 50’ AGL with the proper visual cues in view, during the flare, Auto-throttles in the retard mode that the aircraft would have a last minute excursion off the centerline.

[olivier737]

Captjns, in my opinion you are judging the professionalism of the flight crew a little bit too fast and in a very bad way! I'm happy not to fly with a guy like you who knows everything better than the others. Did you ever heard about CRM? Your words are very rude and not fair!

When you say : "I think it takes great talent to completely miss the runway". What a sad behaviour...

You were not in the TNT B737 cockpit (non-EFIS for info) when the incident occured and you (and all of us) are not in a position to judge these two guys. As you should know (as a professional pilot, if you are) everything goes sometimes fast in a cockpit, especially during marginal weather conditions and the accident can be very close. Keep in mind that it may happen to you as well. Never say never!

[captjns]

Captjns, in my opinion you are judging the professionalism of the flight crew a little bit too fast and in a very bad way! I'm happy not to fly with a guy like you who knows everything better than the others. Did you ever heard about CRM?

As you should know (as a professional pilot, if you are) everything goes sometimes fast in a cockpit, especially during marginal weather conditions and the accident can be very close. Keep in mind that it may happen to you as well. Never say never!

First of all, I am not standing in judgment in any crewmember, because I was not there.

If you want to oliver737, go ahead, use the CRM thing as an excuse to evade the issue. I gotta tell you Ace, you're missing the big picture here. EFIS or no EFIS it doesn’t make a difference. If the runway’s not where it’s suppose to be when you reach minimums… go-around… simple as that. I don’t know but that’s how I was trained, and that’s how I train pilots. What's your opinion about the runway not being there when you reach minimums? Better yet what happens if you are no longer in a safe position to land the jet with the runway in sight... what would you do?

In all my years as a skipper, no one has ever intimidated me to push the envelope when it comes to the safety and legality of operation.

Forget about yourself… but to put your crewmembers, and passengers in harms way is just pure arrogance. No other way to put it. That’s what separates the "Company Yes Men, Button Pushing, Brown Nosers from the real pilots. What are you?

[Charles Darwin]

:confused: ??

On the 757 if during an autoland approach, following LAND 3 annunciation, the Autoland Status Indicator (ASA) changes to LAND 2, execute a manual landing (weather permitting), or execute a manual go-around.

So it could be totally normal to do a manual go-around during a CAT 3 just an example, there are other scenarios which could make you do a manual go-around. What are saying, you should never disconnect during an autoland?

With my company (757´s) we are to continue catIII with autoland with "land2".
Are you telling me that´s not permitted according to Boeing?
Now, I´m getting all confused...

[euroflyer]

To clarify, on the 757s I fly which are earlier models apart from one, ,if you get an ASA change from LAND 3 to LAND 2 during autoland, Boeing says manual landing or manual go-around. You are allowed to come back and do for example a CAT 3A with LAND 2 annunciated provided it remains annunciated.
My point was, an autoland does not necessary mean an automatic go-around or and automatic landing as was previously stated.
I hope this clarifies my previous posting.

[Charles Darwin]

Thanks Euroflyer.
We only do Cat IIIA, so this all makes sense.

[Flap15Geardown]

As for the "NIMBY alert" - yes, it's inevitable. But quicker to jump on the bandwagon was a senior BHX official, this morning quoted in the Birmingham Post as saying "If we already had the runway extension we plan to have by 2012, I think it would have made a difference," he said, "It would have allowed the larger plans to take off earlier."


Typical airport numbskull who doesn't think about what he is saying. It doesn't matter how long the runway is the a/c would still have stopped approximately the same distance from the threshold. The only difference would be that you might have 2 short bits of runway to use, one towards relatively flat open countryside and the other towards rising ground and the car supermarket with all the housing estates beyond:ugh:

[Avman]

Yep, airport managers, just as switched on about aviation as as most of todays airline and ATC managers :ugh:.

[Doors to Automatic]

Typical airport numbskull who doesn't think about what he is saying. It doesn't matter how long the runway is the a/c would still have stopped approximately the same distance from the threshold.

That doesn't necessarily follow. By way of example - 747s once regularly operated into LBA (LDA 5900ft). But very few 747s come to a stop within 5900ft of the threshold at LHR.

[Jet2]

That doesn't necessarily follow. By way of example - 747s once regularly operated into LBA (LDA 5900ft). But very few 747s come to a stop within 5900ft of the threshold at LHR.

Yes but those 747's weren't missing one side of their main landing gear. However, under normal circumstances of course you are quite correct.

[moggiee]

Weird thing is that the right main gear has been ripped off, but they deposited it to the left of R27 at EMA - and pretty close to the threshold at that!
Which runway was in use at EMA at the time? Left of 27 is also right of 09.

That said, if you release a wheel at 130kt, it will travel a long way before it comes to rest.

[bep]

Its a hair-raising situation in the simulator on a Cat III auto-land, with a passive failure; you have 49 feet to make a call

[captjns]

Which runway was in use at EMA at the time? Left of 27 is also right of 09.

That said, if you release a wheel at 130kt, it will travel a long way before it comes to rest.

Runway 27 at EMA is the runway authorized for CAT III approaches.

[Magplug]

Mercenary Pilot, you said...Sorry I’ve got to defend my type here! The Helios accident was caused by negligence! Failure to follow checklists and failure to follow procedure.

I’m not so unprofessional to blame this accident on pilot error or mechanical failure until I read the facts but I do doubt cockpit design played a part.Your clear desire to defend the 737 is charming but only clouds the issue.

There is a very macho way of thinking that seemingly originates from American/Boeing culture that pilots are lantern jawed supermen who can recall emergency checkists perfectly from memory and are incapable of errors of perception or judgement. The reality is that pilots are humans and suffer from human failings... The more forward thinkling organisations in our business recognise this and take every step towards creating aeroplanes and SOP's that allow as little scope for human error as possible.

Unfortunately the design of the 737 flight deck rates very poorly in that regard. Yes.... Helios was due in part to humans failing to execute checklists correctly, then failing to recognised malfunctions and cues associated with a decompression. However there are other aircraft designs where the systems would have completely prevented these human oversights and kept them safe. The 737 unfortunately is not blessed with such a design.

Magplug...... 737 skipper

[manuelwijtenburg]

As a matter of interest, don't cargo a/c have slides?


as a matter of fact,some of them do.specially qc,s .quote]

[Magplug]

MP,

My loyalties lie on neither side of the Atlantic. There is a fundamental lack of appreciation in our industry that as a result of accident findings systems and procedures can sometimes be improved, however the human being cannot.

Therefore your premise that the 'European assumption' that all pilots are numbskulls is (kind-of) the way ahead. Systems MUST be designed with a view to giving two tired pilots on the last day of duty in the third hour of discretion the most help possible when something goes wrong..... Simply because the lives of the travelling public are at stake and not because some 'I-can-hack-it-all-anytime' pilot might be a little bit offended by some system simplification. (That not personal BTW :) )

Some critical pilot interface issues have been fixed on the NG but not all. Anyway we are talking about a classic 733 here and by far the vast majority of the world's 737 fleet are classics.

[captjns]

There is a very macho way of thinking that seemingly originates from American/Boeing culture that pilots are lantern jawed supermen who can recall emergency checkists perfectly from memory and are incapable of errors of perception or judgement.

How does this equate to landing in the grass? The crew was not American. The airline was not an American cargo carrier. So what's the point of your comment other than having an apparent grudge against US certified airmen?

[Magplug]

captjns....... You clearly have not understood either of my posts. I do not have the time to spell it out for the non-aviators here.

BTW, no part of my post was intended as anti-American but I can see how the layman would mis-interpret that.

[Coconutty]

Flaps15GearDown :
It doesn't matter how long the runway is the a/c would still have stopped approximately the same distance from the threshold.

I think what the "typical airport numbskull" ( BHX Official ) was getting at was that if the Runway at BHX had already been extended, which is towards the flat open countryside you describe - extending in the R15 direction - then the 15 Runway - behind where the 737 stopped ( 50 yds or so prior to Bravo ) - would have been sufficient for more of the bigger / heavier stuff to taxi up, or be pushed back, to the scene, and then take off along R15.

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/BHX.jpg

Landings would still be a no-no, but the proposals for BHX development include a second runway as well as the main extension, and they wouldn't BOTH have been closed !

It will be interesting to see if this incident is quoted in any Planning permission applications !

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/coconut.jpg
Coconutty

[Flap15Geardown]

Coconutty

You seem to have fallen into the same trap. You assume that the aircraft would have stopped in the same place, it wouldn't, it would have still stopped approximately the same distance from the 33 threshold giving the same TODA. The only advantage would be having less of the slope to try and accelerate up.

Also just to correct you the runway was open for arrivals an hour or so after it was opened to departures. If I remember the figures correctly it was R15 TORA 1650m and R33 LDA 1300m. I understand the only aircraft that did land was the citation bringing the engineers in to assess and move the 733.

[cwatters]

The long grooves in the grass were nearer the taxiway than the runway at EMA and not caused by "bouncing wheels" but by an aircraft that all but crashed there! The incident/accident at EMA seems of lesser consideration in this topic than the one at BHX. I think more attention should be addressed as to what happened at EMA.

I'm also somewhat surprised that this hasn't recieved more attention. Sounds like they were lucky to have left EMA. Only half the story discussed so far. Any photos of EMA?

[FougaMagister]

Flaps15GearDown :
It will be interesting to see if this incident is quoted in any Planning permission applications !

I guess it will actually be used by the NIMBY brigade as another reason NOT to have a second runway at BHX... :*

As for why the TNT crew used runway 15/33 instead of the x-runway in an emergency, they would have wanted the longest runway with the more straightforward approach!

Cheers :cool:

[Mercenary Pilot]

Ok Magplug, I'll accept that in your previous post's you may have been talking about the classics and not 737 in general but you still havnt said why you think cockpit design may have played a part in this accident?

As I have said, Im a Classic pilot myself so I'm interested in any vices you feel this aircraft has.

[Magplug]

Mercenary Pilot....

I would not describe the vices of the 737 as being contributory to this accident per-se although it certainly has some as you are aware. I imagine the old 737-200 was probably quite a nice balanced machine (although I never flew it), but the sons & grandsons of the -200 have been modified & stretched until you have the higher weight 400's et al that are unbalanced in pitch & roll and have the pitch/power couple from hell when you execute a go-around.

Moving onto your question....

Anyone who has flown another commercial jets before the 737 will have observed that the Auto-Flight modes are rather less than intuitive in some stages of flight. This lack of intuitive communication to the pilot is particularly manifest in the FMA indications... especially in the go-around sequence.

One of the most difficult concepts for every student new to the 737 is trying to understand the various modes you could find yourself in after a go-around from the various permutations of 1/2 AP +/- Flight Director.

As you know the 737 does not so much Autoland as execute a semi-automatic main-gear impact. The scenario of a CAT3 approach is procedurally a 'piece of cake' when all goes according to plan - we have all done it dozens of times. However a late malfunction or undetected LCZR/GP excursion will quickly put you outside that zone of familiarity into places you would rather not be. From this position of discomfort the autopilot will disconnect uncommanded and you will be presented with an out-of-trim aircraft that says 'God-Knows-What' on the FMA which you will then decide to ignore and manually wrestle the aircraft away from the ground. The success of that manoeuvre will hinge entirely on how late it happened and the sum-total of awake pilots on the flight deck.

My comments on the 'Macho' way that Boeing advocate certain procedures here is manifest in their QRH drills for Autoland failures that you might encounter below 1000'.... which of course you will be executing purely from memory! I count six malfunctions detailed in my QRH, four of which invite you to make a snap decision as to continue the approach or not. Is this really sound to be troubleshooting critical stuff so close to the ground? As I already said I have no allegiance to any particular manufacturer but Airbus certainly have the right idea.... When executing an Autoland in anger, any malfunction below 1000RA - Go Around.

If you have any doubts in your mind as to the validity of the two differing ideologies then simply open the flight deck door and ask for a show of hands amongst the passengers. What would they expect?

[Coconutty]

F15GD :

Correct ! - I wasn't necessarily agreeing with the airport numb skull, just putting into context what he was trying to say ... if the runwaty had already been extended, then assuming he still touched down at the same point relative to the R3 threshold, and slowed at the same rate the extra room would have been ahead of where it stopped.

Also just to correct you the runway was open for arrivals an hour or so after it was opened to departures. :confused:

Did I say otherwise ? - Think not - I stated that aircraft were departing on R15 while the 737 was still stranded there, and that landings would have been a "no-no" - are you saying that aircraft DID land on R33 while the 737 was still there, in which case I stand corrected, or was this after it had been towed to the Alpha Loop ?

.... but Hey - where's the update on the East Mids incident ?

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/coconut.jpg
Coconutty

[Flap15Geardown]

F15GD :
Correct ! - I wasn't necessarily agreeing with the airport numb skull, just putting into context what he was trying to say ... if the runwaty had already been extended, then assuming he still touched down at the same point relative to the R3 threshold, and slowed at the same rate the extra room would have been ahead of where it stopped.
:confused:
Did I say otherwise ? - Think not - I stated that aircraft were departing on R15 while the 737 was still stranded there, and that landings would have been a "no-no" - are you saying that aircraft DID land on R33 while the 737 was still there, in which case I stand corrected, or was this after it had been towed to the Alpha Loop ?
.... but Hey - where's the update on the East Mids incident ?
http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/coconut.jpg
Coconutty

If you read my post you will see that is exactly what i said, the choice of heading towards relatively flat open countryside OR towards the rising ground containing the car supermarket and the housing estates.

R33 was open for arrivals before the 733 was moved but the only a/c I know that used it was the citiation bringing the engineers to assess and secure the airframe before it could be moved.

There is also a rumour that the engineers found grass in the cowlings of number 2 engine before it was moved, and it didn't collect that in BHX. If that is true the crew were very lucky that they managed to get to BHX and walk away:ooh:

[HundredPercentPlease]

Having just seen the 2 grooves at EMA, I just cannot understand how the aircraft did not end up in a million pieces smeared along the ground.

The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine.

The aircraft impacted closer to the taxiway than the runway (so at least a couple of aircraft widths from the runway) and it looks like only the RHS of the aircraft hit. So the yaw must have been phenomenal.

A miracle, that a 733 can kind of crash into the ground, with a good dig-in on one side, and then get airborne again. The FDR data will be very interesting.

When you see it, it is also unbelievable that the aircraft was so far off the runway centreline. Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...

[Pilot Pete]

The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine....

What, the engine struck the ground as well?! Hadn't heard this! Did it keep running or did they divert on one (engine, not wheel:E )?

PP

[Doors to Automatic]

Having just seen the 2 grooves at EMA, I just cannot understand how the aircraft did not end up in a million pieces smeared along the ground.
The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine.
The aircraft impacted closer to the taxiway than the runway (so at least a couple of aircraft widths from the runway) and it looks like only the RHS of the aircraft hit. So the yaw must have been phenomenal.
A miracle, that a 733 can kind of crash into the ground, with a good dig-in on one side, and then get airborne again. The FDR data will be very interesting.
When you see it, it is also unbelievable that the aircraft was so far off the runway centreline. Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...


Good job they weren't carrying passengers - I can only imagine the headline in the Daily Mirror the next morning!! :eek:

[almost professional]

ILS is notamed off for long planned replacement, both Loc and G/P

[Map_Shift]

Good job nobody was holding at A2 at the time.

[Mercenary Pilot]

Magplug
Okay I will agree with the point regarding A/P modes during a missed approach, it can be a little confusing for a new pilot. However, I don’t think experienced crew (or just the captain if the F/O was new to type) would have any concerns with this.

As for the autoland, an undetected LZR/GP excursion..Do you mean because the pilots are not monitoring the instruments properly?

From this position of discomfort the autopilot will disconnect uncommanded and you will be presented with an out-of-trim aircraft that says 'God-Knows-What' on the FMA which you will then decide to ignore and manually wrestle the aircraft away from the ground. The success of that manoeuvre will hinge entirely on how late it happened and the sum-total of awake pilots on the flight deck.

Ok, say this scenario is caused by a malfunction of some kind. Wouldn’t you be in the same situation with any commercial airliner?

My comments on the 'Macho' way that Boeing advocate certain procedures here is manifest in their QRH drills for Autoland failures that you might encounter below 1000'.... which of course you will be executing purely from memory! I count six malfunctions detailed in my QRH, four of which invite you to make a snap decision as to continue the approach or not. Is this really sound to be troubleshooting critical stuff so close to the ground? As I already said I have no allegiance to any particular manufacturer but Airbus certainly have the right idea.... When executing an Autoland in anger, any malfunction below 1000RA - Go Around

No I agree with you, below 1000', real CATIII conditions, critical failure...GO AROUND! However, if the problem isn't critical and a safe landing can be made. I like the option to be able to do so, I don’t think this is a macho thing. We are professional, skilled people and the notion we are incapable of sound decisions is more than a little offensive. I believe the current trend for aircraft design to take pilots out of the "loop" is not the way to improve flight safety.

[unwiseowl]

How long had this crew been on duty?

[euroflyer]

I believe most of TNT 733s are non EFIS although I heard some are fully EFIS equipped.
This could also be a problem if crews are flying a non EFIS 737 on one day and the next day an EFIS, especially during a CAT 3.
Just a thought...

[Mercenary Pilot]

All my comments are directed at the EFIS equipped 737 Classics. I was unaware there was any half/non EFIS 733/4/5 operators in Europe?

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...

Didn't other aircraft use the ILS around that time? Did they end up two aircraft-widths left of the runway (so even further left of the centreline!)?

If they did, and they obviously didn't crash, they must have gone-around, so surely ATC would have been very aware of any causal ILS fault.:confused:

SSD

[The AvgasDinosaur]

Brings back memories of the DC-8 at Stansted that hit another aircraft back in 70`/80`s and diverted to Manchester with a large gash in the wing and part of the flaps missing ( from memory )
When you looked at the damage you wondered how it ever made it to Manchester
Can anyone remember this and fill in the gaps for me
G-I-B
This is going from memory, but my recollection of the DC8 incident is a Philipines registered DC8 doing a low go around at Stansted in early morning fog, clipping the tail of a Flying Tigers DC8, and diverting to Manchester. I think it was around 1982/3. A look round the net didn't find anything, but looking in the DC-8 database I found, I think that the offending aircraft was RP-C830 of Intercontinental. It was certainly a surprise to a young spotter who pedalled out one morning and saw it at Manchester - seems a lifetime ago when you just went on spec, and not because a message on the web had flagged something worth seeing!
Hope this helps the AAIB report on the acident to DC-8 srs 51 RP-C830 at Stansted on 5th September 1982 is Aircraft Accident Report 1/84 ISBN 0 11 550657 8. I assume still available from HMSO ( Or whatever they are called this week !:uhoh: )
Does this near accident at EMA have a strong circumstancial link to the Air Algeria crash at Coventry some years ago?
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19941221-0&lang=en
Glad the crew walked away safe and well, from two in one day:D :D .
Be lucky
David

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Shaggy Sheep

Probably not, the other night freight operators come in between 01-04z and this was after then. Unlikely to be a charter flight around then and next inbound is Ryanair at 07z
There have been to my knowledge no issues with the ILS :\

[Fried_Chicken]

Is the B737 a write off or can it be repaired? I noticed sat on jacks on the 06 numbers at Brum this morning.

FC

[Magplug]

Mercenary Pilot,
As for the Autoland, an undetected LCZR/GP excursion..Do you mean because the pilots are not monitoring the instruments properly?
There could be several reasons for the excursion from the LCZR:

Autopilot malfunction combined with inadequate monitoring or timely manual intervention.
Attempting Autoland outside cross-wind limits
Accidental mis-setting of an identical but incorrect QDM by both pilots
Failure/malfunction of the ground ILS installation (unlikely because monitoring & recording equipment alerts ATC).
Human Interference with the ILS installation... Did someone report it was due for maintenance or replacement?
Violation of the ILS protected area by a vehicle....now that would do it!

Who knows... we await the factual report.
No I agree with you, below 1000', real CAT III conditions, critical failure...GO AROUND! However, if the problem isn't critical and a safe landing can be made. I like the option to be able to do so, I don’t think this is a macho thing. We are professional, skilled people and the notion we are incapable of sound decisions is more than a little offensive. I believe the current trend for aircraft design to take pilots out of the "loop" is not the way to improve flight safety.The whole crux of modern aircraft design is for us to admit that humans have a very poor success rate of making sound decisions when under time pressure. Only decisions taken at leisure with due regard for all available information are ultimately safe. We are much more skilled at monitoring than actually doing and any device or enhancement that improves that skill is a step in the right direction.
The fact that you find might find your judgement questioned as being offensive is a broadly held view amongst many pilots..... and a common human failing. Unfortunately we still lose aeroplanes worldwide on a daily basis, often because pilots are convinced they are right about something ....when they were not!

[Pilot Pete]

We are much more skilled at monitoring than actually doing

Erm, not when I studied Human Factors we weren't. Computers are better at monitoring than humans and we are better at doing than computers when something goes wrong, because the computer is dumb and the pilots aren't.........:ok:

The trouble with automatics is that it gets the pilots to do the monitoring (which we are not as good as as we cannot concentrate on vast different bits of info at a similar speed to a computer and stay concentrated for long periods of time). If you practice hand flying and get good at it you will notice deviations very quickly and correct, whereas with the automatics in you will not notice these deviations as quickly and hence why we have warning horns and bells etc to get our attention.

PP

[warm beer]

All but one of the TNT 733 are clockwork, the only EFIS is TNF which is a QC

[Magplug]

If you practice hand flying and get good at it ....It's back to hand flying for me then. CAT 3 is clearly far too dangerous!

[fireflybob]

PilotPete is quite correct - NASA established many years ago that human beings are poor monitors of automation - remember when the B757 first arrived the joke was that the most common comment on the flightdeck was "What's it doing that for now!".

That does not mean we should not use automation but that we need to be aware of the drawbacks. Also automation can put you in a situation you would not be in if you didnt have it! E.g. Cat III and something disconnects at 50 ft - maybe then you have to sort it out manually. On the other hand if you didnt have Cat III etc you would have diverted to a Cat I airport.

This crew have all my sympathies - like the proverbial block of cheese with holes in it all lining up to create an incident, I suspect there will be many factors involved in this incident and the report will make interesting and educating reading for us all.

Good show to the crew getting it down at BHX in trying circumstances!

[britannia66]

What was the EMA actual at the time of the approach there?

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Shaggy Sheep
Probably not, the other night freight operators come in between 01-04z and this was after then. Unlikely to be a charter flight around then and next inbound is Ryanair at 07z
There have been to my knowledge no issues with the ILS :\

I've had it confirmed by one who knows that there were no issues with the ILS. To quote:

"There were no go-arounds, no offset approaches, all arrivals landed safely.

Plus, post accident checks gave the ILS a clean bill of health and it was put straight back into service with no problems afterwards.

The NOTAM taking it out of service is pure co-incidence. A brand new ILS is being installed which has been known about for a long time. Nothing wrong with the present one, just the airport is deciding to invest in more modern equipment."


SSD

[handsfree]

As to the reasons for the excursion on to the grass, the AIB will come up with the answers BUT why did they crew say nothing to ATC with regards to having knocked chunks out of the airfield and left it with scattered debris. I know they were under considerable pressure etc etc but to just inform EGNX ATC that they were overshooting and going to BHX with no thought of warning any poor innocent following them in is unforgiveable. I can't believe they thought nobody would notice.
:confused:

[FougaMagister]

... how about maybe they had a little bit too much on their minds after having hit the deck at EGNX to warn ATC? EGNX to EGBB is about 10-12 minutes flying time, so when you are sorting an emergency and trying to find if your a/c does have some bits missing, you might be a bit too busy. Remember: "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate!" - PPL lesson no.1 or so.

Cheers :cool:

[JW411]

handsfree:

Since you obviously have inside information as to what exactly was said and what was not said between the 737 and ATC at EMA would you like to enlighten the rest of us?

Perhaps you even have the R/T transcript?

[Avman]

But handsfree, what makes you believe that nothing was said to ATC? Have you heard the tapes? Were you monitoring the frequency? I think that you may be guilty of jumping to uncorroborated conclusions here.

Edited: Beat me to it JW411

[787FOCAL]

Good show. Not many pilots can say they crashed the same airplane twice in one day..........and lived. :}

[Sobelena]

Good show. Not many pilots can say they crashed the same airplane twice in one day..........and lived.

You have obviously never seen my landings :hmm:

[irmscher001]

I think with the information provided above, we are all speculating as to why the a/c very almost crashed well off to the side of the runway at ema.

Not being qualified on the older variants of 737 I am unable to comment on what warnings or indications were available to the crew at the time as to the Localiser deviation, however here's a few thoughts of mine, and those that I have heard:

1) How about if both autopilots were not angaged for the approach? The aircraft would fly initially down the ILS as normal, the first warning sign available to the crew would be an amber single channel flag on FMA, and then also the lack of FLARE armed indication. Miss these warnings and the a/c will not complete an autoland. Try and do a go-around in this situation at minimums, press TOGA, you'd expect the A/c to pitch up and do a dual channel go-around, what happens? The autopilot disconnects, you continue to descend and eventually after a few microseconds realise it is your job to manually go-around. It is feasable for this to happen in some 73 variants due to the procedure for a go-around differing depending on if there is two autopilots engaged or not.

2) The Localiser indication would have almost certainly shown more than 1/3 dot deviation (regardless of the cause!), calling for a go-around pretty sharpish to avoid turning into a 140kt grass cutter! The decision time is minimal, not even seconds! Add a long shift, tired crew etc it's possible that it may have been missed. No commercial pilot would be able to tell you they maintain 100% alertness at all times, and have never been a little tired on the last approach of the day!


I think we're all going to learn a lot from this incident when all the facts become available, and it just reiterates the fact that you really do need to stay sharp ready to deal with the unexpected.

Well done to the crew who undoubtedly did a good job to get on the ground safely in BHX, faced with a second diversion with an aircraft that had such damage, there would have been incredible pressure on the crew that night diverting to BHX.

[JHS]

JW411 wrote :



I was simply responding to the statement that the crew "had better not be over 13 hours or there would be trouble". I have tried to point out that under Belgian FTLs, 13 hours is irrelevant.

But then, what's an hour between friends?[/quote]


One hour, in fact, is nothing.
But one extra hour, after a long night and probably up to 4 sectors, is sometime like torture !
So, please, have respect for the 'victims' of this ******* business !

[JW411]

JHS:

I assume that English is not your first language otherwise you would have realised that I was using ironic language and was in fact saying that one hour could indeed be very important.

[NutLoose]

This should answer a few queries, will leave it up a couple of days, took it on Friday.

http://mysite.orange.co.uk/il2skins/737_EGNX_copy.jpg

http://mysite.orange.co.uk/il2skins/737_EGNX_copy.jpg

[ExSimGuy]

Four whites, Nutloose? You were a tad above the GS :E

[NutLoose]

Four whites, Nutloose? You were a tad above the GS :E

who said we were landing :) still better than being below it and off to one side

[ExSimGuy]

Landing - ;)

Seriously though, the black marks were where the gear and the engine presumably made contact? Hell of a way off the runway.

Nevertheless, a scary ride for the crew from then on, and well done for coming out of it safely.

[Magplug]

My My that's a way off the centreline.....

G/s capture but not Lczr ????????

[FullWings]

Reminiscent of the Penta-1 arrival at LHR by a Jumbo many years ago, only this one hit something...:eek:

[cornwallis]

I am sure that a search through this forum will more than cover your questions.At least in this current incident no crew member has felt so desperate about what has happened and the aftermath that they have commited suicide.I never met Glen Stewart but from all reports he was an honourable decent man.

[FullWings]

I never met Glen Stewart but from all reports he was an honourable decent man.
That may, or may not be the case but is it relevant?

Back to the two incident/accidents - I mention the 'Penta' as it seemed strikingly similar to the EMA one.
Tired crew at end of long day: check.
Unnoticed/uncorrected localiser deviation: check.
Failed auto-approach: check.
Go-around not flown as per SOPs: check.
Nobody hurt during the proceedings: check.
Suicide afterwards: I sincerely hope not.

[Cough]

IMR001 - There isn't a 'SINGLE CH' FMA annunciation on the Classic 737. 'Flare' wouldn't annunciate but thats a G/A from 500', not minimums - The likely response to the TOGA button being pressed then is a pitch up even if you don't touch a thing and the A/P drops out due to the pitch/power couple.

I don't think speculation will solve this one. The 737 autoland isn't the most advanced out there so the way forward will be the AAIB and the flight recorders...

[JW411]

Full Wings:

"Tired crew at end of long day: check".

Since you obviously know, perhaps you could tell the rest of us just how long the crew had been on duty?

I, for one, am dying to find out so please oblige and give us the answer.

[Coconutty]

Nutloose,

Brilliant picture - From the angle of the impact marks it looks like they were heading straight for the buildings between the passenger and cargo terminals - anyone know how close they got ?

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/coconut.jpg
Coconutty

[Magplug]

Interesting photo from Nutloose....

As we have already seen from previous photos the damage sustained was to the right main gear. This latest photo suggests that the aircraft was so far displaced to the left of the centreline at impact that it was probably outside of the LCZR coverage completely.

Furthermore, if you join up the impact points on the grass you appear to derive a trajectory that is markedly divergent from the runway centreline opening to the left, not parallel to it. This would suggest an approach executed not down the centreline but on a course slightly across it.

This would add more weight to the possibility of them having executed an approach down a pair of incorrect ILS QDM settings...

But surely there is radar monitoring of arriving aircraft on the ILS, a controller would have spotted that immediately?

[Five Green]

Anyone now where the remains of the gear that broke free ended up in relation to the skid marks ?

Cheers

[threemiles]

My My that's a way off the centreline.....
G/s capture but not Lczr ????????

Neither Lczr nor G/s. Skidmarks are way before the G/S touchdown point.

[Xploy Ted]

The NTSB say that 70% of all transport accidents are fatigue related.

Given the time of this incident it is understandable why people are asking for details of the duty invovled.

I think it is where I would start to try & unravel the problem. We all make mistakes & make them more often when tired. The circadian issue of night flying cannot be disgarded either.

Has anybody have either info on this crew's duties both prior to or on the night in question? Other TNT crews perhaps?

[JW411]

Well hopefully Full Wings is about to tell us since he has already stated that the crew were tired at the end of a long night.

Of course, it could be that he doesn't really know and that he is simply spouting bullsh*t.

I would like to know but I simply don't know the answer. What I can say is that most of the TNT pilots are Belgian and, much as it might astonish you, most of them live in Belgium.

It is therefore just as likely that the crew had reported for duty just before this flight.

[Banzai Eagle]

JW411
This is a rumour network dont forget, even if the crew had been on duty for 2 hours then folk will still speculate that crew had been on duty 13, whoops sorry 12 hours. As you say it will all come out in the washup :ok:

[Magplug]

Threemiles,
Neither Lczr nor G/s. Skidmarks are way before the G/S touchdown point.A valid observation, however if the a/c is tracking an incorrect QDM then the touchdown point generated by following the GS will also be incorrect.

...... The plot thickens

[threemiles]

however if the a/c is tracking an incorrect QDM then the touchdown point generated by following the GS will also be incorrect.

Would have thought that GS touchdown point is independant from a course offset, but always at the extended line transmitter-touchdown point. As the transmitter is also offset from the runway. But maybe that is wrong, would be interesting to know, though.

[Few Cloudy]

If you set the wrong LOC inbound course, the display will be wrongly orientated but the displacement shown is correct.

FC.

[Magplug]

Agreed, however the autoflight system is attempting to fly an ILS with (effectively) rather more drift than normal, even possibly outside the capabilities of the system. The problem gets worse as you approach the LCZR transmitter and the beam narrows.

The discussion is for the most part achedemic as with the LCZR course offset the resulting arrival will be entirely unpredictable.

Someone care to try it in VMC and report back !:) :) :)

[Dream Buster]

I'm amazed at how little the outside world has picked up on what's happened here - yet!

Aircraft diverts from usual destination due bad weather to another airfield with equally bad weather (whoops).

Probably very poorly prepared for short diversion - where are the charts? and probably never been there before.... plenty of opportunity to mis set ILS QDM's etc.

Aircraft hits grass with such force that they leave a main wheel behind - that is some impact!

Divert again finally to a cast iron weather diversion airfield with only two wheels.

How much fuel was left? Fumes.

I have done Liege - STN many times in the past and can imagine the poor crew may have been completely exhausted through out.

Well done lads, I reckon you were quite lucky that night but this deserves an extensive inquest so that your colleagues can learn from your less than perfect flight.

I'm quite worried by this one.

:ugh:

[silverelise]

The NTSB say that 70% of all transport accidents are fatigue related.

Given the time of this incident it is understandable why people are asking for details of the duty invovled.

I think it is where I would start to try & unravel the problem.

Shirley the starting point to unravelling the problem is to gather the data - the FDR, CVR, ATC tapes etc. to understand what exactly happened, before being able/trying to explain why?

[Pilot Pete]

Probably very poorly prepared for short diversion Pure speculation.

probably never been there before same again.

plenty of opportunity to mis set ILS QDM's etc. Just like ANY flight then (and more speculation).

Aircraft hits grass with such force that they leave a main wheel behind - that is some impact! At last, something factual.

How much fuel was left? Fumes. Erm, more speculation.

I have done Liege - STN many times in the past and can imagine the poor crew may have been completely exhausted through out. And equally they may not have been. More speculation.

Well done lads What?

this deserves an extensive inquest I think you will find that the AAIB will conduct an extensive accident investigation.

I'm quite worried by this one. I think we all are, so FACT would help and the AAIB report will be the definitive document, so shall we wait for that or failing that just put theories forward rather than wild speculation about things like how much fuel they had on board?

PP

[Mercenary Pilot]

:D Well said PP.

This thread has so far been interesting and debated in a mature and intelligent manor.

Hopefully we wont have to wait for the full report before some more of the true facts are released.

[Dream Buster]

Pilot Pete,

I wish I could share your confidence and trust in the AAIB.

Sorry if I sounded a bit doubtful, but I have reason to be.

No doubt we will see in a couple of years time...............

Keep up your timely criticism and so will I.

:ok:

[Arkroyal]

I wish I could share your confidence and trust in the AAIBI do. What's your problem with it DB?

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

I do. What's your problem with it DB?

It's not the detached, fact-driven, and disinterested organisation it used to be, IMHO.

SSD

[Pilot Pete]

Whether you think the AAIB is independent enough or not is a side issue. They are the ONLY organization that will produce a report, so we will all have to live with that. Here is not the place to start a campaign against them.

Keep up your timely criticism and so will I Fine by me mate, it's just your previous offering was more 'wild speculation' that adds nothing of value to this thread rather than criticism of something factual.:rolleyes:

PP

[Dream Buster]

Pilot Pete

Calm down!

Keep to the facts.

If one presents a serious incident to the AAIB and they ignore it (as though it had never happened) - how would you feel? I must admit they are brilliant at analyzing accidents down to the last detail. Fact.

I suppose that those of us who know that all is not well in aviation these days look for examples of this and the only measure that people seem to have of whether it is OK or not is the incidents/accident data - true? Fact.

Believe it or not I am totally on the crews side. Fact.

So when one knows that an aircraft is 'probably' flying with near minimum fuel (hopefully you are aware of this latest craze) and diverts to an airfield on RVR's and doesn't land for whatever reason but then diverts again - it is quite likely that he will be cutting into his final reserve - that's what it's for.

One is entitled to point out that the craze (see above) has been tested and 'just' worked but I personally have a problem with the craze and have always been worried by folk putting minimum fuel on board. Fact.

Clearly we will have to wait a couple of years to find out what actually happened but in the mean time keep your eyes open for evidence that all might not be well as you think, encourage crews to carry sufficient fuel regardless of what the rules say and please don't fly over my house when you are struggling between airfields in a bent aeroplane. Fact.

:ouch:

[MrNosy]

A question - what was the actual wx at East Midlands when the aircraft carried out the go-around. I note that in one of the posts an (RVR?) for rwy 27 is quoted as 0350m, was this at the time the aircraft was making the approach?

[Clarence Oveur]

So when one knows that an aircraft is 'probably' flying with near minimum fuel (hopefully you are aware of this latest craze) and diverts to an airfield on RVR's and doesn't land for whatever reason but then diverts again - it is quite likely that he will be cutting into his final reserve - that's what it's for.

I believe you said "Keep to the facts". How do you know that they were 'probably' flying with near minimum fuel? Do you know the fuel policy of the company in question? Or even how much fuel they had at EMA?

[Xploy Ted]

Shirley the starting point to unravelling the problem is to gather the data - the FDR, CVR, ATC tapes etc. to understand what exactly happened, before being able/trying to explain why?

I agree in principle & the discussion has been most illuminating BUT- As has already been pointed out - it will be an age and a half before any official report comes out. The Eu is about to vote on Sub partQ & any info re fatigue related problems would be useful now rather than next year.

Being a gossip network there may just be someone, who either knows what duty the crew had done, or does the route with TNT & could offer an educated guess.

It is about gathering ammo before it is too late.......:ugh:

[Wendel]

I believe you said "Keep to the facts". How do you know that they were 'probably' flying with near minimum fuel? Do you know the fuel policy of the company in question? Or even how much fuel they had at EMA?

The fact is that the plane was diverted to EMA and diverted once more to BHX. If such a situation with subsequent diversions happens again this might cause problems when the plain is flying with near minimum fuel (which is a tendency), especially when the airports are not as close as EMA and BHX.

I agree that we do not know the facts yet on the fuel level of this particulare plane. Yet I think it is useful to take the possibility of multiple diversions into account when discussing necessary minimum fuel levels.

[xetroV]

Flying with minimum fuel to a bad-weather airport is unlikely, even if the company has a minimum fuel policy. Apart from that there is a real possibility of this flight having had tankering fuel for economic reasons (especially when flying from Belgium to the UK), so these minimum fuel comments by Dream Buster are pure speculation. Him asking others to stick to the facts is pretty hypocritical, seeing that he isn't really bothered with facts himself.

[FougaMagister]

To add my 5 p's worth (and without speculating ;) too much), from experience of EGBB-EGNX positioning flight plans, the trip takes about 10-12 minutes and the fuel burn is around 600 kg for a 737-300 in 148Y seats config. So something roughly similar for a 737-300 freighter with 10T of cargo on board - however, the aircraft may actually not have flown direct due to the emergency.

The aircraft is still at BHX, looking forlorn and slightly lopsided :uhoh: on the Western apron.

Cheers :cool:

[Nogbad the Bad]

Wow, you pilots are just about as good at bitching at one another as us controllers !!! :} :}

What I fail to understand is - and I am sure the investigation will fathom this one - with the aircraft so out of position on final approach, how come the approach was continued without a go around ?

:confused:

[jonesthepilot]

Many years ago at Flying School in the Valleys I heard of something called 'sidelobes.' Could he have flown down one of them?

[Coconutty]

from experience of EGBB-EGNX positioning flight plans, the trip takes about 10-12 minutes

... and just to add a few miles more to the trip from EGNX to EGBB it positioned to land on R33.

AFAIK at 0601 Hrs on the day the weather at EGBB was clear and would not have been a factor to prevent a landing on R15....

An approach to R15 could / would have shortened the distance flying the damaged aircraft - a go around / overshoot would have taken them out over the fields with just one "A" road to worrry about ( A45 ), and not a housing estate ! :uhoh:

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/coconut.jpg
Coconutty

[brummbrumm]

The a/c was originally going to make an approach to 15, however I believe that when the ils was switched from 33 to 15 the glideslope became u/s hence the approach to 33

[Flap15Geardown]

Would think the fuel burn would be more than 600kg in this case, doubt they tried to raise the gear (better to land on some than risk none of it coming down again and assuming the hydraulic circuit was still intact to bring them up) and would the flaps have locked in position? I take it the u/c struck them as it exited the wing area. If that were the case they would have been using a fair bit of power to keep the thing in the air.

I believe that it was defueled after it was dumped on 06. Anyone know how much came off?

[threemiles]

EGNX-EGBB + circling around for more than 30 minutes would not be helpful for analysis of the CVR

[Jet2]

The aircraft is still at BHX, looking forlorn and slightly lopsided :uhoh: on the Western apron.
Cheers :cool:

Engineers these days don't fix minor defects as quickly as they used to do they :p

[deconehead]

Jet2, what chance have we got with the way you guys put them down:)

seriously though I have seen the damage that the complete U/C has done to the flaps and the marks and damage that were left where it hit the fuselage just above the rear hold door. How it didn't take off the horizontal stabalizer I just don't know.

The O/B landing lamp has gone and it's filled with mud and grass - now that was close.

They are 2 very very lucky people and thankfully they walked away to tell the tale.

[Few Cloudy]

Yes, we are very lucky not to be disussing a fatal write off here.

Let's hope we can learn something from the results - and apply them.

FC.

[warm beer]

I understand that both pilots have been fired:uhoh:

[NutLoose]

I understand that both pilots have been fired:uhoh:

Does not suprise me, but saddens me too, believe there was pressure to go to EGNX in the first place, but this is just speculation.........

They would probably be the best 2 737 pilots you could employ about now, they wouldnt be likely ever to get into the same situation again and have proved themselves so to speak, as it must of taken some quick thinking to walk away from that............

As to the wheel in the grass at East Midland, this was seen as it was taken away for further investigation and it was the complete main undercarriage, wheels, boogie, strut, trunnion the whole shooting match...... I believe the pins are designed to fail in such circumstances to prevent major damage to the main spars.... could be wrong but that is what people have been telling me, glad the picture shed some light on the subject.

As to the post that it appeared to be heading towards the buildings between the freight and main apron, that could have been real bad news as that is the Fire section....

[London Mil]

I understand that both pilots have been fired:uhoh:


Is that not cause of pre-judgement? Maybe the pilots did screw-up, but surely their employers should wait for the findings of any formal investigation.

[Few Cloudy]

The tragedy is that those guys present a golden opportunity for CRM specialists to find out what their thinking was. They should be treated accordingly.

On the other hand there is a need for action to satisfy the public pressure on an airline following a crash or serious incident.

Best course of action would be to keep them off the roster but in employ and not to antagonise them to the point that nothing will be learned.

Same action often happens after a press-on approach - long landing etc.

What do you think?

FC.

[JW411]

The CRM specialists have had over two weeks to learn the lessons from this event. How long do you think they need?

We do not know for sure if the crew has indeed been fired but in these days of litigation and unfair dismissal claims it must have been a pretty clear cut decision if it is indeed true.

[Few Cloudy]

For the flying world? Much more than two weeks.

These guys should ideally visit airlines and give lectures.

You normally die in these cases. It is rare to be able to pass the word.

FC.

[Speed of Sound]

On the other hand there is a need for action to satisfy the public pressure on an airline following a crash or serious incident.

Not sure how much public pressure there is in this case.

Most non-aviation people I speak to know nothing of this case other than the runway at Brum was 'closed for a few hours' after an emergency landing. Those with a bit more knowledge are praising the pilots for landing on six wheels. The touch and go at Donnington seems to have escaped much of the media.

SoS

[Daysleeper]

AAIB Special Published

AAIB (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/special_bulletins/s5_2006_boeing_737_301sf__oo_tnd.cfm)

Key bit from the pre-amble

In the late stages of this approach, the autopilot momentarily disengaged and re-engaged, and the aircraft deviated from both the glideslope and localiser. It landed heavily on a grass area to the left of the runway threshold, whereupon the right main landing gear detached from the aircraft. After scraping the right engine, outer flap track fairing and right wing tip on the ground, the aircraft became airborne again and made an emergency diversion to Birmingham Airport.

Tough as old boots these 737s

[angels]

Mere SLF here, so please correct me if I'm wrong, but looking at the AAIB report it seems that it was the autopilot that was responsible for the deviation from the approach.

Is there anything the pilots could have done about it at this late stage?

[Magplug]

Tough as old boots these 737s

...Just a shame about the crap autopilot!

[captjns]

There is too much to speculate upon here without full details.

The second A/P must be engaged in CMD by 800 feet RA to execute a dual channel A/P approach. Otherwise, CMD engagement of the second A/P is inhibited.

The A/P automatically disengages when any of the following occurs:


pushing either A/P disengage switch
pushing either Takeoff/Go-around (TO/GA) switch with a single A/P
engaged in CWS or CMD above 2000 feet RA with flaps not up or G/S engaged.
pushing either TO/GA switch after touchdown with both A/Ps engaged in CMD
pushing an illuminated A/P ENGAGE switch
pushing the A/P DISENGAGE bar down
activating either pilot’s control wheel trim switch
moving the STAB TRIM AUTOPILOT cutout switch to CUTOUT
either left or right IRS system failure or FAULT light illuminated
loss of electrical power or a sensor input which prevents proper operation of the engaged A/P and mode
loss of respective hydraulic system pressure.
There is the possibility that late in the approach it was discovered that the second A/P was not in CMD because there was no “Flare Armed” observed on the A/P Mode Display”. Then the operating A/P was inadvertently disengaged by pushing the illuminated switch which would thus cause the A/P to disengage. I have observed this while conducting simulator training.

A successful auto-land can be accomplished, even if the second A/P is engaged below 800’, provided the aircraft is established on the localizer and glide slope centerlines with minor deviations and the flight control computers have enough time to perform their self tests to ensure the integrity of the auto-land system.

Translation of the DFDR will clear up any speculation regarding the A/P issue. Either way it’s a crappy situation to be in. The best news is that nobody went to the hospital.

[Magplug]

Captjns, very interesting but perhaps you missed the following trom the AAIB report...
at approximately one mile from the runway threshold, the autopilot was momentarily disconnected and re-engaged. The aircraft then went above the glide-slope before developing a high rate of descent.
One mile.... that's 300'

...From the 737 QRH Cat2/3 Operations:

--------------------------------------------------
BELOW 500 RA:-

Autopilot disconnect...............Go Around
Nav Set Failure..........................Go Around
2 or more Deviation Flashes..........Go Around
Stab out of trim..........................Go Around
--------------------------------------------------

The wording of the report.....
the autopilot was momentarily disconnected and re-engaged ....suggests that actions were both pilot initiated rather than uncommanded..... Executing a manual go around from 300' in this circumstance would have been the correct thing to do.

[Bam Thwok]

There's also a little hidden "gem" that Mr Boeing has provided for us in the auto-pilot system....
The a/c WILL fully auto-land with ONLY one auto-pilot engaged.....however, the FMA doesn't show "FLARE".
Something to keep in your back pocket !!
Try it next time in the sim ?

[captjns]

There's also a little hidden "gem" that Mr Boeing has provided for us in the auto-pilot system....
The a/c WILL fully auto-land with ONLY one auto-pilot engaged.....however, the FMA doesn't show "FLARE".
Something to keep in your back pocket !!
Try it next time in the sim ?

Very interesting to say the least. Just a questions thouhg... do both A/Ps have to be engaged during the approach, and one trip off??? or does only one A/P have to be engaged from the outset and accomplish and autland?

[BOAC]

A bit of a 'diversion' from the thread, I feel, but single channel 737 autolands are discussed here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=162940&highlight=single+channel).

[The late XV105]

BBC News report on the "landed on the grass and became airborne again" post made earlier in this thread: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/5158954.stm

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

BBC News report on the "landed on the grass and became airborne again" post made earlier in this thread: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/5158954.stm


So, Beeb says the accident at Brum was casued 'by faulty landing gear'.

Well, I suppose if you impact the ground off the runway with some force, it does tend to induce undercarriage faults.:rolleyes:

[fyrefli]

The wording of the report.....

"the autopilot was momentarily disconnected and re-engaged"

....suggests that actions were both pilot initiated rather than uncommanded.

Rather unfortunately, whilst that is indeed the wording of the Report, the wording of the Summary is missing the somewhat critical word 'was'.

Cheers,

Rich.

[Coconutty]

My local TV Station ( Central ) reported yesterday evening that the landing at East Midlands airport went wrong because of a fault with the auto pilot :ooh:

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/coconut.jpg
Coconutty

[FougaMagister]

Beeb says the accident at Brum was casued 'by faulty landing gear'. :rolleyes:

I guess a landing gear that is missing its right main wheel can be considered "faulty" - is this the BBC's idea of understatement?

As for Central Newz reporting that the landing at EMA went wrong "because of a fault with the autopilot", I wonder how they got that info BEFORE the AAIB's interim report being published :*

Cheers :cool:

[rubber jonny]

a report is out


Refer to post #183?:ugh:

[FougaMagister]

It's a special bulletin, NOT a report. Accident reports, even interim ones, take weeks or even months to be compiled and published. I.e. this is a FACTUAL document and does not draw any conclusions as to why the events it refers to happended, and it doesn't present any technical recommendations.

Cheers :cool:

[rubber jonny]

oh yeah, whoops :D

[JonaLX]

heard from a few guys down there in Belgium, that the cause of the disconnection of the AP was pilot's mistake (pressed the AP Disc. button instead of the R/T button) because tower made a call around 500 ft AGL telling the crew that their company wanted them to go to BHX instead of Nottingham.

Only a rumour of course...

[Codman]

Well I guess the company got what they wanted then.

[JW411]

Is it normal for ATC to talk to an aircraft conducting a CAT III approach at 500 ft except in an emergency?

[Codman]

I guess if ATC deem the message to be of significant importance they'll relay it.

[rodthesod]

Is it normal for ATC to talk to an aircraft conducting a CAT III approach at 500 ft except in an emergency?

The only comms I want from ATC after landing clearance at OM or equivalent are:

surface wind check
RVRs for info
'Go Around' if the runway becomes blockedAnd Codman - Some stupid admin message about Company commercial diversion does not qualify as an Emergency.

Whatever the reason for AP disengagement, previous posts have made it clear that re-engagement was strictly prohibited at that height (<500ft atde). The pilots will fry for that, of course.

I do, however, sympathise with the crew who would probably have landed uneventfully at EMA if some stupid pillock had kept their gob shut at a critical time of their flight.

[Nogbad the Bad]

I do, however, sympathise with the crew who would probably have landed uneventfully at EMA if some stupid pillock had kept their gob shut at a critical time of their flight.

Oh I see...so it's not the done thing in this thread to speculate when it comes to the pilots (sic), but it's OK to slander ATC if there is even a hint of some blame to apportion ??

:mad: :mad: :mad: :mad: :mad: :mad:

[captjns]

heard from a few guys down there in Belgium, that the cause of the disconnection of the AP was pilot's mistake (pressed the AP Disc. button instead of the R/T button) because tower made a call around 500 ft AGL telling the crew that their company wanted them to go to BHX instead of Nottingham.

Only a rumour of course...

Hey... Mag plug... did you read that?

[pprecious]

BELOW 500 RA:-
Autopilot disconnect...............Go Around
Nav Set Failure..........................Go Around
2 or more Deviation Flashes..........Go Around
Stab out of trim..........................Go Around
If the interim report is correct and the A/P was disconnected at approx 300' with the remaining 30 odd seconds before touchdown (based on 500' per min) was there any chance of a go around without the aircraft hitting the deck first anyway?
I would assume that the minimum height includes the time taken for the engines to spool up etc, as well as some decision making time for the crew?
(Disclaimer: Not a Commercial pilot and casting no opinions or otherwise anything at all on the pilots, operator or manufacturer BTW)

[Cough]

pprecious

On my cat III training, a regular (and recurrent theme) in the 737 sim is a G/A from 50feet (Cat IIIa minimums), with an engine failure at that moment, which leads to both autopilots disconnecting with a single electrical system failure. Its nasty, but quite manageable.

A manual G/A from 300' is quite routine. You would only loose 20-30'.

[omnidirectional737]

Even if they did disconnect the autopilot they should have been well aware of it, and been able to perform a go-around with out any trouble.

[JW411]

Nobody out there has answered my question yet. What does the ATC Manual say about talking to aircraft on a CAT III approach when LVPs are in force and the aircraft has passed the OM/Decision Point? Surely there is an air trafficer out there with the answer?

I can well remember arriving at EDI early one morning with the RVRs around 300 metres and I am doing a CAT II approach with LVPs in force. I was handed over to Tower (118.7) by Approach (121.2) at about 7 nms on finals.

When I changed to Tower all hell errupted. It quickly became apparent that the Ground frequency was still not manned and every man and his dog was on Tower frequency:

"Tug 46 request clearance to tow a....737....from Stand....XYZ to ......Standby one.....Ah....to Stand ......ABC".

"Ops One request permission to enter ........ to pick up a dead rabbit from...... but that might not be where it is......"

Etc. Etc. Etc.

In the meantime I am on short finals still without a landing clearance with an RVR of 300 metres.

I finally managed to get a word in and said something along the lines of:

"It might astonish all you guys down there but some of us are actually up here trying to get down there so can you all shut up and can I please have landing clearance".

After landing I was invited to visit the Tower. My response was "Don't worry, I'm already on my way"! I really was very piss*d off.

The ATC excuse was that their manning levels were such that they couldn't man the Ground frequency until such and such a time and there was therefore no alternative.

I gave them my alternative and that was that the Approach Controller gave the landing clearance and the aircraft only changed to the Tower frequency after landing safely.

This was greeted by blank stares. I pointed out that every single PAR approach in the RAF was completed on the Radar frequency and it was only on the rollout that the aircraft was changed to Tower frequency.

It is totally unacceptable to carry out an approach in LVP conditions with all of these totally unnecessary distractions taking place.

Could an air trafficer please give some comment?

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

I'm not an Air Trafficer but as a pilot my understanding of civilian ops is that 'Tower' own the runway. The only way an Approach controller can issue a landing clearance is to co-ordinate it with Tower (who are controlling not only landings, but also departures, runway crossings etc).

That might work OK on a PAR in the Military, but with the situation you describe with understaffed ATC, the Approach controller would still have to overcome the bottleneck of the combined Ground / Tower to get you a landing clearance, so you'd have been no better off.

SSD

[JW411]

Well no, my friend; all the Approach Controller has to do is to ask the Tower Controller either by shouting across the room or by making a quick phone call (I presume that ATC have "Red" phones or even a Squawk Box") as to whether the aircraft on finals has clearance to land. This is not rocket science.

You are saying that it is OK to hand the aircraft over to a Tower controller who is barely in charge of bedlam and is certainly not looking after me who is stupidly trying to land while he is being besieged by the tugs and the dead rabbit collectors which are doing their essential duties.

Now either an airport is for landing on or it is for trying to separate competing ground movements. Which is it to be?

[heading 125]

I find it totally odd that a very few pilots, usually ex military have no idea what goes on in ATC and the pressures that we are under. Yes we all want more staff but your airlines want a cheaper service so your are now getting it. Most of my ATC colleagues tell me they are at understaffed towers. So give us a break we are doing our best with what your airline CEOs are prepared to pay. The tone of some of the messages are along the lines "why am I number 2 to so and so I should be number one" the phrase that I used to hear many years ago. So grow up!!! ATCOs and pilots are professionals - it is just a few pilots/ATCOs that seem to have had their brains removed. With todays pressures I understand what the pilots need and I feel that most of the pilots understand what I need. If you as a pilot don't understand what is required then get yourself down to your neaest ATC unit, or better still get out for a beer with one of us and tell us, we would truely welcome it.

Perhaps if this ATCO did transmit at an inappropiate time then he will only learn by a dialog between ATC and the pilots. Famflights were always the best for this lesson learning. Unfortunately cost cutting has resulted in these stopping.

So stop bashing ATC!!

[JW411]

heading 125:

You are missing the point entirely. It was not because the Tower Controller was transmitting when I was trying to get a landing clearance in fog. It was because he was in a situation where HE had no control of who was blocking the frequency by calling HIM; viz: tugs, dead rabbit collectors, "have you got my clearance to Heathrow etc etc". He was not in a position to do his job properly for whatever reason.

THESE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE ON THE FREQUENCY WHILST LVPS ARE IN FORCE - CAN YOU NOT UNDERSTAND THAT?

Finally, I just have to point out that professional only has one "f", transmit only has one "t" and "there", as in the possessive is "their" .

PS. Why did the Tower controller find it necessary to invite me over the RT to visit the Control Tower? Did he think that he was going to discipline me like a naughty little boy? Naughty little boys are unlikely to be conducting CAT II approaches in fog. Sadly, his parochial aspirations disappeared when he found himself confronted with someone who had been flying for 45 years and was very, very happy to file an MOR. He was VERY happy to bury the hatchet.

[heading 125]

Yes totally agree that the frequency should be quiet in LVPs, but please read my previous reply. ATC at the towers have lost a lot of staff to keep cost down. Therefore there may only be one controller working air and ground - thus you will hear all those extra calls. But we are going off the point a little. So do come and visit atc. WE ALWAYS WELCOME AIRCREW VISITS.

By the way Approach control cannot issue a landing clearance. This must be issued by the tower controller as any vehicles or other aircrew may loose situational awareness. If a vehicle was on the runway, when the tower controller issued the landing clearance the vehicle of other aircrew have chance to question an incorrect landing clearance. If not on the tower frequency then disaster, the vehicle driver will not hear a thing until ......

[chiglet]

JW411,
So you were flying after you SHOULD have retired? :E
watp,iktch

[JW411]

chiglet:

No; I retired earlier this year at the age of 65 (I was delighted to stay out of French airspace).

heading 125:

I have visited more ATC organisations than you have had hot dinners. I used to spend a huge amount of time at Prestwick "in the ocean" where my best mate was a controller.

Have you visited NY Centre? Now that is an experience - just do not expect formal dress!

Kai Tak Tower was pretty illuminating. There seemed to be a large acceptance of the inevitable when 13 was in use and there was a stiff crosswind.

Salalah was good too in the 1960s. An ACR7 (SRE) let down in the monsoon to a sand runway with no lights whatsoever and a 20 knot tailwind to break out at 250 feet just to go back in again at 150 feet and finally to get the runway at 100 feet - all of this with no glide path.

God how I loved those two Air Trafficers (where are you now Colin)?

Don't tell me to visit ATC my friend - I have visited more ATC organisations than you are ever likely to visit in your lifetime.

All I want is peace and quiet when I am trying to land in fog.

[heading 125]

Well done for visiting all those places. In a very few short words you must realise what experience you have to pass on. It may supprise you but I am both an ATCO and commercial pilot and have been doing both for 30 years. Yes I have had many a hot dinner. But I am always willing to learn more lessons. Good point about quiet in fog, but not always possible unfortunately.

[Croqueteer]

JW411, well said, I completely agree, having done many cat IIs at 4 or 5 in the morning totally s-----d out. The last thing you need is gabble in the last couple of hundred ft when your eyelids can hardly stay open. I'm sure RodtheSod would agree.

[JW411]

heading 125:

So after a bit of going around the houses we finally seem to be agreeing that when LVPs are in force then the frequency should be quiet. Now, if it is not going to be quiet then surely the airfield concerned cannot be considered to be LVP-compliant? How can you expect a Tower controller to look after the runway that he cannot see and at the same time direct ground traffic?

Mind you, this individual seemed to think that not only could he manage but he still had time to boll*ck me for having the temerity to land on his airfield!

I am glad that we have finally almost made our peace but you absolutely must understand that ATC are just as much a part of the "holes in the Swiss cheese" as anyone else.

I am still waiting to hear from a qualified ATC officer to tell me what would compel him to call an aircraft at 500 ft on a CAT III approach?

[Max Angle]

It stands to reason that ATC should not be transmitting such messages to an aircraft on short finals whether doing a CAT3 or a visual however it also stands to reason that the best response to such a message is silence. Better to say nothing and get on with the task in hand, same goes for the (admittedly rare) occasions when you get taxi instructions fired off at you whilst you are still doing 100kts down the runway.

[JW411]

Max Angle:

I quite agree but would it not be a bit distracting if you were that close to landing on a CAT III approach and ATC fires off a transmission that you don't understand because:

A. You are not expecting what he is saying and

B. English is not your first language so you do not quite understand it since you are within seconds of hitting the ground?

[heading 125]

[QUOTE=JW411]heading 125:
I am glad that we have finally almost made our peace but you absolutely must understand that ATC are just as much a part of the "holes in the Swiss cheese" as anyone else.

Yes agree. But the airlines don't want to pay for the service. So ATC are left to provide a minimal service. We would all love to have fully staffed towers, but that will not happen unless the airlines are willing to pay more. So expect boxed frequencies at certain times. But it must be remembered that the service provided is safe and still to an exceptionally high standard, but minimal when it is quiet.

[JW411]

So are you telling us that UK ATC is so understaffed that safety is getting compromised?

[ExSimGuy]

. . . and the airlines don't want to pay for a "full service" because they are "LOCOs", be it Ryan, EZ, or even BA(con)? The PAX are the driving force?

Be it on our heads? Comments on this thought appreciated . . . .

[Coconutty]

JW411 - Sorry - I'm not an ATC Officer either, all I can add is that sometimes, even when trying really really hard not to, mistakes will still be made ! :rolleyes:

transmit only has one "t"

:ok:

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/coconut.jpg
Coconutty

[fmgc]

JW411

I would agree that it would be a pain to receive a transmission low down on a CAT III approach, but whether your first language is English or not, the guys in the pointy end are paid to use their better judgement and ignore the transmission.

I am sure that if the transmission was to go around, the only pertinent one in these circumstances, then it would be clear no matter what language you speak.

I say this in general and not specifically with regards to the incident that has occured as we have yet to have enough details to comment on it.

[fmgc]

you absolutely must understand that ATC are just as much a part of the "holes in the Swiss cheese" as anyone else

The pilots are the last hole in that cheese.

[Nogbad the Bad]

"It might astonish all you guys down there but some of us are actually up here trying to get down there so can you all shut up and can I please have landing clearance"

You knew the frequency was busy, and you still transmited that ??

How very professional !!!

If you want to bash ATC (as you obviously have every intention to do so) why not start a new thread and leave this one to the facts !!

:rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

[Deal or No deal]

You are missing the point entirely. It was not because the Tower Controller was transmitting when I was trying to get a landing clearance in fog. It was because he was in a situation where HE had no control of who was blocking the frequency by calling HIM; viz: tugs, dead rabbit collectors, "have you got my clearance to Heathrow etc etc". He was not in a position to do his job properly for whatever reason.

THESE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE ON THE FREQUENCY WHILST LVPS ARE IN FORCE - CAN YOU NOT UNDERSTAND THAT?


Exactly.. So tugs, dead raddit man even you calling for clearence in LVP's does not happen on an open frequency?? They are all entitled to transmit in LVP's...

He was not in a position to do his job properly for whatever reason.

Open frequency.. many people use it.

On ATIS for the current stats and you haven't been listening to the atc frequency for the past ten mins, let alone the past 1 min!!! Change the frequency and get in there!! Call for clearence, startup or push... whatever!! Everyone does it!!

So what you are saying the situation should be.. that NO-ONE bar inbound a/c should transmit in LVP's?? Where does that leave you on departure????

How many times does atc have to say 'stand-by' before everyone gets the message?? Currently on frequency!!?????

I get you.. But it's down to each airfields' rules and regulations, ain't gonna happen in our lifetime i imagine!!????

[Danny]

OK, so it has been mentioned that it is possible that ATC asked a question and that it is possible that one of the crew pressed the A/P disconnect instead of the transmit button. It is only speculation and yet we suddenly have a dummy spit because some of you decided to have a debate about some experience on a different a/c at a different airport at some other time!:rolleyes:

Take your debate to Tech Log and the rest of you having imaginary coronaries about ATC passing on a request, drop it because we don't know whether they did. Just because someone suggested it may have happened doesn't mean it really did. :ugh:

It really isn't pleasant to have to delete all your efforts just because you can't keep the discussion on track. :hmm:

[Few Cloudy]

On an autoland approach, the 737 autopilot winds in a lot of nose up trim at 400ft.

If you disconnect the autopilot on such an approach below 400ft. you have to push hard to stop a fast pitch up to way past 20deg ANU.

If in this situation you attempt an AP re-engage, you will be lucky to achieve it first time. Next problem is that the modes will not be what you want if you are away from the FD bars, so you may get CWS in one or both axes.

It is a firm scenario for a crash and a good reason to GA as the rules require.

FC.

[OltonPete]

As mentioned on this thread previously it appears the crew have been sacked (BBC online report).

Sorry but I could not remember if it was reported as fact previously or just hinted at.

The article is under West Midlands Region on the BBC site.

Pete

[Nige321]

Link
Here (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/5219956.stm)
Nige321:cool:

[scruggs]

Not being in the aviation environment, I'm not sure how these things work.

I realise the consequences that resulted from this accident, and I also realise the incident occurred as a result of human error. But is sacking the flight crew a just punishment?

[silverelise]

The Air Accident Investigation Branch is investigating but TNT said it operated a "zero accident tolerance level".
Interesting policy...

[Sun reader pilot]

An excellent investigative journal has been looking into this incident.

The 737 "bounced" over the "packed" terminal, hurtling towards the building before thundering over the roof.

Here's the link: http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2-2006340463,00.html

And here's a useful diagram of the flightpath that might help the AAIB:

http://images.thesun.co.uk/picture/0,,2006340969,00.jpg

So now you all know the truth!! :}

[Clarence Oveur]

So, other than a single report from a regional BBC website, can anybody actually confirm that they have been fired?

[fmgc]

One would hope that a responsible employer would wait for the investigations to be completed before taking disciplinary procedures.

[fox niner]

Now that IS an interesting trajectory, being about 60 degrees in the wrong direction.
I would say that this rules out following side lobes of the ILS.
The most striking aspect of the black and white picture is....
The picture itself! It was made and posted by NutLoose on page 4 of this thread.
Apparently all these various investigation boards use PPRUNE as a source of information.

[fox niner]

Check out the skid marks in the grass in this picture. they are about 5 degrees off-course compared to the runway heading. And not 60 degrees as claimed by the Sun...


Picture made by NutLoose:

http://mysite.orange.co.uk/il2skins/737_EGNX_copy.jpg

[Erwin Schroedinger]

If I've got it right, so far, the speculation is that, on a Cat3 autoland approach,the autopilot was inadvertently disengaged below re-engage height, then re-engaged, the ILS deviation wasn't monitored, the lack of correct annunciators was ignored, the correct references weren't available at decision and a go around wasn't initiated in sufficient time to avoid heavy ground contact.

I find that sequence too difficult to believe of two professional pilots.

[warm beer]

So, other than a single report from a regional BBC website, can anybody actually confirm that they have been fired?

Yes :(

[JW411]

The Sun is talking absolute bullsh*t. When the rest of you get to hear what actually happened you won't be surprised about anything else.

[Clarence Oveur]

warm beer, about a month ago you also said they had been fired. Any reason why your information should be considered more reliable this time around?

[DH121]

Most towers in the UK now monitor tracking and G/S. I'm surprised they didn't order a G/A when they became aware of the deviation. That and the fact that the pilots didn't initiate a G/A either makes one think it may all have happened very quickly?

[fox niner]

OK, so the crew somehow disconnected the A/P at 1.0 NM, which translates in an altitude of 300 feet. If I remember correctly, the 737 autopilot system introduces a nose-up trim at 400 ft agl. If you disconnect the A/P after this point, it will cause the airplane to fly up, and end up above the glideslope. Apparently this is what initially happened, see the preliminary findings report of the AAIB.
In order to reach the grass before the G/S antenna, after being somehow above the glideslope at one mile, they must have....pushed the controls into the ADI/EFIS. I wonder what the vertical speed was, and how the GPWS reacted to all this.


I found this photo of the OO-TND, which has a "CAT 1" placard installed in the cockpit! Does this mean the aircraft was CAT 1? could someone clarify this? picture taken 11 months before the accident.
http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=511294

This mishap has the potential to become a classic, of which the aviation industry can learn a lot, whatever the findings will be.

[NutLoose]

Now that IS an interesting trajectory, being about 60 degrees in the wrong direction.
I would say that this rules out following side lobes of the ILS.
The most striking aspect of the black and white picture is....
The picture itself! It was made and posted by NutLoose on page 4 of this thread.
Apparently all these various investigation boards use PPRUNE as a source of information.

Nice of them to ask me wasn't it. :mad: If they had I might have made the unedited version available to them........... GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR

[EGCN]

A team of pilots who crash landed a cargo plane at East
Midlands Airport, causing its runway to be closed for
several hours, have been sacked. Thousands of passengers
had to be moved to other airports after the cargo plane
landed on its nose at Birmingham Airport on 15 June
after first landing on the grass at East Midlands.
Cargo company TNT said despite the Belgian pilot showing
skill in his handling of the situation, the incident was
down to human error. The automatic pilot system was
disengaged due to a 'momentary lapse', and this lead to
the accident.
The aeroplane remained on the runway, causing all
take-offs to be cancelled for six hours and arrivals
only resuming in the afternoon. More than 200 flights
had to be diverted or were delayed.
The Air Accident Investigation Branch is investigating
but TNT said it operated a 'zero accident tolerance
level'.

http://www.uk-airport-news.info/

[the_hawk]

Looks like news texts aren't copyrighted :) Almost exact the same text as in the BBC article http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/west_midlands/5219956.stm , the link Nige321 posted on p. 12

[sugden]

The Airport News article is the BBC article witha couple of words changed. As the BBC predates this I guess this is a rip-off and does not stand as additional corroboration of these guys having been sacked.

So does anyone have any authoritative evidence other than the BBC that this is what happened to them?

Sacking before the facts are out seems pretty unbelievable. ANyone work for TNT?

[Clarence Oveur]

They have not been sacked. Yet. And that is a fact.

[JW411]

sugden:

"Sacking before the facts are out seems pretty unbelievable".

By that do you mean "before the AAIB report is published"? If so, I would be interested to know if you have a clause in YOUR contract that says that you can't be fired before the report is published.

Just because YOU don't know the facts does not mean that the facts are not known.

[alf5071h]

While we wait for the full analysis of the accident, it is disappointing to see possibly hasty punitive action taken in an industry that strives for a ‘just culture’ and the avoidance of blame. If nothing else, the industry deserves some public explanation, as without it the operator could be criticized for pre-judging the AAIB investigation or possible not conducting a thorough in-house investigation and thus overlooking any organizational contributions.
From a crew error viewpoint, I recall an interesting test – the substitution test.
CAP716 Aviation Maintenance Human Factors P159 www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP716.PDF
The “substitution test” is good rule of thumb when illustrating where blame is inappropriate. If an incident occurs, ask yourself whether another similar individual (with the required skill, training and experience) in the same circumstances would have done anything different. If not, then blame is definitely inappropriate.“Do blame and punishment have a role in organisational risk management?”. Johnston, N. Flight Deck. Spring 1995, pp 33-6.
In addition, I would suggest that those who use this test require the appropriate level of ‘skill, training and experience’ in applying the human factors associated with error.

Applying the substitution test to the assumed initiating error - a ‘momentary lapse’ (a failure of execution – J. Reason) e.g. the disconnection of the autopilot vice use of transmit button, then it would be interesting to hear how many other 737 pilots have made or nearly made a similar mistake. Is the AP DISC button proud or guarded, is it easily depressed? Of course, any specific circumstances in this incident would also have to be considered, e.g. why it was necessary to transmit during the latter stages of a Cat3 approach, which could be a mitigating factor.

It is possible that many crews would judge the initiating factor as an error and therefore not blameworthy. However, if the test was applied to the subsequent autopilot re-engagement then a different judgment might be made. The crew action would have to be balance by the level of training given and understanding acquired about the use of the autopilot, the pressures of time, fuel, or fatigue. Alternatively if there was a clear cut company procedure that states – do not reconnect the autopilot in ‘these’ circumstances, then the ‘error’ could be judged a violation. But even violations have categories that require understanding and explanation, with many contributing factors originating from the organization.

And finally do you blame a crew for a violation that was precipitated by an error? The answer to this question requires both organizational judgment and wisdom.

I hope that the industry is not deprived of the opportunity to learn from this accident either by the operator’s opaque activities or by a limited investigation that does not delve into the human and organizational background to error.

If anyone has the document “Do blame and punishment have a role in organisational risk management?”. Johnston, N. ‘Flight Deck’. Spring 1995, pp 33-6. I would appreciate a copy.

[Oilhead]

So this airline has zero tolerance for accidents. Don't we all? Doesnt mean they have to trash careers without investigations being completed.
Reminds me of the Virgin pilot who allegedly "rang the bell" at Dulles just before Christmas a couple of years back. Fired without even a company hearing since he was banged up in USA with his passport locked away in a judges drawer in Leesburg. Lets have some compassion and process. None of us set out to scratch planes or passengers.
:ugh:

[rodthesod]

So this airline has zero tolerance for accidents. Don't we all? Doesnt mean they have to trash careers without investigations being completed.
:ugh:

Two points:

A statement like 'this airline has zero tolerance for accidents' probably came from a 'bean-counter'. In a previous life I had an 'accident' with the same airline and it did not affect my status, salary or promotion. That was before it became a Belgian airline but I have no reason to believe anything has changed.
Who said anything about 'trashing careers without investigation'? If you bother to read previous posts you will see that at least one source says 'They have not been sacked. Yet. And that is a fact.' Even if they have been 'sacked', I'm certain proper process would have been followed under European Company Law. A full Company investigation can take a matter of hours, not years like an AAIB report. If, FOR EXAMPLE, someone admitted that they had totally disregarded an SOP order NOT TO re-engage the A/P below a certain height AND totally disregarded an SOP TO go-around under certain circumstances, do you really expect that the company should keep them on full pay until such time that the AAIB come to the same inevitable conclusion?

[warm beer]

They have not been sacked. Yet. And that is a fact.

Both pilots are not in the roster system, the FO was asked/told to resign. The captain is not being paid and the matter is with the union.

Both their company email addresses are no longer.

Crewing says they are no longer with the company.

TNT said they are no longer with the company.

C.O. as you know the company lawyers have told them not to speak about it.

[alf5071h]

If the company investigation did not look beyond the (obvious) conclusion that the crew violated procedures, then their action could be based on a false perception of the crew’s difficulties biased by hindsight. This accident and the company’s action is an example of the industry’s need to embrace human factors as illustrated by:-
“If you conclude that human error is the cause of the accident then start your investigation again.”
(I cannot be sure of the source of the quote but James Reason, Sidney Dekker, and Patrick Hudson come to mind).
If an operator was to heed the advice of these and similarly minded people in the industry, then an investigation which attempts to understand the crews foresight or lack of (at the time of the autopilot event), might determine an alternative and most relevant viewpoint.
This is not to say that the company’s conclusion would be any different, but it could be beneficial to the industry and the company’s image if this information (the basis of their action) were to be made public. It could for example provide understanding of how ‘a zero tolerance to accidents’ policy is actually implemented; with the information currently available it appears unlikely that it is i.a.w. the ICAO Guidelines on Safety Management. (www.icao.int/fsix/_Library/SMM-9859_1ed_en.pdf)
The AAIB’s responsibilities under the ICAO convention (Annex 13) would not allow them to come to a conclusion which ‘apportions blame or liability’, only to state the facts and circumstances, and where necessary make recommendations. However, I hope that for the human factors issues the AAIB will be able to at least comment, speculatively if necessary, on the range of scenarios which they had considered.

[Coconutty]

Anyone "in the know" heard how and WHEN the aircraft is going to be moved from the end of R24 at BHX ?

( I guess it will probably have to be be broken up and taken away in chunks ).

It's been there apparantly abandoned since around 16th June - propped up on jacks .

That date was the start of the fishing season in the UK - or should that be "Hunting" Season :confused:

Anyway - Nearly 7 weeks - It's a wonder the locals haven't had the remaining wheels off it yet !

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/Coconutty.jpg

[Clarence Oveur]

warm beer, suffice to say I don't rely on hearsay or secondhand information. I don't get my information from crewing, but from a bit further down the office.

Without making any comment on whether the company have treated the crew fairly or not up to this point, I will say that there must be quite a few people on positions of responsibility, who are awaiting the final AAIB report with some trepidation. Or at least they should be.

[warm beer]

Or at least they should be.[/quote]

C.O. I agree what you say, but after what was said about the crew on the BRU-OST flight:mad:

[Fried_Chicken]

I see the local Decorators are currently in at Brum repainting the TNT B737 all white, has its future been sorted then?

FC

[NutLoose]

I believe you will find it is being repaired......... remember the gear is designed to come off and the engine to take the load in case of such incidents..

[Codman]

Could be quite a long wait. Apparently it sustained not inconsiderable damage whilst being moved.

[Coconutty]

the gear is designed to come off and the engine to take the load in case of such incidents..

.. aah yes, the underside of the engine cowling certainly did take the load on the final landing, then there's the engine itself which may be damaged from eating some of the grass at East Mids, but there's also all the additional impact damage caused when the gear separated - like to the wing, wing root, flaps, holed fuselage etc. PLUS any damage caused when it was dragged to its current location at the R24 open air Paint shop !

Didinlt someone post previously that the aircraft was valued at 17 million Euros, initial repair estimates being 14 million Euros, so it was likely to be a "Write off" ?

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/Coconutty.jpg

[Avman]

Plenty of yesterday's insurance write-offs flying in today's skies though, albeit most of them in South America or Africa.