British Airways Incident at Johannesburg
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contributing factors
OverRun you came first with the clarification of the terms Taxiway and Taxilane, had it on my scribble sheet too.
But hinting towards ICAO standards is also hinting towards the shortcomings in the airport companys responsibility and probable short coming in ATC vigilance.
Missing at that infamous taxiway split -at least in night operation- is
a) a Mandatory Instruction Marking (ICAO Annex 14 Ch. 5 Pt. 5.2.16) on the centreline of Twy "B" ahead of the 30 deg. turn, with an bright arrow pointing left towards 03L holding position.
b) an Information Marking (ICAO Annex14 Ch. 5 Pt. 5.2.17) on the entry to Twy "M", just behind the perimeter of Twy "B", indicating "Max Wingspan XX m".
c) an Enhanced Centreline Marking (ICAO Annex 14 Ch. 5 Pt. 5.2.8.9) leading towards the first holding position marking on Twy "B".
Okay one can say the necessary length of the latter is not ICAO standard on Twy "B", but ICAO allows for deviations of itīs Standards hence they deem necessary and become published in amendments.
There was an entry in this thread about ATC being unable to visually see the mishap happen in a dark night and over a distance of approx. 2500 m. Well, probably that is correct, probably it is not. And if so, what about the Airport Radar Antenna shown on some pictures on top of the TWR. Is that just a fake one ?? Was it running ?? Did anyone watch that - as was said here too - unusual movement at night on a screen ?? What so ever, this problem area for night operation must be known to any one working as a qualified Ground or Tower Controller and should have watched that special movement closely. At least that is how I learned that job and what I got paid for many years.
Finally, what should that early take off clearance - also mentioned earlier in this thread - be good for in that environment ?? Just another distraction and probably felt pressure to rush on side of the crew "because of possible inbound traffic ATC wants us to be airborne ahead of "
Looking foreward to the official investigation findings of this accident.
But hinting towards ICAO standards is also hinting towards the shortcomings in the airport companys responsibility and probable short coming in ATC vigilance.
Missing at that infamous taxiway split -at least in night operation- is
a) a Mandatory Instruction Marking (ICAO Annex 14 Ch. 5 Pt. 5.2.16) on the centreline of Twy "B" ahead of the 30 deg. turn, with an bright arrow pointing left towards 03L holding position.
b) an Information Marking (ICAO Annex14 Ch. 5 Pt. 5.2.17) on the entry to Twy "M", just behind the perimeter of Twy "B", indicating "Max Wingspan XX m".
c) an Enhanced Centreline Marking (ICAO Annex 14 Ch. 5 Pt. 5.2.8.9) leading towards the first holding position marking on Twy "B".
Okay one can say the necessary length of the latter is not ICAO standard on Twy "B", but ICAO allows for deviations of itīs Standards hence they deem necessary and become published in amendments.
There was an entry in this thread about ATC being unable to visually see the mishap happen in a dark night and over a distance of approx. 2500 m. Well, probably that is correct, probably it is not. And if so, what about the Airport Radar Antenna shown on some pictures on top of the TWR. Is that just a fake one ?? Was it running ?? Did anyone watch that - as was said here too - unusual movement at night on a screen ?? What so ever, this problem area for night operation must be known to any one working as a qualified Ground or Tower Controller and should have watched that special movement closely. At least that is how I learned that job and what I got paid for many years.
Finally, what should that early take off clearance - also mentioned earlier in this thread - be good for in that environment ?? Just another distraction and probably felt pressure to rush on side of the crew "because of possible inbound traffic ATC wants us to be airborne ahead of "
Looking foreward to the official investigation findings of this accident.
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I think that if you seriously want ATC to continously monitor the progress of all taxying aircraft at a busy airport, that will require a fair number of additional staff.
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HT
That is exactly what I didnīt say. I continue to believe that this special movement at that special spot on the aerodrome required a close and vigilent monitoring.
And I hope that you donīt want me to believe that now a days controllers issue a clearance and than forget the entire case ???
I am sure we both know that there is a wide field of adequate working skills to fulfill the job to the benefits of aviation safety.
And I hope that you donīt want me to believe that now a days controllers issue a clearance and than forget the entire case ???
I am sure we both know that there is a wide field of adequate working skills to fulfill the job to the benefits of aviation safety.
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hifly787
I appreciate your approach to relief ATC of part of its responsibilities. But the task description in ICAO DOC 4444; Ch. 7; Pt. 7.1.1.1 - 7.1.1.3 says different.
I am also very well aware of the factual legalities for the crew.
Finally, the amount of traffic - as far as I can check the scheduled traffic - at the time of the accident does not withhold a closer watch of that specific movement.
I do agree that nobody is perfect and cases like this classic "Murphyīs Law Nr. 1 " will continue to happen.
I am also very well aware of the factual legalities for the crew.
Finally, the amount of traffic - as far as I can check the scheduled traffic - at the time of the accident does not withhold a closer watch of that specific movement.
I do agree that nobody is perfect and cases like this classic "Murphyīs Law Nr. 1 " will continue to happen.
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Overun ; Thanks. But, note BOAC's submision (Post 384) which shows that the GMC refers to taxilane M. Thanks BOAC. Actually, I was pursuaded by previous posters referring to taxilane M rather than Taxiway M. My ageing "Dancer" computer system is regularly defeated by requests for Google search for the GMC chart.
Anyway, knowledge of all this is mandatory. The fact that it was dark, black hole, can't see, etc , is irrelevant. Knowledge that TaxiWAY B leads straight into TAXILANE M which leads to APRON M is highly relevant & should be briefed for crew awareness.
Anyway, knowledge of all this is mandatory. The fact that it was dark, black hole, can't see, etc , is irrelevant. Knowledge that TaxiWAY B leads straight into TAXILANE M which leads to APRON M is highly relevant & should be briefed for crew awareness.
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Look...this is really simple
1. Were the taxying instructions clear and concise?
2. Did the taxying plate available to the crew accurately reflect the physical layout and instructions/cautions on the Ground Movements Chart amended ten days before the accident and does that latter chart accurately reflect the physical layout and other hazards?
3. Do the lights and signage at the Bravo/Mike intersection comply with ICAO standards and in particular are they visible and clear at night and/or inclement weather if switched on and functioning?
4. Were they switched on and functioning?
If the answer to all the above is yes, and you are 100% sure they are yes, then there are no external mitigating circumstances that I can think of. If the answer to one or more of the above is no - well then there are contributory external factors.
How hard can it be?
Slowjet: the link is:
http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20cent...DEC%202013.pdf
2. Did the taxying plate available to the crew accurately reflect the physical layout and instructions/cautions on the Ground Movements Chart amended ten days before the accident and does that latter chart accurately reflect the physical layout and other hazards?
3. Do the lights and signage at the Bravo/Mike intersection comply with ICAO standards and in particular are they visible and clear at night and/or inclement weather if switched on and functioning?
4. Were they switched on and functioning?
If the answer to all the above is yes, and you are 100% sure they are yes, then there are no external mitigating circumstances that I can think of. If the answer to one or more of the above is no - well then there are contributory external factors.
How hard can it be?
Slowjet: the link is:
http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20cent...DEC%202013.pdf
Last edited by Pinkman; 30th Dec 2013 at 17:06.
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Both SAA and Atlas have extensive engineering facilities on site which should be fully capable of repairing the damage.
What actually happens will be a more complex financial decision, it could for example be patched up for a ferry flight to a facility where it could be either fully refurbished or broken up for spares. The bean counters will decide.
What actually happens will be a more complex financial decision, it could for example be patched up for a ferry flight to a facility where it could be either fully refurbished or broken up for spares. The bean counters will decide.
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Jo, that mandatory signage you mentioned a couple of posts back, seems to have been introduced around 2009 with the intention of reducing Runway Incursions. Does this signage have to be installed for all other "hardstrips" (or vehicleways) as well?
Quote:
What's happening the aircraft re it's future?
reply:
Plenty of debate about that in previous posts - which presumably you have read ?
i think Dave the poster maybe implying there's ''Pprune debate'' and then there is 'debate'...
and then there are 'facts from reliable sources' lol (which so far there has been no factual info about anything related to this 747 as yet from any official source) except on CAA Website press release 23 Dec soon after the accident.
What's happening the aircraft re it's future?
reply:
Plenty of debate about that in previous posts - which presumably you have read ?
i think Dave the poster maybe implying there's ''Pprune debate'' and then there is 'debate'...
and then there are 'facts from reliable sources' lol (which so far there has been no factual info about anything related to this 747 as yet from any official source) except on CAA Website press release 23 Dec soon after the accident.
Last edited by rog747; 30th Dec 2013 at 12:12.
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from any official source) except on CAA Website press release 23 Dec soon after the accident.
...
so it seems, yes, i have read what was discussed about lane v.v. way
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Gerald D
No as I take it from the ICAO Docīs. This Mandatory Instruction Marking is intended either as a substitute for the basic Mandatory Instruction Sighns or, in specific wide taxiway (60 m) cases or on large paved areas as a supplement to the installed MISīs.
Since I havnīt found any hint on an existing sighn(s) - except for the holding position markings - guiding the taxiing traffic to the correct holding position at threshold 03L it deems feasable to have that marking painted on the centreline ahead of the bend, admittantly on a "stretched" position in regard to the holding markings on Twy "B".
Finally a functioning Information sighn or Information Marking might be as helpful at that position, but that exists neither.
Since I havnīt found any hint on an existing sighn(s) - except for the holding position markings - guiding the taxiing traffic to the correct holding position at threshold 03L it deems feasable to have that marking painted on the centreline ahead of the bend, admittantly on a "stretched" position in regard to the holding markings on Twy "B".
Finally a functioning Information sighn or Information Marking might be as helpful at that position, but that exists neither.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Where airfields appearto 'fail' in provisioning safe signage it has to default to the operators to provide adequate briefing material to crews where needed and, of course, for crews to acquaint themselves of such AND be alert to any dangers at all times.
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If it is very dark, how about landing lights briefly on for a quick better look-ahead(around). Nothing says that you must only have the taxi light on.
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Desert185:
The problem with turming on lights is that is can destroy your night vision.
This could mean that you do not see an unlit building on your right ..........
As always, damned if you do, damned if you dont.
The problem with turming on lights is that is can destroy your night vision.
This could mean that you do not see an unlit building on your right ..........
As always, damned if you do, damned if you dont.