Bmi Airbus lands with park brake on (Report)

[easy307]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_yorkshire/6992741.stm

[JB LFPN FLYER]

You mean " Oops I did it again " ;)

Luckly nobody was injured . He was not the first one and will for sure not be the last one ;)


Regards
JBB

[old,not bold]

It would be nice to know if someone had looked at the Human Factors elements in this one, of which there seem to be several from the report linked above, and taken the appropriate action to prevent a re-occurrence.

[ChocksAwayUK]

It would be nice to know if someone had looked at the Human Factors elements in this one, of which there seem to be several from the report linked above, and taken the appropriate action to prevent a re-occurrence.


Like this:

The aircraft manufacturer said there had been five similar events worldwide and the operator said it had now updated its pre-landing checks.

Can't say I remember any reference to the gear in the landing checks...unless it's in the Landing Memo - No Blue bit.

[The Nr Fairy]

Click here to go to the report on the AAIB web site (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/september_2007/airbus_a319_131__g_dbci.cfm).

I've seen pictures - can't remember where - of an American nuclear power station were some handles had beer taps on the from different brewers, so as to more rapidly and accurately identify them.

A simple non-software fix is at hand !

[aw8565]

Even Concorde had a system that wouldn't allow the brakes to become effective until the wheels had spun up.... Is there any feasible reason you would WANT to land with the parking brake on?

If not (and I can't see that there is but I'm not yet a pilot) surely Airbus could have implemented a similar warning/advisory message on the ECAM or some kind of system that prevents the parking brake being applied while airborne?

[old,not bold]

Whoops.....I slipped up asking about the HF angle had been looked at, based on the BBC report, before reading the AAIB report.

The operator even called in a psychologist to help them with this aspect. So it was a silly question.

But I am doubtful about what then happened. The report picks up a number of issues that could be described as contributory, but the eventual single recommendation only concerns changing SOPs to include a look at the lower right quadrant of the ECAM screen in the pre-landing checks.

With respect to AAIB, this is only going to capture the error if, or when it's made again, and does nothing to prevent it happening in the first place.

In the engineering world, a Boeing MEDA investigation, now in common use, systematically analyses ALL contributory factors, and then derives from that analysis recommendations to prevent a re-occurrence of the error, not just to improve its capture. Most events are found to be the culmination of a number of contributory factors leading to errors and, perhaps, violations.

The AAIB report, and /or the psychologist's report, quite rightly mentions the lever design and location, cockpit workload, and the commander's focus on the weather, as contributory factors. But it was not a systematic analysis, and the recommendation ignored most of the contributory factors it did find. I'll bet there were some more, too.

It's not the AAIB's job only to make recommendations with little financial impact. For example; was the design issue irrelevant? Not according to the report; "The ability to grasp the parking brake handle in a similar manner to the flap selector......may.. have prevented the commander from obtaining initial tactile feedback...". It's what we old folk call a "Murphy" and they need to be fixed when found, not left to entrap the next poor sod (This was No 5, wasn't it?).

The sentence He was not the first one and will for sure not be the last one may well be a realistic take on our approach to safety today, but it makes me weep. Simply rewriting the pre-landing check to improve the probability of capturing the error is totally inadequate.

[Farrell]

Is there an ECAM alert when the Parking Brake is engaged prior to touchdown?

[Jet II]

For example; was the design issue irrelevant?

Of course not - all these instances are down to one basic issue - bad design by Airbus.

If you have to apply the footbrakes to engage the Parking brake then it is highly unlikely that you will do that in flight.

Airbus's switch might make the F/C workload easier but has obvious implications for safety.

[FE Hoppy]

Embraer had a incident like this on the 170 acouple of years ago. They have introduced an EICAS message to alert crews if it happens again.

[Smudger]

Couldn't happen on a Boeing............ (oops, I think I've just dug myself a hole.....)

[Seat1APlease]

Many moons ago on the Vanguard the procedure was that the handling pilot on take off used to apply the footbrakes for a couple of seconds to stop the wheels from spinning before calling for the undercarriage to be raised.
The manufacturer thought that the forces on retraction might, over time, cause damage to the undercarriage. If however an engine failed on take off then the pilot called for undercarriage up straight away, to remove the drag as quickly as possible.
When base training a simulated failure might be done a dozen times in a detail so the procedure was for the trainee to call for the undercarriage keeping his feet on the floor, the training captain discretely pulled and released the handbrake to stop the wheels before the gear was raised.
I think you're all probably ahead of me here, the rubber marks were clearly visible ten years later.

[Max Angle]

Latest aircraft have an ECAM warning if park brake is set in flight. Can't remember if it is being retrofitted with new software updates. I seem to remember from my distant 737 days that it had locked wheel protection, would that have helped if the park brake was set or did it just stop you bursting a tyre if your size 12s were on the brake pedals?

The operator even called in a psychologist to help them with this aspect. If it's the one I am thinking of then I am sure he was a great help;)

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

Saw a VC10 do it on 10L at Heathrow many moons ago. VC10s weren't intended to be STOL!!

[Blues&twos]

I had a quick search as I thought it had been covered before...have a look at

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=240245&highlight=parking+brake

and

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=250945&highlight=parking+brake

with colour pictures!!

[ShotOne]

some of these posts particularly those knocking airbus a bit off the mark. Quite a few aircraft from various manufacturers have done exactly the same. Also most airliners including airbus have some form of anti-skid (like ABS) and have done since Dunlop's Maxaret system was marketed in the 1960's. But it won't help in landing with the park brake on.

[Captain Planet]

That's gonna be pricey!!!

[Airbrake]

Similar things have happened on Boeings. I have seen on more than one occassion hands go to the flap lever instead of the gear lever when asking for gear up. Different levers but with the same action and associated with each others use could lead to mistaken operation.

[Jeff Claims]

Was listening to David Gunson's "What goes up..." yesterday. Ironic, isn't it - he reminds us in his typically hilarious way of the stench of burning rubber, the bangs from the tyres and the mountain of paperwork to follow. Hilarious the way he tells it; the reality is... just the same, only without the hilarity. Glad everyone safe.
JC

[Bearcat]

i do recall I asked last year can you set the parking brake in flight on an airbus and the usual detractors just took the piss and laughed me off the stage.....why would a fool do such a thing was the smut written....well now I know you can set it.....I feel sorry for the skipper but setting the parking brake on approach is no excuse.

[TimV]

Hey - we all make mistakes. My mum drove her automatic BMW 8 miles into Kingston with the parking brake on. Only noticed when the smoke pouring out the back was pointed out to her by a passer-by. She wondered why it had felt underpowered.:ugh:

[Rampi]

Same happend with an LTU A321 in Paphos last year in June.
Parking Brake was set and aircraft landed. All main gear tires blew, runway was blocked for hours...
Not much has been published on that. Also no report could be sighted on the german "BFU" site, that investigates accidents normaly.

BRGDS

Rampi

[PBL]

Is there an ECAM alert when the Parking Brake is engaged prior to touchdown?

On the "old" FWC (pre-H2F3), there is an ECAM message generated. On the LBA incident, 24.01.2007, the AAIB pointed out that there was no SOP to check the ECAM before touchdown. AAIB says there is now.

Release H2F3 includes master caution light, aural warning, and specific checklist-type message on the ECAM.

The link to the report was published by The Nr Fairy on this thread on 13.09 at 16:45.

PBL

[dontdoit]

Why not incorporate this into the Air/Ground logic and make it impossible to set the park brake in the air? I've been trying to think of an occasion that might require the park brake to be set when airborne...no, can't think of any!

A lot of types already have a similar arrangement for, say, reverse thrust...why not for park brake????

[PantLoad]

Well, I always do a scan...a 'visual flow', so to speak...

On short final, I always scan the gear down indications, autobrake, Flaps/Slats, etc. and ZERO pressure on the brake pressure indicator. (Don't necessarily care about the actual position of the parking brake handle...

Just a personal thing...


PantLoad

[stormin norman]

Park brake on, reverse thrust in the air (see other thread) no wonder they stop so quick !

[SkyMiles]

What is strange about that story? If the Captain was the PF why was he "setting the flaps"? There are two pilots on the airplane with PF and PNF duties for a reason. Maybe he wanted to set the Autobrakes and instead went for the parking brakes. Putting bodies in the seats attitude will keep biting management's behind.

[dontdoit]

No, the Capt was PNF.... read the report !

[Right Way Up]

Skymiles
Wow :ugh::ugh:

[Tree]

During my first engine out SIM session on the Airbus I attempted to adjust the rudder trim with the untraditionally located park brake handle. Stuff happens when there are ergonomic issues involved during high workloads.

Yes I know it has to be located there so both pilots can access it.

[Farrell]

"Maybe he wanted to set the Autobrakes and instead went for the parking brakes."

I'm sorry......are you serious????

[grimmrad]

Quote The NR Fairy: I've seen pictures - can't remember where - of an American nuclear power station were some handles had beer taps on the from different brewers, so as to more rapidly and accurately identify them.

A simple non-software fix is at hand !

-------------

I am not sure if I should admire their creativity - or be afraid as hell, they are using beer taps in order to be able to handle a nuclear power plant.... What is worse, that they are using beer taps or that they had to use something like beer taps to distinguish handles...

[BYALPHAINDIA]

Why not add a bit of 'colour' to the Deck,

Parking Brake - White Sticker.
Landing Gear - Green Sticker.
Flaps Lever - Blue Sticker.
Speedbrake - YellowSticker.

This would make it easier to identify what is what just by colour markings.

It would be cheaper than blowing the Tyres!:ugh:

Regards.:ok:

[mohdawang]

Thank God it did not happen to a third world carrier...the insinuations about pilot incompetence would have been thunderous. As far as I remember airbus parking brake design can lead to some unforseen results especially when one try to use it instinctively.

[The Nr Fairy]

grimmrad:

I seem to recall that the picture showed a sea of beige, unbroken except for innumerable identical gauges, handles and knobs.

It was the operator's response to a situation which should have been designed out at birth, IMO, but I'm no psychologist nor an ergonomist.

If the humans are the weakest link, then Airbus and other manufacturers need to design in accordance with that. It seems to me that changing the shape of and (I don't recall from the report if it's the case) the motion required to set the parking brake is much more Murphy-proof.

[llondel]

Unless you've got a strict requirement to test everyone who might need to operate the aircraft for colour-blindness (including the maintenance people), it's not a good idea to colour-code controls. If you're in low-light conditions it's also not helpful. Tactile differences are far better.

[mustafagander]

llondel, I agree with you 100%. We rarely look that closely when we reach for a knob/lever. Tactile differences are much more likely to save our bacon. Take a look at a Boeing MSP and check out the knobs.

[permFO]

Why not have what the 737 had- a big red light that indicates when the park brake is on? Mind you the 737 has other issues to do with the ergonomics of the cockpit, but the park brake is not one of them.

[PAXboy]

non-pilot speaking
Tactile differences are far better.

On any of the occasions that I have visited a flight deck (operational or static) some of the main controls were tactile in their design. I recall my father showing me how the undercart (as they called it in his day) lever was shaped like a wheel so that you knew which lever you had in your hand.

If designers have started to use standard switches again then it looks like we are going to have to learn the lessons all over again.

[smudgethecat]

Paxboy, to be fair to Airbus they do not use "standard controls" the flap lever and the parking brake lever are nothing alike, and operate totally differently, the brake lever is lifted out of its detent and turned in a rotary direction to set the brake, i can undestand confusing the speed brake lever with the slat/ flap lever perhaps, but not the brake and flap/slat lever.

[Two's in]

Not underestimating the HF failures of the ergonomic layout, there are also confirmatory checks required that a control selection has been effective that may have prevented this - ie. the flap position would have shown that full flaps had not been selected. This guy was clearly distracted for a number of reasons, but the whole concept of CRM is that you are not acting alone. It's not like there were not other indications that something was not right in the cockpit. Before we redesign the Airbus, just consider how many thousand crews get this sequence of events right every single day.

[Krueger]

I know that this is a forum to speculate about aviation issues, but do we have any knowledge of the previous incidents where a similar problem occured?

I think we should like look to what was in the PNF mind to do such a thing.

I am Bus Driver and it's hard for me to get an explanation how could oneself mistake the flap lever for the parking brake. The levers are different, operate in different ways and give different indications (Landing memo would show flaps 3).

However, I agree on software change (ECAM) to indicate the pilots when parking brake is on without WoW.

Check Six krueger...

[Kiteflier]

I agree it seems hard to believe that the park brake was mistaken for the flap lever and the landing memo was disregared. But on the point of it not happening on a 737 . I agree it could not be mistaken, but I do remember years ago someone applying the park brake whilst airbourne for some reason and this led to another problem altogether, that is once set and released I believe the antiskid becomes inop. The fact that it may have been set earlier in the flight and flap full was still taken would mean that there would still be an appropriate landing memo.

[old,not bold]

It is obvious from many posts that there is justified disbelief that the error (operate park brake instead of flap lever, and not spot the warning) could happen at all.

But the point is that it has happened, because it can happen.

At the risk of being boringly repetitive, it is not enough simply to improve the chance of capturing the error prior to landing, as recommended by AAIB.

Action is needed to eliminate the possibility of the error occurring in the first place. Perhaps some or all operators have done that, by going well beyond the AAIB's recommendation.

But because of the financial consequences, perhaps not. In which case, the error WILL occur again. Let's hope that when it does the only consequence is some burst tyres. But what if the surface is very wet, maybe not even grooved?

[CJ Driver]

I am slightly surprised that people are suprised you can make this kind of error :-) Perhaps I am unusually dozy, but there are many "automatic motor actions" that I interchange on a regular basis. I have certainly, for example, picked up the coffee pot when I was looking for the frying pan, turned on the car windshield wipers when I meant to turn on the headlights, and to be more on topic, turned on the aircraft fuel boost pumps when I meant to turn on the ignitors.
The key is in identifying the error in the chain. For example, if the checklist calls for "igniters on", I reach over and flick a couple of switches. If the other pilot says - "Hey, the igniters are not on" - then we might go ahead and look again, and switch them on. BUT the other importnant task is to go back and determine - what the heck DID we turn on last time?
The same opportunity was present in the park brake incident. The PF called for the flaps, and PNF did an action. On later review, the PF noticed that the flaps were not set, and called for flaps again. The PNF selected flaps. The missed opportunity was to say - "Since it wasn't the flaps, I wonder what you did LAST time I called for flaps...". That may have got some much needed attention back inside the cockpit for a moment or two, and avoided an embarrassing rubber stripe down the runway.
This seems like an excellent CRM learning example.

[acbus1]

Four, not one, pilot errors occurred, as follows:

Error one - selected park brake on instead of flap.

Error two - failed to check that the selected flap position was actually achieved after selection.

Error three - after PF requested a repeat of the selection, failed to ask himself what he had actually selected previously if it wasn't flap.

Error four - if the Captain was so concerned about landing conditions at Leeds, he should have elected himself as PF for that sector. Basic command error.

One eror is unfortunate, two errors are careless, but four errors?


Wasn't "management", was he?

Bet if you gave me the pilots name he'd be on my list of "accidents waiting to happen". Unless he was someone I hadn't flown with before I left the sinking ship. Interesting how I have a much shorter list in my current airline.
The solution starts with the pilot selection process, of course. The whole sorry can of worms opens up, though, when you look at that.

The operator even called in a psychologist to help them with this aspect.
That wouldn't be the self proclaimed (delusional?) Appollo astronaut, Space Shuttle pilot, "consultant to every major aviation issue in the last twenty years" and "ace airliner pilot after two sim rides" would it? God help you.

In fairness, the psychologist comments (as far as quoted in the report) seem to be sensible (can't be the same bloke, then!). They are also extremely obvious. Wonder if I could get a job doing stating the obvious as a sideline? Easy money!

Watch this space. More like it to come, IMHO. (and don't anybody mention the Kegworth crash, emergency landing Luton without any oil in either engine, F27 crash EMA, attempting to fly LHR to MME with only a fraction of the required fuel, taking off with gear pins in, trying to take off from a taxyway or severe damage by hailstones which other operators avoided, to name but a few).

[IcePack]

ACBUS1 "Got an axe to grind with BMI then!" :rolleyes:

[I.C.Nosignal]

acbus1 has ground enough axes to chop down the amazon rain forest, he is an extremely disgruntled ex employee with a rather worrying personality flaw when it comes to getting over being given the push I would regard his opinions as the rantings of a rather sad individual

[Roy Bouchier]

Perhaps there are some of us here old enough to recall the moves necessary to get the gear and flaps in motion on a DC3.
We seem to have managed it well enough most of the time. But then we were from a different era.

[vs69]

Very interesting reading here and I would put money on that incident NOT being the last of its kind,as said further up the post,it happened because it COULD happen.One A340-600 operator (not VS which may narrow it down!) had a similair incident when the park brake was activated instead of the taxi camera,the switches are fairly close together on the centre console,oops.Several bangs later....Theres a pic on airliners.net for the curious,right where was I? Oh yes,whether it was intentionally designed to prevent little 'oops' moments or not I dont know but the B744 method of fully applying the brakes before being able to set the park brake seems more 'Murphy's' proof. (Thats the law,not the beer)

[Max Angle]

But then we were from a different era.Yeah, one that was far less safe than the present one.

[Dan Winterland]

Force of habit and not in our SOPs, I always check the residual brake pressures befroe landing. With two needles pointing at the '3' mark on the standby brakes, it would have been a big clue!

[4potflyer]

but the B744 method of fully applying the brakes before being able to set the park brake seems more 'Murphy's' proof

From what I recall it is the same in a humble Cessna 152, seems like a fundamentally good thing.

[acbus1]

ACBUS1 "Got an axe to grind with BMI then!"
Don't understand where that suggestion comes from!

I merely listed a combination of pilot errors which contributed (IMHO) to the incident. I was attempting to suggest that the incident was caused, in this instance, more by human error than defective design or ergonomics. The designers can attempt to design error out of the system (and I'm obviously in favour of that) but, in the end, it all boils down to having a minimum level of competence from the cockpit crew. Just my opinion, supported by a list of what I saw as obvious errors. At least I attempted to contribute to the thread topic, unlike those who seem to populate PPRuNe in order to berate contributors, rather than add to the discussion.


As an aside to the thread topic, I certainly do have an axe to grind with the authorities who permit unregulated involvement by psychologists. From my observations, backed by the opinions from the vast majority of colleagues, some of these individuals actually do the industry a disservice. There was a widespread opinion that one such individual was in urgent need of treatment and was certainly unsuitable for the job.

[Sleeve Wing]

ACBUS1.
Quote - "ACBUS1 "Got an axe to grind with BMI then!"

Certainly agree with your views on airlines' "tame" psychologists, particularly ones with an obsession about the mental powers of leeches !
Collecting a whole list of incidents though, dating back to the days when the airline was in its infancy, seems to reflect an unhealthy paranoia with your own weaknesses.
Could it be that you spent your whole time watching your back instead of confidently looking ahead and getting on with the job ( and your fellow crewmates ?)

Just a thought.
Don't let's get away from the thread though.

Rgds, Sleeve. :=

[acbus1]

Collecting a whole list of incidents though, dating back to the days when the airline was in its infancy...
The incidents I listed (though I did say not to mention them!) have occurred throughout the airline's history, not just in it's infancy. They are the ones I could recall with minimal effort. I can probably list more if you encourage me further.

They are fact and were included to ask the question....Is this part of a pattern, into which the topic incident fits?

Asking such questions is healthy, is it not? It is all part of the normal process of identifiying trends, bad habits, bad practices and system deficiencies. Only by identifying such will we ever improve air safety.

...an unhealthy paranoia with your own weaknesses.
I fail to see how listing incidents, with the motive stated above, reflects upon my own mental state. Bizzare conclusion!

Not a low grade psychologist are we, Sleeve Wing?

Could it be that you spent your whole time watching your back instead of confidently looking ahead and getting on with the job
Very definitely! Most colleagues of the time did the same! The vast majority would agree that such is the culture within bmi.

....and it isn't healthy, I agree completely!

[mccdatabase]

acbus1 has ground enough axes to chop down the amazon rain forest, he is an extremely disgruntled ex employee with a rather worrying personality flaw when it comes to getting over being given the push I would regard his opinions as the rantings of a rather sad individual
I would tend to agree with this statement, virtually all acbus1`s posts are attacks on bmi,their management and staff . The only conclusion any rational being can come to is that he/she has a vendetta agianst bmi and will use and distort any topic to try and badmouth bmi.
I must say it is all getting rather repetetive and tedious now , so come on acbus1 give it a rest!!
Lets face it ALL airlines have minor incidents from time to time ,happily the vast majority come to nothing and hysterical journos never get to hear about them, bmi has a safety culture that is up there with the best (as it rightly should be) and I find it distasteful in the extreme for ex employees to suggest that their former colleagues are less than professional and competant in any aspect of performance.
acbus1 you have a worrying and unhealthy obsession which you need to let go of, do yourself a favour and move on !

[Flap 5]

Whether acbus has an axe to grind or not is irrelevant to the four errors he puts forward. Please do not confuse the messenger with the message. Rediculing the messenger does not help and often hinders the message.

Checks and confirmations in the cockpit are there for a reason and this incident is one of many, with many airlines worldwide, why such checks are required. Hence when you select flap full you check that you achieve flap full on the ECAM.

[Desperate]

Wasn't "management", was he?
Bet if you gave me the pilots name he'd be on my list of "accidents waiting to happen". Unless he was someone I hadn't flown with before I left the sinking ship.
No, ACBus1, he isn't management.

Just a very good line captain, decent bloke, excellent CRM etc and certainly wouldn't feature on anyone's list of an accident waiting to happen. In fact I can't think of a single pilot - in either seat - who would fit that particular bill. As for watching your back - we're getting shafted far more by balpa than we are by the company! And no, I'm not management either.

As others have said: If it can happen, it will.

[angrymanc1]

I recall an incident identical to this back around 1992/3 on 27L at LHR. I was at the time an apprentice engineer with BA. I attended the scene to recover a Lufthansa A320, it had blown 3 of the 4 mainwheels (numbers 2, 3, & 4), and the 4th was not in a very good way. The 3 axles carrying the burst mainwheels also saw extreme damage to the brake units, worn completely flat through almost 50% of their diameter, the aircraft gouged 3 'trenches' down the runway, and took us several hours to clear, using crocodile jacks, main aircraft jacks, and bags, big mess, fortunately no-one was hurt, although the trolley dollies stood taking pictures of the one remaining inflated tire were lucky to escape harm as that one could have blown at any time.
It strikes me as ludicrous that you can select the park brake on whilst the aircraft is airborne, what purpose does that serve - maybe a pit stop in the sky ???? But that's airbus for you, I am currently a B2 certifier on these types and find many strange anolomies, another example is the RAT deploy switch, which is a guarded switch identical in size, shape, and action as well as very similar location to the emergency gen test switch, the only difference being colour of the guard. And on numerous occasions whilst carrying out hangar checks has the RAT been deployed instead of the emergency generator test being initiated, the question I am asking is why should that system need to be live on the ground ? You would hardly want to deploy the RAT in 'anger' whilst on the ground now would you ????

[Red Top Comanche]

How does it go on your initial training

Brakes off, undercarriage down and locked...........

Even my wife can recite it.

:bored:

[acbus1]

Thanks for the info Desperate. Always seemed to me that the good blokes in bmi were the ones who were victimised the most. Bullies out to score brownie points in the eyes of their Lords and Masters always go for the easy targets and the good blokes are often regarded as such (and often are in fact).

As for your comments regarding BALPA, I'd agree with you wholeheartedly on that. A decent replacement for BALPA would go a long way towards solving a lot of the problems. BALPA are beyond salvage, unfortunately. Equally unfortunately, the bmi pilot workforce has got what it deserves in that respect.

.....you have mentioned a few incidents.....
I've got twelve more bmi ones! Took me all of a couple of minutes to recall them. I'm sure there are more.

Still, there's a lot of objections, justified or not, to all these facts I'm posting, so I'll save myself the time and effort and let my previous posts and future events do the talking for me.

[Check Airman]

Gents,

I'm not an A320 pilot, but I have some idea of the layout. Even on the older planes without the software mod, isn't it true that the ECAM memo would show an amber PARK BRAKE? In this case, how can a contributing factor be that the crew did not check the right side of the ECAM, only the left? It's the same screen for heaven's sake!! I'd imagine that even if the msg was in green, they'd have picked up on it.

I really don't see what good the it will do to write in a manual "remember to check the lower right side of the ECAM". I don't see how a crew can not check the right side of the ECAM. I'm going to have to call BS on that one. To me, it's a bit like a piston pilot saying "I checked the oil pressure was a bit high, but I did not check the adjacent oil temperature gauge". Anyone care to comment or correct me? I'd be really interested to get another view on this.

[smudgethecat]

Correct, he would have that msg on the upper screen, he would also of course have brake pressure indicated on his brake pressure /accum gauge

[Popster]

how can a contributing factor be that the crew did not check the right side of the ECAM, only the left? It's the same screen for heaven's sake!! I'd imagine that even if the msg was in green, they'd have picked up on it
Yes, some that weren't there or haven't done it (yet) would think so but the crew didn't pick up on the memo on the day, and that is a mistake all can be sure that they will never make again.
It might not help that because of fuel saving priorities, bmi commonly taxi out with only one pack running. The second is switched on as the Before Take-off checklist below the line is called for thus displaying a [sts] on the EWD until then.
The predictive windshear is also not switched to auto until this part of the checklist so generating an Amber annunciation on the EWD.
Therefore when calling for the Before Take-off Checklist to the line, the last item - ECAM Take-off Memo......... Response ...... Normal
is correct with [sts] and an Amber msg! And this before every departure.
So seeing a bit of amber on the EWD before landing and it passing the awareness threshold of the pilots when lots else was happening.........?

[Firestorm]

Check Airman: surely your cross check of the ECAM message and the brake lever position comes under the general heading of 'common sense' or to us aviators 'airmanship'? Or is it one of those things that we now have to be taught as CRM or as it's about to be known TEM (Threat Error Management)? :uhoh:

[TyroPicard]

I hate to be picky - but I'm going to be - it's the Slat position that controls the Centre Tank Pumps in Auto, not the Flap lever.
Cheers, TP

[permFO]

It also happened on 5 other occasions, so to simply say that the crew should know better misses the point that the design and location of the park brake is at fault. Does it happen in other Airbus aircraft? If it doesn't then the problem is equally the fault of the aircraft itself.

[Check Airman]

I think I can better understand this incident given what Popster has introduced. It can't be good to have "abnormal" messages being displayed as part of normal ops. The stupid things some airlines do to save a few quid. I'm sure that incident has totally negated any savings. If Airbus designed the plane to go out with those systems off, they wouldn't have memo's up. I'd be very uncomfortable calling "checklist complete" with an amber message right in front of me. In this context, it's easy to understand why they'd try to land with an amber message. Wonder if they ever tried to take off with the parking brake set?

What's the purpose of turning off the predictive windshear before takeoff???

One final question is, if this is really how BMI does it, why didn't the report list it as a factor? It makes a hell of a lot more sense than saying that they never checked the right ECAM:ugh:

[smudgethecat]

permFO ,i dont wish to sound rude but you really are talking rubbish, and one can only assume you have never been on the 320/21 flightdeck let alone operated the controls, the parking brake bears no
resemblance either in design or fuction to the slat/flap lever. The parking brake is located in the same postion as on every other aircraft ive ever worked on boeing or airbus, ie on the centre pedastal left hand side, and is operated by lifting it out of its detent and turning it thro 90 degrees to set, the flap /slat lever is a conventional looking lever operating in the normal way up and down a slotted gate, and to say you could confuse the two is stretching things a tad far, whatever circumstances led to this unfortunate incident it wasnt shortcomings in aircraft control layout, the only real difference i would say in the 321/330 parking brake system is as it operated electricaly you do not have to depress the brake pedals before setting the brake as you would on a 757 for example

[old-timer]

BUMPFICH checks ! - works for me but I'm just an old timer ...ok, skip the mixture & pitch part for heavy turbines but it's a handy aid-memoir.
Progress is learning-going forward but not forgetting the obvious along the way.....exits stage left awaiting abuse from the crowd.....?

[Popster]

Check Airman - Just to clarify that the PWS switch in the off position, with engines running, produces an amber caption. It is always turned on just before Take-off, but after the checklist item mentioned.


I have been taught that when acting as PNF, a simple method of ensuring that flaps move when you think that they did, is to keep your hand on the lever until observing the new setting has been reached, then remove hand and call it. It works -- so far!

[Check Airman]

Popster,

I understand that the PWS being off would cause a caution message, but I'd like to know why they would want it off in the first place? Most folks leave it on.

[acbus1]

Just to clarify, I don't claim to be perfect, I do agree that mistakes will happen and I definitely applaud sensible adjustments to procedures to prevent a repetition of mistakes.

Now thats an idea.....do you want me to explore bmi's reaction to previous incidents, then? Very interesting, some of those are!

One of my points (which, I repeat, I originally said "not to mention") was that any airline which is infested with an arguably abnormal number of mistakes and incidents deserves to have some very fundamental questions asked of it.

Seems as if the majority here aren't willing to consider asking those questions in this case, or, more interestingly, would prefer them ignored.

I certainly won't be expecting the CAA to get excited any century soon! Pigs might crash first.


flapsfullretard, you have me worried. I haven't received a penny in salary as "armchair MD"! But then, that's typical. It's also the first area demanding attention if you think about it....if you pay peanuts you end up employing nothing but monkeys. The guys with brains soon move on to better salaries and better terms and conditions.

So I herewith resign as armchair MD of bmi, before they make a monkey out of me!

I enjoyed that! Now I've resigned twice from bmi. Does any man deserve such pleasure in one lifetime?

[ex-rotaree]

Shurely shome mishtake old-timer and Red Top Comanche?

Mixture, fuel, flaps, harness, hood, brakes or My Friend Fred Has Hairy Balls!;)

[I.C.Nosignal]

airline which is infested with an arguably abnormal number of mistakes and incidents deserves to have some very fundamental questions asked of it.

What absolute bollo*ks
Now I've resigned twice from bmi
Did he jump or was he pushed (again!) ?

[Dan Winterland]

I was talking with my colleagues about this incident and one of them mention that one day, he found the parking brake on in flight where neither pilot could remember setting it, or for that matter wnting it on in flight. They summised that it was as a result of the cabin crew's habit of putting food trays on the centre pedestal. It got set when a tray was removed.

I don't like the practice and I tell our crew not to do it. And in fact in my previous airline it was a big no no after a 747 had full aileron trim applied in flight for the very same reason. (This only becomes apparent when you click the autopilot out. At 500' in this case, which made for a very interesting landing!)

My company's SOPs has us confirming the autobrake setting when the PM confirms the gear is down. I add my own check of the triple indicator which is a habit which stems from the check list of my first training type. This would immediately warn you that the park brake was set.

[Steve R]

It has been a while since I flew grand aeroplanes, but in my day we had a little gauge by which we could tell whether landing flap had been selected.

Though it was a boring little thing with neither fancy flashing lights nor glowing cursor, not even a fancy name, it was, non the less, fully a multi functional device.

Not only would it tell us that we had acheived our ambition with regard to the current flap lever position, it would tell us all sorts of other flap positions, maybe even that the flaps were, or more significantly, were not in transit immediately following a selection.

We were required to look at it in order to read it, though I have to admit, legally speaking, looking was not written down as a check list item.

Perhaps things had not developed to quite such a complicated level in my time.

Selected brakes instead of flaps? That is not a crime. We all make/made such mistakes.

Didn't check that operating the switch had acheived the expected result?

Now thats a crime, even at LBA , even with a wet runway, even with 30kt fog from 90 degrees.

[Tree]

permFO ,i dont wish to sound rude but you really are talking rubbish, and one can only assume you have never been on the 320/21 flightdeck let alone operated the controls, the parking brake bears no
resemblance either in design or fuction to the slat/flap lever. The parking brake is located in the same postion as on every other aircraft ive ever worked on boeing or airbus, ie on the centre pedastal left hand side, and is operated by lifting it out of its detent and turning it thro 90 degrees to set, the flap /slat lever is a conventional looking lever operating in the normal way up and down a slotted gate, and to say you could confuse the two is stretching things a tad far, whatever circumstances led to this unfortunate incident it wasnt shortcomings in aircraft control layout, the only real difference i would say in the 321/330 parking brake system is as it operated electricaly you do not have to depress the brake pedals before setting the brake as you would on a 757 for example


Well, someone must have moved ours. It's in the centre and much further back than on every other aircraft ive (sic) ever worked on. And the flap and speedbrake levers are much further aft than on every other aircraft I have worked on (out of normal line of sight, out of sight- out of mind)

[zeus_737]

(All on the sim so please don't freak)

WE have personaly tried setting the PrkBrk inflight and then continuing the approach. and all the way down till 200AGL We didn't recieve any Ecam Warning. And Finally we released the PB and continued landing without any residual pressure. only to prove tht it is a very likely phenomena tht a CApt might Reply bk to the Challange of " Ecam Memo" as "Landing No Blue" but totally ignore the PrkBrk Memo on the Memo Panel on the E/WD.

As a cross check a personal option i employ is at the 400 AGL
I check The wind to confirm any Tail or x wind. And the memo on the E/WD for the following

L dg Inhibit
I gnition
L dg lights
A auto brake

I call it the LILA Check. anythin out of the ordinary and it strikes u immediately.

It is a very sad thing for somethin like this to happen to a crew... and it is even sadder tht our fellow crew could actually say...U gotta be stupid to set the PB inflight..its not stupid cuz u didn't do it intentionally and no excuses but could happen...