nedeljniknin on Instagram has a video recorded by passenger.

They are all lucky to be alive.

Well, CVR transcript will make an interesting reading, me thinks... Especially with some 'rumors' on CRM and attitude issues.

For me this transmission will explain a lot "yes tora is two two actually sorry tora is one two seven three meters i assume that's not enough"
* preceding comm's were: initial ATC taxi instruction to D6 / pilot reporting approaching D6 / ATC explicit line-up via D6 instruction
* "yes" as an answer to "are you familiar that you entered runway via D5" is a big fat lie, being caught red handed making a (excusable) mistake. But more importantly, this is the start of a continued "face loss" cover up, digging one's hole deeper and deeper
* "tora is two two actually..." continued face loss avoidance, reading on the spot some EFB data which clearly was not briefed beforehand. The only 22xx TORA on the airfield is D5 for the opposite runway (12R)
* "actually sorry tora is one two seven three meters" quickly correcting on the spot the reading of EFB data, and getting the correct 30L TORA (once more confirming this was NOT briefed before by the crew - as never planned on using D5)
* "i assume that's not enough" this is not passing on to ATC the decision of T/O rwy length required (which is of course totally and technically impossible). This is simply the mouth voicing what the startled brain concluded (and concluded correctly if I might add).
From there on, the hole digging continued. I wonder from that moment on, what exactly went on in the cockpit CRM wise, switching in a hurry from standard OPS, to short field OPS with a full pax load and (hopefully) a moderate fuel load.
EDIT: too many doubts about interpretation of ATC recording and who is transmitting what.

OK, I've put on my flak-vest now...so here we go.
In a way I somewhat agree with one much criticized poster, not that ATC has in any way any T/O rwy length responsibility nor authority, as long as there are no published restrictions on intersection use. (wouldn't be surprised to see in future some restrictions published on D5 intersection use - potentially dangerous for 30L and of no use in the 12R context.)
But ATC do has controlling responsibility and after at least 5 instructions/confirmations on D6, answering "YES" to "are you familiar that you entered runway via D5" is a big NO, NO. Especially with traffic already lining/lined up via D7 as no. 2, this D5 confusion on the runway, delaying the release of the D7 traffic. If the response was "aah sorry, my mistake" and no other traffic near or on the rwy, then some patience and leniency would be in place. But with this smartass answer, "vacate rwy, taxi down A to D6 holding point as no. 2" would be in place. Nothing to do with hindsight, everything to do with smartass control.

One thing that ATC may be open to criticism for, is the use or lack of stop bars. Was D5 stop bar lit, does it even have them? Shades of the recent Tokyo crash perhaps. Not heard of any mention of this factor so far here. For example I’d like to think this event wouldn’t happen in the UK, where stop bar use and obedience is meticulous.

installed yes, in use (most likely) no, as weather was CAVOK

Listening to the audio linked in post #74, where is the takeoff clearance for 86C? I hear the LUAW at D6, the incorrect D5 entry, the discussion of TORA from D5, and the offer to backtrack to D6. Next heard is “86C, is everything OK?”

Back in 2005 I was taking a checkride in a C-17. For those who don’t know, the C-17 is a heavy 4 engine military transport that can takeoff at close to 600,000 lbs. it has a STOL capability that allows us to takeoff and land on a 3500 ft (1066 meters) runway. We were flying into Richmond Virginia and asked for a visual approach to Runway 25 to accomplish an assault landing. Rwy 25 was only 5000 x 50 ft long/wide. ATC cleared us for the approach, but then he asked what type of aircraft? We told him a “C-17” He then asked if that was a type of Cessna. We told him we were a heavy 4 engine jet transport. He then informed us that Rwy 25 was very short and only 50 ft wide. We told him we were aware of that and the jet was more than capable of landing on that runway . He asked us again, and then resigned himself to watch our approach. He was obviously uncomfortable about this scenario, but we explained yet again we were cognizant of the runways dimensions. He was amazed after we landed with room to spare. I still remember how concerned he was and we thanked him for his professionalism and concern that day.
It seems like the ATC controllers in this incident went above and beyond to inform the crew of the Embraer of his concerns as well.

Thanks for the info. Chilling to see, and a long time after tail strike till they got out of ground effect / off the grass.

The recording is missing ta few transmissions ,the usual thing with spotters hand held recordings posted on Internet right after an accident . Hence my standard reservations on using those to post "blaming " comments . .. There was a take off clearance issued.

A 195 would be able to takeoff with 1250 meter using ECS off and static takeoff, given it is not at max t/o weight.

However, that would require the highest flap setting for T/O which doesn’t appear to be the case judging from the on board video.

I think it was ATC who said "I assume that's not enough", not the pilot. Sound recording is cut off and pilot responses at that time are not included.

here it is


"In a way I somewhat agree with one much criticized poster, not that ATC has in any way any T/O rwy length responsibility nor authority"

hah I agree about that and I agree that ATC is not accountable here, but somehow it's just another redundancy step that one could expect here from an experienced ATC(bear in mind not a single jet airliner has ever took off from that position), confused pilot going to the wrong position cutting his runway for 1 whole kilometer and saying "2-2 no 1-2" would ring an alarm and just telling the pilot "please go back to default position"(no reasons needed) would have prevented all of this

It would seem that AreOut has changed his tune a little but still wants to attribute some blame on the controller. He talks of what an experienced controller may have done. Now I only listened to the ATC tape once, but I thought that it was first a youngish female controller handling the traffic (possibly a trainee) and that at the point the aircraft entered via D5 an older sounding male controller stepped in. Was that not so? If I'm correct that would be her coach who, by definition, would be experienced. If a pilot states that he can take it from that position it is not for the controller to enter into an argument with him.

My take is that all blame lies with the Captain of that flight. He is in command and he should know where he is. He was given an adequate wake up call which, for reasons only known to him, he appeared to ignore. As also mentioned, the CRM aspect will be interesting, if the recording still exists that is!

The redundancy step was re-iterating the position and TORA and double-checking they were happy to accept. What do you want next, controllers thinking a crosswind approach looks a bit dodgy and instructing the pilot to go-around because they saw a tail strike once? You have to trust that a pilot knows what their plane is (and isn’t) capable of, and how to fly it, or the system doesn’t work.

When you read performance from the magazine
https://www.flyingmag.com/embraer-e1...n%20in%202025.

Unfortunately your argument has no validity whatsoever. You don't seem to be able to grasp the fundamental point which is that, further to what he already did, it was not the controller's call to fly the airplane on behalf of the pilot. Please try hard to understand that and stop flogging a dead horse.

How do we know that no E195 has ever taken off from there? We do know that the TORA was 1,273 metres. Is that not enough in the right conditions?

I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.

I think you're still better off, reading performance on pprune ;)

BTW, article is about the -E2 generation, new, better, larger wing, performance not comparable to the -E1 (as in this incident)

different plane (E2)

Equally, how many people have actually seen max performance takeoffs of modern jets? Just because you watch someone use 1700-1800 metres to take off as standard doesn’t mean the aircraft isn’t capable of doing a lot better. If the pilot says they can do it, who are you to disagree? For an ATCO to even police the takeoff in the way being suggested requires so many assumptions about things they’d never know - or be expected to know - that it’s not even close to being reasonable.

A large proportion of EGLC movements are still E190s (and still include E1s) and the published TORA is still 1199m. And off runway 27 the climb out needs to clear Canary Wharf, which implies a slightly better rate of climb is available on the E190 there than the E195 showed here.