The TNT B737 EMA/Birmingham incident thread

[Flap15Geardown]

I noticed it the other day down to just a small triangle of orange over the wing. Does anyone know exactly what the damage is as I heard that the wing is now twisted as a result of it being dragged clear on the lowloader. Shouldn't the fuse bolts given way and released the engine before that kind of damage could occur?

[sikeano]

i was reading flight interational and there is an article about this incident the flight crew have been sacked from tnt
the company according to flight international reckons the pilots done a good job in landing the plane but were responsible for it to be in that shape in the first place
:ugh:
there is no justice in the world my thoughts to the sacked pilots

[warm beer]

TNT sacks Birmingham pilots

By David Kaminski-Morrow in London
Freight operator TNT Airways has fired the two pilots involved in the Boeing 737-300 landing accident at the UK's Birmingham airport in June, after concluding that human error played a central role in the event. The crew diverted to Birmingham after an aborted attempt to land at Nottingham East Midlands airport resulted in the 737's right main undercarriage being torn from the aircraft.
While TNT acknowledges that the crew demonstrated skill in recovering the damaged aircraft and making an ultimately successful emergency landing, they had been the "catalyst for the difficulty. It's with profound regret that we've taken this action," the company says. The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch is conducting an inquiry into the accident.:(

[JW411]

sikeano:

"there is no justice in the world"

So let's see if I've got this right. You reckon that if a crew screws up badly and wrecks an aircraft and then succeeds in landing the wreckage safely then they should not get fired?

If you can't get fired for this then what on earth CAN you get fired for? What sort of message would that send?

[fox niner]

JW411,

I agree. At a certain point it certainly is possible for a company to fire its pilots because they screwed up. However, I would have waited for the outcoming of all the findings of the AAIB.

After the report is out, TNT can fire them and present a solid motivation.

[JW411]

So you would keep them employed until the AAIB report is published in about two years time or so?

Why would you want to do that when the answers are probably already well known and no doubt the FDM revealed within hours.

I doubt that any reputable airline would even dream of firing a pilot unless they were absolutely sure of their grounds.

[LD Max]

So you would keep them employed until the AAIB report is published in about two years time or so?
Why would you want to do that when the answers are probably already well known and no doubt the FDM revealed within hours.
I doubt that any reputable airline would even dream of firing a pilot unless they were absolutely sure of their grounds.

It's probably not my place to say since I don't know the grounds of their dismissal, but I personally take a dim view of pilots being fired for an error unless there is a clear case of gross negligence. I think this can only come after a thorough investigation.

Does this imply, therefore, that BOTH pilots were negligent? The FDR would not record their thought processes. Does the fact that one pilot pressed the A/T disconnect mean he was grossly negligent or was it just a slip of the finger? If he was, how does that make the other pilot Grossly Negligent?

Maybe the fact that neither of them called a go-around makes them both grossly negligent... or is it a psychological facet of HP which would have caught many other fully competant pilots out?

Having made the committment in their own minds to Land, isn't it well known that a change of mind requires overwhelming evidence to contradict that decision? If the landing had been made safely, would they still have both been found grossly negligent and fired?

It smacks too much of retribution to me... to make them "pay" for a costly hull loss and the consequent embarrassment to the executives. It seems more like a "face saving" exercise on the part of TNT.

Hull losses are insured. But how is this going to affect the future careers of two pilots who may well be perfectly competent - but who made a simple mistake under pressure that anyone could have made?

[fox niner]

What I meant to say was that yes, indeed it must be possible to fire pilots at a certain moment in time. But in this case, I have the feeling that TNT is rushing to conclusions before they are available. And although they look quite obvious, one can never tell what the outcome will be for sure.

So I wouldn't have simply fired them just like that. I certainly would take them off their roster and put them on non-active duty, and wait for the outcome of the report.

F9

[scanscanscan]

I think it is poor practice for companies to insist on change of destination instructions to their commanders be given via ATC on short landing finals.
I also think ATC as an SOP should refrain from doing so at this critical time.
Certainly ATC should not do it inside the OM unless an emergency exists.
The present system invites things to sometimes go wrong as this incident should be used to modify the best safest ATC practices allowed.

[JW411]

LD Max:

"Maybe the fact that neither of them called a go-around makes them both grossly negligent...."

That would certainly do it.

[LD Max]

LD Max:
"Maybe the fact that neither of them called a go-around makes them both grossly negligent...."
That would certainly do it.


Hardly fair is it without considering the HP factors I mentioned?

[alf5071h]

"Maybe the fact that neither of them called a go-around makes them both grossly negligent...."

Maybe that neither of the crew recognised the situation, or did not recognised the need for a go-around.
Until all of the circumstances are explained and the AAIB report is published, no judgement should be made, either by us in speculation or by the operator who should have greater awareness of the facts.

Negligence is associated with wilful violation; no one has suggested that this is an issue in this incident. Violation implies intent, no self respecting professional pilot intends to make an error, let alone endanger the aircraft. The crew’s intent might be best be explained by their subsequent performance in landing the aircraft – very professional.
I assume that all of us strive to be professional, but that does not exempt us from error.

If the report of ‘an operational change of destination’ and the suggestion that this was the message being transmitted late in the approach is true, then the behaviours of both the operator and ATC would also have to be considered. Simple distractions should be avoided, but those which could impact the crew’s mental capacity with further assessment and decision making must be avoided in critical phases of flight. The application of human factors by being aware of the situation from other viewpoints - CRM - applies to everyone involved with aircraft.

Maybe the fact that neither of them called a go-around makes them … human … which would have caught many other fully competent pilots out.

I agree with the viewpoints provided by LD Max

[sikeano]

jw411 and the rest
sorry chaps when i learnt my flying in the good old raf we were told any landing you walk out from is a good landing
now jokes apart
sacking two pilots within days without waiting for the accident board to file in thier report and taking a narrow view of the situvation is bit harsh, all we know is hearsay and we assume , at the time and moment the decison taken by those pilots were wrong , i read some one saying go around .now i can say tnt is not raf ,they have a schedule and like any other small budget airline ,i am led to believe they pressurise thier flt crew to burn fuel within a certain range
whilst we have been brave here in moaing about the competencies of the pilots we have not looked into the bigger picture .tnt lost a lot of business they have to repair the plane they have to pay the emergency services and also the airport people ,these guys dont do charity my thoughts was sacking the pilots maybe was too early and not the ideal thing to do at the current climate
i would like to end by saying this, so some of us here are pilots or like to think we are ,and there is nothing worse for a pilot than not flying so i said there is no justice in the world in a ironic way
:ok:

[Fried_Chicken]

they have to repair the plane

maybe they don't. It's apparently been returned to the leasing company/sold?, hence the reason for repainting the aircraft all white. TNT no longer want anything to do with the aircraft & have thus requested their colours be removed from the offending "wreck"

FC

[JW411]

Have any of you out there actually thought about this from the crew's point of view?

Would you really want to sit at home in a state of suspension waiting for an AAIB report which will take many months (if not years) to be published? Even when the report IS published it will be a statement of fact and will not allocate blame.

Personally I would want to get on with my life.

I have heard it said that one of the crew does not want to get back into a cockpit ever again.

[A37575]

Siceano. I can't believe you were in the RAF as you claim. No RAF trained pilot would type a Pprune letter as careless as yours. Spelling RAF as raf is appalling. Guard duty for two weeks for you...

[sikeano]

cheers a37575
i am ex now since jan 2006 so i think i can say raf :p

[Few Cloudy]

I think the operative line in Sikeano´s post was, "or like to think we are..."

[Chugalug2]

I found this photo of the OO-TND, which has a "CAT 1" placard installed in the cockpit! Does this mean the aircraft was CAT 1? could someone clarify this? picture taken 11 months before the accident.
http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=511294

This mishap has the potential to become a classic, of which the aviation industry can learn a lot, whatever the findings will be.

Interesting photo, fn, as it confirms previous mention that 'TND is a clockwork FD. The BIG, BIG, issue with these, especially on a mixed clockwork/EFIS fleet was the dreaded "Killer Switches", outboard of the Mode Control Panel. These have to be changed to ILS before commencing an ILS approach of any category or much bad Karma results. I remember it was the one thing above all else that you concentrated on getting right when flying a non EFIS 737. Don't know if it has any bearing on this case, but I imagine the outcome could be similar if they indeed had not been selected!

[Chugalug2]

Chugalug2

Perhaps the mobile phone in your photo was the cause?:ouch: Placard is usually used to remind crew of any down grade/upgrade state and can change from day to day.

Not my photo, nor my "command" mobile! I was merely commenting on Fox Niners posting, and drawing attention to the HSI ("killer") switches, which, unlike EFIS aircraft, had to be changed from NAV to VOR/ILS before commencing an ILS or VOR Approach, coupled or otherwise. If not the HSI Course Pointer will display FMC and not ILS or VOR lateral deviation, not conducive to a wish to live long and prosper!

[Human Factor]

I must admit that I haven't read the whole thread. I've read and heard a bit of what happened, enough to be a little concerned. Anyway:

Maybe that neither of the crew recognised the situation...

If I'm right in saying that they "arrived" a few yards to the side of the runway at EMA, they ****** ought to have recognised that situation, possibly due to the slight vibration on touchdown!! I've operated on the hazy side of awake in the past (possibly when I shouldn't - hands up anyone else out there.....) but I haven't missed a runway so far.

There are procedures in force and I'm being deliberately careful not to be specific. If an aeroplane is placarded as Cat 1, the chances are it's probably like that for a reason. Even if it isn't, there are sufficient provisos (gotchas?) within SOPs for Cat 3 type ops which will be enough to warn the most "entertaining" of individuals. At the end of the day, they had enough fuel to get to BHX with a wrecked aeroplane. To me, that means they had enough fuel to get to BHX with a good aeroplane and sit there and think about it.

There are a few issues here which bear further investigation (and no doubt will get just that).

[Dream Buster]

Human Factor.

I agree that this is a very worrying incident.

'If' they had been following normal Company policy and had been carrying minimum fuel then by the time they were making the second diversion to BHX they would be well into their final reserve fuel.

Clearly it would and will be fascinating to know how much fuel was on board when they eventually 'touched down' at BHX.

I believe that it will take an incident like this to prove that minimum fuel is just that and Company's have no real understanding of the pressure carrying it can have in certain situations.

So why do it, as you never know what's going to happen?

The questions remain 'How much fuel was actually left?' quite apart from what did happen at EMA.

I guess we will find out one day, when it suits 'them' to tell 'us'.

:ok:

[theresalwaysone]

Perahaps some of you might like to look at the initial AIIB report at

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/S5-2006%20OO-TND.pdf

and then understand why the crew were sacked.

[Clarence Oveur]

'If' they had been following normal Company policy and had been carrying minimum fuel then by the time they were making the second diversion to BHX they would be well into their final reserve fuel.

It is not normal company policy to carry minimum fuel. Fuel was not an issue in this accident.

And again, they were not sacked. All parties involved agreed that any continued cooperation would be very difficult. The crew involved chose to have their contract terminated by the company, as that was financially the best option for them.

[BRUpax]

I presume that when the autopilot disconnected (for whatever reason) and the approach became unstable, the crew should have initiated an immediate go-around rather than try and chase the GS in such a short distance?

[ExSimGuy]

Perahaps some of you might like to look at the initial AIIB report at

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/S5-2006%20OO-TND.pdf

and then understand why the crew were sacked.
Having read the (just 2 pages) report, maybe I'm being dense, but don't see the "why the crew was sacked". It appears that the autopilot disconnect/reconnect was followed immediately by g/a action by the crew - I would have thought this was exactly the right response.

Am, I missing something obvious?

[BOAC]

was followed immediately by g/a action by the crew - not quite how I read it.

[Pilot Pete]

It appears that the autopilot disconnect/reconnect was followed immediately by g/a action by the crew - I would have thought this was exactly the right response.

Am, I missing something obvious?

I suspect you are, as I doubt that re-engaging the autopilot at that stage of a Cat3 approach is exactly the right response according to their operations manual.

PP

[cwatters]

The important bit seems to be...

"..at approximately one mile from the runway threshold, the autopilot was momentarily disconnected and re-engaged. The aircraft then went above the glide-slope before developing a high rate of descent. At the same time, it deviated to the left of the centre-line. A go-around was initiated..."

It's not clear from the report what the various time intervals were or what caused the high rate of descent... but those intervals will be the key.

[4potflyer]

It looks as though the important bit here is "re-engaged". If they had immediately initiated a G/A when the autopilot was accidentally disengaged, they would have been in compliance with SOP and would, according to earlier posts, have avoided colliding with the ground.

The burning question is would any other competent pilot put in the same situation have reacted differently? If you knock the kettle switch off while reaching for the sugar, your human reaction is to instantly correct for the mistake and turn it back on pronto. In that split second, while thinking about the ATC message, the embarassment of knocking off the A/P, SOPs are probably just too far out of mental reach. If there were many seconds available to react a less human, more trained decision may have been made.

Maybe there should be an audiable alert in such a situation, stating clearly "Go Around", to remove/minimize any chances for human instincts to jump in?

I have no jet experience whatsoever, but from earlier posts by 737 drivers, it appears that the rapid nose pitch up would be expected on this palne when the autopilot disengaged. It seems that when the autopilot was re-engaged (which may have been immediately afterwards-in a split second) the autopilot overcorrected, and put the plane at an attitude where neither an on target landing nor a G/A was possible in the space remaining.

[Coconutty]

Over 3 months since landings(s) and the 737 is STILL abandoned at Birmingham Airport -Company logo's all whitewashed out ( badly ), engines covered up with plastic sheeting, and propped upon jacks looking very sad :sad:

Does anyone have any info. on when it might get moved or broken up ?

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/Coconutty.jpg

[Fluffy flyer]

It is not normal company policy to carry minimum fuel. Fuel was not an issue in this accident.
And again, they were not sacked. All parties involved agreed that any continued cooperation would be very difficult. The crew involved chose to have their contract terminated by the company, as that was financially the best option for them.

Clarence

From your post, you sound to be a person in the know, with regard to TNT company policy that is.

Could you tell me then is it company policy for the Commander sitting in the left seat to be the handling pilot during a cat 3 approach.

The AAIB report stated that…… The commander was the handling pilot in the left cockpit seat.

Not all, I know but the majority of companies have adopted the policy that during this type of approach with reduced visibility then a monitored approach be carried out, i.e. the First Officer flies the a/c by means of the autopilot and the Captain/Commander monitors the a/c performance and progress down the flight path.

This procedure allows the Commander free brain capacity to asses when it all goes wrong and call for the correct action to be taken. i.e. Go Around.

I was actually the person that first spotted the undercarriage laying in the grass the morning of the incident, we were the crew that notified East Midlands tower, up to that point they didn’t even know that it was laying there. It was some 50 meters from the left runway edge which means the a/c was touching down some 75 meters from the runway centre line.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but I do wonder if the Commander had been monitoring instead of flying maybe this thread wouldn’t exist.

Fluffy Flyer.

[stator vane]

not sure what TNT does but i was with virgin express BRU for four years ending 2002 and their CAT 3A's were captain fly, which i must say i still prefer. i will have to ask to see if they still are.

might be a case of which ever way you are taught first, but all i can remember in the states' 737 cat 3's were captain fly and Belgian VEX was captain fly, so perhaps belgian TNT is as well. in the states, i remember a monitored approach for cat 2's but they cancelled that before too long. only when coming to the UK did i see the change over at the last minute from F/O flying to captain flying. (same goes for the extended T/O&LDG briefings that includes one's mother's maiden name.)

i find it uneasy and un-natural. (both the monitored approach and extreme briefings). there is a time point in which the F/O is flying and the captain is looking outside along with trying to look inside and crosscheck approach, split attention. then the captain takes over right at the point of any visual sightings/or minimums depending on approach/company- which is usually right near minimums involving moment of hands on thrust levers and more importantly, transfer of actual flying/non flying status. then the visual might go away or some other malfunction could occur all possible in a very short period of time on either side of the "change over point" and it has never felt right. it adds an extra layer of complication which is unnecessary in my opinion. it would make more logical sense to me if the F/O would stay pilot flying until the captain "takes the aircraft" on the ground-disconnecting A/P A/T etc. or have the captain fly the approach and keep it all the way.

would be interesting to hear if the A/P disconnect was an incorrect button pushed or a a/c disconnect. i have seen the TOGA button pushed by mistake-- the A/T button pushed by mistake--- the A/P button pushed by mistake and the A/P disconnect all by itself. and with the added layer of "who's flying NOW" possibly delaying reactions due to the "normal" change over at the last second, and the fact that it was a mistake, the "other" person has no idea at the moment and the one who pushed the button is equally surprized as well.

all the years of captain flying CAT3A's there was never any confusion about who was flying and who was to start the go/around and it all flowed quite naturally. even with all the failures that can happen at the last minute, and there are quite a few-there was never a second of confusion as to who was flying and who should start the go-around when needed. it was only matter of am i going to land or go/around. never WHO. and when you consider the incapcitation factor, it is only a matter for the one remaining pilot. yes that has it's weak spot, but let's keep the number of weak spots to a minimum.

i must say that when in the sim, i cannot forget that i am in a sim and when failures did occur right near the decision height, i was quite "sprung" to let it continue down if i could see anything. but of all the times it happened, it never strayed from the center line of the rwy.

things happen so quickly at that point and de-briefings have shown that we as pilots are very limited in our memories of what actually happened and the time sequence of events, even when reviewing the events just moments later after freezing the sim.

the more hours i accumulate, now at 16200 of which 8260 are in 737's, and the more i "see" these things happen, all i can say is "i'm relieved it wasn't me." i learned very early in my training that i am quite capable of any mistake and i have the attitude that "it could happen to me as well."

and if the fuel was getting close to the point that it was to become the next factor, i could understand how it could affect the "eagerness" to go-around.

[Fluffy flyer]

Stator Vane

I agree with you entirely some very good and valid point.

I guess it does boil down to what you have been taught and what you are comfortable with. I have never myself flown a cat 3 as Captain and pilot flying so can’t comment on what it feels like to do it that way.

You are also right that it could have been any of us out there, I just feel that what ever way the sop’s were written or what there procedure was in low vis opps it let them down, this of course is giving the pilots the benefit of the doubt that they followed them.

They were a long way off the runway centre line though, that’s for sure.

No one in the 16 or so pages of this thread has mentioned the possibility of the ILS its self being at fault, I mention this as I operate from EMA on a regular basis and shortly after this incident the ILS was removed from service on rwy 27 and the NDB approach was the only one available.

Just a thought.

[Simtech]

No one in the 16 or so pages of this thread has mentioned the possibility of the ILS its self being at fault, I mention this as I operate from EMA on a regular basis and shortly after this incident the ILS was removed from service on rwy 27 and the NDB approach was the only one available.

As mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the removal of the 27 ILS was part of a long-planned equipment upgrade - the timing was coincidental.

[JW411]

It is my understanding that TNT use the monitored-approach technique. In other words the F/O flies the aircraft (through the automatics) with the express purpose of making a G/A while the Captain monitors and looks for a runway. I have personally used this method since 1964 and it has always worked very well for me.

I am also reliably informed that fuel was absolutely not a factor and that they had loads on board. Following SOPs, however, might have been useful.

I don't think there was anything wrong with the ILS.

[scanscanscan]

JW411....On which autoland aircraft and for which company did you do LVP autolands in 1964?
As far as I know BEA was the first operator on Tridents to use LVP and autolands with the monitored SOPs.
Did you indeed have autoland capability as far back as 1964?
Gf were trained by BEA on Cat3 for GF L1011s in 1975 and as far as I knew were at this time and for a time afterwards the only operators cleared for Cat3.
Either way it makes us both quite old in a young mans game!

[Fluffy flyer]

Scan.

If you read JW411's post carefully you will see no mention of LVP's or cat 3. however there is mention of the monitored approach method.

I have in the past while flying the BAC 1-11 flown a monitored approach to 200ft Cat 1, we were not cat 2 or 3 rated in those days and company sop's stipulated that below a certain cloud base a monitored approach be flown.

Monitored approaches are not only flown when the cloud is on the deck.

The only reason I brought up the ILS was because of the large distance to the left of the centre line they were, not pointing the blame in any direction was just a thought that's all.

[FIRESYSOK]

What caught my eye in reading the report is that they went from one airport with an approach ban, to another conducting CatIII approaches. Surely there was a better diversion airport. Not good practice to ask a crew to do that kind of thing, as it turns out.

[rodthesod]

What caught my eye in reading the report is that they went from one airport with an approach ban, to another conducting CatIII approaches. Surely there was a better diversion airport. Not good practice to ask a crew to do that kind of thing, as it turns out.

If it was a 'fresh' crew with excess fuel, then why on earth not? That, after all, is what they're paid very well to do. TNT's charter is to get the customer's cargo to its destination on time; they will go to all reasonable lengths to do so. This often means flying to a destination, holding and then diverting to a commercial (rather than fuel) alternate in order to satisfy the customer that they 'tried'. Fuel was definitely not an issue in this case, nor I believe was crew fatigue.

Just a point on Monitored Approaches. What JW411 says in his first paragraph of post no 307 is correct. The Captain is designated HP because he makes the decision to land or go-around, but the First Officer is flying the aircraft for the approach (always auto-coupled on CATII or III). If there is no Land call at DH the FO executes a GA; if there is, the Capt, by calling it assumes control (SOPs) and lands. If after that point a GA becomes necessary, the Capt flies it.

[JW411]

scanscanscan:

As has already been pointed out, I made no mention of LVPs or autolands in my post as you will see if you read it properly.

I was talking about the monitored approach method which BEA taught me on the Viscount 802/806.

You might be interested to know that Belfast XR364 made its first autoland on 7th June 1966 at RAE Bedford and went on to make more than 800 autolands during the programme. The Smiths system used was identical to that of the Trident.

[Planter]

rodthesod

The Captain is designated HP because he makes the decision to land or go-around, but the First Officer is flying the aircraft for the approach (always auto-coupled on CATII or III). If there is no Land call at DH the FO executes a GA; if there is, the Capt, by calling it assumes control (SOPs) and lands. If after that point a GA becomes necessary, the Capt flies it.

Just one correction there. The Captain is designated P1, the FO is the HP on a monitored approach. The rest is indeed correct :ok:

[scanscanscan]

Thank you Fluffy and Jw411 for the interesting information on the Belfast trials and the clarification on the monitored approach minus autolands.
Did you hear this one?.... the entire smiths/trident autoland development team were offered jobs at Lockheed and went and developed the L1011 autoland system.

[Coconutty]

Looks like someone found a fresh tin of whitewash and some longer ladders - all the TNT Orange bits are painted over now. The engine intakes have been covered with sheeting - ( including the scraped one ). :hmm:

Meanwhile - Anyone know how much they charge these days at BHX for parking ? It's STILL propped up on the old 06 threshold :ooh:

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/Coconutty.jpg

[Coconutty]

..... and it is STILL abandoned on the end of the old, short, disused Runway ( 06/24) at Birmingham -

One of the latest rumours is that they might chop what's left of the wings off and let the Airport Fire Service have it for practice !

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/Coconutty.jpg

[Mercenary Pilot]

Link to video of the landing...Ive seen better. (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=255382) ;)

[volrider]

unless you have seen the SVHS version I doubt it:)

[groundhogbhx]

Remember it well, watched it happen and so began another :mad: day:(

[IMHO]

Can't believe it's still there!:ugh:
next week will be the 6 month anniversary -
Bout sums up the ambitions of BIA!!

In my Honest opinion

[Fried_Chicken]

The aircraft has been declared a write off & should be broken up soon, well, as soon as all the correct procedures & documentation are completed

Fried Chicken

[Smokie]

I'm not sure if this has already been shown.

http://www.alexisparkinn.com/airliners_videos.htm

Click on 737 Crash Landing.

[fox niner]

How is the investigation progressing? Any news on the fate of the two blokes up front?

[Coconutty]

The aircraft has been declared a write off & should be broken up soon

7 months after the incident with the stranded aircraft just sitting there, at last there is some activity - The screens are up again, with engineers working on it - engine cowlings were all open the other day - maybe they are starting to dismantle it, or maybe its Annual Inspection time :rolleyes:

BTW - Excellent video footage through Smokie's link a few posts back showing the actual landing at BHX - can't be too many videos like that in existence around the world !

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/Coconutty.jpg

[AltFlaps]

Hope they get rid of it soon ... I REALLY could've used R24 yesterday afternoon !

Might have saved on a clean pair of pants ...

[Coconutty]

I thought 06 / 24 was permanently closed after they widened the passenger terminal area and apron ?

Or are you talking rotary ?

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d129/coconut11/Coconutty.jpg

[Fried_Chicken]

The B737 was finally broken up this week with the fuselage leaving by road tonight.

Any reports out on this yet?

Fried Chicken

[ArthurR]

Just seen on BBC news page:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7372457.stm

No comment, but the AAIB report should be interesting.

[stickyb]

I think this is the link to the report

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/5_2008_oo_tnd.cfm

[3rd_ear]

Yeah, I remember that - the plane that crashed twice. There was an amazing photo of the gouge in the turf at EMA. [Edit] Nutloose, if you're reading, would it be possible to repost your photo?

Hope the pilot got another job btw.

[Navy_Adversary]

Apparently the company asked him via ATC to divert to Liverpool just as he was on short finals.:eek:

[PPRuNe Towers]

A reminder of the police unit video of the BHX landing.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rnGgMSCpu2A&feature=related

[BOAC]

A quick 'skim' of the reports indicates that the Captain was 'PF' which is totally outwith my experience of AWOPS in 3 airlines, where PF is always the co-pilot.

Are there any other airlines which do it this way? I did not see a comment from the AIB on this in my quick look.

Perhaps a relevant suggestion would also be that when 'PM' transmits, the centre console R/T switch should be used. This precludes any interference with PF's controls.

The report does show a good outcome from the aircraft design and its build strength.

[Mercenary Pilot]

Many of us knew that the filing of EMA under "Nottingham" would catch someone out eventually. :suspect:

[ETOPS]

Are there any other airlines which do it this way?

Yes - BA below 1000' AAL. P2 flies the the approach and P1 takes over at 1000' stating the minima (ie autoland 50 radio) P2 monitors for such things as Captain accidently disconnecting the autopilot :eek:

[Talkdownman]

Causal factors
1. ATC inappropriately transmitted a company R/T message when the
aircraft was at a late stage of a CAT III automatic approach.
2. The commander inadvertently disconnected the autopilots in attempting
to respond to the R/T message.

Without hindsight would any ATCO on this forum have done anything differently?
Is 500 ft agl now too low to expect a PAIR of pilots to receive a relayed company message?
What happened to AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE?
Maybe ATCOs should not get involved in relaying company messages after all........
Come on AAIB, get real.

[jumpseater]

Without hindsight would any ATCO on this forum have done anything differently?

Yup, me. I have however been very fortunate to spend a good deal of time up front with crews, and have seen how busy that last mile or so is. I'm not suggesting the ATCO in question here hasn't, but I do know opportunities for fam flights are far far fewer than they used to be. It gives an invaluable look at the other side of the frequency, and would help ATCO's in assessing the value of passing non flight safety messages where cockpit workload can be very high.

For a pure company commercial message at that stage of the approach I'd leave it until the a/c is on the ground, or had gone around.

[Hotel Tango]

I most certainly would not have passed such a message at such a late stage of a CAT III approach.

[TWR]

500' AGL means less than 2 NM final. During a CAT III approach, the flight would have been given already its landing clearance ( here, on the other side of the Channel, anyway) and the only thing that would trigger a transmission from my side would be an infringement of the sensitive/critical area, a degradation of the ILS signal, or an apparent deviation from the centreline/glide path as monitored on radar. The message would be very simple; Go around ! I cannot believe colleagues would pass company-related messages under these conditions in such a critical stage of the flight ! You don't need a familiarization flight to understand this.

[411A]

The commander recognised at once that he had used the wrong button on the control column and stopped speaking.

Leaving aside the inappropriate ATC reply by either pilot during the late stages of a low visibility approch (should not be considered, as pilot attention needs to be inside, not elsewhere), it is for this reason that, at two airlines where I have worked, during low visibility approaches, pilot boom mikes are not to be used, but hand mikes instead.
This keeps fingers away from the 'wrong' buttons, thus helping to prevent inadvertant disconnection of autopilots.

In addition, from the report, it seems that the First Officer was, shall we say, out to lunch.:ugh:

And further...
A quick 'skim' of the reports indicates that the Captain was 'PF' which is totally outwith my experience of AWOPS in 3 airlines, where PF is always the co-pilot.

Are there any other airlines which do it this way? I did not see a comment from the AIB on this in my quick look.


Yes, quite a few, which mandate that, in the event of a low visibility approach, the Commander should always be the PF.
Very good company policy, in my considered opinion.

[Basil]

The difficulty in locating the charts for EMA could be overcome if the chart manufacturerers had placed one page under 'E' stating:
East Midlands Airport
is now
Nottingham East Midlands Airport

I'm surprised that the AAIB did not make this a recommendation for, say, ten years following an airport name change.

. . and very proud of my restraint in witholding comment upon recent name changes :)

[GotTheTshirt]

411A

I suggest you look at EU regulations re-Hand mikes!!:eek:

[BOAC]

Yes - BA below 1000' AAL. - thanks for the update. Is that 'your fleet'/CatIIIB specific or is it a change from the Cat IIIA policy in 2004? Probably suffering from 'brain fade' as I recall the co-pilot always used to fly the approach (and g/a) in AWOPS in BA? Certainly did in DanAir and does in Astraeus. How do these 'new' SOPs cope with the 'master' A/P selection for Cat IIIA g/a on the 737?

[Spruit]

Appologies for the thread drift!

The difficulty in locating the charts for EMA could be overcome if the chart manufacturerers had placed one page under 'E' stating:
East Midlands Airport
is now
Nottingham East Midlands Airport

Unfortunately they would now be changing the pages back as it's been renamed to "East Midlands Airport - Nottingham, Derby, Leicester" to save confusion over where it is, obviously!

:ugh: and :D Bizarre!

Spru!

[Mercenary Pilot]

I'm also surprised the AAIB didn't make a recommendation regarding the approach plates. They do hint at the issue very heavily throughout the report.

Anyone know where to find the Jepps for Robin Hood Airport Doncaster Sheffield these days?!? :rolleyes: :ugh:

[Talkdownman]

The World has gone mad.
What's wrong with Castledon and Finningly?

I reckon a lot of ATCOs will be 'turning deaf ears' to company messages after this......

[captplaystation]

Very "off thread". . . . sorry, but an associated video on youtube at the link given by PPRuNe Towers is the Tarom " car crash", Jeez , I didn't realise they were going THAT fast, collision was 27 sec into T/O roll, that too was a close call for all concerned.
Regards Capt handling on AWOPS , both BMI and VEX used to have Capt handling in the past too, don't know current policy, have to say I prefered it that way too, but no choice now. In RYR it's the other way. . . . 300hrs/200m Yeah Sure, why don't you fly this approach. . . . . Duh.

[Mercenary Pilot]

300hrs/200m Yeah Sure, why don't you fly this approach. . . . . Duh.Well, I gotta say that I think that it should be the F/O flying with the skipper making the final decision to land. That's how I've always done a monitored approach anyway.

[captplaystation]

Done it both ways, and I prefer the other.
"Vive le difference", it would be boring if we were all the same.

[411A]

I suggest you look at EU regulations re-Hand mikes!!

Know all about those, TShirt, and indeed it is quite likely that this contributed to this accident.
I have had UKCAA guys on the FD during low visibility approaches, and we used hand mics throughout, and strangely enough, they never objected.
One must realise that some CAA/JAA/EASA regulations are, shall we say, just a tad behind the times...or, if you prefer, obtuse.:eek:

[Hotel Tango]

Come off it 411A, Yanks like hand mikes because it's macho........:E

[fmgc]

In my Company for LVPs the FO flies the approach and the Captain does the "landing" such as it is. That way the Capt is doing all the tricky bits like making the decision, take over in the event of a high flare etc.

Somebody said to me once that the reason that ATC always have to call the Americanos 2 or 3 times before getting a reply was because they use hand mics & speakers rather than headsets!! :}

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

For me - an ATC transmission at 400ft is not something I'd consider crashing for.

I'd buy that ATCO a beer.


WWW

[JW411]

TNT SOPs for an approach under LVPs are such that the approach is treated like a "monitored approach" in that the F/O flies the aircraft (through the automatics) to minima and the captain monitors and makes the landing/go around decision at minimas.

The F/O is taught to understand that his big game in life is the G/A procedure and to thoroughly absorb what he is going to do if a G/A is called by the captain at minimas. The G/A procedure is often complex.

Therefore, the captain is geared up to "landing" and the F/O is geared up to "going around".

Some of you out there (and I am talking about the professionals and not
the sciolists) might still be a little bit confused about the terms PF (Pilot Flying) and PNF (Pilot Not Flying).

In this case, the captain is the PF because he is the "landing" pilot but, during the approach, he will be making the radio calls as the F/O is otherwise engaged in flying the aircraft.

I had nothing to do with the TNT 737 fleet but I taught LVPs for nearly 20 years on other TNT aircraft.

[BOAC]

Thank you, JW for confirmation. May I have your comments on para 2.3.3. of the 'Analysis' regarding SOPs? I still read Captain 'flying', F/O 'monitoring'? What do you read? I actually (reading 'between' the AIB lines, particularly the last para of 2.3.2) think the approach mindset could well have been to set up a dual a/p Cat I based on the wx info they had? This does explain the apparent anomaly in handling.

BTW, I agree with your comment on the possible confusion amongst the readers, but I still reckon the Captain is 'PNF' on a correctly flown IIIA approach from handover until 'Decide'?

PS - you taught me a new word tonight:ok:

[JW411]

Let's face it; this crew did not do particularly well.

BOAC:

Send me a PM and I will happily answer your questions.

[lederhosen]

There are companies who do it differently. Our SOP for the 737 states clearly that the Captain is PF all the way down. The FO is to stay head down on instruments (monitoring as PNF) all the way until rollout and to call for a go-around if he spots any problems. The Captain flies the G/A.

I fully understand reasons why the alternative system might have been favoured in the past. But these days with autothrottle and glass cockpit the situation has changed. Indeed it could be argued that some of the things we practice in the sim (e.g. TOGA button failure on G/A) are better handled by the Captain.

Full marks to JW411 for sciolist. My dictionary defines this as 'a superficial pretender to knowledge'. Apparently not much used, but I think Pprune could give it a new lease of life!